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PLATO

REPUBLIC

BOOKS 1–5

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY

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AND

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION

Republic is the most widely known and in many ways the most important dialogue of Plato (ca. 429–347 BC).¹ It is a work of Plato's middle maturity, a "staging post," consolidating and expanding political, ethical, psychological, and metaphysical ideas explored in earlier dialogues, notably *Gorgias*, *Meno*, and *Phaedo*, all dating probably to the middle to late 380s. It also incorporates basic ideas concerning human goodness and knowledge which go back further still to the earliest *aporetic* dialogues (dialogues without positive outcome) probably composed in the 390s.

The title, *Republic*, is the traditional but misleading English translation, derived from the Latin, of Cicero's *De Republica*. The Greek title is *Politeia*, more accurately rendered "The State," "Citizenship," or "Government." *Politeia* has a much broader semantic range than our "government" and denotes both an institution and the behavior, activities, customs, and traditions of the people in it. The dialogue is cited by name by Aristotle (384–322) at *Politics* 2.1261a6. The subtitle "or *On Justice*" found in a

¹ All dates will be BC unless otherwise stated.

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number of MSS may have been added by the scholar Thrasyllos of Alexandria (d. AD 36), to whom is also ascribed the organization of Plato's dialogues into tetralogies.

Perhaps more than any other philosophical work, Plato's *Republic* has been subject to a variety of different and often mutually contradictory interpretations: a foundation of idealist metaphysics for Neoplatonist and early Christian thinkers who tended to give prominence to the theory of Forms (*Resp.* 6, 7, and 10) and to emphasize the more metaphysically oriented of Plato's dialogues such as *Timaeus*. For the Stoics, on the other hand, e.g., Zeno (*Republic*) and Cicero (*De Republica*), *Republic* was a source of not uncritical interest for its revolutionary political content. Since the Renaissance, *Republic* has rarely been absent from broadly based debates concerning the political and ethical basis of the ideal state, from Thomas More's *Utopia* in the sixteenth century AD to Victorian political idealism in the nineteenth;² and in the twentieth century severe critiques of Plato's totalitarian state by e.g., R. H. S. Crossman and notably K. Popper³ are offset by the interpretation of *Republic* by L. Strauss and his followers as an impossibility ironically conceived.⁴

Republic's unique ability to reflect so many radically different philosophical visions stems from the nature of the work. Exceeded in length only by Plato's last work, *Laws*, *Republic* consists of an extensive and leisurely ex-

² Jenkyns, *Victorians and Ancient Greece*, 227ff.

³ Crossman, *Plato Today*; Popper, *Open Society*.

⁴ Strauss, *City and Man*; Bloom, *Republic of Plato*. (On the afterlife of *Republic*, see further the introduction to vol. 2, section 3).

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ploration, in ten books,⁵ of the nature of justice and what constitutes living the good life. Ostensibly the construction of a “Kallipolis” (“beautiful,” or “fine city”), the purpose and aims of *Republic* are nevertheless far from straightforwardly expressed. There are two basic tensions in the work: the first between practical proposals for the founding of a state and a utopian fantasy, a “blueprint” or “thought experiment” which Socrates, the main speaker of the dialogue, hints may not be practicable (e.g., 9.592a9–b6). The second tension concerns the focus of the key concept of “justice.” The Greek words translated by “justice” (*dikē*, *dikaiosunē*, *to dikaion*)⁶ have a much wider semantic range than the English word, and indicate both external relationships, e.g., between individuals and communities, and also describe the inner state of the individual: “justice” as a kind of inner, or psychological, harmony.⁷ This tension between external and internal justice,

⁵ The division of *Republic* into “books” was almost certainly not made by Plato himself, but at some later date in the history of transmission. These divisions usually correspond roughly to divisions in the subject matter, but not always, e.g., Books 1–2, where the dramatic structure indicates a clear break at 2.368c4 (see note ad loc.).

⁶ Distinctions in meaning between *dikē* and its cognates are often hard to establish in translation. In particular *dikaiosunē* and *to dikaion* (literally “the just thing”) are often used almost interchangeably, e.g., 336a10, where, however, Socrates, in using the words in close proximity, may be making a distinction between a more abstract concept and a practical application (“justice” and “doing what is just”).

⁷ Translators sometimes render *dikē* and its cognates as “morality” (Waterfield, *Plato, Republic*), or “right” (Lee, *Plato: The*

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and uncertainty about where Plato intends that the emphasis should lie, pervades the whole dialogue, (see especially below, the introduction to Books 1–5, section 2 (iii), and the introduction to volume 2, section 2 (ii)).

2. THE COMPOSITION OF *REPUBLIC*

Despite the absence of absolute dating criteria for this or any other Platonic dialogue, there is general agreement that *Republic* was composed (or reached its final form) in the mid-370s, before Plato's second visit to Sicily. There is also a rough consensus that the dialogue is to be placed in Plato's late "middle period" (after *Symposium* but before *Theaetetus*).⁸ More controversial than relative chronology is how *Republic* relates in compositional terms to the dialogues which precede it. It undoubtedly reflects or sums up many issues and doctrines in Plato's earlier thought and

Republic). The implied anachronism in such renderings (there is, notoriously, no Greek equivalent for "morality") makes a consistent use of the literal rendering the most satisfactory, as in e.g., Reeve, *Plato, Republic*, and in the translation presented here.

⁸ See the Chronology of Plato's Life and Works (p. xxvii). Precision on absolute dates and relative chronology is not possible. While there is rough agreement that the dialogues can be divided up into early, middle, and late, there is lively debate over the exact order and methods of composition. Basic tools of analysis include stylometrics (Brandwood, *Chronology of Plato's Dialogues*), development of Plato's thought (Vlastos, *Socrates*), and methods of composition (Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology*). See also Kahn, "On Platonic Chronology"; Irwin, "The Platonic Corpus."

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can be seen as an important landmark in Plato's philosophical development up to that point. A doctrine such as the theory of separable Forms or Ideas, central to Plato's development of the idea of the true philosopher in Books 6-7 and 10, has its anticipation in middle-period dialogues written before *Republic*, e.g., *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and *Symposium*. Continuity is, however, balanced by change: in its tripartite model of the human soul (*psuchē*) in Book 4, separating intellect and emotion and appetite in the individual, *Republic* represents what appears to be a departure from the Socratic intellectualism of the earlier dialogues, the assertion that virtue is knowledge and nobody does wrong intentionally (e.g., *Apology* 25e5ff., *Protagoras* 358c).⁹ It is also notable that the dialogues which follow *Republic* tend to develop in very different ways from those which precede it.

A work as large as *Republic* was doubtless a long time in gestation; it has been speculated that the roots of *Republic* 2-5, which include the theories of the extended role of the women in the state and the disappearance of the family (Book 5) may go back as far as a possible "proto-*Republic*," an outline of an ideal state, from the 390s, since these subjects appear to be the subject of parody by the comic playwright Aristophanes in his *Eccleziiazousae* (*Women in the Assembly*) of 392; Socrates' reference to the "gibes from the smart set" (5.452b7) which would greet his proposals concerning the role of women in the state, has plausibly been seen as a possible reaction to

⁹ For a review of both aspects of *Republic*, see Rutherford, *Art of Plato*, 23-25.

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Aristophanes' play.¹⁰ An independent existence for the outline of society contained in these books may also be suggested by evidence from the Roman writer Aulus Gellius (2nd century AD) who, in a discussion of the rivalry of famous authors, reports that Xenophon wrote his *Education of Cyrus* as an answer to the first two separately published "books" of *Republic*.¹¹

The very different content and dramatic style of Book 1 has sometimes been thought to indicate that it is a revival of an early dialogue, perhaps called *Thrasymachus* (after the major interlocutor with Socrates in Book 1), which Plato reused as an introduction to the *Republic* as a whole, with minimal alterations to fit a new context.¹² Socrates discovers that—contrary to his assumption that, following failure, they would agree to abandon the discussion (as in earlier *aporetic* dialogues)—two of his associates, Glaucon and Adeimantus, regard Book 1 as merely a "prelude" (*prooimion* 2.357a2), and that they expect Socrates to give answers to their reformulation of the Book 1 argument between him and Thrasymachus (see below, section 4). Be that as it may (and there is no concrete evidence to sup-

¹⁰ For details of possible cross-references, see Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology*, 103–4. For a skeptical view of the relationship, see Halliwell, *Plato Republic* 5, 224–25 (appendix).

¹¹ *Attic Nights* 14.32. "Papyrus scrolls" (*libri*), containing more than our conventional two books (plausibly 2–5), are meant.

¹² See Vlastos, *Socrates*, 248–50, with earlier bibliography. It has also been suggested that the arguably genuine *Cleitophon* might have been an alternative introduction to *Republic*, which the existing Book 1 replaced (Irwin, "The Platonic Corpus," 75). For a different view, see Slings, *Plato Cleitophon*.

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port the idea of a separate dialogue, previously composed), the organic relationship between Books 1 and 2–10 is clear in many details, to the extent that any earlier version, if it ever existed, was seamlessly woven into the whole.¹³

3. DRAMATIC CONTEXT AND CHARACTERS IN THE DIALOGUE

With one exception, Plato's works are cast in the form of dialogues, almost all between Socrates and a series of interlocutors, most of whom are recognizably historical persons transported into a largely fictional dramatic context.¹⁴ The extent to which the personality or beliefs of Plato's Socrates represent those of the historical character is a controversial issue; Plato's dialogues belong to a genre of prose works termed, e.g., by Aristotle, "Socratic discourses" (*Sōkratikoí Logoi*): *Poetics* (1447b11), philosophical dialogues written by Socrates' associates as commemorative memoirs of their revered master.¹⁵ With the exception of the works of Plato and the soldier/historian Xenophon (428–ca. 354) these survive in very scanty fragmentary form. While Plato's dialogues are formally part of

¹³ There are problems in the relationship of Book 10 with the remainder of the dialogue, on which see the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (iv).

¹⁴ The single exception to the dialogue form is *Apology*, Plato's version of Socrates' defense speech against a charge of impiety in 399 (which nevertheless contains a section of dialogue between Socrates and one of his prosecutors, Meletus).

¹⁵ The fragments of the Socratics are collected in Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*.

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this genre, in philosophical scope and literary quality they go far beyond it. It is generally accepted that by the time of *Republic* "Socrates" is largely a character invented, or at the very least, extensively developed, by Plato.¹⁶

The dramatic setting of *Republic*, the house of a *metic* (noncitizen) family in the port of Piraeus is unusual in taking Socrates outside the city of Athens, which he was portrayed as always reluctant to leave.¹⁷ Socrates has made a journey of nine kilometers from the city, accompanied by Glaucon (a young associate and, incidentally, Plato's brother; see Book 2 n. 38). The event is a festival of the Thracian god Bendis, apparently recently introduced to the Piraeus, and featuring processions, races, and other celebrations. Socrates is persuaded to go home with Polemarchus, where they find his aged father, Cephalus. Those present comprise a prominent *metic* family, Athenian citizens, and a visiting sophist from Chalcedon, Thrasymachus, who plays an important part in Book 1. Plato's choice of a *metic* residence for the dialogue, together with a geographical setting removed from the city of Athens, as well

¹⁶ For differing views on the extent to which the historical Socrates can be detected in the early dialogues of Plato, see Vlastos, *Socrates*, 45–80; Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, 88–95.

¹⁷ Another notable exception to this is *Phaedrus*, where Socrates' reluctance to stray outside the walls is commented on by Phaedrus, (*Phdr.* 230c–d). See also *Cri.* 52b–c. In fact, the port of Piraeus, the setting of *Republic*, in the late fifth century was still technically part of the "city," being within the fortification walls built by Pericles (and rebuilt in the 390s following the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War (431–404).

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as a festival to a foreign goddess, may be a deliberate attempt to match context to subject matter—a venue and an event suitably distanced from the established values of the Athenian citizen democracy as a context for revolutionary social and political proposals.

In the introductory sections of *Timaeus*, in a report of a discussion purporting to have taken place “yesterday,” Socrates outlines the basic subject matter of *Republic* Books 2–5 (17c–19a). The dramatic and philosophical link which connects the two dialogues is of course contrived (*Timaeus* was written probably up to twenty years after *Republic*; see the Chronology), and the date imagined for the setting of *Republic* appears to be determined partly by the participation in Book 1 of the elderly Cephalus, the paterfamilias, who had been persuaded by the Athenian statesman Pericles to immigrate to Athens in the late 450s and had established a flourishing shield factory in the Piraeus, where he lived for thirty years. This suggests the late 420s for the dramatic setting of the dialogue. However, there is a reference at *Rep.* 2.368a3 to Glaucon and Adeimantus having distinguished themselves in a battle at Megara. Two dates are possible here, 424 and 409; the latter seems preferable, since Glaucon and Adeimantus, as brothers of Plato, would have been far too young for the earlier engagement.¹⁸ The reference to the gathering for the festival of the Thracian goddess Bendis (1.327a1ff.) does not help with the dating, since it is not known exactly when the cult was introduced to Athens, nor whether

¹⁸ On the birth dates of Glaucon and Adeimantus and the battle of Megara, see Nails, *The People of Plato*, 2–3.

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conventional religious piety are underlined by his exit from the scene in order to make a sacrifice, after handing the argument over to his son Polemarchus (331d10), who in his turn, following an inconclusive initial attempt with Socrates to define justice, gives way to the most formidable of Socrates' interlocutors, the visiting sophist Thrasymachus (336b1), who states the case for justice as the advantage of the stronger, a philosophical position which Socrates sets out to refute in the remainder of *Republic*.

By far the most important of Socrates' respondents in *Republic* are the Athenian citizens Glaucon and Adeimantus, who take over the argument at the beginning of Book 2, restate and refine Thrasymachus' case against Socrates (357a–67e4), and subsequently act as Socrates' respondents throughout the remainder of the long dialogue. After the initial setting out of their case against Socrates, they adopt a less confrontational role,²⁴ corresponding to the change in the dialogue from an adversarial to an expository style. Despite what has been seen as a somewhat passive reaction to Socrates, nevertheless, as young open-minded Athenian citizens, Glaucon and Adeimantus fulfill a valuable role as representatives of the generation of ordinary Athenians Plato wished to reach and influence.²⁵

²⁴ Although not invariably so: see the adversarial and structurally significant interventions of Adeimantus at the beginning of Book 4 (419a), at the beginning of Book 5 (449a), and in Book 6 (487b). (See further below, section 4.)

²⁵ See Yunis, "The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic." Glaucon emerges as the more philosophically sophisticated of the two, although more inclined, on the whole, to accept what Socrates says, unlike his brother (see previous note).

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Republic taken as a whole imperceptibly leaves far behind the initial dramatic framework of the social event of the Bendis festival in which it is placed. A relatively swift discussion followed by dinner and a postprandial walk-about to converse further with young men and view the festival is what Polemarchus has promised Socrates at 328a7-9; but all this is forgotten in the broad development of Plato's larger structure.

4. THE DIALOGUE FORM IN *REPUBLIC*

Other composers of the *Sōkratikoī Logoi* may have had a hand in inventing the form of the philosophical dialogue, but Plato developed its dramatic possibilities to a unique degree. Influences on him have been variously traced. The dramatic interaction of characters in the debates (especially the *agones*) of Athenian tragedy may have contributed something, as well as the dramatic prose mimes of Sophron (Syracusan, 5th century), about which little is known, but which may have suggested a realistic setting and a conversational style.²⁶ Plato's contemporary Xenophon also wrote Socratic dialogues, as did later imitators such as Cicero and, in the eighteenth century AD, the philosopher Berkley. But none of these developed the precise and subtle dramatic interaction of character and philosophical ideas which we find in Plato.

²⁶ Categorized with the Socratic dialogue by Aristotle *Poet.* 1447b9. Diogenes Laertius also suggests the influence of Sophron (3.18); see a possible allusion to the mimes by Socrates in *Resp.* 5.451c. See Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy*, 3:332.

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Plato's dialogue form, like that of Xenophon, doubtless originated in the adoption of the oral method of their teacher, Socrates (469–399), who wrote nothing but appears to have believed that real progress in philosophy is made by discussion of issues of importance by two individuals, rather than through solitary monologue, which was the main teaching method of his contemporaries, the sophists, and which Socrates, with varying degrees of ironic politeness, rejected as a method of discussion.²⁷ The main form of discussion in Plato's earlier dialogues, perhaps modeled to some degree on conversations with the historical Socrates, is known as the *elenchus* ("cross examination or scrutiny and refutation of an argument"), an exchange in which, having elicited from his associate an initial definition of a particular value, e.g., holiness, bravery, temperance, Socrates engages in a step-by-step examination which ends in refutation of the original definition and a more or less good-tempered agreement that they have not succeeded in arriving at an acceptable conclusion, but, along with Socrates, have reached an impasse (*aporia*: see *Euthyphro*, *Charmides*, *Hippias Minor*, *Laches*, and *Lysis*).²⁸

This method is to be contrasted with *dialectic*, a method of conversation or discussion in which the relationship between Socrates and his respondents is, in theory at least, nonconfrontational and enables progress to be made on important issues by mutual exploration. This latter method is characteristic of (though not exclusive to) the later dialogues, and *Republic* appears to represent a transition

²⁷ E.g., *Prt.* 328eff.

²⁸ See e.g., Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus."

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between the two methods of discourse: in the discussion of what "justice" is (the ostensible subject of *Republic*) Book 1 ends in Socrates, having refuted definitions by both Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, confessing that he has not succeeded in defining it himself: "For as long as I don't know what justice is, I'm hardly likely to discover whether it is actually an excellence or not, and whether the person possessing it is unhappy or happy" (1.354c1). However, for once, things do not end there: at the start of Book 2, Glaucon and Adeimantus take the initiative and restate the position which had been taken by Thrasymachus in Book 1, their contributions each taking the form *not of dialogue but of a display speech (epideixis)* setting out the case, and leading to Socrates' reply, in which he meets their challenge by taking a different tack altogether, and begins the long dialectical discussion which occupies the remainder of the work.

In some respects the role of Glaucon and Adeimantus is thenceforward, i.e., from 2.367e onward, much less assertive than that of their previous speeches or, for that matter, that of Polemarchus and, in particular, Thrasymachus in Book 1, and consists largely in expressing agreement at intervals with Socrates' leisurely exposition. It is, however, not true to see their role as an entirely passive foil to Socrates: there are key moments in the dialogue when questioning interventions, in particular from Adeimantus, underline potentially difficult or controversial problems. For example, at the beginning of Book 4 (419a–20b2) Adeimantus abruptly takes on an adversarial role and asks Socrates to defend himself against the charge that his ruling guardians have none of the normal advantages, such as wealth and social prestige, which should naturally

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stem from their position; this leads to the important point that the happiness of one group lies in the happiness of all—an idea which introduces the analogy of three interdependent elements in the state/human soul. Again, in Book 6.487b Adeimantus raises the “everyman” objection to the counterintuitive idea (with which Glaucon [a6], the more knowledgeable, but perhaps the more conformist of the two, seems to be perfectly happy) that philosophers should rule the state; this leads to Socrates’ more developed exposition, in Books 6 and 7, of the philosophers’ education and their study of the Forms.²⁹

At one key point at the beginning of Book 5 (449a), Adeimantus, aided and abetted by Polemarchus, effects a major structural change in the direction of the discussion. Socrates, having ostensibly finished outlining his “good constitution,” is planning to pass on to the deficient ones when Adeimantus pulls him up short and accuses him of avoiding tricky issues relating to the position of women and the family. Socrates is forced to change tack. While ostensibly a digression, Books 5–7 actually contain the heart of the discussion, the social and intellectual organization and development of the guardian class.

These interventions and Socrates’ reaction to them demonstrate that Plato’s dramatic structure is not simply an ornamental device but an essential means of conveying the far from straightforward development of his ideas. This development is, however, by no means easy to follow. Plato never introduces himself as a character in his dia-

²⁹ “Form” is used throughout to translated *eidos*, as being less ambiguous than “Idea,” which can, in modern discourse, suggest something subjective, conceived purely by the mind.

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logues, and every contributor, including Socrates himself, is a fictional construct. Therefore, one cannot baldly and uncritically accept any statement in *Republic* (or in any other dialogue) as what Plato wishes us to believe. His dramatic sense is all-pervasive, and the direction of the dialogue is often established by the corrective objections of Socrates' associates. The dialogues, including *Republic*, are intended to be performed, if only in the mind of the listener/reader.³⁰ We get the impression of a mind thinking things out as the work progresses, an essentially exploratory or improvisatory style of discourse, which admits doubts and problems, frequently conveyed through Socrates' well-established irony.³¹

There are also key points in the dialogue where argument gives way to image, often to illustrate and reinforce important ideas: e.g., the story of Leontius outside the walls of Athens (4.439e6ff.) unable to control his desire to look at executed corpses, as an example of warring elements in the human *psuchē*; or the "image" (*eikōn*) of disputed political authority as a ship with diverse groups trying to wrest control from the owner (6.487e7ff.) as an attempt to answer Adeimantus' objection to the idea of philosophers as rulers of the state.

These images, and others like them, are used to illustrate ideas which are reached independently by dialectical argument. There are, however, two important occasions

³⁰ Blondell, *Play of Characters*, 23–28. There is no evidence that any of the dialogues were ever actually performed by pupils or associates in Plato's Academy or elsewhere; for a hypothetical reconstruction, see Ryle, *Plato's Progress*, 21–32.

³¹ See e.g., Blössner, "The City-Soul Analogy," 376.

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where the image is there to describe something which is not apparently reachable by logical argument: one is the all-reaching power of the sun as an image or idea of the Good (6.508a8ff.). The other, perhaps better described as a reported vision, is the final description of the fate of souls in the Underworld in the Myth of Er (10.614b2–21c9).³²

Quite apart from these easily discernable images and myths, Plato's prose is a uniquely rich and subtle amalgam of a wide variety of reference, allusion, and parody in which is encompassed the whole of Greek literature, poetry and prose, to the extent that a full typology of his varied styles has never been attempted, and might not in any case be a feasible proposition, such is the range of his discourse. Some of the more explicit and obvious references are included in the notes to the translation.

5. HISTORY AND CONSTITUTION OF THE TEXT OF *REPUBLIC*

Our text is based on the Oxford text by S. Slings, *Platonis Respublica* and its predecessor by J. Burnet. The textual notes are confined to instances where a divergence in textual reading significantly affects the translation or interpretation of the Greek; for a comprehensive apparatus, Slings' edition should be consulted. On the occasions when a significant issue of interpretation is at stake we have included a footnote in the translation.

The following MSS of *Republic* are cited in the notes to the text:


³² On these myths/images, see the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (i) and (iv).

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- A Parisinus Graecus 1807, 9th century AD, with interlineal and marginal additions
- D Marcianus Graecus 185, coll. 576, ca. 12th century AD
- F Vindobonensis, suppl. Gr. 39, late 13th–14th centuries AD

In addition there are testimonia included here from ancient authors of the early centuries AD who quote from and comment on *Republic*: Justinus (2nd), Eusebius (3rd–4th), Proclus, Stobaeus, and Cyrillus (5th), Philoponus (6th). We have also included, where appropriate, modern editorial conjectures.

For full details of textual matters related to *Republic*, including discussion of Coptic and Arabic evidence, see the *Praefatio* of Slings' edition, pp. vii–xxiii, and for the definitive modern discussion of the textual tradition of *Republic*, see Boter. Note has also been taken of the posthumous publication of Slings' *Critical Notes* on the text.



CHRONOLOGY OF PLATO'S LIFE AND WORKS

The dates and order of composition of Plato's dialogues cannot be established with any certainty. The events of his life, and, in particular, details of visits to Sicily, depend to a large extent on the *7th Letter*, which may or may not be genuine. The following represents a general, but not universal, consensus (omitting dialogues sometimes attributed to Plato, but generally regarded as not genuine). For differing approaches to questions of the chronology of Plato's dialogues, see e.g., Brandwood, *Chronology of Plato's Dialogues*; Kahn, "On Platonic Chronology"; Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology*; Vlastos, *Socrates*.

- ca. 429 Birth of Plato from an old and wealthy Athenian family.
- 404 Defeat of Athens in the war with Sparta (the Peloponnesian War).
- 403 The rule of an oligarchic junta in Athens (the "Thirty Tyrants"), involving Plato's relatives, followed by the restoration of the democracy.

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- 399** The trial, condemnation, and execution of Socrates on a charge of “not acknowledging the gods which the city acknowledges, but introducing new divinities and corrupting the youth.”
- 390s–early 380s** Following the death of Socrates, Plato and other followers of Socrates withdraw from Athens to the nearby city of Megara.
Plato travels extensively.
Composition of the short Early Period dialogues: *Apology*, *Crito*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*, *Hippias Minor*, *Ion*, *Laches*, *Lysis*.
- 389/8** Plato visits Italy and Sicily, probably in order to make contact with Pythagorean philosophers.
- ca. 387** Plato founds the Academy on the site of the shrine of the hero Academus in the northwest district of Athens.
- 380s** The later Early Period dialogues (“transitional”): *Gorgias*, *Menexenus*, *Protagoras*.
- Late 380s** The Middle Period dialogues: *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, *Phaedo*.
- 370s** The later Middle Period dialogues: *Parmenides*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*.

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- 367** Plato visits Sicily for a second time at the invitation of Dion, uncle of the young Dionysius, ruler of Syracuse, possibly in the hope of influencing the government of the city. The attempt is unsuccessful.
- 360s–50s** Aristotle joins the Academy.
The Late Period dialogues: *Critias*, *Philebus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Timaeus*.
- 361** Final visit to Sicily, ending again in failure to influence Dionysius.
- Late 350s** Final dialogue: *Laws*.
- 347** Death of Plato.

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INTRODUCTION TO BOOKS I–V

1. OUTLINE OF CONTENTS AND ARGUMENT OF *REPUBLIC* I–V

Book I

On the surface, the opening stage of *Republic* looks like a self-contained *aporetic* dialogue, with vivid presentation of characters and lively argument typical of the early dialogues. The structure of Book I most resembles the earlier *Gorgias* not only in its subject matter but in its clear tripartite structure, marked by the succession of three Socratic interlocutors, the *metics* Cephalus and Polemarchus, together with Thrasymachus, the visiting sophist. The book also reflects *Gorgias* in the abrupt but dramatically subtle transitions from speaker to speaker (Gorgias/Cephalus, Polus/Polemarchus, Callicles/Thrasymachus) and the increasing space given to each, reflecting their relative importance in the dialogue.

(a) The beginning is a particularly elaborate example of the way in which philosophical argument is allowed to arise naturally out of social intercourse and ordinary conversation. Deflected from his initial plan of returning to Athens from Piraeus following the festival of Bendis. Soc-

rates goes with his friends to Polemarchus' house, and out of natural courtesy first addresses the elderly Cephalus and inquires how he copes with old age. Socrates probes Cephalus' somewhat complacent answer by suggesting that his wealth rather than any innate personal quality might be responsible for the ease with which he bears old age, a suggestion which Cephalus rejects. This takes them on to the role wealth might play in attitudes to approaching death, and how these might relate to living the just life. According to Cephalus, possession of money prevents the fear of approaching death in the knowledge that one has not told lies or incurred any debts. To illustrate his position, Cephalus resorts to quotation from poets, in this case Pindar (frequent quotation from poets, especially Homer, Hesiod, and the tragic dramatists, characterizes *Republic* as a whole—see further on Book 2 below). At this point (331c1), Socrates abruptly increases the tempo of the discussion and fixes on Cephalus' concern with how wealth might enable its possessor to avoid the injustices which generate the fear of approaching death, by asking him for a definition of justice.³³ This simultaneously introduces the major theme of the *Republic* as a whole and also sows the seeds of the first stage of an *elenchus*. This procedure usually involves Socrates' interlocutor attempting a definition in response to a request from Socrates. Here, on the reasonable assumption that Cephalus is not going to be up to this task, Socrates provides his own: to tell the truth and give back whatever one has taken, to which he immediately puts his own objection—it is not justice to give back

³³ For an analysis of Plato's artistry in this transitional scene, see Harrison, "Plato's Manipulation of Thrasymachus," 227–28.

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his weapon to a friend after he has gone mad. At this point Cephalus has had enough and goes out to perform a sacrifice (331d6).

Strictly philosophical commentaries on *Republic* tend to ignore this scene.³⁴ Those who do treat it differ on how Plato intends us to see Cephalus: ironically presented as a “limited and complacent man”³⁵ whose views on life would not withstand deeper analysis, or as someone whose beliefs are to be taken seriously.³⁶ Cephalus’ emphasis on “character” (*tropos*: 329d4), expressed in terms of “decency,” “order,” and “contentment,” does not fit Socrates’ intention at this point in the dialogue to move the argument away from justice as an internal order in the individual toward viewing it as a characteristic rather of *relationships* between individuals—a definition in terms of society rather than of individual psychology.³⁷ However, the idea that the good life is rooted in internal qualities as well as in social relationships resurfaces, more sharply developed, later in the argument of *Republic* as a whole.

(b) Polemarchus, as a younger man (assuming a late 420s dramatic date, he would be about thirty years old)³⁸ is more combative than his father, and much more prepared to engage in the *elenchus*. He modifies the initial definition (see above) by quoting the sixth/fifth-century lyric poet Simonides that justice is “to give back to everyone what he is owed” (331e3). Socrates then proceeds to

³⁴ E.g., Cross and Woosley, *Plato's Republic*, 2.

³⁵ Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, 19

³⁶ E.g., Reeve, *Philosopher Kings*, 6.

³⁷ See Lycos, *Plato on Justice and Power*, 33–35.

³⁸ See Nails, *The People of Plato*, 251.

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attack Simonides' saying. His objections are essentially four in number:

1. On an analogy with skills such as medicine, which have precisely defined appropriate activities and objects, what activity and object would justify classifying justice as a skill? Professional skills such as medicine and navigation and others which have specific methods of operation are much more effective at "giving back what is owed," i.e., realizing the desired good or bad ends, than justice.³⁹
2. The aforementioned skills render their practitioners equally effective at doing good or harm to their objects. So, by analogy, the just person will also be skilled at being unjust.⁴⁰
3. In harming enemies, you may be mistaken as to who are your friends and enemies, which means that justice may involve harming friends.
4. Harming means making worse; but the just person cannot by his skill make anyone less just, any more than, e.g., a musician by exercise of his professional skill can make anyone less musical.

These arguments are unsatisfactory, chiefly because behind them lies the assumption, familiar from earlier dialogues, that justice is simply a "skill" or "art" (*technē*), the "craft analogy." A *technē* is an activity characterized by *epistēmē* (knowledge), which has a clearly defined area of

³⁹ Narrowing (or eliminating) the possible area of operation of expertise of a claimed skill can be found in e.g., *Ion* 537a-41c, *Grg.* 447d-52e.

⁴⁰ For this argument see *Hipp. Min.* 375e-76c.

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expertise and a product or outcome. On the assumption that justice must be a *technē* (because otherwise, according to Socratic belief, it could not be an object of knowledge), none of Polemarchus' suggestions work. A classic *elenchus*, resulting in *aporia*.

What did Plato intend to be the purpose of these arguments? It has been suggested that he was making Socrates consciously and deliberately tie Polemarchus up in knots and reveal how little he had really thought about the issues involved, thereby exposing his "moral complacency."⁴¹ Another approach is to see these arguments as looking forward to the main thrust of *Republic*, in that Plato was anxious to clear the ground, while retaining in his exploration of justice some aspects of the "craft analogy," namely the emphasis on specialist knowledge—the knowledge of justice which will enable the rulers of the state to have and apply the required expertise.⁴² Yet in the dramatic context of Book 1, Plato is here clearly having Socrates stage a failure, perhaps a deliberate breakdown of the "Socratic method," including even the *elenchus* itself⁴³ (see Book 6 n. 7, for Adeimantus' later critique of this method).

(c) The final interlocutor in Book 1, Thrasymachus, is the most formidable and most fully characterized (336b1ff.). Socrates uses his position of advantage as narrator to describe Thrasymachus as rude and violent. But he is also capable of questioning the whole basis of Socrates' style of argument, objecting to his "usual ironic eva-

⁴¹ Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, 30.

⁴² See e.g., Irwin, *Plato's Ethics*, 69; Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, 118.

⁴³ See Reeve, "Socrates Meets Thrasymachus," 263.

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sion” (*eironeia*: 337a4), which consists of always asking questions but avoiding answering himself by supposedly shamming ignorance. Thrasymachus himself offers a first definition of justice as “the advantage of the stronger” (338c2–3), the implication being that “justice” is simply a name for whatever behavior characterizes those in power, and it is “just” for the weaker to obey.⁴⁴ Socrates counters that by getting Thrasymachus to admit that rulers are infallible in calculating their advantage, which enables Socrates to make profitable use of the familiar Socratic idea of “expertise”; his purpose, largely successful in formal terms at least, is to get Thrasymachus to concede that the art or skill (*technē*) of the expert is always directed toward the benefit of its object and not of itself, which appears to refute Thrasymachus’ argument that justice is the advantage of the stronger.

At this point Thrasymachus counters by reformulating his original definition and flatly contradicting Socrates: justice is someone else’s advantage, injustice is the interest of oneself.⁴⁵ So injustice rather than justice is to one’s

⁴⁴ There has been considerable discussion over whether at 338c2–3 Thrasymachus is defining justice or simply saying in effect “Justice? There’s no such thing—it’s simply a name for the advantage of the more powerful.” See Chappell, “The Virtues of Thrasymachus”; Everson, “The Incoherence of Thrasymachus.”

⁴⁵ The inconsistency often attributed to Thrasymachus here is only apparent (see Kerferd, “The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s *Republic*.”); the first formulation, directly answering Socrates’ question in the form it is posed at 336a10: “what else can anyone suggest [justice] is?,” is given from the viewpoint of the weaker (i.e., it is “just” for the weaker, from their point of view, to obey the stronger), whereas the second formulation (343c5ff.),

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advantage: this is the way the world works and what the rational person ought to pursue. Socrates' subsequent counterarguments rely, once again, on the well-trodden Socratic path of deducing consequences stemming from the argument from "expertise." This is particularly in evidence in the extended train of argument at 349b1-50c11, where the unjust person's *pleonexia* does not necessarily imply, as S. wishes to establish, an ignorance of professional expertise, but may be evidence of a different aim altogether: the unjust person may not be aiming to get an advantage over the "experts" in the professional sense, but to "get the better" of them in the sense of exercising greater power.⁴⁶

Socrates concludes (352d2ff.) with two arguments which look forward in some respects to the main argument of *Republic*:

1. Justice is more powerful than injustice, since, to achieve anything, individuals and groups must cooperate, i.e., have a minimal component of justice within them (351c7-54a9).
2. Everything: living creature, part of the body or activity, has a function (*ergon*), by means of which it can do what it is designed to do better than anything else (e.g., eyes have sight, a pruning knife is designed to cut a vine shoot). Everything which has a particu-

that injustice is the interest of oneself (i.e., from the viewpoint of the stronger), represents a more straightforward version of his views. Moreover, Socrates appears not to detect any inconsistency, which suggests that Plato intends none.

⁴⁶ For detailed critique of S.'s arguments at 349b1-50c11, see Emlyn-Jones, *Plato Republic 1-2.368c4*, n. ad loc.

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lar function can also be said to have an excellence (*aretē*): in the case of our examples, to function well. The function of the human soul is living, and the *aretē* is to do it well, i.e., with justice (352e2-54a9). On this, see the table in Book I n. 74.

The ideas of justice being (1) related to the interdependence of different elements in society and (2) the end to which the human soul is directed, assume great importance in subsequent books. However, in the immediate context of the Book I argument with Thrasymachus, (2) especially depends heavily on the unspoken (and to us counterintuitive) assumption that the behavior of the human soul can be equated with, e.g., the capacity of the senses or a pruning knife. Thrasymachus' argument implies, on the contrary, that the *aretē* of the function of living might equally plausibly be injustice rather than justice, in the sense that the wholly unjust person can most effectively attain his version of "excellence" or "living well," i.e., prosperous wickedness.⁴⁷

In holding this position, Thrasymachus, although formally in debate with Socrates, really bypasses him in the sense that there is no common basis on which they can conduct the debate. Socrates wins on points, in the sense that Thrasymachus ultimately pays lip service to his conclusions, but none of the participants in the dialogue is convinced, least of all Socrates himself. The conventional *aporia* (354b9-c1) is accompanied by Socrates' unusually frank analysis of his own shortcomings (a13-c1). There is

⁴⁷ On all these arguments, see e.g., Irwin, *Plato's Ethics*, 69; Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, 118.

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a suggestion of closure, which turns out to be false; as we shall see below at the beginning of Book 2, Glaucon immediately returns to the argument about justice.

But Plato clearly intends another angle on the discussion: the final argument advanced by Socrates against Thrasymachus (see (2) above), while questionable in the immediate context, also looks forward in a larger perspective to the positive dialectic of the remainder of *Republic*, a binding-in, as it were, of Book 1 with the rest of the dialogue.⁴⁸

Book II

This book can be divided into two distinct sections: (a) 357a–67e represents a reformulation by Glaucon and Adimantus of Thrasymachus' basic position concerning justice and injustice; (b) 368a–83c consists of the beginning of Socrates' answer. The transition from (a) to (b) also sees a major change in the dramatic structure—from an oppositional mode of argument to a much more narrative and expository style.

(a) The beginning of the book reveals the expectation of closure at the end of Book 1 to be false; Glaucon unexpectedly prolongs the debate by challenging Socrates' conclusions of the previous discussion: the victory over

⁴⁸ See also Glaucon's unexpected entry at 347a6 (his only contribution to the debate in Book 1) and Socrates' answer, which suggests a brief allusion to the later *Republic*, and in particular the obligation on the philosopher to leave his contemplation of truth and reason and reluctantly take office to avoid the job going to those less fitted (7.520aff. and 540d–41a).

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Thrasymachus was too easily won, in his opinion. In reality he sides with Socrates in believing that justice, not injustice, is the key to the good life, but he does not believe that Socrates has made a good enough case. He therefore challenges him, as a kind of devil's advocate, by reintroducing Thrasymachus' argument in a novel way, giving it more coherence.

Glaucon divides things which are good into three categories: (1) things good in themselves, such as pleasant and harmless emotions, (2) things both good in themselves and for their consequences, such as sight and health, (3) things burdensome in themselves but necessarily experienced or undertaken for the ultimate benefits they bring, such as taking exercise, making money in various ways. Justice, according to Socrates, would fit into category (2),⁴⁹ but Glaucon would place it in (3), along with the majority of people, as something burdensome which one only practices for its consequences, principally financial rewards and social esteem (357b4-58a6). If one could obtain these consequences without needing to be just in the

⁴⁹ Socrates devotes most of *Republic* to proving the former proposition of category (2), i.e., justice as good in itself; however, having done this adequately, as he believes, he seems prepared to reintroduce at 10.612b7-c2 the favorable consequences of being just: "is it now at last unobjectionable to restore to justice and all other aspects of virtue, in addition to what has gone before, their rewards, of the number and quality they give the soul both from men and gods while the human being is still alive and after death?" The latter is vividly illustrated in the Myth of Er which follows (614b2-21c9).

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first place, this would be the obvious choice, which, in practice, most people would make if they could.⁵⁰

Glaucon develops this thesis by means of a version of a social compact: individuals consider that it is in their interest to make an agreement with each other not to practice injustice, so as to avoid the consequences of suffering it. Therefore justice is not good in itself, which is what Socrates is committed to demonstrating, but a compromise between the good of being able to commit injustice with impunity and the evil of being forced to suffer it. If you possessed the ring of Gyges the Lydian, and were able to make yourself invisible, you would naturally pursue injustice, as Gyges allegedly did, so as to attain happiness (*eudaimonia* 359c7–60c5). Glaucon elaborates this thesis by means of a hypothetical case: take the perfectly just and perfectly unjust person and give them opposite reputations: the just person is thought to be perfectly unjust and the unjust person perfectly just; the consequences for each would be such that no rational person could possibly choose the former.

In a speech of similar length, Adeimantus supplements Glaucon's case by bringing in the inherited Greek cultural wisdom found in poetry and religion, all of which supports their argument: any suggestion that injustice in this world might be punished in the next is refuted by the actual

⁵⁰ On the problems associated with Glaucon's tripartite model from a modern philosophical viewpoint, see Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, 60ff. For one solution, see Irwin, "Republic 2: Questions about Justice," 166–67, and on the first part of Book 2 in general, see Kirwan, "Glaucon's Challenge."

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behavior of the gods and traditional teachings with regard to the fate of individuals after death.

This reformulation of Thrasymachus' argument brings to the fore two ideas which the original formulation did not emphasize: (1) the idea of justice as good both for itself *and* for its consequences, as opposed to justice as a good merely *because of* its consequences; (2) the dichotomy, which runs through both speeches, of appearance and reality (*doxa/alētheia*). These two aspects of Glaucon's position are closely related: in his hypothetical case (see above) the truly unjust person who could appear just is able to profit from all the artificial consequences of seeming justice (artificial in the sense that they are not intrinsically connected to the person's character and actions). Conversely the truly just person who seems unjust suffers all the bad consequences of his seeming injustice.

The foursquare symmetry of the Glaucon-Adeimantus thesis comes over as somewhat artificial, depending as it does on improbably extreme circumstances, and Socrates' ironic interjection at 361d4-6 underlines this. But despite this, the *epideixeis* (extended display speeches) of Glaucon and Adeimantus present a tough thesis for Socrates to tackle: he has to show that justice, shorn of all its normal positive social consequences (good reputation, etc.), is intrinsically better for the individual (i.e., actually more profitable) than injustice, likewise shorn of all its negative associations (bad reputation, punishment, etc.). In these circumstances, say Glaucon and Adeimantus, can justice really be a rational choice? This sets the stage for the remainder of *Republic*: Socrates has to show that justice has intrinsic, and not just consequential, value.

(b) After some elaborate compliments to Glaucon and

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Adeimantus on the quality of their arguments, Socrates starts his defense of justice, but not in a manner for which the previous discussion has prepared us. From this point on, the largely cooperative interjections of Glaucon and Adeimantus allow Socrates to develop an expository framework with little interruption or the need to face regular serious criticism.⁵¹

Using an image from reading and sight, Socrates suggests that, if justice is to be “read” as a characteristic of both an individual and a city, it will be easier for those who are less keen-sighted to read the idea in big letters first and look for justice in the city before they progress from there to the small letters and do it for the individual.⁵² This move from the micro- to macro-level enables Socrates to begin to build up the essentials of a hypothetical state. In establishing the basic essentials for life, food, clothing, shelter, etc., and who should provide them, Socrates takes some pains to introduce a Principle of Specialization (PoS): that the basic community functions best when “one man does one job according to his aptitudes and opportunities and leaves everything else alone” (370c5-6). Alongside this, and following from it, is the principle of interde-

⁵¹ For the rare, but important adversarial interventions from Socrates’ interlocutors after Book 2, see General Introduction n. 24.

⁵² Using an image to illustrate an argumentative point is characteristic of Plato in *Republic*. In this instance, Plato’s assumption of the validity of a basic analogy between individual and city, a central plank of the *Republic* argument, has been radically questioned (see e.g., Williams, “Analogy of City and Soul.”). See further below, section 2 (iii).

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pendence: all sections of the community depend on each other. These principles of justice, originating in mutual need (see Adeimantus at 372a1), continue to be fundamental throughout the development of the more complex state and underlie Plato's subsequent tripartite division of society and the human soul (below, Book 4).

Socrates adds other essential people to his basic community, such as traders and merchants, together with associated place of activity and medium of exchange: marketplaces and coinage. He embarks on a description of the idyllic life and diet such a basic community will enjoy (372a5-d4), only to be interrupted by Glaucon, who characterizes this as a "city of pigs" (d5). Socrates reacts by developing the idea of a less healthy but more realistic model of a city, with comforts and luxuries, involving more service industries and inevitably requiring more territory, which will lead to war and the need for armies. It is essentially this city which is the basis for the remainder of *Republic*. So why pass at all from the healthy and presumably ideal city? The answer is that for *Republic* to deal realistically with justice and injustice in the city, we have to take into account the complexity of human needs and desires in what purports to be a real world: "Primitivism . . . is not a serious option."⁵³

The complex state will require more land to feed itself, which will lead to the seizure of other people's land and defense of one's own. So there will have to be an army. Socrates spends some time emphasizing the need for this to be a specialist rather than part-time job, and we

⁵³ Schofield, *Plato*, 204. See also Morrison, "Plato's Ideal City," 250-54; Reeve, *Philosopher Kings*, 171.

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soon see why: the key qualities required are those which are needed by the guardians (*phulakes*), the ruling class in the state. Discussion of the kind of intellectual capacity and temperament required, via the semihumorous comparison with guard dogs as having philosophic capacity (376b1ff.), leads to discussion of a disposition of gentleness and high spirit required of a guardian "naturally passionate about wisdom, and noble-minded, quick and strong" (376c4).

How does the state develop individuals with such temperament and capacities? This moves Socrates quite abruptly on to the important subject of education, which extends into the remainder of this and the following book. Taking the traditional division of Athenian education into *gumnastikē* (physical education) and *mousikē* (all that we now assemble under the label "arts"), Socrates concentrates on the latter as being more vital for intellectual and emotional development.

Plato's uncompromising aim to eliminate most of traditional Greek poetry, including the vast majority of Homer and the tragedians, as being unsuitable for children (and ultimately for most people), is well-known, if not notorious.⁵⁴ He envisages the human soul, especially that of children, as a kind of unformed "tabula rasa" on which impressions are to be stamped. Stories such as the violence between generations of the family of gods (*Hesiod, Theogony*) are not suitable as models for the education of the young.

⁵⁴ For a detailed and balanced treatment of the Platonic texts on poetry and a detailed commentary (*Ion* and relevant sections of *Republic*), see Murray, *Plato on Poetry*.

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And not just the young. It quickly becomes clear that Socrates' strictures apply to citizens generally. He is aiming his attack principally at the bastions of Greek education in *mousikē*: Homer and Hesiod. He also appears to have other poetic forms in his sights, (cf. his mention of "epic, lyric, or tragedy" at 379a7-9), but his concentration on Homer undoubtedly reflects the central role played by the poems of Homer and Hesiod in Athenian education, and he proposes banishing them from the city. *What* he is attacking in them is a more complex matter. He recalls myths of bloody intergenerational violence between Uranus (Heaven), Cronus, and Zeus, and his concern lest this myth and others like it should be considered a suitable model for conduct. But Socrates is concerned with much more than this extreme example. He is prepared to eliminate all traditional stories which portray the gods in anything but a perfect light. The gods must be absolutely good, and so must exemplify goodness and abstain from the kind of conduct which Homer records (e.g., 378d2ff.); the gods are not capable of inflicting evils on humans: all bad things which happen to mortals have another cause (379c2ff.).⁵⁵ Moreover gods must not be portrayed as changing shape, but remaining perfect as they are (380d1ff.).

Most of the time Plato seems to be saying unequivocally that the stories found in the poets are false (377d4-5); however, he seems much more concerned about their

⁵⁵ An idea startlingly anticipated by Zeus in Homer *Od.* 1.32-34: "For shame, how mortals blame the gods; for they say that evil comes from us, but it is they who, through their own folly, bring on themselves sorrow beyond what is fated."

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value as moral exemplars than their actual truth or falsity (examples of morally unacceptable quotations from the poets are given at 379d1ff.). He is not prepared to accept that they might have truth-value even as allegories, since “the young are not able to distinguish what has a deeper meaning and what hasn’t” (378d6), and at 378a1-6, concerning the stories about Zeus, Cronus, etc., he says that “*even if they were true*, [our italics] I would not think that they should be told to fools and youngsters in this light-hearted way, but should be kept strictly quiet. And if there were any need to tell the story, then as few as possible should hear it in secret, after sacrificing not a pig, but some huge victim, so hard to get hold of that as few as possible hear the story.”

To conclude the book, in the course of establishing that the gods will never be guilty of falsehood, Socrates makes an important distinction between a falsehood *in the soul*, that is in reality, and a falsehood in words, which may be permitted if useful, e.g., against enemies, or to protect friends against themselves.⁵⁶ This distinction becomes very significant later.

Book III

(a) This book continues the discussion of the undesirable effects of most traditional poetry and broadens the context. As well as avoiding false/undesirable depictions of the gods, one must also eliminate stories about the horrors of the afterlife, and what traditionally is said about the rigors

⁵⁶ A dilemma already met in Book 1.331c5—the justice of returning a weapon to a friend who has become insane.

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of Hades, in order to maximize bravery by eliminating the fear of death (386a6ff.). Turning his attention to legendary mortals (387c11ff.), Socrates also censures passages which portray Homer's heroes, such as Achilles, exhibiting emotions such as anger and despair, which are not suitable models of conduct for the person aiming to live a good life. Such people should be able to bear disaster with calm resignation and also exhibit the emotional balance suitable for those who have the best natural ability to reach fulfillment in their lives, and so act as potential leaders in the city.

In passing from content to style and form, Socrates introduces distinctions between narrative and "imitation" (392d5ff.), i.e., the form of delivery in which the speaker becomes the person imitated (as in dramatic performance).⁵⁷ Socrates objects particularly to the imitative style on two related counts: firstly the ability to imitate a multiple of undesirable character traits results, in Plato's estimation, in a breach of PoS, namely that an individual should practice a single pursuit well; secondly, the repeated imitation of people exhibiting such undesirable character traits results in the development of "natural habits, physically, vocally, and mentally" (395d1-3), i.e., you become like the people you imitate. The same applies to the imitations of "low" characters in comedy. In a further technical discussion of musical modes and rhythms, Socrates proposes the banning of those associated with such performances as dirges and lamentations, which ex-

⁵⁷ As opposed to epic which is "mixed," i.e., part narrative, part speech, and dithyramb which is wholly narrated (see Book 3 n. 52).

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emplify and promote "softness and idleness" (398e6-7), in favor of the "manly" Dorian and Phrygian modes. The important goal is for the individual to imitate that which enables him to attain order (*kosmos*) and harmony (*harmonia*) in his soul.

Criticism of Plato's censorship of poetry has always loomed large.⁵⁸ Leaving aside the issue of whether poetry "imitates" real life in a literal sense, which would at many periods of history have been questioned, in the extremity of his views Plato comes across as a moral puritan, enforcing his banning of the poets by means of a culturally authoritarian regime.⁵⁹ It is also clear that in banning undesirable imitations, Plato has in his sights performance in the "democratic" arena of the Athenian theater, a popular spectacle which was open to a wide social spectrum of the population: see, e.g., 397a4ff. on the attraction of theatrical effects to a large audience.⁶⁰ (On Plato, poetry, and

⁵⁸ The secondary literature discussing Plato's attitude to poetry is enormous: see e.g., Ferrari, "Plato on Poetry"; Janaway, *Images of Excellence*; Moravcsik and Temko, *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts*; Murray, "Inspiration and *Mimesis* in Plato"; Gould, "Plato and Performance."

⁵⁹ See e.g., Halliwell, *Aesthetics of Mimesis*.

⁶⁰ Plato's perception of the theater as a focus of emotional license affecting popular democratic culture is brought to the surface in *Laws*, 3.701a, with his claim that, for *aristocratia*, there had been substituted in his time *theatrocratia* ("rule of the *theatron*" (Plato's own coinage) i.e., the "mob" (*ochlos*)). For a balanced view of the evidence, concluding that Plato's estimate of actual crowd license was exaggerated, see Wallace, "Poet, Public and 'Theatocracy.'"

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“imitation” (*mimēsis*), see the introduction to vol. 2, section 1 (Book 10) and section 2 (iv.)

(b) In the latter part of Book 3 Socrates fulfills the second part of the outline of the educational program proposed at 2.377b5ff.: after *mousikē* comes physical training (*gumnastikē*). Socrates is in no doubt that *gumnastikē* should be subordinated to *mousikē*: effective care of the body should be controlled by the harmonious soul. As the soul should be in harmony with the Dorian rhythm (see 399a3ff.), so the body should be adapted to war.⁶¹ The parallel is made explicit: indulgence in bad diet can be compared “to the composition of lyric poems and songs in all modes and meters” (404d12). The potential ruler should strive to acquire a balanced diet which will produce a temperament which mediates between the roughness of career athletes and excessive softness. Intemperance and disease spawn doctors and lawyers. Doctors (concerned as they are with the body) should ideally have the widest experience of disease from childhood on; but, a good judge “governs the soul with a soul” (409a1). He must therefore be an older man, so that, not having assimilated injustice from childhood in his own soul, he considers it as something alien to himself, residing in other people’s souls, which he has studied over a long period. Suitable guardians must be carefully watched so that they do not involuntarily jettison what is true; from a young age they

⁶¹ For the influence of the Spartan and Cretan model on the construction of the *politeia*, see Schofield, *Plato*, 38ff. See also 415d5ff. on the organization of rulers in a military camp with communal living arrangements and absence of private property.

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must be tested by exposing them to influences likely to beguile them away from a true path.

(c) This takes Socrates to the first of a series of serious underlying problems which have to be tackled in devising the structure of authority in the city: how are rulers to be persuaded to accept their role as guardians, and the city in general to go along with this? Socrates introduces the first of a number of stories or myths, in this case a “noble lie” one “fabricated in a moment of need” (414b8–c1), namely that in the beginning all humans were produced by the gods from the earth, but made up of a mixture of metals (gold, silver, and iron or bronze), which determines their role in the state. The status of guardians, auxiliaries, and other workers can be believed to arise naturally from the original creative act of the gods: “gold” people naturally have gold in them, “silver” have silver, and so on, which determines their role within the city. This state of affairs will be, on the whole, perpetuated: golden parents will produce golden offspring, etc.⁶² What they thought they experienced in terms of education and upbringing was really a dream, the reality being that they were being fashioned and nurtured under the ground.

The justification or pretext for this myth relates back to the distinction made at the end of Book 2: the differ-

⁶² Socrates allows (415b3–c7) for careful screening of metals in individual souls, with provision for demoting/promoting individuals who are born with an admixture of a different metal from their parents. It is at around this point (414b4–5) that Socrates makes explicit the distinction between guardians and auxiliaries (*epikouroi*).

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ence between a lie in words and a lie in the soul. The myth of the metals is clearly seen by Socrates as in the former category, a necessary, or “noble lie” (*gennaion pseudos*), which has to be told with the ultimately beneficial aim of justifying the organization of the city. This anticipates a point argued at the beginning of Book 4, that the highly stratified organization of classes in the state is in the interests of all, who are thus enabled to attain the just life in the way suited to themselves, and in this way (through the myth) the guardians will also be persuaded to take care of the whole population (415dff.), on the grounds that all people, with their different qualities and abilities, have a common origin in mother earth. In order to perform their caring, guardianship role successfully, the rulers will have to live a communal life in a military camp environment with no access to private property.⁶³

Book IV

(a) This book starts with an abrupt objection from Adeimantus (which ultimately leads to a closer analysis of the class structure of the state): why should the rulers undergo the absence of all the things that give people satisfaction, and “simply appear to be occupying the city like mercenaries who do nothing but guard it” (419a10). In answering Adeimantus, Socrates does not rely on the implications of the previous Myth, but reruns, as it were, the PoS and interdependence arguments (see above, Book 2 (b)), which assert that, just as the quality of a painted statue

⁶³ On the significance of the myth of metals, see further below, section 2 (ii).

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depends not on the brilliance of the individual detail but on the overall composition of the inter-dependent parts of the whole, so the happiness of the various groups of citizens, including the guardians, will depend on the happiness of the whole, in which they have their specific role. Wealth is not appropriate for the happiness of the guardians, and a lean, fit fighting force will be more than a match for soft and wealthy enemies. Strength comes from unity, and the city must not be allowed to grow to a size at which its unity and coherence are threatened. As previously, Socrates sees education, and especially education of the guardians, rather than laws as being the essential basis of the well-organized city and the way of countering a disorganized existence.

At this point they can move on, Socrates believes, to the main task; having, as he claims, outlined the foundation of the city, he then invites them all, including Polemarchus, to return to the main subject with which they started: where do they think justice and injustice might be located in this city? This will involve revisiting the issue with which Glaucon and Adeimantus (and Thrasymachus) originally challenged Socrates (2.367e1-5): “which of the two [justice and injustice] a person must acquire if he is to be successful” (427d4-5).⁶⁴

(b) At this point (427e6) Socrates introduces the traditional four cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance,

⁶⁴ Plato marks this key moment dramatically by having Socrates invite all the participants into the discussion, followed by Glaucon’s sharp reminder (d8) that rather than asking for their help, Socrates has earlier promised that he himself would take the lead in defending justice (2.368b7-c3).

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and justice, as all essential to the correctly founded city.⁶⁵ Wisdom is not any kind of knowledge, for example craft knowledge, but deliberation about the organization of the city as a whole; the group possessing this wisdom will be the smallest and the part which governs and rules. Courage is possessed by those whose job it is to preserve the state from enemies, "in pain as also in pleasure, in passion and in fear" (429d1), that is, the auxiliaries, relying on education (reared in *mousikē* and *gymastikē*); this virtue is to be absorbed just as wool absorbs a fast dye in such a way as to ensure permanence. Temperance, the mastery of destructive pleasures and appetites, is different from these two (wisdom and courage) in that it resides throughout the whole of the city, in that the rulers and ruled share a belief and "sing together in unison" about who should rule and who should be ruled (432a).

So, where is the fourth virtue, justice? Socrates embarks on an elaborate hunting metaphor as an ironic prelude to the discovery that in the case of justice it is "as if it has been rolling around in front of our feet for ages since we started and we didn't even notice it" (432d7). In the city, justice, as established at the beginning of the discussion, is "doing one's own job" (PoS); the various classes do what they are best at—deliberation and rule, defense, and production, respectively. The worst evil that can happen to a city is if its citizens have "involvement in many activities and swapping about from one to another" (434b8–c1), and that worst evil constitutes injustice.

⁶⁵ A traditional list of these virtues, with some omissions and additions, can be found in Xenophon and the orators: see Dover, *Greek Popular Morality*, 66–67.

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(c) Socrates then embarks on a more controversial move, to us at least: how to demonstrate that justice in the city (PoS) can be exactly paralleled by justice in the soul of the individual person. What Socrates ironically describes as a “minor problem” (435c4) soon reveals the difficulty: are each of the impulses felt by the soul operated by different elements in it, or is the whole of the *psuchē* involved in each? Whichever answer Socrates comes up with, there is a major problem of how the soul can experience and mediate between contrary desires and impulses: that is, wanting something and rejecting it at the same time, which boils down to tackling the Law of Contradiction. We could never be persuaded that “one and the same thing would ever undergo, be or even do opposing things at the same time and in the same respect” (436e8–37a1).

There follows a complex passage in which Socrates discusses appetite and distinguishes between simple desires and desires of a particular sort which stand in a relation to a particular object, for example, for drink pure and simple as against a hot or a cold (or other kind of) drink. There are also situations in which the impulse to drink is countered by something else within the individual: “So if anything ever pulls the thirsty soul in a different direction there would be something else in it other than what is thirsty leading it like a wild animal toward a drink?” (439b3–5). There must be an element in the soul urging toward drink and also one stopping the individual, “it being a different force which overcomes that element doing the urging” (c6–7). The force which deters against simple desire must be that of rational calculation, which leads to the conclusion that there are at least two elements in the soul, a rational and an irrational element, one with

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which the soul feels passions and desires, and one which calculates whether such impulses are well or badly directed.

From this, Socrates moves on to make a further distinction, between the appetitive and spirited element, via the story of Leontius, the man who, while traveling up from the Piraeus and walking outside the walls of Athens, wrestles with his desire to gaze on the corpses of recently executed criminals. True to his dramatic instinct, Plato stages a vignette in which Leontius struggles with his desire and finally addresses his own appetites, which have overcome his better feelings: "Look for yourself, you wretches," he shouted 'and fill yourself with an image of the beautiful'" (440a2). Here, by implication, the spirited element which causes Leontius shame at what his appetites drive him to do is allied to reason. Just as in the state the auxiliaries support the guardians, as obedient sheepdogs for the ruling shepherds, so in the individual soul the spirited element is a natural ally to the calculating element, provided that it has been properly educated.

Socrates admits that it has been a difficult argument: "we have just about managed to swim through that" (441c4), but nevertheless regards the analogy between the constitution of the city and the individual soul as established. Just as the calculating and spirited elements in alliance should naturally control the appetitive element in the soul, so the guardians and auxiliaries in their different ways should rule the rest of the city. A harmony between the elements in both soul and city, the result of agreement by all that the reasoning part should rule, constitutes temperance (*sōphrosunē*).

In this book, therefore, Socrates has added psycho-

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logical depth to the fundamental principle established in Book 2 (368ff.) of “each doing his own job,” by relating this to the internal structure of the individual mirrored, as he thinks, in the structure of the state. At this point Socrates and Glaucon too (445a5ff.) believe that the question has been answered: they have established the principle of the good city, and Socrates prepares to turn to consider the various kinds of vice.⁶⁶

Book V

At this point Plato engineers a major shift in the dramatic structure of *Republic*: just as at the end of Book 1, Socrates is not allowed by Glaucon to bring the discussion to an (inconclusive) close, so here Socrates is prevented by Polemarchus and Adeimantus from assuming that the good city has been thoroughly discussed, allowing him to pass to a discussion of the various types of unsatisfactory ones.

(a) The stimulus for Adeimantus' intervention is a remark that Socrates casually threw out at 4.424a1-3 that on the subject of women, marriage, and procreation “they [the guardians] must do all these things as far as possible as something shared with their friends.” Socrates' ironically dismayed reaction at 450b1—that he was omitting further discussion on this topic to avoid trouble, and that, by demanding that he revisit this topic, they have stirred up “a hornet's nest of a debate” (450b2)—is Plato's way of indicating that we are approaching a potentially contro-

⁶⁶ For a critical discussion of the city-soul analogy, see below, section 2 (iii), and the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (ii).

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versial topic: his most radical proposals for the social organization of the rulers.

Socrates presents the arguments in context of a discussion about the detailed organization of the ruling of the city, which actually extends into Book 6, as a series of waves of increasingly formidable power, (a succession of "tidal waves")⁶⁷ which metaphorically they have to surmount. The first two waves concern the organization of women, marriage, and procreation. The first argument concerns the role of women, where Socrates is up against tradition, represented both by "the gibes from the smart set" (452b7) (probably represented by the role-reversal comedy of Aristophanes *Ekklesiazousai*, see n. ad loc.), and also the initial incomprehension of Glaucon. In examining the difference between men and women, Socrates makes a vital distinction between aspects of gender which are relevant and those which are irrelevant to ruling. The fact that women bear and men sire offspring is not relevant to their comparative suitability to be guardians; some women will and some will not be suitable. So it will be right for women with the appropriate nature to be selected to live and guard with men of the same nature, as the good of the community must prevail over conventional beliefs.⁶⁸

(b) Discussion of women's suitability for guardianship leads logically to the next, more formidable wave: the law that "these women [i.e., the guardians] shall all be the

⁶⁷ For the wider significance of the three waves (*trikumia*), see Sedley, "Philosophy, the Forms and the Art of Ruling," 256-57.

⁶⁸ On Plato and feminism, see below, section 2 (iv).

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common property of all the men: none shall live with any man privately. Their children too shall be held in common and no parent will know his or her offspring, nor any child his or her parent" (457c10ff.). This abolition of the family, Socrates maintains, is not only viable but will prove beneficial for the organization of the city.⁶⁹ He turns again to analogies with animals (see above, Book 2.376b1ff.): just as efforts are made to breed animals such as dogs and horses so as to produce the best offspring, so sexual pairing of men and women should be controlled and not left to personal choice. Men who are good at warfare, for example, should have the right to mate more frequently so that as many children as possible may come from this kind of union. There will be specific detailed arrangements concerning optimum ages for mating and penalties for those who mate outside these limits or outside the prescribed classes. Suitable offspring should be brought up in state nurseries (the female guardians will presumably be busy at other work), mothers should visit only to breast-feed children, and it will be important that they remain ignorant of which child is theirs. The whole question of how these arrangements, holidays for weddings, religious ceremonies, poetic accompaniments, and so on, can best be made should be concealed from all except the rulers themselves, by means of a medicinal lie (459d), similar to that proposed earlier at 3.414b.

⁶⁹ Plato's ideas here are strongly reminiscent of the Cretan and Spartan system, where boys were removed from their families when young to be brought up in *agelai* ("herds") as potential soldiers, and women exercised naked alongside men (see above, n. 61).

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The basic motive in all this is to abolish from the community of rulers personal possessions and instill a feeling of communal experience. In doing this Socrates has recourse once again to the city/human body analogy:

SOCRATES: "And isn't it the one which most resembles a single person? For example, I imagine where we have a pain in one of our fingers, the whole relationship binding the body with the soul into one system of control perceives it and feels the pain as a whole with the part which suffers, and so we say that the person has a pain in his finger, don't we? Again doesn't the same argument apply to any other part of a human being when part of the body is either suffering pain or finds relief through pleasure?"

GLAUCON: "It is the same," he said, "and, to answer your question, the best run state resembles this very closely" (462c9-d7).

At this point Socrates digresses to explain how his type of cohesive city will function in warfare. The ruling class will be organized so as to defend the city effectively. Male and female auxiliaries will fight alongside each other and will be accompanied by their children. He deals with military rewards and punishments and the treatment of enemies, and makes what was (for Greeks) a conventional distinction between treatment in warfare of fellow Greeks as against non-Greeks.

(c) The final section of Book 5 represents the beginning of a new aspect of the dialogue, a lengthy and closely argued discussion of what sort of people the guardians

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should be. Glaucon pulls Socrates back to the question of the feasibility of the arrangements of the state detailed in the previous sections of the book (which Glaucon has already questioned at 457e), which leads to the third and most formidable wave which they have to surmount, a discussion of the institution of "philosopher kings." Here, Socrates makes a very large and, in the circumstances, improbable claim: "Unless philosophers become kings in our state," I said, "or those we now call kings and potentates genuinely and competently pursue philosophy, and political power and philosophy combine into the same thing, and the many natures of those pursuing exclusively the one or the other are of necessity excluded, there can be no respite from evil in the state, my dear Glaucon, nor, in my view, even in the human race" (473c10-d5). All that has been described up to this point, therefore, hinges on this idea, to which, not unexpectedly, Socrates anticipates major opposition. The development of the nature of the philosopher and his fitness to rule is the central and most radical thesis of *Republic* and extends from this point until the end of Book 7.

Socrates begins his long argument with an initial distinction between knowledge and belief. Glaucon takes Socrates' point that the philosopher has an appetite for all wisdom to apply, strangely, he thinks, to people who love seeing and hearing all manner of beautiful sights and sounds. But such people, Socrates claims, do not possess wisdom; they are unable to see the nature of the beautiful itself.⁷⁰ They are people who have belief, rather than

⁷⁰ This idea relates back to the critical treatment of poetry and drama in Books 2 and 3 ("beautiful sounds" (476b5)). For the

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knowledge, and so they are not philosophers, who deal exclusively with what can be known—the thing in itself. The person who deals in belief is concerned with what lies between knowledge and ignorance (“what is” and “what is not”).⁷¹ For such a person, what is beautiful will also seem ugly, and so with other values, such as the just and unjust. The views of such people “are rolling around somewhere between nonexistence and pure existence” (479d4–5). Such people are *philodoxoi* (“belief lovers”) as opposed to *philosophoi* (“lovers of wisdom”).⁷²

2. ISSUES IN *REPUBLIC* I-V

(i) *Plato and Poetry*

Throughout the dialogues Plato’s attitude to poetry varies between a degree of acceptance of its value and function, undercut by criticism and on occasion a degree of irony (e.g., *Ion*, *Phaedrus*, *Laws*),⁷³ and more or less outright

addition of painting to the argument (“colors and shapes” *ibid.*), see Book 10.596eff.

⁷¹ For the various meanings of the Greek for the verb “to be” relevant here, see Halliwell, *Plato Republic* 5, n. on 476e10.

⁷² For discussion of the distinction between knowledge and belief, see the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (i).

⁷³ *Ion*, 535e–36d; *Phaedrus*, 245a; *Laws*, 719c. Awareness of the importance of poetic inspiration is common in the pre-Platonic literature, e.g., Homer, *Il.* 2.484–92; Hes. *Th.* 104. Socrates’ recognition of poetic inspiration is often ambiguously expressed (see e.g., *Ion*, 533dff.) and countered by his reiterated claim that, although (because) they are under the influence of the

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dismissal as in *Republic*. The motives for Plato's extreme attitude in *Republic* are complex, arising as they do from an amalgamation of beliefs relating to education, culture, politics, sociology, psychology, and, not least, metaphysics (for this last, see especially Book 10). Plato's criticism of the poets in Books 2 and 3 is focused on their cultural claim to be the teachers of the *polis*, the knowledgeable repository of moral values. So, in order to create a completely new and just state (or individual—see below, (iii)), it was necessary to tackle the traditional authority of poetry head-on.

On this topic there is a problem of an apparent discrepancy between what Plato maintains in Books 2 and 3, which appears to leave room for a limited range of poetry conforming to his ethical and psychological requirements, and Book 10, in which poetry and painting appear to be dismissed absolutely on the metaphysical grounds that they imitate the external world, which is itself an imperfect copy of the real Forms (which makes them two removes from reality, i.e., what one can really "know," in Plato's sense of the word, see 10.596aff.). Here we will be addressing the question of poetry in Books 2 and 3.⁷⁴

In Books 2 and 3 the ethical and psychological aspects come to the fore. Poets are to be dismissed on the dual grounds that (1) they do not tell the truth about the most important matters, emphasizing, for example, the vio-

Muses, poets literally do not know what they are talking about (e.g., *Ap.* 22b8-c6).

⁷⁴ The problem of the relation of Books 2 and 3 to Book 10 will be discussed in the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (iv).

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lent family feuds, immorality, and changeability of deities (2.379bff.), and (2) they present human role models, such as the heroes Agamemnon and Achilles, exhibiting undesirable qualities and emotions which pander to the lowest part of the human soul (3.387eff.). These two aspects—the falsity of the stories told by the poets and their capacity to arouse emotions which are undesirable—are generally not clearly differentiated.⁷⁵ The latter is given prominence in this part of *Republic*, and its danger to the human *psuchē* is explained by Plato's view that emotions generated by dramatic poetry simply bypass the rational faculty. This is particularly relevant to dramatic performance, which was the standard form in which poetry was presented in ancient Greece—typically in large theatrical settings, such as the theater of Dionysus at Athens. The actor produces these emotions and passes them on to the audience.⁷⁶

As frequently happens in *Republic*, in his critique of poetry, Socrates both builds on and anticipates different parts of his overall structure: in exploring the dangers of the “imitative” form of poetic expression he looks backward in noting the way in which, in assuming multiple roles, an actor violates the principle of specialization he had established right at the beginning of his exposition (3.369ff.) and concludes: “Therefore doesn't the same argument apply to imitation: that the same man is unable to

⁷⁵ Halliwell, *Aesthetics of Mimesis*; Gill, “Plato on Falsehood,” 38–87.

⁷⁶ Poet and actor frequently being the same person (e.g., the *rhapsode*, who both interpreted and performed the poems of Homer).

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imitate many things well as he can one thing?" (3.394e7-9). At the same time, in considering how these imitated emotions stimulate the irrational part of the soul, he is also looking forward to the tripartite division of the soul in Book 4 (440eff.).

For Plato, the emotion generated by poetry (whether in rhapsodic recitation or the stage drama) totally bypasses the reason; he sees no way in which the recipients of poetry, whether actors or audience, can detach themselves from its emotional content. The fact that one is viewing an emotion which is not one's own (i.e., presented by an actor on the stage) may give an audience sense of detachment, but this is illusory. And for actors imitation inevitably becomes a habit: "have you not observed that if imitations continue from childhood on, they become natural habits, physically, vocally, and mentally?" (3.395c8-d3).⁷⁷

One key objection of Plato to dramatic performance, which remains largely implicit in *Republic*, is political: his perception of the force of the sheer physical presence in the theater of the *ochlos*, "the mob."⁷⁸ This group is by definition moved entirely by the irrational fears and de-

⁷⁷ The inability of an actor to detach himself from an "imitated" role is not entirely borne out by other Platonic evidence, e.g., the *rhapsode Ion* in *Ion*, 535e: "As I look down on the audience from the stage above, I see them weeping, stricken with amazement . . . in fact I have to give them very close attention, for if I set them weeping I myself shall laugh when I get my money, but if they laugh, it is I who have to weep at losing it."

⁷⁸ The pejorative connotation of this word applies in a large proportion of cases, especially in Plato; see Brandwood, *Word Index to Plato*, s.v. ὄχλος.

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sires characteristic of the third class. The theatrical event is conflated by Socrates with the mass gatherings generating the violent emotions Plato considered were typical of democracy (see especially 6.492b6). In this Plato correctly identified the democratic core of Athenian culture he disliked and wished to replace.

An unresolved issue, frequently discussed, is the apparent paradox of Plato's implicit condemnation of the form of discourse he himself used: the dramatic dialogue.⁷⁹ Since Plato is never present either as actor or narrator, his dialogues are, by his own definition, in the purely "imitative" form he particularly condemns (3.394dff.).⁸⁰ They are essentially dramatic performances, whether actually performed or not (see above, n. 30). Moreover, he uses a highly crafted style which covers the imitation of a wide range of genres (he specializes in parody).⁸¹ He also makes frequent use of quotation from the poets and there is a pervasive use of theatrical imagery and myth.⁸² Books 2 and 3 seem to offer a possible way out of this dilemma, by their suggestion that imitation of suitable kinds is allowed (see, e.g., 3.396b10ff.), and Plato's dialogues would presumably come under that heading. He might have argued that his portrayal of unpleasant, immoral, or plainly stupid

⁷⁹ See Murray, *Plato on Poetry*, 12-14, with bibliography.

⁸⁰ This is the case even in narrated dialogues, since the narrator is actually part of the *mimesis* which the author, Plato, is creating.

⁸¹ See e.g., Nightingale, *Genres in Dialogue*.

⁸² See Emlyn-Jones, "Poets on Socrates' Stage"; Yamagata, "Plato, Memory and Performance"; Tarrant, "Plato as Dramatist."

characters in his dialogues merely serves to put into relief his underlying ethical purpose. However, as we shall see, Book 10 appears to condemn *all* mimetic literature totally, irrespective of quality or purpose. The paradox goes deeper: the incapacity of poetry to reflect reality goes together with its power—a deadly addictive pleasure, a *kēlēsis* (enchantment) from which not even Socrates (and by implication Plato himself) is immune (10. 601b).

(ii) *The “Noble Lie”*

The “noble lie” (*gennaion pseudos*) is introduced at 3.414b–c, as a “Phoenician tale,” which Socrates expounds with the kind of hesitation and embarrassment with which Plato has him dramatically express difficult, even counter-intuitive ideas. The idea of lies and trickery, however much informally admired by Greeks, was in principle opposed to Athenian democracy, and the onset of deliberate lying on public issues was an indication of political life going badly wrong (hence Glaucon’s initially shocked reaction at 414e6).⁸³ Socrates expresses uncertainty as to whether the rulers themselves (presumably the inner circle of *phulakes* as opposed to the *epikouroi*)⁸⁴ can be made to believe the lie; but if not, then their successors.

⁸³ See esp. Thuc. 3.82 on the deterioration in morality during *stasis* (internal state feuding) in Corcyra. On deception in Athenian democracy, see Hesk, *Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens*.

⁸⁴ At 414b5 Socrates describes the auxiliaries (introduced here for the first time) as those who assist the governors, the *archontes*, in their decrees.

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The rulers' justification for their use of lies (and the necessity for others to avoid such practice) is based on their expertise, by analogy with several activities, chiefly the medical:

SOCRATES: "There again we must set a high value on truth too. If we were right in what we were saying just now and falsehood is really of no use to the gods, although it is to men in the form of medicine, then it should be clear that as such we should sanction it for doctors, but laymen should not touch it. . . . Indeed for those who govern our state, if for anyone else at all, it is appropriate to tell lies because of our enemies or our citizens, in order to benefit the state, but all the rest must avoid having anything to do with such a thing. For a layman to lie to such governors we shall say is a mistake on the same level, or even greater than a patient not telling his doctor the truth, or an athlete not telling his trainer the truth about his physical condition; or a sailor not telling the helmsman what the real situation is about the way in which he himself or one of his fellow crewmen is managing concerning the ship and the crew" (3.389b2-c5).

The lie as a "drug" (*pharmakon*) is introduced in 3.414b in the context of a discussion of the qualities required for a ruling class capable of defending the city from enemies but gentle to those they are guarding (416aff.). So there is expression in mythical terms of two things that Plato considers literally true: there is both inherent difference (individuals can be portrayed as composed quite naturally of different metals assigned to them by the god (415a2-3)),

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and society must have underlying solidarity (they can all be seen as emerging from mother earth).⁸⁵ For the city to operate justly, both of these have to be believed by the citizens. The ultimate rulers, those who go on to study the Forms and subsequently return to the Cave (7.515ff.), come to understand the essential allegorical meaning of the myth.⁸⁶

(iii) *The Structure of the State and the Soul (1)*

Plato's account of the tripartite division of the soul and classes in the state (as described in the last section) undergoes amplification between Book 4 and Books 8-9, in particular as a result of the intervening discussion of the philosopher-king/guardian in Books 6-7 (and we return to it in the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (ii)). In Book 4, as we have seen above, the basic functions of each part of the soul/division of the state are established, and the soul and state are regarded as exactly parallel (441c ff.).

There are some problems with the exact functions of the classes. From Book 4 it would appear that the guardians' function appears to be essentially supervisory, i.e., it is their job to make decisions on behalf of the other classes, a role which might be seen as essentially prudential, in-

⁸⁵ Schofield, "The Noble Lie," 154-58. Both the aspects of difference and of group solidarity come together also in the "lies" which have to be told by the rulers to the auxiliaries to ensure that the best men and women mate at appropriate times in "wedding festivals" (see 5.459c8ff.).

⁸⁶ See Lear, "Allegory and Myth in Plato's *Republic*," 25-43 (esp. 31-38).

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volving good judgment rather than a seeking after truth (this issue might, however, be seen to be resolved once we have studied the role of the philosopher in Books 6–7). In the second class, the auxiliaries, the problem is some ambivalence about what the “spirited element” (*to thumoides*) implies: on the one hand it expresses unreasoning violence (as with animals and children), relating them to the third class, and on the other hand it relates to courage and the typically Greek value of “shame” (*aidōs*), as in the story of Leontius, mentioned earlier (4.439e6ff.). Those possessing the “spirited element” are therefore pulled in two directions: but as auxiliaries their education ideally enables the rational element to prevail and to help them assist the guardians. The third class, the class of unreasoning desires, the “appetitive” (*to epithumētikon*), is in some respects the most incoherent, ranging from an indiscriminating desire for food and drink (the main topic of Book 4, e.g., 439ff) to sexual desire and moneymaking (both of these implying what was, for Plato, its inherently chaotic, unreasoning nature).

Underlying all this is a more basic uncertainty: it is often difficult to know whether Plato, in referring to the divisions of the soul, is specifying individuals or political/social groups. This matter is brought into prominence by the idea of “parts of the soul,” and the question of whether there is a unified entity desiring, wanting something, or whether the individual is to be seen as essentially a discrete combination of little “homunculi,”⁸⁷ who each con-

⁸⁷ The characterization is that of Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, 142ff.

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tain a division of desires, etc. in an infinite regress. This model seems to fit more readily with the idea of a political structure of three classes, each containing individuals with a predominance of the quality which puts them in a particular class, but at the same time possessing some measure of the other qualities also.⁸⁸

This does not, however, resolve the larger question of Plato's discussion of the relationship between the arrangement of the human soul, or *psuchē*, and the organization of the state, which lies at the basis of the structure of *Republic*, and, as such, has ramifications which stretch across the whole dialogue, especially Books 8 and 9. The discussion starts as early as Book 2.368c-d, where the decision to start the examination with the state is based on the fact that this is much easier to see than the (effectively invisible) soul: "I think that we should employ the kind of investigation suitable for people who are not very keensighted, if someone had ordered them to read small letters from a distance, but then someone noticed that the same letters existed somewhere else written larger and on a larger background, I think it would seem a godsend to read those first and then examine the smaller ones to see if they were the same." At Book 4.434d Socrates refers back to the state/soul analogy as something which has still to be firmly established, but nevertheless by 441c Glaucon agrees to Socrates' claim that the analogy has been established: "does it not now follow of necessity that as our state

⁸⁸ E.g., the class of *epithumētikon* would have enough of the rational part to understand that they should obey the guardians.

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is wise and in what respect it is so, so the individual is wise in that respect also?" (and so on, with the courageous and just person (d-e)).

For Plato, then, the validity of the analogy is settled: the state is an exact match for the soul (441d5-6) and this convenient parallelism can be a basis for further discussion. There is, however, a major issue involved here which has exercised and divided commentators: even assuming, as Plato clearly does, an exact parallelism, which side is he primarily concerned with: the state or the individual soul?

The way in which the whole question of justice is introduced in Books 1 and 2 suggests that Socrates' primary consideration (as opposed to that of his opponents) is with the individual; in other words, the political aspect is subordinate to the psychological and ethical.⁸⁹ Hesitation over whether his state is practically realizable (e.g., 9.592a-b) tends to support this hypothesis (on the question of *Republic* as Utopia, see further the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (iii)). However, Plato also makes it clear that the just person should ideally realize his potential in a real political context, which makes the view that in *Republic* Plato "is constructing an *imaginary* community to serve as a paradigm" improbably extreme.⁹⁰ This issue will be discussed further in volume 2.

⁸⁹ See esp. Blössner, "The City-Soul Analogy," 346.

⁹⁰ Waterfield, *Plato, Republic*, xvii.

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(iv) *The Role of Women in the Running of the State*

Among the radical proposals in Book 5, Socrates' discussion of the women guardians and auxiliaries⁹¹ constitutes the first wave which they have to surmount. His proposal that women guardians should join men in ruling the state, based on his distinction between relevant and irrelevant differences between the nature and abilities of the sexes, would have been, like the introduction of the "noble lie" (above, 2 (ii)) counterintuitive in an Athenian social context.⁹²

Taken on its individual merits, Plato's argument, in denying the relevance of gender difference in activities such as medicine (454d1-3) can certainly be seen as an early forerunner of the assumption of equal intellectual abilities of men and women by modern feminism, as adumbrated in the nineteenth century by J. S. Mill.⁹³ The idea of discriminating between relevant and irrelevant gender difference, which Plato originated, has had obvious significance in the debate about the suitability of women for

⁹¹ As in almost all Plato's discussions of state organization in *Rep.* 2-7, only the top two classes are here in question.

⁹² For the position of women in the classical Athenian *polis*, see Fantham, *Women in the Classical World*. The way in which Socrates takes Glaucon step-by-step through the argument in 5.451d4ff. precludes the latter from again expressing dissent (as he did with the "noble lie"). For possible precedents for sexual communism in Greek culture, see the discussion in Halliwell, *Plato Republic 5*, 10-12.

⁹³ Mill, *The Subjection of Women*. See also Vlastos, "Was Plato a Feminist?"

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certain activities and professions from which they were traditionally barred on grounds of gender. However, in the broader context of Plato's blueprint for the society of the guardians and auxiliaries, it becomes clear that Plato was not at all interested in what has become the modern concept of women's rights, desires, or needs, but only in the utilitarian significance of the role of women in the overriding need to maximize the solidarity of the state through the quality of the ruler class.⁹⁴

It must also be noted, in the context of fourth-century BC social perspectives, that Plato's proposals only apply to the top two classes of the state, i.e., guardians and auxiliaries; he presumably envisaged a conventional social position for females of the third class, who will stay at home and see to their domestic duties, as did almost all Athenian women. What is important, for men as well as women, is not gender, but to which of the three classes they belong.

It is significant that elsewhere, in *Republic* as well as other dialogues, Plato seems to revert to a conventional estimate of the abilities and social position of women (*Rep.* 395e, 431b-c, 605c-e; *Tim.* 42b-e, 90e-91a); in *Laws* 781a ff. he suggests that women's entry into public life needs to be carefully controlled and is a problem "in proportion as her native disposition is inferior to a man's."⁹⁵

⁹⁴ See Annas, "Plato's *Republic* and Feminism," 265-79; Halliwell, *Plato Republic* 5, 14.

⁹⁵ This general estimate is not contradicted by *Meno* 72d-73e: in correcting Meno's assertion of different virtues (*aretai*) for men and women (71e) by asserting that both groups need the same qualities, e.g., temperance and justice (73b), whatever they are

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The “relevant abilities” argument is closely connected with the second (and more formidable) wave (457c6)—the radical proposal that the nuclear family should be abolished and that women should be shared among the men and that children should be reared in state nurseries without knowing who their parents are. Again, it would be wrong to see Plato’s proposals as a forerunner of modern theories of liberation from the psychological restraints of the family: he makes it clear that there will be very strict regulation of the resultant groups (459c–61e). Again, what is of overriding importance is the solidarity of the state.⁹⁶

doing, Socrates does not imply that they should necessarily be involved in the same activities. Socrates does again briefly refer in *Republic* (540c5–7) to women with the appropriate natures as equally the recipients of philosophic training; at this point it does, however, have the appearance of an afterthought (see Book 7 n. 54).

⁹⁶ Annas, “Plato’s *Republic* and Feminism,” 277–78.

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A

- 327 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἅμα τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες. καλὴ μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, | οὐ μέντοι ἦττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἢν οἱ Θυράκες ἔπεμπον. προσευξάμενοι
- b δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες ἀπήμην πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ. κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὠρμημένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν παῖδα περιμεῖναι ἔκελεύσαι. καὶ μου ὄπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖναι. | Καὶ

¹ Dion. Hal. (*Comp.* 25) in order to illustrate the care Plato took over stylistic matters even into old age, relates an anecdote that after his death a tablet was found containing this first sentence arranged in a variety of ways. For Proclus' (fifth century AD) allegorical interpretation of the "descent" of Socrates (henceforward "S."), see the introduction to vol. 2, section 3.

² The festival was of the Thracian Bendis (see 354a10–11), here possibly referring to the foundation of the Piraeus festival in 413 (all dates BC unless otherwise stated), although the cult was known earlier in Athens (see R. Parker, *OCD*³, "Bendis"). "The goddess" without qualification regularly denotes Athena (see e.g.,

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SOCRATES: I went down to the Piraeus yesterday with Ariston's son Glaucou¹ to offer my prayers to the goddess and also because I wanted to watch the festival and see how they would perform it, seeing that this was the first time they were holding it.² I must say that I thought that the procession of the local people was quite excellent, but the one put on by the Thracian contingent seemed no less impressive. When we had made our prayers³ and seen the spectacle, we started back toward town.⁴ Now, as we were heading homeward, Polemarchus the son of Cephalus caught sight of us from a distance and ordered his slave to run on and tell us to wait for him. Coming up from behind the slave caught hold of my cloak and said "Pole-

Pl. *Ti.* 21a); a dual festival may be intended, referring possibly to both the "procession of the local people" and the "Thracian contingent."

³ For S. as an observer of religious rites, see e.g., *Xen. Mem.* 1.3.1, 4.3.16.

⁴ "Town" is *to astu*, the central area surrounded by defensive walls, as opposed to the *polis*, the whole of the Athenian city-state, including its ports. S.'s journey to the Piraeus was about 9 km.—in fact still within the defensive walls joining the city to the Piraeus, which were constructed in the mid-fifth century, shortly before the Peloponnesian War (431–404).

ἐγὼ μετεστράφημ τε καὶ ἠρόμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶη. Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὅπισθεν προσέρχεται ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. Ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων.

c Καὶ ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον ὃ τε Πολέμαρχος ἦκε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφὸς καὶ Νικήρατος ὁ Νικίου καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς.

Ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτέ μοι πρὸς ἄστὺ ὠρμηῆσθαι ὡς ἀπιόντες. |

Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Ὅρας οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Ἦ τοίνυν τούτων, ἔφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένεται αὐτοῦ. |

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐλλείπεται,¹ τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι;

Ἦ καὶ δύναισθ' ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πείσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων.

Ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε.

328 Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Ἄρά γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἴστε ὅτι λαμπὰς ἔσται πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἀφ' ἵππων τῇ θεῶ;

Ἀφ' ἵππων; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καιρὸν γε τοῦτο. λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἀμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις; ἦ πῶς λέγεις; |

¹ ἐλλείπεται ADF: ἐν λείπεται A in margine

⁵ The contrast between force and persuasion in argument, here introduced jocularly at c7–e14, is a key theme in this book

BOOK I

marchus tells you to wait.” So I turned round and asked where he was. “There he is,” he said, “behind you, coming this way; do wait.” “All right, we will,” said Glaucon.

And shortly afterward Polemarchus came up. With him were Adeimantus, Glaucon’s brother, Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and some others apparently from the procession.

Then Polemarchus said: “Socrates, you look as if you are *moving off* to go back to town.”

“Yes, that’s not a bad guess,” I said.

“Do you see how many of us there are?” he asked.

“Of course.”

“Well then,” he said, “either prove yourselves stronger than these people, or remain here.”

“Yes, but don’t we still have the alternative,” I said, “to see if we can persuade you to let us go?”

“Would you really have any success,” he said, “in persuading those who don’t listen?”

“No, we certainly wouldn’t,” said Glaucon.

“Well then, you’d better face the fact that we won’t listen.”⁵

“Are you telling us that you don’t know,” Adeimantus added, “that there’s to be a torch race on horseback this evening in honor of the goddess?”

“On horseback?” I said; “that really is something new! Do you mean they pass torches on to each other as they race their horses?⁶ Or something else?”

and later in Plato *Resp.*, e.g., 449b5 (henceforward all references to Plato will be to work alone).

⁶ See Hdt. 8.98. See also the Platonic metaphor at *Leg.* 6.776b of generations “handing on the torch of life to one another.”

Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Πολέμαρχος. καὶ πρὸς γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἦν ἄξιον θεάσασθαι. ἐξαναστησόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα θεασόμεθα. καὶ συνεσόμεθά τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων αὐτόθι καὶ διαλεξόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε.

- b Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων, ὅμοιον, ἔφη, μενετέον εἶναι.
Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.

- Ἦμιν οὖν οὐκάδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Λυσίαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Εὐθύδημον, τοὺς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἀδελφούς, | καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον τὸν Καλχηδόσιον καὶ Χαρμαντίδην τὸν Παιανιά καὶ Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου. ἦν δ' ἔνδον καὶ ὁ πατήρ ὁ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου Κέφαλος. καὶ μάλα πρεσβύτης μοι
c ἔδοξεν εἶναι διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐωράκη αὐτόν. καθῆστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος ἐπὶ τινος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου τεθυκῶς γὰρ ἐτύγγανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ. ἐκαθεζόμεθα οὖν παρ' αὐτόν. ἔκειντο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλω. |

- Εὐθύς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ εἶπεν·
ᾠ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ θαμίζεις ἡμῖν καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ. χρῆν μέντοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγώ ἔτι ἐν δυνάμει ἢ τοῦ ῥαδίως πορευέσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, οὐδὲν ἂν σέ ἔδει
d δεῦρο ἵεναι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἂν παρὰ σέ ἦμεν· νῦν δέ σε χρὴ

7 For S.'s habit of conversing with the young, see e.g., *Ap.* 23c. Here the length of *Republic* makes it clear that this postprandial walkabout never happens. For a possible original shorter dialogue which this plan might better fit, see General Introduction, section 2.

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“Exactly that,” said Polemarchus, “and besides, they’re going to hold an all-night festival, which will be worth watching. After dinner we’ll get up and go out and have a look at the festival; we shall meet a lot of young men there and talk to them.⁷ Do stay, and don’t refuse us.”

“It looks as if we shall have to stay,” replied Glaucon.

“Well, if that’s what you decide,” I said, “that’s what we must do.”

So we went to Polemarchus’ house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, and besides them Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Charmantides of the deme Paiania and Clitophon, son of Aristonymus. Inside Polemarchus’ father, Cephalus, was there too. Indeed he looked a very old man to me seeing I hadn’t seen him for a long time. He was sitting on some kind of cushion on a chair, and wearing a garland, as he had actually just finished offering a sacrifice in the courtyard. So we sat down beside him, for there were some seats there arranged in a circle.

As soon as he saw me Cephalus welcomed me and said: “You don’t often come down to see us in the Piraeus, Socrates.⁸ Yet you ought to. For if I were still strong enough to make the journey up to town easily, you wouldn’t have to come here; we would come to you instead. But as it is,

⁸ Cephalus’ language recalls almost word for word a Homeric formula (*Od.* 5.88, *Il.* 18.385). Cephalus’ situation and language here are also strikingly reminiscent of *La.* 181c1ff., where the elderly Lysimachus also matches Cephalus’ role as an older man not used to Socratic debate (see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 1 (a))).

πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναί. ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε ὅσον αἰ ἄλλαι αἰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἀπομαραίνονται, τοσοῦτον αὐξονται αἰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί. | μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ τοῖσδέ τε τοῖς νεανίσκοις σύνισθι καὶ δεῦρο παρ' ἡμᾶς φοίτα ὡς παρὰ φίλους τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους.

Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, χαίρω γε διαλεγόμενος
 e τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων ἦν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τίς ἐστίν, τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή, ἢ ῥαδία καὶ εὐπορος. καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην ὅτι σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἰ τῆς ἡλικίας | ὃ δὴ “ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ” φασιν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταί, πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου, ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις.

329 Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, νῆ τὸν Δία ἐρῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἷόν γέ μοι φαίνεται. πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθά τινες εἰς ταῦτον παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασώζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν· οἱ οὖν πλείστοι ἡμῶν ὀλοφύρονται συνιόντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς ποθοῦντες | καὶ ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι περὶ τε τὰ φροδίσια καὶ περὶ πότους τε καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα ἃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται, καὶ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι καὶ

⁹ *Neaniskos* = “youth,” appropriate, perhaps, from Cephalus’ elderly perspective; but Polemarchus and Lysias would be at least in their late twenties at the earliest possible dramatic date of *Republic* (see General Introduction, section 3).

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you should come here more often; for I would have you know that, for my part, the more the physical pleasures wither away, the more my passion for conversation and pleasure in it increase. So don't refuse, but come and get together with these lads here,⁹ and make yourself at home with us: regard us as your dear and very close friends."

"Yes indeed, Cephalus," I said, "and what's more I do enjoy talking to very old men. As they have already traveled along a road, as it were, which we too perhaps will have to travel, I think we should find out from them what kind of a road it is: is it rough and difficult, or easy and passable?¹⁰ I should very much like to ask you in particular what you make of it, since you are now at that point in your life which the poets say is 'on the threshold of old age': is it a difficult time of life? What report can you give of it?"

"By Zeus," he said, "I'll tell you how I feel about it, Socrates. For a number of us of about the same age often meet together, just as the old proverb says.¹¹ Now at these meetings most of us lament, long for the pleasures of youth,¹² and recall the sex, the drinking, the good food and other things of that sort. And we feel irritated, as if we have been deprived of something important. We imagine we had a

¹⁰ On the difficult/easy path of life, see Hes. *Op.* 288-92 and Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21-28.

¹¹ The proverb was obviously so well-known that Cephalus does not feel the need to quote it. See *Phdr.* 240c ("like age delights in like") and scholiast ad loc (Greene, 189) "jackdaw sits next to jackdaw" (ὁ κολοῖδς ποτὶ κολοῖδν ἰζάνει).

¹² For the sentiments, see the elegiac poets passim, e.g., Mimn. fr. 1 Gerber, Simon. fr. 520 Campbell (vol. 3), and Soph. *O.C.* 1235ff.

- τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὰς
- b τῶν οἰκείων προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήραος οὐδύρονται, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γήραος ὑμνοῦσιν ὅσων κακῶν σφίσιν αἴτιον. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτοι οὐ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιαῖσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτ' αἴτιον, κὰν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπεπόνθη, ἔνεκά γε γήραος, | καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ἐνταῦθα ἦλθον ἡλικίας. νῦν δ' ἔγωγε ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσιν καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτε τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμενῃ ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπό τινος· “Πῶς,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σοφόκλεις, ἔχεις πρὸς τὰ φροδίσια; ἔτι οἴός τε εἶ
- c γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι;” καὶ ὅς, “Εὐφήμει,” ἔφη, “ὦ ἀνθρώπε· ἀσμενέστατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγών.” εὖ οὖν μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν ἐκεῖνος εἰπεῖν, καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἦττον. | παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήραε πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία· ἐπειδὴ αἱ ἐπιθυμῖαι παύσωνται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσιν, παντάπασιν
- d τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν πάνυ πολλῶν ἔστι καὶ μαινομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι καὶ τῶν γε πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους μία τις αἰτία ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γήραος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἂν μὲν γὰρ κόσμιοι καὶ εὐκόλοι ᾧσιν, καὶ τὸ γήραος μετρίως ἐστὶν ἐπίπονον | εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ γήραος, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ συμβαίνει.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, βουλόμενος

¹³ For sexual desire as a burden, see lyric poets passim, e.g., Ibyc. fr. 287 Campbell (vol. 3), Anac. fr. 358 Campbell (vol. 2).

good life then, but now no life at all. Some also moan on about the abuse shown to their advanced years by their families, and it's especially for this reason that they harp on about the great miseries old age causes them. But in my opinion, Socrates, these people are not putting the blame where it belongs. For if old age were the cause, I too would have had just the same experience, at least as far as old age is concerned, and so would all the others who have reached this time of life. As it is, I have long encountered others who don't feel like this, and again I was once present when someone asked the poet Sophocles: 'How do you get on with sex, Sophocles? Can you still make love to a woman?' And he replied: 'Mind what you say. Let me tell you I am so glad to have escaped from it; it was like getting away from a raging, savage master.' I thought his answer was good then, and I still do now no less. For undoubtedly there is considerable peace and freedom in old age from such things as these. Whenever our passions stop torturing us, Sophocles' remark is entirely relevant: it's an escape from a great many raging masters.¹³ But for all this, and our relationship with our families, there is just one thing to blame: not old age, Socrates, but human character. For if individuals are orderly and contented,¹⁴ even old age is only a moderate burden. But if not, this makes both old age and youth hard to bear, Socrates."

Now I was full of admiration for what he said,¹⁵ and,

¹⁴ For Sophocles as "contented" (*eukolos*), see *Ar. Ran.* 82.

¹⁵ Extravagantly favorable reaction by S., followed by critical interrogation (331c1ff.), typical of Plato's S.: see also *Prt.* 328d, *Symp.* 198a.

e ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Κέφαλε, οἴμαί σου τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγῃς, οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀλλ' ἠγείσθαι σε ῥαδίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτηῆσθαι· τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ φασι παραμύθια εἶναι. |

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται· ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους εὖ ἔχει, ὃς τῷ Σεριφίῳ λοιδορουμένῳ καὶ λέγοντι
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Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, ὦν κέκτησθαι τὰ πλείω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω;

b Ποῦ ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις γέγονα χρηματιστῆς τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος ἐμοὶ σχεδόν τι ὅσῃν ἐγὼ νῦν οὐσίαν κέκτημαι παραλαβὼν πολλάκις τοσαύτην ἐποίησεν, Λυσαυίας δὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἔτι ἐλάττω αὐτὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νῦν οὐσσης· | ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ εἶναι μὴ ἐλάττω καταλίπω τούτοισιν, ἀλλὰ βραχεῖ γέ τιμι πλείω ἢ παραλάβον.

Οὐ τοι ἔνεκα ἠρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ

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wanting him to say more, I attempted to draw him out by saying: "I fancy, Cephalus, that most people hearing you speak like this don't agree with you, but reckon that you bear old age lightly not because of your character, but because of the great wealth you have acquired: for the rich, they say, have many consolations."

"You're right," he said, "they don't agree with me. And there is something in what they say, though not actually as much as they imagine. But Themistocles' retort is particularly apt here: in reply to the man from Seriphos who became abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to his own merits but to his city, Themistocles said that he would not himself have become famous if he were a Seriphian, and nor would the other if he were an Athenian.¹⁶ And indeed the same reply nicely fits those who are not rich and find old age difficult: that neither would the reasonable man bear old age at all easily if he were poor, nor would an unreasonable man ever be content with himself even if he had acquired riches."

"May I ask, Cephalus, whether you inherited most of your wealth, or did you make it yourself?"

"You want to know how much I made, Socrates?" he said. "As a businessman, I come somewhere between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather and namesake inherited about as much as I now have and multiplied it many times, whereas my father Lysanias reduced it to less than it is now. For myself, I'm well pleased if I pass on to these sons of mine not less, but a little more than I inherited."

"The reason I asked," I said, "is that you didn't strike

¹⁶ The same anecdote in Hdt. (8.125), but with different details.

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c σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσιν, ταύτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, | καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν ἤπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ συγγενέσθαι εἰσὶν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλουτες ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον.

Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

d Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλά μοι ἔτι τοσόνδε εἰπέ· τί μέγιστον οἶε ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέσαι τοῦ πολλῆν οὐσίαν κεκτήσθαι;

Ὅ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων. | εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν τις ἐγγὺς ἦ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσειν, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντὶς περὶ ὧν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσήει. οἱ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ

e ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελῶμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσιν· καὶ αὐτός— ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρωσ ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὧν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον τι καθορᾶ αὐτά— ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη | καὶ σκοπεῖ εἴ τινα τὴν δίκην. ὁ μὲν οὖν εὐρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπνῶν,

¹⁷ For the parent/poet/moneymaker comparison, see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 4.1.20.

¹⁸ For the tradition of rewards and punishments for the insubstantial ghost of the individual in the after-

me as having an excessive love of money, and that is generally the case with those who have not made it themselves, while those who have are twice as attached to it as anyone else. For just as poets love their own poems, and fathers their own children, so too, those who have made money take it seriously as their own creation, as well as valuing its use, as other people do.¹⁷ So they are difficult even to be with, since they are unwilling to commend anything except wealth."

"You're right," he said.

"I certainly am," I said. "But tell me this too; what do you believe is the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the acquisition of all your wealth?"

"Something," he said, "which perhaps would not convince many, if I told them. For let me tell you, Socrates," he said, "that whenever someone gets close to thinking he will die, fear and worry come upon him about things which didn't occur to him before. The stories told about what goes on in Hades, how the wrongdoer here must suffer punishment there, which he earlier laughed at, now torment his soul in case they are true.¹⁸ Furthermore, either through the feebleness of old age, or because he is indeed now nearer to the beyond as it were, and so perceives it somewhat more clearly, he himself becomes filled with suspicion and fear and now begins to reckon up and consider if there is anyone he has wronged in any way. What is more the one who finds he has committed many injus-

life, see Hom. *Od.* 11.576-600. This idea is prominent in the Mystery Religions, such as at Eleusis (see Pind. fr. 121 Bowra), taken up by Plato in *Crg.* 523ff., *Phd.* 107dff., and most elaborately in the "Myth of Er" (see *Resp.* 614aff).

331 ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος δειμαίνει καὶ ζῆ
 μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος· τῷ δὲ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ ἄδικον συννειδῶτι
 ἠδεῖα ἐλπίς ἀεὶ πάρεστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος, ὡς καὶ
 Πίνδαρος λέγει. χαριέντως γάρ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ'
 ἐκείνος εἶπεν, ὅτι ὃς ἂν δικαίως καὶ ὀσίως τὸν βίον
 διαγάγη,

- a γλυκεῖά οἱ καρδίαν
 ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος συναορεῖ
 ἐλπίς ἂ μάλιστα θνατῶν πολύστροφον
 γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ.

εὔ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτ'
 ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πλείστου
 b ἀξίαν εἶναι, | οὐ τι παντὶ ἀνδρὶ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπιεικέι.² τὸ
 γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοιτά τινα ἐξαπατήσῃ ἢ ψεύσασθαι, μηδ'
 αὐτὸν ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα
 ἔπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπιέναι δεδιότα, μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ
 τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις συμβάλλεται. | ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλ-
 λας χρεῖας πολλάς· ἀλλὰ γε ἔν ἀνθ' ἐνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχι-
 στον ἔγωγε θείην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

- c Παγκάλως, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ'
 αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ
 φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι ἂν τίς
 τι παρά του λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ἐνίστε μὲν

² ἐπιεικέι DF: ἐπιεικέι καὶ κοσμίῳ Stob.

BOOK I

tices in his life and, like children, is frequently woken by his dreams, is afraid and lives in fear of the worst. But if a person is conscious of having done no wrong, sweet hope is ever present to cheer him and to be the good 'nourisher of old age' as Pindar himself has it. I tell you Socrates, this is a beautiful saying of his about the man who lives his life in justice and piety,

Sweet expectation that nurtures old age,
Fosters and accompanies the heart,
And above all guides the complex
Mind of mortals.¹⁹

He puts that so wonderfully well! It is indeed in this respect that I take the acquisition of wealth to be of the highest value, certainly not for everyone, but for the decent person. For when it comes to cheating anyone even unintentionally or telling lies, or again, owing anything—any sacrifices to a god, or money to a person, and so departing for the other world in fear, the acquisition of wealth goes a long way toward avoiding such a misfortune. And it has many other uses also; but taking one thing with another I would propose that, for a man of sense, Socrates, this is not the least important thing for which wealth is particularly useful."²⁰

"Most beautifully put, Cephalus," I said.²¹ But let's take this very thing, justice: are we to say that it is simply truthfulness without qualification, and the giving back of whatever one may have taken from someone else? Or is it

¹⁹ Pind. fr. 202 Bowra.
elderly Cephalus with a prolix and discursive style which verges on parody in this final sentence.

²⁰ Plato characterizes the
²¹ See above, n. 15.

δικαίως, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν; | οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω·
 πᾶς ἄν που εἴποι, εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς
 σωφρονοῦντος ὄπλα, εἰ μανεῖς ἀπαιτοί, ὅτι οὔτε χρῆ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἄν εἴη ὁ ἀπο-
 διδούς, οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα πάντα ἐθέλων
 τὰληθῆ λέγειν.

Ὅρθως, ἔφη, λέγεις.

d Οὐκ ἄρα οὗτος ὅρος ἐστὶν δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε
 λέγειν καὶ ἂ ἄν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Πο-
 λέμαρχος, εἶπερ γέ τι χρῆ Σιμωνίδη πείθεσθαι. |

Καὶ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν
 τὸν λόγον· δεῖ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ἐγώ,³ ὁ Πολέμαρχος, τῶν γε σῶν
 κληρονόμος;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς γελάσας, καὶ ἅμα ἦει πρὸς τὰ
 ἱερά. |

e Λέγε δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος,
 τί φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δι-
 καιοσύνης;

Ὅτι, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι
 δίκαιόν ἐστι· τοῦτο λέγων δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς λέ-
 γειν. |

³ ἔφη ἐγώ AD: ἐγὼ ἔφη F

²² An example of a Socratic *elenchus*: putting up a trial defi-
 nition (in this case an obviously inadequate one) for debate; see
 the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 1 (b)). S. also re-
 hearses this argument in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.17–18.

BOOK I

possible to do these very same things sometimes justly and sometimes unjustly? To take an example of what I mean: I think everyone would agree that if one were to take weapons from a friend who is a man of sound mind, and if he were to go mad and demand them back, one ought not to return them. The one giving them back would not be 'just' to do so, and again one should not be willing to tell the whole truth to somebody in that state."²²

"You're right," he replied.

"Then this is not a definition of justice: to tell the truth and give back whatever one has taken."

"Oh but it is, Socrates," said Polemarchus taking up the argument, "at any rate if we're to believe Simonides."

"Well now," said Cephalus, "I'll hand the discussion over to you two; for it's time for me to see to the sacrifices."

"So does that make me, Polemarchus, heir to what is yours?" he said.

"Certainly it does," replied Cephalus with a laugh, and he promptly went off to the sacrifices.²³

"So tell me," I said, "you who are heir to the discussion, what is it that Simonides says about justice which you think is right?"²⁴

"That it is just to give back to everyone what he is owed," he replied. "At least I think he is right in putting it like this."

²³ Cic. *Att.* 4.16.3, comments, apparently without irony, that Plato did not think it appropriate to keep a man of Cephalus' age too long in conversation.

²⁴ Polemarchus is heir to the argument as well as Cephalus' property; the Greek exploits the ambiguity.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδη γε οὐ ῥάδιον ἀπιστεῖν—σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ—τοῦτο μέντοι ὅτι ποτὲ λέγει, σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ· δηλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τό τινος παρακαταθεμένου τι ὄψου· μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι. καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενόν πού ἐστιν τοῦτο ὃ παρακατέθετο· ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Ἀποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν τότε ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ; |

Ἀληθῆ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἄλλο δὴ τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικεν, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι.

Ἄλλο μέντοι νῆ Δί, ἔφη· τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις οἶεται ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι δρᾶν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν. |

Μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ—ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσιν ὡς ἂν τῷ χρυσίον ἀποδῶ παρακαταθεμένῳ, ἐάνπερ ἢ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἢ λῆψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ ὦσιν ὃ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὃ ἀποδιδούς—οὕτω λέγειν φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Τί δέ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέον ὅτι ἂν τύχη ὀφειλόμενον; |

²⁵ S. regularly uses "inspired" (*theios* = literally "godlike") ironically, to imply that poets, like prophets, spoke under divine influence but with obscure meaning (see *Ap.* 22a–c, *Ion* 542a, *Prt.*

BOOK I

“Well, it is certainly not easy to disbelieve Simonides,” I said, “for he was after all a wise and inspired man.²⁵ However as to whatever he means by this, Polemarchus, perhaps you know: I don’t. For he obviously doesn’t mean what we were saying just now, to return anything deposited with us by anyone, even if the person asking for it back is not in his right mind. And yet what he entrusted to us is surely owed to him. Isn’t it?”

“Yes.”

“But that means that if anyone demands something back when they are not in their right mind, in no circumstances should it be returned?”

“True,” he replied.

“Then it seems that Simonides means something other than this when he says that it is just to give back what is owed.”

“Definitely something else, by Zeus,” he replied; “for he thinks that friends owe it to friends to do them something good and not something harmful.”

“I see,” I said: “If two people are friends, and one gives back money deposited with him to the other when the exchange is going to cause harm, the one returning the money is not giving the other what is owed to him. Isn’t that what you claim Simonides is saying?”

“Certainly.”

“But how about this: oughtn’t enemies to be repaid whatever happens to be owed to them?”

315e, *Men.* 99c, and on poetry in general see below, Books 2 and 3 *passim*). This saying of Simonides (sixth/fifth century) is otherwise unknown.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ γε ὀφείλεται αὐτοῖς, ὀφείλεται δέ γε, οἶμαι, παρά γε τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακόν τι.

Ἦνίξατο ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης
 c ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον ὃ εἶη. διανοεῖτο μὲν γάρ, ὡς φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶη δίκαιον, τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν ὀφειλόμενον.

Ἄλλὰ τί οἶει; ἔφη. |

Πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο. “Ὡ Σιμωνίδη, ἣ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται;” τί ἂν οἶει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι;

Δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἣ σώμασιν φάρμακά τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά. |

Ἡ δὲ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσ-
 ἦκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ καλεῖται;

Ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα.

d Εἶεν ἣ οὖν δὴ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη δικαιο-
 σύνη ἂν καλοῖτο;

Εἰ μὲν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένους, ἣ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδούσα. |

Τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει;

Δοκεῖ μοι.

26 Doing good to friends and evil to enemies was traditional Greek morality, see e.g., *Men.* 71e.

27 See above, n. 25.

"Yes absolutely, of course they should get what is owed to them," he said; "and what is more I think that what is owed by one enemy to another should be something appropriate: something bad."²⁶

"So it seems that Simonides was talking in riddles as poets do," I said, "to produce his definition of 'just.'²⁷ For he was apparently thinking that it is just to pay back to each person what is appropriate, and this is what he meant by 'what is owed.'"

"Well, what do you think he meant?" he said.

"By Zeus," I said, "what if someone were to ask Simonides: 'What is the art called medicine? What does it repay that is owed and appropriate, and to what things?' How do you think he would reply to us?"

"Obviously," he said, "it's the art²⁸ which gives drugs, food and drink to the body."

"And what art is known as cookery? What does it give which is owed and appropriate, and to what?"

"It is the one which gives food its seasoning."

"Good. So then, the art of what we repay and to whom could be called justice?"

"If we must be at all consistent with what we said before, Socrates, it must be the art which renders benefit to our friends and harm to our enemies."

"So he means that justice is to do good to one's friends and harm to one's enemies?"

"I think so."

²⁸ *Technē*: = "art" or "skill" (a body of expert knowledge), a key term in the argument with Polemarchus, as later with Thrasymachus; see the introduction to Books 1-5, section 1 (Book 1 (b)).

Τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν
καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν;

Ἰατρός.

e Τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον;
Κυβερνήτης.

Τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον
δυνατώτατος φίλους ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; |

Ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ συμμαχεῖν, ἔμοιγε
δοκεῖ.

Εἶεν· μὴ κάμνουσί γε μήν, ὦ φίλε Πολέμαρχε,
ιατρὸς ἄχρηστος.

Ἀληθῆ.

Καὶ μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης. |

Ναί.

Ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρη-
στος;

Οὐδὲ πᾶν μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο.

333 Χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη;

Χρήσιμον.

Καὶ γὰρ γεωργία· ἢ οὐ;

Ναί. |

Πρὸς γε καρποῦ κτήσιν;

Ναί.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική;

Ναί.

Πρὸς γε ὑποδημάτων ἂν οἶμαι φαίης κτήσιν; |

Πᾶν γε.

BOOK I

“Now in matters of sickness and health, who is best able to do good to friends and harm to enemies when they are ill?”

“A doctor.”

“And who for those who sail, as regards the dangers of the sea?”

“A ship’s captain.”

“But what of the just man? In what action and in what function is he most able to benefit friends and harm enemies?”

“In making war and alliances, I would think.”

“Very well; but when someone is not ill, my dear Polemarchus, a doctor is useless.”

“True.”

“And likewise, when people are not at sea, a ship’s captain is useless.”

“Yes.”

“So likewise for those not fighting a war the just man is useless?”

“Oh no, that doesn’t seem to be true to me at all.”

“So justice is also a useful thing in peacetime?”

“It is.”

“Yes, and so is farming, isn’t it?”

“Yes.”

“For producing crops?”

“Yes.”

“And likewise, shoemaking?”

“Yes.”

“I presume you would say, for producing shoes?”

“Of course.”

Τί δὲ δῆ; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ κτήσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι;

Πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Συμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο; |

b Κοινωνήματα δῆτα.

Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνῶνς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεττευτικός;

Ὁ πεττευτικός.

Ἄλλ' εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνῶνς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ; |

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἄλλ' εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνῶνς τοῦ κιθαριστικοῦ,⁴ ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων;

Εἰς ἀργυρίον, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. |

c Πλήν γ' ἴσως, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δέῃ ἀργυρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδόσθαι ἵππον· τότε δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἵππικός. ἢ γάρ;

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης; |

Ἔοικεν.

Ὅταν οὖν τί δέῃ ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων;

Ὅταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

⁴ κιθαριστικοῦ AF: οἰκοδομικοῦ τε καὶ κιθαριστικοῦ D

BOOK I

"So what about justice, now? For what need, or for producing what would you say it was useful in peacetime?"

"It's useful in connection with business contracts, Socrates."

"By business contracts do you mean partnerships, or something else?"

"Yes, I mean partnerships."

"Now, when it comes to playing draughts, is the just man a good useful partner, or someone skilled in playing draughts?"

"The person skilled in playing draughts."

"And in laying bricks and stone is the just man a better, more useful partner than the builder?"

"Of course not."

"Well then, for what partnership is the just man a better partner than the lyre player, just as the lyre player is better at playing the lyre than the just man?"

"Where money is involved, I would say."

"Except, Polemarchus, perhaps when it comes to using money when you need to buy or sell a horse jointly; then, I presume, you need a trained horseman: isn't that so?"

"Apparently."

"And again, when it comes to a ship, the shipbuilder or ship's captain?"

"It seems so."

"So what then is the occasion for the joint use of silver or gold when the just man is a more useful partner than others?"

"When it is to be put on deposit and kept safe, Socrates."

Οὐκοῦν λέγεις ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κείσθαι; |

Πάνυ γε.

Ἦν ἄρα ἄχρηστον ἢ ἀργύριον, τότε χρήσιμος ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἢ δικαιοσύνη;

d Κινδυνεύει.

Καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέῃ φυλάττειν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ· ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, ἢ ἀμπελοργική; |

Φαίνεται.

Φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέῃ φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὀπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν; |

Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα δὴ πάντα ἢ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστία χρήσιμος;

Κινδυνεύει.

e Οὐκ ἂν οὔν, ὦ φίλε, πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον εἶη ἢ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὄν τυγχάνει. τότε δὲ σκεψώμεθα. ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι;

²⁹ S. polishes off the argument with a polar expression in epigrammatic form: literally: "in use useless, in uselessness useful" (ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστία χρήσιμος), a neatly balanced "chiastic" (ABBA) form of expression. The snappy, manerred epigram and paradoxical expression, reminiscent of the sophist Gorgias, is perhaps intended by Plato to indicate the sophistic tendency of S.'s whole line of argument here. Note also

BOOK I

"In fact, you mean, when we have no need to use it at all, but to put it by?"

"Exactly."

"So when money is useless, that's when justice is useful in relation to it?"

"It looks that way."

"And so when a pruning knife needs to be kept safe, justice is useful both in the community and in private life; but when you need to use it you turn to the art of viticulture?"

"It seems so."

"And so will you say that when you need a shield or a lyre to be kept safe without using it, justice is useful, but when they need to be used you turn to the skills of the hoplite or the musician?"

"That follows."

"So in all other cases, too, justice is useless when each thing is being used, but useful when it is not?"²⁹

"It seems so."

"Then, my friend, justice can't be anything very important, if it turns out to be useful for things only when they are out of use. But let's consider this point: isn't the person who is most formidable in striking blows in a fight, whether boxing or any other kind, also the one who is best at defending himself against them?"³⁰

Polemarchus' less than enthusiastic response in the following line.

³⁰ Not obviously true (one might argue that defense and attack require different skills), but the two aspects have to be subsumed under the heading of a "unitary" skill, if S.'s argument is going to work here. In *Xen. Mem.* 3.1.6, S. assumes that generalship involves skills of both defense and attack.

Πάνυ γε. |

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ
λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας;

Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

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Ἀλλὰ μὴν στρατοπέδου γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός,
ὅσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλευμάτα
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις;

Πάνυ γε. |

Ὅτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φῶρ δει-
νός.

Ἐοικεν.

Εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ
κλέπτειν δεινός.

Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει. |

Κλέπτῃς ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀναπέφανται,
καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὀμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό· καὶ
γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύς πρὸς μητρὸς πάππον
b Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ φησιν αὐτὸν πάντα ἀνθρώ-
πους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνη θ' ὄρκῳ τε. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ
δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σέ καὶ καθ' Ὀμηρον καὶ κατὰ
Σιμωνίδην κλεπτικὴ τις εἶναι, ἐπ' ὠφελία μέντοι τῶν
φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. | οὐχ οὕτως ἔλε-
γες;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι
ἔλεγον· τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν
τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς
c ἐχθρούς.

BOOK I

“Certainly.”

“And again, the person who is skilled at guarding against disease is the one best able to cause it undetected?”

“I think so.”

“Then again, the same man is a good guard of a military camp who can also get hold of the plans and other activities of the enemy?”

“Of course.”

“So, whatever someone is skillful at guarding, he will also be a skillful at stealing?”³¹

“I suppose so.”

“If then the just person is good at guarding money, he will also be good at stealing it.”

“That’s the way the argument seems to be pointing,” he said.

“Then it appears that the just man is unveiled as some kind of thief, and you’re likely to have learned that from Homer. For I tell you he’s fond of Autolycus, Odysseus’ maternal grandfather, and says that ‘he excelled all men in thieving and perjury.’³² So justice, according to you, Homer and Simonides, seems to be some kind of art of stealing, with the proviso that it must be for the benefit of your friends and to the detriment of your enemies. Isn’t that what you meant?”

“Zeus no!” he said, “but I no longer know what I did mean.³³ However I still think myself that justice is helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies.”

³¹ For this paradox, see *Hp. Mi.* 375d–76b.

³² See *Hom. Od.* 19.395. Clearly a joking reference.

³³ For S.’s capacity to bewilder his associates in the *elenchus*, see e.g., *Euthphr.* 11b, *La.* 194b, *Men.* 80a.

Φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἐκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι, καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως;

Εἰκὸς μὲν, ἔφη, οὓς ἂν τις ἠγγῆται χρηστοὺς φιλεῖν, οὓς δ' ἂν πονηροὺς μισεῖν. |

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τούναντίον;

Ἅμαρτάνουσιν. |

Τούτοις ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι;

Πάνν γε.

Ἄλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν;

Φαίνεται.

d Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοί τε καὶ οἷοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν;

Ἄληθῆ.

Κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν. |

Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος.

Τοὺς ἀδίκους ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὠφελεῖν;

Οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται. |

BOOK I

"When you say friends, do you mean those who seem to be true to each of us, or those who really are true, even if they don't seem to be so; and similarly with enemies?"

"It makes sense," he said, "to like those one considers true and dislike those one thinks bad."

"But then, don't you think people make mistakes about this, so that they think many people are good when they aren't really, and many are the opposite?"

"They do."

"For these people, then, the good are their enemies and the bad their friends?"

"Yes, indeed."

"But is it nevertheless just in that case for them to help the bad and harm the good?"

"It would seem so."

"But surely good people are just and cannot do wrong?"

"True."

"So according to your argument it is just to do harm to those who do no injustice."

"No, no, Socrates," he said, "that seems to be a bad argument."

"Then," I said, "it must be just to harm the unjust and help the just?"

"That seems a better conclusion than the previous one."

Πολλοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, συμβήσεται, ὅσοι
 e διημαρτήκασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν
 φίλους βλάπτειν—πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσιν—τοὺς δ'
 ἐχθροὺς ὠφελεῖν—ἀγαθοὶ γάρ· καὶ οὕτως ἐροῦμεν
 αὐτὸ τοῦναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν. |

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω συμβαίνει. ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα·
 κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν
 θέσθαι.

Πῶς θέμενοι, ὦ Πολέμαρχε;

Τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστόν, τοῦτον φίλον εἶναι.

Νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταθώμεθα; |

335 Τὸν δοκοῦντά τε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστόν
 φίλον· τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μὲν, ὄντα δὲ μή, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ
 μὴ εἶναι φίλον. καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲ ἢ αὐτῇ
 θέσει.

Φίλος μὲν δῆ, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς
 ἔσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρός.

Ναί. |

Κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ
 πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φί-
 λον εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακῶς· νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ
 ὠδε λέγειν,⁵ τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν
 δ' ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν;

b Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς
 λέγεσθαι.

Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίου ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν
 καὶ ὄντιν οὖν ἀνθρώπων;

⁵ λέγειν F: λέγειν ὅτι ἔστιν δίκαιον AD

BOOK I

"So, for many people who have misjudged their fellows, it will turn out to be just to harm their friends, who are bad as far as they are concerned, and help their enemies, who are good, won't it? And thus we'll be saying the very opposite of what we claimed Simonides meant."

"It certainly does work out like that," he said. "But let's change our ground: you see perhaps we didn't define 'friend' and 'enemy' correctly."

"How did we define them, Polemarchus?"

"We said that the person who seems to be true is our friend."

"But how are we to change it now?" I asked.

"By stating," he said, "that the one who seems to be good and actually is good is the friend, while the one who seems to be good, but in reality is not, is not our friend, though he may seem so. And the same definition applies to an enemy."

"Then it seems by this definition that the good person will be our friend, and the bad one our enemy."

"Yes."

"So you're telling us to add to our definition of the just. Rather than as we first defined it, when we said that it was just to do good to a friend and harm to an enemy, now we are to add: that it is just to do good to a friend who is good, and to harm an enemy who is bad?"

"Certainly," he replied, "that seems a good way of putting it."

"But is it part of being a just man," I asked, "to harm any human being at all?"

Καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη· τούς γε πονηρούς τε καὶ ἐχθρούς
δεῖ βλάπτειν. |

Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίνον-
ται;

Χείρους.

Ἄρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετὴν, ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν
ἵππων;

Εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. |

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χείρους γίνονται
εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρε-
τήν;

Ἀνάγκη.

c Ἀνθρώπους δέ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν,
βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀρετὴν χείρους
γίγνεσθαι;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἄλλ' ἢ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή; |

Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι.

Ἔοικεν.

Ἄρ' οὖν τῇ μουσικῇ οἱ μουσικοὶ ἀμούσους δύναν-
ται ποιεῖν; |

Ἀδύνατον.

Ἀλλὰ τῇ ἵππικῇ οἱ ἵππικοὶ ἀφίππους;

Οὐκ ἔστιν.

Ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ καὶ
συλληβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὺς;

BOOK I

"Yes, indeed," he replied, "he ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies."

"When horses are harmed, do they become better or worse?"

"Worse."

"Judging by the standards of excellence of dogs or of horses?"

"Of horses."

"And dogs, too, if harmed, become worse by the standards of dogs and not of horses?"

"That follows."

"But as for human beings, my friend, mustn't we say that when harmed they become worse by human standards?"

"Certainly."

"And is not justice a human excellence?"

"That also follows."

"So, my friend, those men who are harmed necessarily become more unjust."

"So it seems."

"Well, are musicians able to make people unmusical through their musicianship?"

"Impossible."

"Or horsemen able to make people bad riders through their horsemanship?"

"No."

"Well, is it by justice, then, that the just make people unjust, or, in short, is it by their standards of excellence as humans that the good make people bad?"

d Ἄλλὰ ἀδύνατον.

Οὐ γὰρ θερμότητος οἶμαι ἔργον ψύχειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. |

Ναί.

Οὐδὲ ξηρότητος ὑγραίνειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

Φαίνεται. |

Ὅ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ ἀδίκου.

e Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι φησὶν τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὠφελίαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν· | οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὃν βλάπτειν.

Συγχωρῶ, ἦ δ' ὄς.

Μαχοῦμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῇ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, εἴαν τις αὐτὸ φῆ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιπτακὸν

BOOK I

"No, that cannot be."

"You see, it's not, I think, the function of heat to cool things down, but the opposite."

"Yes."

"Nor of dryness to make things wet, but the opposite."

"Of course."

"Nor indeed is it the function of the good person to do harm, but the opposite."

"So it appears."

"And the just person is good, isn't he?"

"Of course."

"Then, Polemarchus, it is not the function of the just person to harm either a friend or anyone else, but that of his opposite, the unjust person."

"I think you're entirely right, Socrates," he said.

"So if anyone claims that it is just to render to each what is owed, and by that he actually means that harm is due from the just man to his enemies and benefit to his friends, the man who said this was not wise. You see what he said is not true; it's become apparent to us that it is in no way just to harm anyone."³⁴

"I concede that," he said.

"So you and I," I said, "will fight together against anyone who claims that this view was put forward by Simo-

³⁴ That a genuine *technē* can only benefit its recipient is a fundamental tenet of Socratic ethics, thereby refuting Simonides: the just person cannot harm his enemies. Note, however, that in the immediate context S.'s conclusion simply constitutes *aporia* (impasse); in refuting Polemarchus (Simonides) they have actually failed to discover what justice is (see 336a10 below).

εἰρηκένοι ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. |

Ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη, ἕτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης.

336 Ἄλλ' οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν;

Τίνος; ἔφη. |

Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἴσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἢ δικαιοσύνη ὃν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίη εἶναι; |

b Καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγόμενων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὄρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύετο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον· ὡς δὲ διεπανσάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, | ἀλλὰ συστρέφας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς

³⁵ Bias and Pittacus were sixth-century statesmen and lawgivers (two of the traditional seven “wise men”). “Blessed” (*makarios*) and “wise” (*sophos*) clearly have ironical overtones here, the irony being underlined by S.’s assumption, tongue in cheek, that rather than show these wise men to be wrong, one must deny that they could be responsible for the words attributed to them. In the following line, the irony is clearly lost on Polemarchus.

BOOK I

nides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other of the wise and blessed.”³⁵

“Well,” he said, “I’m ready enough to join in the fight.”

“But do you know,” I said, “whose saying I think it is: the one which says that it is just to benefit friends, and to harm enemies?”

“Whose?” he asked.

“I think it must be from Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias of Thebes, or some other rich man with a great belief in his capabilities.”³⁶

“That’s very true,” he said.

“Well then,” I said, “since it’s become apparent that neither ‘justice’ nor the ‘just’ consists in this, what else can anyone suggest it is?”

Now Thrasymachus, even while we were talking, had many times been eagerly trying to get between us and take hold of the argument. Up to this point however he had been restrained by those sitting near him who wanted to hear the argument out. When we finally brought it to an end and I had asked my question, he could no longer keep quiet, but, gathering himself up like a wild beast, he sprang

³⁶ The first three were absolute rulers (of Corinth, Macedon, and Persia, respectively), whose despotic power makes them likely candidates. Ismenias of Thebes was involved in a scandal of taking bribes from Greece’s enemy, Persia (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1). The reference to Ismenias, dated after S.’s death to 395, is clearly anachronistic in the dramatic context (see General Introduction, section 3).

διαρπασόμενος. Καὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δέι-
 σαντες διεπτοήθημεν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγγόμενος,
 c Τίς, ἔφη, ὑμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ
 τί εὐηθίζεσθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ὑμῖν
 αὐτοῖς; ἀλλ' εἶπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς βούλει εἰδέναι τὸ
 δίκαιον ὅτι ἔστι, μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ
 ἐλέγχων ἐπειδάν τις τι ἀποκρίνηται, ἐγνωκῶς τοῦτο,
 ὅτι ῥᾶον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, | ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς
 ἀπόκριναί καὶ εἰπέ τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ὅπως
 d μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον
 μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι
 τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅτι
 ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι ἐὰν ὕθλους τοι-
 ούτους λέγῃς. |

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐξεπλάγην καὶ προσβλέπων
 αὐτὸν ἐφοβούμην, καὶ μοι δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἐω-
 ράκη αὐτὸν ἢ 'κείνος ἐμέ, ἄφωνος ἂν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ
 ἡνίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἤρχετο ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσ-
 ἐβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος, ὥστε αὐτῷ οἷός τ' ἐγενόμην
 e ἀποκρίνασθαι, καὶ εἶπον ὑποτρέμων· ὦ Θρασύμαχε,
 μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἴσθι· εἰ γάρ ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ
 τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὄδε, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἄκοντες
 ἀμαρτάνομεν. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐζη-
 τοῦμεν, | οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἡμᾶς ἐκόντας εἶναι ὑποκατα-

37 The imagery here has mock-heroic overtones, cf. the Homeric simile-type of Greeks fighting compared to wild animals attacking sheep, e.g., at *Il.* 16.352ff., *Od.* 18.340. Plato uses S.

on us as if he wanted to tear us to pieces.³⁷ Both Polemarchus and I were struck with fear and panic as he bawled out to the whole circle: "What rubbish is this that has got hold of you all this time, Socrates? And why do you play the fool, deferring to each other like this? If you really wish to know what justice is, Socrates, don't just ask questions, or show off by refuting anyone who answers you, while you know that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them. So give an answer yourself and say what you claim justice is. And don't you go telling me that it is 'the obligatory,' or 'the beneficial,' or 'the advantageous,' or 'the profitable,' or 'the expedient,' but, whatever you say, make your definition clear and precise; for I won't take that sort of drivel from you."

When I heard this I was astounded, and looking at him I was filled with fear and I believe that if I hadn't looked at him before he looked at me, I'd have become speechless.³⁸ But at the very moment he began to be exasperated as a result of the argument, I glanced at him first, so that I was able to answer him, and trembling a little I said: "Don't be hard on us, Thrasymachus. You see if I and my friend here have missed the point in any way in our discussion of the argument, rest assured it was not deliberate error on our part. Certainly don't imagine that if we were looking for a piece of gold³⁹ we would never willingly defer

in his narrator role to begin an unflattering portrait of Thrasymachus before the latter even opens his mouth.

³⁸ S., close to playing the fool here, turns a traditional superstition into a joke: if a wolf looks at you before you catch sight of it, you are rendered dumb, cf. Verg. *Ecl.* 9.53.

³⁹ For gold as wisdom, cf. Heraclit. DK 22B22.

κλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ ζητήσῃ καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὐρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ζητοῦντας, πρᾶγμα πολλῶν χρυσίων τιμιώτερον, ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἀνοήτως ὑπέικειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὅτι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό. οἶον γε σύ, ὦ φίλε. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ
 337 δυνάμεθα· ἐλεείσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστίν που ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἢ χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάκχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν· ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὕτη 'κείνη ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, | καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τούτοις προύλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλησσις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἴ τίς τί σ' ἐρωτᾷ.

Σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· εὖ οὖν ἤδησθα ὅτι εἴ τινα ἔροιο ὅποσα ἐστὶν τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ
 b ἐρόμενος προείποις αὐτῷ—“Ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι ἐστὶν τὰ δώδεκα δις ἕξ μηδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ' ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο μηδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία· ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαί σου ἐὰν τοιαῦτα φλναρῆς”—δηλον οἶμαί σοι ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖτο οὕτως πυνθανομένῳ. | ἀλλ' εἴ σοι εἶπεν· “ὦ Θρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προείπες μηδέν; πότερον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, μηδ' εἰ τούτων τι τυγχάνει ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶπω τι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;” τί ἂν αὐτῷ εἶπες πρὸς ταῦτα;

⁴⁰ *Eirōneia* (irony) is habitually attributed to S. by Plato, here in its original sense of “deliberate deceit” (see *Ar. Vesp.* 169–74, *Av.* 1208–11, *Nub.* 444–51) as opposed to the modern sense of

BOOK I

to each other in the search and ruin our chances of finding it, yet in searching for justice, an objective more valuable than masses of gold, we would be so thoughtless as to give way to each other and not seriously do our very best to bring it to light. Believe me, we are serious, my friend; but I think it's the ability we lack. So I think it is far more reasonable for us to be pitied by clever fellows like you rather than be victims of your anger."

When he heard this he burst into loud sarcastic laughter and said: "Heracles! Here we have that usual ironic evasion of Socrates;⁴⁰ I knew it and told these people before that you would not be willing to answer questions, but would sham ignorance and do anything to avoid answering any questions."

"That's because you're clever, Thrasymachus," I said. "So you knew very well that if you were to ask anyone what are the factors of twelve, and in putting the question you warned him: 'Be sure not to tell me that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, because I will not accept that kind of nonsense from you,' I think it was clear to you that nobody would answer a question put like that. But if he had said to you: 'What do you mean, Thrasymachus? May I not give any of the answers you have mentioned? Even if it really is one of these, my dear fellow, must I still give something other than the real one? Or do you mean something else?' What would your answer be?"

irony, where the point is that there is a distinction between surface and underlying meaning. However, there is also a sense in which S. might be able to justify his claim of ignorance as sincere (see e.g., *Ap.* 23a-b).

- c Εἶεν, ἔφη· ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνω.
 Οὐδέν γε κωλύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὅμοιον, φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἤττον τι αὐτὸν οἶει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ, ἕαντε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἕαντε μῆ; |

Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις· ὦν ἐγὼ ἀπεῖπον, τούτων τι ἀποκρινῆ;

Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἰ μοι σκεφαμένῳ οὕτω δόξειεν. |

- d Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δείξω ἑτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης, βελτίω τούτων; τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν;

Τί ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ ὅπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότη; προσήκει δέ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότη· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἀξιῶ παθεῖν. |

Ἦδὺς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότεισον ἀργύριον.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδάν μοι γένηται, εἶπον.

Ἄλλ' ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων· ἀλλ' ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, λέγε· πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσοίσομεν. |

- e Πάνυ γε οἶμαι, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξῃται αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινόμενου λαμβάνῃ λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ.

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὶς ἀποκρίναιτο

"Well," he replied, "this instance is just like the previous one, to be sure!"

"I can't see why it shouldn't be," I said, "but even assuming the examples are not alike, yet appear so to the person questioned, do you think he is any less likely to give what he thinks is the right answer, whether we forbid him to or not?"

"So you're going to do it in some other way, is that it?" he asked: "you're going to give one of the answers I've forbidden?"

"I wouldn't be surprised," I said, "if on reflection I decided to do that."

"So what if I demonstrate that there is an answer about justice which is different from all these and better? What penalty ought you to incur?"⁴¹

"What else," I said, "than what is fitting for the man who doesn't know? I think it is fitting to learn from those who know. So that's what I propose as my penalty."

"You play the innocent!" he said, "but along with the learning you must pay some money too."

"Sure! Whenever I get some," I said.

"Oh, there is some," said Glaucon; "if money is the problem, go ahead, Thrasymachus, for we'll all chip in for Socrates."⁴²

"Oh yes, I'm sure you will," he said, "so that Socrates can do his usual trick, not answer himself, but demand an explanation and refute someone else's attempt."

"Yes, my good fellow," I said, "for how could anyone

⁴¹ A formula from Athenian court procedure: the defendant has a right to propose his own penalty, along with that of the prosecutor (e.g., *Ap.* 36b).

⁴² For his friends' willingness to subsidize S., cf. *Ap.* 38b, *Cri.* 45b.

πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναί, | ἔπειτα,
 εἴ τι καὶ οἶεται, περὶ τούτων ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἶη
 ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὧν ἡγείται ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου;
 338 ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν· σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς
 εἰδέναί καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ
 ἐμοὶ τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσης καὶ
 Γλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

Εἰπόντος δέ μου ταῦτα, ὅ τε Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
 ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. | καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος
 φανερὸς μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν ἵν' εὐδοκιμήσειεν,
 ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην· προσεποιεῖτο
 δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.
 b τελευτῶν δὲ συνεχώρησεν, κάπειτα, Αὐτῆ δὴ, ἔφη, ἡ
 Σωκράτους σοφία· αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν,
 παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιόντα μαθάνειν καὶ τούτων
 μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι. |

Ὅτι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μαθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων,
 ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι δὲ οὐ με φῆς χάριν
 ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδη· ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὅσῃν δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ
 ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω. ὡς δὲ προ-
 θύμως τοῦτο δρῶ, εἴαν τις μοι δοκῆ εὐ λέγειν, εὐ εἶσῃ
 αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὰν ἀποκρίνη· οἶμαι γάρ σε εὐ
 ἐρεῖν.

c Ἄκουε δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς. φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον
 οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τί
 οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθελήσεις. |

answer if in the first place he has no knowledge and is making no claim to it; and secondly, even if he had an opinion, he has been forbidden by a man of no mean reputation to say anything of what he believed? But actually it's more reasonable for you to do the talking: you're the one who claims to know and has something to say. So don't hesitate, but gratify me by answering my questions, and don't begrudge instructing Glaucon here and the others."

When I said this, Glaucon and the others begged him do just as I asked. It was clear that Thrasymachus was keen to speak in order to gain credit, since he believed he had a brilliant answer; but he went on pretending to be keen for me to be the one to answer the questions. Finally he gave way and then said: "there you are: this is the wisdom of Socrates; he's not willing himself to teach, but goes about learning from others and doesn't even show gratitude."

"When you said I learn from others, Thrasymachus," I said, "that's true. But you're mistaken when you claim that I'm not grateful in return: for I pay back as much as I can. But I can only bestow praise, as I have no money. You'll find out how readily I do this when I think someone gives a good answer, at the very moment you give your reply: for I think you will argue your case well."

"Listen then," he said: "for I say that justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.⁴³ Well, why don't you praise me? You just won't do it."

⁴³ On the significance of Thrasymachus' various definitions of justice/injustice in this whole section (esp. 343b–d) and S.'s counterarguments, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book I (c)).

Ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἔφη, τί λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὐπω οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῆς συμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που τό γε τοιόνδε φῆς· εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιαστῆς καὶ αὐτῷ συμφέρει τὰ βόεια κρέα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον.

d Βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταύτη ὑπολαμβάνεις ἧ ἂν κακουργήσαιοι μάλιστα τὸν λόγον.

Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἰπὲ τί λέγεις. |

Εἰπ' οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει, τὸ ἄρχον; |

Πάνυ γε.

e Τίθεται δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἢ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτῇ συμφέρον, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικούς, τυραννὶς δὲ τυραννικούς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως· θέμεναι δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι συμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα. | τοῦτ' οὖν ἐστίν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὃ λέγω ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ταυτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον· αὕτη δέ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε συμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἀντὶ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. |

"I will," I said, "provided that I first understand what you mean, because at the moment I'm not yet clear. You say that the advantage of the stronger is just. But whatever do you mean by this, Thrasymachus? For I can't imagine you're claiming something like this: if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and it's to his advantage to eat beef to keep fit, that this diet is advantageous and just for us too, who are weaker than him."

"You are appalling, Socrates," he said; "you take my statement in whatever sense is most likely to wreck it."

"Not at all, my dear fellow," I said; "just explain more clearly what you mean."

"Do you mean to say," he said, "that you don't know that some cities are governed by tyrants, some by democrats and some by aristocrats?"

"Of course."

"And so what has control in each city state is the ruling power?"

"Certainly."

"But each ruling power passes laws with a view to its own advantage: a democracy passes democratic laws, a tyranny tyrannical ones, and so on with the rest. In passing them, the rulers proclaim that what is to their own advantage is just for those who are ruled by them, and if anyone deviates from this they punish them as lawbreakers and criminals. So that is what I mean, my dear fellow, when I say that justice is the same in all cities: that which is to the advantage of the established regime. This, I think, is what exercises sovereign power, so that to anyone who reasons correctly justice is the same everywhere, namely the advantage of the stronger."

Νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἦ μή, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ συμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι—καίτοι ἔμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην—πρόσεστιν δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ “τοῦ κρείττονος.”

b Σμικρά γε ἴσως, ἔφη, προσθήκη.

Οὐπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον. | ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ προστιθείς καὶ αὐτὸ φῆς εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτέον δὴ.

Σκόπει, ἔφη.

Ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι; |

Ἔγωγε.

c Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἷό τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν;

Πάντως που, ἔφη, οἷό τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τινὰς οὐκ ὀρθῶς; |

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

Τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τὸ τὰ συμφέροντά ἐστι τίθεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀσύμφορα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

Οὕτως. |

BOOK I

"Now," I said, "I grasp your meaning; but I will try to find out whether you are right or not. You yourself have answered that what is just is what is advantageous, Thrasymachus; and yet this was an answer you forbade me to make; but you immediately added the qualification: advantageous 'to the stronger.'"

"A trivial addition, perhaps!" he said.

"Well, it's not even clear yet if it might be significant. But what is clear is that we must consider whether what you say is true. Now even I agree with your definition that what is just is some kind of advantage, but you go further and say that it is the advantage of the stronger person, and this is what I don't know about. We really must look into it."

"Go ahead," he said.

"I shall," I said. "Tell me, don't you claim too, that it's obeying those in authority that is just?"

"I do."

"Are the rulers in the various cities infallible or can they sometimes make mistakes?"

"Of course," he said; "I think they can make some mistakes."

"Therefore in attempting to legislate, some laws they get right and some not?"

"I suppose so."

"Getting them right implies doing it to their own advantage, and wrong, to their disadvantage, doesn't it? Is that what you mean?"

"Precisely."

Ἄ δ' ἂν θῶνται ποιητέον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, καὶ τοῦτό
 ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

d Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον
 τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸνναν-
 τίον, τὸ μὴ συμφέρον.

Τί λέγεις σύ; ἔφη. |

Ἄ σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ σκοπῶμεν δὲ βέλτιον.
 οὐχ ὠμολόγηται τοὺς ἀρχοντας τοῖς ἀρχομένοις
 προστάττοντας ποιεῖν ἅττα ἐνίοτε διαμαρτάνειν τοῦ
 ἑαυτοῖς βελτίστου, ἀ δ' ἂν προστάττωσιν οἱ ἀρχοντες
 δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ποιεῖν; ταῦτ' οὐχ ὠμο-
 λόγηται; |

Οἴμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

e Οἶον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορα ποιεῖν
 τοῖς ἀρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὠμολο-
 γησθαί σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀρχοντες ἄκοντες κακὰ αὐ-
 τοῖς προστάττωσιν, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῆς ταῦτα
 ποιεῖν ἀ ἐκείνοι προσέταξαν | — ἄρα τότε, ὦ σοφώτατε
 Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὕτωςί,
 δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τὸνναντίον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ
 τοῦ κρείττονος ἀσύμφορον δήπου προστάττεται τοῖς
 ἥττοσιν ποιεῖν.

340 Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, σα-
 φέστατά γε.

Ἐὰν σύ γ', ἔφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσης, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν
 ὑπολαβών. |

BOOK I

"But whatever they legislate must be acted on by their subjects, and that is justice?"⁴⁴

"Of course."

"Then by your argument it is just to do not only what is to the advantage of the stronger, but also the opposite, what is to their disadvantage."

"What do you mean?" he replied.

"The same as you, I think; but let's take a closer look at it. Was it not agreed that governments in legislating for their subjects sometimes fail to obtain what is best for themselves, but at the same time it is just for their subjects to do whatever their rulers lay down. Was that not agreed?"

"I certainly think so," he said.

"Therefore," I said, "you have to suppose that you have also conceded that it is just for the rulers and those who are stronger to do what is to their disadvantage whenever the rulers unintentionally lay down what is bad for themselves, and you claim that it is just for their subjects to do what the rulers have laid down. In that case doesn't the conclusion inevitably follow, you oh so clever Thrasymachus, that it is just to do the opposite of what you assert? For the weaker are commanded to carry out what is to the disadvantage of the stronger."

"Yes, by Zeus, Socrates," said Polemarchus, "nothing could be more obvious."

"Of course," said Clitophon, joining in, "if you're his witness."

⁴⁴ For the idea of justice as simply obedience to the laws which happen to be laid down, cf. Antipho Soph. (late fifth century) DK 87B44.

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Καὶ τί, ἔφη, δέεται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας ἐνίοτε ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ προστάττειν, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν.

Τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος. |

Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὦ Κλειτοφῶν, συμφέρον
 b δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο. ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφοτέρωθεν θέμενος ὁμολόγησεν αὐτὸς ἐνίοτε τοὺς κρείττους τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀσύμφορα κελεύειν τοὺς ἥττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον δίκαιον ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ μὴ συμφέρον. |

Ἄλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὁ ἡγούμενος ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ συμφέρειν· τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἥττονι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο.

Ἄλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἐλέγετο.

Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ
 c νῦν οὕτω λέγει Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχόμεθα. Καὶ μοι εἶπέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο ἦν ὁ ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι, ἕαντε συμφέρη ἕαντε μὴ; οὕτω σε φῶμεν λέγειν; |

Ἦκιστα γε, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οἶε καλεῖν τὸν ἕξαμαρτάνοντα ὅταν ἕξαμαρτάνη;

Ἐγωγε, εἶπον, ὦμην σε τοῦτο λέγειν ὅτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὁμολόγησις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι ἀλλά τι καὶ ἕξαμαρτάνειν.

d Συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς

BOOK I

“And why do we need a witness?” he replied. “Thrasymachus himself admits that rulers sometimes give orders which are harmful to themselves and it is just for their subjects to obey them.”

“Yes, Polemarchus, because Thrasymachus proposed that it is just to carry out the orders of the rulers.”

“Yes, Clitophon, and he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just. And having proposed both of these, he again made the concession that the stronger sometimes order the weaker subjects to do what is not to their own advantage. And from these admissions it follows that the advantage of the stronger would no more be just than their disadvantage.”

“But,” Clitophon objected, “by the advantage of the stronger he meant what the stronger believe to be to their advantage; this is what the weaker must do, and that is what he claimed was just.”

“Well, that wasn’t what was said,” replied Polemarchus.

“It doesn’t matter, Polemarchus,” I said, “but if that is now what Thrasymachus maintains, let us accept it as it is. So tell me, Thrasymachus, was this how you wanted to define justice: that it is the advantage of the stronger as it appears to the stronger, whether it really is to their advantage or not? Is that how we are to take what you said?”

“Not in the least,” he replied; “do you really imagine I call someone who makes a mistake stronger at the moment when he makes his mistake?”

“Well I thought you meant that,” I said, “when you agreed that rulers are not infallible but can sometimes make mistakes.”

“That’s because you are a cheat, Socrates, the way you

λόγοις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα
περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαμαρτάνει;
ἢ λογιστικόν, ὃς ἂν ἐν λογισμῷ ἁμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν
ἁμαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν; | ἀλλ' οἶμαι
λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξῆμαρτεν καὶ
ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξῆμαρτεν καὶ ὁ γραμματιστὴς· τὸ δ' οἶ-
e
μαί ἕκαστος τούτων, καθ' ὅσον τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ προσ-
αγορεύομεν αὐτόν, οὐδέποτε ἁμαρτάνει ὥστε κατὰ
τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογῆ, οὐδεὶς
τῶν δημιουργῶν ἁμαρτάνει. ἐπιλιπούσης⁶ γὰρ ἐπι-
στήμης ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἁμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι
δημιουργός· | ὥστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων
οὐδεὶς ἁμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ᾖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν
εἴποι ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἥμαρτεν καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἥμαρτεν.
τοιούτου οὖν δὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νυνδὴ ἀπο-
κρίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκείνο τυγχάνει ὄν,
341 τὸν ἄρχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν,
μὴ ἁμαρτάνοντα δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι,
τοῦτο δὲ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ποιητέον. ὥστε ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
ἔλεγον δίκαιον λέγω, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμ-
φέρων. |

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· δοκῶ σοὶ συκο-
φαντεῖν;

⁶ ἐπιλιπούσης AD Stob.: ἐπιλειπούσης F

⁴⁵ "Cheat" is used here to translate the noun *sukophantēs* (origin obscure), the name given to a person in the Athenian

BOOK I

argue.⁴⁵ For example, do you call a person who makes a mistake about his patients a doctor in respect of the actual mistake? Or, whoever makes a mistake in calculation, do you call him an arithmetician at the moment when he makes the mistake in respect of that mistake? I think we express it like this: that the doctor has made a mistake, and the arithmetician and the teacher likewise, but in fact, I don't think that any of these ever makes a mistake in respect of what we call him. Consequently, according to strict logic, since you too insist on precision, no skilled professional makes a mistake. For it is when one's knowledge has failed that he who goes wrong goes wrong, and in the area in which he is not a professional; so that no professional, wise man or ruler, makes a mistake at the moment when he is a ruler, even though everybody may well use the expression that the doctor or the ruler made a mistake. This is the way then that you should take the answer I gave you just now. But to speak really strictly one should say that the ruler, as far as he is a ruler, does not make mistakes, and in his infallibility he ordains what is best for himself, and this his subjects must carry out. Consequently, I repeat what I have been saying from the start: justice is to do what is to the advantage of the stronger."

"Well now, so you think I'm cheating you, Thrasymachus?"

"I certainly do."

courts who made a living out of malicious prosecutions, whose aim was to extort money from defendants or reward prosecutors. The meaning of the Greek word (very different from the modern "sycophant") implies sharp practice. Translated elsewhere as "informer" (see 8.553b4, 9.575b8).

Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οἷε γάρ με ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουρ-
γούντά σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἠρόμη;

Εὖ μὲν οὖν οἶδα, ἔφη. καὶ οὐδέν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται
b οὔτε γὰρ ἂν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε μὴ λαθῶν
βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ. δύναιο.

Οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε.
ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ αὐθις ἡμῖν τοιοῦτον ἐγγένηται, διόρισαι
ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἄρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα, τὸν
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, |
οὗ τὸ συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ
ἥττονι ποιεῖν.

Τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἔφη, λόγῳ ἄρχοντα ὄντα.
πρὸς ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει, εἴ τι δύνασαι—
οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι—ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἰός τ' ἦς.

c Οἷε γὰρ ἂν με, εἶπον, οὕτω μανῆναι ὥστε ξυρεῖν
ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκοφαντεῖν Θρασύμαχον;

Νῦν γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδέν ὦν καὶ ταῦτα. |

Ἄδην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι ὁ τῷ
ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἰατρός, ὃν ἄρτι ἔλεγες, πότερον χρη-
ματιστής ἐστίν ἢ τῶν καμνόντων θεραπευτής; καὶ
λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι ἰατρὸν ὄντα.

Τῶν καμνόντων, ἔφη, θεραπευτής.

Τί δὲ κυβερνήτης; ὁ ὀρθῶς κυβερνήτης ναυτῶν
ἄρχων ἐστὶν ἢ ναύτης; |

⁴⁶ Scholiast explains: "to dare the impossible," as in the mod-
ern English proverb "to beard the lion."

“Does that mean you think I asked my questions with the deliberate intention of using unfair arguments against you?”

“I’m perfectly sure of it,” he said. “And you won’t get any further, for you don’t fool me with your evil ways, nor, failing that, could you use argument to take me by force.”

“I wouldn’t even dream of trying, my dear fellow,” I said. “But to avoid us getting into this sort of situation again, clarify either in general terms or by strict reasoning, as you were saying just now, what you mean by both the ruler and the stronger, in whose interest, as the stronger, it will be just for the weaker to act.”

“I mean the ruler in the strictest sense,” he replied. “Try out your evil tricks and fraudulent arguments on that, if you can; I’m not asking to be excused. But there’s really no chance of your succeeding.”

“What, do you imagine,” I said, “that I would be so mad as to attempt to shave a lion⁴⁶ and defraud Thrasymachus?”

“Well you did try just now,” he said, “though you were no good even then.”

“Enough of that sort of talk,” I said. “But tell me: this doctor by strict definition whom you’ve just been talking about, is he a man of business or a carer of the sick? Mind you talk about the man who really is a doctor.”

“He’s a carer of the sick,” he replied.

“And what of the ship’s captain? Is the proper ship’s captain one who commands sailors, or just a sailor?”

“One who commands sailors.”

d Ναυτῶν ἄρχων.

Οὐδὲν οἶμαι τοῦτο ὑπολογιστέον, ὅτι πλεῖ ἐν τῇ νηί, οὐδ' ἐστὶν κλητέος ναύτης· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν κυβερνήτης καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν. |

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἔστιν τι συμφέρον;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐ καὶ ἡ τέχνη, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπὶ τούτῳ πέφυκεν, ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ συμφέρον ἐκάστῳ ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἐκπορίζειν; |

Ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστιν τι συμφέρον ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι μάλιστα τελείαν εἶναι;

e Πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;

Ὡσπερ, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ με ἔροιο εἰ ἐξαρκεῖ σώματι εἶναι σώματι ἢ προσδεῖταιί τινος, εἴποισμ' ἂν ὅτι "Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ἰατρικὴ νῦν ἠύρημένη, | ὅτι σῶμά ἐστιν πονηρὸν καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. τούτῳ οὖν ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ συμφέροντα, ἐπὶ τοῦτο παρεσκευάσθη ἡ τέχνη." ἢ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκῶ, ἔφην, ἂν εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων, ἢ οὐ;

342 Ὅρθως, ἔφη.

Τί δὲ δῆ; αὐτῇ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐστὶν πονηρά, ἢ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἔσθ' ὅτι προσδεῖταιί τινος ἀρετῆς—ὥσπερ

⁴⁷ *Technē* = "art" or "skill" (see above, n. 28).

BOOK I

“I don’t think we should take into account at all the fact that he sails on the ship, and he shouldn’t even be called a sailor. For it’s not in respect of his sailing that he is called a ship’s captain, but by virtue of his art⁴⁷ and command of the crew.”

“True,” he said.

“Then, do these people each have some advantage?”

“Yes.”

“And doesn’t their art have the natural aim of seeking and getting what is to their advantage?”

“It does,” he said.

“So is there anything else advantageous to each of these arts other than their being as perfect as possible?”

“What do you mean by that question?”

“It’s just as if you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficient or whether it needs something else,” I said. “In that case I should reply: ‘It certainly does need something else. That’s why the art of medicine has now been discovered, because the body is defective and as such isn’t self-sufficient. So the art was developed for the very purpose of providing for the advantage of the body.’ Do you think in saying this my reasoning would be correct, or not?”

“Yes, it would be,” he replied.

“Then what about this? Is the art of medicine or any other art itself defective, because it lacks some particular excellence⁴⁸ to perfect it? For example the eyes lack sight

⁴⁸ S. uses here the conventional sense of *aretē* = “excellence” as the end for which something exists, e.g., sight is what the eyes

ὀφθαλμοὶ ὄψεως καὶ ὠτα ἀκοῆς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δεῖ τινος τέχνης τῆς τὸ συμφέρον εἰς ταῦτα σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριούσης— Ἰ ἄρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τέχνῃ ἐνι τις πονηρία, καὶ δεῖ ἐκάστη τέχνῃ ἄλλης τέχνης ἣτις αὐτῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκέψεται, καὶ τῇ σκοπομένη ἑτέρας αὐ τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν

b ἀπέραντον; ἢ αὐτὴ αὐτῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκέψεται; ἢ οὔτε αὐτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης προσδεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς πονηρίαν τὸ συμφέρον σκοπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἁμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾶ τέχνῃ πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ προσήκει τέχνῃ ἄλλῃ τὸ συμφέρον ζητεῖν ἢ 'κείνῳ οὗ τέχνῃ ἐστίν, ἢ αὐτῇ δὲ ἀβλαβῆς καὶ ἀκέραιός ἐστιν ὀρθῇ οὔσα, ἕωςπερ ἂν ἡ ἐκάστη ἀκριβῆς ὅλη ἤπερ ἐστίν; καὶ σκόπει ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ· οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως ἔχει;

Οὕτως, ἔφη, φαίνεται.

c Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἰατρικὴ ἰατρικῇ τὸ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ ἀλλὰ σώματι.

Ναί, ἔφη.

Οὐδὲ ἵππικὴ ἵππικῇ ἀλλ' ἵπποις· οὐδὲ ἄλλη τέχνῃ οὐδεμία ἐαυτῇ—οὐδὲ γὰρ προσδεῖται—ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνῃ ἐστίν. ἢ

Φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως.

are for, hearing for ears, etc. In this complex paragraph, S.'s argument seeks to show that arts, correctly practiced, including the art of just rule, have no defect which require concern for *their own* advantage, but are entirely concerned with the advantage of

and the ears hearing, and for this reason they need some art in addition to them which will take into account and provide for their advantage to achieve these ends. Is there any defect in an art itself and does each one require another one which will provide for its advantage, and again another one for that one, and so on *ad infinitum*, or will each consider its own advantage? Alternatively, it has no need either of itself or any other art to consider what is advantageous for it in respect of its own defects. For there is no defect or flaw present in any art, nor is it part of its function to seek the advantage for anything other than for that of which it is the art. When it is right itself, is it faultless and whole, so long as each art remains precisely and wholly what it is? Consider this in that precise sense of yours—is it so or not?”

“It appears to be so,” he said.

“So,” I said, “the art of medicine looks not to its own advantage but to that of the body.”

“Yes,” he replied.

“And the art of horsemanship looks not to its own advantage but to that of horses. Nor does any other art look to its own advantage—for it has no shortcomings—but to the advantage of that for which it exists as an art.”

“So it seems,” he said.

their subject matter. This is the key argument against Thrasymachus, which, in more elaborate form, extends throughout *Republic*. See below, n. 74, and the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 1 (c)).

Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι
καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου οὐπὲρ εἰσιν τέχναι.

Συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόγις. |

Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη γε οὐδεμία τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος
συμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἥττονός
τε καὶ ἀρχομένου ὑπὸ ἑαυτῆς.

- d Συνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει
δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠμολόγησεν, Ἄλλο
τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲ ἰατρός οὐδεὶς, καθ' ὅσον
ἰατρός, τὸ τῷ ἰατρῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει,
ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ κάμνοντι; | ὠμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῆς
ἰατρός σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής. ἢ
οὐχ ὠμολόγηται;

Συνέφη. |

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἶναι
ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ ναύτης;

- e Ὡμολόγηται.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὅ γε τοιοῦτος κυβερνήτης τε καὶ ἄρχων
τὸ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ συμφέρον σκέψεται τε καὶ προσ-
τάξει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ναύτῃ τε καὶ ἀρχομένῳ. |

Συνέφησε μόγις.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, οὐδὲ ἄλλος
οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, τὸ
αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ
ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ, | καὶ πρὸς
ἐκεῖνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκείνῳ συμφέρον καὶ πρέπον,
καὶ λέγει ἅ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἅ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.

BOOK I

“But then again, Thrasymachus, arts surely also rule and control those things of which they are the arts.”

At this point he conceded, but very reluctantly.

“So no body of knowledge is concerned with the advantage of the stronger or lays down rules, but that of the weaker ruled by it.”

He finally agreed to this, too, though he tried to make a fight of it. Since he had agreed, I said: “so in other words, no doctor, in his capacity as a doctor, looks to or orders anything to his own advantage, but rather to that of his patient? For it was agreed that the doctor, by strict definition, is one who controls the body and is not in the business of making money. Was that not agreed?”

He agreed.

“And that the ship’s captain, by strict definition, is a commander of sailors but not a sailor?”

“Agreed.”

“And so that sort of captain and ruler will not consider and give orders to his own advantage, but to that of the sailor who is commanded by him.”

He assented reluctantly.

“And so it follows, Thrasymachus, that nobody at all in any position of authority, in his capacity as a ruler, looks to or takes measures for what is to his own advantage, but that of the subject and the person on whose behalf he exercises his skill, and it is by looking to that, and to what is advantageous and appropriate to it, that he says all that he says and does all that he does.”

343 Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἡμεν τοῦ λόγου καὶ πᾶσι καταφανὲς ἦν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς τοῦναντίον περιεισπύσκει, ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τίτθη σοι ἔστιν; |

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν μάλλον ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτᾶν;

Ὅτι τοί σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾶ καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γινώσκεις.

Ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

- b Ὅτι οἶε τοὺς ποιμένας ἢ τοὺς βουκόλους τὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ τῶν βοῶν ἀγαθὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέποντας ἢ τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας, οἳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν, | ἄλλως πως ἡγήθῃ διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ ὥσπερ ἂν τις πρὸς πρόβατα διατεθείη, καὶ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖν αὐτοὺς διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἢ
- c τοῦτο, ὅθεν αὐτοὶ ὠφελήσονται. καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἶπερί τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας, ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθόμενου τε

⁴⁹ A runny nose was popularly thought to indicate stupidity (Lucian, *Alex.* 20). There is also a play on words: κορυζᾶν means "to snivel" and "(talk) drivel"; ἀπομύττειν means "to wipe someone's nose" and also "to stop the drivel."

BOOK I

Now when we had come to this point in the discussion, and it was obvious to everybody that his reasoning on justice had been turned upside down, Thrasy-machus, instead of replying, said: "Tell me, Socrates, do you have a wet nurse?"

"What do you mean?" I replied; "shouldn't you have answered me rather than ask such a question?"

"Because I'm telling you," he said, "she's turning a blind eye to your sniveling⁴⁹ and doesn't stop you driveling, though you need it, who can't even get you to recognize the difference between sheep and shepherd."

"And why exactly do you say that?" I asked.

"Because you imagine that shepherds or herdsmen are considering the good of their flocks or herds, and that they fatten and tend them for some purpose other than the good of their masters and themselves. And what's more, you think that the attitude of those who govern our cities (those who really are rulers) toward those who are governed is somehow different from the way one might regard sheep, and that they think of anything else night and day but how to make a profit out of them. And you are so far out in understanding⁵⁰ about what is just and justice, and what is unjust and injustice, that you don't know that justice and the just are in reality someone else's good, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, whereas any harm suffered by the subject who obeys and is subservient is all

⁵⁰ So most translators, see LSJ *πόρρω*, BII, or, alternatively, heavily sarcastic, "you are so far advanced in understanding . . . that you are ignorant."

καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, | ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τοῦναντίον,
καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, οἱ
δ' ἀρχόμενοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον κρείττονος
ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἐκείνον ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες
αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν.

- d Σκοπεῖσθαι δέ, ᾧ εὐηθέστατε Σώκρατες, οὕτωςι
χρή, ὅτι δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει.
πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμβολαίοις,
ὅπου ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ κοινωνήσῃ, οὐδαμοῦ
ἂν εὔροις | ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινωνίας πλέον ἔχοντα
τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀλλ' ἔλαττον· ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς
πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τέ τινες εἰσφοραὶ ᾧσιν, ὁ μὲν
δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ δ' ἔλαττον,
e ὅταν τε λήψῃς, ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ πολλὰ κερδαίνει. καὶ
γὰρ ὅταν ἀρχὴν τινα ἄρχῃ ἐκάτερος, τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ
ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ζημία, τά γε οἰκεία δι'
ἀμέλειαν μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου
μηδὲν ὠφελείσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, | πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις ἀπεχθέσθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις,
ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλῃ αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον·
344 τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τὰναντία ὑπάρχει. λέγω
γὰρ ὅνπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλε-
ονεκτεῖν· τοῦτον οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ βούλει κρίνειν

⁵¹ *Eisphorai* = special taxes levied on citizens from time to time on their property. Thrasymachus' point is that the unjust person will minimize his wealth in order to escape a just assessment. *Lēpseis* = payouts, i.e., exceptional distributions of land or money, or the rewards of an official position.

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his own. But injustice is the opposite of this, and rules over those who are truly simpleminded and just; and, being ruled, they serve the advantage of the one who is the stronger, and by serving him they promote his happiness to the total exclusion of their own.

You must look at the matter, my most simpleminded Socrates, thus: that the just man everywhere comes off worse than the unjust. To begin with, in business relations, wherever such a person collaborates with another such, nowhere would you find, when the association is concluded, that the just person has come off better than the unjust, but worse. Secondly, in dealings with the city, when there are taxes to be paid,⁵¹ the just person contributes more and the unjust less out of equal resources, and when there are payouts the latter gains much, but the former nothing. And so, when each of them holds any office, the just person, even if he suffers no other penalty, will see his private affairs becoming comparatively worse through neglect⁵² and, because he is just, he will gain no profit from his office. And on top of that he will be hated by his family and friends, whenever he refuses to do them a service unjustly. But with the unjust person all this is exactly the opposite. I'm referring to the person I spoke of just now, the one who is able to gain unfair advantage on a grand scale. Now this is the man to watch if you want

⁵² The neglect of private affairs by those in public office is a Greek commonplace (see e.g., Hdt. 1.97), utilized later by S. against Thrasymachus, as part of the argument (346d1ff.) that rulers, strictly defined, are not acting in their own interest.

πόσω μᾶλλον συμφέρει ἰδίᾳ αὐτῷ ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον.⁷

Πάντων δὲ ῥᾶστα μαθήσῃ, εἰς ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς, ἢ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ, | τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθέντας καὶ ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς, ἢ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰλλότρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ
 b συλλήβδην· ὧν ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ, ζημιουταί τε καὶ ὀνειδίῃ ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα— καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρῦχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικούντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται— | ἐπειδὴν δέ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασιν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσῃται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ὀνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται,
 c οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν ἠδικηκότα· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμενοι ὀνειδίζουσιν οἱ ὀνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν. |

Οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης ἔστιν ἰκανῶς γιγνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ συμφέρον.

⁷ ἄδικον . . . ἢ τὸ δίκαιον AD: τῶν ἀδίκων . . . ἢ τῶν δικαίων F

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to judge how much more he benefits personally by being unjust than by being just.

However, you will understand this matter most easily of all if you turn to absolute injustice which makes the person who has been unjust most happy, and those who have been wronged and would be unwilling to commit a crime most wretched. I'm talking about tyranny, which secretly appropriates by force what does not belong to it, sacred and secular;⁵³ private and public, and on no small scale, but wholesale. When people are caught committing individual unjust acts like these, they are fined and incur the greatest disgrace. I'm talking about temple robbers, kidnappers, burglars, fraudsters, thieves, as people who commit these individual forms of villainy are called. But whenever someone kidnaps and enslaves the citizens themselves in addition to their property, instead being named and shamed such people are called happy and fortunate, not only by the citizens but also by everyone else who hears about the one who has committed such out-and-out injustice; for those who censure injustice do so not because they fear committing unjust acts, but rather because they fear being the victims of them.

Thus, Socrates, injustice when it occurs on a sufficiently large scale is both stronger, freer and more masterful than justice, and, as I said at the beginning, justice is in fact the advantage of the stronger, and on the other hand injustice is what is profitable and advantageous to oneself."

⁵³ *Hiera kai hosia* ("sacred and secular") indicates a contrast between things which are reserved for the gods (*hiera*) and those which may be used by humans (*hosia*—not secular in the modern sense).

d Ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῶ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι,
 ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὠτων
 ἄθροον καὶ πολλὸν τὸν λόγον· οὐ μὴν εἴσάν γε αὐτὸν
 οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ' ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομείναι τε καὶ
 παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγον. | καὶ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ
 αὐτὸς πάνυ ἐδεόμην τε καὶ εἶπον· ὦ δαιμόνιε Θρα-
 σύμαχε, οἷον ἐμβάλων λόγον ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι
 πρὶν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως
 e ἔχει; ἢ σμικρὸν οἶε ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι
 ἀλλ' οὐ⁸ βίου διαγωγὴν, ἣ ἂν διαγόμενος ἕκαστος
 ἡμῶν λυσιτελεστάτην ζωὴν ζῷ;

Ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, τοῦτ' ἄλλως
 ἔχει; |

Ἔοικας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ—ἦτοι ἡμῶν γε οὐδὲν κήδεσθαι,
 οὐδὲ τι φροντίζειν εἴτε χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα
 ἀγνοοῦντες ὃ σὺ φῆς εἰδέναί. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, προθυμοῦ
 καὶ ἡμῖν ἐνδείξασθαι—οὔτοι κακῶς σοι κείσεται ὅτι
 345 ἂν ἡμᾶς τοσοῦσδε ὄντας εὐεργετήσης—ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ
 σοι λέγω τό γ' ἐμόν, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὐδ' οἶμαι
 ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐὰν ἐᾷ
 τις αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ διακωλύῃ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται. |

⁸ ἀλλ' οὐ AD: ὅλου F

⁵⁴ A deliberately “low” comic image; the *balneus* = “bath man” is coupled with prostitutes in Aristophanes *Eq.* 1403; likewise “pour over,” “drench,” of words, Ar. *Vesp.* 483. With varying degrees of irony S. claims in the Platonic dialogues to dislike and mistrust long speeches (though not above making them himself,

After he had said this Thrasymachus made as if to leave, having, like a bath attendant, poured over our ears an incessant copious flood of argument.⁵⁴ However the company would not let him, but compelled him to stay and defend what he had just said. Indeed I myself too was one of those very much begging him to stay, and said: "My dear Thrasymachus, after hurling such an argument at us surely you don't intend then to go away⁵⁵ before you've explained it adequately, or found out whether it is right or not? Or do you think it's a minor matter you're attempting to define, and not the conduct of a life by which each of us will live our course most profitably, if we follow it through?"

"Of course; do you imagine I think otherwise?" retorted Thrasymachus.

"You seem to," I replied, "or else you don't care about us, and you don't feel any concern whether we are going to live better or worse lives in our ignorance of what you claim to know. Come on, my friend, show willing and explain to us. Whatever benefit you can bestow on so many of us won't be a bad investment.⁵⁶ For I can tell you that as far as I'm concerned you haven't convinced me, and I don't think that injustice is more profitable than justice, not even if you allow it a free hand and don't prevent it

e.g., *Grg.* 507–9), as opposed to his preferred method of discussion, the *elenchus*.⁵⁵ A change of metaphor: Scythian archers proverbially shot their arrows at the enemy and then rode away (cf. *Hdt.* 4.128ff.). For the metaphor, see *Eur. Alc.* 679–80.

⁵⁶ The metaphor from finance extracts humor at Thrasymachus' expense: for him to stay and try to convince S. and the others will be in his interest (possibly a covert dig at his reputation for *philarguria*, "love of money"), see also 337d6.

ἀλλ', ὦγαθέ, ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ
 τῷ λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι, ὅμως ἐμέ γε οὐ
 b πείθει ὡς ἔστι τῆς δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον. ταῦτ'
 οὖν καὶ ἕτερος ἴσως τις ἡμῶν πέπονθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγώ·
 πείσον οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἱκανῶς ἡμᾶς ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς
 βουλευόμεθα δικαιοσύνην ἀδικίας περὶ πλείονος ποι-
 ούμενοι. |

Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νυνδὴ ἔλεγον
 μὴ πέπεισαι, τί σοι ἔτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν
 φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον;

Μὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ σύ γε· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν, ἂ
 ἂν εἶπης, ἔμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἐὰν μετατιθῆ, φανερώς
 c μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπάτα. νῦν δὲ ὄρας, ὦ
 Θρασύμαχε—ἔτι γὰρ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψώμεθα—
 ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἱατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον ὀριζόμενος τὸν
 ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ᾧου δεῖν ὕστερον ἀκριβῶς
 φυλάξει, ἀλλὰ πιαίνειν⁹ οἶει αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθ'
 ὅσον ποιμὴν ἔστιν, | οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλ-
 τιστον βλέποντα ἀλλ', ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ
 μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι, πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς
 τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα.
 d τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δήπου ἄλλου του μέλει ἢ ἐφ' ᾧ
 τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ—ἐπεὶ τὰ
 γε αὐτῆς ὥστ' εἶναι βελτίστη ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπε-

⁹ πιαίνειν A Euseb.: ποιμαίνειν A (lectio in margine scripta)
 D: παχύνει F

from doing what it wants. No, my friend, let the unjust person be, and let him have the power to act unjustly, either undetected, or by fighting it out openly, yet he still doesn't persuade me there is something more profitable than justice. And there may well be someone else among us who feels the same, and not just me. So then, see if you can make a decent job of persuading us that we are wrong to value justice above injustice."

"And how am I to persuade you?" he said. "For if you are not convinced by what I have just been saying, what more can I do for you? Must I go and infuse the argument into your soul?"⁵⁷

"Zeus! don't go and do that," I said. "Firstly, though, do stand by whatever you say, or, if you do shift your ground, make your move openly and don't mislead us. Now then, Thrasyachus, let's continue to look at your previous remarks. You see that while you began by defining a doctor in the true sense, you didn't subsequently think it necessary to keep to the precise definition where the true shepherd was concerned. You think that, as part of his being a shepherd, he fattens up the flocks not with an eye to their best interests, but like some guest about to dine, with an eye to a good dinner, or again with a view to selling them, as a businessman, but not as a shepherd. But shepherding is surely directed only toward how to provide the best for its charges, since I presume that it has sufficiently provided what concerns itself as regards its own arrangements

⁵⁷ The metaphor is from nurses feeding children (cf. *Ar. Eq.* 716ff.). Thrasyachus is portrayed as relying on the rhetorical force of his argument leading to passive assimilation rather than critical examination.

πόρισται, ἕως γ' ἂν μηδὲν ἐνδέη τοῦ ποιμενικῆ εἶναι—
 | οὕτω δὴ ὥμην ἔγωγε νυνδὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν
 ὁμολογεῖν πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθ' ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδεὶ
 ἄλλω τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ἀρχομένῳ
 τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ, ἐν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ
 e ἀρχῇ. σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, τοὺς ὡς
 ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, ἐκόντας οἶει ἄρχειν;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα. |

346 Τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε; τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς
 οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἐκόν, ἀλλὰ
 μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφελίαν ἐσομένην
 ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις; ἐπεὶ τοσονδε
 εἶπέ· οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φαμὲν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν
 τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι, τῷ ἑτέραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν; καί,
 ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ
 περαίνωμεν. |

Ἄλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέρα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὠφελίαν ἐκάστη ἰδίαν τινὰ ἡμῖν παρ-
 ἔχεται ἀλλ' οὐ κοινήν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίειαν,
 κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
 οὕτω;

Πάνν γε.

⁵⁸ This somewhat convoluted sentence essentially reiterates what has already been said by S. at 342a2ff.: an art's advantage must come from nothing other than its best practice of itself (taking ἐκπεπόρισται d4 as Middle rather than Passive).

for making it the best, as long as it in no way falls short of being the shepherding art.⁵⁸ And so I thought just now that agreement among us was inevitable that every form of government, seen purely as government, considers what is best solely for those who are governed and under its care in both the public and private domain. But do you think that rulers in our cities, rulers in the true sense, hold office willingly?”

“Zeus no!” he replied, “I don’t think it; I know very well they do.”

“But what about this, Thrasymachus?” I said. “Have you not considered that in the case of other forms of government nobody willingly chooses to be in authority, but they demand payment, on the grounds that no benefit will come to themselves from their office, but to those who are governed?⁵⁹ And tell me this: don’t we usually say that each branch of the arts is different from others because it has a different function? And, my good fellow, so that we may make some progress, please don’t give an answer contrary to your own opinion.”⁶⁰

“Well yes,” he replied, “that is where they differ.”

“So doesn’t each of them give us some unique benefit not common to the others: for example, medicine gives us health, navigation safety in sailing, and so on?”

“Yes.”

⁵⁹ Arist. *Eth.Nic.* 5.6.6–7 echoes this argument in describing justice as another’s good, so that rulers have to be recompensed with honor and dignity.

⁶⁰ The Socratic *elenchus* requires S.’s interlocutors to say what they sincerely believe; but see below, 349a9–b1.

b Οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθόν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις· ἢ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἢ ἑάνπερ βούλη ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἕάν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιῆς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ συμφέρεω αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἔνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικὴν; |

Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.

Οὐδέ γ', οἶμαι, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, ἐὰν ὑγιαίνει τις μισθαρνῶν. |

Οὐ δῆτα.

Τί δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαρνητικὴν, ἐὰν ἰώμενός τις μισθαρνή;

c Οὐκ ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τὴν γε ὠφελίαν ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαν ὠμολογήσαμεν εἶναι;

Ἔστω, ἔφη. |

Ἦντινα ἄρα ὠφελίαν κοινῇ ὠφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὅτι κοινῇ τινι τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρόμενοι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὠφελοῦνται.

Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

Φαμὲν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνημένους ὠφελείσθαι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρῆσθαι τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. |

Συνέφη μόγις.

⁶¹ One of S.'s weaker arguments: S., in his anxiety to separate the practice of an art from its financial reward (see below, d3), spoils his argument, seemingly unnecessarily, by introducing the

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"So doesn't the art of wage earning give us wages?⁶¹ For that is its function; or would you call the doctor's and the helmsman's skill the same? Or, if you wish to discriminate precisely as you proposed, are you any more likely to call navigation medicine simply because some ship's captain recovers his health through the beneficial effect of a voyage?"

"No, of course not," he replied.

"Any more, I imagine, than you would call wage earning medicine if someone regains health while earning money."

"No, indeed."

"What about this, then? Is medicine to be called wage earning, if someone earns money while administering treatment?"

He said it wasn't.

"So are we agreed that each art has its own particular benefit?"

"Let's say so," he said.

"So any benefit all skilled workers enjoy in common they clearly derive from the use of some additional thing that they have in common?"

"It seems so," he said.

"And we say, don't we, that skilled workers earning wages benefit from exercising the art of wage earning in addition to their own."

He agreed reluctantly.

"art" of wage earning. There are two serious objections to this idea: (1) "wage earning" is an incidental accompaniment to an art, such as medicine, etc., and not an art as such. (2) If wage earning were actually shown to be an art, it would in fact *contradict* the Socratic assertion that no *technē* benefits its practitioner.

d Οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάστω αὕτη ἡ ὠφελία ἐστίν, ἢ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήψις, ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἢ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, ἢ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν, καὶ ἢ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἢ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ αὐτῇ ἐπομένῃ μισθόν, | καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι οὕτως τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται καὶ ὠφελεῖ ἐκεῖνο ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτῇ προσγίγνηται, ἔσθ' ὅτι ὠφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης;

Οὐ φαίνεται, ἔφη.

e Ἄρ' οὖν οὐδ' ὠφελεῖ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργάζηται;

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

Οὐκοῦν, ᾧ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἤδη δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτῇ ὠφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ', ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, | τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἥττονος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγωγε, ᾧ φίλε Θρασύμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἐκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰ-
347 τεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξειν οὐδέποτε αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐβελήσσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργῦριον ἢ τιμῆν, ἢ ζημίαν ἐὰν μὴ ἄρχῃ. |

Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ᾧ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων.

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“So this benefit, the receiving of wages, does not come to each man from his own art, but, if we must be precise, medicine produces health, wage earning wages, and house building a house, but it is the addition of wage earning which produces the wages, and with all the other arts likewise: each has its own function and benefits that over which it has charge. But if no wages are added to the art, can the skilled worker benefit from his art?”

“Apparently not,” he said.

“But does he therefore confer no benefit either, on the occasions when he works for nothing?”

“I think he does.”

“So, Thrasymachus, it is by now apparent that no art or rule provides its own benefit, but, as we said long ago, it provides and dictates for the benefit of those who are governed by looking to the advantage of the weaker, and not that of the stronger. That is why, my dear Thrasymachus, I made a point of saying just now that nobody willingly chooses to govern and get involved in setting right other peoples' wrongs, but he demands payment, because whoever intends to exercise his art well never acts to his own best advantage, nor gives orders to that end, provided he is directing as his art prescribes, but acts in the interests of his subject; and it is for these reasons, it seems, that those who are going to be willing to rule must be paid, either in money or honors, or incur a penalty if they do not take up office.”

“What do you mean by that, Socrates?” said Glaucon;

τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς γιγνώσκω, τὴν δὲ ζημίαν ἦντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἴρηκας, οὐ συνῆκα.

- b Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἄρα μισθόν, ἔφη, οὐ συνιείς, δι' ὃν ἄρχουσιν οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλωσιν ἄρχειν. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἔστιν; |

Ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

- Διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτε χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐθέλουσιν ἄρχειν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε τιμῆς· οὔτε γὰρ φανερώς πραττόμενοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕνεκα μισθὸν μισθωτοὶ βούλονται κεκληῆσθαι, οὔτε λάθρα αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς λαμβάνοντες κλέπται. οὐδ' αὖ τιμῆς ἕνεκα· οὐ γὰρ εἰσι φιλότιμοι. | δεῖ δὴ αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσεῖναι
 c καὶ ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν—ὅθεν κινδυνεύει τὸ ἐκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι—τῆς δὲ ζημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃ ἄρχειν. | ἦν δείσαντές μοι φαίνονται ἄρχειν, ὅταν ἄρχωσιν, οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, καὶ τότε ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν οὐχ ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθόν τι ἰόντες οὐδ' ὡς εὐπα-
 d θήσοντες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἑαυτῶν βελτίσιν ἐπιτρέψαι οὐδὲ ὁμοίους. ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο,

⁶² This uncharacteristically long speech by S., structurally a digression from the main argument with Thrasymachus, in fact represents an anticipation of one of the themes of *Republic* as a whole—the reluctance to rule of those most fitted for it,

“you see, I acknowledge the two rewards, but what penalty you mean and in what sense you have described it as replacing wages—that I don’t understand.”

“Then you don’t understand the reward of the best men,” I replied, “for which the most estimable govern, when they are willing to do so. Don’t you know that to be ambitious and keen on money is said to be discreditable, and actually is?”

“I do,” he replied.

“That’s the reason, therefore,” I said, “why the good are not willing to rule for the sake of money or honor; you see they don’t wish to be called hired workers for openly doing the work of government for pay, nor thieves for secretly extracting money from their office. Nor do they wish to serve for honor, for they are not ambitious. So they must have imposed on them in addition an obligation and a penalty, if they are going to consent to rule: which is probably why it has been considered shameful to be willing to accept office and not wait to be compelled. But the most serious aspect of the penalty, if they are not themselves willing, is to be ruled by someone inferior. It is in fear of this, it seems to me, that those who are suitable rule, when they do rule, and even then they go into it not as something good, nor as something which they expect to enjoy, but as something they have to do, because they cannot put it into the hands of anyone better than themselves, or equal to them.⁶² You see it’s likely that if a city of good men

namely the philosophers (see 7.520aff., 540d–41a). The momentary change of respondent to Glaucon, one of S.’s main interlocutors in the remainder of the dialogue but otherwise largely silent in Book I, may be intended by Plato as a signal that the issue will subsequently be of importance.

περιμάχητον ἂν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν ὥσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἂν καταφανὲς γενέσθαι ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων | οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γιγνώσκων τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἔλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν
 e ἔγωγε οὐδαμῆ συγχωρῶ Θρασυμάχῳ, ὡς τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰς αὐθις σκεψόμεθα· πολὺν δέ μοι δοκεῖ μείζον εἶναι ὁ νῦν λέγει Θρασύμαχος, τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω ἢ τὸν τοῦ δικαίου. σὺ οὖν ποτέρως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, αἰρήῃ; | καὶ πότερον ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι;

Τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἔγωγε λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶ-
 ναι.

348 Ἦκουσας οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα ἄρτι Θρασύμαχος ἀγαθὰ διήλθεν τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου;

Ἦκουσα, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐ πείθωμαι.

Βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πείθωμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθά πη ἐξευ-
 ρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει; |

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἄν μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγω-
 μεν αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὅσα αὖ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὐθις οὗτος, καὶ ἄλλον ἡμεῖς, ἀριθμεῖν δεήσει τὰγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν ὅσα ἐκάτεροι ἐν
 b ἐκατέρῳ λέγομεν, καὶ ἤδη δικαστῶν τινων τῶν δια-
 κρινούτων δεησόμεθα· ἂν δὲ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἀνομολογού-

were to exist, there would be as much battling to avoid political power as there now is to gain it, thereby making it plain that the person who is really and truly a ruler does not naturally consider his own interest, but that of his subject. The result is that every person of understanding would choose to be helped by another rather than have the bother of helping the other. So on that point, then, I totally disagree with Thrasymachus when he claims that justice is the advantage of the stronger. But that's a question which we shall examine later. Of much greater significance, it seems to me, is what Thrasymachus was saying just now, when he asserted that the life of the unjust person is better than that of the just. Now which of these do you choose, Glaucon? And which do you think is nearer the truth?"

"I say that the life of the just person is more profitable."

"Did you hear," I said, "how many good things in the life of the unjust person Thrasymachus has just listed?"

"I did," he said, "but I'm not convinced."

"Then if we can find a way, do you want us to persuade him that he's not right?"

"Of course I want us to," he said.

"Well then," I said, "if we set out our line of argument directly counter to his, enumerating all the good things to come from justice, and then he does the same, and then we reply to him, we shall have to count up and measure all the good things listed by each of us in each argument, and we shall soon need some judges to decide between us. But if we carry on the inquiry by mutual agreement as we

μενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἅμα αὐτοί τε διαστὰι καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα. |

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει.

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀποκρίναι ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. τὴν τελείαν ἀδικίαν τελείας οὐσῆς δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῆς εἶναι; |

c Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ φημί, ἔφη, καὶ δι' ἃ, εἶρηκα.

Φέρε δὴ, τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μὲν που ἀρετὴν αὐτοῖν καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; |

Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν;

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἥδιστε, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὐ.

Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν; |

Τοῦναντίον, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν;

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίαν εὐθήθειαν.

d Τὴν ἀδικίαν ἄρα κακοθήθειαν καλεῖς;

Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εὐβουλίαν, ἔφη.

63 S. is here contrasting his *elenchus* with popular Athenian debating procedure, with successive speeches advancing contrasted or opposed positions, e.g., in Athenian legal debate or the dramatic *agon* in tragedy and comedy or in some political philosophizing (see e.g., Hdt. 8.83 presenting successive speakers on the ideal constitution).

BOOK I

have done up to this point, we will be both judges and advocates ourselves.”⁶³

“Certainly,” he said.

“So which method,” I asked, “do you prefer?”

“The latter,” he replied.

“Come then, Thrasymachus,” I said, “go back to the beginning and answer our questions. You claim that absolute injustice is more profitable than justice in its perfect state?”

“That’s exactly what I do say,” he replied, “and I have told you why.”

“Well then, what do you say about them on this point: you call one of them, I presume, an excellence and the other a vice?”

“Of course.”

“So justice is an excellence and injustice a vice?”

“Oh that’s very likely isn’t it,” he said, “you simpleton, when I actually say that injustice is profitable and justice isn’t?”

“Well, what do you say then?”

“The opposite,” he replied.

“Are you saying justice is a vice?”

“No, but a most high-minded good nature”

“Then are you calling injustice a bad disposition?”

“No; rather good judgment,” he replied.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ In this semisophistic sparring, S. is trying to trap Thrasymachus into asserting that if injustice is a virtue (*aretē*), then justice must be its opposite, a vice (*kakia*). Thrasymachus avoids the traps and finally settles on injustice as “good judgment” (*euboulia*), which subsequently, however, with the emphasis on wisdom, leads him into more problems (see below, 350c1.1ff).

Republic

Ἦ καὶ φρόνιμοὶ σοὶ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι; |

Οἷ γε τελέως, ἔφη, οἷοί τε ἀδικεῖν, πόλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι· σὺ δὲ οἶε με ἴσως τοὺς τὰ βαλλάντια ἀποτέμοντας λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάνπερ λανθάνῃ· ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἄξια λόγου, ἀλλ' ἂ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον.

εΤοῦτο μὲν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀγνοῶ ὁ βούλει λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τιθεῖς μέρει τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις.

Ἀλλὰ πάνυ οὕτω τίθημι. |

Τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη στερεώτερον, ὦ ἐταῖρε, καὶ οὐκέτι ράδιον ἔχειν ὅτι τις εἶπη. εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὠμολόγεις εἶναι ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες· νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι | καὶ τᾶλλα αὐτῶ πάντα προσθήσεις ἃ ἡμεῖς τῶ δικαίῳ³⁴⁹προσετίθεμεν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφία ἐτόλμησας θεῖναι.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, μαντεύη.

Ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποκνητέον γε τῶ λόγῳ ἐπεξεληθεῖν σκοπούμενον, | ἕως ἄν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἄπερ διανοῆ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖς σύ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε,

Book I

“So you think that the unjust are good intelligent people, Thrasymachus?”

“Those who are capable of absolute injustice,” he said, “and have the power to subject cities and nations to themselves. But you perhaps imagine I’m talking of people who snatch purses. To be sure,” he said, “things like that can be profitable too, if they go undetected; but they are insignificant compared with what I have just described.”

“While I’m not unaware of what you mean by that,” I said, “I am surprised if you’re putting injustice in the category of excellence and wisdom, and justice among the opposites.”

“Well, that is just what I am doing.”

“That takes us on to a much stiffer proposition, my friend,” I said, “and it’s no longer easy to find an answer. You see if you were proposing that injustice was profitable, yet conceding that it was a vice and shameful, as some others do, we would be able to discuss the matter along generally accepted lines. As it is, you’re obviously going to claim that it is good and strong and will ascribe to it all the other qualities with which we were categorizing justice, since you have dared to put it alongside even excellence and wisdom.”⁶⁵

“Spot on with the prophecies” he sneered.

“Yes,” I said, “but in our inquiry we mustn’t shrink from taking our examination through to the end, as long as I can take it for granted that you are saying what you think. For I believe, Thrasymachus, that you’re not now simply

65 On the absence of mutually agreed basic values between S. and Thrasymachus, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 1 (c)). S.’s apparent indifference as to Thrasymachus’ sincerity at this point seems to indicate the danger of a breakdown in the interaction characteristic of the elenchus

REPUBLIC

ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὐ σκώπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν.

Τί δέ σοι, ἔφη, τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις; |

- b Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τότε μοι πειρῶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τί σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλέον ἔχειν;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀστείος, ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ εὐήθης. |

Τί δέ; τῆς δικαίας πράξεως;

Οὐδὲ (ταύ)της [δικαίας],¹⁰ ἔφη.

Τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου πότερον ἀξιοῖ ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῖτο; |

Ἐγοῖτ' ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δύναται.

- c Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου;

Ἄλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει.

Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἄδικος; ἄρα ἀξιοῖ τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως; |

Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη, ὅς γε πάντων πλέον ἔχειν ἀξιοῖ;

¹⁰ <ταύ>της Slings: τῆς ADF Stob.: δικαίας ADF Stob.: secl. Wilamowitz: δικαίας πράξεως Stallbaum

BOOK I

ply mocking us, but saying what you believe about the truth.”

“What difference does it make to you,” he replied, “whether I believe it or not, if you’re still not testing my argument?”

“None,” I replied, “but still try and give me an answer to this question: do you think that a just person would wish to have the advantage over another just person?”⁶⁶

“Certainly not,” he said, “otherwise he wouldn’t be the charming simple fellow we’ve just been talking about.”

“And does that mean he would want the advantage in a just business transaction?”

“Not that either,” he replied.

“But what of the unjust person: would the just man think it worth having the advantage over him and think it right, or not?”

“He’d think it right and worth it, but he wouldn’t be able to.”

“That’s not what I’m asking,” I said. “But the question is whether a just person thinks it’s not worth having an advantage over another just person and doesn’t wish to have, but would wish to in the case of an unjust person?”

“Yes, that is so,” he replied.

“Well then, what about the unjust person? Will he think it right to have the advantage over the just person and in a just transaction?”

“How couldn’t he,” he replied, “seeing that he expects to have more of everything?”

⁶⁶ For discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of S.’s line of argument at 349b1–50c11, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 1 (c)).

Republic

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου γε ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος
πλεονεκτῆσει καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ; |

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Ἔδε δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔφην· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ,
τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου;

δ Ἄριστα, ἔφη, εἴρηκας.

Ἔστιν δέ γε, ἔφην, φρόνιμός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος
οὐδέτερος; |

Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, εὔ.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ ἄδικος,
ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ἔοικεν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ἔφη, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὢν καὶ εἰκέναι τοῖς τοιούτοις,
ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰκέναι; |

Καλῶς. τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷσπερ ἔοικεν;

Ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει; ἔφη.

Εἶεν, ὃ Θρασύμαχε· μουσικὸν δέ τινα λέγεις, ἕτερον δὲ ἄμουσον;
ε Ἔγωγε.

Πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα;

Τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν δήπου φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἄμουσον ἄφρονα. |

Οὐκοῦν ἄπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ἃ δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν;

Ναί.

Τί δὲ ἰατρικόν; οὐχ οὕτως;

Book I

“Therefore the unjust person will want to have the advantage both over another unjust fellow and in a business transaction, and will struggle to get the largest share of everything himself?”

“That is so.”

“Let’s put it this way then,” I said. “The just person does not seek to have the advantage over the man like himself but his opposite, but the unjust seeks to have it over both.”

“Very well put,” he said.

“Doesn’t that mean the unjust man is intelligent and good, and the just man neither?”

“Well put again,” he said.

“So that means the unjust man also resembles the intelligent and good man, but the just does not?”

“Yes, for being such as he is, how can he not resemble those of this kind, while the just person never does?”

“Excellent. So each of them is the same sort as those he resembles?”

“So, what would you expect?” he said.

“Let’s see, Thrasymachus; do you say one person is musical and another not?”

“I do.”

“Which one is intelligent and which unintelligent?”

“The musical one is the intelligent one, I suppose, and the unmusical one isn’t.”

“And is he not good in the things in which he is intelligent and bad where he lacks intelligence?”

“Yes.”

“What of a doctor; doesn’t the same apply?”

Οὕτως. |

Δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν τίς σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ ἀρμοττόμενος λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιούν πλέον ἔχειν;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

Τί δέ; ἀμούσου; |

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

350 Τί δὲ ἰατρικός; ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἂν τι ἰατρικοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ πράγματος;

Οὐ δῆτα.

Μὴ ἰατρικοῦ δέ; |

Ναί.

Περὶ πάσης δὴ ὅρα ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμο-
σύνης εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὅστισοῦν πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἰρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅσα ἄλλος ἐπιστήμων ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταῦτὰ τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πράξιν. |

Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχειν.

Τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως μὲν ἐπιστήμονος πλεονεκτῆσειεν ἂν, ὁμοίως δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονος;

b Ἴσως.

Ὅ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός;

Φημί. |

Ὅ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός;

Φημί.

Ὅ ἄρα ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἐθελήσει πλεονεκτεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναντίου.

BOOK I

"It does."

"Then do you think, my friend, that in tuning a lyre a musical person would want to gain the advantage over someone else in adjusting the strings, or think it worth having the advantage?"

"I don't think so."

"But would he, with an unmusical person?"

"Of course," he replied.

"And what of a doctor? In prescribing food and drink would he wish to have some advantage, either over the doctor or the medicine he practices?"

"Certainly not."

"But he would over someone who is not a medical practitioner?"

"Yes."

"In every aspect of his knowledge and ignorance, consider whether you think any knowledgeable person whatever would want to choose to do or say more than another knowledgeable person, and not rather do and say the same as his colleague in the same circumstances."

"Well," he said, "perhaps this must be so."

"But what of the person without knowledge? Won't he wish to have the same advantage over the man with knowledge and the one without?"

"Perhaps."

"But the knowledgeable person is wise?"

"Yes."

"And the wise person is good?"

"I agree."

"So the good and wise person will not wish to have the advantage over the man who is like him, but only over the one who is not like him."

Republic

Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. |

Ὁ δὲ κακός τε καὶ ἀμαθής τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

Φαίνεται.

Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ἄδικος ἡμῖν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὁμοίου πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγε;

Ἐγωγε, ἔφη.

εἰ δέ γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτῆσει, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου;

Ναί.

Ἔοικεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ. |

Κινδυνεύει.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὠμολογοῦμεν, ὦ γε ὅμοιος ἐκάτερος εἶη, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐκάτερον εἶναι.

Ὡμολογοῦμεν γάρ. |

Ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφονται ὡν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός.

Ὁ δὲ Θρασύμαχος ὠμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥαδίως λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐλκόμενος καὶ δμῳγίς, μετὰ ἰδρωτός θυμαστοῦ ὄσου, ἅτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος—τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ, πρότερον δὲ οὔπω, Θρασύμαχον

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“It appears so,” he said.

“But the bad and ignorant will wish to have the advantage over both those like him and unlike him.”

“So it seems.”

“Therefore, Thrasymachus,” I said, “our unjust person has the advantage over both those unlike and like him? Or is that not what you were saying?”

“Yes it is,” he replied.

“But the just person will not take advantage of the man like him, but the one unlike him?”

“Yes.”

“So the just person is like the wise and good man, and the unjust person like the bad and ignorant one.”

“I suppose so.”

“But we agreed furthermore that each of them is the same kind of person as the one he resembles.”

“Yes, we did.”

“So by our argument the just person has turned out to be good and wise, and the unjust person ignorant and bad.”

Now Thrasymachus’ agreement to all this did not come easily as I am now telling it, but had to be dragged out of him with some difficulty, with a remarkable amount of sweat—it was summer. And then I saw what I had never seen before: Thrasymachus blushing.⁶⁷ So when we did

⁶⁷ This may be intended as an indication of shame at the social humiliation of being worsted in what the sophist clearly perceives as a competitive situation (cf. Euthyd. 297a), rather than, as S. rather slyly suggests, a reaction to climatic conditions. However, the marked emphasis on Thrasymachus’ physical reaction at this point may be designed to make the reader forget any weaknesses in the preceding argument. At any rate, from this point on Thrasymachus is presented as willing to give only token assent to S.’s argument (see e1–3).

μαχον ἐρυθριῶντα—ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὖν διωμολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, | τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτω κείσθω, ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν. ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε;

Μέμνημαι, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε οὐδὲ ἂ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. εἰ οὖν λέγοιμι, e εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἄν με φαίης. ἢ οὖν ἔα με εἰπεῖν ὅσα βούλομαι, ἢ, εἰ βούλει ἐρωτᾶν, ἐρώτα· ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὡς περ ταῖς γραυσὶν ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαις, “εἶεν” ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. |

Μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν.

“Ὡστε σοί, ἔφη, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδὴ περ οὐκ ἔῃς λέγειν. καίτοι τί ἄλλο βούλει;

Οὐδὲν μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, ποίειν ἐγὼ δὲ ἐρωτήσω. |

Ἐρώτα δή.

351 Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξῆς διασκειψόμεθα τὸν λόγον, ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὃν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχθη γάρ που ὅτι καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἶη ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δέ γ', ἔφη, εἴπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐστίν

⁶⁸ S.'s opponents regularly protest at being compelled to adopt his preferred method of discussion rather than being allowed to debate in their preferred manner of making a speech. “Ranting” (*dēmēgorein*: literally “to speak like a demagogue”) has for Plato the pejorative implications of popular persuasive oratory in the Athenian democratic Assembly.

reach agreement that justice is excellence and wisdom, injustice baseness and ignorance, I said: “Well, let’s now take that as settled. But we did also say that injustice is indeed strong. Don’t you remember that, Thrasymachus?”

“I do,” he said; “but I’m not even happy with what you’re now saying, and I’ve got something to say about it. Now, if I were to say it, I know very well that you’d accuse me of ranting.⁶⁸ So either allow me to say as much as I want, or if you prefer to question me, ask away; but, like someone listening to old women telling their tales, I’ll only answer you ‘Right you are,’ and nod or shake my head.”

“No, don’t do that,” I said, “not if it is contrary to what you think is right.”

“Yes, I will,” he replied, “to please you,⁶⁹ since in fact you won’t allow me to make a speech. But what else do you want?”

“Nothing, I swear it,” I said, “but if that’s what you plan to do, go ahead and do it, and I’ll ask the questions.”

“Go on, then.”

“Then I’ll ask the questions, as I did before, so that we may examine our argument in sequence. How does the nature of justice actually relate to injustice? It was stated, I believe, that injustice is more powerful and stronger than justice. Now,” I said, “if indeed justice is wisdom and ex-

⁶⁹ Heavily sarcastic; Thrasymachus is saying that his cooperation will be merely a formality, since S.’s method of argument gives him no choice. Note the sarcastic tone of the immediately following exchanges (c1–c6) on both sides (and see S. at d7).

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δικαιοσύνη, ραδίως οἶμαι φανήσεται καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἢ ἀδικία— | οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο ἀγνοήσειεν— ἀλλ' οὐ τι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῆδέ πη σκέψασθαι· ἠπόλιν φαίης ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλωθῆσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῆ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη. καὶ τοῦτό γε ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὕσα ἄδικος. |

Μανθάνω, ἔφην, ὅτι σὺ οὕτως ἦν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ τότε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ· πότερον ἢ κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔξει, ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῆ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης;

Ἐὶ μὲν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες ἔχει—ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία—μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἀδικίας.

Πάνυ ἄγαμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεις μόνον καὶ ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνη πάνυ καλῶς. |

Σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι.

Εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τότε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε· δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν ἢ στρατόπεδον ἢ ληστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κοινῆ ἐπὶ τι ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πρᾶξαι ἂν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῖεν ἀλλήλους; |

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I think it can easily be shown to be also stronger than injustice, seeing that injustice is ignorance. Nobody could now fail to recognize that. But I myself have no desire to put it simply like that, Thrasymachus, but consider it from some such angle as this: would you say that a city is unjust to try to enslave other cities unjustly and permanently at that, and keep many of those which it has enslaved in its power?"

"Yes, of course," he replied. "And this is what the best city that is most absolute in its injustice will do above all."

"I understand that that was your argument," I said, "but the point I am considering is this: will the city which has become stronger than another without justice have ability to do this, or must it do it with justice?"

"If the case is as you have just maintained, that justice is wisdom," he replied, "then justice must be included; but if it is as I was arguing it must be done along with injustice."

"I really admire you, Thrasymachus," I said, "not just for nodding and shaking your head, but also giving very good answers."

"I'm doing it," he said, "to oblige you."

"And well done you! But now do me this favor and tell me whether you think that a city or an army or bandits or thieves or any other group which sets about any unjust action together, could achieve anything if they wronged one another?"⁷⁰

70 For this and the following concluding Socratic arguments of Book 1, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 1 (c)).

Οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

d Τί δ' εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖεν; οὐ μᾶλλον;

Πάνυ γε.

Στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἦ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν ἦ γάρ; |

Ἔστω, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι.

Ἄλλ' εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε. τόδε δέ μοι λέγε· ἄρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνῆ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις ἐγγιγνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων πράττειν;

e Πάνυ γε.

Τί δὲ ἂν ἐν δυοῖν ἐγγένηται; οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσουσιν καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἔσονται ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις; |

Ἔσονται, ἔφη.

Ἐὰν δὲ δῆ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἐνὶ ἐγγένηται ἀδικία, μῶν μὴ ἀπολεί τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἕξει;

Μηδὲν ἦττον ἐχέτω, ἔφη. |

352 Οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινὰ φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἴαν, ὧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὄψου, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν μεθ' αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι, ἔτι δ' ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ; οὐχ οὕτως; |

Πάνυ γε.

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"Certainly not," he replied.

"But what if they didn't wrong each other? Wouldn't their prospects be better?"

"Yes, indeed."

"Yes, for injustice surely breeds hatred, dissension and fighting among people, whereas justice brings concord and friendship; isn't that so?"

"Let it be so," he replied, "to avoid my contradicting you."

"You *are* doing well, my friend. But tell me this: if it is the function of injustice to foster hatred wherever it is, when it arises among both free men and slaves, won't it cause them to hate each other, quarrel and be unable to act in concert?"

"Indeed, yes."

"What if injustice arises between two people? Won't they quarrel and hate each other and be at odds both with each other as well as with those who are just?"

"They will," he replied.

"But, my dear fellow, what if injustice arises within one person; surely it won't lose its power, but rather retain it undiminished?"

"Let's say it will," he replied.

"Does it then appear to have the kind of power that wherever it arises, in a city, a family, an army or anywhere else, it makes it firstly incapable of cooperation with itself owing to factions and quarrels, and secondly makes it hostile both to itself and to every opponent, including the man who is just? Isn't that so?"

"Certainly."

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Καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ δὴ οἶμαι ἐνοῦσα ταῦτα ταῦτα ποιήσει ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμοιοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις· ἦ γάρ; |

Ναί.

Δίκαιοι δέ γ' εἰσίν, ὧ φίλε, καὶ οἱ θεοί;

Ἐστῶ, ἔφη.

Καὶ θεοῖς ἄρα ἐχθρὸς ἔσται ὁ ἄδικος, ὧ Θρασύμαχε, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλος.

Εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἔφη, θαρρῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγέ σοι ἐναντιώσομαι, ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι. |

Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μοι τῆς ἐστιάσεως ἀποπλήρωσον ἀποκρινόμενος ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττειν μετ' ἀλλήλων οἶοί τε—ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὓς φαμεν ἐρρωμένως πρόποτε τι μετ' ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πράξαι ἀδίκους ὄντας, τοῦτο οὐ παντάπασι ἀληθὲς λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μήτοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ' οὓς ἦσαν ἅμα ἀδικεῖν, | δι' ἣν ἐπραξαν ἅ ἐπραξαν, ὥρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικία ἡμιμόχθηροι ὄντες, ἐπεὶ οἱ γε παμπόνηροι

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“And so, I think, dwelling in a single person it will bring about those very same effects which it naturally produces: it will make him firstly unable to act because of strife and lack of agreement within himself, and secondly he will be hostile both to himself and to those who are just. True?”⁷¹

“Yes.”

“But the gods too are just?”

“Let’s say they are,” he replied.

“So then, Thrasymachus, the unjust person will be an enemy to the gods, but the just will be their friend.”

“Go on, enjoy your feast, relish your argument,” he said; “for I won’t oppose you in case I annoy these people here.”⁷²

“Come then,” I said, “fill me full with what remains of my feast by answering as you have done up to now. The fact is that the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action, while the unjust cannot even cooperate with each other. In fact even when we say that people have ever taken common action with each other effectively, despite being unjust, we are not being altogether truthful, for if they had been entirely unjust, they would never have kept their hands off one another. But it is clear that there was some justice in them which at least prevented them from wronging each other as well as those they were attacking, and because of which they succeeded in what they attempted and set about their unjust acts only half-corrupted by injustice, since utter villains, men who are

⁷¹ The idea of injustice as disharmony within an individual anticipates Plato’s theory of the parts of the soul in Book 4 and is given particular application to the tyrannical soul in Book 9.

⁷² The imagery of the feast reminds us that the conversation is taking place at a festival (see above, 327–28, and below, 354a10).

d πόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἄδικοι τελέως εἰσὶ καὶ πράττειν
 ἀδύνατοι—ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει μανθάνω,
 ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον
 ζῶσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροί
 εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προουθέμεθα σκέψασθαι,
 σκεπτέον. φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ,
 ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν ἢ ὅμως δ' ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον. οὐ
 γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ
 ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆ ζῆν.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη.

Σκοπῶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καί μοι λέγε· δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι
 ἵππου ἔργον;

e Ἔμοιγε.

Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὅτου-
 οὖν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῆ τις ἢ ἄριστα; ἢ

Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ' ὧδε· ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς;

Οὐ δῆτα.

Τί δέ; ἀκούσῃς ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν;

Οὐδαμῶς. ἢ

Οὐκοῦν δικαίως [ἂν] ταῦτα τούτων φημὲν ἔργα
 εἶναι;

Πάνν γε.

353 Τί δέ; μαχαίρα ἂν ἀμπέλου κλήμα ἀποτέμῃς καὶ
 σμίλη καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς;

⁷³ This expression of concern about how one should live, al-
 most formulaic in Plato (cf. *Ap.* 38a, *Cri.* 48b, *Gr.* 500c, *Resp.*

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completely unjust, are also completely incapable of effective action. Now this is how I understand the situation, and not as you proposed at first. But we must now consider the question we proposed to investigate subsequently: whether the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier. Now it seems to me, from what we have said, this is clearly the case already; but all the same we ought to consider the question still more closely. For the discussion is not about an incidental matter, but about the way we ought to live.”⁷³

“Enquire away, then,” he said.

“I will,” I replied. “So tell me, in your opinion, does a horse have a function?”

“It does.”

“So would you maintain that the function of a horse, or anything else is this: namely that which one can only do, or do best with that alone?”

“I don’t understand,” he said.

“Well, look at it like this; is there anything else you can see with except your eyes?”

“Of course not.”

“Again, can you hear with anything but your ears?”

“Certainly not.”

“Therefore are we right in saying that these organs have these functions?”

“Yes.”

“So again: you could cut off a vine shoot with a dagger or carving knife or many other tools?”

344e2-3), marks the beginning of the more serious and constructive tone of the remainder of this book.

Republic

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
Ἄλλ' οὐδενί γ' ἂν οἶμαι οὕτω καλῶς ὡς δρεπάνῳ τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦτο
ἔργασθέντι. |

Ἀληθῆ.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο τούτου ἔργον θήσομεν;

Θήσομεν μὲν οὖν.

Νῦν δὴ οἶμαι ἄμεινον ἂν μάθοις ὃ ἄρτι ἠρώτων, πυνθανόμενος εἰ
οὐ τοῦτο ἐκάστου εἶη ἔργον ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνον τι ἢ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων
ἀπεργάζεταιται. |

Ἀλλά, ἔφη, μανθάνω τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἐκάστου πράγματος
ἔργον εἶναι.

βεῖεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ᾧπερ
καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; ἴωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν· ὀφθαλμῶν,
φαμέν, ἔστι τι ἔργον; |

Ἔστιν.

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔστιν;

Καὶ ἀρετή.

Τί δέ; ὧτων ἦν τι ἔργον;

Ναί. |

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετή;

Καὶ ἀρετή.

Τί δὲ πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οὕτω;

Οὕτω.

Ἔχε δὴ ἄρ' ἂν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσαιντο
μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς κακίαν;

Καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἔφη· τυφλότητα γὰρ ἴσως λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὄψεως. |

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“Of course.”

“But with none so well, I think, as with a pruning knife made for that purpose.”

“True.”

“So shall we put down pruning as its function?”

“Yes, let’s do that.”

“Well now, I think you can understand better what I was asking you just now when I asked if the function of each thing was that which it alone can do, or that which it does better than anything else.”

“Yes, I do understand,” he said, “and I think that this is what is meant by the function of each thing.”

“Good,” I said. “Therefore don’t you think that in the case of everything to which a function has been ascribed, there is also an excellence? Let’s go over the same points again: in the case of the eyes, we say there is a function.”

“We do.”

“And so they also have an excellence?”

“Yes that too.”

“Again: the ears have a function?” “Yes.” “And so an excellence?” “Yes again.”

“And what about all the other things? Is it not the same?”

“It is.”

“Well then: could the eyes ever perform their function well if they didn’t have their own particular excellence, but instead a defect?”

“Why, how could they,” he said; “for I suppose you mean blindness instead of sight.”

Ἦτις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἢ ἀρετῆ· οὐ γάρ πω τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακία δὲ κακῶς.

Ἀληθές, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσα στερόμενα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται; |

Πάνυ γε.

d Τίθεμεν οὖν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον;

Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Ἴθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι. ψυχῆς ἔστιν τι ἔργον ὃ ἄλλω τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ πράξαις, οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε· τὸ ἐπιμελείσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, | ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλω ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαίμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι;

Οὐδενὶ ἄλλω.

Τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; οὐ ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; |

Μάλιστα γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι;

Φαμέν.

e Ἄρ' οὖν ποτε, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ψυχὴ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα εὖ ἀπεργάσεται στερομένη τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον;

Ἀδύνατον.

Ἀνάγκη ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελείσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὖ πράττειν. |

BOOK I

"Whatever their excellence may be," I said; "for I'm not asking that yet, but only whether anything will perform its function well by virtue of its particular excellence, and badly by virtue of its particular defect."

"That much is certainly true," he said.

"So the ears too, when they are bereft of their particular excellence, will perform their distinctive function badly?"

"Yes indeed."

"And so we can apply the same argument to all other cases?"

"Well I certainly think so."

"All right then, next consider this: take the soul: does it have a function which you could perform with nothing else in the world, as for example: caring, ruling, deliberating and all things like that: is there anything else other than the soul to which we could rightly entrust these, and say that they were its particular province?"

"No, no other."

"But what about living, then? Shall we not say that it is a function of the soul?"

"Very definitely," he replied.

"And do we not say that the soul also has an excellence?"

"We do."

"Now, Thrasy machus, will the soul ever realize its particular functions well if it is deprived of its own excellence, or is that impossible?"

"It's impossible."

"So of necessity, if the soul is bad it will perform its functions of governing and caring badly, but if it's good, it will perform all of these things well."

Republic

Ἀνάγκη.

Οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴν γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἀδικίαν;

Συνεχωρήσαμεν γάρ.

Ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὖ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄδικος. |

Φαίνεται, ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

354 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τάναντία.

Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

Ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμων, ὁ δ' ἄδικος ἄθλιος. |

Ἔστω, ἔφη.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, εὐδαίμονα δέ.

Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

Οὐδέποτε' ἄρα, ὦ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης. |

Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰσιτιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδίοις.

Book I

“That must be so.”

“And did we not agree that the excellence of the soul is justice, and its defect injustice?”

“Yes, we did agree.”⁷⁴

“So the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man badly.”

“It appears so,” he said, “according to your argument.”

“But furthermore, the person who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not, the reverse.”

“Of course.”

“So the just person is happy, the unjust wretched.”

“So be it,” he said.

“Moreover it does not pay to be wretched, but it does pay to be happy.”

“Of course.”

“In that case, my dear Thrasymachus, injustice can never be a more profitable thing than justice.”

“Well, Socrates,” he replied, let these conclusions be your feast at the festival of Bendis.”⁷⁵

74 S.’s argument at 353b2–e11 can be expressed in tabular form thus:

organ/implement	function (ergon)	excellence (aretē)/defect (kakia)
eyes	sight	seeing well/badly
ears	hearing	hearing well/badly
pruning knife	cutting a vine shoot	doing the job well/badly
soul	living (caring, ruling, deliberating)	justice/injustice

75 Mention of the festival during which the current discussion is taking place, and which the company is ostensibly planning to attend after dinner (see 328a7–8), serves to give Book I a false indication of approaching closure.

Ὑπὸ σοῦ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾧ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδὴ μοι
 πρᾶος ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω. οὐ μέντοι κα-
 λῶς γε εἰστίμαι, δι' ἐμαντὸν ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ· ἀλλ'
 ὡσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ ἀεὶ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται
 ἀρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαῦσαι,
 καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω, πρὶν ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν
 εὐρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν, | ἀφήμενος ἐκείνου
 ὀρμηῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε κακία
 ἐστὶν καὶ ἀμαθία, εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπροσόν-
 τος αὖ ὕστερον λόγου, ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἢ ἀδικία
 τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο
 ἐλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ δια-
 λόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναί· ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ
 ἐστίν, σχολῆ εἶσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὔσα τυγχάνει
 εἴτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων
 ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.

BOOK I

“Provided by you, Thrasymachus,” I said, “now that you have become gentler and have stopped being angry.⁷⁶ I have not feasted well, however, not because of you, but because of myself; just like greedy banqueters who snatch a taste of each dish as it’s served up before they have savored the previous one properly. That’s how I think I too have behaved: before discovering what we were first investigating: what justice is, I let that subject drop in my rush to consider whether it is baseness and ignorance, or wisdom and excellence. And again later when the argument burst in on us that injustice is more profitable than justice, I couldn’t resist turning to it from the previous argument. So now the current outcome of our inquiry is that I don’t know anything. For as long as I don’t actually know what justice is, I’m hardly likely to discover whether it is actually an excellence or not, and whether the person possessing it is unhappy or happy.”

⁷⁶ Attributing his own conclusion to his interlocutor (here transparently false) is a common ploy of S. in the *elenchus*. It is, however, followed by S.’s confession of personal failure, an expression of *aporia* which, on this occasion, turns out to be misleading.

Republic

B

357 Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾧμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον. ὁ γὰρ Γλαῦκων αἰεὶ τε ἀνδρειότατος ὢν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλ' ἔφη· | ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν βπεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πείσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον;

Ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἶπον, ἔγωγ' ἂν ἐλοίμην, εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἴη.

Οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ποιεῖς ὃ βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι ἄρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, | ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι, οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἰ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα;

Ἐμοιγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον.

Book II

Now when I had said this, I thought I had been released from the discussion; but apparently it was only a prelude after all.¹ For Glaucon, who always proves himself very bold in everything,² on this occasion in particular did not accept Thrasymachus' withdrawal from the debate, but said: "Socrates, do you want it to look as if you have persuaded us that it is in every way better to be just than unjust, or do you want to actually persuade us?"

"I would prefer the latter," I replied, "if it were up to me."

"Well then," he said, "you are not doing what you want. Tell me, do you think there is a certain kind of good which we would allow ourselves to possess not from a desire for its consequences, but welcoming it for its own sake? For example experiencing joy, and such pleasures as are harmless and through which nothing afterward results beyond the joy of having them?"

"Yes," I said, "I certainly think there is something of that kind."

1 S. as narrator expresses dramatically the unpremeditated nature of the continuation (for Polemarchus' original plan, see Book 1.328a4–9). "Prelude" (*prooimion*) is used of a formal introduction to a larger work, a musical prelude or introduction to a lyric poem, or the exordium of a prose speech.

2 Glaucon's *philonikia* (competitive nature) is alluded to by Adeimantus at 8.548d9 and seen as evidence for his political ambitions, *Xen. Mem.* 3.6.

c Τί δέ; ὁ αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνομένων, οἷον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὀράν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν; τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά που δι' ἀμφοτέρα ἀσπαζόμεθα. |

Ναί, εἶπον.

Τρίτον δὲ ὀρῶς τι, ἔφη, εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰατρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαίμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἔνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν.

d Ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον. ἀλλὰ τί δῆ;

Ἐν ποίῳ, ἔφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην τιθεῖς;

358 Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὁ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι.

Οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἶδους, | ὁ μισθῶν θ' ἔνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ δι' αὐτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὄν χαλεπόν.

Οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω καὶ πάλαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὄν ψέγεται, ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινείται.¹ ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς εἶκε, δυσμαθής.

¹ ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινείται DF: om. A

“Well, again, is there a kind which we value both for itself and for its consequences: such as soundness of mind, sight and health? For I imagine we welcome such things for both reasons.”

“Yes,” I replied.

“But” he went on: “do you see a third kind of good, in which I would include taking exercise and being treated when sick, the practice of one’s profession as a doctor as well as other ways of making money? We’d say that these are burdensome, but that they benefit us, and we wouldn’t agree to have them for their own sake, but for the financial rewards and other things which result from them.”³

“Why yes,” I replied, “there is this third sort too. But what of it?”

“In which of these do you put justice?”

“I think I’d put them in with the finest,” I replied, “which any person aiming at future happiness must value both for its own sake and for its consequences.”

“Well,” he said, “*that isn’t what most people think; they put it in the burdensome class of things which must be practiced for the sake of financial reward and a favorable position in popular esteem, but which in itself is to be avoided as being difficult.*”

“I know,” I said, “that is how it is regarded, and has long been disparaged as such by Thrasymachus, who praises injustice instead. But I’m rather a bad pupil, it seems.”⁴

³ For Glaucon’s three classes of good and S.’s choice, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 2 (a)).

⁴ S.’s familiar stance, with varying degrees of irony, of someone who knows little or nothing and so needs to learn from others (see 1.354a12–b1, though the tone here is more equivocal).

b Ἴθι δὴ, ἔφη, ἄκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, εἴαν σοι ἔτι δοκῇ ταυτά. Θρασύμαχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται πρῶαιτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφεις κηληθῆναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔπω κατὰ νοῦν ἢ ἀπόδειξις γέγονεν περὶ ἐκατέρου· ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τί τ' ἔστιν ἐκότερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, | τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν εἶσαι χαίρειν.

c Οὕτωςι οὖν ποιήσω, εἴαν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇ· ἐπανα-
νεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναι φασιν καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι, δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, | ὡς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔ τι δοκεῖ οὕτως· ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὄντα ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου
d καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον, ὡς ἀμεινον ἀδικίας, οὐδενός πω ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι—βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκοῦσαι—μάλιστα δ' οἶμαι ἂν σοῦ πυθέσθαι. |

Διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαί σοι ὃν τρόπον αὖ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ

⁵ For S.'s ability to persuade his interlocutors at a nonrational level, see *Meno* 80aff. (S. as the "stingray fish" who numbs his opponents into agreement.) His ability to use words to charm (*kēlein*) as musicians use instruments is expounded by Alcibiades at *Symp.* 215c.

“Come then,” he said, “hear also what I myself have to say, and see whether you still think the same. You see Thrasymachus seems to me to have given in to you before he really needed to, like a charmed snake.⁵ But I am not yet satisfied in my own mind about the proof for each: justice and injustice. I want to hear what each of them is, what power each has in and of itself, dwelling within the soul, and to forget about the financial rewards and what comes from them.

“So this will be my procedure, if you agree: I shall revive Thrasymachus’ argument and firstly state what people say justice is and where it comes from. Secondly, I shall argue that all who practice it do so unwillingly, as a necessity and not as a good, and thirdly, that what they are doing is reasonable, since the life of the unjust person is after all far better than that of the just, as people say. Although, Socrates, that’s not at all how I see it myself.⁶ Yet I feel at a loss and my ears deafened when I hear the arguments of Thrasymachus and countless others,⁷ while I have never yet heard the case for justice being better than injustice stated as I wish by anybody. I want to hear it praised for itself alone, and I think that is most likely to come from you.

“Therefore I am going to stick my neck out and speak in praise of the unjust life, and when I have done so, I shall

⁶ Glaucon’s speech is in the form of an *epideixis* (display speech), a hallmark of sophistic rhetoric, in which the speaker (as here) is not necessarily presenting his actual convictions.

⁷ Cf. S. in *Cri.* 54d, hearing the arguments of the Laws of Athens against his escape from prison after his trial ringing in his ears and excluding all others.

ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαι-
νοῦντος. ἀλλ' ὄρα εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἂ λέγω.

Πάντων μάλιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· περὶ γὰρ τίνας ἂν
μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ
ἀκούων;

- e Κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ὁ πρῶτον ἔφη·ν ἐρεῖν,
περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, οἷόν τ' ἐ(στὶ) καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε
δικαιοσύνη. πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασιν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν
ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερ-
βάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, | ὥστ'
ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ
ἀμφοτέρων γένωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκ-
φεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν συνθέσθαι ἀλ-
359 λήλους μῆτ' ἀδικεῖν μῆτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἐντευθεν δὴ
ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι καὶ συνθήκας αὐτῶν, καὶ
ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ
δίκαιον· καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν
δικαιοσύνης, | μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος,
ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῶ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδι-
κούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ἦ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν
μέσῳ ὄν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγα-
b θόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· ἐπεὶ
τὸν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδ'
ἂν ἐνὶ ποτε συνθέσθαι τὸ μῆτε ἀδικεῖν μῆτε ἀδικεῖσθαι

⁸ Speeches of praise and censure were traditional forms of sophistic exercise, with which Glaucon seems to expect S. subsequently to join in.

BOOK II

show you the manner in which I want to hear you in your turn censure *injustice* and praise *justice*.⁸ Anyway, see if you like my idea."

"Nothing could suit me better," I replied; "for on what *subject* would anyone of sense be happier to talk and listen again and again?"

"Music to my ears!" he replied. "And now listen to what I said I would talk about first: what *justice* is and where it comes from. You see, people do say that to commit an *injustice* is naturally good, while to be the victim of it is bad. Yet being wronged is much more of a bad thing than committing wrong is a good thing. The result of this is that whenever people wrong each other and are also victims of wrong and have a taste of both sides, those who are unable to avoid the one or achieve the other believe that it is in their interest to make a mutual agreement with each other not to do anything wrong to each other. From this basis they begin to make laws and covenants with each other, and they give the terms legal and just to what is laid down by the law. This is indeed the origin and essence of *justice*, lying between what is best: to commit wrong with impunity, and what is worst: not being able to get revenge when wronged. So *justice*, being midway between these two, is welcomed not as a good thing, but is valued through our being too weak to commit an *injustice*. For anyone who had the power to do wrong and was a real man would never make a compact with anybody not to inflict *injustice*

μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἄν. | ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης,
ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε
τοιαῦτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.

Ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν
ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστα' ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ
c τοιόνδε ποιήσασθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἑκα-
τέρῳ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ
ἀδίκῳ, εἴτ' ἐπακολουθήσασθαι θεώμενοι ποῖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία
ἐκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν
δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν,
ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, | νόμῳ δὲ
βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμῆν.

Εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἦν λέγω τοιαύδε μάλιστα, εἰ
αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἷαν ποτέ φασιν δύναμιν †τῷ Γύγου²
d τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ† γενέσθαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν
ποιμένα θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι,
ὄμβρου δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμῷ ῥαγῆναί τι
τῆς γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἧ ἔνεμεν.
ιδόντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι | καὶ ιδεῖν ἄλλα

² τῷ Γύγου ADF Procl.: Γύγου secl. Hermann: τῷ Γύγγ
schol.: Γύγγ τοῦ Κροίσου Jowett-Campbell

⁹ Glaucon is here putting forward a version of the “social contract” theory of the origins of civilization, implicit in e.g., the sophist Protagoras (ca. 490–420) in the speech given him by Plato (*Prt.* 320ff.).

¹⁰ A celebrated textual crux. The story is found in *Hdt.* 1.8–13, and the latter part of the story (11–13) contains details which are found in Plato here; many scholars have supposed that Plato must be referring to Herodotus' Gyges rather than his ancestor (sup-

on each other: he would be mad to do so. Therefore, Socrates, the nature of justice is just such as this and this is how it originated, as the argument goes.⁹

“We would most effectively grasp the point that people who practice justice do so because they are unable to commit injustice, if we were to explore the following idea. Imagine giving to each of them, the just and the unjust, the power to do whatever they wish, and then following each of them, watching where their desire will lead them. We should then catch the just person red-handed going after the same thing as the unjust man, which everyone naturally pursues as a good thing because of his greed but is forcibly deflected by the law into respect for equality.

“The ability I am talking about is particularly like the kind which would come from having the power which they say was once possessed by †the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian†.¹⁰ They say that he was a shepherd in the service of the then ruler of Lydia, and when a heavy shower of rain came on together with an earthquake, the ground opened up creating a chasm in the place where he was tending his flock. Amazed at the sight he climbed down¹¹ and among

ported by the later reference to Gyges himself at 10.612b). It has also been suggested that Plato and Herodotus may be reflecting a common folktale source, and possibly two versions of the same story. Against Proclus (fifth century AD) who quotes the unemended text, we need to note Cic. *Off.* 3.38 who, in recalling the story, clearly refers to Gyges and not some ancestor.

¹¹ The theme of descent (*katabasis*) to see what is beyond normal human knowledge links this story with the “Myth of Er” at the end of *Republic* (10.614bff.). Gyges, like Er, has the privilege of return after his descent, but, unlike Er, fails to gain any moral insight from the experience.

τε δὴ ἅ μυθολογοῦσιν θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον χαλκοῦν, κοῖλον, θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ' ἃς ἐγκύβαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόητα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι μείζω ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν³ οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον ὄν⁴ περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι.

- e Συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ περὶ τὰ ποίμνια, ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον | καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην τοῦ δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἶσω τῆς χειρός, τοῦτον δὲ γενομένου ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχο-
 360 μένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιψηλαφῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον στρέψαι ἔξω τὴν σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέψαντα φανερόν γενέσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐννοήσαντα ἀποπειράσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν, | καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω συμβαίνειν, στρέφοντι μὲν εἶσω τὴν σφενδόνην ἀδήλω γίγνεσθαι, ἔξω δὲ δήλω αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθὺς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα, ἐλθόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ
 b μοιχεύσαντα, μετ' ἐκείνης ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατασχεῖν.

Εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίῳ γενοίσθην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, | οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν

³ ἔχειν om. A

⁴ ὄν ADF: secl. Winckelmann

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the marvels there—the sort they make fables about—he saw a bronze horse which was hollow and had small openings in it. Peeping through these, he saw a corpse inside which appeared to be of more than human size. It had nothing else on, but a gold ring on its finger, which he took off and then climbed out.

When the time came for the shepherds' regular meeting to make their monthly report to the king about the flocks, he also attended wearing the ring. Now while seated with the others he happened to twist the setting of the ring toward himself, to the inside of his hand; at this he became invisible to those sitting by him and they spoke about him as if he had gone away. He was amazed and, feeling the ring again, he turned the setting outward and became visible. He pondered this and experimented with the ring to see if it actually had this power, and he found that this was the case: if he turned the setting inward he became invisible, outward and he became visible again. As soon as he became aware of this, he immediately arranged to become one of the messengers who went to the king, and when he got there he seduced his wife and with her help attacked the king, killed him and took possession of his kingdom.¹²

“Now if there should exist two such rings, and the just person were to put on one and the unjust person the other, nobody, it could be supposed, could have such an iron will as to stick to justice and have the strength to resist

¹² Note that Glaucon gives Gyges none of the moral scruples found in Herodotus' version of the story (Hdt. 1.11); moreover, the motif of invisibility, not in Herodotus, emphasizes Gyges' freedom from moral constraint.

c ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι, ἐξὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῶς ὅτι βούλοιο λαμβάνειν, καὶ εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὅτῳ βούλοιο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν οὔστινας βούλοιο, καὶ τᾶλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰσόθεον ὄντα. οὕτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιοῖ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῦτόν ἴοιεν ἀμφοτέροι. |

Καίτοι μέγα τοῦτο τεκμήριον ἂν φαίη τις ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίᾳ ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅπου γ' ἂν οἴηται ἕκαστος οἴος τε d ἔσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν. λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ οἴεται πᾶς ἀνὴρ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἰδίᾳ τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος, ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπλαβόμενος μηδὲν ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικῆσαι μηδὲ ἄψαιτο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατος, | ἐπαινοῖεν δ' ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτω.

e Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου περὶ ᾧ λέγομεν, εἰς διαστησώμεθα τὸν τε δικαιοτάτον καὶ τὸν ἀδικιώτατον, οἰοί τ' ἐσόμεθα κρίναι ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις; ἦδε· μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδίκου

¹³ The license traditionally ascribed to the person with absolute power, the tyrant (see e.g., *Crg.* 469c ff., *Resp.* 576c ff.).

¹⁴ A direct reversal, surely deliberate, of the famous Socratic paradox "no one does wrong voluntarily": see e.g., *Ap.* 25d, *Hp. Min.* 376b, *Prt.* 358c.

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taking other people's property, while at the same time being capable even of taking from the marketplace whatever he wanted with impunity. He could go into houses and seduce anyone he pleased, kill and release from prison whomever he liked, and in all other matters behave like a god among humans.¹³ In acting thus, the behavior of neither would differ in any way from the other. Both would take the same course.

"And indeed, one would say that this is firm evidence that no one is voluntarily just,¹⁴ but only under compulsion. Justice is thought to give no personal benefit, since in any circumstances where an individual thinks he will be able to get away with being unjust, he is so. That there is far more personal profit in injustice than in justice is what every man believes, and rightly so, as the person putting forward this sort of argument will maintain, because if a person who had this sort of opportunity within his grasp should be unwilling ever to behave unjustly or seize the possessions of others, he would be regarded as most wretched and foolish by those who observed him, although in front of each other they would commend him, deceiving one another for fear of being treated unjustly themselves. So this covers that point.

"But to come now to the distinction itself concerning the life of those we are talking about, if we distinguish *between the most just man and the most unjust*, we shall be able to make a correct judgment, but if not, then we can't. In what then lies the distinction? It's this: let us take

ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθώμεν. | πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁ ἄδικος ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιεῖτω—οἷον κυβερνήτης ἄ.ρος ἢ ἰατρὸς τά τε ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ διαισθάνεται,
 361 καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐᾷ· ἔτι δὲ εἰάν ἄρα πησφαλῆ, ἱκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι—οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι. τὸν ἀλίσκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἡγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα. |

Δοτέον οὖν τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον ἀλλ' ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὐτῷ παρεσκευακέναι
 b εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ εἰάν ἄρα σφάλληται τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῶ εἶναι, λέγειν τε ἱκανῶ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, εἰάν τι μνηνῆται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται, διὰ τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας. |

Τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον παρ' αὐτὸν ἰστώμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἀπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα. ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι,
 c ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι τοιοῦτῳ εἶναι

¹⁵ This phrase exactly recalls Thrasymachus' words in his long *epideixis* at 1.344a4.

away nothing from the injustice of the unjust person, nor from the justice of the just person, but take each to be perfect in his own way of life. First, then, the unjust person: let him operate as clever professionals do—for example, as a *first-rate navigator* or doctor—who clearly distinguish what is and is not possible in their art, and attempt the former but leave the latter alone. Then, too, if they ever make any mistake, they are capable of correcting it. Similarly, let the unjust person going about his wrongdoing in keeping with his character escape detection in his wrongdoing, if he is going to be thoroughly unjust. The person who is caught must be considered a bungler, for the height of injustice is to seem just when you are not.

“So we must grant the completely unjust person the most absolute injustice,¹⁵ and not deprive him of any of it, but allow the wrongdoer to obtain for himself the greatest reputation for justice by doing the greatest wrong, and if he should slip up at all, to be capable, through his courage, strength and the backing of friends and material resources, of correcting his mistake and of arguing to persuade people, if any of his injustices come to light; and to use force when force is needed.

“Having set the unjust person up as this sort of character, let us in turn place the just person by his side in the argument: a straightforward, high-minded man who, to quote Aeschylus, ‘wants not to seem to be good, but to be’ good.¹⁶ Now we must take away the outward appearance; for if he is going to be reputed just, he will have the honors

¹⁶ Aesch. *Sept.* 592. Glaucon alters Aeschylus’ *aristos* (“best,” “bravest”) to *agathos* (“good”), whose less heroic overtones better suit the context of the socially isolated just person.

ἄδηλον οὖν εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ
 τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη. γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν
 δικαιοσύνης καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ
 προτέρῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν ἔχέτω τὴν μεγίστην
 ἀδικίας, | ἵνα ἢ βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ
 μὴ τέγγεσθαι ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς
 γιγνομένων, ἀλλὰ ἴτω ἀμετάστατος μέχρι θανάτου,
 d δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι ἄδικος διὰ βίον, ὧν δὲ δίκαιος, ἵνα
 ἀμφοτέρω εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἐληλυθότες, ὁ μὲν δικαιο-
 σύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας, κρίνονται ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν εὐδαι-
 μονέστερος.

Βαβαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως
 ἐκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις
 τοῖν ἀνδροῖν. |

Ὡς μάλιστ', ἔφη, δύναμαι. ὄντιν δὲ τοιούτοιν,
 οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελεῖν τῷ λόγῳ
 e οἷος ἐκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει. λεκτέον οὖν καὶ δὴ καὶ
 ἀγροικότερως λέγεται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρα-
 τες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν.
 ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μα-
 362 στιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδηήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται
 τῷ φθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχιנדυλευ-
 θήσεται καὶ γνώσεται ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ

17 Just as the polishing process gets rid of all extraneous matter from the sculpture, so Glaucon has eliminated any extraneous detail which might spoil the (improbable) foursquare exactness of his comparison between just and unjust. Glaucon seems unaware (d7) of the ironical tone of S.'s praise.

and gifts this sort of reputation bestows on him, and then it will be unclear whether he has such a character because of his justice, or because of his gifts and honors. Indeed let him be stripped of everything except his justice and be made exactly the opposite of the unjust person we imagined before; although doing no wrong, let him have a reputation for the greatest injustice so that he may be thoroughly tested for his justice by his not weakening in the face of ill-repute and all that goes with it. But let him hold an unalterable course until death: although he is really just, let him be regarded as unjust throughout his life, so that, when both have reached the ultimate of justice and injustice respectively, we may judge which of them is the happier."

"That's fantastic! Glaucon," I said, "how vigorously you're polishing up each of your two men as if they were sculptures entered for a competition!"¹⁷

"I'm doing my best," he replied. "If they are both as I have described them, I don't think there will be any further difficulty in developing our discussion about the sort of life that awaits each of them. So, we must discuss that. Moreover if my account is delivered in a somewhat uncouth manner, don't think that it is me speaking, Socrates, but those who commend injustice over justice. What they will say is that, such being his character, the just person will be whipped, stretched on the rack and imprisoned, his eyes will be burned out and finally, after suffering every evil, he will be impaled on a stake, and come to realize that *not to be just, but to seem just is what one must aim for.*

δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν. τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου. | τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουςι τὸν ἄδικον, ἅτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν,

βαθείαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον,
ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα,

- b πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι, ἔπειτα γαμῆν ὀπόθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἂν βούληται, συμβάλλειν [κοινωνεῖν] οἷς ἂν ἐθέλη, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὠφελεῖσθαι κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν. | εἰς ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλουτεῖν καὶ τοὺς τε φίλους
- c εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ θεοῖς θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὓς ἂν βούληται, ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τὸν δίκαιον. | οὕτω φασίν, ὧ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ.
- d Ταῦτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἐγὼ μὲν ἐν νῷ εἶχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, Οὐ τί πον οἶει, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς εἰρησθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου;

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So the saying I quoted from Aeschylus would be more correctly applied to the unjust person. In reality they will say that the unjust person, inasmuch as he is pursuing something that relates to the truth and is not living with an eye on his reputation, does not want to seem to be unjust but to be unjust:

harvesting the deep furrow throughout his mind,
from which spring valuable resolutions,¹⁸

first, by holding office in the city because he is thought to be just, secondly by marrying into any family he wishes, marrying off his children to whomever he wishes, joining up in business with anyone he likes. And in all this he is helped to gain advantage by the fact that he does not have any scruples about committing injustice. And so, by engaging in lawsuits, private and public, he wins and gets the better of his enemies, and this enables him to become rich and do good to his friends and harm to his enemies. He will make sacrifices and dedicate votive offerings to the gods on an appropriately magnificent scale, and do service to the gods and any humans he wishes far more effectively than the just person, so that it is reasonable to suppose that he is also more loved by the gods than the just person. Thus they say, Socrates, that a better life has been provided by gods and men for the unjust than for the just person."

When Glaucon had said this, I had it in mind to make some reply to these points, but his brother Adeimantus interposed: "I don't suppose that you think enough has been said about the subject, Socrates, do you?"

¹⁸ Aesch. *Sept.* 593-94.

Ἄλλὰ τί μῆν; εἶπον. |

Αὐτό, ἧ δ' ὅς, οὐκ εἴρηται ὁ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι.

Οὐκοῦν, ἧν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη· ὥστε καὶ σύ, εἴ τι ὅδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμυνε. καί-
τοι ἐμέ γε ἱκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθέντα κατα-
παλαῖσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη.

e Καὶ ὅς, Οὐδέν, ἔφη, λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε.
δεῖ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὧν
ὅδε εἶπεν, οἱ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ
ψέγουσιν, ἕν' ἧ σαφέστερον ὅ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι
Γλαύκων. |

Λέγουσι δέ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέρες τε
ύέσιν, καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι, ὡς χρῆ δίκαιον
363 εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ'
αὐτῆς εὐδοκίμησεις, ἵνα δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι γίγνη-
ται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι καὶ ὅσαπερ
Γλαύκων διήλθεν ἄρτι, ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ
δικαίῳ. | ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὗτοι τὰ τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσιν.
τὰς γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκίμησεις ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα
ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθὰ, τοῖς ὁσίοις ἅ φασι θεοὺς διδό-
ναι ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδος τε καὶ Ὅμηρός φα-
σιν, ὁ μὲν τὰς δρυὺς τοῖς δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν
b ἄκρας μὲν τε φέρειν βαλάνους, μέσσας δὲ μελίσσας·

“Well yes, what else is there?” I replied.

“The most vital point,” he said, “has not been stated.”

“Then,” I replied, “a man should have his brother by his side, as the saying goes;¹⁹ so, if Glaucon here has fallen short in any way, you too come to his aid. And yet, as far as I’m concerned, what he has already said is quite sufficient to floor me and make me incapable of coming to the aid of justice.”²⁰

“You’re talking nonsense,” he answered; “but just listen to this further point. We should also go through the arguments contrary to those he mentioned, those which commend justice and censure injustice, so that what I suppose to be Glaucon’s meaning may become clearer.

“I imagine that fathers talk to their sons, as do all those who have someone they are concerned for, and urge them to be just, commending justice not as something in itself, but for the good reputation it brings. This is in order that political offices and marriage alliances and all that Glaucon has just explained: rewards which the just person has from being well thought of, will come to the person with a reputation for justice. These people enlarge still further on the fruits of a good reputation. For by throwing in good standing with the gods, they are able to list in plenty the good things which they say the gods give to the pious: such as what the noble *Hesiod and Homer* say. *Hesiod* says that for the just the gods make oaks bear ‘acorns at the top,

¹⁹ For the proverb, the scholiast quotes *Hom. Od.* 16.97ff. “a man trusts/help from these [brothers] in fighting when a great quarrel arises.”

²⁰ For the use of the wrestling metaphor, see e.g., *Euthd.* 277d. Unlike his brother, Adeimantus (e2) is not taken in by S.’s irony.

εἰροπόκοι δ' ὄιες, φησίν, μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι, καὶ
 ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα. παραπλήσια
 δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος· ὡς τέ τευ γάρ φησιν |

ἢ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος ὅς τε θεουδῆς
 εὐδικίας ἀνέχησι, φέρησι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα
 c πυρούς καὶ κριθάς, βρίθησι δὲ δένδρεα καρπῶ,
 τίκτη δ' ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχη
 ἰχθῦς.

Μουσαῖος δὲ τούτων νεανικώτερα τὰγαθὰ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς
 αὐτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδόασιν τοῖς δικαίοις· εἰς Ἴδιον
 γὰρ ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ καὶ | κατακλίναντες καὶ συμ-
 πόσιον τῶν ὀσίων κατασκευάσαντες ἐστεφανωμένους
 ποιοῦσιν τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἤδη διάγειν μεθύοντας,
 d ἠγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνιον.
 οἱ δ' ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσιν μισθοὺς
 παρὰ θεῶν· παῖδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατ-
 ὀπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ εὐόρκου. | ταῦτα δὴ
 καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐγκωμιάζουσιν δικαιοσύνην τοὺς
 δὲ ἀνοσίους αὖ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τινα κατορύτ-
 τουσιν ἐν Ἴιδου καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι
 φέρειν, ἔτι τε ζῶντας εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἄγοντες, ἅπερ

²¹ The Hesiod quotation is *Op.* 232–34, and that from Homer is *Od.* 19.109, 111–13. The reference to the “noble” Hesiod and Homer is part of the prevailing satirical tone of Adeimantus’ exposition of traditional religion; for the ironical overtones of *gen-naios* (“noble”), see Book I.348c12.

²² Musaeus and Eumolpus were legendary figures linked to

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bees in the middle.' He adds 'the woolly sheep are weighed down by their fleeces,' and many other benefits like these. And Homer has something very similar: 'like someone

or a noble king who, god-fearing,
upholds good government, and the black earth bears
wheat and barley, and the trees are weighed down
with fruit,
the sheep continually bear young, and the sea teems
with fish.'²¹

"But Musaeus and his son²² sing of still more splendid rewards that the just can expect from the gods. For the story goes that when they have conducted them down to Hades they sit them down to a wine party for the pious that they have laid on, and have them pass the whole time drinking with garlands on their heads in the belief that the finest reward of virtue is to be drunk for all eternity. But others extend the rewards from the gods even farther; they say the children's children and the family of a man who is pious and keeps to his word are preserved thereafter.²³ So with these and similar commendations they extol justice. But the impious and unjust, on the other hand, they bury in some sort of mud in Hades and force them to carry water in a sieve.²⁴ In fact while they are still alive even they bring them into evil repute, and all the punishments which

Orpheus, all three of whom were associated with the Mysteries and the fate of the soul in the afterlife.

²³ The idea is common in Greek thought: see Hom. *Il.* 20.308, Tyr. 12.29ff. Gerber.

²⁴ The fate of the daughters of Danaus, who were punished in the afterlife for killing their husbands (see *Grg.* 493b).

e Γλαύκων περὶ τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων διήλθε τιμωρήματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων λέγουσιν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἔπαινος καὶ ὁ ψόγος οὗτος ἑκατέρων. |

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκέψαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο αὖ εἶδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἰδία τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἢ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον, ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξη δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν· λυσιτελέστερα δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος | λέγουσι, καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας εὐδαιμονίζουσιν καὶ τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσιν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ, b τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζουσιν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἄν πη ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ὦσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἑτέρων. τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας τε καὶ βίον κακὸν ἔνειμαν, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν μοῖραν. | ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντιες ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπρωδαῖς, εἴτε τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκεῖσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε c καὶ ἑορτῶν, εἴαν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλῃ, μετὰ

Glaucon described as falling on the just who are supposed to be wicked, they talk of as belonging to the unjust: they don't have any others. Such is the praise and censure of the just and unjust.

“But consider further, Socrates, another line of argument again about justice and injustice found both in ordinary conversation and in the poets. You see, all with one voice harp on about moderation and justice as fine things, but hard and laborious, while licentiousness and injustice are pleasant, easily acquired and regarded as shameful only by common repute. They say that unjust deeds are for the most part more profitable than just, and they readily call the wicked happy and honor them in public and in private, provided that they are wealthy or have other resources. Whereas those who are in any way weak and poor they dishonor and despise, even while admitting that they are better than the others. But strangest of all, these are the stories that are told about the gods and virtue: how even the gods have assigned to many good people misfortune and a wretched life, but to those who are the opposite an opposite fate. Wandering priests and prophets approach the doors of the wealthy and persuade them that they have a power from the gods conveyed through sacrifices and incantations, and any wrong committed against someone either by an individual or his ancestors can be expiated with pleasure and feasting.²⁵ Or if he wishes to injure any enemy of his, for a small outlay he will be able

²⁵ For S.'s/Plato's disdain for prophets (*manteis*) see *Euthyphr.* 6aff., and for a critical attitude to bizarre and profane rituals, see Heraclit. DK 22B14. The type is illustrated by the oracle monger (*chrēsmologos*) in *Ar. Av.* 959–90.

σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάβει ἐπαγωγῆς τισιν καὶ καταδέσμοις, τοὺς θεοὺς, ὡς φασιν, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν. | τούτοις δὲ πᾶσιν τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι, εὐπετείας διδόντες,⁵ ὡς

d τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
 ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει
 τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρώτα θεοὶ προπάρουθεν ἔθηκαν

καὶ τινα ὁδὸν μακράν τε καὶ τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὅμηρον μαρτύρονται, | ὅτι καὶ ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν—

e λιστοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,
 καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίασι καὶ εὐχολαῖς ἀγαναῖσιν
 λουβῆ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρῶπῶσ' ἀνθρωποὶ
 λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῆῃ καὶ ἀμάρτη.

βίβλων δὲ ὄμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων, ὡς φασι, καθ' ἃς θνητολοῦσιν, πείθοντες | οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων
 365 διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσι μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσι δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἱ

⁵ διδόντες ADF: ἄδοντες Muretus

²⁶ Hes. Op. 287–89.

²⁷ Hom. Il. 9.497, 499–501.

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to harm just and unjust alike with certain spells and incantations through which they can persuade the gods, they say, to serve their ends. For all these stories they call on the poets as support. Some, granting indulgences for vice, quote as follows:

Indeed evil can be obtained easily in abundance,
smooth is the way, and it lives very close by.

But the gods have placed sweat in the path of
virtue,²⁶

and a long hard uphill road. Others bring in Homer as a witness for the beguiling of gods by men, since he too said:

The gods themselves can be moved by supplication;
And humans, with sacrifices and soothing prayers
With libations and sacrifices, turn their wills
By prayer, when anyone has overstepped the mark
and offended.²⁷

And they produce a babble of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, descendants, as they claim, of Selene and the Muses, and using these they make sacrifices, and persuade not only individuals but cities that they really can have atonement and purification for their wrongdoing through sacrifices and playful delights while they are still alive and equally after death.²⁸ These they actually call initiations,

²⁸ In Athenian religion the existence of diverse doctrines produced in "books" was a sign of unorthodoxy and marginality; see Eur. *Hipp.* 953, *Alc.* 967, and, generally, Parker, 55. Selene was the moon goddess, particularly associated with witchcraft (see *Grg.* 513a, *Ar. Nub.* 750).

τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ
δεινὰ περιμένει.

Ταῦτα πάντα, ἔφη, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ
τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἢ ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς
ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα
ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ
ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὥσπερ ἐπιπτώμενοι συλλο-
γίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ποῖός τις ἂν ὦν καὶ πῆ πορευθεῖς
b τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι; λέγοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τῶν
εἰκότων πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον ἐκείνο τὸ Πότερον
δίκαια τεῖχος ἕψιον ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβάς καὶ
ἐμαντὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγό-
μενα δικάϊω μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ ὄφελος
οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι, πόρους δὲ καὶ ζημίας φανεράς·
ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρεσκευασμένῳ θεσπέ-
σιος βίος λέγεται.

Οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί,
c καὶ τὰν ἀλαθείαν βιάται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ
τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὅλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα
κύκλω περὶ ἐμαντὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περι-
γραπτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα
ἐλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. ἢ

“Ἄλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ράδιον αἰεὶ λανθάνειν
κακὸν ὄντα.” Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές, φήσομεν,
d τῶν μεγάλων· ἀλλ’ ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν,

²⁹ Pind. fr. 201 Bowra.

³⁰ Simon. 598 Campbell (vol. 3).

³¹ Archil. fr. 185 Gerber.

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which free us from evils in the next world, while terrible things await those who neglect their sacrifices.

"How, my dear Socrates," he continued, "do we imagine the souls of young men will react on hearing all this and a lot of other such talk like it about virtue and vice, and the esteem in which they are held by men and gods? I mean those young men who are naturally gifted and capable of darting around all these sayings, as it were, and gathering from them what sort of character they should have, and what path they should take through life in order to live it as well as possible. Because such a person might reasonably ask himself, in the words of Pindar: 'Is it by justice I should ascend the higher tower, or by crooked deceit?' and thus 'live out my life securely fenced around?'²⁹ For if I am a just man, then they say that these sayings are of no consequence unless I also give the outward appearance of being just, but the sufferings and penalties are manifest. But for the unjust person who has cultivated a reputation for justice a life fit for the gods is predicted.

"Since therefore as wise men reveal to me, 'appearance even ravishes truth'³⁰ and governs our happiness, I must devote myself entirely to appearance; as a front and façade I must sketch out around myself a painted backdrop of virtue, but drag behind me on a lead most wise Archilochus' 'cunning' and wily fox.³¹

"'But the fact is,' someone may object, 'that it is not easy to be wicked and always get away with it.' 'Yes,' we will reply, 'but neither is any other major undertaking easy. Yet all the same, if we aim to be happy, we must take the

ταύτη ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν συνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρίας συνάξομεν, εἰσὶν τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι χρημάτων⁶ σοφίαν δημογορικὴν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, | ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι.

“Ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν.” Οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, τί καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν; e εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν ἢ ἕκ τε τῶν νόμων⁷ καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν, οἳ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν ὡς εἰσὶν οἴοι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχολαῖς ἀγανῆσιν καὶ ἀναθήμασιν παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι, | οἷς ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον. εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ 366 θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων. δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήμιοι μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπωσόμεθα. ἄδικοι δὲ κερδανοῦμέν τε καὶ λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες, πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. |

⁶ χρημάτων F: om. AD

⁷ νόμων F: λόγων AD Cyril.

³² Clubs (*hetairiai*) were upper-class gatherings, oligarchic in tendency (see Thuc. 8.54 for a fifth-century example). The “teachers of the art of persuasion” were the sophists, who taught, among other subjects, the art of political debate (see *Grg.* 452e).

³³ Hom. *Il.* 9.499 (quoted previously at 364d7).

³⁴ A rather opaque phrase; the antecedents of “both” and “nei-

path where the steps of our argument lead. For in order to escape notice we shall organize conspiracies and clubs; and there are teachers of the art of persuasion who for a fee give lessons in the ways of the assembly and the courtroom, as a result of which, by persuading some and forcing others, we shall gain the advantage without having to pay a penalty.³²

“But to be sure it is impossible to deceive or use force against the gods.’ Surely then, if the gods do not exist, or if human affairs are of no concern to them, why should it be a concern to us to escape their attention? But even if they do exist and do care about us, our knowledge of them comes only either from hearsay, or from the laws and the poets who write genealogies. Yet these are those very authorities who tell us that the gods can be persuaded and diverted by sacrifices, ‘soothing prayers’³³ and votive offerings; they should carry conviction in both aspects or neither.³⁴ Now, if they are to carry conviction one should do wrong and make sacrifices from the proceeds of our wrongdoings. For if we are just we will merely escape punishment from the gods, but at the same time we will be rejecting the profits which would come from our injustice. But if we are unjust we will both profit and, provided we make our supplications as transgressors and wrongdoers, will be able to win them over and get off unpunished.

ther” are far from clear in the Greek. A plausible interpretation is that “they” are the laws and the poets (e2) and “both aspects” refer to beliefs that (1) the gods exist, and (2) that they are susceptible to prayer. These popular views about the gods must therefore be believed *in toto* or disbelieved *in toto*.

“Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἄιδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν, ἢ αὐτοῖ ἢ παῖδες παίδων.” Ἄλλ', ὦ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόμενος, αἱ τελεταὶ αὖ μέγα δύνανται καὶ
 b οἱ λύσιοι θεοί, ὡς αἱ μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ προφήται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἱ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν μηνύουσιν.

Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην [ἂν] πρὸ
 μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἰροίμεθ' ἂν, ἣν εἰς μετ' εὐσχημο-
 σύνης κιβδήλου κτησώμεθα, | καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ
 παρ' ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ζῶντές τε καὶ
 τελευτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμε-
 c ὦ Σώκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν ᾧ τις δύναμις
 ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος ἢ χρημάτων ἢ γένους,
 ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα; ὡς δὴ τοι εἶ
 τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἃ εἰρήκαμεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ
 ἔγνωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη, | πολλήν που συγ-
 γνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀδίκους, ἀλλ'
 οἶδεν ὅτι πλὴν εἴ τις θεία φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδι-
 κεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε
 d ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἢ
 γήρωσ ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν,
 ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δέ, δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν

³⁵ Note the verbal echo (in contradiction) from 363d4–5; on that occasion the “children’s children” were profiting from their ancestors’ piety. Here we have the opposite: culpability for crimes, extending into the future and the afterlife.

³⁶ Apollod. 3.210ff. makes Eumolpus a son of the god Posei-

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“But the fact is that we shall pay for the misdeeds done in this world in Hades: either we ourselves or our children’s children.”³⁵ ‘But, my friend,’ will come the considered reply, ‘again, initiation rites and gods who give absolution are very powerful, as the greatest cities affirm, and the children of gods who have become poets and prophets of the gods³⁶ reveal that these things are so.’

“Well then, by what argument might we still prefer justice instead of the greatest injustice, which, if we acquire it with a counterfeit elegance,³⁷ we shall be able to practice as we like among gods and men, in this world and the next, as the argument of the majority of the acutest minds goes? Indeed, from all that has been said, what means are there, Socrates, to make someone of any strength of spirit, body, wealth or family want to honor justice and not laugh when he hears it being praised? I’m telling you, if there is anybody able to prove what we have said is false and has come to be sufficiently aware that justice is best, I imagine he has a good deal of tolerance, and is not angry with the unjust, but knows that, unless there is someone who by his godlike nature disdains injustice, or who *having gained understanding* refrains from it, none of the rest are voluntarily just, but they censure injustice since as a result of cowardice, old age, or some other weakness they are unable to commit it. It is obvious that this is so; for the first of such people having reached

don (for a different genealogy see above, 363c4) and Orpheus a son of Apollo and the Muse Calliope.

³⁷ A metaphor from the adulteration of precious metals, indicating the desirability of maintaining an outward appearance of rectitude (for the image, see Thgn. 117).

τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἔλθων πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, καθ' ὅσον
 ἂν οἶός τ' ᾗ. |

Καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον ἢ ἐκείνο,
 ὅθεν περ ἅπας ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὥρμησεν καὶ τῷδε καὶ
 ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι “ὦ θαυμάσιε,
 πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι,
 e ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἠρώων ἀρξάμενοι, ὅσων λόγους
 λελειμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς πώποτε
 ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπήνεσεν δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ
 δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνο-
 μένας· | αὐτὸ δ' ἐκάτερον τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ
 ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνόν, καὶ λανθάνον θεοῦς τε καὶ ἀνθρώ-
 πους, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ἰδίοις
 λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγιστον
 367 μέγιστον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ
 πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπέιθετε, οὐκ ἂν
 ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ
 ᾗν ἕκαστος ἄριστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ
 μεγίστῳ κακῷ σύνοικος ᾗ.” |

Ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείω
 Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης
 τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἂν, μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν
 b δύναμιν φορτικῶς, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν
 γάρ σε δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούσαι
 τὰναντία, ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. μὴ
 οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδι-
 κίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιούσα ἐκάτερα τὸν ἔχοντα

a position of power is the first to commit injustice as far as he may be able.

“And the root cause of all this is none other than that point from which the whole of this argument started out, prompting Glaucon here and myself to say to you, Socrates: ‘My friend, of all of you who claim to praise justice, starting from the heroes of old whose words survive right up to the present day, none has ever censured injustice, or praised justice for any other reason than the reputation, honors and gifts which flow from them. But what each of these does through its own power, when it is within the soul of the man who possesses it, and which escapes the observation of gods and men, nobody, either in poetry or in private conversation, has ever adequately explained by his argument that injustice is the greatest of evils which the soul contains within itself, while justice is the greatest good. For if it had been set out in this way by all of you from the beginning, and you had persuaded us from our youth up, we would not be on our guard against doing wrong to each other, but each one of us would be his own best guardian, for fear that in doing wrong he would be associated with the greatest evil.’

“Perhaps this, or even much more than this, is what Thrasymachus and maybe someone else would say about justice and injustice, Socrates, crudely misrepresenting their true capability, in my view. But as I do not need to hide anything from you, I put my case, having put in as much effort as I can because I want to hear you refute it. So, don't merely demonstrate to us by your argument that justice is superior to injustice, but show what each does in and of itself to the person who possesses it: harm in the

αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν ἢ μὲν κακόν, ἢ δὲ ἀγαθόν ἐστίν· τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὥσπερ Γλαύκων διεκελεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἐκατέρωθεν τὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι ψέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι ἄδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, συμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὐτῷ μὲν συμφέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἥττονι ἀσύμφορον. |

Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὁμολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἕνεκα ἄξια κεκτήσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, οἷον ὄραν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δῆ, καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἀλλ' οὐ δόξη ἐστίν, τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης, ὃ αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησιν καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει, μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν· | ὡς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀποδεχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, διότι πάντα τὸν βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἢ τοῦτο. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρείττον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τί ποιούσα ἐκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν, ἕαντε λανθάνῃ ἕαντε μὴ θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἢ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ κακόν ἐστι. |

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, αἰεὶ μὲν δῆ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε

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one instance and good in the other. But take away their reputations, as Glaucon told you to. For if you don't remove from each of them their true nature and add on false ones, we shall say that you're praising not justice, but what it seems to be, nor censuring real injustice, but what it seems to be; that you are advising someone who is unjust to keep it secret, and that you agree with Thrasymachus that justice is the good of someone else, the interest of the stronger, while injustice is what is in the interest of, and to the profit of oneself and to the disadvantage of the weaker.

"Since therefore you have admitted that justice is among the greatest of good things which are worth acquiring for their consequences, although far more for their own sake, for example sight, hearing, intelligence, and health too of course, and all other good things which are inherently so by their very nature and not just by their apparent value, so, praise that very aspect of justice which entirely on its own benefits the person who has it whereas injustice harms him, and leave it to others to commend the rewards and reputations. While I would put up with other people commending justice and censuring injustice by praising and disparaging the reputations and rewards which come from them, I could not take this from you unless you insisted, because you have passed your whole life considering nothing else but this subject. So do not demonstrate to us simply by argument that justice is superior to injustice, but also what each of them does for its possessor in and of itself, whether observed or not by gods and humans, whereby the one is good, the other evil."

On hearing this, much as I had always admired the

368 Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἡγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ
 τότε πάνυ ἤσθη καὶ εἶπον· Οὐ κακῶς εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὦ
 παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐλεγείων
 ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμήσαντας περὶ
 τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην, εἰπών—

παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός· |

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν· πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον
 πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἄμει-
 νον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖτε
 b δὴ μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπείσθαι—τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ
 τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπον, ἐπεὶ κατὰ γε αὐτοὺς
 τοὺς λόγους ἠπίστων ἂν ὑμῖν—ὄσω δὲ μᾶλλον
 πιστεύω, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὅτι χρήσωμαι. οὔτε
 γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω· δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι—
 | σημεῖον δέ μοι, ὅτι ἂ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων
 ὦμην ἀποφαίνειν ὡς ἄμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας, οὐκ
 ἀπεδέξασθέ μου—οὔτ' αὖ ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω·
 c δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἦ παραγενόμενον δικαιο-
 σύνη κακηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἔτι
 ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν
 οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῇ. |

³⁸ Adam, n. ad loc, suggests that by “that man” the still present Thrasymachus is jokingly meant and that Glaucon and Adeimantus have inherited the argument as “his sons” (for a parallel see *Phlb.* 36d). But “sons of Ariston” in a4 clearly echoes “sons of that man,” which makes it likely that a honorific reference is intended to their actual father, Ariston, who was also Plato’s father, as Glau-

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abilities of Glaucon and Adeimantus, on this particular occasion I was especially pleased and said: “You, the sons of that man,³⁸ Glaucon’s lover did not speak badly of you both, when at the beginning of his poem, after you had distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara³⁹ he wrote:

Sons of Ariston, divine race, sprung from a famous
man;

I think that sums it up well, my friends. For you really must have something godlike in your disposition if you are not convinced that injustice is better than justice, when you are able to plead its case like that. Of course, I believe that you are not really convinced: this I infer from your general character, since going by the speeches themselves I would disbelieve you; but the more I trust you, the more I am at a loss as to what I should do. And I don’t know how I am to help you: I doubt my ability. The reason being that you did not accept from me the arguments I used when I thought I had demonstrated to Thrasymachus that justice was better than injustice. Nor, on the other hand, do I know how I can refuse to come to your aid, for I fear that it would be impious to stand by and renounce justice when it is being slandered, and not come to the rescue while I have breath and voice in me. So the best course for me is to support justice to the best of my ability.”

con and Adeimantus were his brothers (possible covert authorial self-reference?).

³⁹ For the dates of Glaucon and Adeimantus in relation to the battle of Megara, see General Introduction, section 3.

Ὁ τε οὖν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ
 τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνεῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ
 διερευνησασθαι τί τέ ἐστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ περὶ τῆς
 ὠφελίας αὐτοῖν τάληθές ποτέρως ἔχει. εἶπον οὖν ὅπερ
 ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, ὅτι τὸ ζήτημα ᾧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον
 d ἀλλ' ὄξυν βλέποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν
 ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιή-
 σασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἷανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις
 γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὄξυν
 βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι | τὰ αὐτὰ γράμ-
 ματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι,
 ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη οἶμαι ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας
 οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγ-
 χάνει.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον,
 ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ζητήσῃ καθορᾶς;
 e Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρώ. δικαιοσύνη, φασμέν, ἔστι μὲν
 ἀνδρὸς ἐνός, ἔστι δέ που καὶ ὅλης πόλεως;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὄς.

Οὐκοῦν μείζον πόλις ἐνός ἀνδρός;

Μείζον, ἔφην.

Ἴσως τοίνυν πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζονι
 ἐνεῖη καὶ ῥάων καταμαθεῖν. εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον

⁴⁰ For the continuing theme of “not letting S. go,” see above, Book 1.327c10–11, 357a1. At this point in Book 2 there is a radical change in the structure of the dialogue to constructive dialectic, which marks the real end of the introduction to *Republic*.

So Glaucon and the others begged me to help in every way, not abandon the discussion,⁴⁰ but on the contrary track down the nature of each of our subjects (justice and injustice) and how the truth of each stood regarding the benefit they each provided. So I said how it seemed to me, that: “The search we are undertaking is no mean task, but as I see it, it’s one that needs a sharp eye, not a weak one. Since therefore,” I said, “we are not good at making an inquiry of such a kind, I think we should employ the kind of investigation suitable for people who are not very keen-sighted, if someone had ordered them to read small letters from a distance, but then someone noticed that the same letters existed somewhere else written larger and on a larger background. I think it would seem a godsend to read those first and then examine the smaller ones to see if they were the same.”

“I’m all for that,” said Adeimantus, “but what relevance here do you perceive in our search for ‘the just?’”

“I’ll tell you,” I said, “Do we talk sometimes of a justice of an individual person, and sometimes perhaps of a whole city-state⁴¹ too?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“And of course a state is something larger than one person?”

“Yes it is,” he said.

“In which case justice may be of a greater scale in the larger context and be easier to understand. If you wish

⁴¹ Plato takes as his basic political unit the “city-state” (*polis*), henceforward translated as “state” for short, the small self-governing city and its surrounding territory typical of the classical Greek world.

369 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν τί ἐστίν· ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστω, τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέα ἐπισκοποῦντες.

Ἄλλά μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καλῶς λέγειν. |

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν;

Τάχ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἐλπίς εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν ὁ ζητοῦμεν;

b Πολύ γε.

Δοκεῖ οὖν χρῆναι ἐπιχειρῆσαι περαίνειν; οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον αὐτὸ εἶναι σκοπεῖτε οὖν.

Ἔσκεπται, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει. |

Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής· ἢ τίν' οἶει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν;

Οὐδεμίαν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

c Οὕτω δὴ ἄρα παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον, ἐπ' ἄλλου, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου χρεία, πολλῶν δεόμενοι, πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν οἴκησιν ἀγείραντες κοινωνοὺς τε καὶ βοηθοὺς, ταύτῃ τῇ συνοικία ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα ἢ γάρ; |

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

then, let's firstly try to find out what kind of a thing it is in states, then let's examine it in this way in each individual too by looking closely at the resemblance of the greater in the form of the lesser."

"Well, I think you've got a good idea there," he said.

"So if we were to look at a state coming into being in theory, we would also be able to see its justice and injustice coming into being, wouldn't we?"

"Probably," he said.

"So that means that when it has taken shape, we can expect to see what we are looking for more easily, doesn't it?"

"Very much so."

"So do you think we should attempt to go through with it? Because I think it is no small undertaking. So, think it over."

"We have done so," said Adeimantus. "Please go ahead."

"Well then as I see it, a state comes into being since each of us is not independent, but actually needs the support of many people.⁴² Or what other way of founding a state do you think there is?"

"None," he said.

"Right then, by associating with each other, one person in need of another, and another of someone else, we need many people, and after bringing many together into one settlement as associates and helpers, we give this community the name of state, do we not?"

"Certainly."

⁴² Speculations about the origins of society through social co-operation were common in fifth-century thought, e.g., Protagoras in *Prt.* 322b-c.

Μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλω, εἴ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ μεταλαμβάνει, οἰόμενος αὐτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι;

Πάνυ γε. |

Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν· ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἡμετέρα χρεία.

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

d Ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν χρειῶν ἢ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν ἕνεκα.

Παντάπασί γε.

Δευτέρα δὴ οἰκήσεως, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. |

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόση⁸ πόλις ἀρκέσει ἐπὶ τοσαύτην παρασκευήν; ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἷς, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δὲ τις ὑφάντης; ἢ καὶ σκυτοτόμον αὐτόσε προσθήσομεν ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπευτήν; |

Πάνυ γε.

Εἴη δ' ἂν ἢ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν.

e Φαίνεται.

Τί δὴ οὖν; ἓνα ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἅπασι κοινὸν κατατιθέσθαι, οἷον τὸν γεωργὸν ἓνα ὄντα παρασκευάζειν σιτία τέτταρσιν καὶ τετραπλάσιον χρόνον τε καὶ πόνον ἀναλίσκειν | ἐπὶ σίτου παρασκευῇ καὶ ἄλλοις κοινωνεῖν, ἢ ἀμελήσαντα ἑαυτῷ μόνον τέ-

⁸ πόση Chapman: πῶς ἢ ADF

“They each share things with each other, if there is something to share, or exchange them, thinking that it is better for each of them in this way, don’t they?”

“Yes.”

“Come on then,” I said, “let’s make a theoretical state from scratch. I think our need for it will build it for us.”

“It certainly will.”

“But the first and greatest of our needs is the provision of food in order to survive and live.”

“Absolutely.”

“Secondly we need somewhere to live, thirdly clothes and things like that.”

“That’s right.”

“Right then,” I said. “What size of state will be capable of providing for those needs?⁴³ We need one farmer to do one job, a builder to do another; do we need another as a weaver? Shall we also add a shoemaker, or anyone else to deal with our physical needs?”

“Yes.”

“Then our most basic state would consist of four or five people.”⁴⁴

“It looks like it.”

“So what then? Each one of these must do his job for the common good of all; for example, our farmer must provide food for four and spend four times the amount and effort on producing food and share it with the rest. Or he could neglect them and produce a quarter of this

⁴³ Or (on an alternative reading) “How will the city be able to provide all this?”

⁴⁴ For explicit criticism of the restrictive nature of S.’s first *polis*, see Arist. *Pol.* 1291a10.

370 ταρτον μέρος ποιεῖν τούτου τοῦ σίτου ἐν τετάρτῳ
 μέρει τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ τρία, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς οἰκίας
 παρασκευῇ διατρίβειν, τὸ δὲ ἱματίου, τὸ δὲ ὑποδη-
 μάτων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις κοινωνοῦντα πράγματα ἔχειν,
 ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δι' αὐτὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν; |

Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ἔφη· Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 οὕτω ῥᾶον ἢ κείνως.

Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὰ Δία ἄτοπον. ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ
 αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν φύεται
 b ἕκαστος οὐ πᾶν ὅμοιος ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν
 φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου πράξειν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ
 σοι;

Ἔμοιγε.

Τί δέ; πότερον κάλλιον πράττει ἂν τις εἰς ὧν
 πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος, | ἢ ὅταν μίαν εἰς;

Ὅταν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰς μίαν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαι καὶ τόδε δῆλον, ὡς, ἐάν τις τινος
 παρῆ ἔργου καιρόν, διόλλυται.

Δῆλον γάρ. |

Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐθέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πρᾶτ-
 τουτος σχολὴν περιμένειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τὸν πρᾶττοντα
 c τῷ πραττομένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρέργου μέρει.
 Ἀνάγκη.

⁴⁵ Note how S. here uses expressions which rhetorically "load" the argument against the view he wishes Adeimantus to reject, (369e7) "neglect" [sharing food], and 370a4 "just doing his own job for himself alone." The desirability of the cooperation of people with different aptitudes is developed as a central theme

food for himself in a quarter of the time, and the other three quarters he could spend on building his house, making his clothes, his shoes and have no dealings in common with the rest, just doing his own job for himself alone?"⁴⁵

Now Adeimantus said: "Perhaps the former is easier than the latter, Socrates."⁴⁶

"That would not be at all surprising," I said. "For I myself was reflecting, since you mentioned it, that in the first place we are none of us much like each other, but being different in nature all of us are good at activities which are different from each another; or don't you agree?"

"I do."

"Well then would a man working at many tasks do better than when one man does one job?"

"No: one man one job," he said.

"And furthermore, I think that it is quite clear that if anyone misses the ideal moment for doing some job, the result is fatal."

"Yes that's clear enough."

"For I don't think that the work will wait for the workman's leisure, but the worker must give it his attention and not regard it as a sideline."

"That must be so."

of *Republic* as a whole (see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 2 (b))).

⁴⁶ The strict grammar of Adeimantus' reply suggests the opposite (οὗτω . . . κείνως = "the latter . . . the former"). The sense, and S.'s reply, clearly indicates the reverse; Adam, n. ad loc, suggests οὗτω as indicating the speaker's choice of the more obvious alternative, citing Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.13 as a parallel.

Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥῆον, ὅταν εἷς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττη. |

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Πλειόνων δὴ, ὧ Ἀδείμαντε, δεῖ πολιτῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἐπὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς ὧν ἐλέγομεν. ὁ γὰρ γεωργός, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ
d μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ σμυνύην, οὐδὲ τᾶλλα ὄργανα ὅσα περὶ γεωργίαν. οὐδ' αὖ ὁ οἰκοδόμος· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ δεῖ. ὡσαύτως δὲ ὁ ὑφάντης τε καὶ ὁ σκυτοτόμος.

Ἀληθῆ. |

Τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλκῆς καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες πολλοὶ δημιουργοί, κοινωνοὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ πολιχνίου γιγνόμενοι, συχνὸν αὐτὸ ποιούσιν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν πω πάνυ γε μέγα τι εἶη, εἰ αὐτοῖς βουκόλους | τε καὶ ποιμένας τούς τε ἄλλους νομέας
e προσθεῖμεν, ἵνα οἷ τε γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄροτρον ἔχοιεν βοῦς, οἷ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρῆσθαι ὑπόζυγίοις, ὑφάνται δὲ καὶ σκυτοτόμοι δέρμασιν τε καὶ ἐρίοις.

Οὐδέ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, σμικρὰ πόλις ἂν εἶη ἔχουσα πάντα ταῦτα. |

Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον οὗ ἐπεισαγωγίμων μὴ δεῆσεται, σχεδόν τι ἀδύνατον.

Ἀδύνατον γάρ.

BOOK II

“Indeed as a result of this all these things grow and become better and easier when one man does one job according to his aptitudes and opportunities, and leaves everything else alone.”

“Absolutely.”

“Indeed, Adeimantus, we need more than four citizens to produce what we were talking about. Our farmer is not going to be likely to make his own plow, if it is to be a good one, nor a hoe, nor any of the other tools used in farming. The same is also true of the builder. We need more here as well. And the same goes with our weaver and shoemaker, right?”

“Yes, true.”

“Carpenters and blacksmiths and many skilled workers of this sort sharing our little town with us will swell the numbers.”

“They certainly will.”

“Yet it still wouldn’t be anything very big, even if we add to these cowherds, shepherds and all the other kinds of herdsmen, in order that the farmers can have oxen to use for plowing, the builders pack animals to deliver their materials along with the farmers, and our weavers and shoemakers skins and fleeces.”

“Yet it certainly wouldn’t be a small state either, with all these,” he said.

“And there’s another thing,” I said. “It would be almost impossible to build the state itself in the sort of place where there is no call for imported goods.”

“Yes, impossible.”

Προσδεήσει ἄρα ἔτι καὶ ἄλλων, | οἱ ἐξ ἄλλης
πόλεως αὐτῇ κομοῦσιν ὧν δεῖται.

Δεήσει.

371 Καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἦ ὁ διάκονος, μηδὲν ἄγων ὧν
ἐκείνοι δέονται παρ' ὧν ἂν κομίζονται ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς
χρεία, κενὸς ἄπεισιν. ἦ γάρ;

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Δεῖ δὴ τὰ οἴκοι μὴ μόνον ἑαυτοῖς ποιεῖν ἱκανά,
ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷα καὶ ὅσα ἐκείνοις ὧν ἂν δέονται. |

Δεῖ γάρ.

Πλειόνων δὴ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργ-
ῶν δεῖ ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει.

Πλειόνων γάρ. |

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων που τῶν τε
εἰσαζόντων καὶ ἐξαζόντων ἕκαστα. οὔτοι δέ εἰσιν ἔμ-
ποροι ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Καὶ ἐμπόρων δὴ δεησόμεθα.

Πάνυ γε.

b Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε κατὰ θάλατταν ἡ ἐμπορία γίγνηται,
συχνῶν καὶ ἄλλων προσδεήσεται τῶν ἐπιστημόνων
τῆς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐργασίας.

Συχνῶν μέντοι.

Τί δὲ δὴ; ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς ἀλλήλοις μετα-
δώσουσιν ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι ἐργάζονται; | ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα
καὶ κοινωνίαν ποιησάμενοι πόλιν ᾠκίσαμεν.

Δῆλον δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὠνούμενοι.

BOOK II

“Then we shall need yet other things that we lack which will be brought in from another state.”

“We shall.”

“And there again if the supplier arrives empty handed without bringing any of the things which are needed by those people who are supplying what his people need, he will go away empty handed, won't he?”

“I should think so.”

“So they must make not only enough for their own use, but also enough of the kind of things the other people need.”

“They must.”

“Then we need more farmers and other artisans for our state.”

“We do.”

“And what's more, other suppliers to import and export every kind of commodity. And these are our merchants, aren't they?”

“Yes.”

“So we need merchants?”

“Yes.”

“And if our trade is by sea, then we shall also need plenty of others who understand seafaring.”

“Yes, plenty of those.”

“Now what about this? In the state itself, how will they share with each other the produce they are each working at? Which is after all the reason we made a community and built a state.”

“Obviously by buying and selling,” he said.

Ἄγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα σύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

- c Ἄν οὖν κομίσας ὁ γεωργὸς εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν τι ὦν ποιεῖ, ἢ τις ἄλλος τῶν δημιουργῶν, μὴ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἦκη τοῖς δεομένοις τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀλλάξασθαι, ἀργήσει τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας καθήμενος ἐν ἀγορᾷ;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ εἰσὶν οἱ τοῦτο ὀρώντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν τάττουσιν ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι σχεδόν τι οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀχρεῖοί τι ἄλλο ἔργον πράττειν.

- d αὐτοῦ γὰρ δεῖ μένοντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ μὲν ἀντ' ἀργυρίου ἀλλάξασθαι τοῖς τι δεομένοις ἀποδόσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὐτῷ ἀργυρίου διαλλάττειν ὅσοι τι δέονται πρίασθαι.

Αὕτη ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ χρεῖα καπήλων ἡμῖν γένεσιν ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ἰδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

- e Ἔτι δὴ τινες, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διάκονοι, οἱ ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς διανοίας μὴ πάνυ ἀξιοκοινωνήτοι ὦσιν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἰσχὺν ἱκανὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἔχουσιν· οἱ δὴ πωλοῦντες τὴν τῆς ἰσχύος χρεῖαν, τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην ἢ μισθὸν καλοῦντες, κέκληνται, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, μισθωτοί· ἦ γάρ;

Ναί. [πάνυ μὲν οὖν]

BOOK II

“So we shall have a market place, and coinage as a token of exchange resulting from this?”

“Certainly.”

“If then our farmer, or one of the other workmen, brings some of his produce to the market place, and does not arrive at the same time as those who need to exchange goods, he will be sitting idly in the market place instead of being occupied with his proper work?”

“Not a bit of it,” he said. “There are after all those who see this and set themselves up to provide this service. In properly run states they are generally those who are physically the weakest and are of no use at doing any other work. For they have to stay there around the market place to exchange goods for money with those who want to sell something, and on the other hand exchange money for goods with those who want to buy something.”

“This need then gives us the origin of traders in our state,” I said. “Or do we not call those who sweat and toil in the market place in order to buy and sell things traders, and those who wander between states merchants?”⁴⁷

“Certainly.”

“There are still some other workers, I think, who are not altogether worthy of our community in terms of their intelligence, but who have sufficient physical strength for hard labor. Those then who sell the use of their strength call their recompense for this ‘pay,’ and I think I am right that they are known as wage earners, aren’t they?”

“Certainly.”

⁴⁷ For a similar account of the expansion of a basic *polis*, see Arist. *Pol.* 1257a36ff.

Πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεώς εἰσιν, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ μισθωτοί.

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἤδη ἡμῖν ἠϋξῆται ἡ πόλις, ὥστ' εἶναι τελέα; |

Ἴσως.

Ποῦ οὖν ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀδικία; καὶ τίνι ἅμα ἐγγενομένη ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα;

372 Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκратες, εἰ μὴ που ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεῖα τινὲ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλῶς λέγεις· καὶ σκεπτέον γε καὶ οὐκ ἀποκηγτέον. |

Πρῶτον οὖν σκεψώμεθα τίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται οἱ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένοι. ἄλλο τι ἢ σῖτόν τε ποιῶντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα; καὶ οἰκοδομησάμενοι οἰκίας, θέρους μὲν τὰ πολλὰ γυμνοί τε
 b καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι ἐργάζονται, τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ἡμφιεσμένοι τε καὶ ὑποδεδεμένοι ἱκανῶς· θρέβονται δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κριθῶν ἄλφιστα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἄλευρα, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάξαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμόν τινα παραβαλλόμενοι | ἢ φύλλα καθαρὰ, κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις, εὐωχῆσονται αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδιά, ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεοὺς, ἡδέως συνόντες
 c ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας, εὐλαβοῦμενοι πενίαν ἢ πόλεμον.

BOOK II

“So that means that those who make up the full complement of our state are the wage earners, it seems.”

“I think so.”

“So, Adeimantus, is our state now expanded enough to be complete?”

“Perhaps.”

“Whereabouts then would justice and injustice be in it? In which of those areas we’ve been examining did they originate?”

“For my part, Socrates,” he said, “I have no idea, unless I suppose it was in the need of those same people regarding their mutual interests.”

“Well, perhaps you are right there,” I said. “We must look at it and not shy away from it.

“First of all then, let’s look at the kind of life the people will live who have been provided for in this way. Will they make anything other than food, wine, clothing and shoes? They will also build houses, in summer working for the most part naked and unshod, while in winter they will be adequately wrapped up and wearing shoes. They will be fed on barley meal which they prepare themselves; they will make flour from wheat, cook or knead some of it, serve excellent barley cakes and bread on a reed, or clean leaves; lie on straw beds strewn with holm oak and myrtle; they and their children will eat sumptuously, drink wine, wear garlands and sing praises to the gods, while living in harmony with each other, not producing children beyond their means, taking care to avoid hunger and war.”

Καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ὑπολαβὼν, ἄνευ ὄψου, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικας, ποιεῖς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐστιωμένους.

Ἄληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἐπελαθόμεν ὅτι καὶ ὄψον ἔξουσιν, ἢ ἄλας τε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐλάας καὶ τυρόν, καὶ βολβούς καὶ λάχανά γε, οἷα δὴ ἐν ἀγροῖς ἐψήματα, ἐψήσονται. καὶ τραγήματά που παραθήσομεν αὐτοῖς τῶν τε σύκων καὶ ἐρεβίνθων καὶ κυάμων, καὶ μύρτα
d καὶ φηγούς σποδιοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες· καὶ οὕτω διάγοντες τὸν βίον ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ὑγιείας, ὡς εἰκός, γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες ἄλλον τοιοῦτον βίον τοῖς ἐγγόνουσι παραδώσουσιν.

Καὶ ὅς, Εἰ δὲ ὑὼν πόλιν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἢ κατεσκευάζεις, τί ἂν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἐχόρταζεις;

Ἄλλὰ πῶς χρή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾧ Γλαῦκων;

Ἄπερ νομίζεται, ἔφη· ἐπὶ τε κλιῶν κατακείσθαι
e οἶμαι τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν δειπνεῖν, καὶ ὄψα ἄπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι καὶ τραγήματα.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μανθάνω. οὐ πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικε, σκοποῦμεν μόνον ὅπως γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφῶσαν πόλιν. ἴσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἔχει σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ τοιαύτην τάχ' ἂν ἢ κατίδοιμεν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἢν διεληλύθαμεν, ὥσπερ ὑγιῆς τις· εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε, καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν
373 πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν· οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει. ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ

BOOK II

Glaucon retorted: "It seems you are making your people dine without relishes."⁴⁸

"That's true," I said. "I had forgotten they will have relishes. Of course they will have salt, olives and cheese, also boil up roots and herbs, the sort of vegetables they boil up in the country, and I imagine we shall add to these dried figs, chickpeas and beans; they will roast myrtle berries and acorns in the ashes near the fire while they drink in moderation. So, it seems, they will spend their lives in peace and good health; they will reach old age and pass on to their successors a life just like this one."

"If you were setting up a city of pigs, Socrates," said Glaucon, "what else would you feed them on but this?"⁴⁹

"Well how should I feed them then, Glaucon?" I asked.

"In the customary way," he said. "I think that to avoid suffering any hardship they should recline on couches, eat off tables and eat food and desserts as people do nowadays."

"Well then," I said, "I see. It looks as if we are not only considering how a state comes into being, but also one that is luxurious. Perhaps then it is not that bad an idea, for in examining one like that also, we may observe where justice and injustice take root in states. Now the *genuine state* seems to me to be the one we've dealt with and gone through in detail as a healthy one. But again if you want, we can look at an inflamed one. There's nothing to stop us.

⁴⁸ "Relishes" (*opson*)—cheese, olives, vegetables, fish, herbs, berries, and, occasionally, meat—all to go with bread (the barley cakes (b3)).

⁴⁹ For the "city of pigs," see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 2 (b)).

τισιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει, οὐδὲ αὐτῆ ἡ δίαιτα, ἀλλὰ κλῖναί τε προσέσονται καὶ τράπεζαι καὶ τᾶλλα σκευή, καὶ ὄψα δὴ καὶ μύρα καὶ θυμιάματα καὶ ἐταῖραι καὶ πέμματα, ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἂ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν οὐκέτι τἀναγκαῖα θετέον, | οἰκίας τε καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τὴν τε ζωγραφίαν κινητέον καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν,⁹ καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ ἐλέφαντα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα κτητέον. ἦ γάρ;

b Ναί, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν μείζονά τε αὖ τὴν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν· ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ ὑγιεινὴ οὐκέτι ἱκανή, ἀλλ' ἤδη ὄγκου ἐμπληστέα καὶ πλήθους, ἂ οὐκέτι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, | οἷον οἷ τε θηρευταὶ πάντες οἷ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικὴν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ράψωδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι, c σκευῶν τε παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν γυναικείον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλειόνων δεησόμεθα· ἦ οὐ δοκεῖ δεήσειν παιδαγωγῶν, τιθῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτριῶν, κουρέων, καὶ αὖ ὄψοποιῶν τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν προσδεησόμεθα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν | τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνήν—ἔδει γὰρ οὐδέν—ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτου προσδεήσει. δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἴ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται· ἦ γάρ;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

⁹ καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν om. A

BOOK II

You see I can assure you that these conditions apparently will not satisfy some people, nor even this way of life, unless they also have beds, tables and other furnishings; relishes, perfumes, incense and call girls; and each and every kind of pastry. Moreover what we were describing: houses, clothes and shoes, must no longer be taken as the bare essentials: but we must call into play painting and embroidery, and we must acquire gold, ivory and all such things as that. Isn't that so?"

"Yes," he said.

"In that case we must make our state even bigger, mustn't we? For our healthy one is no longer adequate, but already must be filled with hordes of people who are no longer in our states for essential purposes, such as all the huntsmen and all the artists: many of whom are concerned with form and color, many with music; poets and their attendants; professional reciters, actors, dancers;⁵⁰ contractors; makers of all kinds of products, both for the adornment of women and for other purposes. And on top of that we shall need even more servants. If that were not enough, don't you think we shall need minders, nurses and nannies,⁵¹ dressers, barbers and again cooks and butchers? Furthermore we shall need swineherds, as we didn't have any in our previous state: we didn't need them, but we shall in this one. We shall also need other animals in very large numbers, if anyone is going to eat them, won't we?"

"Of course."

⁵⁰ An anticipation of Plato's critical attitude to the theater and acting; see below, 2.376eff. and Book 3.

⁵¹ For the role of nurses for guardian mothers, see 5.460d.

d Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐν χρεία ἐσόμεθα πολὺ μᾶλλον οὕτω διαιωόμενοι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρότερον;

Πολύ γε.

Καὶ ἡ χώρα που, ἡ τότε ἰκανὴ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε, | σμικρὰ δὴ ἐξ ἰκανῆς ἔσται. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῶν ἀποτμητέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἰκανὴν ἔξειν νέμειν τε καὶ ἀροῦν, καὶ ἐκείνοις αὖ τῆς ἡμετέρας, εἰ καὶ ἐκείνοι ἀφώσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν ἄπειρον, ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρον;

e Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Πολεμήσομεν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαῦκων; ἢ πῶς ἔσται;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Καὶ μηδὲν γέ πω λέγωμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτ' εἴ τι | κακὸν μήτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόλεμος ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι πολέμου αὖ γενέσιν ἠύρηκαμεν, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ κακὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν γίγνηται.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

374 Ἔτι δὴ, ὦ φίλε, μείζονος τῆς πόλεως δεῖ οὐ τι σμικρῶ, ἀλλ' ὅλω στρατοπέδω, ὃ ἐξελθὼν ὑπὲρ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπάσης καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιούσιν.

Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἰκανοί;

Οὐκ, εἰ σύ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ὁμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, | ἠνίκα ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν·

BOOK II

“So we shall need doctors even more than in our previous state, if that’s the way we are going to live.”

“Indeed we shall.”

“Also I suppose the country which in our previous model was sufficient to feed the people we had in it then will be small instead of adequate. Do you agree?”

“Yes,” he said.

“In which case, shall we have to appropriate part of our neighbors’ land if we are going to have enough for stock and arable farming? And will they do the same to us, if *they too indulge themselves in the limitless acquisition of material goods and go beyond the bounds of basic necessities?*”

“That’s bound to happen, Socrates,” he said.

“Consequently we shall go to war, Glaucon. *Unless you see it differently?*”

“No, you are absolutely right.”

“Well let’s say nothing as yet about whether war accomplishes anything good or bad,” I said, “but only this much: that we have further discovered the origins of war out of which, when it happens, the greatest evil ensues for our states both collectively and individually.”

“Certainly.”

“Yet again, my friend,” I said, “the state must become bigger, not by some small unit, but by a whole army which can go out and *fight the assailants to defend all our property and the things we were talking about just now.*”

“Just a moment,” he said, “you mean the citizens are not capable of doing it by themselves?”

“No,” I said, “if you yourself and all of us were happy with the agreement we made when we formed our state.

ὠμολογοῦμεν δέ που, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ἓνα πολ-
λὰς καλῶς ἐργάζεσθαι τέχνας.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.

b Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἢ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ
τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Ἦ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολε-
μικῆς; |

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον διεκωλύομεν μήτε
γεωργὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι ἅμα μήτε ὑφάντην μήτε οἰ-
κοδόμον ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν τὸ τῆς σκυτι-
κῆς ἔργον καλῶς γίγνοιτο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ
ὡσαύτως ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν, | πρὸς ὃ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστος
καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βίου
c αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παριεῖς τοὺς καιροὺς καλῶς
ἀπεργάσεσθαι· τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πότερον οὐ
περὶ πλείστον ἐστὶν εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα; ἢ οὕτω ῥάδιον,
ὥστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἅμα πολεμικὸς ἔσται καὶ |
σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἠντιοῦν ἐργαζόμενος,
πεττευτικὸς δὲ ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς γένοιτο
μη αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων, ἀλλὰ παρέργω
d χρώμενος; καὶ ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν
πολεμικῶν ὄπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων αὐθημερὸν ὀπλιτι-

⁵² Plato's principle of specialization coincides with the rise of the professional army in Greece in the fourth century, as opposed to the citizen militia of earlier centuries. Soldiering is seen as a

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I think we agreed, if you recall, it is impossible for one person to carry out many skilled tasks well.”

“You’re right,” he said.

“So then,” I said. “Don’t you think that fighting a war is one of our skilled tasks?”⁵²

“Very much so,” he said.

“So ought there to be any more concern for shoemaking than warfare?”

“Absolutely not.”

“Well, we prevented our shoemaker from trying to be a farmer at the same time, or a weaver, or a builder. He had to be a shoemaker in order that the job of making our shoes would be done well. So in the same way we gave one job to each one of the others for which he was suited by nature and at which he was to work all his life free from the other tasks, and not let his opportunities pass for making a fine job of it. So, as to the business of warfare, isn’t it of the utmost importance that it should be carried out to perfection? Or is it so easy that even one of our farmers will be simultaneously competent in warfare, or even one of our shoemakers, or someone practicing any other art whatsoever; yet no one playing draughts, or dice, would become sufficiently competent, if he had treated it as a mere sideline and not practiced it since childhood? And, if he took up a shield or any other weapon or instrument of war, would he become that very same day a competent

technē (a skilled task); S.’s extensive elaboration of this point (b1–e6) foreshadows the importance of the military guardians in the political structure of *Republic*; they become the sole object of discussion in subsequent sections.

κῆς ἢ τινος ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἰκανὸς ἔσται ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν ἢ οὐδένα δημιουργὸν οὐδὲ ἀθλητὴν ληφθὲν ποιήσει, οὐδ' ἔσται χρήσιμον τῷ μῆτε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου λαβόντι μῆτε τὴν μελέτην ἰκανὴν παρασχομένῳ;

Πολλοῦ γὰρ ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὰ ὄργανα ἦν ἄξια.

e Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσῳ μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργον, τοσοῦτω σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν εἴη καὶ αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον.

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτηδεΐας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα; ἢ

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον ἂν εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπερ οἰοί τ' ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι τίνες τε καὶ ποῖαι φύσεις ἐπιτηδεΐαι εἰς πόλεως φυλακὴν.

Ἡμέτερον μέντοι.

Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἄρα φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἠράμεθα· ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέον, ὅσον γ' ἂν δύναμις παρείκη.

375 Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

Οἶε οὖν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς;

Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις; ἢ

Οἶον ὀξύν τέ που δεῖ αὐτοῖν ἐκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς

warrior as a *hoplite*, or in any other kind of fighting in war, though no other implement once taken up will make anyone a craftsman or an athlete, or be useful to him if he has not gained the knowledge of each one, or if he has not put in enough practice?"

"Implements would be worth a great deal, if they could do that," he said.

"So the job of the guardians⁵³ would require freedom from other jobs in proportion to its extreme importance, and what is more, it needs the greatest skill and attention."

"I certainly think so," he said.

"Then we need a suitable nature for this very pursuit, don't we?"

"Of course."

"It seems that it will be our job to select, if we can, who and what kind of people are by nature fit to guard our state."

"Yes, that's right."

"Zeus," I said, "so it was no small undertaking we've been taking on. Well we mustn't balk at it as long as our strength allows."

"No we mustn't."

"Do you think then, when it comes to guarding, that there is any difference in nature between a well-bred dog and a young man of good family?"

"What kind of differences are you talking about?"

"For example, both of them must be keen sighted and

⁵³ The first mention of the *phulakes*, the "guardians," the ruling class in the state (as yet undifferentiated). See below, 4.414b5, for mention of the class of *epikouroi* (auxiliaries).

αἴσθησιν καὶ ἑλαφρὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκᾶ-
θειν, καὶ ἰσχυρὸν αὖ, ἐὰν δέη ἐλόντα διαμάχεσθαι.

Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, πάντων τούτων.

Καὶ μὴν ἀνδρεῖόν γε, εἴπερ εὖ μαχεῖται. †

Πῶς δ' οὖν;

Ἄνδρείος δὲ εἶναι ἄρα ἐβελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδῆς εἴτε
ἵππος εἴτε κύων ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ζῶον; ἢ οὐκ ἐννεόηκας
b ὡς ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὗ παρόντος ψυχῆ
πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος;

Ἐννεόηκα.

Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ σώματος οἷον δεῖ τὸν φύλακα
εἶναι, δῆλα.

Ναί.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι γε θυμοειδῆ.

Καὶ τοῦτο.

Πῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, † οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλή-
λοις ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις¹⁰ πολίταις, ὄντες τοιοῦτοι
τὰς φύσεις;

Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ ραδίως.

c Ἄλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πράγους
αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεπούς· εἰ δὲ
μή, οὐ περιμενοῦσιν ἄλλους σφᾶς διολέσαι, ἀλλ' αὐ-
τοὶ φθήσονται αὐτὸ δράσαντες. †

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

¹⁰ ἄλλοις F Stob.: ἀλλοτρίοις AD: ἀλλήλοισ Stob. <τοῖς>
πολίταις fortasse legendum Slings

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nimble at pursuing their prey when they have spotted it, and again strong when they need to fight it out when they have captured their quarry."

"Yes, they need all of those things," he said.

"And be brave too, if they are going to fight successfully."

"Of course."

"Will any animal, a horse, a dog, or any other be ready to be brave, if it is not strong in spirit? Or have you not noticed what an unconquerable and steadfast thing the spirit is which by its presence makes every soul fearless and invincible against everything?"⁵⁴

"Yes, I have."

"So the physical qualities we need for a man to be a guardian are evident."

"Yes."

"And correspondingly, those of the soul, I mean strength of spirit?"

"Yes, that too."

"Then how can it be, Glaucon," I said, "that they won't be savage toward each other and the rest of our citizens⁵⁵ if that is what they are like by nature?"

"Zeus!" he said, "it won't be easy."

"Yet the fact is that they must be amenable toward their own people, but intractable against their enemies: otherwise they will not wait for others to destroy them, but will do it themselves first."

"That is true," he said.

⁵⁴ For the key role of *thumos* (here "spirit") in Plato's psychology, see the introduction to Books I–5, section 2 (iii).

⁵⁵ Reading *τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις*.

Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιήσομεν; πόθεν ἅμα πρᾶον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον ἦθος εὐρήσομεν; ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδεῖ πραεῖα φύσις.

Φαίνεται. |

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι τούτων γε ὁποτέρου ἂν στέρηται, φύλαξ ἀγαθὸς οὐ μὴ γένηται ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις
d ἔοικεν, καὶ οὐτῶ δὴ συμβαίνει ἀγαθὸν φύλακα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἐπισκεψάμενος τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, Δικαίως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἀποροῦμεν | ἥς γὰρ προυθέμεθα εἰκόνας ἀπελείφθημεν.

Πῶς λέγεις;

Οὐκ ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄρα φύσεις οἷας ἡμεῖς οὐκ ᾔήθημεν, ἔχουσαι τἀναντία ταῦτα.

Ποῦ δὴ; |

Ἴδοι μὲν ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ζώοις, οὐ μὲντᾶν
e ἥκιστα ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι. οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἷόν τε πραοτάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας τούναντίον. |

Οἶδα μέντοι.

Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατόν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα.

Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Ἄρ' οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι τοῦδε προσδεῖσθαι ὁ φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος, | πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἔτι προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν;

"Then what shall we do?" I said. "Where shall we find a gentle and stouthearted character together? You see, surely gentleness of nature and strong spirits are opposing qualities."

"That seems to be right."

"Yet whichever of these qualities you removed, the result would never be a good guardian. It looks as if we are in an impossible situation here, and so it turns out that it is impossible for there to be a good guardian."

"Yes, that looks rather likely," he said.

Indeed I was flummoxed, and after considering the remarks just made I said: "We're in a mess, and rightly so, Glaucon; we're a long way short of the image we proposed."

"How do you mean?"

"We did not notice that there are natural dispositions that we didn't think existed which have these opposing qualities."

"Where are they in that case?"

"We may see it in other animals, not least in the one we compared to our guardian.⁵⁶ I'm sure you know about dogs with good breeding: that their character is naturally to be able to be most friendly to those they are used to and recognize, but the opposite with those they don't know."

"Yes, I did know that."

"Then this is possible," I said, "and we are not looking for our guardian to be the type that contradicts nature."

"It doesn't appear to be so."

"Do you then think he who is going to be watchful still lacks something: in addition to being strong-spirited, he must be naturally interested in philosophy?"

⁵⁶ At 375a2.

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Πῶς δῆ; ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς κυσὶν κατοίψει, ὃ καὶ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τοῦ θηρίου.

Τὸ ποῖον; |

Ὅτι ὃν μὲν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνώτα, χαλεπαίνει, οὐδὲ κακὸν προπεπονθώς· ὃν δ' ἂν γνώριμον, ἀσπάζεται, καὶ μῆδὲν πώποτε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθη. ἢ οὐπω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, μέχρι τούτου προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν· ὅτι δέ που δρᾶ ταῦτα, δῆλον.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν κομφίον γε φαίνεται τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς
b φύσεως καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον.

Πῆ δῆ;

Ἢι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅψιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ φίλην καὶ ἐχθρὰν διακρίνει ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν καταμαθεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἀγνοῆσαι. | καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἂν φιλομαθὲς εἴη συνέσει τε καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ ὀριζόμενον τό τε οἰκείον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅπως οὔ.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταῦτόν; |

Ταῦτόν γάρ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν θαρροῦντες τιθῶμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ
c μέλλει πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρᾶός τις

⁵⁷ The “dog as philosopher” is clearly introduced as a joke here, and the somewhat weak analogy with humans (b11) likewise. The argument for the combination of passion and gentleness in the *epikouroi* is not satisfactorily tackled until 3. 410eff.

"How come? I don't understand."

"You will also see this in dogs, something that deserves our admiration in the animal."

"What is that then?"

"That at the sight of someone unknown to it, it becomes aggressive, even if it hasn't had an adverse experience before. But whoever it sees that it recognizes, it welcomes them even if it has never been well treated by that person. Or have you not yet wondered about that?"

"Up to now, I haven't really thought about it," he said. "That it does do this sort of thing is clear enough I suppose."

"Furthermore this natural instinct of the animal makes it seem clever and truly a philosopher."⁵⁷

"In what way?"

"In that it distinguishes what it sees as either friendly or hostile, by no other means than being familiar with the one and not recognizing the other. Yet how could it not be eager to learn when it can distinguish by what it knows and what it does not know what belongs to its world and what is alien to it?"

"There's no way this can't be true," he said.⁵⁸

"And as a further point," I said, "is passion for knowledge the same thing as the passion for wisdom?"

"Indeed they're the same."

"In that case, let's go for it and apply it to mankind as well. If a person is going to be amenable toward his own

⁵⁸ Glaucon's *emphatic* agreement emphasizes that he does not see any elements of humor in the suggested analogy (see also his insensitivity to S.'s humor at 361d7 above).

ἔσεσθαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι;

Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη.

Φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ θυμοειδῆς καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλλων καλὸς καγαθὸς ἔσεσθαι | φύλαξ πόλεως.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχοι. θρέβονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδεύονται τίνα τρόπον; καὶ ἄρα τι προὔργου ἡμῖν ἔστιν αὐτὸ σκοποῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν
 d οὐδὲρ ἔνεκα πάντα σκοποῦμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει γίγνεται; ἵνα μὴ ἔωμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ συχνὸν διεξιῶμεν.

Καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφός, Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε | προσδοκῶ προὔργου εἶναι εἰς τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν.

Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα ἀφετέον, οὐδ' εἰ μακροτέρα τυγχάνει οὔσα.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ἴθι οὖν, | ὥσπερ ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές τε ἅμα καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγῳ παιδεύομεν τοὺς ἄνδρας.

e Ἄλλὰ χρή.

Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου ἠύρημένης; ἔστιν δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική. |

⁵⁹ Plato starts out from a conventional base, the traditional staple Athenian education: *gymnastikē* ("physical education"),

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kind and those who are known to him, then he must be naturally passionate about knowledge and wisdom.”

“Let’s do that.”

“Then the man who is going to be a good fine guardian of our city-state will be naturally passionate about wisdom, and noble-minded, quick and strong.”

“Yes,” he agreed, “absolutely.”

“This may well be the basis of his character as such, but how shall we bring such people up and educate them? Will examining this subject be of any use to us in looking into the object of our whole inquiry: how justice and injustice originate in a state? This is to make sure that we do not pass over any valid argument, or go through too many.”

It was now Glaucon’s brother’s turn to join in. “Indeed it will,” he said. “I myself expect this will be a very useful way of looking at it.”

“Good, Adeimantus!” I said. “Then we must not drop the idea, even if it’s actually a rather long way round.”

“No, certainly not.”

“Come on then, and like people in a fable telling stories with ample leisure, let’s educate these men by our discussion.”

“Yes we must.”

“What is this education then? Or is it difficult to find anything better than what has been discovered over many years? I think I am right in saying that we have physical exercise for the body and the arts for the soul?”⁵⁹

and *mousikē* (“music”). We translate *mousikē* here and henceforth, in modern parlance, as “arts” or “cultural education”—a broader concept than our “music.” It comprises poetry, music, song, and dance, the staples of Athenian cultural education.

Ἔστιν γάρ.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ μουσικῇ πρότερον ἀρξόμεθα παιδεύοντες ἢ γυμναστικῇ;

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Μουσικῆς δ', εἶπον, τιθεῖς λόγους, ἢ οὐ;

Ἔγωγε.

Λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ' ἕτερον;

Ναί.

377 Παιδευτέον δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν;

Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη, πῶς λέγεις.

Οὐ μανθάνεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; | τοῦτο δὲ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἀληθῇ. πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδιά ἢ γυμνασίοις χρώμεθα.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Τοῦτο δὴ ἔλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῆς πρότερον ἀπτεόν ἢ | γυμναστικῆς.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη.

Οὐκ οὖν οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέω καὶ ἀπαλῶ ὀφροῦν; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται, καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος ὃν ἂν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἐκάστω.

⁶⁰ "Fiction" = *pseudos* ("falsehood," "lie"). S.'s subsequent discussion makes it clear that his concern is with the moral value of "fictions" rather than their literal truth-value: as S. says about

“Yes we do.”

“Shall we not begin our education with the arts before physical exercise?”

“Of course.”

“Do you consider storytelling as part of the arts?”

“I do.”

“And there are two kinds of story: true ones and fictional?”⁶⁰

“Yes.”

“We must educate them in both kinds, but in fiction first, mustn’t we?”

“I don’t understand,” he said. “What do you mean?”

“Don’t you understand,” I said, “that we tell children fables first? I assume this means fiction on the whole, but there can be truth in this too, and we use fables with children before we go on to physical exercise.”

“That is so.”

“Indeed that’s what I was saying, that we must take up the arts before physical exercise.”

“And rightly so,” he said.

“You know that the beginning of everything we undertake is most important, especially in any young tender creature? That is when it is most malleable and when whatever character you desire to be stamped on the individual is fixed.”⁶¹

the *muthoi* (“fables”) in 377a4–5 “there can be truth in this too” (see further the introduction to Books 1–5, section 2 (i)).

⁶¹ For the idea of education as the stamping of impressions on the malleable soul, see *Tht.* 191d6–7. For the whole argument of the remainder of this book and Book 3 up to 392c, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 2 (b)) and section 2 (i).

Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

- b Ἄρ' οὖν ῥαδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις ἄς, ἐπειδὰν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς; |

Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν παρήσομεν.

- c Πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν¹¹ ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ' ἂν μῆ, ἀποκριτέον. τοὺς δ' ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφούς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισίν, καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν· | ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον.

Ποίους δὴ; ἔφη.

- d Ἐν τοῖς μείζουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι καὶ ταῦτ' ὀν δύνασθαι τοὺς τε μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

Ἐγώ, ἔφη· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐννοῶ οὐδὲ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις.

Οὓς Ἡσίοδός τε, εἶπον, καὶ Ὅμηρος ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ | οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. οὗτοι γὰρ πον μύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσι.

Ποίους δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις;

"I agree."

"Are we then going to allow our children to hear any old stories so easily created by any passer by, and to let into their souls opinions which are for the most part the opposite of those which we think they ought to have when they're grown up?"

"No, there is no way we shall let them do that."

"Then first of all it seems that we must put them into the care of those who create these tales and accept any that they compose which are good, and reject those that are not. We shall persuade their nurses and mothers to tell their children the approved stories and form their souls with them much more than their bodies by handling them. The majority of the stories they tell nowadays must be thrown out."

"Which ones in particular?" he asked.

"In the greater stories," I said, "we shall see the lesser ones. For both the greater and lesser stories must be of the same pattern and be capable of the same effects. Do you not agree?"

"I do," he said, "but I don't understand what you mean by the greater stories."

"The ones," I said, "which Hesiod and Homer told us as well as the other poets. For they composed and told false tales to people, as I see it, and are still doing so."

"Which ones are they," he asked, "and what is it in them you say you are criticizing?"

¹¹ *καλὸν* A Euseb.: *καλὸν μῦθον* DF Stob., Philop.

Ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρῆ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδεται. |

Τί τοῦτο;

e Ὅταν εἰκάξῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ, περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἰοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν εἰκότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῆ γράψαι.

Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἔχει τά γε τοιαῦτα μέμφεσθαι. | ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα;

378 Πρῶτον μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο ὡς Οὐρανός τε ἠργάσατο ἃ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὃ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν. τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ νέου, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ ὥμην δεῖν ῥαδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν, δι' | ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους, θυσαμένους οὐ χοῖρον ἀλλά τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὅτι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκούσαι.

Καὶ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐτοί γε οἱ λόγοι χαλεποί.

b Καὶ οὐ λεκτέοι γ', ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρα πόλει. οὐδὲ λεκτέον νέῳ ἀκούοντι ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῖ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα

⁶² *Theog.* 154–82, 453–506.

“It’s what we must criticize first and foremost,” I said, “especially if the false tale is not well told.”

“What’s that?”

“Whenever one makes a bad comparison in one’s story when dealing with what sort of beings the gods and heroes are: like an artist who paints nothing like those whose likenesses he wishes to paint.”

“Ah yes,” he said, “it is right to criticize things like that. But what do we mean, and what kind of things are we talking about?”

“Firstly,” I said, “is the man who told the greatest lie about the greatest matters and made a poor job of it, about how Uranus accomplished what Hesiod says he did, and furthermore how Cronus took revenge on him. And as for Cronus’ deeds and sufferings at the hands of his son,⁶² even if they were true, I would not think they should be told to fools and youngsters in this lighthearted way, but should be kept strictly quiet. And if there were any need to tell the story, then as few as possible should hear it in secret, after sacrificing not a pig, but some huge victim, so hard to get hold of that as few as possible hear the story.”⁶³

“My word,” he said, “these stories are dangerous stuff!”

“What is more they are not to be told in our state, Adeimantus,” I said, “and a young listener is not to be told that by committing the worst of crimes he would be doing nothing remarkable, not even if he were punishing his

⁶³ A pig was the customary sacrifice at the Eleusinian Mysteries. The semi-humorous imagery of secrecy and revelation nevertheless indicates how important S. regards this subject.

κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρώη ἄν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ
πρώτοί | τε καὶ μέγιστοι.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἧ δ' ὅς, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ
ἐπιτήδεια εἶναι λέγειν.

Οὐδέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ παράπαν ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς
c πολεμοῦσί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται—οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἀληθῆ—εἴ γε δεῖ ἡμῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας τὴν πόλιν
φυλάξειν αἰσχιστον νομίζειν τὸ ῥαδίως ἀλλήλοις
ἀπεχθάνεσθαι—πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολο-
γητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον, καὶ | ἄλλας ἔχθρας
πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων πρὸς
συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν—ἀλλ' εἴ πως μέλ-
λομεν πείσειν ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἐτέρῳ
ἀπήχθετο οὐδ' ἔστιν τοῦτο ὅσιον, τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον
d καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγυὺς
τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν. Ἦρας δὲ δεσμοὺς
ὑπὸ ὑέος καὶ Ἥφαιστου ῥύψει ὑπὸ πατρός, μέλλοντος
τῆ μητρὶ τυπτομένη ἀμυνεῖν, καὶ | θεομαχίας ὅσας
Ἵμῆρος πεποίηκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν,
οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. ὁ

⁶⁴ As Zeus did Cronus (see a1–2 above). Plato has S. question this myth as a suitable moral paradigm for family relations in *Euthyphr.* 6aff.

⁶⁵ For example, embroidered in the robe (*peplos*) conveyed to the Athenian Acropolis in the Panathenaic festival. See again *Euthyphr.* 6b–c for a skeptical reference by S. to the feuds of the gods depicted in scenes on this *peplos* and in other pictures.

father in every way for doing wrong, but he would be doing what the first and greatest of the gods did.”⁶⁴

“Certainly not,” he said; “I don’t myself think that it seems suitable to tell such stories.”

“Nor are any of those stories at all suitable that tell of the gods making war, plotting against and fighting other gods (they are not true anyway), if those who are going to guard our state are to consider it most shameful to fall recklessly into enmity with each other. Still less should stories of the battles of the giants be related and made into embroideries,⁶⁵ and the many other hostile acts of every kind among the gods and heroes against their families and close associates. However, if we can somehow persuade them that no citizens have ever yet quarreled with each other and that this is impious behavior, such stories should be told straightaway to the children preferably by old men and women, and poets too should be compelled to compose stories like these for them to listen to when they get older. Hera chained up by her son; the hurling down by his father of Hephaestus, who was attempting to defend his mother who was being beaten up; and such battles of the gods as Homer composed:⁶⁶ these are not to be admitted into our state whether they have been composed with a deeper meaning to them, or not.⁶⁷ For the young are not

⁶⁶ Hephaestus chaining his mother: the title of a play by the comic playwright Epicharmos; Hephaestus hurled down from Olympus: Hom. *Il.* 1.590–94; battles of the gods: Hom. *Il.* 20.1–74, 21.358–513.

⁶⁷ “Deeper meaning” = allegory (*huponoia*). Allegorical interpretation of Homer existed as early as the sixth century, e.g., in Theagenes of Rhegium, and in Plato (see *Tht.* 152e).

e γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἴός τε κρίνειν ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὁ μῆ,
 ἀλλ' ἂ ἂν τηλικούτος ὦν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις δυσ-
 ἐκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι· ὦν δὴ
 ἴσως ἔνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον ἂ πρώτα ἀκούουσιν
 ὅτι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν. |

Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. ἀλλ' εἴ τις αὖ καὶ ταῦτα
 ἐρωτῶῃ ἡμᾶς, αὐτὰ ἄττα ἐστὶν καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι,
 τίνας ἂν φαίμεν;

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ
 379 ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ' οἰκισταὶ πόλεως·
 οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναί ἐν οἷς
 δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ' οὓς ἂν ποιῶσιν
 οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύ-
 θους. |

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ
 θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν;

Τοιοῖδε πού τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ οἶος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς
 ὦν, αἰεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἕαντε τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσιν
 ποιῇ ἕαντε ἐν μέλεσιν ἕαντε ἐν τραγωδίᾳ. |

Δεῖ γάρ.

b Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὁ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον
 οὔτω;

Τί μῆν;

Ἄλλὰ μῆν οὐδέν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερόν· ἦ
 γάρ;

Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. |

Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ μὴ βλαβερόν βλάπτει;

able to distinguish what has a deeper meaning and what hasn't. Whatever opinions they have formed at their age are hard to wash out and usually become ingrained.⁶⁸ Perhaps then for these reasons we must make it of prime importance that the first stories they hear are the finest tales possible to encourage their sense of virtue."

"Yes, that makes sense," he said. "But if one of them were again⁶⁹ to ask us what are these things and what are these stories, what should we say?"

"Adeimantus," I replied, "you and I are not poets at the present moment, but founders of a state. It's the founders' job to know the forms in which the poets must tell their stories, from which, if they compose, they must not deviate; but it is not the job of the founders themselves to write stories."

"And rightly so," he said. "But on this specific point, what would be the model for a story about matters divine?"

"Something like this, I suppose," I said: "I think you should always present a god as he really is, whether you are writing about him in epic, lyric or tragedy."

"That must be the case."

"A god is, of course, good in reality and must be spoken of as such?"

"What do you mean?"

"Well no good quality is harmful, is it?"

"I don't think so."

"Can what is not harmful cause any harm?"

⁶⁸ For the metaphor, see below, 4.429d4–30b2, on the need to imbue the soldiers who guard the city with courage, like an indelible dye. ⁶⁹ As at 377d10.

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ὁ δὲ μὴ βλάπτει κακὸν τι ποιεῖ;

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Ὁ δέ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ' ἄν τις εἴη κακοῦ αἴτιον; |

Πῶς γάρ;

Τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν;

Ναί.

Αἴτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας;

Ναί. |

Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον.

c Παντελῶς γ', ἔφη.

Οὐδ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἄν εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω | τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἅττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν.

d Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε Ὀμήρου οὔτ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνοήτως ἁμαρτάνοντος καὶ λέγοντος— ὡς δοιοὶ πίθοι

⁷⁰ "The god," with definite article, is a literal translation; rather than attribute monotheism to Plato at this stage, Reeve, n.

“Of course not.”

“Can what causes no harm do anything bad?”

“Again, no.”

“Therefore, whatever can do nothing bad cannot be responsible for anything bad?”

“How can it?”

“Now, what about this: a good thing is a beneficial thing, isn’t it?”

“Yes.”

“And so responsible for our well-being?”

“Yes.”

“Good is not responsible for everything, only for those things which are good, not those which are bad?”

“Entirely.”

“Then since he is good,” I said, “the god cannot be responsible for all things, as most people say. But he is responsible for only a few things for us men, but not for many of them. For we have fewer good things than bad. No one else is to be held responsible for the good things, but for the bad things we must look for any other cause but the god.”⁷⁰

“I think what you’re saying is very true,” he said.

“Then we must not accept the following blunder from Homer, or any other poet, who makes a foolish mistake about the gods when he says that ‘two pitchers

ad loc, would describe this use of the article as a “universal quantifier” (e.g., “The squirrel is an animal which hibernates.”). However, S.’s description here implies a radical critique of Greek polytheism and may to some extent anticipate Plato’s later theological ideas.

κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν

καὶ ᾧ μὲν ἂν μείξας ὁ Ζεὺς δῶ ἀμφοτέρων, |

ἄλλοτε μὲν τε κακῶ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ'
ἐσθλῶ·

ᾧ δ' ἂν μή, ἀλλ' ἄκρατα τὰ ἕτερα,

τὸν δὲ κακῇ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δίαν ἐλαύνει·

e οὐδ' ὡς ταμίας ἡμῖν Ζεὺς—

ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται.

τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄρκων καὶ σπονδῶν σύγχυσις, ἣν ὁ Πάν-
δαρος συνέχεεν, εἰάν τις φῆ δι' Ἀθηνᾶς τε καὶ Διὸς
γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, οὐδὲ θεῶν ἔριν τε καὶ
380 κρίσιν διὰ Θέμιτός τε καὶ Διός, οὐδ' αὖ, ὡς Αἰσχύλος
λέγει, ἐατέον ἀκούειν τοὺς νέους, ὅτι—

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,

ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλη. |

ἀλλ' εἰάν τις ποιῆ ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ ἱαμβεῖα ἔνεστιν, τὰ
τῆς Νιόβης πάθη, ἢ τὰ Πηλοπιδῶν ἢ τὰ Τρωικὰ ἢ τι
ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον αὐτὰ

⁷¹ All three quotations are from *Il.* 24.527–32. The source for e2 is unknown.

⁷² Pandarus breaking a truce between the Achaeans and Trojans: *Hom. Il.* 4.69ff. The following reference

BOOK II

stand at Zeus' door
Filled with fates, some good, some evil

and the person to whom he gives a mixture of both:

Sometimes he happens upon an evil one, sometimes
upon a good one

But whoever he doesn't, but gives an unmixed portion of
evil:

Grinding poverty drives him across the rich earth.⁷¹

Nor is Zeus for us the distributor, who:

Has wrought both good and evil.'

There is the violation of oaths and truce carried out by Pandarus. If someone says this came about through the agency of Athena and Zeus, we will not approve; nor will we if they say the dispute and quarrel of the gods came about through Themis and Zeus;⁷² nor must we ever allow the young to hear that, in Aeschylus' words:

For mortals god implants guilt
Whenever he wishes to ruin a house utterly.⁷³

But if anyone writes anything in verse in which these lines occur, for example the sufferings of Niobe, or those of the house of Pelops,⁷⁴ or the Trojan Wars, or anything else of this sort, then either we must not let them say that these

to a "dispute" may be to the Theomachy of *Il.* 20.1–74 or, possibly, the Judgment of Paris (see Adam, n. ad loc).

⁷³ Fr. 160 from *Niobe*.

⁷⁴ See especially Aesch. *Oresteia*.

λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρετέον αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν ὄν νῦν
 ἡμεῖς λόγον ζητοῦμεν, καὶ λεκτέον ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς
 b δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἡργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο
 κολαζόμενοι· ὡς δὲ ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ἢ
 δὲ δὴ ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα θεός, οὐκ ἑατέον λέγειν τὸν
 ποιητήν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως λέγοιεν
 ὡς ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί, | διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὠφελούντο ὑπὸ
 τοῦ θεοῦ, ἑατέον· κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεὸν τινι
 γίνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ
 μήτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει
 c εὐνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινὰ ἀκούειν, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε
 πρεσβύτερον, μήτ' ἐν μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτρου μυθο-
 λογοῦντα, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε
 σύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς.

Σύμφηφός σοί εἰμι, ἔφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, | καὶ
 μοι ἀρέσκει.

Οὗτος μὲν τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἂν εἴη τῶν περὶ
 θεοὺς νόμων τε καὶ τύπων, ἐν ᾧ δεήσει τοὺς λέγοντας
 λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αἴτιον
 τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. |

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἀπόχρη.

d Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὅδε; ἄρα γόητα τὸν θεὸν οἶε
 εἶναι καὶ οἶον ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν
 ἄλλαις ιδέαις τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν γιγνόμενον, [καὶ] ἀλλάτ-
 τουτα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ
 ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα δο-
 κεῖν, ἢ ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ | πάντων ἡκιστα τῆς
 ἑαυτοῦ ιδέας ἐκβαίνειν;

are the work of god, or if they are, then they must search out the reason that we are pretty much looking for now and say that god carried out good, just deeds, and that the people responsible have profited by being punished. We must not allow the poet to say that those paying the penalty were wretched and the one who brought this about was god. But if they were to say that evil men are wretched because they need punishment, and that they are benefited by god in being punished, we must allow that. We must resist at all costs anyone in his own state saying that god is the cause of anyone's evils, if it is to be well governed; or anyone, young or old, hearing it related either in verse or prose, on the grounds that such things given utterance are impious, and neither beneficial to us, nor harmonious within themselves."

"I agree with you over that law," he said, "and I like it."

"I can tell you," I said, "that this would be one of the laws and models concerning the gods which those telling the tales will have to use and follow, and writers likewise saying that god is not responsible for everything, but for all good things."

"I'm certainly happy with that," he said.

"Now what about this second point? Do you think god is a wizard and the sort who treacherously makes himself visible sometimes in one form, sometimes in another, and then again becoming himself, changing his appearance into many forms, then deceiving us and making us believe he has done so, or do you think he is straightforward and least of all one to step out of his own form?"

Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν γε οὕτως εἰπεῖν.

Τί δὲ τόδε; οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τι ἐξισταίτο τῆς
 e αὐτοῦ ιδέας, ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ μεθίστασθαι ἢ ὑπ'
 ἄλλου;

Ἀνάγκη.

Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἤκιστα
 ἀλλοιοῦνται τε καὶ κινεῖται; οἷον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτίων τε
 καὶ ποτῶν καὶ | πόνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἰλήσεών
 τε καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, οὐ τὸ
 381 ὑγιέστατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον ἤκιστα ἀλλοιοῦνται;

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην
 ἤκιστ' ἂν τι ἔξωθεν πάθος ταραξιεῖν τε καὶ ἀλλοι-
 ώσειεν; |

Ναί.

Καὶ μὴν που καὶ τὰ γε σύνθετα πάντα σκευή τε
 καὶ οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
 λόγον τὰ εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων ἤκιστα ἀλλοιοῦνται. |

Ἔστι δὴ ταῦτα.

b Πᾶν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέ-
 ροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται.

Ἔοικεν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεός γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντα ἄριστα
 ἔχει. |

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ταύτη μὲν δὴ ἤκιστα ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἰσχοι ὁ
 θεός.

BOOK II

"I can't say I can tell you at the moment," he said.

"What about this then: isn't it essential that if something departs from its own form in some way, the change is made by itself, or it is done by some other agent?"

"That must be so."

"Then are things in the best situation least altered and moved by something else? For example, your body is altered as a result of food, drink and hard work, and every plant by the heat of the sun and the wind and similar influences; isn't the healthiest and strongest least altered?"

"Of course."

"And wouldn't some external event disturb and change the bravest and most intelligent soul least?"

"Yes."

"And I imagine furthermore by the same argument that all manufactured goods, buildings and clothing that are well made and in good condition are least altered by time and other effects?"

"That is indeed so."

"Then everything that is in a good state, naturally, artificially or both, undergoes the least change by an external force."

"It seems so."

"There again god and everything that pertains to god is in excellent condition in every way."

"Of course."

"Then in this respect god would be least likely to have many forms."

Ἔκιστα δῆτα.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεταβάλλοι ἂν καὶ ἀλλοιοί;

Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται. |

Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἑαυτοῦ;

c Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεᾶ γε φήσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι.

Ὁρθότατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἂν τίς σοι, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, | ἐκὼν αὐτὸν χεῖρω ποιεῖν ὀπηοῦν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων;

Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη.

Ἀδύνατον ἄρα, ἔφην, καὶ θεῶ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὢν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ. |

Ἄπασα, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

d Μηδεὶς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡς—

θεοὶ ξείνοισιν εὐικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι,
παντοῖοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστροφῶσι πόλῃας· |

μηδὲ Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος καταψευδέσθω μηδεῖς,
μηδ' ἐν τραγωδίαις μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν
εἰσαγέτω Ἥραν ἠλλοιωμένην, ὡς ἰέριαν ἀγείρουσαν—

“Indeed I agree.”

“Well then would he change and turn himself into something else?”

“Clearly he would, if he does change.”

“Does he then change himself into something better and finer, or something worse and more demeaning than himself?”

“Obviously it must be to something worse, if he does change,” he said, “because we’re not going to claim that god is lacking in beauty or virtue.”

“You’re absolutely right,” I said. “And this being the case, do you think, Adeimantus, any god or human being would deliberately make himself worse in any way at all?”

“That’s impossible,” he said.

“Then it is impossible even for a god to want to change himself. But every one of them, it seems, being the best and finest possible, always remains simply in their own shape.”

“I think that must be absolutely right,” he said.

“Good man! Then let none of our poets, say:

Gods of all kinds appear like strangers
And haunt our cities.⁷⁵

“Do not let anyone speak falsely against Proteus or Thetis, or bring Hera into their tragedies or other poems in disguise⁷⁶ on the pretext of collecting a sacrificial victim:

⁷⁵ Hom. *Od.* 17.485–86. ⁷⁶ Proteus and Thetis were both deities who changed their shape: Proteus, see Hom. *Od.* 4.456–58; Thetis, see Pind. *Nem.* 4.62–66, on her capture after trying to escape by assuming different shapes.

Ἰνάχον Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις·

e καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ μὴ ἡμῖν ψευδέσθων. μηδ' αὖ
 ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδιά ἐκ-
 δειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς, ὡς ἄρα
 θεοὶ τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένους καὶ
 παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἅμα μὲν εἰς θεοὺς
 βλασφημῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεργάζωνται
 δειλοτέρους.

Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοὶ εἰσιν οἷοι
 μὴ μεταβάλλειν, ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσιν δοκεῖν σφᾶς
 παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι, | ἕξαπατῶντες καὶ
 γοητεύοντες;

Ἴσως, ἔφη.

382 Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψεύδεσθαι θεὸς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ
 ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων;

Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος,
 | εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι
 μισοῦσιν;

Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν
 ψεύδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἐθέλει,
 ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆ-
 σθαι. |

Οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἦ δ' ὅς, μανθάνω.

b Οἷε γάρ τί με, ἔφην, σεμνὸν λέγειν· ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω
 ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι

BOOK II

For the life-giving son of Inachus, Argos' river⁷⁷

nor tell us any of the many other lies of this sort. There again let not mothers, persuaded by these poets, terrify their children by telling these stories wrongly that there are some gods who go the rounds at night in the guise of all different kinds of stranger, lest they blaspheme the gods and at the same time make their children cowardly."

"No, indeed," he said.

"Well," I said, "then are the gods themselves those who never change, but make themselves seem to appear to us in every guise, by way of deceiving and bewitching us?"

"Perhaps," he said.

"But does that mean a god would be willing in word or deed to falsify himself by presenting an apparition to us?"

"I don't know," he said.

"Don't you know," I asked, "that all gods and men hate the true lie if one may put it like that?"

"What do you mean?"

"This," I said: "that I don't think anyone intentionally wants to give a false impression to the most important part of themselves about the most important things, but it is there that he is most of all afraid that he will bring it on himself."

"I still don't understand," he said.

"You think I'm saying something highfalutin," I said. "But I am saying that to be the victim of deception in the

⁷⁷ Aeschylus, fr. 168, from *Xantriai*.

καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι
τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἤκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο, καὶ ἰ μισοῦσι
μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.

Πολύ γε, ἔφη.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γ' ἂν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο
ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἢ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἢ
τοῦ ἐψευσμένου· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι
τοῦ ἰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶν παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γε-
c γουὸς εἶδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος. ἢ οὐχ
οὔτω;

Πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ
καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται. ἰ

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Τί δὲ δὴ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος; πότε καὶ τῷ
χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἂρ' οὐ πρὸς
τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων, ὅταν
διὰ μανίαν ἢ τινα ἄνοϊαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσιν πράτ-
τειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον ἰ
d γίγνεται; καὶ ἐν αἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις,
διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τάληθές ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν,
ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὔτω
χρήσιμον ποιούμεν;

Καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὔτως ἔχει. ἰ

Κατὰ τί δὴ οὔν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεῦδος χρήσιμον;
πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιωῶν ἂν
ψεῦδοιτο;

Γελοῖον μεντὰν εἶη, ἔφη.

BOOK II

soul about reality and to have been deceived and to be ignorant and to have and keep the false impression there is something everyone would least admit to and in such a case especially will hate it.”

“Very much indeed,” he said.

“But again,” I said, “as I was just saying, what would be most rightly called a true falsehood is the ignorance in the soul of the one who has been deceived. Since the falsehood in our words is some representation of the affection in our soul which is later turned into an image, the falsehood is not entirely pure. Isn’t that so?”⁷⁸

“Yes, very much so.”

“That means that what is false in reality is detested not only by the gods, but also by human beings.”

“It seems so to me.”

“And now what about falsehood in our words? When is it useful, and what is it useful for in situations where it won’t deserve our hatred? Isn’t it against our enemies, even those who are called *our friends*, whenever they contrive to do something harmful through madness or ignorance. That’s when it becomes useful as a preventative, like a medicine. And in the fables we were just talking about, because of our not knowing where the truth stands in relation to past times, in likening the false to what is real, as far as we can, do we make it useful?”

“That is very much how things are,” he said.

“In what way then is a falsehood useful to a god? Would he falsify the past by altering it owing to his ignorance?”

“That would be ridiculous,” he said.

⁷⁸ On “falsehood in words” and “falsehood in the soul,” see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 2 (b)).

Ποιητῆς μὲν ἄρα ψευδῆς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι. |

Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

Ἄλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο;

e Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.

Ἄλλὰ δι' οἰκείων ἄνοιαν ἢ μανίαν;

Ἄλλ' οὐδεῖς, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων

θεοφιλῆς.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεύδοιτο. |

Οὐκ ἔστιν.

Πάντη ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ
καὶ λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους
ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ | φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους
οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, ὕπαρ οὐδ' ὄναρ.

383 Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέγον-
τος.

Συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἔφην, τοῦτον δεύτερον τύπον εἶναι
ἐν ᾧ δεῖ περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς μήτε
αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς μήτε
ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ;

Συγχωρῶ.

Πολλὰ ἄρα Ὀμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες, ἄλλα τοῦτο οὐκ
ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ
Ἀγαμέμνονι· οὐδὲ Αἰσχύλου, ὅταν φῆ ἢ Θέτις τὸν
b Ἀπόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὐτῆς γάμοις ἄδοντα ἐνδατεῖσθαι τὰς
εἰς εὐπαιδίας—

BOOK II

“So there is no lying poet in a god?”

“I don’t think so.”

“But would he deceive his enemies because of fear?”

“No, far from it.”

“Because of the folly or madness of his fellows?”

“But no one who is a fool or mad is a friend of god.”

“In that case there is no reason why a god should be false?”

“No.”

“In that case the divine and holy is completely without falsehood?”

“Absolutely,” he said.

“In that case god is utterly straightforward and true in word and deed; he does not change himself or deceive others either by means of apparitions, or stories, or a parade of signs, in sleeping or waking?”

“Listening to what you say, I find myself in agreement,” he said.

“In that case do you agree,” I said, “with this second model in which we must speak and write about the gods as not being magicians who change themselves and mislead us with false tales in fact or fiction?”

“I do.”

“In that case we applaud Homer for many reasons, but not for the sending of the dream by Zeus to Agamemnon while he was asleep;⁷⁹ nor even Aeschylus when Thetis says that Apollo at her own wedding sings that: ‘Her goodly race of children will enjoy:

⁷⁹ Hom. *Il.* 2.1–34.

νόσων τ' ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίωνας βίους,
 ξύμπαντά τ' εἰπὼν θεοφιλεῖς ἑμὰς τύχας
 παιῶν' ἐπηυφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἑμέ. |
 κἀγὼ τὸ Φοῖβον θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα
 ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρύον τέχνη
 ὁ δ', αὐτὸς ὕμνων, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίνῃ παρών,
 αὐτὸς τὰδ' εἰπὼν, αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κτανὼν
 τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἑμόν—

- c ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον | ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλείστον οἶόν τε.

Παντάπασι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρῶμην.

BOOK II

A life free of illness, and long in years,
And telling in full of my fates dear to the gods,
Sang a hymn of praise and cheered my heart.
I expected the divine lips of Phoebus to be
Free from falsehood, full to bursting with prophetic
skill.

But he himself singing his hymn, himself
Present at the banquet, himself singing these words
Is the very one who killed my son.⁸⁰

Whenever anyone says such things about the gods, we shall be enraged and not grant them a chorus.⁸¹ And we shall not allow the teachers to use it for the education of our young, if our guardians are to be god-fearing and high-minded as far as is possible for a human being.”

“I agree with you about these models in every respect,” said Adeimantus, “and I would use them as laws.”

⁸⁰ Aesch. fr. 350, play unknown.

⁸¹ In order to have their plays performed, Athenian dramatists had to be granted a chorus by the *polis*; the expense of training and presenting the chorus was born by a wealthy citizen as a *liturgy*.

Γ

386 Τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοῦς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, ἀκουστέον τε καὶ οὐκ ἀκουστέον εὐθὺς ἐκ παί-
 δων τοῖς θεοῦς τε τιμῆσουσιν καὶ γονέας τῆν τε
 ἀλλήλων φιλίαν μὴ περὶ σμικροῦ ποιησομένοις. ¹

Καὶ οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν φαίνεσθαι.

Τί δὲ δὴ εἰ μέλλουσιν εἶναι ἀνδρείοι; ἄρα οὐ ταυτά
 τε λεκτέον καὶ οἷα αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι ἥκιστα τὸν θάνατον
 δεδιέναι; ἢ ἡγή τινά ποτ' ἂν γενέσθαι ἀνδρείων ἔχοντα
 ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτο τὸ δεῖμα;

b Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Τί δέ; τὰν Ἄιδου ἡγούμενον εἶναί τε καὶ δεινὰ εἶναι
 οἷε τινὰ ἢ θανάτου ἀδεῆ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις
 αἰρήσεσθαι πρὸ ἥττης τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Δεῖ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμᾶς ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ περὶ τούτων
 τῶν μύθων τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν λέγειν, καὶ δεῖσθαι μὴ

¹ The subject matter of Book 3 follows on from Book 2 without a break (for the division of *Republic* into “books” as a development subsequent to composition, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1, n. 5).

BOOK III

“So then,”¹ I said, “as far as the gods are concerned it seems that these are some of the kinds of things that those who are to honor the gods and their parents and who value their friendship with each other in no small degree, must listen to, or not listen to, from earliest childhood.”²

“Yes, and I think that we are right in that view,” said Adeimantus.

“Then what about if they are going to be courageous? Are these stories that must be told, the kind which make them least afraid of death? Or do you think that anyone could ever be courageous with this fear inside them?”³

“Zeus, I do not!” he replied.

“What about this? Do you think that anyone who thinks that Hades is real and terrifying will be unafraid of death and will prefer death in battle rather than defeat and slavery?”

“No, not at all.”

“Then it looks as if we shall also⁴ have to take charge of those who undertake to talk about these fables, and

² This refers back to S.’s condemnation at 2.378a–d of what he claims are false stories about the immoral activities of the gods.

³ For Plato’s S. on death as no evil, see *Ap.* 40c–41c.

⁴ I.e., as well as exercising authority over those fashioning stories about the gods.

REPUBLIC

λοιδορεῖν | ἀπλῶς οὕτως τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
 c ἐπαινεῖν, ὡς οὔτε ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοντας οὔτε ὠφέλιμα
 τοῖς μέλλουσιν μαχίμοις ἔσεσθαι.

Δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη.

Ἐξαλείβομεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους
 ἀρξάμενοι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα— |

βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητενέμεν ἄλλω
 ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρω, ᾧ μὴ βίωτος πολὺς εἴη
 ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν

καὶ τὸ—

d οἰκία δὲ θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι φανείη
 σμερδαλέ', εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοὶ περ

καὶ—

ὃ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τί¹ ἐστί καὶ εἰν Ἄϊδαο δόμοισιν |
 ψυχῇ καὶ εἶδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν

καὶ τὸ—

οἷω πεπνῦσθαι, ταὶ δὲ σκιαὶ αἴσσουσι

καὶ—

¹ τι Slings: τις Hom. codd. plerique

⁵ Hom. *Od.* 11.489–91; Achilles to Odysseus in Hades.

⁶ Hom. *Il.* 20.64–65. Hades fears lest the earth will split open and reveal his realm to all.

BOOK III

require them not to abuse Hades in such a sweeping manner, but rather praise it for the reason that otherwise they would not be relating what is true or helpful for those who are destined to be warriors."

"Yes, we must do that," he said.

"In that case starting from the following passage we shall excise everything such as:

I would wish to serve as a peasant beside
Another poor man who has a meager livelihood
Rather than rule over the dead who have wasted
away,⁵

and this:

[lest] to mortals and immortals the dwellings appear
terrifying, dank, which even the gods detest⁶

and:

Alas! So even in the halls of Hades there is truly
Soul and outward form, but there is no understand-
ing at all⁷

and this:

He alone has consciousness; the others flit around as
shadows⁸

and this:

⁷ Hom. *Il.* 23. 103-4; Achilles, dreaming that the insubstantial soul of the dead Patroclus eludes his embrace and departs for Hades.

⁸ Hom. *Od.* 10.493. Circe speaks to Odysseus describing the prophet Tiresias in the Underworld.

ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδόσδε βεβήκει, |
ὄν πότμον γούωσα, λιπούσ' ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἦβην

387 καὶ τὸ—

ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονός, ἥϋτε καπνός,
ᾧχετο τετριγυῖα

καὶ— |

ὡς δ' ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῶ ἄντρον θεσπεσίῳ
τρίζουσai ποτέονται, ἐπεὶ κέ τις ἀποπέσῃσιν
ὄρμαθού ἐκ πέτρης, ἀνά τ' ἀλλήλῃσιν ἔχονται,
ὡς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἄμ' ἦσαν.

- b ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα παραιτησόμεθα Ὅμηρόν
τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς μὴ χαλεπαίνειν ἂν δια-
γράψωμεν, οὐχ ὡς οὐ ποιητικὰ καὶ ἡδέα τοῖς πολλοῖς
ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' ὅσῳ ποιητικώτερα, τοσούτῳ ἦττον ἀκου-
στέον παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν | οὐς δεῖ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι,
δουλείαν θανάτου μᾶλλον πεφοβημένους.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

- Οὐκ οὖν ἔτι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὀνόματα πάντα τὰ
δεινὰ τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητέα, Κωκυτούς τε καὶ
c Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα
τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ τῶς

BOOK III

The soul flew from its limbs and went to Hades
Bewailing its fate, leaving behind manhood and
youth⁹

and this:

The soul went below ground like smoke,
shrieking¹⁰

and:

As when bats in the depths of a wondrous cave
Squeak and flit about whenever one of the string falls
From a rock, and they cling to each other,
So with a shriek (the souls) went together.¹¹

We shall plead with Homer and the rest of the poets not to be angry if we put a line through all these and passages like them, not because they are not poetical or pleasant to hear for most people, but the more poetical they are, the less the boys and the men should hear them who must be free, fearing slavery rather than death.”

“Absolutely,” he said.

“So on top of this we must, mustn’t we, get rid of all the terrifying, fearful names connected with them: names like Cocytus and Styx¹² and ‘those below’ and ‘corpses,’ and all the other similar things of this type that make those

⁹ Hom. *Il.* 16. 856–57; describing Patroclus, who has been killed by Hector.

¹⁰ Hom. *Il.* 23.100–101; the soul is that of Patroclus.

¹¹ Hom. *Od.* 24.6–9; these are Penelope’s suitors, whom Odysseus has killed, making the journey to Hades.

¹² Cocytus = “river of wailing”; Styx = “river of hatred.”

οἴεται² πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας, καὶ ἴσως εὖ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλάκων φοβούμεθα μὴ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης θερμότεροι | καὶ μαλακώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος γίνονται ἡμῖν.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, φοβούμεθα.

Ἄφαιρετέα ἄρα;

Ναί.

Τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον τύπον τούτοις λεκτέον τε καὶ ποιητέον; |

Δῆλα δῆ.

d Καὶ τοὺς ὀδυνμοὺς ἄρα ἐξαιρήσομεν καὶ τοὺς οἴκτους τοὺς τῶν ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, εἶπερ καὶ τὰ πρότερα.

Σκόπει δῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ὀρθῶς ἐξαιρήσομεν ἢ οὐ. φαμὲν δὲ δῆ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικῆς ἀνὴρ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, οὐπερ καὶ ἐταῖρός ἐστιν, τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινὸν ἠγγίσεται. |

Φαμὲν γάρ.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπὲρ γ' ἐκείνου ὡς δεινόν τι πεπονθότος ὀδύρουτ' ἄν. |

Οὐ δῆτα.

e Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε λέγομεν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἐτέρου προσδέεται.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

² ὡς οἴεται ADF: ὡς οἶόν τε Laur. 80.19pc: ὡς ὄντα Apelt: alii alia

who hear them shudder, †as he thinks†?¹³ Perhaps they are good for other purposes: but we fear for our guardians, that as a result of such a shock they will become more feverish and softer than we think they should.”

“And we are right to be afraid,” he said.

“Then we must remove them?”

“Yes.”

“And we must compose and tell stories opposite in character to these?”

“Oh yes, clearly.”

“We shall also remove the lamentations and pitiful wailing of famous men?”

“We must,” he said, “if we are also going to remove the things we were talking about before.”

“Consider carefully then,” I said, “whether it will be right or not for us to remove them. We do say that the good man does not consider death fearful for the good man, even if he is his comrade-in-arms.”

“We do.”

“Then he would not mourn for that man as if he has suffered something fearful.”

“Indeed no.”

“But again we also say this: that such a man is particularly self-reliant with regard to living well, and is different from others in having the least need of someone else.”

“That is true,” he said.

¹³ The text is probably corrupt here; many emendations have been proposed, and, among those who wish to retain the reading, it has been suggested that the words are a gloss by a Christian or Epicurean commentator, commenting adversely on “he” (i.e., Plato).

Ἔκιστα ἄρ' αὐτῷ δεινὸν στερηθῆναι ὑέος ἢ ἀδελφοῦ ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων. |

Ἔκιστα μέντοι.

Ἔκιστ' ἄρα καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι, φέρειν δὲ ὡς πραότατα, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν τοιαύτη συμφορὰ καταλάβῃ.

Πολύ γε.

388 Ὅρθως ἄρ' ἂν ἐξαιροῖμεν τοὺς θρήνους | τῶν ὀνομαστώων ἀνδρῶν, γυναιξὶ δὲ ἀποδιδοῖμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις, καὶ ὅσοι κακοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἵνα ἡμῖν δυσχεραίνωσιν ὅμοια τούτοις ποιεῖν οὐς δὴ φάμεν ἐπὶ φυλακῇ τῆς χώρας τρέφειν.

Ὅρθως, ἔφη. |

Πάλιν δὴ Ὅμηρον τε δεησόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν μὴ ποιεῖν Ἀχιλλέα θεᾶς παῖδα—

ἄλλοτ' ἐπὶ πλευρᾶς κατακείμενον, ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτε ὕπτιον, ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηγῆ,

τοτὲ δ' ὀρθὸν ἀναστάντα

b πλώζοντ'³ ἀλύοντ' ἐπὶ θίν' ἀλὸς ἀτρυγέτιο,

³ πλωιζοντ' A: πλάζοντ' F: πλώζοντ' D

BOOK III

“Then the least he has to fear is to be deprived of a son, or brother, or his money, or anything else of this sort.”

“That is true.”

“Then he should be the last to mourn, but bear it as resignedly as possible whenever such a disaster befalls him.”

“Very much so.”

“Then we would be right to remove the lamentations of men of good standing, and allocate them to women, although not even then if they are virtuous, as well as to men of bad character in order that those whom we say we are bringing up to guard our country may scorn to do similar things to these men.”

“Rightly so,” he said.

“Again we shall beg Homer and the rest of the poets not to portray Achilles, son of a goddess:

Sometimes lying on his side, and at others
On his back, and yet others on his face

‘then standing up,

weaving around distraught along the shore of the
barren sea’,¹⁴

¹⁴ *Il.* 24.10–12. Plato often alters original quotations, from either incorrect recall or quoting from a variant text, or to make an artistic point. Here *πλωίζοντ’* (“weaving around”), is Plato’s substitute for the Homeric text “pace around in distraction” (*δινεύεσκ’ ἀλύων*). The alteration, and this unusual use of the word (usually found in its literal sense of “sailing”) may, in view of the negative context, be a deliberate parody on Plato’s part (see Adam, n. ad loc).

μηδὲ ἀμφοτέραισιν χερσὶν ἐλόντα κόνιν αἰθαλόεσσαν
 χευάμενον κακ κεφαλῆς, μηδὲ ἄλλα κλαίοντά τε καὶ
 ὀδυρόμενον ὅσα καὶ οἶα ἐκείνος ἐποίησε, μηδὲ Πρία-
 μον ἐγγυὺς θεῶν γεγονότα λιτανεύοντά ἰ τε καὶ—

κυλινδόμενον κατὰ κόπρον,
 ἐξονομακλήδην ὀνομάζοντ' ἄνδρα ἕκαστον.

πολὸν δ' ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον δεησόμεθα μή τοι θεοὺς
 γε ποιεῖν ὀδυρομένους καὶ λέγοντας—

c ὦμοι ἐγὼ δειλή, ὦμοι δυσαριστοτόκεια·

εἰ δ' οὖν θεοὺς, μήτοι τόν γε μέγιστον τῶν θεῶν τολ-
 μήσαι οὕτως ἀνομοίως μιμήσασθαι, ὥστε

ὦ πόποι, φάσαι, ἦ φίλον ἄνδρα διωκόμενον περὶ
 ἄστν

ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὀρώμαι, ἐμὸν δ' ὀλοφύρεται ἦτορ· ἰ

καὶ—

d αἰ αἰ ἐγών, ὃ τέ μοι Σαρπηδόνα φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν
 μοῖρ' ὑπὸ Πατρόκλοιο Μενoitιάδαο δαμῆναι.

εἰ γάρ, ὦ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμῖν οἱ νέοι
 σπουδῇ ἀκούοιεν καὶ μὴ καταγελῶεν ὡς ἀναξίως
 λεγομένων, σχολῆ ἂν ἑαυτὸν γέ τις ἀνθρώπον ὄντα

¹⁵ *Il.* 18.23–24.

¹⁶ *Il.* 22.414–15.

¹⁷ *Il.* 18.54.

Spoken by the goddess Thetis, mother of Achilles.

¹⁸ *Il.* 22.168–69. Zeus observes Achilles pursuing Hector round the walls of Troy.

¹⁹ *Il.* 16.433–34.

BOOK III

nor

'taking the sooty ashes in both hands and pouring
them over his head',¹⁵

nor even when crying and complaining about things to the
extent and in the way the poet has described; nor even
Priam, close relative of the gods, supplicating and:

. . . rolling in the dung
Calling each man by name . . .¹⁶

And all the more shall we beg these poets at least not to
portray the gods as complaining and saying:

O what a wretch I am, unhappy mother of the noblest
son¹⁷

But if they do represent the gods like this, let them not
have the gall to portray the greatest of the gods in such an
unbecoming way so that:

O shame, he said, am I to see with my own eyes
A man dear to me being pursued around the city? My
heart grieves;¹⁸

and:

O what a wretch I am, to think that Sarpedon, dearest
of men to me,
Is to succumb to his fate at the hands of Patroclus,
son of Menoetius.¹⁹

You see, my dear Adeimantus, if our young men were to
listen to these kind of lines seriously and not laugh at them
as despicable, a person would hardly think himself be-

ἀνάξιον ἡγήσαιο τούτων καὶ ἢ ἐπιπλήξῃειν, εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι αὐτῷ τι τοιοῦτον ἢ λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσχυνόμενος οὐδὲ καρτερῶν πολλοὺς ἐπὶ σμικροῖσιν παθήμασιν θρήνους ἂν ἄδοι καὶ ὀδυρμοὺς.

Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

e Δεῖ δέ γε οὐχ, ὡς ἄρτι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἐσήμαιεν· ᾧ πειστέον, ἕως ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἄλλω καλλίονι πείσῃ.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δεῖ.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ φιλογέλωτάς γε δεῖ εἶναι. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὅταν τις ἐφίῃ ἰσχυρῷ γέλωτι, ἰσχυρὰν καὶ μεταβολὴν ζητεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον. ἢ

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

389 Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνθρώπους ἀξίους λόγου κρατουμένους ὑπὸ γέλωτος ἄν τις ποιῇ, ἀποδεκτέον, πολὺν δὲ ἦττον, εἰάν θεός.

Πολὺν μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν Ὀμήρου οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν—

ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνώρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι
θεοῖσιν, ἢ

ὡς ἴδον Ἥφαιστον διὰ δώματα ποιπνύοντα·

οὐκ ἀποδεκτέον κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

b εἰ σύ, ἔφη, βούλει ἐμὸν τιθέναι· οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἀποδεκτέον.

²⁰ At 387d4ff.

²¹ At *Leg.* 732c laughter is regarded as undignified, and see *Resp.* 606c2–3, where it is associated with the lowest part of the soul.

neath such conduct and rebuke himself, if it occurred to him to say or do such things. On the contrary he would sing many dirges and laments at the least sufferings without shame or restraint."

"What you say is very true," he said.

"Indeed this must not be, as our discussion showed us just now.²⁰ We must follow the argument until such times as someone persuades us with a better one."

"In that case it must not be."

"There is another point: they must not be fond of laughter. For generally when anyone gives way to violent laughter, then such behavior is likely to lead to a violent reaction."²¹

"I think that is right," he said.

"Nor must we accept it when someone portrays men who deserve respect being overcome by laughter, and even less so if they are gods."

"Hear, hear," he said.

"Consequently we shall not even accept such lines about the gods from Homer.

Unquenchable laughter rose among the gods
When they saw Hephaestus bustling about the
palace²²

is unacceptable according to your argument."

"If you are willing to make it mine,"²³ he said, "for indeed it is certainly not acceptable."

²² *Il.* 1.599–600.

²³ For S. attributing what are essentially his own arguments to his interlocutor, see e.g., above, 1.354a11, *Euthypr.* 6d12. Here Adeimantus shows himself aware of this trick.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειάν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον.
εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεοῖσι μὲν
ἄχρηστον ψεῦδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὡς ἐν φαρ-
μάκου εἶδει, δῆλον ἴσθι τό γε τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον,
ιδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἀπτέον.

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δὴ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις,
προσῆκει ψεύδεσθαι ἢ πολεμίων ἢ πολιτῶν ἕνεκα ἐπ'
ὠφελίᾳ τῆς πόλεως, ἴ τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πᾶσιν οὐχ ἀπτέον
c τοῦ τοιοῦτου· ἀλλὰ πρὸς γε δὴ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ιδιώτῃ
ψεύσασθαι ταῦτόν καὶ μείζον ἀμάρτημα φήσομεν ἢ
κάμνοντι πρὸς ἰατρὸν ἢ ἀσκούντι πρὸς παιδοτρίβην
περὶ τῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ σώματος παθημάτων μὴ τάληθῆ
λέγειν, ἢ πρὸς κυβερνήτην περὶ τῆς ἰκεῖν τε καὶ τῶν
ναυτῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντι ὅπως ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τις τῶν
συνναυτῶν πράξεως ἔχει.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

d Ἄν ἄρ' ἄλλον τινὰ λαμβάνῃ ψευδόμενον ἐν τῇ
πόλει τῶν οἷ δημοουργοὶ ἔασι,
μάντιν ἢ ἰητήρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,
κολάσει ὡς ἐπιτήδευμα εἰσάγοντα ἴ πόλεως ὥσπερ
νεὸς ἀνατρεπτικόν τε καὶ ὀλέθριον.

²⁴ The issue of truth and lies was introduced at 2.382c6-7. The idea of a lie as medicine (*pharmakon*) to be used to help a friend is now out of bounds for a layman and reserved for (expert) doctors, and, by analogy, rulers (see below, b8ff.); this idea fore-

BOOK III

“There again we must set a high value on truth too. If we were right in what we were saying just now and falsehood really is of no use to the gods, *although it is to men* in the form of medicine, then it should be clear that as such we should sanction it for doctors, but laymen should not touch it.”²⁴

“That is clear,” he said.

“Indeed for those who govern our state, if for anyone else at all, it is appropriate to tell lies because of our enemies or our citizens in order to benefit the state, but all the rest must avoid having anything to do with such a thing. But for a layman to lie to such governors, we shall say is a mistake on the same level, or even greater than a patient not telling his doctor the truth, or an athlete not telling his trainer the truth about his physical condition; or a sailor not telling the helmsman what the real situation is about the way in which he himself or one of his fellow crewmen is managing concerning the ship and the crew.”

“That is very true,” he said.

“If anyone catches anyone else in the state telling lies:

Of those who are craftsmen

Prophet, healer of illnesses, or carpenter²⁵

he will punish him for introducing a practice that will disrupt and destroy the state just as it would a ship.”²⁶

shadows the “noble lie,” the myth of diverse origins for humans containing metals of different value (see below, 414b8ff. and the introduction to Books 1–5, section 2 (ii)).

²⁵ *Od.* 17.383–84.

²⁶ The “ship” analogy becomes important below at 6.488a–89.

Ἐάνπερ, ἧ δ' ὅς, ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελέηται.

Τί δέ; σωφροσύνης ἄρα οὐ δεήσει ἡμῖν τοῖς νεανίαις;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

e Σωφροσύνης δὲ ὡς πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιαῦτα [δὲ] μέγιστα, ἀρχόντων μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν;

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Τὰ δὴ τοιάδε φήσομεν οἶμαι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷα καὶ Ὀμήρῳ | Διομήδης λέγει—

τέττα, σιωπῇ ἦσο, ἐμῷ δ' ἐπιπέιθεο μύθῳ,

καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα, τὰ—

ἴσαν μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί,
σιγῇ δειδιότες σημάντορας,

καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. |

Καλῶς.

Τί δέ; τὰ τοιάδε—

οἶνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ'
ἐλάφοιο

390 καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐξῆς ἄρα καλῶς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τις ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ποιήσει εἴρηκε νεανιεύματα ἰδιωτῶν εἰς ἄρχοντας;

27 "Self-control" = *sōphrosunē* (generally translated "temper-

BOOK III

“If indeed the actual results are in accord with what has been said.”

“What about this? Will our young men not need self-control?”²⁷

“Of course.”

“And for the general population the main thing about self-control is that while they are to be the subjects of those who govern them, they themselves are to be in control of the pleasures derived from drink, sex and food?”

“I think so.”

“Indeed I think we shall claim that what Diomedes says in *Homer* is well expressed:

Friend, sit quietly and do as I say.²⁸

and in connection with this:

Achaean breathing equal passion
In silence fearing their commanders²⁹

and other such lines.”

“Yes, they are well put.”

“But what about the following?”

Heavy with wine, with eyes of a dog, heart of a deer,³⁰

and the lines following, are they well put, and any other insolent stuff like them that one of the private citizens has said to his rulers in prose or in poetry?”

ance,” “moderation”), a key value term in *Republic*, one of the four cardinal virtues (see Book 4.427eff.).

²⁸ *Il.* 4.412.

²⁹ A combination of *Il.* 3.8 and 4.431.

³⁰ *Il.* 1.225. Achilles to Agamemnon. Such lines as this do not suggest *sōphrosunē*, but encourage insubordination.

Οὐ καλῶς.

Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι εἷς γε σωφροσύνην νέοις ἐπιτήδεια ἀκούειν· | εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν παρέχεται, θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν. ἢ πῶς σοι φαίνεται;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; ποιεῖν ἄνδρα τὸν σοφώτατον λέγοντα ὡς δοκεῖ αὐτῷ κάλλιστον εἶναι πάντων, ὅταν— |

παρὰ πλείαι ὧσι τράπεζαι

b σίτου καὶ κρειῶν, μέθῃ δ' ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσων
οἰνοχόος φορέησι καὶ ἐγχείῃ δεπάεσσι,

δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν ἑαυτοῦ ἀκούειν νέω; ἢ τὸ— |

λιμῷ δ' οἴκτιστον θανέειν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν;

ἢ Δία, καθευδόντων τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων [ὡς]⁴, μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς (ὄσ)α ἐβουλεύσατο, τούτων πάντων ῥαδίως ἐπιλαθόμενον διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων
c ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὕτως ἐκπλαγέντα ἰδόντα τὴν Ἥραν, ὥστε μηδ' εἰς τὸ δωμάτιον ἐθέλειν ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ βουλόμενον χαμαὶ συγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ λέγοντα ὡς οὕτως ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχεται, ὡς οὐδὲ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐφοίτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους φίλους λήθοντε τοκῆας· |

⁴ ὡς ADF seclisit Wilamowitz

BOOK III

“No, they are not good.”

“You see I don’t think they are suitable for the young to hear for the benefit of their self-control; but if it provides any other pleasure, that is not surprising. How does it seem to you?”

“Just as you say,” he said.

“What about this then? To make the wisest man say that the best thing of all seems to him to be when:

The tables beside them are full
Of food and drink; the wine steward draws wine from
the bowl
And brings it and pours it into our cups³¹

do you think hearing this is conducive to a young man’s self-control? Or:

*To die most pitiably of hunger and meet one’s
doom.*³²

or Zeus, when awake alone, while the rest of the gods and men were sleeping, easily forgetting all that he had planned on account of his passion for love, and so struck with desire at the sight of Hera, that he did not wish to return to his bed chamber, but, wishing to make love to her there on the ground, saying that he was gripped by such a passion as did not even happen when they met together for the first time ‘without their parents knowing’;³³

³¹ *Od.* 9.8–10. Plato varies the standard text slightly.

³² *Od.* 12.342. The point is that this sentiment encouraged Odysseus’ followers to go against his orders and slaughter the sun god’s cattle for food. ³³ The story of Hera’s seduction of Zeus is told in *Il.* 14.294–351.

οὐδὲ Ἄρεώς τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Ἑφαιστού δεσμὸν
δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἧ δ' ὅς, οὐ μοι φαίνεται ἐπι-
τήδειον.

d Ἄλλ' εἴ πού τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καρτερίαι πρὸς ἅπαντα
καὶ λέγονται καὶ πράττονται ὑπὸ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν,
θεατέον τε καὶ ἀκουστέον, οἶον καὶ τὸ—

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ |
τέτλαθι δῆ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ'
ἔτλης.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐ μὲν δὴ δωροδόκους γε ἐάτεον εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρας
οὐδὲ φιλοχρημάτους.

e Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐδ' ἄστέον αὐτοῖς ὅτι—

δῶρα θεοὺς πείθει, δῶρ' αἰδοίους βασιλῆας· |

οὐδὲ τὸν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως παιδαγωγὸν Φοῖνικα ἐπαινε-
τέον ὡς μετρίως ἔλεγε συμβουλεύων αὐτῷ δῶρα μὲν
λαβόντι ἐπαμύνειν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ δῶρων μὴ
ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τῆς μήνις. οὐδ' αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα
ἀξιώσομεν οὐδ' ὁμολογήσομεν οὕτω φιλοχρήματου
εἶναι, ὥστε παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος δῶρα λαβεῖν, καὶ
391 τιμὴν αὖ λαβόντα νεκροῦ ἀπολύειν, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ
θέλειν.

³⁴ *Od.* 8.266-332.

BOOK III

nor even the binding of Ares and Aphrodite for other similar reasons.”³⁴

“Zeus, *no!*” he said, “I don’t think they are suitable.”

“Well,” I said, “I suppose if there are some examples of perseverance in the face of everything, and these are narrated and composed by men of high standing, then we must see them and hear them, such as:

He struck his breast and rebuked his heart
Be patient, my heart, you have endured things even
more horrific than this.”³⁵

“Absolutely!” he said.

“Mind you, we must not let our men be corrupt or moneygrubbing.”

“Certainly not.”

“Nor must we sing to them:

Gifts persuade gods, gifts persuade revered kings.”³⁶

“Nor must we approve of Achilles’ tutor Phoenix as speaking reasonably in advising him to accept the gifts and defend the Achaeans, but not to relinquish his wrath without them.³⁷ Nor shall we judge or admit that Achilles himself was so mercenary as to accept gifts from Agamemnon, and ransom the corpse when he got paid for it, but otherwise to refuse.”³⁸

³⁵ *Od.* 20.17–18 (Odysseus speaking). For Plato’s sympathetic portrayal of Odysseus elsewhere, see 10.620c–d; *Phd.* 94d–e.

³⁶ Source unknown, attributed to Hesiod.

³⁷ S. is referring to Phoenix’s speech, *Il.* 9.515–605.

³⁸ The corpse referred to is that of *Hector*; see *Il.* 24.560–70.

Οὐκ οὖν δίκαιόν γε, ἔφη, ἐπαινεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Ὅκνῶ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δι' Ὅμηρον λέγειν ὅτι οὐδ' ὅσιον ταῦτά γε κατὰ Ἀχιλλέως φάναι καὶ ἄλλων λεγόντων ἢ πείθεσθαι, καὶ αὖ ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ἀπόλλω εἶπεν—

ἔβλαψάς μ' ἐκάεργε, θεῶν ὀλοώτατε πάντων
ἦ σ' ἂν τισαίμην, εἴ μοι δύναμίς γε παρέιη·

- b καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ποταμόν, θεὸν ὄντα, ἀπειθῶς εἶχεν καὶ μάχεσθαι ἔτοιμος ἦν, καὶ αὖ τὰς τοῦ ἐτέρου ποταμοῦ Σπερχειοῦ ἱερὰς τρίχας

- Πατρόκλῳ ἦρωϊ, ἔφη, κόμην ὀπάσαιμι φέρεσθαι, νεκρῶ ὄντι, καὶ ὡς ἔδρασεν ἢ τοῦτο, οὐ πειστέον· τὰς τε αὖ Ἑκτορος ἔλξεις περὶ τὸ σῆμα τὸ Πατρόκλου καὶ τὰς τῶν ζωγρηθέντων σφαγὰς εἰς τὴν πυράν, σύμπαντα ταῦτα οὐ φήσομεν ἀληθῆ εἰρήσθαι, οὐδ' c εἰσομεν πείθεσθαι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ὡς Ἀχιλλεύς, θεᾶς ὦν παῖς καὶ Πηλέως, σωφρονεστάτου τε καὶ τρίτου ἀπὸ Διός, καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ σοφωτάτῳ Χείρωνι τεθραμμένος, τοσαύτης ἦν ταραχῆς πλέως, ὥστ' ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσήματε δύο ἐναντίῳ ἀλλήλοι, ἢ ἀνελευθερίαν μετὰ φιλοχρηματίας καὶ αὖ ὑπερηφανίαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

³⁹ Il. 22.15, 20

⁴⁰ Il. 21.130ff.

BOOK III

"It is certainly unjust to approve this sort of thing," he said.

"Out of regard for Homer," I said, "I do hesitate to say that it is impious to say these things against Achilles and to believe them when others tell the story, and again when he says to Apollo:

You thwarted me, far shooter, most deadly of all the
gods,

Indeed I would repay you, if I had the strength,³⁹

and when he disobeyed the river, which was a god, and was ready to fight it;⁴⁰ and again of the hair sacred to another river, the Spercheius, he said:

I give this hair to the hero Patroclus as a prize⁴¹

when he was dead, we must not believe he really did this. Then again there is the dragging of Hector around the grave mound of Patroclus⁴² and the slaughter of the captives at the pyre:⁴³ we shall say that none of these stories is true and we shall not allow our people to believe that Achilles, son of a goddess and Peleus, the most temperate of men and grandson of Zeus,⁴⁴ and brought up under the eye of the most wise Chiron, was so fully distraught as to have within him two opposing afflictions: meanness with his greed for possessions, and, on the other hand, contempt for gods and men."

"You're right," he said.

⁴¹ *Il.* 23.151–52.

⁴² *Il.* 24.14–18.

⁴³ *Il.* 23.175.

⁴⁴ Peleus' father, Aeacus, was a son of Zeus.

Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μηδὲ τάδε πειθώμεθα μηδ'
 ἐώμεν λέγειν, ὡς Θησεὺς Ποσειδῶνος υἱὸς Πειρίθους
 d τε Διὸς ὄρμησαν οὕτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγὰς, μηδέ τιν'
 ἄλλον θεοῦ παιδὰ τε καὶ ἦρω τολμῆσαι ἂν δεινὰ καὶ
 ἀσεβῆ ἔργάσασθαι, οἶα νῦν καταψεύδονται αὐτῶν
 ἀλλὰ προσαναγκάζωμεν τοὺς ποιητὰς ἢ μὴ τούτων
 αὐτὰ ἔργα φάναι ἢ τούτους μὴ εἶναι | θεῶν παῖδας,
 ἀμφοτέρα δὲ μὴ λέγειν, μηδὲ ἡμῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν
 τοὺς νέους ὡς οἱ θεοὶ κακὰ γεννώσιν, καὶ ἦρωες
 ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν βελτίους· ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν
 e ἐλέγομεν, οὐθ' ὅσια ταῦτα οὔτε ἀληθῆ· ἐπεδείξαμεν
 γάρ που ὅτι ἐκ θεῶν κακὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσιν βλαβερά· πᾶς γὰρ
 ἐαυτῷ συγγνώμην ἔξει κακῷ ὄντι, | πεισθεῖς ὡς ἄρα
 τοιαῦτα πράττουσιν τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ οἱ θεῶν ἀγ-
 χίσποροι,

<οἱ> Ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ὧν κατ' Ἰδαῖον πάγον
 Διὸς πατρώου βωμός ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι,
 κοῦ πώ σφιν ἐξίτηλον αἶμα δαιμόνων. |

392 ὧν ἔνεκα παυστέον τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν
 πολλὴν εὐχέρειαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις πονηρίας.

Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡμῖν ἔτι λοιπὸν εἶδος λόγων πέρι

BOOK III

“So then let us not believe, nor allow anyone to say that Theseus, son of Poseidon, and Peirithous, son of Zeus launched themselves into terrible plundering raids,⁴⁵ nor that any other son of a god and hero had the gall to carry out dreadful and impious deeds that they so falsely accuse them of now. But let us compel our poets either not to say that these are their deeds, or say that they are not the sons of gods, but not to say both, and not to try to persuade our young that the gods bring about evil and our heroes are no better than men. And as to what we were saying in our earlier discussion⁴⁶ these stories are neither sanctioned nor true, for I think that we demonstrated that it is impossible for evil to originate with the gods.”

“Of course.”

“What’s more, they are harmful to those who hear them. I tell you everyone will excuse himself for being evil if he is convinced that they do and have done such things even:

Those akin to the gods
those close to Zeus, whose altar of the ancestral god
is high above around Ida’s rocky crag
For them the blood of the gods has not yet lost its
power.⁴⁷

For these reasons we must stop such tales in case they cause an indifference to vice among our young.”

“Yes, exactly,” he said.

“So what have we got left,” I asked, “concerning these

⁴⁵ Related in Plutarch, *Thes.* 31 (subject of lost plays by Sophocles and Euripides). ⁴⁶ 2.377e–80c.

⁴⁷ Aeschylus, *Niobe*, fr. 162 Radt.

ὀριζομένοις οἴους τε λεκτέον καὶ μή; περὶ γὰρ θεῶν
ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι | εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ
ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἴδιδου.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶη ἄν;

Δῆλα δῆ. |

Ἀδύνατον δῆ, ὦ φίλε, ἡμῖν τοῦτό γε ἐν τῷ παρόντι
τάξαι.

Πῶς;

Ἵτι οἶμαι ἡμᾶς ἐρεῖν ὡς ἄρα καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογο-
b ποιοὶ κακῶς λέγουσιν περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ μέγιστα, ὅτι
εἰσὶν ἄδικοι μὲν εὐδαίμονες πολλοί, δίκαιοι δὲ ἄθλιοι,
καὶ ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἐὰν λανθάνῃ, ἢ δὲ δικαιο-
σύνῃ ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν, οἰκεία δὲ ζημία· καὶ τὰ
μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀπερεῖν | λέγειν, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων
προστάξειν ἄδειν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

Εὖ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἶδα.

Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ὁμολογῆς ὀρθῶς με λέγειν, φήσω σε
ὁμολογηκέναί ἃ πάλαι ἐζητοῦμεν;

c Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, ὑπέλαβες.

Οὐκοῦν περὶ ἀνθρώπων ὅτι τοιούτους δεῖ λόγους
λέγεσθαι, τότε διομολογησόμεθα, ὅταν εὖρωμεν οἶδόν
ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὡς φύσει λυσιτελοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι,
ἐάντε δοκῇ ἐάντε μὴ τοιούτος εἶναι; |

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

⁴⁸ For *daimons*, see Book 5 n. 51.

tales by way of defining what is to be told and what is not? We have already said how one should speak about the gods, daimons,⁴⁸ heroes and the inhabitants of Hades."

"Yes, very much so."

"So that would leave the human race?"

"Clearly."

"My friend, it is impossible to prescribe this at present."

"How come?"

"Because I think that we shall say that both poets and prose authors get it wrong about mankind in matters of the greatest importance, that many of those who are happy are unjust, while the wretched are just, and that doing wrong is profitable, if you can get away with it, justice is the good of someone else, but a dead loss for oneself.⁴⁹ Indeed we shall forbid them to say such things, but command them to sing and narrate the opposite of this. Or do you not think so?"

"On the contrary, I know very well so," he said.

"Then if you agree that I am right, shall I say that you have agreed upon what we were looking for a while back?"

"You have understood me perfectly," he said.

"In that case we shall agree that these are the kind of stories which must be told about men only when we discover what kind of thing justice is and that it is naturally profitable for the person who has it whether in fact he seems to be a just man or not."

"That is very true," he said.

⁴⁹ The position advanced by Thrasymachus at 1.343b1–44c4, and defended by Glaucon and Adeimantus in 2.358ff.

Τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων περί ἐχέτω τέλος· τὸ δὲ λέξεως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν ἄ τε λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον παντελῶς ἐσκέψεται.

Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ μανθάνω ὅτι λέγεις.

d Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεῖ γε ἴσως οὖν τῆδε μᾶλλον εἶση. ἄρ' οὐ πάντα ὅσα ὑπὸ μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν λέγεται διήγησις οὔσα τυγχάνει ἢ γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ μελλόντων;

Τί γάρ, ἔφη, ἄλλο; |

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἀπλῆ διηγήσει ἢ διὰ μιμήσεως γιγνομένη ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν;

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι δέομαι σαφέστερον μαθεῖν.

e Γελοῖος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικα διδάσκαλος εἶναι καὶ ἀσαφής· ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ἀδύνατοι λέγειν, οὐ κατὰ ὄλον ἀλλ' ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι πειράσομαί σοι ἐν τούτῳ δηλῶσαι ὃ βούλομαι. καί μοι εἰπέ· ἐπίστασαι τῆς Ἰλιάδος τὰ πρῶτα, ἐν οἷς ὁ ποιητής φησι τὸν μὲν Χρῦσην δεῖσθαι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἀπολυῖσαι τὴν θυγατέρα, τὸν δὲ χαλεπαίνειν, τὸν δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐτύχαιεν, κατεύχεσθαι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πρὸς τὸν θεόν;

Ἔγωγε.

Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν—

καὶ ἐλίσσεται πάντα Ἀχαιοῦς, |

Ἀτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δύω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν

BOOK III

“Then let that be an end of what we have to say about the stories. But following that, as I think, we must consider style and examine thoroughly what is to be said and how it is to be said.”

Now Adeimantus said: “I don’t understand what you mean by this.”

“But it is essential that you do,” I said. “Perhaps you will grasp it better this way: isn’t everything said by storytellers and poets really a narrative of the past, present or future events?”

“What else can it be?” he asked.

“So don’t they achieve this either by a simple narrative, or by means of imitation, or a combination of both?”⁵⁰

“Here too,” he said. “I need to understand you more clearly.”

“I seem to be an inept and obscure teacher,” I said: “so, just like people who are no good at speaking, I shall try to demonstrate to you what I mean, not all in one go, but by taking a bit at a time. Well then, tell me, do you know the beginning of the *Iliad*, where the poet says that Chryses begs Agamemnon to release his daughter; Agamemnon gets angry, but having failed, Chryses prays to the god invoking a curse on the Achaeans?”⁵¹

“I do.”

“Then you know that up to these words:

... and he begged all the Achaeans
and especially the two sons of Atreus, the
commanders of the men

⁵⁰ On “imitation” (*mimesis*) in the context of Books 2–3, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 2 (i). ⁵¹ *Il.* 1.15ff.

λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητῆς καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν τὴν
 διάνοιαν ἄλλοσε τρέπειν ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ
 αὐτός· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης
 b λέγει καὶ πειράται ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα ποιῆσαι μὴ
 Ὅμηρον δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα,
 πρεσβύτην ὄντα. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὴ πᾶσαν σχεδόν τι
 οὕτω πεποιήται διήγησιν περὶ τε τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ
 περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλη Ὀδυσσεΐα παθημάτων. |

Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν διήγησις μὲν ἐστὶν καὶ ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις
 ἐκάστοτε λέγη καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων;

c Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

Ἄλλ' ὅταν γέ τινα λέγη ῥῆσιν ὡς τις ἄλλος ὢν,
 ἀρ' οὐ τότε ὁμοιοῦν αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν
 αὐτοῦ λέξις ἐκάστῳ ὃν ἂν προείπη ὡς ἐροῦντα;

Φήσομεν· τί γάρ; |

Οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν
 ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμείσθαι ἐστὶν ἐκείνον ᾧ ἂν τις
 ὁμοιοῖ;

Τί μῆν;

Ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
 ποιηταὶ διὰ μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν. |

Εἰ δέ γε μηδαμοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτοιο ὁ ποιητῆς,
 πᾶσα ἂν αὐτῷ ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἢ ποιήσις τε καὶ διή-
 d γησις γεγонуῖα εἴη. ἵνα δὲ μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι οὐκ αὖ
 μανθάνεις, ὅπως ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο ἐγὼ φράσω. εἰ γὰρ
 Ὅμηρος εἰπὼν ὅτι ἦλθεν ὁ Χρῦσης τῆς τε θυγατρὸς

BOOK III

it is in fact the poet himself who is speaking and he makes no attempt to distract our minds into thinking that anyone else is talking except himself. But in the following lines he speaks as if he is Chryses himself and tries as far as he can to make us think that the speaker is not Homer, but the priest, who is an old man. And pretty much the whole of the rest of the narrative is composed in this way about the events in Ilium, in Ithaca, and the whole of the *Odyssey*."

"Yes, very much so," he said.

"Therefore every time he presents a speech, and what comes between the speeches, is the narrative?"

"Of course."

"But whenever he makes a speech as if he were another person, are we going to say that he will then model his speech as far as possible on that of the individual himself who he announces is about to speak?"

"Yes, we shall."

"Then isn't modeling himself on someone else, either his voice or his appearance, imitating that person on whom he is modeling himself?"

"Yes, of course."

"Then in such circumstances, it seems that both he and the rest of the poets are making their narrative by imitation."

"That's right."

"But if the poet were not to conceal his identity anywhere, the whole of his poetry and narrative would have been created without imitation. Now, to stop you saying you don't understand again, I'll explain how this comes about. For if Homer had said that Chryses came with a

λύτρα φέρων καὶ ἰκέτης τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν
 βασιλέων, μετὰ τοῦτο μὴ ὡς Χρύσης γενόμενος
 ἔλεγεν ἀλλ' ἔτι ὡς Ὅμηρος, ἰοῖσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν μίμησις
 ἦν ἀλλὰ ἀπλή διήγησις. εἶχε δ' ἂν ᾧδε πως—φράσω
 e δὲ ἄνευ μέτρον· οὐ γάρ εἰμι ποιητικός— Ἐλθὼν ὁ
 ἱερεὺς ἤρχετο ἐκείνοις μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς δοῦναι ἐλόντας
 τὴν Τροίαν αὐτοὺς σωθῆναι, τὴν δὲ θυγατέρα οἱ
 λῦσαι δεξαμένους ἄποινα καὶ τὸν θεὸν αἰδεσθέντας.
 ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐσέβοντο καὶ
 συνήνουν, ὁ δὲ Ἀγαμέμνων ἠγρίαιεν ἐντελλόμενος
 νῦν τε ἀπιέναι καὶ αὐθις μὴ ἐλθεῖν, μὴ αὐτῷ τό τε
 σκῆπτρον καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ στέμματα οὐκ ἐπαρκέσαι
 πρὶν δὲ λυθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν θυγατέρα, ἐν Ἄργει ἔφη
 394 γηράσειν μετὰ οὗ· ἀπιέναι δ' ἐκέλευεν καὶ μὴ ἐρεθί-
 ζειν, ἵνα σῶς οἴκαδε ἔλθοι. ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτης ἀκούσας
 ἔδειςέν τε καὶ ἀπήει σιγῇ, ἀποχωρήσας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ
 στρατοπέδου πολλὰ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι ἠῦχετο, τὰς τε
 ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνακαλῶν καὶ ὑπομιμνήσκων καὶ
 ἀπαιτῶν, εἴ τι πώποτε ἢ ἐν ἰναῶν οἰκοδομήσεσιν ἢ
 ἐν ἱερῶν θυσίαις κεχαρισμένοι δωρήσαιο· ὦν δὴ
 χάριν κατηύχετο τεῖσαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὰ ἅ δάκρυα
 τοῖς ἐκείνου βέλεσιν. οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾧ ἑταῖρε, ἄνευ
 μιμήσεως ἀπλή διήγησις γίγνεται.

b Μανθάνω, ἔφη.

Μάνθανε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ταύτης αὖ ἐναντία
 γίγνεται, ὅταν τις ἰτὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν
 ῥήσεων ἐξαιρῶν τὰ ἀμοιβαῖα καταλείπη.

BOOK III

ransom for his daughter as a suppliant of the Achaeans and their kings in particular and after this he was still speaking in the person of Homer, and not as Chryses, you know that this would not be imitation, but plain narrative. It would go something like this (I'm not going to speak in verse—I'm no poet): The priest came and prayed that the gods would grant them the capture of Troy and a safe return home. He asked them to accept the ransom, respect the god and release his daughter to him. When he had said this everyone else paid their respects and approved his proposal, but Agamemnon grew angry and told him to go away immediately and never return; that his scepter and the wreaths he wore would not protect him; before his daughter was ransomed she would grow old with him in Argos. He told him to go away and not provoke him if he wanted to return home safely. When the old man heard this he was afraid and went off in silence. On leaving the camp he offered up many a prayer to Apollo, calling up the god's titles, reminding him and demanding his due if he himself had hitherto made any acceptable offering either in the ritual of building temples or in holy sacrifice. Indeed he repeatedly begged him to repay the Achaeans for his tears with those arrows of his. So, my friend," I said, "this is how a straightforward narrative is constructed without imitation."

"I understand," he said.

"Then make sure you understand that you get the opposite of this whenever you take out the poet's words between the speeches and leave the dialogue."

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, μανθάνω, ὅτι ἐστὶν τὸ περὶ τὰς τραγωδίας τοιοῦτον.

Ὅρθότατα, ἔφην, ὑπέλαβες, καὶ οἶμαί σοι ἤδη δηλοῦν ὃ ἔμπροσθεν οὐχ οἴος τ' ἦ, ὅτι τῆς ποιήσεώς τε
 c καὶ μυθολογίας ἣ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὡσπερ
 σὺ λέγεις, τραγωδία τε καὶ κωμωδία, ἣ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—εὗροις δ' ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστα
 που ἐν διθυράμβοις— ἣ δ' αὖ δι' ἀμφοτέρων ἐν τε τῇ
 τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι, εἴ μοι
 μανθάνεις. |

Ἄλλὰ συνίημι, ἔφη, ὃ τότε ἐβούλου λέγειν.

Καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου δὴ ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι ἔφαμεν ἂ
 μὲν λεκτέον ἤδη εἰρήσθαι, ὡς δὲ λεκτέον ἔτι σκεπτέον
 εἶναι.

Ἄλλὰ μέμνημαι.

d Τοῦτο τοίνυν αὐτὸ ἦν ὃ ἔλεγον, ὅτι χρεῖη διο-
 μολογήσασθαι πότερον ἑάσομεν τοὺς ποιητὰς μιμου-
 μένους ἡμῖν τὰς διηγήσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ μὲν μι-
 μουμένους, τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ ὅποια ἑκάτερα, ἢ οὐδὲ
 μιμείσθαι. |

Μαντεύομαι, ἔφη, σκοπέεισθαί σε εἴτε παραδεξόμεθα
 τραγωδίαν τε καὶ κωμωδίαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ
 οὔ.

Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων· οὐ
 γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγέ πω οἶδα, ἀλλ' ὅπη ἂν ὁ λόγος ὡσπερ
 πνεῦμα φέρη, ταύτη ἰτέον. |

⁵² The dithyramb was a choral song in honor of Dionysus,

BOOK III

"Yes, I understand this too," he said, "because it's the sort of thing you find in tragedy."

"You've got it in one," I said, "and I think I can now make clear to you what I couldn't before, the fact that of poetry and storytelling: the one is done entirely by means of imitation, i.e., tragedy and comedy exactly as you say, and the other is the recital of the poet himself, and you would find it in particular, I suppose, in the dithyramb.⁵² Where it is a combination of the two, you would find it in the composition of epic poetry and in many other places, if you follow me."

"Oh yes," he said, "I do understand this time what you meant."

"Remember too that before this we said that we had already talked about what stories must be told, but we still had to examine how they are to be told."

"Yes, I remember."

"Now this is the very thing I was saying we should agree on, whether we are going to let our poets compose their narrative using imitation, or have some works with imitation, others without, and which each shall be. Or again do we not allow imitation at all?"

"I get the feeling you're going to consider whether we admit tragedy and comedy into our state, or not."

"Perhaps," I said, "and yet perhaps there is more to it than this. For I can assure you that I for one do not yet know, but like the wind, wherever our discussion leads us, that is the way we must go."

performed at dramatic festivals in Athens. Exemplified in the lyrics of Pindar and Bacchylides (fifth century), it consisted mainly or entirely of poetic narrative, which is S.'s point here.

Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις.

- e Τόδε τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἄθρει, πότερον μιμητικούς ἡμῖν δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας ἢ οὐ· ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔπεται, ὅτι εἰς ἕκαστος ἐν μὲν ἂν ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι, πολλὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἂν, ὥστ' εἶναι πον ἐλλόγιμος; |

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει;

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μιμήσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ αὐτὸς μιμῆσθαι εὖ ὥσπερ ἐν οὐ δυνατός; |

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

- 395 Σχολῆ ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει γέ τι ἅμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγους ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μιμήσεται καὶ ἔσται μιμητικός, ἐπεὶ που οὐδὲ [τὰ] δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμῆσθαι, οἷον κωμωδίαν καὶ | τραγωδίαν ποιοῦντες. ἢ οὐ μιμήματα ἄρτι τούτῳ ἐκάλες;

Ἐγώ γε· καὶ ἀληθῆ γέ λέγεις, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται οἱ αὐτοί.

Οὐδὲ μὴν ραψωδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα.

Ἀληθῆ.

- b Ἄλλ' οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ κωμωδοῖς τε καὶ τραγωδοῖς οἱ αὐτοί· πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μιμήματα. ἢ οὐ;

Μιμήματα.

⁵³ For the argument for specialism, see above 2.369e–70c.

⁵⁴ Contrast *Symp.* 223d, where S. is arguing that the same man might be capable of writing tragedy and comedy.

"Yes, well put," he said.

"Well now, consider this, Adeimantus: whether our guardians have to be capable of imitation or not. Or does this also follow what we had before: that one individual should practice one pursuit well and not many. But if he were to try dabbling about with many, he would fail to be distinguished in any of them in any way."⁵³

"Of course that's bound to happen."

"Therefore doesn't the same argument apply to imitation: that the same man is unable to imitate many things well as he can one thing?"

"Of course he can't."

"Then he will hardly practice any of those pursuits worth mentioning at the same time as also making many imitations and being an imitator, since I take it that the same people cannot simultaneously make good imitations of two things that seem close to one another, such as writing comedy and tragedy.⁵⁴ Or did you not call these two imitative arts just now?"

"I did; and you're right in saying that one and the same person cannot do it."

"Nor can they be rhapsodists⁵⁵ and actors at the same time."

"Indeed not."

"Well I can tell you that you don't have the same people acting in both comedy and tragedy, yet both these are imitative arts: or is that not the case?"

"Yes, it is."

⁵⁵ The rhapsode's performance consisted in recitals of other poets, principally Homer.

Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, φαίνεται μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ἵ ὥστε ἀδύνατος εἶναι πολλά καλῶς μιμείσθαι ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκείνα πράττειν ὧν δὴ καὶ τὰ μιμήματά ἐστιν ἀφομοιώματα.

Ἄληθέστατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Εἰ ἄρα τὸν πρῶτον λόγον διασώσομεν, ἰ τοὺς φύλακας ἡμῖν τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν δημιουργιῶν ἀφειμένους δεῖν εἶναι δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως πάνν
 c ἀκριβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύειν ὅτι μὴ εἰς τοῦτο φέρει, οὐδὲν δὴ δέοι ἂν αὐτοὺς ἄλλο πράττειν οὐδὲ μιμείσθαι· ἔαν δὲ μιμῶνται, μιμείσθαι τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδῶν, ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ἰ ὀσίους, ἐλευθέρους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινὸς εἶναι μιμήσασθαι, μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν. ἦ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι αἰ
 d μιμήσεις, ἔαν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθνη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν;

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς. ἰ

Οὐ δὴ ἐπιτρέψομεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧν φαμὲν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, γυναῖκα μιμείσθαι ἀνδρας ὄντας, ἦ νέαν ἢ πρεσβυτέραν, ἦ ἀνδρὶ λαιδορουμένην ἢ πρὸς θεοὺς ἐρίζουσαν τε καὶ
 e μεγαλαυχουμένην, οἰομένην εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἦ ἐν συμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθεσιν καὶ θρήνοις ἐχομένην·

“And furthermore, Adeimantus, It seems to me that man’s nature has been chopped up into even smaller parts⁵⁶ than these so as to make him unable to imitate many things well, or create those very things which resemble their imitation most closely.”

“That’s very true,” he said.

“If then we are to stand by our first argument, that our guardians must abandon the practice of all other pursuits and in a very strict sense be workers for the freedom of our state and practice nothing else unless it has a relevance to the state, then indeed they would have to do nothing else, not even by way of imitation. But if they do imitate then they must imitate those things which are appropriate for these people from earliest childhood: brave, temperate men, pious, free, and all such things, but they must not do anything contrary to liberty, nor be good at imitating it, nor anything else which is classed as shameful, in order that they may gain no enjoyment of the reality from their imitation of it. Or have you not observed that if imitations continue from childhood on, they become natural habits, physically, vocally and mentally?”

“Indeed I have noticed this,” he said.

“So we shall not allow those we claim to care about and who must become good men themselves, to impersonate, as they are men, a woman, either a young or an old one, or one who abuses her husband, or squabbles with the gods, and brags about it thinking she is happy, or one involved in misfortune, grief and lamentation. As for any

⁵⁶ Or the metaphor is possibly from coinage: “minted in even smaller coins.”

κάμνουσαν δὲ ἢ ἐρώσαν ἢ ὠδίνουσαν, πολλοῦ καὶ δεήσομεν.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐδέ γε δούλας τε καὶ δούλους πράττοντας ὅσα δούλων. |

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

396 Οὐδέ γε ἄνδρας κακοῦς, ὡς ἔοικεν, δειλούς τε καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πράττοντας ὧν νυνδὴ εἵπομεν, κακηγοροῦν-
τάς τε καὶ κωμφοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦν-
τας, μεθύοντας ἢ καὶ νήφοντας, ἢ καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα οἱ
τοιούτοι καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις ἀμαρτάνουσιν εἰς
αὐτούς τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλους, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ μαινομένοις
ἐθιστέον ἀφομοιοῦν αὐτούς ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲ ἐν ἔργοις·
γνωστέον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μαινομένους καὶ πονηροὺς
ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας, ποιητέον δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων
οὐδὲ μιμητέον. |

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· χαλκεύοντας ἢ τι ἄλλο δημι-
ουργοῦντας, ἢ ἐλαύνοντας τριήρεις ἢ κελεύοντας τού-
τοις, ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν περὶ ταῦτα μιμητέον;

b Καὶ πῶς; ἔφη, οἷς γε οὐδὲ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν
τούτων οὐδενὶ ἐξέσται;

Τί δέ; ἵππους χρεμετίζοντας καὶ ταύρους μκωμένους
καὶ | ποταμοὺς ψοφοῦντας καὶ θάλατταν κτυποῦσαν
καὶ βροντὰς καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἢ μιμήσονται;

Ἄλλ' ἀπείρηται αὐτοῖς, ἔφη, μήτε μαίνεσθαι μήτε
μαινομένοις ἀφομοιοῦσθαι.

Εἰ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω ἃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔστιν τι

BOOK III

woman who is sick, in love, or in the pangs of childbirth: we shall keep them well away from that!"

"Absolutely," he said.

"Not to mention slaves, male or female, doing what slaves do."

"Certainly not that."

"And no bad men either, so it would seem: those who are cowardly and who do the opposite of what we were talking about just now, abusing and ridiculing each other, and using foul language whether drunk, or even sober, or also the other wrongs that such people perpetrate against both themselves and others in word and deed; nor do I think that they should make a habit of portraying madmen in word or even deed. They must of course recognize men and women who are mad and of low character, but they must not write about, or even imitate any of these."

"That's very true," he said.

"Then what about this point," I said: "are they to impersonate blacksmiths, or any other kind of artisan, or those who row triremes, or their commanders, or anything else that has some connection with these?"

"How can they," he said, "as they will not even be allowed to pay attention to any of these things?"

"Then what about this: are they going to impersonate horses neighing, oxen bellowing, rivers gurgling, the sea crashing, thunder and indeed anything of this kind?"⁵⁷

"No," he said, "they have been forbidden to be mad, or become like madmen."

"If I understand what you are saying then," I said,

⁵⁷ S. may be referring here to stage machinery or vocal imitations of these noises.

- c εἶδος λέξεώς τε καὶ διηγήσεως ἐν ᾧ ἂν διηγοῖτο ὁ τῷ ὄντι καλὸς ἀγαθός, ὅποτε τι δέοι αὐτὸν λέγειν, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ ἀνόμοιον τούτῳ εἶδος, οὗ ἂν ἔχοιτο ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ διηγοῖτο ὁ ἐναντίως ἐκείνῳ φύς τε καὶ τραφεῖς. |

Ποῖα δὴ, ἔφη, ταῦτα;

- ‘Ὁ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, μέτριος ἀνὴρ, ἐπειδὴν ἀφίικηται ἐν τῇ διηγήσει ἐπὶ λέξιν τινὰ ἢ πρᾶξιν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ἐθελήσειν ὡς αὐτὸς ὢν ἐκείνος ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ μιμῆσει,
d μάλιστα μὲν μιμούμενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἥττον ἢ ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ ὑπὸ ἐρώτων ἐσφαλμένον ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἢ τινος ἄλλης συμφορᾶς· ὅταν δὲ γίγνηται κατὰ τινα ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον, οὐκ ἐθελήσειν | σπουδῇ ἀπεικάζειν ἑαυτὸν τῷ χείρονι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα κατὰ βραχύ, ὅταν τι χρηστὸν ποιῇ, ἀλλ’ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι, ἅμα μὲν ἀγύμναστος ὢν τοῦ μιμείσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δυσχεραίνων αὐτὸν ἐκμάττειν τε καὶ ἐνιστάναι εἰς τοὺς τῶν κακιόνων τύπους, ἀτιμάζων τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὅτι μὴ παιδιᾶς χάριν.

- e Εἰκός, ἔφη.

Οὐκ οὖν διηγήσει χρήσεται οἷα ἡμεῖς ὀλίγον πρότερον διήλθομεν περὶ τὰ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἔπη, καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῦ | ἡ λέξις μετέχουσα μὲν ἀμφοτέρων, μιμῆσεώς τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης διηγήσεως, σμικρὸν δέ τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς μιμῆσεως; ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω;

“there is a form of diction and narrative which the person who is really good and true would use whenever he needed to say something, and then there is another form unlike this which the man who has been born and brought up in the opposite way to him would always stick to for his narrative.”

“So what are these forms you are talking about?” he asked.

“To my mind,” I said, “when a reasonable sort of man comes in his narrative to some speech or action of a good man, he will want to narrate it as if he himself were that man, and not feel any shame at impersonating this kind of person especially if he is portraying the good man as acting soundly and sensibly, but to a lesser extent and less willingly if he is portraying a man who has been laid low by some illness, or love, or drink, of any other misfortune. But when it comes to dealing with someone inferior to himself he will not want to liken himself seriously to the inferior type, except briefly though, when that person does some good deed, but he will feel ashamed both because he lacks practice at impersonating people like this and because he feels disgust at molding and conforming himself to the stamp of those who are inferior, disparaging them in his mind, except for the purposes of a joke.”

“That seems reasonable,” he said.

“Will he then use the same kind of narrative that we examined a little while back when we were talking about Homer’s poetry and will his language share aspects of both imitative and other kinds of narrative, but with only a small proportion of impersonation in a lengthy story? Or am I talking nonsense?”

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οἷόν γε ἀνάγκη τὸν τύπον εἶναι τοῦ τοιούτου ῥήτορος.

397 Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος αὖ, ὅσῳ ἂν φαυλότερος ᾖ, πάντα τε μᾶλλον διηγήσεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον οἰήσεται εἶναι, ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμῆσθαι σπουδῇ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, καὶ ἄνυδῆ ἐλέγομεν, βροντάς τε καὶ ἰψόφους ἀνέμων τε καὶ χαλαζῶν καὶ ἀξόνων τε καὶ τροχιλείων, καὶ σαλπύγων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων
b φωνάς, καὶ ἔτι κυνῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὀρνέων φθόγγους· καὶ ἔσται δὴ ἡ τούτου λέξις ἅπασα διὰ μιμήσεως φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν, ἣ σμικρόν τι διηγήσεως ἔχουσα;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο.

Ταῦτα τοῖσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔλεγον τὰ δύο εἶδη τῆς λέξεως. ἰ

Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν αὐτοῖν τὸ μὲν σμικρὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς ἔχει, καὶ ἕαν τις ἀποδιδῶ πρόπουσαν ἀρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν τῇ λέξει, ὀλίγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν γίγνεται λέγειν τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἀρμονίᾳ—σμικραὶ γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαί—καὶ ἰ δὴ καὶ ἐν ῥυθμῷ ὡσαύτως παραπλησίῳ τινί;

c Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει.

Τί δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου εἶδος; οὐ τῶν ἐναντίων δέεται, πασῶν μὲν ἀρμονιῶν, πάντων δὲ ῥυθμῶν, εἰ μέλλει αὖ

BOOK III

"No, that's just the sort the model such a narrator has to be," he said.

"So is it the case that, with the person who is not of this kind," I said, "the more inferior he is the more he will narrate anything and everything and consider nothing beneath his dignity, so that he'll attempt to impersonate everything seriously and in front of large audiences, including the things we were talking about just now: thunder, the roaring of wind and hail, the creaking of axles and pulleys, and the sounds of trumpets, flutes, pipes and every musical instrument, and in addition to that the sounds made by dogs, sheep and birds; and will the whole style of this man consist of words and gestures carried out through impersonation, or with a small element of narrative thrown in?"

"That too has to be the case," he said.

"Then these are the two forms of expression I was talking about," I said.

"Indeed they are," he said.

"Then does one of these two contain little variation⁵⁸ and if you give the diction an appropriate mode⁵⁹ and rhythm, will it be possible for someone speaking correctly to speak it almost in a consistent mode: for the variations are negligible, and likewise with much the same rhythm?"

"This is absolutely right," he said.

"Then what about the form of the other one? Doesn't it need the opposite, all the different modes and rhythms,

⁵⁸ "Variation" = *metabolē*, used technically in music for a change from one harmony to another.

⁵⁹ "Mode" = *harmonia*, the Greek system of scales and modes (in 398d2, "melody").

οικείως λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ παντοδαπὰς μορφὰς τῶν μεταβολῶν ἔχειν; |

Καὶ σφόδρα γε οὕτως ἔχει.

Ἄρ' οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἳ τι λέγοντες ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν τύπῳ τῆς λέξεως ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τινὲ συγκεραυνύντες;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

d Τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· πότερον εἰς τὴν πόλιν πάντας τούτους παραδεξόμεθα ἢ τῶν ἀκράτων τὸν ἕτερον ἢ τὸν κεκραμένον;

Ἐὰν ἢ ἐμή, ἔφη, νικᾷ, τὸν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς μιμητὴν ἄκρατον. |

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἡδύς γε καὶ ὁ κεκραμένος, πολὺ δὲ ἡδιστος παισί τε καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς ὁ ἐναντίος οὗ σὺ αἰρήνῃ καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ.

Ἡδιστος γάρ.

e Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρμόττειν φαίης τῇ ἡμετέρα πολιτεία, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστος ἐν πράττει.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἀρμόττει.

Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει τόν τε σκυτοτόμον σκυτοτόμον εὐρήσομεν καὶ οὐ κυβερνήτην πρὸς τῇ σκυτοτομία, | καὶ τὸν γεωργὸν γεωργὸν καὶ οὐ δικαστὴν πρὸς τῇ γεωργία, καὶ τὸν πολεμικὸν πολεμικὸν καὶ οὐ χρηματιστὴν πρὸς τῇ πολεμικῇ, καὶ πάντας οὕτω;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

BOOK III

if indeed it is going to be spoken in an appropriate way, because it contains all different kinds of variations?"

"That is very much the case."

"So do all poets then and those who recite poetry of any kind either settle for one or other model of presentation, or use a combination of some of each?"

"They must do," he said.

"What shall we do then?" I asked. "Shall we allow into our state all these models, or one of the straightforward ones or the other which contains a mixture of elements?"

"If my view wins the vote," he said, "it will be the one who impersonates decent people without the mixed elements."

"And yet, Adeimantus, the one with the mixed elements is delightful; and by far the most delightful to children and their teachers and to the majority of the common people is the opposite kind to the one you choose."

"Yes, for it *is* very delightful."

"Well perhaps," I said, "you would say that it doesn't fit into our state because we don't have people with double, or even multiple interests since each man does one job."

"Yes, for it certainly won't fit."

"For this reason then, only in such a state as this shall we find that a shoemaker is a shoemaker and not a ship's captain in addition to his shoemaking; and that a farmer is a farmer and not a juryman in addition to his farming; and again that a trained soldier is engaged in warfare and not in commerce in addition to his fighting; and the same sort of thing applies to every one else, doesn't it?"

"True," he said.

Ἄνδρα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνάμενον ὑπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μιμείσθαι πάντα χρήματα, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀφίκοιτο εἰς τὴν πόλιν αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξασθαι, προσκυνούμεν ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερόν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἠδύν, | εἴπομεν δ' ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ἐν τῇ πόλει παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ θέμις ἐγγενέσθαι, ἀποπέμποιμέν τε εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχέαντες καὶ ἐρίῳ στέφαντες, αὐτοὶ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ
 b χρώμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ὠφελίας ἕνεκα, ὃς ἡμῖν τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιμ μμοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγοι ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τύποις οἷς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐνομοθετησάμεθα, ὅτε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπεχειροῦμεν παιδεύειν. |

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν ποιοῦμεν, εἰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἴη.

Νῦν δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους παντελῶς διαπεπεράνθαι ἅ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἴρηται.

Καὶ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

c Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ περὶ ὧδῆς τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν;

Δῆλα δὴ.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πᾶς ἤδη ἂν εὔροι ἃ ἡμῖν λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν οἷα δεῖ εἶναι, εἴπερ μέλλομεν τοῖς προειρημένους συμφωνήσεις; |

Καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ἐπιγελάσας, Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύω ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἶναι οὐκ οὐκ

BOOK III

“Then it would seem that if a man who is able because of his skills to become versatile and impersonate everything were to arrive in our state wishing to show off himself and his poems, we would revere him as inspired, wonderful and delightful, but we would say that we do not have such a man in our state, nor would it be right to have one. In fact we would send him away to another city after anointing his head with oil and wreathing it with woolen bands,⁶⁰ while we ourselves would employ a more austere and less pleasing poet and story teller on account of his usefulness, who could reproduce for us the diction of a decent man and who would express his words in those forms which we laid down from the beginning when we undertook to educate our soldiery.”

“Yes we would certainly do it this way,” he said, “if it were up to us.”

“Now my friend,” I said, “we really have got very close to a complete and thorough examination of the words and stories belonging to this art form: the subject and manner of narrative.”

“Yes, I think so too,” he said.

“So after that,” I said, “we are left with the handling of songs and lyrics, aren’t we?”

“Yes, clearly.”

“Wouldn’t everyone have discovered by now what the things we must say must be like, if we are going to agree with what has already been said?”

And Glaucon laughed at this and said: “Well I tell you, Socrates, that ‘everyone’ doesn’t include me, as I don’t

⁶⁰ Activities normally directed toward the image of a god—here ironically directed at the poet.

ικανῶς γε ἔχω ἐν τῷ παρόντι συμβάλλεσθαι ποῖα
ἅττα δεῖ ἡμᾶς λέγειν ὑποπτεύω μέντοι. |

Πάντως δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε ἱκανῶς
d ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστὶν συγκεῖμενον,
λόγου τε καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ.

Ναί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

Οὐκοῦν ὅσον γε αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, οὐδὲν δήπου
διαφέρει | τοῦ μὴ ἁδομένου λόγου πρὸς τὸ ἐν τοῖς
αὐτοῖς δεῖν τύποις λέγεσθαι οἷς ἄρτι προείπομεν καὶ
ὡσαύτως;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Καὶ μὴν τήν γε ἀρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀκολουθεῖν
δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. |

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι θρήνων γε καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ἔφαμεν ἐν
λόγοις οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὔν.

e Τίνες οὔν θρηνώδεις ἀρμονίαι; λέγε μοι σὺ γὰρ
μουσικός.

Μειξολυδιστί, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστί, καὶ τοιαῦ-
ταί τινες.

Οὐκοῦν αὐται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι; ἄχρηστοι γὰρ
καὶ γυναιξὶν ἄς δεῖ ἐπιεικέις εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσι. |

Πάνυ γε.

BOOK III

think I have a sufficient understanding at this moment of the kind of things we must say, although I do have my suspicions."

"At all events," I said, "presumably to start with you have enough of an understanding to say that lyric verse consists of three elements: words, melody and rhythm?"

"Oh yes, at least that much," he said.

"So as far as the words are concerned, I imagine it is no different from words that are not sung in that they must be spoken within the actual patterns which we described a while ago, and in the same manner. Isn't that so?"

"True," he said.

"Added to which, melody and rhythms must follow the words."⁶¹

"Of course."

"But on the other hand we said there is no place for dirges and lamentations in the words of our songs, is there?"

"No, there isn't."

"So what are the melodies suitable for dirges? Tell me, as you're a musician."

"Those written in the Mixolydian and Syntonolydian modes and the like."

"So these must be removed, then? You see, they're of no use even to women who should be of good character, let alone men."

"Yes, they must."

⁶¹ N.b. the late fifth-/early fourth-century tendency for melody to gain independence from, and distort, the words. Plato is, predictably, part of a conservative reaction to this tendency.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν μέθη γε φύλαξιν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ
μαλακία καὶ ἀργία.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Τίνες οὖν μαλακαί τε καὶ συμποτικάι τῶν ἀρμο-
μιῶν; |

Ἰαστί, ἧ δ' ὄς, καὶ λυδιστί αὖ τινες χαλαραὶ
καλοῦνται.

399 Ταύταις οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπὶ πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔσθ'
ὅτι χρήσῃ;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει σοι δωριστί λεί-
πεσθαι καὶ φρυγιστί. |

Οὐκ οἶδα, ἔφη· ἐγώ, τὰς ἀρμονίας, ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε
ἐκείνην τὴν ἀρμονίαν, ἧ ἔν τε πολεμικῇ πράξει ὄντος
ἀνδρείου καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ πρεπόντως ἂν
μιμήσαιτο φθόγγους τε καὶ προσωδίας, καὶ ἀποτυχόν-
b τος ἢ εἰς τραύματα ἢ εἰς θανάτους ἰόντος ἢ εἰς τινα
ἄλλην συμφορὰν πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατε-
ταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμνημονέου τὴν τύχην
καὶ ἄλλην αὖ ἐν εἰρηρικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαίῳ ἀλλ' ἐν
έκουσίᾳ πράξει ὄντος, ἢ τινά τι πείθοντός τε καὶ
δεομένου, | ἢ εὐχῇ θεὸν ἢ διδαχῇ καὶ νουθητήσει
ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τούναντίον ἄλλω δεομένῳ ἢ διδάσκοντι
ἢ μεταπείθοντι ἑαυτὸν ὑπέχοντα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πρά-
ξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπερηφάνως ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ
c σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πράττοντά

⁶² The various modes (*harmoniai*) mentioned here were tra-
ditionally used to accompany different activities: dirges, soft, ef-

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“And again drunkenness is most unbecoming for our guardians as well as softness and idleness.”

“Of course.”

“So which melodies are soft and are associated with drinking?”

“Some Ionian and also Lydian modes, among those known as effeminate.”

“So, my friend, could you possibly use these in the presence of warriors?”

“In no way,” he said. “Well it looks as if you’re left with the Dorian and Phrygian modes.”⁶²

“I don’t know the modes,” I said, “but let’s make an exception of that mode which both in military action and every activity requiring forcefulness would fittingly represent the tones and modulations of the speech of a man who is truly brave and who, although failing and succumbing to wounds or death or falling victim to any other misfortune, in all this has resisted fate by fighting steadfastly and resolutely. Again, leave out that other mode that a man uses in peaceful, voluntary activities that do not entail force when he is trying to persuade someone, or plead with him: a god by prayer, or another man he is teaching or advising; or the other way round, when he defers to someone else who is pleading with him, instructing him, or trying to make him change his mind, and as a result acting according to his judgment without behaving arrogantly, but in all these things proceeding with sound sense

feminate activities and, in contrast, those associated with manly activities such as war. Plato wishes to ban all but these latter (i.e., the Dorian and Phrygian) which engender desirable qualities and emotions in their performers and listeners.

τε καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. ταύτας δύο ἀρμονίας, βίαιον, ἐκούσιον, δυστυχούντων, εὐτυχούντων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων [ἀρμονίας] αἴτινες φθόγγους μμήσονται κάλλιστα, ταύτας λείπε. |

Ἄλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλας αἰτεῖς λείπειν ἢ ἃς νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολυχорδίας γε οὐδὲ παναρμονίου ἡμῖν δεήσει ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ μέλεσιν.

Οὐ μοι, ἔφη, φαίνεται.

Τριγῶνων ἄρα καὶ πηκτίδων | καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων ὅσα πολύχορδα καὶ πολυαρμόνια, δημιουργοὺς οὐ θρέψομεν.

d Οὐ φαινόμεθα.

Τί δέ; ἀυλοποιούς ἢ αὐλητὰς παραδέξῃ εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχорδότατον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μίμημα; |

Δῆλα δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Λύρα δὴ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ κιθάρα λείπεται καὶ κατὰ πόλιν χρήσιμα· καὶ αὖ κατ' ἀγροὺς τοῖς νομεῦσι σύριγξ ἂν τις εἴη. |

Ὡς γοῦν, ἔφη, ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει.

e Οὐδέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καινὸν ποιοῦμεν, ὦ φίλε, κρινοντες τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄργανα πρὸ Μαρσύου τε καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου ὀργάνων.

Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ μοι φαινόμεθα.

⁶³ These refer to the Dorian and Phrygian modes, respectively.

BOOK III

and moderation, and ending up contented.⁶³ Put these two modes to one side, the forced and the voluntary, which will reproduce very well indeed the utterances of those in misfortune and good fortune, those of sound mind and the brave.”

“So you are asking to be left with none other than the ones I have been talking about,” he said.

“That means,” I said, “that we shall not need instruments of many strings and every kind of mode in our songs and lyrics.”

“I agree with that,” he said.

“We shall not patronize the makers of lyres and harps and all the instruments which have multiple strings and are capable of playing in every mode.”

“It doesn’t seem so.”

“What about the following then: are you going to let pipe makers and players into our state? Or is the pipe not a ‘multistringed’ instrument with the full range of modes and don’t the multimodal instruments actually imitate it?”⁶⁴

“That is clearly so,” he said.

“Then you are left with the lyre and the kithara, also useful in our state; and again out in the fields our shepherds would have their panpipes.”

“At least that’s the way the discussion is heading,” he said.

“Well we’re not doing anything new, my friend, by preferring Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his.”

“Zeus, no,” he said, “I don’t think we are.”

⁶⁴ The “pipe” = *aulos* (actually a reed instrument like an oboe) is described as “multistringed” because of the variety of notes it could reproduce.

Καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, εἶπον, λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἦν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν. |

Σωφρονοῦντές γε ἡμεῖς, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἴθι δῆ, ἔφη, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθαίρωμεν. ἐπόμενον γὰρ δῆ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη τὸ περὶ ῥυθμούς, μὴ ποικίλους αὐτοὺς διώκειν μηδὲ παντοδαπὰς βάσεις, ἀλλὰ βίον ῥυθμούς ἰδεῖν κοσμίον τε καὶ ἀνδρείου 400 τίνες εἰσὶν· οὓς ἰδόντα τὸν πόδα τῷ τοιούτου λόγῳ ἀναγκάζειν ἔπεσθαι καὶ τὸ μέλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγον ποδί τε καὶ μέλει. οἷτινες δ' ἂν εἶεν οὔτοι οἱ ῥυθμοί, σὸν ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰς ἀρμονίας, φράσαι. |

Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί, ἔφη, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρί ἄττα ἐστὶν εἶδη ἐξ ὧν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέτταρα, ὅθεν αἱ πᾶσαι ἀρμονίαι, θεαμένος ἂν εἴποιμι ποῖα δὲ ὁποῖου βίον μιμήματα, λέγειν οὐκ ἔχω.

b Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος βουλευσόμεθα, τίνες τε ἀνελευθερίας καὶ ὑβρεως ἢ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι βάσεις, καὶ τίνας τοῖς ἐναντίοις λειπτέον ῥυθμούς· οἶμαι δέ με ἀκηκοέναι | οὐ σαφῶς ἐνόημι τίνος τινος ὀνομάζοντος αὐτοῦ σύνθετον καὶ δάκτυλον καὶ ἡρώον γε, οὐκ οἶδα

⁶⁵ An oath characteristic of Plato's S. (see also e.g., *Ap.* 21e, *Resp.* 8.567d12, 9.592a7), possibly referring to the dog-headed Egyptian Anubis (see *Grg.* 482b5).

⁶⁶ See above, n. 61.

⁶⁷ These are combinations of different arrangements of long and short: (1) equal (2:2), as in a dactyl (- υυ) or a spondee (- -);

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“By the dog,”⁶⁵ I said, “without actually realizing it, we have repurified our state which just now we called effeminate.”

“So at least we are showing restraint,” he said.

“Come on then,” I said, “let’s clear out the rest. Following on from the modes there is the matter of rhythms. We must not go for the ones that are elaborate or with a variety of movements, but see which are the rhythms of an orderly and manly life. In view of this the metrical foot and the melody must follow the verbal expression and not the expression follow the meter and the melody.⁶⁶ Again it’s your job to say what these rhythms should be, as you did with the modes.”

“But by Zeus,” he said, “I can’t say. I could tell you after some reflection that in the first place there are three models from which rhythmical movements are constructed,⁶⁷ just as there are four in musical sounds from which all the modes are derived;⁶⁸ but I can’t say which forms represent which kind of life.”

“Well,” I said, “we shall also consult with Damon⁶⁹ as to which rhythmical movements are appropriate to illiberality and insolence, or madness and other forms of vice, and which ones are left for their opposites. I think I have heard him talking vaguely of a compound rhythm which he called ‘martial,’ ‘dactyl’ and even ‘heroic’ and somehow

(2) 3:2 as in a cretic (- ∪-); (3) 2:1, as in an iambus (∪ -) or a trochee (- ∪).

⁶⁵ This reference to “four in musical sounds” is obscure; possibly the four primary musical ratios are meant (see Waterfield, *Plato, Republic*, n. ad. loc).

⁶⁹ A fifth-century Athenian musicologist, whose views underlie Plato’s exposition here; see also *La.* 200b.

ὅπως διακοσμοῦντος καὶ ἴσον ἄνω καὶ κάτω τιθέντος,
 εἰς βραχύ τε καὶ μακρὸν γιγνόμενον, καί, ὡς ἐγὼ
 οἶμαι, ἴαμβον καὶ τιν' ἄλλον τροχαῖον ὠνόμαζε, μήκη
 δὲ καὶ βραχύτητας προσῆπτε. καὶ τούτων τισὶν οἶμαι
 τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ ποδὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ἦττον ψέγειν τε καὶ
 ἐπαινεῖν ἢ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς αὐτούς—ἦτοι συναμφότερόν
 τι οὐ γὰρ ἔχω λέγειν— | ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ὥσπερ εἶ-
 πον, εἰς Δάμωνα ἀναβεβλήσθω· διελέσθαι γὰρ οὐ
 σμικροῦ λόγου. ἢ σὺ οἶεις;

Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Ἄλλὰ τόδε γε, ὅτι τὸ τῆς εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ
 ἀσχημοσύνης τῷ εὐρύθμῳ τε καὶ ἄρρυθμῳ ἀκολουθεῖ,
 δύνασαι διελέσθαι; |

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ἄλλὰ μὴν τὸ εὐρυθμόν γε καὶ τὸ ἄρρυθμον τὸ μὲν
 τῇ καλῇ λέξει ἔπεται ὁμοιούμενον, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἐναντία,
 καὶ τὸ εὐάρμοστον καὶ ἀνάρμοστον ὡσαύτως, εἶπερ
 ῥυθμός γε καὶ ἀρμονία λόγῳ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο,
 ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος τούτοις.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον. |

Τί δ' ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ λόγος;
 οὐ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθει ἔπεται;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Τῇ δὲ λέξει τὰ ἄλλα;

Ναί. |

Εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ

⁷⁰ Here probably describing the dactyl, which is the basic

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arranging it equally up and down with an interchange of long and short,⁷⁰ and, I think I am right, he called one foot an 'iambus' and another sort a 'trochee'⁷¹ and he added long and short syllables together. And I think with some of these he criticized the tempo of the 'foot' no less than the rhythms themselves, or indeed a bit of both, I can't say. Well, as I said, let's leave that one for Damon: it is no small task to decide: or do you think it is?"

"Zeus, no I don't."

"But can you at least distinguish the fact that the element of elegance and that of inelegance match what is good rhythm and bad rhythm respectively?"

"Of course."

"And another aspect of what is good and bad rhythm and what isn't: the first resembles and matches fine language, the other does the opposite, and the same applies to what is melodious and what isn't, if rhythm and melody match the words, as was said just now, and not the other way round."

"Yes indeed," he said, "these must match the words."

"What about the style of language and the content?" I said; "don't they match the character of the soul?"

"Of course."

"And everything else matches the language?"

"Yes."

"Fine language then, melodiousness, elegance and

meter of heroic poetry: "compound," because it consists of one long and two short syllables, and arranged "equally up and down with an interchange of long and short" because one long syllable is equivalent to two short ones.

⁷¹ On these "feet," see above, n. 67.

- e εὐρυθμία εὐηθεία ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἦν ἄνοιαν οὔσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν εὐήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διανοίαν.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. |

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ ταῦτα διωκτέα τοῖς νέοις, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ αὐτῶν πράττειν;

Διωκτέα μὲν οὖν.

- 401 Ἔστιν δέ γέ που πλήρης μὲν γραφικὴ αὐτῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη δημιουργία, πλήρης δὲ ὑφαντικὴ καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομία καὶ πᾶσα αὖ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων σκευῶν ἐργασία, ἔτι δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων φυτῶν. | ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἀρρυθμία καὶ ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοηθείας ἀδελφά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου, σῶφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἦθους, ἀδελφά τε καὶ μιμήματα.

Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

- b Ἄρ' οὖν τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἡμῖν μόνον ἐπιστατητέον καὶ προσαναγκαστέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἦθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἢ μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς ἐπιστατητέον καὶ διακωλυτέον τὸ κακότηδες τοῦτο | καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ ἄσχημον μῆτε ἐν εἰκόσι ζῶων μῆτε ἐν οἰκοδομήμασι μῆτε ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ δημιουργουμένῳ ἐμποιεῖν, ἢ ὁ μὴ οἶός τε ὢν οὐκ ἐατέος παρ' ἡμῖν δημιουργεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐν κακίας εἰκόσι τρεφόμενοι ἡμῖν

BOOK III

good rhythm match goodness of character, not in the sense of simplicity that we say by way of endearment, but the quality of mind equipped with a truly good and fine character."⁷²

"I agree in every way," he said.

"So shouldn't our youngsters pursue these goals everywhere, if they are going to manage their own affairs?"

"Yes, they must."

"Again I imagine that painting and every craft of that kind is full of these qualities: weaving and embroidery, house building and every trade concerned with household artifacts in general, and again the physical nature of animals and plants as well. For in all of these there is elegance or gracelessness. So too ugliness, poor rhythm and disharmony are close relatives of poor language and poor character, and the opposites of each of these are closely related and imitate the opposite, good sense and good character."

"Completely so," he said.

"Must we supervise only our poets then and also force them to include representations of good character in their works, or not work in our community? Or mustn't we also supervise the rest of our craftsmen and prevent them from including this undisciplined, niggardly, ugly and bad character either in their images of living creatures, or in their buildings, or in any other work of craftsmanship? Or is he who cannot do this not to be allowed to work among us, in order that our guardians may not be brought up on im-

⁷² "Goodness of character" = *euētheia*: S. is using this word in a positive sense: contrast Thrasy machus' negative definition at 1.348c12 ("naïveté," "simplicity").

οἱ φύλακες ὥσπερ ἐν κακῇ βοτάνῃ, πολλὰ ἐκάστης
 ἡμέρας κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀπὸ πολλῶν δρεπόμενοί τε καὶ
 c νεμόμενοι, ἐν τι συνιστάντες λανθάνωσιν κακὸν μέγα
 ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν ψυχῇ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους ζητητέον τοὺς δημι-
 ουργοὺς τοὺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους ἰχνεύειν | τὴν τοῦ
 καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐν ὑγιεινῷ
 τόπῳ οἰκοῦντες οἱ νέοι ἀπὸ παντὸς ὠφελῶνται, ὁπόθεν
 ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἢ πρὸς ὄψιν ἢ πρὸς
 ἀκοήν τι προσβάλλῃ, ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρη-
 d στῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδῶν λανθάνῃ εἰς
 ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ
 λόγῳ ἄγουσα;

Πολὺ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, κάλλιστα οὕτω τραφεῖεν.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυρι-
 ωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, | ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται
 εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἄρμονία, καὶ
 ἐρρωμενέστατα ἄπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημο-
 e σύνῃν, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ
 δὲ μή, τοῦναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων
 καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων
 ὀξύνται ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεῖς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ
 ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαί-
 402 ροι καὶ⁵ | καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφουτ' ἂν
 ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλὸς τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ'
 αἰσχρὰ φέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὢν, πρὶν
 λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου

⁵ χαίροι καὶ Slings: χαίρων καὶ ADF

BOOK III

ages of baseness, on poor pasture as it were, lest, reaping and grazing little by little on much each day, they fail to realize that they are accumulating great evil in their souls. But must we search out those craftsmen who have the innate ability to track down a natural goodness and beauty in order that our youngsters, living in a healthy place as it were, may benefit from everything, wherever it may come from, which brings to their eyes or ears something resulting from fine works of art, like a breeze bringing health from wholesome places and leading them unawares from their earliest childhood into resembling, being friendly toward and in harmony with the beauty of reason?"

"Bringing them up like this would be by far the best," he said.

"In that case, Glaucon," I said, "isn't an education in the arts most essential for these reasons, in that rhythm and melody above all penetrate to the innermost part of the soul and most powerfully affect it, bringing gracefulness, and, if one is brought up correctly, make one graceful; if not, isn't the result the opposite? And furthermore he who has been brought up in the arts as he should have been, will be most acutely aware of what has been omitted and not well made, or not well nurtured, and he would rightly disparage it and approve and rejoice in what is beautiful, allow it into his soul, feed on it and become a good, fine man. On the other hand would he rightly reject and hate what is shameful even while still young, and before he is able to reason these things out, and, because he has been brought up in this way, when reason does come

ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα
ὁ οὕτω τραφεῖς; |

Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα ἐν μου-
σικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφή.

Ἦσπερ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἱκα-
νῶς εἶχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὀλίγα
ὄντα ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστιν περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὐτ' ἐν
σμικρῷ οὐτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἠτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐδέοι
b αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ προυθυμούμεθα διαγι-
γνώσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσόμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν
οὕτως ἔχοιμεν—

Ἀληθῆ. |

Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εἴ που ἦ ἐν ὕδασι
ἢ ἐν κατόπτροις ἐμφαίνοντο, οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα,
πρὶν ἂν αὐτὰ γνῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τε
καὶ μελέτης;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ
c πρότερον ἐσόμεθα, οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὓς φάμεν ἡμῖν
παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας, πρὶν ἂν τὰ τῆς
σωφροσύνης εἶδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος
καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ
τούτων αὐτῶν ἐναντία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα | γνωρίζω-
μεν καὶ ἐνόητα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ
καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν
μεγάλοις ἀτιμάζομεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰώμεθα τέχνης
εἶναι καὶ μελέτης;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

would he welcome it because he recognizes its utter fitness for him?"

"It seems to me, at any rate," he said, "that education lies in the arts for these reasons."

"Then just as with reading our letters," I said, "we were competent at that point when the individual letters, few that they are, *did not escape our notice in any of the words* in which they were scattered around, and we did not overlook them, as if we did not need to see them, whether the context was small or large, but were keen to distinguish them in all circumstances, since we could not be literate until we were able to do so."

"That is true."

"So too with the images of letters if, suppose, they were reflected in water or mirrors, we would not recognize them until we had learned the letters themselves; but this is all part of the same practical skill, isn't it?"

"Yes it certainly is."

"Well then, by the gods, isn't it as I am saying: that we shall not be accomplished in the arts, neither we nor those we say we must educate as our guardians, until we are familiar with the forms of moderation, bravery, liberal mindedness, magnificence and those concepts akin to these as well as their opposites, which indeed surround us on all sides. We perceive them and their images in their surroundings, and do not disregard them either on a small or a large scale, but consider them part of the same practical skill, don't we?"

"Necessarily so," he said.

d Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτου ἂν συμπίπτη ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἦθη ἐνόντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι; |

Πολύ γε.

Καὶ μὴν τό γε κάλλιστον ἐρασμιώτατον;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Τῶν δὴ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ὃ γε μουσικὸς ἐρώη ἂν εἰ δὲ ἀσύμφωνος εἶη, οὐκ ἂν ἐρώη. |

Οὐκ ἂν, εἰ γέ τι, ἔφη, κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλλείποι· εἰ μέντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὑπομείνειεν ἂν ὥστε ἐθέλειν ἀσπάζεσθαι.

e Μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅτι ἔστιν σοι ἢ γέγονεν παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ συγχωρῶ. ἀλλὰ τότε μοι εἰπέ· σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡδονῇ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ἔστι τις κοινωμία;

Καὶ πῶς; ἔφη, ἢ γε ἔκφρονα ποιεῖ οὐχ ἦττον ἢ λύπη; |

Ἀλλὰ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ;

403 Οὐδαμῶς.

Τί δέ; ὕβρει τε καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ;

Πάντων μάλιστα.

Μείζω δέ τινα καὶ ὀξυτέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια; |

Οὐκ ἔχω, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδέ γε μανικωτέραν.

Ὁ δὲ ὀρθὸς ἔρως πέφυκε κοσμίου τε καὶ καλοῦ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μουσικῶς ἐρᾶν;

"So," I said, "if for anyone there is a correspondence of the fine qualities in the soul agreeing and harmonizing with those in his physical form, and they share the same pattern—this would be a very fine sight for anyone capable of seeing it?"

"Very much so."

"And again, that which is very beautiful is most desirable?"

"Of course."

"The person who is cultivated would especially love people of this kind, but if the person is inharmonious he would not."

"He wouldn't," he said, "if there were any shortcomings in his soul, but if there were some physical defect, he would tolerate it and still be happy to love him."

"I understand," I said, "that you have, or have had such lovers, and I go along with that. But tell me this: does moderation⁷³ have anything in common with excessive pleasure?"

"How can it," he asked, "when the latter makes you frantic no less than pain?"

"And excessive pleasure with any other virtue?"

"Not at all."

"But what about licentiousness and intemperance?"

"Out of all of them, those especially."

"Can you name a pleasure greater and more exhilarating than sex?"

"I can't," he said, "nor any more maddening."

"Yet true love is to love the moderate and the beautiful in a sensible and cultivated way, isn't it?"

⁷³ *sōphrosunē*. See above, n. 27.

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς. |

Οὐδὲν ἄρα προσοιστέον μανικὸν οὐδὲ συγγενὲς ἀκολασίας τῷ ὀρθῷ ἔρωτι;

Οὐ προσοιστέον.

- b Οὐ προσοιστέον ἄρα αὕτη ἡ ἡδονή, οὐδὲ κοινωνητέον αὐτῆς ἐραστῇ τε καὶ παιδικοῖς ὀρθῶς ἐρῶσί τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις;

Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσοιστέον.

Οὕτω δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, νομοθετήσεις ἐν τῇ οἰκίζομένη πόλει φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ἄπτεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑέος παιδικῶν ἐραστήν, τῶν καλῶν χάριν, | ἐὰν πείθῃ, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὕτως ὀμιλεῖν πρὸς ὃν τις σπουδάξῃ, ὅπως μηδέποτε δόξῃ μακρότερα τούτων συγγίγνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, ψόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέξοντα.

- c Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται τέλος ἡμῶν ἔχειν ὁ περὶ μουσικῆς λόγος; | οἱ γοῦν δεῖ τελευτᾶν, τετελεύτηκεν· δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά.

Σύμφημι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Μετὰ δὴ μουσικὴν γυμναστικὴν θρεπτέοι οἱ νεανίαι.

Τί μήν;

- d Δεῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ ταύτη ἀκριβῶς τρέφεσθαι ἐκ παίδων διὰ βίου. ἔχει δέ πως, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ὧδε· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται, ὃ ἂν χρηστὸν ἦ τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετῇ ψυχῆν ἀγαθὴν ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ

"Yes, very much so," he said.

"Then nothing maddening or akin to licentiousness is to be brought into contact with true love?"

"No, it isn't."

"Then this pleasure is not to be involved, and a lover and his beloved who truly love and are loved by each other must not have anything to do with it?"

"Zeus no! Socrates, they must not!"

"So it looks as if you are going to make a law in the state we are founding that a lover of young men may kiss, associate with and touch his beloved, if the beloved can be persuaded, as he would a son for the sake of all that is good; but in all other respects he should associate with the object of his desires so as to prevent any association ever going farther than this; if not, it will lay him open to a charge of lack of education and taste."

"That is so," he said.

"So," I said, "do you too think that we've reached an end of our discussion about the arts? I think it has ended where it should; in my view the arts should end in the love of beauty."

"I agree," he said.

"After the arts, our young men must have some physical training."

"Yes, of course."

"Indeed in this discipline too they must be brought up from childhood carefully throughout their lives, and in my view it goes something like this—see whether you agree too: I don't think that a body that is fit makes the soul good by its own good qualities, but on the contrary it's the soul

τοῦναντίον ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ τῇ αὐτῆς ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρ-
έχειν ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστον· σοὶ δὲ πῶς φαίνεται; |

Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, οὕτω.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἱκανῶς θεραπεύσαντες
παραδοῖμεν αὐτῇ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι,
ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον τοὺς τύπους ὑφηγησάμεθα, ἵνα μὴ
μακρολογῶμεν, ὀρθῶς ἂν ποιῶμεν;

ε Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Μέθης μὲν δὴ εἴπομεν ὅτι ἀφεκτέον αὐτοῖς· παντὶ
γάρ που μᾶλλον | ἐγχωρεῖ ἢ φύλακι μεθυσθέντι μὴ
εἰδέναί ὅπου γῆς ἐστίν.

Γελοῖον γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τόν γε φύλακα φύλακος
δεῖσθαι.

Τί δὲ δὴ σίτων πέρι; ἀθληταὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες
τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος. ἦ οὐχί; |

Ναί.

404 Ἄρ' οὖν ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ἀσκητῶν ἕξι προσήκουσ' ἂν
εἶη τούτοις;

Ἴσως.

Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπνώδης αὕτη γέ τις καὶ σφαλερὰ
πρὸς | ὑγίειαν. ἦ οὐχ ὀρᾶς ὅτι καθεύδουσί τε τὸν βίον
καί, ἐὰν σμικρὰ ἐκβῶσιν τῆς τεταγμένης διαίτης,
μεγάλα καὶ σφόδρα νοσοῦσιν οὗτοι οἱ ἀσκηταί;

Ὅρῶ.

that makes the body the best there can be by its good qualities.⁷⁴ What do you think of that?”

“I think so too.”

“So would we be doing the right thing if we were to look after the mind adequately and allow it to assess the body’s precise needs, but, to stop ourselves from going on too long, we were simply to indicate the pattern to be followed?”

“Very much so.”

“Indeed we would say that they must abstain from drinking, for I think we can allow everything but a drunken guardian not knowing where on earth he is.”

“It would be ridiculous,” he said, “for a guardian to need a guardian!”

“Then what about food? I mean athletes are men competing in the greatest of contests, are they not?”

“Yes.”

“Is the condition of those who undergo physical training appropriate for these guardians?”

“Perhaps.”

“But this has a tendency to induce sleep,” I said, “and is dangerous to the health. Don’t you see these athletes sleeping all their lives, and if those who train do veer slightly from their daily routine they fall very seriously ill.”

“Yes, I do.”

⁷⁴ The primacy of soul over body is a basic tenet of Plato (see e.g., *Grg.* 479b–c, *Phd.* 106ff.), which enables S. to examine the physical parallel with *mousikē* more briefly (for the parallel made explicit, see e.g., below, 404d11–e1).

Κομφοτέρας δὴ τινος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀσκήσεως δεῖ τοῖς
πολεμικοῖς ἀθληταῖς, οὓς γε ὥσπερ κύνας ἀγρύπνους
b καὶ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ὀξὺ ὄραν καὶ ἀκούειν
καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις μεταβάλλον-
τας ὑδάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σίτων καὶ εἰλήσεων καὶ
χειμῶνων μὴ ἀκροσφαλεῖς εἶναι πρὸς ὑγίειαν.

Φαίνεται μοι. |

Ἄρ' οὖν ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστικὴ ἀδελφή τις ἂν εἴη
τῆς ἀπλῆς μουσικῆς ἣν ὀλίγον πρότερον διῆμεν;

Πῶς λέγεις;

Ἄπλη που καὶ ἐπιεικὴς γυμναστικὴ, καὶ μάλιστα
ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον. |

Πῆ δὴ;

Καὶ παρ' Ὀμήρου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά γε τοιαῦτα μάθοι
ἂν τις. οἶσθα γὰρ ὅτι ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἠρώων
c ἐστιάσεσιν οὔτε ἰχθύσιν αὐτοὺς ἐστιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπὶ
θαλάττῃ ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ ὄντας, οὔτε ἐφθοῖς κρέασιν
ἀλλὰ μόνον ὀπτοῖς, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη στρατιώταις
εὐπορα· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν αὐτῷ τῷ πυρὶ
χρηῖσθαι εὐπορώτερον ἢ ἀγγεῖα συμπεριφέρειν. |

Καὶ μάλα.

Οὐδὲ μὴν ἠδυσμάτων, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, Ὀμηρος πώποτε
ἐμνήσθη. ἡ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσκηταὶ ἴσασι,
ὅτι τῷ μέλλοντι σώματι εὖ ἔξειν ἀφεκτέον τῶν τοι-
ούτων ἀπάντων; |

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη, ἴσασί τε καὶ ἀπέχονται.

BOOK III

"Indeed," I said, "those who train for warfare need a more refined kind of training and, like dogs, must be un-sleeping and have the keenest possible sight and hearing, and on their campaigns not be vulnerable in their health to changes in water and the rest of their food, and summer heat and winter storms."

"That's the way I see it."

"Would the best physical training then be somehow akin to training in the arts which we examined a little while ago?"

"How do you mean?"

"Uncomplicated, appropriate exercise, I suppose, especially the training for those who are concerned with warfare."

"Really? In what way?"

"One could even learn this sort of thing from Homer," I said. "After all you know that in feeding the heroes on campaign, he doesn't feed them on fish, and yet there they are in the Hellespont beside the sea; nor on boiled meat, but only on roast meat which would be particularly easy for soldiers to get hold of because it is easier everywhere to use an actual fire so to speak, than to carry cooking pots around with them."

"Why of course, that's very true!"

"Again, as far as I know, Homer has never yet mentioned seasonings, or is this something that other people in training also know that you must avoid, if your body is going to be in good condition?"

"Indeed they know that it's right and avoid such things," he said.

d Συρακοσίαν δέ, ὦ φίλε, τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὄψου, ὡς ἕοικας, οὐκ αἰνεῖς, εἶπερ σοὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.

Οὐ μοι δοκῶ. |

Ψέγεις ἄρα καὶ Κορινθίαν κόρην φίλην εἶναι ἀνδράσιν μέλλουσιν εὖ σώματος ἕξειν.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ Ἀττικῶν περμμάτων τὰς δοκούσας εἶναι εὐπαθείας; |

Ἀνάγκη.

Ὅλην γὰρ οἶμαι τὴν τοιαύτην σίτησιν καὶ διαίταν τῇ μελοποιίᾳ τε καὶ ᾠδῇ τῇ ἐν τῷ παναρμονίῳ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ῥυθμοῖς πεποιημένη ἀπεικάζοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν ἀπεικάζοιμεν.

e Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀκολασίαν ἢ ποικιλία ἐνέτικτεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ νόσον, ἢ δὲ ἀπλότης κατὰ μὲν μουσικὴν ἐν ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην, κατὰ δὲ γυμναστικὴν ἐν σώμασιν ὑγίειαν; |

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

405 Ἀκολασίας δὲ καὶ νόσων πληθυσουσῶν ἐν πόλει ἂρ' οὐ δικαστήριά τε καὶ ἰατρεία πολλὰ ἀνοίγεται, καὶ δικανικὴ τε καὶ ἰατρικὴ σεμνύνονται, ὅταν δὴ καὶ ἐλεύθεροι πολλοὶ καὶ σφόδρα περὶ αὐτὰ σπουδάζωσιν; |

Τί γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;

Τῆς δὲ κακῆς τε καὶ αἰσχρᾶς παιδείας ἐν πόλει ἂρα μὴ τι μείζον ἕξεις λαβεῖν τεκμήριον ἢ τὸ δεῖσθαι ἰατρῶν καὶ δικαστῶν ἄκρων μὴ μόνον τοὺς φαύλους

BOOK III

"If you think they are right, I suppose you do not approve of the Syracusan fare, my friend, and the Sicilian way of enhancing cooked food."⁷⁵

"No, I don't think I do."

"Then you criticize a Corinthian whore⁷⁶ for befriending men who intend to be physically fit?"

"Absolutely, in every way!"

"And that includes those Attic pastries we consider luxuries?"

"Of course."

"Yes, because I think we would be right to compare all foodstuffs and every way of living of this kind to the composition of lyric poems and songs in all modes and meters."

"Well of course."

"In that case, embellishment brought about licentiousness, and here illness is the result, while a straightforward approach in the arts gives rise to moderation in the soul, and in physical training, bodily health?"

"That is very true," he said.

"Doesn't that mean that when licentiousness and illness are rife in a state many law courts and surgeries open, and law and medicine give themselves airs whenever even free men in large numbers become excessively serious about these matters?"

"Indeed, what is to stop them?"

"As for a shamefully poor education in a state, surely you will have no greater evidence than the need for first-rate doctors and jurors not only for the lower orders and

⁷⁵ For the proverbial richness of Sicilian food, see *Grg.* 518b, *Epist.* 7.326b.

⁷⁶ Corinth had a reputation for prostitutes.

b τε καὶ χειροτέχνας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἐλευθέρῳ σχή-
ματι προσποιουμένους τεθράφθαι; ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δο-
κεῖ καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας μέγα τεκμήριον τὸ ἐπακτῶ παρ'
ἄλλων, ὡς δεσποτῶν τε καὶ κριτῶν, τῷ δικαίῳ ἀναγ-
κάζεσθαι χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἀπορία οἰκείων;

Πάντων μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, αἴσχιστον. |

ᾧ δοκεῖ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτου αἴσχιον εἶναι τούτο,
ὅταν δὴ τις μὴ μόνον τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βίου ἐν δικαστηρίοις
φεύγων τε καὶ διώκων κατατρίβηται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ
ἀπειροκαλίας ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ τούτῳ πεισθῆ καλλω-
c πίξεσθαι, ὡς δεινὸς ὢν περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἰκανὸς
πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι, πάσας δὲ διεξόδους
διεξελθὼν ἀποστραφῆναι λυγιζόμενος, ὥστε μὴ
παρασχεῖν δίκην, καὶ ταῦτα σμικρῶν τε καὶ οὐδενὸς
ἀξίων ἔνεκα, ἀγνοῶν ὅσῳ κάλλιον καὶ ἄμεινον τὸ
παρασκευάζειν τὸν βίον αὐτῷ μηδὲν δεῖσθαι νυστά-
ζοντος δικαστοῦ; |

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἐκείνου ἔτι αἴσχιον.

d Τὸ δὲ ἰατρικῆς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεῖσθαι ὅτι μὴ τραυμάτων
ἔνεκα ἢ τινῶν ἐπετείων νοσημάτων ἐπιπεσόντων,
ἀλλὰ δι' ἀργίαν τε καὶ διάιταν οἷαν διήλθομεν, ρευ-
μάτων τε καὶ πνευμάτων ὥσπερ λίμνας ἐμπιμπλαμέ-
νους φύσας τε καὶ κατάρρους νοσήμασιν ὀνόματα
τίθεσθαι ἀναγκάζειν τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας, οὐκ
αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ; |

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ὡς ἀληθῶς καινὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἄτοπα
νοσημάτων ὀνόματα.

manual workers, but also for those who claim to have been brought up as ostensibly free men? Or do you not think it is shameful and strong evidence of a lack of education to be compelled to use the services of a justice brought in from elsewhere as our masters and jurors because of the shortage of homegrown qualities?"

"Indeed, that is the most shameful aspect of the whole situation," he said.

"Really?" I said, "or is this more shameful—whenever someone has not only spent the whole of his life as defense or prosecution in the jury courts, but because of his vulgarity is also persuaded to take pride in the very fact that he is clever in matters of injustice and capable of sidestepping every turn, exploring every means of escape, wriggling to get out of a corner so as not to lose the case, and for these trivial and worthless reasons be unaware of how much better and worthwhile it is to organize one's life so as not to need any judge who goes about half-asleep?"⁷⁷

"Yes, the latter is far more a disgrace than the former," he said.

"And the need for medicine, not just where there are injuries, or seasonal illnesses, but as a result of idleness and a way of life of the sort we have discussed, when people are full of discharges and wind like emissions from a swamp, so that those oh-so-clever followers of Asclepius are compelled to identify their illnesses with names such as 'flatulence' and 'catarrh'—don't you think that is a disgrace?"

"Yes," he said, "those really are weird and absurd names for diseases."

⁷⁷ For a similar description of the shortcomings of the legal profession, see *Tht.* 172e–73b.

Οἷα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς οἶμαι, οὐκ ἦν ἐπ' Ἀσκληπιοῦ.
 τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι αὐτοῦ οἱ υἱεῖς ἐν Τροίᾳ Εὐρυπύλω
 e τετρωμένω ἐπ' οἶνον Πράμνειον ἄλφιστα πολλὰ ἐπι-
 406 πασθέντα καὶ τυρὸν ἐπιξυσθέντα, ἃ δὴ δοκεῖ φλεγμα-
 τώδη εἶναι, οὐκ ἐμέμψαντο τῇ δούσῃ πιεῖν, οὐδὲ Πα-
 τρόκλῳ τῷ ἰωμένῳ ἐπετίμησαν.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ἀτοπὸν γε τὸ πῶμα οὕτως
 ἔχοντι. |

Οὐκ, εἴ γ' ἐννοεῖς, εἶπον, ὅτι τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ τῶν
 νοσημάτων ταύτῃ τῇ νῦν ἰατρικῇ πρὸ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιά-
 δαι οὐκ ἐχρῶντο, ὡς φασι, πρὶν Ἡρόδικον γενέσθαι
 Ἡρόδικος δὲ παιδοτρίβης ὢν καὶ νοσώδης γενόμενος,
 μείξας γυμναστικὴν ἰατρικῇ, ἀπέκναισε πρῶτον μὲν
 καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν, ἔπειτ' ἄλλους ὕστερον πολλούς.

b Πῆ δὴ; ἔφη.

Μακρόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν θάνατον αὐτῷ ποιήσας. |
 παρακολουθῶν γὰρ τῷ νοσήματι θανασίμῳ ὄντι οὔτε
 ἰάσασθαι οἶμαι οἷός τ' ἦν ἑαυτόν, ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε
 πάντων ἰατρευόμενος διὰ βίον ἔζη, ἀποκναιόμενος εἴ
 τι τῆς εἰωθυίας διαίτης ἐκβαίῃ, δυσθανατῶν δὲ ὑπὸ
 σοφίας εἰς γῆρας ἀφίκετο.

⁷⁸ Plato is citing inaccurately, and probably from memory here (see above, n. 14); Eurypylus is wounded in *Il.* 11.580ff., but it is the Greek heroes Nestor and Machaon who are given the mixture by Hecamede at *Il.* 11.624 (correctly stated at *Ion.* 538b). Plato's misremembering of episodes which happen at different times in the poem is understandable: Achilles draws Patroclus' attention to the wounded Machaon and Patroclus comes into

"Of a sort which I don't imagine existed in Asclepius' time," I said. "I take as evidence the fact that at Troy his sons did not reproach the slave girl who gave the wounded Eurypylus Pramnian wine over which she had sprinkled a large amount of barley and grated cheese, which indeed is thought inflammatory, nor did they censure Patroclus who was tending him."⁷⁸

"That was certainly an absurd concoction to give a man in that condition," he said.

"No, not if you think about it," I said, "because the sons of Asclepius did not use the present day methods of treating illnesses until the time of Herodicus.⁷⁹ Herodicus was a physical trainer who fell ill. By combining physical training with medicine, he wore out first and foremost himself, and then later on many others."

"In what way?" he asked.

"He brought a long drawn-out death upon himself," I said. "You see although concentrating on his illness, he was in my view unable to cure himself because it was fatal, and he lived his life under medical treatment with no time for anything else. He became worn out if he deviated at all from his accustomed regime, but despite continually ailing,⁸⁰ he reached old age thanks to his skill."

their tent at 11.643ff., but does not treat Eurypylus' wound until 15.390-94.

⁷⁹ Herodicus was a medical expert from Selymbria in Thrace, who traveled the Greek world expounding his views on health and physical fitness (see *Prt.* 316e, *Phdr.* 227d).

⁸⁰ Literally "struggling against death" (the present participle has full force); cf. Waterfield's apt translation in *Plato, Republic*, ad loc, "had one foot constantly in the grave."

Καλὸν ἄρα τὸ γέρας, ἔφη, τῆς τέχνης ἠνέγκατο.

- c Οἶον εἰκός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν μὴ εἰδότα ὅτι Ἀσκληπιὸς οὐκ ἀγνοία οὐδὲ ἀπειρία τούτου τοῦ εἶδους τῆς ἱατρικῆς τοῖς ἐκγόνοις οὐ κατέδειξεν αὐτό, ἀλλ' εἰδὼς ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς εὐνομουμένοις ἔργον τι ἐκάστω ἐν τῇ πόλει προστέτακται, | ὃ ἀναγκαῖον ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐδενὶ σχολῆ διὰ βίου κάμνειν ἰατρονομῆν. ὃ ἡμεῖς γελοίως ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν δημιουργῶν αισθανόμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνων δοκούντων εἶναι οὐκ αισθανόμεθα.

Πῶς; ἔφη. |

- d Τέκτων μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κάμνων ἀξιοῖ παρὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ φάρμακον πιῶν ἐξεμέσαι τὸ νόσημα, ἢ κάτω καθαρθεῖς ἢ καύσει ἢ τομῇ χρησάμενος ἀπηλλάχθαι. ἂν δέ τις αὐτῷ μακρὰν δίαιταν προστάτῃ, πιλίδια τε περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περιτιθεῖς καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐπόμενα, ταχὺ εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ σχολῆ | κάμνειν οὐδὲ λυσιτελεῖ οὕτω ζῆν, νοσήματι τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα, τῆς δὲ προκειμένης ἐργασίας ἀμελοῦντα. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα
- e χαίρειν εἰπὼν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἱατρῷ, εἰς τὴν εἰωθυῖαν δίαιταν ἐμβάς, ὑγιῆς γενόμενος ζῆ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττων. ἂν δὲ μὴ ἰκανὸν ᾖ τὸ σῶμα ὑπενεγκεῖν, τελευτήσας πραγμάτων ἀπηλλάγη. |

Καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ μὲν γ', ἔφη, δοκεῖ πρέπειν οὕτω ἱατρικῇ χρῆσθαι.

BOOK III

“A fine reward that was then for his skill!”⁸¹ he said.

“As is fitting,” I said, “for one who didn’t know that it was not as a result of his ignorance or inexperience of this kind of medical practice that Asclepius did not introduce it to his successors, but knowing that a function has been assigned to each and everyone of those who are well governed in the state which they are obliged to perform, and that no one has the time throughout their life to fall ill and be treated, something we see would be absurd among the working classes, but which we don’t see among the rich and those who are apparently happy.”

“How can this be?” he asked.

“A carpenter,” I said, “who falls ill thinks it is worth taking medicine from his doctor which will cause him to vomit up the illness, or purge his bowels, or get rid of it by means of cauterizing or surgery. But if anyone prescribes a long course of treatment for him, wrapping bandages around his head and the usual things that follow, he quickly says he doesn’t have time to be ill and it isn’t worth his while to live like this, if he turns his attention to his illness and neglects the work that lies before him. Then after this he bids farewell to that kind of doctor and returning to his normal way of life he recovers his health and lives on minding his own business. But if his body is unable to endure, he ends up dead and free of all his troubles.”

“Indeed that seems an appropriate way for someone like that to use medicine,” he said.

⁸¹ Glaucon may be punning here on *gēras* (“old age”) and *geras* (“reward”).

407 Ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον, ὃ εἰ μὴ
πράττοι, οὐκ ἔλυσιτέλει ζῆν;

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Ὁ δὲ δὴ πλούσιος, ὡς φαμεν, οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον
ἔργον | προκείμενον, οὗ ἀναγκαζομένῳ ἀπέχεσθαι
ἀβίωτον.

Οὐκουν δὴ λέγεταιί γε.

Φωκυλίδου γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀκούεις πῶς φησι
δεῖν, ὅταν τῷ ἤδη βίος ἦ, ἀρετὴν ἀσκέειν.

Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἔφη, καὶ πρότερον. |

Μηδέν, εἶπον, περὶ τούτου αὐτῷ μαχώμεθα, ἀλλ'
ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διδάξωμεν πότερον μελετητέον τοῦτο τῷ
b πλουσίῳ καὶ ἀβίωτον τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι, ἢ νοσοτροφία
τεκτονικῇ μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ
προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ, τὸ δὲ Φωκυλίδου παρακέλευμα
οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει.

Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς. σχεδόν γέ τι πάντων
μάλιστα ἢ | γε περαιτέρω γυμναστικῆς ἢ περιττῆ
αὕτη ἐπιμέλεια τοῦ σώματος· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκονομίας
καὶ πρὸς στρατείας καὶ πρὸς ἐδραίους ἐν πόλει ἀρχὰς
δύσκολος.

Τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, (***), ὅτι καὶ πρὸς μαθήσεις
c ἀστινασοῦν καὶ ἐννοήσεις τε καὶ μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
χαλεπῆ, κεφαλῆς τινος αἰεὶ διατάσεις καὶ ἰλίγγους
ὑποπτεύουσα καὶ αἰτιωμένα ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίγνε-

⁸² Phocylides was from Miletus (fl. ca. 540), composing elegiac and hexameter verse.

“Does this mean,” I asked, “that he had a job without which, if he hadn’t carried it out, it would not have been worth his while to live?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“But look here, the rich man, as we say, has no such job assigned to him whereby life would be intolerable for him, if he were forced to give it up.”

“Yes, at least that’s what they say.”

“Yes,” I said, “for haven’t you heard tell of Phocylides and how he says that once anyone has established his livelihood, he must practice virtue?”⁸²

“Yes I have, and I think it was said earlier in fact,” he said.

“Let’s not pick a fight with him over this,” I said, “but let’s try to find out for ourselves whether our rich man should be concerned with this, and whether his life would be intolerable if he were not. Or is nursing an illness a hindrance to the mind whose attention is on carpentry, or any other craft, whereas Phocylides’ maxim is no hindrance?”

“But by Zeus it is,” he said. “This excessive attention to the body which goes beyond physical training is pretty much the greatest impediment. You see it’s troublesome to things like household management, military campaigns and civil office in the state.”

“But the most important point is that it makes learning of any kind and reflection and private meditation difficult, always causing imaginary headaches, and dizzy spells and leading to the accusation that they come about as a result of philosophy, so that where this kind of virtue is practiced

σθαι, ὥστε, ὅπη ταύτη ἀρετὴ ἀσκεῖται καὶ δοκιμάζεται, πάντη ἐμπόδιος· κάμνειν γὰρ οἷσθαι ποιεῖ ἀεὶ καὶ ὠδίνοντα μήποτε λήγειν περὶ τοῦ σώματος. |

Εἰκός γε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα γινώσκοντα φῶμεν καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸν τοὺς μὲν φύσει τε καὶ διαίτη ὑγιεινῶς ἔχοντας τὰ
 d σώματα, νόσημα δέ τι ἀποκεκριμένον ἴσχοντας ἐν αὐτοῖς, τούτοις μὲν καὶ ταύτη τῇ ἔξει καταδείξαι ἰατρικὴν, φαρμάκοις τε καὶ τομαῖς τὰ νοσήματα ἐκβάλλοντα αὐτῶν τὴν εἰωθυῖαν προστάττειν δίαιταν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ πολιτικὰ βλάβηται, τὰ δ' εἴσω διὰ παντὸς νεοσηκότα σώματα | οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν διαίταις κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀπαντλοῦντα καὶ ἐπιχέοντα μακρὸν καὶ
 e κακὸν βίον ἀνθρώπων ποιεῖν, καὶ ἔγγονα αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα φυτεύειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυῖα περιόδῳ ζῆν μὴ οἷσθαι δεῖν θεραπεύειν, ὡς οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε πόλει λυσιτελεῖ;

Πολιτικόν, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιόν. |

Δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τοιοῦτος
 408 ἦν, οὐχ ὁρᾶς ὡς καὶ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐφάνησαν, καὶ τῇ ἰατρικῇ, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐχρῶντο; ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι ὅτι καὶ τῷ Μενέλεω ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος οὐδ' ὁ Πάνδαρος ἔβαλεν—

αἰμ' ἐκμυζήσαντ' ἐπὶ τ' ἥπια φάρμακ' ἔπασσον, |

and put to the test, excessive bodily care is a complete hindrance; for it makes a person think that he is always ill and never lets him stop agonizing about his body."

"So it seems," he said.

"Are we not to say then, with regard to these things that Asclepius knew too that some are healthy both naturally and by their way of life, but have some illness distinctly formed within themselves and that it was for those people in this condition he developed medicine and by getting rid of the illnesses with drugs and surgery he ordered their habitual way of life so that no harm should be done to the state? Those whose bodies had fallen sick internally through and through he did not treat with a regime which by drawing off a little here and pouring in a little there secured a long and miserable life and enabled them to produce descendants, as you would expect, just like themselves. But as for the one who could not live in the established world, he thought he should not treat him, as he was of no benefit to himself or the state."

"Asclepius was a politician, as you see it" he said.

"This is clearly the case," I said, "and as for his children too, because he was like this, don't you see that in Troy they showed themselves to be good men in the war, and they used their knowledge of medicine, as I say. Or don't you remember that for Menelaus too as a result of the wound which Pandarus had inflicted:

"Sucking out the blood, they sprinkled soothing drugs upon it,"⁸³

⁸³ A loose recall of Hom. *Il.* 4.218 (Machaon laid healing medicines on Menelaus' wound).

ὅτι δ' ἐχρῆν μετὰ τοῦτο ἢ πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν οὐδὲν
 μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ Εὐρυνύλῳ προσέταττον, ὡς ἰκανῶν ὄν-
 των τῶν φαρμάκων ἰάσασθαι ἄνδρας πρὸ τῶν τραυ-
 b μάτων ὑγιεινούς τε καὶ κοσμίους ἐν διαίτῃ, κὰν εἰ
 τύχοιεν ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα κυκεῶνα πίνοντες, νοσῶδη
 δὲ φύσει τε καὶ ἀκόλαστον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ᾧοντο λυσιτελεῖν ζῆν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τῆν
 τέχνην δεῖν εἶναι, οὐδὲ θεραπευτέον αὐτούς, οὐδ' εἰ
 Μίδου πλουσιώτεροι εἶεν. |

Πάνυ κομψούς, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιοῦ παῖδας.

Πρέπει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καίτοι ἀπειθοῦντές γε ἡμῖν οἰ
 τραγωδοποιοί τε καὶ Πίνδαρος Ἀπόλλωνος μὲν φασιν
 c Ἀσκληπιὸν εἶναι, ὑπὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πεισθῆναι πλούσιον
 ἄνδρα θανάσιμον ἤδη ὄντα ἰάσασθαι, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ
 κεραυνωθῆναι αὐτόν. ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα
 οὐ πειθόμεθα αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ἦν,
 οὐκ ἦν, φήσομεν, αἰσχροκερδής· εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδής,
 οὐκ ἦν θεοῦ. |

Ὅρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά γε. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦδε τί
 λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἂρ' οὐκ ἀγαθούς δεῖ ἐν τῇ πόλει
 κεκτῆσθαι ἰατρούς; εἶεν δ' ἄν που μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι
 ὅσοι πλείστους μὲν ὑγιεινούς, πλείστους δὲ νοσῶδεις

⁸⁴ See n. 78 above.

⁸⁵ Aesch. *Ag.* 1022ff., Pind. *Pyth.* 3.53, Eur. *Alc.* 3–4.

⁸⁶ According to the principle established at 2.379ff.: gods (and their offspring) are by necessity good.

⁸⁷ “Judge” = *dikastēs*: in the conventional Athenian legal system = “juryman,” one of the large panel of ordinary citizens, who

“But as to what he should eat or drink after that, they prescribed nothing more than they did for Eurypylyus, on the grounds that their remedies were enough to heal men who were both healthy and moderate in their way of life before receiving their wounds, even if they happen to have drunk a potion of barley, cheese and wine at that moment:⁸⁴ But they did not think that living a life which is naturally prone to illness and license was of benefit to themselves or to others, nor was there need for any treatment to be devoted to these people, nor should they be attended even if they were richer than Midas.”

“You make out the sons of Asclepius to be very clever,” he said.

“That is as it should be,” I said, “and yet, disregarding us, both the tragedians and Pindar say that Asclepius despite being Apollo’s son, for a sum of money was persuaded to cure a rich man who was already in the throes of death: hence he was struck by a thunderbolt.⁸⁵ But, according to what has been said, we do not believe them on either count: if he were the son of a god, we shall say he was not out for the money, or if he was, then he was not the son of a god.”⁸⁶

“This is certainly most true,” he said. “But what do you say about the following, Socrates? We must get hold of good doctors in our state, mustn’t we? It seems to me that those most likely to be good would be those who treat the largest number of people who are healthy and the largest number who are ill, and that judges⁸⁷ too by the same to-

passed verdicts (and were even required to interpret the law); but here Plato clearly has in mind exceptional individuals (cf. Waterfield, *Plato, Republic*, ad. loc, “legal expert”).

d μετεχειρίσαντο, καὶ δικασταὶ αὐ̄ ὡσαύτως οἱ παντο-
δαπαῖς φύσεσιν ὠμιληκότες.

Καὶ μάλα, εἶπον, ἀγαθοὺς λέγω. ἀλλ' οἴσθα οὐς
ἡγοῦμαι τοιούτους;

Ἄν εἴπῃς, ἔφη. |

Ἄλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· σὺ μέντοι οὐχ ὅμοιον
πρᾶγμα τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἦρου.

Πῶς; ἔφη.

Ἴατροὶ μὲν, εἶπον, δεινότατοι ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ἐκ
παίδων ἀρξάμενοι πρὸς τῷ μανθάνειν τὴν τέχνην ὡς
e πλείστοις τε καὶ πονηροτάτοις σώμασιν ὀμιλήσειαν
καὶ αὐτοὶ πάσας νόσους κάμοιεν καὶ εἶεν μὴ πάνν
ὑγιεῖνοι φύσει. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι σώματι σῶμα θεραπεύ-
ουσιν—οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὰ ἐνεχώρει κακὰ εἶναι ποτε καὶ
γενέσθαι—ἀλλὰ ψυχῇ σῶμα, ἧ̄ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ κακὴν
γενομένην τε καὶ οὔσαν εἶ τι θεραπεύειν. |

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη.

409 Δικαστῆς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, ψυχῇ ψυχῆς ἄρχει, ἧ̄ οὐκ
ἐγχωρεῖ ἐκ νέας ἐν πονηραῖς ψυχαῖς τεθράφθαι τε καὶ
ὠμιληκέναι καὶ πάντα ἀδικήματα αὐτὴν ἡδίκηκυῖαν
διεξεληλυθέναι, ὥστε ὀξέως ἀφ' αὐτῆς τεκμαίρεσθαι
τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικήματα οἶον κατὰ σῶμα νόσους· |
ἀλλ' ἄπειρον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκέραιον δεῖ κακῶν ἡθῶν νέαν
οὔσαν γεγονέναι, εἰ μέλλει καλὴ καγαθὴ οὔσα κρινεῖν
ὑγιῶς τὰ δίκαια. διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις νέοι ὄντες οἱ
ἐπιεικεῖς φαίνονται καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδίκων,

ken will be those who will have had dealings with all kinds of natures."

"And I say we certainly need good men too," I said. "But do you know the kind of people I mean by this?"

"I shall, if you tell me," he said.

"Well I'll have a go," I said. "But you've asked, in the same question, about things which are not alike."

"How so?" he asked.

"Doctors," I said, "would become most highly skilled, if, starting from childhood, in addition to learning their craft, they were to have dealings with as many people as possible in the worst physical condition, suffer every illness themselves, and not naturally be in particularly good health. For I do not think that they treat the body with a body, as then it would never be allowable for them to be ill, or become ill. No, they treat the body with the soul, and the soul cannot treat anything well if it is, or has itself become, bad."

"Rightly so," he said.

"Now the judge, my friend, governs the soul with a soul, which cannot be brought up from childhood and have dealings with base souls, and experience every kind of wrongdoing when it has gone wrong itself, so that it can make shrewd inferences from its own experience as to the wrongdoing of others in the same way as it experiences physical illnesses. No, the soul itself must be without experience of, and be uncontaminated by bad characters when it is young if, as a fine beautiful soul, it is going to judge what is just in a healthy way. Hence those who are decent even seem to be simple when they are young and easily deceived by the unjust, inasmuch as they do not

ἄτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς παραδείγματα ὁμοιοπαθῆ
τοῖς πονηροῖς.

b Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε αὐτὸ πάσχουσι.

Τῷ τοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ νέον ἀλλὰ γέροντα δεῖ τὸν
ἀγαθὸν | δικαστὴν εἶναι, ὁψιμαθῆ γεγονότα τῆς ἀδι-
κίας οἷόν ἐστιν, οὐκ οἰκείαν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἐνούσαν
ἦσθημένον, ἀλλ' ἀλλοτρίαν ἐν ἀλλοτρίαις μεμελετη-
κότα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διαισθάνεσθαι οἷον πέφυκε
κακόν, ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἐμπειρία οἰκεία κεχρημένον.

c Γενναϊότατος γοῦν, ἔφη, ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ τοιοῦτος
δικαστής.

Καὶ ἀγαθός γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ σὺ ἠρώτας· ὁ γὰρ
ἔχων ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν ἀγαθός. ὁ δὲ δεινὸς ἐκεῖνος καὶ
καχύποπτος, ὁ πολλὰ αὐτὸς ἠδικηκῶς καὶ πανοῦργός
τε καὶ σοφὸς οἰόμενος εἶναι, ὅταν μὲν ὁμοίοις ὁμιλῆ,
| δεινὸς φαίνεται ἐξευλαβούμενος, πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ
παραδείγματα ἀποσκοπῶν· ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ
πρεσβυτέροις ἤδη πλησιάσῃ, ἀβέλτερος αὖ φαίνεται,
d ἀπιστῶν παρὰ καιρὸν καὶ ἀγνοῶν ὑγιὲς ἦθος, ἄτε οὐκ
ἔχων παράδειγμα τοῦ τοιούτου. πλεονάκεις δὲ πονηροῖς
ἢ χρηστοῖς ἐντυγχάνων σοφώτερος ἢ ἀμαθέστερος
δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις. |

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ.

Οὐ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιοῦτον χρὴ τὸν δικαστὴν
ζητεῖν τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ σοφόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν πρότερον·
πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τε καὶ αὐτὴν οὐποτ' ἂν
γνοίῃ, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἅμα

have models within themselves which share the experiences of those who are base."

"Yes, indeed, that is something that happens to them a great deal," he said.

"Then I tell you," I said, "a good judge must be not young but old; one who has learned late in life what kind of thing injustice is, who has perceived that it is not something inherent in his own soul, but something alien in other people's souls, and after studying it over a long period of time has come to perceive what sort of nature evil has, using his knowledge, not his own experience."

"At any rate," he said, "it seems that such a judge is the noblest sort."

"And good, what is more," I said: "which is what you were asking about. For he who has a good soul is a good man. But that cunning and suspicious type, one who has done much wrong himself, and who thinks he is unscrupulous and smart, appears clever when he has dealings with those like himself, being particularly on his guard, referring to the models within himself. But when he comes to approach good men older than himself, he appears to be stupid, inappropriately mistrustful and failing to recognize too late a healthy character, in that he does not have a model of this type within himself. The more often he meets base characters than good ones, the more he seems wise rather than ignorant to himself and others."

"That is true whichever way you look at it," he said.

"Therefore this is not the good, wise judge we should be looking for," I said, "but the former type is. For baseness of character would never recognize both itself and virtue, but the virtue of a person educated over time will

αὐτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην λήψεται. σοφὸς οὖν οὗτος, ὡς μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται.

e Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, συνδοκεῖ.

410 Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρικὴν, οἷαν εἵπομεν, μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης δικαστικῆς κατὰ πόλιν νομοθετήσεις, | αἱ τῶν πολιτῶν σοὶ τοὺς μὲν εὐφυνεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύουσιν, τοὺς δὲ μή, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιοῦτοι, ἀποθνήσκουσιν ἐάσουσιν, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυνεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν;

Τὸ γοῦν ἄριστον, ἔφη, αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς πάσχουσιν καὶ τῇ πόλει οὕτω πέφανται.

| Οἱ δὲ δὴ νέοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δῆλον ὅτι εὐλαβήσονται σοὶ δικαστικῆς εἰς χρεῖαν ἵεναι, τῇ ἀπλῇ ἐκείνῃ μουσικῇ χρώμενοι ἦν δὲ ἔφαμεν σωφροσύνην ἐντίκτειν. |

Τί μὴν; ἔφη.

b Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα ἵχνη ταῦτα ὁ μουσικὸς γυμναστικὴν διώκων, εἰάν ἐθέλῃ, αἰρήσει, ὥστε μηδὲν ἰατρικῆς δεῖσθαι ὅτι μὴ ἀνάγκη;

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. |

Αὐτὰ μὴν τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τοὺς πόνους πρὸς τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῆς φύσεως βλέπων κακῆν ἐγείρων πονήσει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύν, οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀθληταὶ ῥώμης ἕνεκα σιτία καὶ πόνους μεταχειρίζονται.

Ὅρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς. |

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, καὶ οἱ καθιστάντες

BOOK III

gain a secure understanding of both itself and baseness. This man therefore, and not the bad one, becomes wise, it seems to me."

"Yes, I agree with that," he said.

"Will you not then establish by law in the state the art of medicine, as we said, together with this kind of art of judging, which will take care of those citizens of yours who have a good natural disposition in body and soul, but which will allow those who are not physically of this kind to die, but also actually execute those who are of a naturally bad soul and incurable?"

"It has been shown that that is best for those who suffer and for the state," he said.

"Indeed it's clear," I said, "that your young people will take care not to resort to the need for the law, since they use that simple form of education in the arts which we said gives rise to a sound mind."

"Of course," he said.

"So won't the man educated in the arts pursue physical training along these same lines, if he wishes, and adhere to it so that he will not need anything from medicine except where necessary?"

"I certainly think so."

"What is more, he will toil at the gymnastics and physical exercise with a view to arousing the passionate side of his nature rather than cultivating mere strength, unlike other athletes who plan their diet and exercise with a view to developing muscle."

"Most rightly so," he said.

"So then, Glaucon," I said, "it follows that those who

- c μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν οὐχ οὐδ' ἕνεκά τινες οἴονται καθιστάσιν, ἵνα τῇ μὲν τὸ σῶμα θεραπεύουιντο, τῇ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν;

Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν; ἔφη. |

Κινδυνεύουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρα τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον καθιστάναι.

Πῶς δὴ;

Οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, εἶπον, ὡς διατίθενται αὐτὴν τὴν διάνοιαν οἱ ἂν γυμναστικῇ μὲν διὰ βίου ὀμιλήσωσιν, μουσικῆς δὲ μὴ ἄψωνται; ἢ αὖ ὅσοι ἂν τοῦναντίον διατεθῶσιν;

| Τίνος δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πέρι λέγεις;

- d Ἀγριότητός τε καὶ σκληρότητος, καὶ αὖ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερότητος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ—

Ἐγωγε, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ μὲν γυμναστικῇ ἀκράτῳ χρησάμενοι ἀγριώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος ἀποβαίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ μουσικῇ μαλακώτεροι αὖ γίνονται ἢ ὡς κάλλιον αὐτοῖς. |

Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γε ἄγριον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἂν τῆς φύσεως παρέχοιτο, καὶ ὀρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρείον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντος σκληρόν τε καὶ χαλεπὸν γίγνοιτ' ἂν, ὡς τὸ εἶκός. |

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

- e Τί δέ; τὸ ἡμέρον οὐχ ἢ φιλόσοφος ἂν ἔχοι φύσις, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀνεθέντος αὐτοῦ μαλακώτερον εἴη τοῦ δέοντος, καλῶς δὲ τραφέντος ἡμερόν τε καὶ κόσμιον;

Ἔστι ταῦτα. |

BOOK III

established education in the arts and physical exercise didn't do this for the reasons that some think: to look to the needs of the body on the one hand, and the soul on the other, did they?"

"Well what for then?" he asked.

"It can well be that they prescribe both especially for the good of the soul."

"How can that be?"

"Do you not notice, I said, how those who are involved with physical education throughout their lives, but have nothing to do with the arts, develop a particular type of mind? Or again, those who do the opposite?"

"What are you talking about?" he asked.

"Roughness and hardness as opposed to softness and gentleness," I said.

"I get it," he said: "you mean that those who indulge in nothing but physical training end up rougher than necessary, while those who indulge in the arts become softer than is really good for them."

"There again," I said, "the spirited part of their nature may produce a roughness, and if rightly nurtured it might be manly, but applied more than is necessary, it would in all likelihood become intractable and recalcitrant."

"I think so," he said.

"What then? Wouldn't a philosopher's nature have a gentleness in it and, if it were allowed to go too far, wouldn't it be softer than need be? But if it were nurtured in the right way wouldn't it be gentle and orderly?"

"That is right."

Δεῖν δέ γέ φαμεν τοὺς φύλακας ἀμφοτέρα ἔχειν
τούτῳ τῷ φύσει.

Δεῖ γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν ἡρμόσθαι δεῖ αὐτὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας;

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

411 Καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡρμοσμένου σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία
ἢ ψυχῆ;

Πάνυ γε.

Τοῦ δὲ ἀναρμόστου δειλὴ καὶ ἄγροικος;

Καὶ μάλα. |

Οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὲν τις μουσικῇ παρέχη καταυλεῖν
καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὧτων ὥσπερ διὰ
χώνης ἅς νυνδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ
μαλακὰς καὶ θρηνώδεις ἀρμονίας, καὶ μινυρίζων τε
καὶ γεγανωμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς διατελῆ τὸν βίον
ὅλον, οὗτος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, εἴ | τι θυμοειδὲς εἶχεν,
b ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξεν καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξ ἀχρήστου
καὶ σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν· ὅταν δ' ἐπιχέων μὴ ἀνιῆ ἀλλὰ
κηλῆ, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἕως ἂν
ἐκτῆξῃ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς
ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ “μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν.” |

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσει ἄθυμον
λάβῃ, ταχὺ τοῦτο διεπράξατο· εἰ δὲ θυμοειδῆ,
ἀσθενῆ ποιήσας τὸν θυμὸν ὀξύρροπον ἀπηργάσατο,

⁸⁸ See 2.375c6–8

⁸⁹ At 398d–e, where these *harmoniai* were rejected as unsuit-

BOOK III

"Now we said⁸⁸ that our guardians have to have both of these natural characteristics."

"They must."

"Consequently they must fit in with one another?"

"Of course."

"Then the soul of the man where they fit together is temperate and courageous?"

"Certainly."

"And the soul of the man where they do not fit together is cowardly and boorish?"

"That too."

"So whenever someone submits himself to the musical art to beguile and pour down upon his soul through his ears, as it were through a funnel, the sweet, soft and mournful harmonies which we were describing just now,⁸⁹ and he passes his whole life humming, gladdened by the song, if he has any passion, would he not first of all soften it as he would iron, and make it usable instead of useless and hard? But whenever he does not stop pouring in the music and is bewitched, then the immediate result is that he melts and liquefies until he has dissolved away his spirit, and he cuts out the sinews of his soul, as it were, and makes himself a "fainthearted spearman."⁹⁰

"That is very much so," he said.

"And again," I said, "if he is naturally without passion from the beginning, this is soon accomplished; but if he is passionate, he makes his heart weak and unstable, and

able for the guardians' education; here they are introduced to illustrate their positive effect on the rough temperament, if absorbed in moderation.

⁹⁰ E.g., Hom. *Il.* 17.588.

c ἀπὸ σμικρῶν ταχὺ ἐρεθιζόμενόν τε καὶ κατασβεν-
νύμενον. ἀκράχοιο οὖν καὶ ὀργίλοιο ἀντὶ θυμοειδοῦς
γεγέννηται, δυσκολίας ἔμπλεω.

Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δὲ ἂν αὖ γυμναστικῆ πολλὰ πονῆ καὶ εὐωχῆται
εὖ μάλα, ἢ μουσικῆς δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας μὴ ἄπτηται;
οὐ πρῶτον μὲν εὖ ἰσχωὺν τὸ σῶμα φρονήματός τε καὶ
θυμοῦ ἐμπίμπλαται καὶ ἀνδρειότερος γίγνεται αὐτὸς
αὐτοῦ;

Καὶ μάλα γε.

Τί δὲ ἐπειδὴν ἄλλο μὴδὲν πράττει μὴδὲ κοινωνῆ
d Μούσης μῆδαμῆ; οὐκ εἶ τι καὶ ἐνήν αὐτοῦ φιλομαθὲς
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἅτε οὔτε μαθήματος γενόμενον οὐδενὸς
οὔτε ζητήματος, οὔτε λόγου μετίσχων οὔτε τῆς ἄλλης
μουσικῆς, ἀσθενές τε καὶ κωφὸν καὶ τυφλὸν γίγνεται,
ἅτε οὐκ ἐγειρόμενον οὐδὲ τρεφόμενον οὐδὲ διακαθαί-
ρομένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτοῦ; ἢ

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Μισόλογοσ δὴ οἶμαι ὁ τοιοῦτοσ γίγνεται καὶ ἄμου-
σοσ, καὶ πειθοὶ μὲν διὰ λόγων οὐδὲν ἔτι χρῆται, βία
e δὲ καὶ ἀγριότητι ὡσπερ θηρίον πρὸσ πάντα διαπράτ-
τεται, καὶ ἐν ἀμαθία καὶ σκαιότητι μετὰ ἀρρυθμίασ
τε καὶ ἀχαριστίασ ζῆ.

Παντάπασι, ἦ δ' ὅσ, οὕτωσ ἔχει.

Ἐπ[ε]ὶ δὴ δὴ δὴ οὔτε τούτω, ὡσ ἔοικε, δύο τέχνα θεὸν
ἔγωγ' ἂν ἢ τινα φαίην δεδωκέναι τοῖσ ἀνθρώποισ, μου-
σικὴν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐπὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲσ καὶ τὸ
φιλόσοφον, οὐκ ἐπὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρ-

from the slightest cause he flares up and is extinguished. People become irascible and prone to anger instead of passionate, full of discontent."

"Absolutely."

"Again, what about someone who spends much effort on physical training and really enjoys his food, but doesn't touch the arts and philosophy? By keeping his body in good condition at first is he not filled with resolution and spirit, and does he not become more courageous than he was before?"

"Indeed he does."

"But what happens when he does nothing else and has nothing to do with the Muse? Even if he has some enthusiasm for learning in his soul, inasmuch as he does not get a taste of any learning or spirit of inquiry, takes no part in debate or the rest of the arts, does he not become weak, dull and blind in so far as he is not stimulated or nurtured, nor are his senses ever thoroughly cleansed?"

"You are right," he said.

"Such a person indeed gets to hate argument,⁹¹ I think, and lacks refinement. In discussion he no longer uses any kind of persuasion, but carries out all his business with brute force like a wild animal and lives in ignorance and is clumsy without elegance or grace."

"This is true however you look at it," he said.

"Since it seems then that there are these two types, I myself would say that god has given men two faculties: the arts and physical training with a view to the spirited and the philosophical elements: not for the soul and body, ex-

⁹¹ *misologos*, as opposed to the philosopher, who is *philologos*, "lover of argument." See *La.* 188c, *Phd.* 89dff.

412 εργον, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνω, ὅπως ἂν ἀλλήλοιν συναρ-
μοσθῆτον ἐπιτεινομένω καὶ ἀνιεμένω μέχρι τοῦ προσ-
ήκοντος.

Καὶ γὰρ ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

Τὸν κάλλιστ' ἄρα μουσικῇ γυμναστικὴν κεραννύντα
καὶ ἰ μετριώτατα τῇ ψυχῇ προσφέροντα, τοῦτον ὀρ-
θότατ' ἂν φαίμεν εἶναι τελέως μουσικώτατον καὶ
εὐαρμοστότατον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν τὰς χορδὰς
ἀλλήλαις συνιστάντα.

Εὐκότως γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡμῶν, ὦ Γλαύκων, δεήσει
τοῦ τοιούτου τινὸς αἰεὶ ἐπιστάτου, εἰ μέλλει ἡ πολιτεία
σώζεσθαι;

b Δεήσει μέντοι ὡς οἶόν τέ γε μάλιστα.

Οἱ μὲν δὴ τύποι τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι
ἂν εἶεν. χορείας γὰρ τί ἂν τις διεξίει τῶν τοιούτων
καὶ θήρας ἰ τε καὶ κυνηγέσια καὶ γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας
καὶ ἵππικούς; σχεδὸν γάρ τι δῆλα δὴ ὅτι τούτοις
ἐπόμενα δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκέτι χαλεπὰ εὐρεῖν.

Ἴσως, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ χαλεπά.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο τί ἂν ἡμῶν
διαιρετέον εἴη; ἄρ' οὐκ αὐτῶν τούτων οἵτινες ἄρξουσὶ
τε καὶ ἄρξονται;

c Τί μῆν;

Ἵτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους τοὺς ἄρχοντας δεῖ εἶναι,
νεωτέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, δῆλον; ἰ

Δῆλον.

Καὶ ὅτι γε τοὺς ἀρίστους αὐτῶν;

cept incidentally, but for these two former elements, so that they would fit together, being stretched and relaxed as much as is appropriate."

"That seems very likely," he said.

"We would say very rightly that he who combines physical exercise with the arts best and brings what is most balanced to the soul is the most completely refined and well-balanced, far more than the man who tunes the strings on the lyre."

"Yes, that is very likely, Socrates," he said.

"So in our state, Glaucon, we shall need some such person always in charge, if the constitution is to be preserved, won't we?"

"We shall indeed, certainly."

"These then would be our models of education and upbringing. For why would one go through the dances of people like this, their hunting, with and without hounds, their gymnastic and equestrian competitions, for it is pretty clear that they must follow on from these models, and it would no longer be difficult to work out what they are."

"No, presumably they won't be difficult to discover," he said.

"Well then," I said, "what are we going to choose to follow on from this? Is it not which among these people are those who will govern and those who will be governed?"

"Certainly."

"Isn't it clear that those who govern must be older men, and those governed younger?"

"Yes."

"And they must be the best of them?"

Καὶ τοῦτο.

Οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἄριστοι ἄρ' οὐ γεωργικώτατοι γίνονται;

Ναί. |

Νῦν δ', ἐπειδὴ φυλάκων αὐτοὺς ἀρίστους δεῖ εἶναι, ἄρ' οὐ φυλακικωτάτους πόλεως;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν φρονίμους τε εἰς τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν καὶ δυνατοὺς καὶ ἔτι κηδεμόνας τῆς πόλεως;

d Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Κήδοιτο δέ γ' ἂν τις μάλιστα τούτου ὁ τυγχάνοι φιλῶν.

Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ' ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ᾧ συμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ | καὶ [ὅταν μάλιστα]⁶ ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος οἶοιτο συμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δέ, τοῦναντίον.

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

e Ἐκλεκτέον ἄρ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων φυλάκων τοιούτους ἄνδρας, οἳ ἂν σκοποῦσιν ἡμῖν μάλιστα φαίνονται παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον, ὃ μὲν ἂν τῇ πόλει ἡγήσονται συμφέρειν, πάσῃ προθυμία ποιεῖν, ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ πράξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν.

Ἐπιτήδειοι γάρ, ἔφη.

Δοκεῖ δὴ μοι τηρητέον αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐν ἀπάσαις | ταῖς ἡλικίαις, εἰ φυλακικοὶ εἰσι τούτου τοῦ δόγματος καὶ μῆτε γοητενόμενοι μῆτε βιαζόμενοι ἐκβάλλουσιν

"Yes, that too."

"Then the best of the farmers are those most skilled in farming, aren't they?"

"Yes."

"But in the present case, since the rulers must be the best of the guardians, will they not be those most skilled at defending the state?"

"Yes."

"That means they must be discerning, capable, and yet again show concern for the state, doesn't it?"

"That is the case."

"And the one who would take most care of this would be the one who actually loves it."

"That must be so."

"And added to this, he would love especially something whose advantage he thought coincided with his own and when he thought that he would have the good fortune to prosper when it was prospering, and not when it wasn't."

"That is so," he said.

"Then we must choose from among our guardians the sort of men who from our scrutiny appear to do with the utmost enthusiasm throughout their lives whatever they think will benefit the state, while on the other hand having no wish at all to do what they do not consider beneficial."

"They are the ones you want," he said.

"It seems to me that they must be watched at every stage of their lives to see if they are inclined to keep this conviction, and not be inveigled or compelled to forget

⁶ ὅταν μάλιστα seclisit Hermann, Burnet, Slings

ἐπιλανθανόμενοι δόξαν τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν δεῖν ἂ τῇ πόλει βέλτιστα.

Τίνα, ἔφη, λέγεις τὴν ἐκβολήν;

413 Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ. φαίνεται μοι δόξα ἐξιέναι ἐκ διανοίας ἢ ἐκουσίως ἢ ἀκουσίως, ἐκουσίως μὲν ἢ ψευδῆς τοῦ μεταμανθάνοντος, ἀκουσίως δὲ πᾶσα ἢ ἀληθής.

Τὸ μὲν τῆς ἐκουσίου, ἔφη, μανθάνω, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀκουσίου δέομαι μαθεῖν. |

Τί δέ; οὐ καὶ σὺ ἡγή, ἔφη, ἐγώ, τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀκουσίως στέρεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἐκουσίως; ἢ οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐψεῦσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθεύειν ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὐ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀληθεύειν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;

Ἄλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ὀρθῶς λέγεις, καὶ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄκοντες | ἀληθοῦς δόξης στερίσκεισθαι.

b Οὐκοῦν κλαπέντες ἢ γοητευθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες τοῦτο πάσχουσιν;

Οὐδὲ νῦν, ἔφη, μανθάνω.

Τραγικῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κινδυνεύω λέγειν. κλαπέντας | μὲν γὰρ τοὺς μεταπεισθέντας λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλανθανομένους, ὅτι τῶν μὲν χρόνος, τῶν δὲ λόγος ἐξαιρούμενος λανθάνει· νῦν γὰρ που μανθάνεις;

Ναί.

Τοὺς τοίνυν βιασθέντας λέγω οὓς ἂν ὀδύνη τις ἢ ἀλγηδὼν | μεταδοξάσαι ποιήσῃ.

and throw out their belief that it is necessary to do what is best for the state."

"What do you mean by this 'throwing out'?" he asked.

"I'll tell you," I said. "It seems to me that a belief slips out of our mind either voluntarily or involuntarily: voluntarily when we unlearn what is false, involuntarily in the case of every doctrine that is true."

"The voluntary action I can understand, but I need to learn about the other."

"But why?" I said: "Even you think that people are not willing to be deprived of good things, but quite happy to have bad things taken away, don't you? Or, is it not a bad thing to be misled over the truth, yet a good thing to possess the truth? Or, do you not think that to believe what is so is to possess the truth?"

"No," he said, "you are right, and I think that people are deprived of the truth against their will."

"So doesn't this happen to them when they have been robbed, or beguiled, or forced to do something?"

"I don't understand even now," he said.

"Perhaps I am talking like a tragic poet,"⁹² I said. "By robbed, I mean people who have been persuaded to change their minds and those who forget, because for the latter, time carries their beliefs away unawares and, for the former, reason does the same. Now I think perhaps you understand?"

"Yes."

"Now by those who have been forced into something I mean those whom some pain or distress makes them change their minds."

⁹² I.e., in a high-flown, obscure manner.

Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἔμαθον, καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

c Τοὺς μὴν γοητευθέντας, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, κἂν σὺ φαίης εἶναι οἱ ἂν μεταδοξάσωσιν ἢ ὑφ' ἡδονῆς κηληθέντες ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου τι δείσαντες.

Ἐοικε γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, γοητεύειν πάντα ὅσα ἀπατᾶ. |

ἌΟ τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ζητητέον τίνες ἄριστοι φύλακες τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς δόγματος, τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέον ὁ ἂν τῇ πόλει αἰεὶ δοκῶσι βέλτιστον εἶναι αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν. τηρητέον δὴ εὐθύς ἐκ παίδων προθεμένοις ἔργα ἐν οἷς ἂν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον μάλιστα ἐπιλαιθάνοιτο καὶ ἐξαπατῶτο, καὶ τὸν μὲν μνήμονα καὶ δυσεξαπάτητον ἐγκριτέον, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀποκριτέον. ἦ γάρ;

d Naί.

Καὶ πόρους γε αὖ καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ἀγῶνας αὐτοῖς θετέον, ἐν οἷς ταῦτὰ ταῦτα τηρητέον. |

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τρίτου εἴδους τοῦ τῆς γοητείας ἄμιλλαν ποιητέον, καὶ θεατέον—ὥσπερ τοὺς πώλους ἐπὶ τοὺς ψόφους τε καὶ θορύβους ἄγοντες σκοποῦσιν εἰ φοβεροί, οὕτω νέους ὄντας εἰς δείματ' e ἅττα κομιστέον καὶ εἰς ἡδονὰς αὖ μεταβλητέον, βασανίζοντας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρί—εἰ δυσγοήτευτος καὶ εὐσχήμων ἐν πᾶσι φαίνεται, φύλαξ αὐτοῦ ὢν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μουσικῆς ἧς ἐμάνθανεν, εὐρυθμόν τε καὶ εὐάρμοστον ἑαυτὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις

"I get that too," he said, "and you are right."

"And those who have been beguiled, as I myself think and as I think you too would say, are those who have changed their minds because they have been charmed as a result of some pleasant experience, or have been frightened by something."

"It seems that 'to beguile' means everything that misleads," he said.

"Right then, as I was saying a little while ago, we must look for those who will be the best guardians among themselves of the principle that they must always do whatever they consider is the best to do for the state. Indeed we must watch those we put in charge right from earliest childhood in setting them tasks in which an individual would be most likely to forget such a principle or be misled, and select the one who has a good memory and is difficult to mislead, and reject the one who isn't. Is that right?"

"Yes."

"And again we must set them painful demanding tasks in which we must look out for these same qualities."

"That's right," he said.

"Then," I said, "we must arrange to test the third form of deception, 'beguilement,' and observe it. Just as those who lead foals toward loud jangling noises to see if they are afraid, we must confront them when they are young with anything frightening and then once again turn them to pleasures, and test them much more than you would test gold in the fire. If any of them appears to be hard to beguile and conducts himself well in all of this, is a good guardian of himself and the cultural training he has received, proving himself refined and well-balanced in all

παρέχων, οἷος δὴ | ἂν ὦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ πόλει
 414 χρησιμώτατος εἶη. καὶ τὸν αἰεὶ ἔν τε παισὶ καὶ νεα-
 νίσκοις καὶ ἐν ἀνδράσι βασανιζόμενον καὶ ἀκήρατον
 ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ
 φύλακα, καὶ τιμὰς δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι,
 τάφων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μνημείων μέγιστα γέρα
 λαγχάνοντα· τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποκριτέον. τοιαύτη
 τις, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ μοι, | ὧ Γλαύκων, ἡ ἐκλογή εἶναι
 καὶ κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων, ὡς ἐν
 τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρήσθαι.

Καὶ ἐμοί, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὕτως πη φαίνεται.

b Ἄρ' οὖν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀρθότατον καλεῖν τούτους μὲν
 φύλακας παντελείς τῶν τε ἕξωθεν πολεμίων τῶν τε
 ἐντὸς φιλίων, ὅπως οἱ μὲν μὴ βουλήσονται, οἱ δὲ μὴ
 δυνήσονται κακουργεῖν, τοὺς δὲ νέους, οὓς δὴ νῦν
 φύλακας ἐκαλοῦμεν, ἐπικούρους τε καὶ βοηθοὺς τοῖς
 τῶν ἀρχόντων δόγμασιν; |

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

Τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μηχανὴ γένοιτο τῶν
 ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δέοντι γιγνομένων, ὧν δὴ νῦν ἐλέγομεν,
 γενναῖόν τι ἐν ψευδομένους πείσαι μάλιστα μὲν καὶ
 c αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν;

Ποῖόν τι; ἔφη.

Μηδὲν καινόν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ Φοινικικόν τι, πρό-

⁹³ At 2.382a-d

⁹⁴ On the "noble lie," see the introduction to Books 1-5, section 2 (ii).

these things, he is in short the sort who would be most useful to himself and the state. The one who is continually assessed in childhood, youth and manhood and emerges incorruptible must be appointed governor and guardian of the state and must be accorded honors in his lifetime and after death, together with the highest privileges for his burial and other memorials. But he who is not such must not be selected. I think, Glaucon, speaking in general terms, though not in detail, our selection and appointment of our guardians and governors goes along these lines."

"Yes, I too think it is something like this," he agreed.

"Does this then mean that it is truly most correct to refer to these men as guardians in the fullest sense, fighting against our enemies from without and looking after our friends within, so that the latter will not wish and the former will not be able to cause us harm, and the young men whom we are now calling our guardians will be the auxiliaries who assist the governors and implement their decrees?"

"I think so," he said.

"Then," I said, "what device," I said, "could there be in the case of lies fabricated in a moment of need, which we were talking about just now,⁹³ which would enable us, by telling one noble lie, to persuade the rulers themselves in particular, but if not, then the rest of the state?"⁹⁴

"What sort of lie?" he asked.

"Nothing new," I said, "but a Phoenician tale:⁹⁵ it's hap-

⁹⁵ A reference either to the legend of the Phoenician Cadmus, who sowed teeth in the earth from which giants grew, or to the lying Phoenician stories told by Odysseus in *Hom. Od.* 13–15.

τερον | μὲν ἤδη πολλαχοῦ γεγονός, ὡς φασιν οἱ
ποιηταὶ καὶ πεπεύκασιν, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ οὐ γεγονός οὐδ'
οἶδα εἰ γινόμενον ἄν, πείσαι δὲ συχνῆς πειθούς.

Ὡς ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὀκνοῦντι λέγειν.

Δόξω δέ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μάλ' εἰκότως ὀκνεῖν,
ἐπειδὴν εἶπω. |

Λέγ', ἔφη, καὶ μὴ φοβοῦ.

d Λέγω δὴ—καίτοι οὐκ οἶδα ὁποῖα τόλμη ἢ ποίοις
λόγοις χρώμενος ἐρῶ—καὶ ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν
αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας πείθειν καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας,
ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ὡς ἄρ' ἂ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὺς
ἐτρέφομεν τε καὶ | ἐπαιδεύομεν, ὥσπερ ὄνειράτα ἐδό-
κουν ταῦτα πάντα πάσχειν τε καὶ γίνεσθαι περὶ
αὐτούς, ἦσαν δὲ τότε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐντὸς πλατ-
τόμενοι καὶ τρεφόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ ὄπλα αὐτῶν
e καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σκευὴ δημιουργουμένη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ παν-
τελῶς ἐξεργασμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτοὺς μήτηρ
οὔσα ἀνῆκεν, καὶ νῦν δὴ ὡς περὶ μητρὸς καὶ τροφοῦ
τῆς χώρας ἐν ἧ εἰσι βουλευέσθαι τε καὶ ἀμύνειν
αὐτούς, εἴαν τις ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴη, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πο-
λιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν ὄντων καὶ γηγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι. |

Οὐκ ἐτός, ἔφη, πάλαι ἦσχύουν τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν.

415 Πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰκότως· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἄκουε καὶ τὸ
λοιπὸν τοῦ μύθου. ἔστὲ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ
πόλει ἀδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολο-

⁹⁶ For the Athenians' traditional boast of autochthony and the earth as their mother, see e.g., *Menex.* 237e.

BOOK III

pened all over the place in the past, as the poets say and have persuaded people. It hasn't happened in our time, and I don't know if it would happen, but to gain belief it would need a lot of persuasion."

"You look as if you're reluctant to say," he said.

"And you will think I'm stalling for very good reasons," I said, "when I tell you."

"Go on," he said, "don't be afraid."

"I shall indeed, although I don't know where I will get the audacity or words to speak and try to persuade first the governors themselves and their troops, then the rest of the state too that in fact our methods of bringing them up and educating them were all, like dreams, happening to them in their imagination, while at that time they themselves, their weapons and the rest of their manufactured equipment were in reality being formed and nurtured down under the ground, and when they had been completely finished, the earth, which was their mother, released them; and now indeed they deliberate about the land they live in as if it were their mother and nurse and defend it themselves if anyone attacks it and take thought for the rest of the citizens as if they are their brothers and children of the earth."⁹⁶

"It was not for no reason that you were ashamed to tell your lie just now," he said.

"I had every good reason," I said.⁹⁷ "Nevertheless now listen to the rest of the story too: 'Now all of you who are in the city are brothers,' as we shall say to them in our

⁹⁷ Note the accumulation of excuses/disclaimers in Plato's introduction of the "noble lie" (see reference above, n. 94).

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γούντες, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ἢ ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ
 ἄρχειν, χρυσοῦν ἐν τῇ γενέσει συνέμειξεν αὐτοῖς, διὸ
 τιμιώτατοί εἰσιν· ὅσοι δ' ἐπίκουροι, ἄργυρον· σίδηρον
 δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν τοῖς τε γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημι-
 ουργοῖς. ἄτε οὖν συγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ
 b ὁμοίους ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς γεννώτε, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ
 γεννηθείη ἂν ἀργυροῦν καὶ ἐξ ἀργύρου χρυσοῦν
 ἔκγονον καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτως ἐξ ἀλλήλων. τοῖς οὖν
 ἄρχουσι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα παραγγέλλει ὁ
 θεός, ὅπως μηδενὸς οὕτω ἢ φύλακες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται
 μηδ' οὕτω σφόδρα φυλάξουσι μηδὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐκγόνους,
 ὅτι αὐτοῖς τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμικται, καὶ
 c ἕαν τε σφέτερος ἔκγονος ὑπόχαλκος ἢ ὑποσίδηρος
 γένηται, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ κατελεήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ
 φύσει προσήκουσαν τιμὴν ἀποδόντες ὥσουςιν εἰς
 δημιουργοὺς ἢ εἰς γεωρούς, καὶ ἂν αὖ ἐκ τούτων τις
 ὑπόχρυσος ἢ ὑπάργυρος φυῆ, τιμήσαντες ἀνάξουσι
 τοὺς μὲν εἰς φυλακὴν, τοὺς δὲ ἢ εἰς ἐπικουρίαν, ὡς
 χρησιμοῦ ὄντος τότε τὴν πόλιν διαφθαρῆναι, ὅταν
 αὐτὴν ὁ σιδηροῦς φύλαξ ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς φυλάξῃ. τοῦτον
 οὖν τὸν μῦθον ὅπως ἂν πεισθίεν, ἔχεις τινὰ μη-
 χανήν;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὅπως γ' ἂν αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ὅπως μετ' ἂν
 οἱ τούτων ὑεῖς καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ
 ὕστερον.

d Ἄλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ
 μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ ἀλλήλων κήδεσθαι·
 σχεδὸν γάρ τι μαυθάνω ὃ λέγεις. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ

BOOK III

storytelling, 'but during the creation the god mixed gold in the production of those of you who are competent to govern, for which reason they are worthy of the greatest respect, and he put silver into those who are auxiliaries, iron and bronze in farmers and other artisans. For the most part you would produce offspring similar to yourselves, but, inasmuch as you are all fellow kinsmen, there are times when silver may be produced in the offspring from gold and gold from silver and all the others from each other in the same way. The god instructs his governors first and foremost that there is nothing of which they will be such good guardians and nothing they will protect so keenly as the mixture of metals in the souls of their offspring. Indeed if one of their offspring is born with a proportion of bronze or iron in him, then they will take no pity on him in any way, but will treat him according to his nature and thrust him out into the midst of the artisans or the farmers. Then again if any of them are born with a proportion of gold or silver in him, they will elevate some to be guardians and others auxiliaries on the grounds that there is an oracle that the city will be destroyed on that day when a guard with iron or bronze in him is on duty.' So, do you have any scheme to make this story plausible?"

"None at all that would convince these people themselves," he said, "However as to their sons, the following generations and the rest of the population who come after, that's a different matter."

"Yet even this would do," I said, "to get them to take greater care of the state and each other: for I can more or less understand what you are saying. This matter will go

ἔξει ὅπη ἂν αὐτὸ ἢ φήμη ἀγάγη· ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτους
 τοὺς γηγενεῖς ὀπλίσαντες προάγωμεν ἡγουμένων τῶν
 ἀρχόντων. ἐλθόντες δὲ θεασάσθων τῆς πόλεως ὅπου
 κάλλιστον στρατοπεδεύσασθαι, ὅθεν τοὺς τε ἔνδον
 c μάλιστ' ἂν κατέχοιεν, εἴ τις μὴ ἐθέλοι τοῖς νόμοις
 πείθεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἔξωθεν ἀπαμύνοιεν, εἰ πολέμιος
 ὥσπερ λύκος ἐπὶ ποιμνῆν τις ἴοι στρατοπεδεδυσάμενοι
 δέ, θύσαντες οἷς χρή, εὐνάς ποιησάσθων. ἢ πῶς; |

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τοιαύτας, οἷας χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ
 θέρους ἱκανὰς εἶναι;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; οἰκήσεις γάρ, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι
 λέγειν.

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, στρατιωτικὰς γε, ἀλλ' οὐ χρημα-
 τιστικὰς.

416 Πῶς, ἔφη, αὖ τοῦτο λέγεις διαφέρειν ἐκείνου;

Ἐγώ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πειράσομαι εἰπεῖν. δεινότατον
 γάρ που πάντων καὶ αἰσχιστον ποιμέσι τοιούτους γε
 καὶ οὕτω τρέφειν κύνας ἐπικούρους ποιμνίων, ὥστε
 ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἢ λιμοῦ ἢ | τινος ἄλλου κακοῦ ἔθους
 αὐτοὺς τοὺς κύνας ἐπιχειρήσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κα-
 κουργεῖν καὶ ἀντὶ κυνῶν λύκοις ὁμοιωθῆναι.

Δεινόν, ἦ δ' ὅς· πῶς δ' οὐ;

b Οὐκοῦν φυλακτέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἡμῖν
 οἱ ἐπικούροι ποιήσωσι πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, ἐπειδὴ αὐ-
 τῶν κρείττους εἰσίν, ἀντὶ συμμαχῶν εὐμενῶν δεσπό-
 ταις ἀγρίοις ἀφομοιωθῶσιν; |

Φυλακτέον, ἔφη.

where popular tradition leads. But let us arm these sons of the earth and lead them forward under the direction of their rulers. When they arrive, let them reconnoiter whereabouts in the city is the best place to pitch camp from where they can control those inside in particular, in case any of them is unwilling to abide by the laws, and beat off those from the outside if some enemy like a wolf attacks the fold. When they have pitched camp and made their sacrifices to whichever gods they need to, they can make their sleeping quarters. Or how should it go?"

"The way you've described," he said.

"These measures are to be sufficient to protect them in both winter and summer, aren't they?"

"Of course, because it seems to me you are talking about housing."

"Yes," I said, "but for military, not business use!"

"How then are they different from one another?" he asked.

"I shall try to explain to you," I said. "Now I imagine that the most dreadful and shameful thing of all for shepherds is to rear dogs as helpers in the management of their sheep which turn out to be the sort that, through lack of control, or hunger, or any other bad trait, themselves attempt to harm their sheep and resemble wolves instead of dogs."

"That is a terrible thing, of course," he said.

"So we must take every precaution to prevent our auxiliaries from doing anything like this against our citizens, since they are stronger than they are, and from becoming more like savage masters than kindly allies, mustn't we?"

"We must," he said.

Οὐκοῦν τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμέ-
νοι ἂν εἶεν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι καλῶς πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν;

Ἄλλὰ μὴν εἰσίν γ', ἔφη.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄξιον δισχυρίζεσθαι,
| ὦ φίλε Γλαῦκων· ὁ μέντοι ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ἄξιον, ὅτι
c δεῖ αὐτοὺς τῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν παιδείας, ἣτις ποτέ ἐστίν,
εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ μέγιστον ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ἡμεροὶ εἶναι
αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς φυλαττομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. |

Πρὸς τοίνυν τῇ παιδείᾳ ταύτῃ φαίη ἂν τις νοῦν
ἔχων δεῖν καὶ τὰς οἰκίσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν
d τοιαύτην αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθαι, ἣτις μήτε τοῦ[s] φύ-
λακας ὡς ἀρίστους εἶναι παύσει αὐτούς, κακουργεῖν
τε μὴ ἐπαρεῖ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

Καὶ ἀληθῶς γε φήσει.

Ὅρα δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, εἰ τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον δεῖ αὐ-
τοὺς ζῆν τε καὶ | οἰκεῖν, εἰ μέλλουσι τοιοῦτοι ἔσεσθαι·
πρῶτον μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένον μηδεμίαν μηδένα
ιδίαν, ὧν μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη· ἔπειτα οἴκησιν καὶ ταμι-
εῖον μηδενὶ εἶναι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, εἰς ὃ οὐ πᾶς ὁ
βουλόμενος εἰσεῖσι· τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια, ὅσων δέονται
e ἄνδρες ἀθληταὶ πολέμου σῶφρονές τε καὶ ἀνδρείοι,
ταξαμένους παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δέχεσθαι
μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς τοσοῦτον ὅσον μήτε περιεῖναι
αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν μήτε ἐνδεῖν· φοιτῶντας δὲ εἰς
συσσίτια ὡσπερ ἐστρατοπεδευμένους κοινῇ ζῆν· |
χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον εἰπεῖν αὐτοῖς ὅτι θεῖον παρὰ
θεῶν ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχουσι καὶ οὐδὲν προσδέονται

"So they would have been prepared for the most important of their duties if they had in fact been well educated, wouldn't they?"

"But indeed they have been," he said.

And I said: "That doesn't deserve a strong assertion, my dear Glaucon, but what we were saying just now does: that they must have the right education, whatever that is, if they are going to have the most important responsibility of being friendly toward each other and to those who are being protected by them."

"And rightly so!" he said.

"Then in addition to this education anyone with any sense would say that we must provide accommodation for them and all other material needs of this kind which will neither prevent them from being the best guardians possible, nor induce them to do any harm to the rest of the citizens."

"Indeed he will say that in all truth!"

"In that case consider if they should live and reside in some such way as follows," I said, "if they are going to be men of this sort: first of all none of them is to have acquired any personal property which is not absolutely necessary. Then none must have any dwelling or storehouse of any sort to which there is not free access to anyone who wishes to enter. They will have such supplies as men need who are fit to fight, sound of mind and courageous, covenanting from the rest of the citizens to receive so much pay for their duties as guardians that they will not have a surplus nor a shortfall at the end of the year. They will eat regularly in a mess and live together like troops in camp. We shall tell them that they have divine gold and silver from the gods for ever in their souls, and that they have

417 τοῦ ἀνθρωπέιου, οὐδὲ ὅσια τὴν ἐκείνου κτήσιν τῆ τοῦ
 θνητοῦ χρυσοῦ κτήσει συμμειγνύντας μιαίνειν, διότι
 πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόσια περὶ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν νόμισμα
 γέγονεν, τὸ παρ' ἐκείνοις δὲ ἀκήρατον· ἀλλὰ μόνους
 αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ ἄπτεσθαι
 χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου οὐ θέμις, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν
 ὄροφον ἰέναι οὐδὲ περιώφασθαι οὐδὲ πίνειν ἐξ ἀργύρου
 ἢ χρυσοῦ. |

Καὶ οὕτω μὲν σφύζοντό τ' ἂν καὶ σφύζοιεν τὴν
 πόλιν· ὁπότε δ' αὐτοὶ γῆν τε ἰδίαν καὶ οἰκίας καὶ
 νομίσματα κτήσονται, οἰκονόμοι μὲν καὶ γεωργοὶ
 b ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἔσονται, δεσπότηται δ' ἐχθροὶ ἀντὶ
 συμμάχων τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γενήσονται, μισοῦντες
 δὲ δὴ καὶ μισούμενοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες καὶ
 ἐπιβουλενόμενοι διάξουσι πάντα τὸν βίον, πολὺν
 πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον δεδιότες τοὺς ἔνδον ἢ τοὺς ἔξωθεν
 πολεμίους, θέοντες ἤδη τότε ἐγγύτατα ὀλέθρου αὐτοί
 τε καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πόλις. |

Τούτων οὖν πάντων ἕνεκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶμεν οὕτω
 δεῖν κατεσκευάσθαι τοὺς φύλακας οἰκήσεώς τε πέρι
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταῦτα νομοθετήσωμεν, ἢ μή;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων.

BOOK III

no need of human gold and silver in addition. Also that they must not combine the possession of that gold with the possession of mortal gold and contaminate the divine, because many unholy things have been done in relation to the currency of the masses, but what they have is pure. For them alone of those in the state it is not lawful to deal with and touch the gold and silver belonging to those in the state, nor to come under the same roof where it is to be found, nor adorn themselves with it, nor drink from silver or gold vessels.

“And in this way they would preserve themselves and the state. But whenever they themselves acquire private land, houses and coined money, they will be householders and farmers instead of guardians, they will become hostile masters instead of allies of the rest of the citizens. Indeed they will lead the whole of their lives hating and hated, plotting and plotted against, fearing those within the state far more than the enemy outside. Both they and the rest of the state will be running a course very near destruction.

“So for all these reasons,” I said, “shall we say that this is how we must prepare our guardians regarding their living conditions and everything else, and shall or shall we not enact laws for these things?”

“Very much so,” said Glaucon.

Δ

- 419 Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ὑπολαβὼν, Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρα-
 τες, ἀπολογήσῃ, εἴαν τις σε φῆ μὴ πάνν τι εὐδαίμονας
 ποιεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑαυτοῦς, ὧν
 ἔστι μὲν ἡ πόλις τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οἱ δὲ μηδὲν ἀπολαύουσιν
 ἀγαθὸν | τῆς πόλεως, οἷον ἄλλοι ἀγροῦς τε κεκτημένοι
 καὶ οἰκίας οἰκοδομούμενοι καλὰς καὶ μεγάλας, καὶ
 ταύταις πρέπουσαν κατασκευὴν κτῶμενοι, καὶ θυσίας
 θεοῖς ἰδίας θύοντες, καὶ ξενοδοκοῦντες, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἄ
 νυνδῆ σὺ ἔλεγες, χρυσὸν τε καὶ ἄργυρον κεκτημένοι
 καὶ πάντα ὅσα νομίζεται τοῖς μέλλουσιν | μακαρίοις
 420 εἶναι; ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς, φαίη ἄν, ὥσπερ ἐπικούροι μισθω-
 τοὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει φαίνονται καθῆσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ
 φρουροῦντες.

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐπισίτιοι καὶ οὐδὲ
 μισθὸν πρὸς τοῖς σιτίοις λαμβάνοντες ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλ-
 λοι, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν ἀποδημῆσαι βούλωνται | ἰδίᾳ,
 ἐξέσται αὐτοῖς, οὐδ' ἑταίραις διδόναι, οὐδ' ἀναλίσκειν
 ἂν ποι βούλωνται ἄλλοσε, οἷα δὴ οἱ εὐδαίμονες δο-

¹ For the dramatic significance of interventions by S.'s associ-
 ates in the dialogue, see the introduction to Books 1-5, sec-
 tion 4.

BOOK IV

Now Adeimantus intervened:¹ “What will you say in your defense, Socrates,” he asked, “if someone says you’re not making these men at all happy, and that they, people who really make up the state, are responsible for this themselves? They enjoy nothing of the benefits of the state, as others do who have purchased land and built grand houses and are in the process of acquiring furnishings fit for them; who make private sacrifices to the gods and entertain guests. And not only that: as you were saying just now, they have amassed gold and silver and everything that is highly valued by those who are destined to be happy.² He would say that they simply appear to be occupying the city like mercenaries who do nothing but guard it.”

“Yes,” I said, “and there’s also the fact that they work just for their keep and don’t earn any money in addition to their food like the rest, so that if they wish to move elsewhere for personal reasons, they won’t be able to, nor will they be able to give their mistresses presents, nor spend money on anything else they want in the same way

² Adeimantus is here still reflecting Thrasymachus’ criticism in I.343bff. of S.’s argument that the genuine ruler is happy ruling for the benefit of those he rules and not for his own advantage.

κοῦντες εἶναι ἀναλίσκονσι. ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα
 συχνὰ τῆς κατηγορίας ἀπολείπεις.

Ἄλλ', ἣ δ' ὅς, ἔστω καὶ ταῦτα κατηγορημένα.

b Τί οὖν δὴ ἀπολογησόμεθα, φῆς;

Ναί.

Τὸν αὐτὸν οἶμον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πορευόμενοι εὐρήσομεν,
 ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἃ λεκτέα. ἐροῦμεν γὰρ ὅτι θαυμαστὸν μὲν
 ἂν οὐδὲν εἴη εἰ καὶ οὗτοι οὕτως εὐδαιμονόεστατοί εἰσιν,
 | οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν,
 ὅπως ἔν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὐδαιμον,
 ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις. ᾤθημεν γὰρ ἐν
 τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἂν εὐρεῖν δικαιοσύνην καὶ αὖ ἐν
 c τῇ κάκιστα οἰκουμένη ἀδικίαν, κατιδόντες δὲ κρῖνα
 ἂν ὁ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν. νῦν μὲν οὖν, ὡς οἴομεθα, τὴν
 εὐδαίμονα πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαμβάντες ὀλίγους ἐν
 αὐτῇ τοιούτους τινας τιθέντες, ἀλλ' ὅλην· αὐτίκα δὲ
 τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεψόμεθα. |

Ὡσπερ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντα γράφοντας
 προσελθὼν τις ἔπειγε λέγων ὅτι οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις
 τοῦ ζώου τὰ κάλλιστα φάρμακα προστίθεμεν—οἱ γὰρ
 d ὀφθαλμοὶ κάλλιστον ὄν οὐκ ὀστρεῖω ἐναηλιμμένοι
 εἶεν ἀλλὰ μέλανι—μετρίως ἂν ἔδοκοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτὸν
 ἀπολογεῖσθαι λέγοντες· “³Ω θαυμάσιε, μὴ οἴου δεῖν
 ἡμᾶς οὕτω καλοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς γράφειν, ὥστε μηδὲ

³ At 2.369a.

BOOK IV

as those do who are apparently happy. These points and many others like them are missing from your charge sheet."

"Well then, let's include those as well," he said.

"What then will be our defense, are you saying?"

"Yes."

"I think we shall discover what must be said if we proceed along the same path as previously," I said, "for we shall say that it would be no surprise if these men too are most happy living like this. Yet this is not what we are aiming for in establishing our state, namely to ensure we have one group of people who are particularly happy, but that as far as possible the whole state will be so. For we thought³ that we would be most likely to find justice in such a state and injustice by contrast in one which was the most badly administered, and after careful consideration we would be able to distinguish what we have long been looking for. So now, we think, we are forming the happy state as a whole, not proposing to isolate a few happy people in it. Straight after that we shall look at the opposite."⁴

"So it is just as if we had painted a statue and someone approached us and criticized it because we were not applying the most beautiful color to the most beautiful part of the image. For the eyes, the most beautiful part, had been painted not with purple dye, but black. We would probably think it a reasonable defense to say to him: 'My dear fellow, don't imagine that we're making the eyes so

⁴ S.'s attempt to move to the unjust state, begun at the end of the Book (445c), is quickly interrupted by Adeimantus and Polemarchus, and then postponed until Books 8 and 9.

ὄφθαλμοὺς φαίνεσθαι, μηδ' αὖ τὰλλα μέρη, ἀλλ' ἄθρει εἰ τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις ἀποδιδόντες | τὸ ὄλον καλὸν ποιούμεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν μὴ ἀνάγκαζε ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς φύλαξι προσάπτειν, e ἢ ἐκείνους πᾶν μᾶλλον ἀπεργάσεται ἢ φύλακας. ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ καὶ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ξυστίδας ἀμφιέσαντες καὶ χρυσὸν περιθέντες πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐργάζεσθαι κελεύειν τὴν γῆν, καὶ τοὺς κεραμέας κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ | διαπίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους, τὸν τροχὸν παραθεμένους, ὅσων ἂν ἐπιθυμῶσι κεραμεύειν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ μακαρίους ποιεῖν, ἵνα δὴ ὅλη ἢ πόλις εὐδαιμονῆ. ἀλλ' 421 ἡμᾶς μὴ οὕτω νουθέτει· ὥς, ἂν σοι πειθώμεθα, οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς ἔσται οὔτε ὁ κεραμεὺς κεραμεὺς οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἔχων σχῆμα ἐξ ὧν πόλις γίγνεται.

Ἄλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐλάττων λόγος· νευρορράφοι γὰρ φαῦλοι γενόμενοι | καὶ διαφθαρέντες καὶ προσποιησάμενοι εἶναι μὴ ὄντες πόλει οὐδὲν δεινόν, φύλακες δὲ νόμων τε καὶ πόλεως μὴ ὄντες ἀλλὰ δοκοῦντες ὀργᾶς δὴ ὅτι πᾶσαν ἄρδην πόλιν ἀπολλύασιν, καὶ αὖ τοῦ εὖ οἰκεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μόνοι τὸν καιρὸν ἔχουσιν.” εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν φύλακας ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιῶμεν ἢκιστα κακούργους τῆς πόλεως, ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο λέγων γεωργοὺς τινὰς (εὐδαίμονας)¹ καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν

¹ εὐδαίμονας ex b3 transp. Wilamowitz

BOOK IV

beautiful that they don't look like eyes, or indeed any other part of the body, but consider whether we've given appropriate treatment to the individual parts so as to make the whole thing beautiful.' And so in this particular case don't force us to attach such happiness to our guardians that will make them everything but guardians. For we understand that we could clothe even our farmers in fine robes and array them in gold and tell them to work the land as the fancy takes them, and get the potters to recline on the right of the fire⁵ and eat and drink, setting their wheels alongside them to make pots as the desire takes them. We can also make all the rest happy in just such a way as this so that the whole state is happy. However do not advise us to do this because, if we take your advice, the farmer will not be a farmer, nor a potter a potter, nor will anyone else who makes up the state have a specific function.

"But the rest are of lesser importance. If cobblers become inefficient and corrupt and pretend to be what they are not, it is no great loss for the state, but you can see that if guardians give the impression of guarding the laws and the state without actually doing so, they will bring down the state utterly, and furthermore they are the only ones who have the opportunity to manage things well and make it prosper. If then we are making guardians in the true sense least harmful to our state, but he who argues the opposite is talking about some farmers being happy and

⁵ A parody of the aristocratic symposium, emphasizing the formalities: the group ran counterclockwise; reclining to the right of the host indicated the highest status of those present.

πανηγύρει ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐν πόλει ἐστιάτορας [εὐδαίμονας],
ἄλλο ἂν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι. |

Σκεπτέον οὖν πότερον πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τοὺς
φύλακας καθιστῶμεν, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστη αὐτοῖς εὐδαι-
μονία ἐγγενήσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὄλην
βλέποντας θεατέον εἰ ἐκείνη ἐγγίγνεται, τοὺς δ' ἐπι-
κούρους τούτους καὶ τοὺς φύλακας ἐκείνο ἀναγκαστέον
c ποιεῖν καὶ πειστέον, ὅπως ὅτι ἄριστοι δημιουργοὶ τοῦ
ἑαυτῶν ἔργου ἔσονται, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας
ὡσαύτως, καὶ οὕτω συμπάσης τῆς πόλεως ἀξανομένης
καὶ καλῶς οἰκίζομένης ἑατέον ὅπως ἐκάστοις τοῖς
ἔθνεσιν ἢ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν | εὐ-
δαιμονίας.

Ἄλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, καλῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ τούτου ἀδελφὸν δόξω
σοι μετρίως λέγειν;

Τί μάλιστα; |

Τοὺς ἄλλους αὖ δημιουργοὺς σκόπει εἰ τάδε δια-
φθείρει, ὥστε καὶ κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι.

d Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα;

Πλοῦτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πενία.

Πῶς δὴ;

Ἦδε. πλουτήσας χυτρεὺς δοκεῖ σοι ἔτ' ἐθελήσειν |
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς τέχνης;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.

feasting as if at a festival but not as part of a state, he would not be talking about a state, but of something else.

“So when we set up our guardians, we must consider whether our aim is to create the greatest happiness for them, or whether we must see if this will be the result if we look at the state taken as a whole; and we must compel and persuade these auxiliaries and guardians that their task is to be the best workers in their individual jobs, and similarly with everyone else. Consequently when the entire state grows and is well administered we must allow the nature of things to let each section of the community share in the happiness.”⁶

“Well,” he said, “I think you’re right.”

“Then do you think I shall be tolerably right about something related to this argument?”

“What in particular?”

“Consider whether these things will ruin the rest of the workforce and actually make them bad as a result.”

“Which ones are they, then?”

“Wealth and poverty,” I said.

“How do you mean?”

“It’s like this: do you think a potter who has become rich will still want to practice his trade?”⁷

“Certainly not,” he said.

⁶ The basic meaning of this rather convoluted passage is clear: the guardians, to be real guardians (i.e., doing their particular job which nature intends) must find happiness not in their immediate personal happiness but in working for the fulfillment of all.

⁷ For observation of the effect of wealth on the practice of trades, see Ar. *Phut.* 510ff.

Ἄργος δὲ καὶ ἀμελῆς γενήσεται μᾶλλον αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ;

Πολύ γε.

Οὐκοῦν κακίων χυτρεὺς γίγνεται; |

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, πολύ.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὄργανά γε μὴ ἔχων παρέχεσθαι ὑπὸ
 e πεινίας ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν εἰς τὴν τέχνην τά τε ἔργα
 διδάσκη χείρους δημιουργοὺς διδάζεται.

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ἵπ' ἀμφοτέρων δὴ, πεινίας τε καὶ πλούτου, | χείρω
 μὲν τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔργα, χείρους δὲ αὐτοί.

Φαίνεται.

Ἔτερα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῖς φύλαξιν ἠυρήκαμεν, ἅ
 παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλακτέον ὅπως μήποτε αὐτοὺς λήσει
 εἰς τὴν πόλιν παραδύντα.

Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; |

422 Πλούτος τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πεινία· ὡς τοῦ μὲν τρυ-
 φὴν καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν ἐμποιοῦντος, τῆς δὲ
 ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ κακοεργίαν πρὸς τῷ νεωτερισμῷ.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τόδε μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκό-
 πει, πῶς | ἡμῖν ἢ πόλις οἷα τ' ἔσται πολεμεῖν, ἐπειδὰν
 χρήματα μὴ κεκτημένη ἦ, ἄλλως τε κἂν πρὸς μεγάλην
 τε καὶ πλουσίαν ἀναγκασθῆ πολεμεῖν.

b Δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρὸς μὲν μίαν χαλεπώτερον,
 πρὸς δὲ δύο τοιαύτας ῥᾶον.

Πῶς εἶπες; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Πρώτον μὲν που, εἶπον, ἐὰν δέη μάχεσθαι, ἄρα οὐ

BOOK IV

"But he will become more idle and careless than he was, won't he?"

"Yes, very much so."

"So he becomes a worse potter, doesn't he?"

"Again, much worse," he said.

"Furthermore, if he's unable to provide himself with the tools or anything else he needs for his trade as a result of his poverty, he'll produce inferior goods and he'll train inferior apprentices whether he teaches his sons or anyone else."

"Of course."

"Then as a result of both poverty and riches, the products of the trade and the producers themselves are inferior."

"So it would seem."

"In that case it seems we have discovered other things which our guardians must watch out for in every way they can, to prevent them creeping into the state unobserved."

"What kinds of things do you mean?"

"Wealth and poverty," I said, "the one creating fastidiousness, idleness and revolution; the other servility and bad workmanship as well as revolution."

"Very much so," he said. "But, Socrates, consider how our state will be able to go to war, since it will not have acquired any wealth, especially if it's also compelled to make war on a large wealthy state."

"Clearly it will be more difficult against one," I said, "but against two such states it will be easier."

"How do you mean?" he asked.

"In the first place," I said, "I think that if it is necessary

πλουσίοις ἀνδράσι μαχοῦνται αὐτοὶ ὄντες πολέμου ἀθληταί; |

Ναὶ τοῦτό γε, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε; εἰς πύκτης ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἐπὶ τοῦτο παρεσκευασμένος δυοῖν μὴ πύκταιν, πλουσίῳ δὲ καὶ πτόνοι, οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι ῥαδίως μάχεσθαι;

Οὐκ ἂν ἴσως, ἔφη, ἅμα γε. |

Οὐδ' εἰ ἐξείη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑποφεύγοντι τὸν πρότερον
 c αἰὲ προσφερόμενον ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῖ πολλάκις ἐν ἡλίῳ τε καὶ πνίγει; ἄρα γε οὐ καὶ πλείους χειρώσασαί' ἂν τοιούτους ὁ τοιοῦτος;

Ἀμέλει, ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστόν. |

Ἄλλ' οὐκ οἶει πυκτικῆς πλέον μετέχειν τοὺς πλουσίους ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἐμπειρία ἢ πολεμικῆς;

Ἐγώ, ἔφη.

Ῥαδίως ἄρα ἡμῖν οἱ ἀθληταὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων διπλασίοις τε καὶ τριπλασίοις αὐτῶν μαχοῦνται.

d Συγχωρήσομαί σοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

Τί δ' ἂν πρεσβείαν πέμφαντες εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν πόλιν τάληθῆ εἴπωσιν, ὅτι “Ἡμεῖς μὲν οὐδὲν χρυσίῳ οὐδ' ἀργυρίῳ χρώμεθα, οὐδ' ἡμῖν θέμις, ὑμῖν δέ | συμπολεμήσαντες οὖν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἔχετε τὰ τῶν ἐτέρων;” οἶει τινὰς ἀκούσαντας ταῦτα αἰρήσεσθαι κυσὶ πολεμῆν στερεοῖς τε καὶ ἰσχυροῖς μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ κυνῶν προβάτοις πίσσί τε καὶ ἀπαλοῖς;

BOOK IV

to fight, won't those who themselves are fit warriors⁸ be fighting against wealthy men?"

"Yes, that is so," he said.

"So what does that mean, Adeimantus?" I asked. "Don't you think it would be easy for a single boxer who is best prepared for this kind of fighting to fight against two fat rich men who are not boxers?"

"Not at the same time perhaps," he said.

"Not even if it were possible," I said, "for him to retreat, and then to turn round and hit the one who persists in attacking first and even to do this often in the sun and stifling heat? Such a man as this would surely defeat even more opponents like these?"

"Doubtless," he said, "it would not be surprising."

"Yet don't you think that rich men have a greater understanding and experience of boxing than of warfare?"

"I do," he replied.

"In all likelihood then our athletes can easily fight two or three times their own number."

"I'll go along with you," he said, "because I think you're right."

"But what if they send a delegation to the other state and tell them the truth, namely that: 'We ourselves have no use for gold and silver, it's not even right for us, but it is for you. So if you join us in war, keep the spoils of the other side.' Do you think that some will hear this and choose to make war against lean solid hounds rather than fight with them against fat tender sheep?"

⁸ Cf. 3.416dff., on the guardians as continually living in a state of military preparedness like soldiers in a camp.

Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν εἰς μίαν, ἔφη, πόλιν συναθροισθῆ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων χρήματα, ὅρα μὴ κίνδυνον φέρῃ τῇ μὴ πλουτούσῃ.

e Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἶε ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλην τινὰ προσειπεῖν πόλιν ἢ τὴν τοιαύτην οἷαν ἡμεῖς κατεσκευάζομεν.

Ἄλλὰ τί μῆν; ἔφη.

Μειζόνως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρὴ προσαγορεύειν τὰς ἄλλας· ἰεκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάμπολλαι ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων. δύο μὲν, κὰν ὅτιοῦν ἦ, 423 πολεμία ἀλλήλαις, ἡ μὲν πενήτων, ἡ δὲ πλουσίων· τούτων δ' ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ πάνυ πολλαί, αἷς ἐὰν μὲν ὡς μιᾷ προσφέρῃ, παντὸς ἂν ἀμάρτοις, ἐὰν δὲ ὡς πολλαῖς, διδούς τὰ τῶν ἐτέρων τοῖς ἐτέροις χρήματά τε καὶ δυνάμεις ἢ καὶ αὐτούς, ἰ συμμάχοις μὲν αἰεὶ πολλοῖς χρήσῃ, πολεμίοις δ' ὀλίγοις. καὶ ἕως ἂν ἡ πόλις σοι οἰκῆ σωφρόνως ὡς ἄρτι ἐτάχθη, μεγίστη ἔσται, οὐ τῷ εὐδοκιμεῖν λέγω, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη, καὶ ἐὰν μόνον ἦ χιλίων τῶν προπολεμούντων· οὕτω γὰρ μεγά- b λην πόλιν μίαν οὐ ῥαδίως οὔτε ἐν Ἑλλησιν οὔτε ἐν βαρβάροις εὐρήσεις, δοκούσας δὲ πολλὰς καὶ πολλαπλασίας τῆς τηλικαύτης. ἢ ἄλλως οἶε;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη. ἰ

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ἂν εἶη καὶ κάλλιστος ὄρος

⁹ Or "the jest." The reference is *either* to a game, possibly called "cities," in which sets of pieces on each side were called cities and individual pieces "dogs" (cf. scholiast), *or* to a saying,

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"I don't think so," he said. "But if the wealth of the other cities accrues to one state, make sure that this does not cause harm to the state which is not enriched."

"You are the lucky one," I said, "because you think that it's worth applying the term 'state' to a place other than the kind we were establishing."

"Well, what else?" he asked.

"You must apply the term to the others in a broader sense," I said, "because each of them are countless states, not just a state as in the game.⁹ Two, of whatever composition they may actually be, are at enmity with each other, the one of the poor and the other of the rich.¹⁰ And there are very many within in each of these. Now if you deal with them as a single unit, you will totally miss the mark, but if you deal with them as many and give the money and power and even the population itself of one side to the other, you would have the advantage of many allies and few enemies. What's more, if your state is organized temperately, as was established a little while ago, it will be the greatest: I don't mean in the sense of having a high reputation, but truly the greatest even if there are only a thousand fighting on its behalf. This means that you will not easily find a single state so great which is a unity, either among the Greeks or among foreign nations, but you will find many, many times larger that are apparently so—or perhaps you disagree with this?"

"No, by Zeus, I don't!" he said.

"So," I said, "wouldn't this also be the best limit for

the meaning of which is unknown (for the various conjectures, see Adam, n. ad loc).

¹⁰ For critical analysis of this idea, see Arist. *Pol.* 1264a25, and see further 1261a15.

τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἄρχουσιν, ὅσην δεῖ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἡλικὴ οὔση ὅσην χώραν ἀφορισαμένους τὴν ἄλλην χαίρειν ἔαν.

Τίς, ἔφη, ὅρος; |

Οἶμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὗ ἂν ἐθέλη αὐξομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὔξειν, πέρα δὲ μή.

c Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο αὖ ἄλλο πρόσταγμα τοῖς φύλαξι προστάξομεν, φυλάττειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ὅπως μήτε σμικρὰ ἢ πόλις ἔσται μήτε μεγάλη δοκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ τις ἱκανὴ καὶ μία. |

Καὶ φαῦλόν γ', ἔφη, ἴσως αὐτοῖς προστάξομεν.

d Καὶ τούτου γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι φαυλότερον τόδε, οὗ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπεμνήσθημεν λέγοντες ὡς δέοι, ἔάντε τῶν φυλάκων τις φαῦλος ἔκγονος γένηται, εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτὸν ἀποπέμπεσθαι, ἔαντ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων σπουδαῖος, εἰς τοὺς φύλακας. τοῦτο δ' ἐβούλετο δηλοῦν ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, πρὸς ὃ τις πέφυκεν, πρὸς τοῦτο ἕνα πρὸς ἕνα ἕκαστον ἔργον δεῖ κομίζειν, ὅπως ἂν ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύων ἕκαστος μὴ πολλοὶ ἀλλ' εἰς γίγνηται, | καὶ οὕτω δὴ σύμπασα ἢ πόλις μία φύηται ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλαί.

Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐκείνου σμικρότερον.

Οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ ἀγαθὲ Ἀδείμαντε, ὡς δόξειεν ἂν τις, ταῦτα πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα αὐτοῖς προστάττομεν

¹¹ Discussed in the "myth of the metals" at 3.415a-c.

our rulers: how big to make the state in terms of size, and when it is that size how much land to mark off and let the rest go?"

"What limit?" he asked.

"I think it means this," I said: "if the state wants to be a single entity, it should expand thus far and no farther."

"Another good point!" he exclaimed.

"And shall we not also insist that our guardians carry out their duties in every way so as to ensure that the state will be neither small nor large to all appearances, but something adequate and unified?"

"I'm sure we shall probably have no trouble in getting them to do this!" he said.

"Or even easier than this," I said. "We actually touched on this before when we said that if an inferior child is born to one of our guardians, we should send it away to join the others, and if a good child came from these others, we should make him one of the guardians.¹¹ This was intended to make clear that the rest of the citizens too would each have to concentrate individually on one job, the one they are naturally suited to, so that each one pursuing his own business becomes a specialist and not a jack-of-all-trades. And so indeed the entire state becomes a unity and not a society of many units."

"Oh yes, this is a matter of less importance than the previous one!"¹²

"My dear Adeimantus," I said, "I tell you we are not imposing as many heavy responsibilities on them as one

¹² The ironic pretense of triviality is a typically Platonic way of introducing and negotiating a major topic, namely the education of the guardians.

e ἀλλὰ πάντα φαῦλα, ἐὰν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν μέγα φυλάττωσι, μᾶλλον δ' ἀντὶ μεγάλου ἰκανόν.

Τί τοῦτο; ἔφη. |

424 Τὴν παιδείαν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τροφήν· ἐὰν γὰρ εὖ παιδευόμενοι μέτριοι ἄνδρες γίνωνται, πάντα ταῦτα ῥαδίως διόψονται, καὶ ἄλλα γε ὅσα νῦν ἡμεῖς παραλείπομεν, τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτήσιν καὶ γάμων καὶ παιδοποιίας, ὅτι δεῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ποιέισθαι.

Ὅρθότατα γάρ, ἔφη, γίνονται' ἄν. |

Καὶ μὴν, εἶπον, πολιτεία ἐάνπερ ἅπαξ ὀρμήσῃ εὖ, ἔρχεται ὥσπερ κύκλος ἀξανομένη· τροφή γὰρ καὶ παιδευσίς χρηστὴ σφζομένη φύσεις ἀγαθὰς ἐμποιεῖ, καὶ αὖ φύσεις χρησταὶ τοιαύτης παιδείας ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι ἔτι βελτίους τῶν προτέρων φύονται, εἰς τε τᾶλλα καὶ εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν | τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις.

b Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

Ὡς τοίνυν διὰ βραχέων εἰπεῖν, τούτου ἀνθεκτέον τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὺς μὴ λάθῃ διαφθαρὲν ἀλλὰ παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι, τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν περὶ | γυμναστικὴν τε καὶ μουσικὴν παρὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα φυλάττειν, φοβουμένους ὅταν τις λέγῃ ὡς τὴν

¹³ See 5.459aff. for detailed discussion of arrangements for guardians' marriage and procreation. At the beginning of Book 5, when he is attempting to pass on to inferior constitutions (and

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might think, but they are all light if they keep to the one thing that's important, as the saying goes, or, rather, not important but rather sufficient."

"What is this thing?" he asked.

"Their education and upbringing," I said. "If they are well educated and become decent human beings, they will discern all these things easily. There are other matters too, which we'll pass over for the moment, such as getting a wife, marriage and having children, because as the saying goes, they must do all these things as far as possible as something shared with their friends."¹³

"That would be very right and proper," he said.

"And besides," I said, "if our state once gets off to a good start, it proceeds like a growing cycle. For a good upbringing and education kept up produces people who are naturally good, and good offspring in turn seize upon such an education and grow even better than their predecessors, both as regards their offspring and as regards everything else, just as among other animals."

"As one would expect," he said.

"Well then, to put it briefly: what those in charge of our state must cling to so that it is not corrupted through carelessness without their noticing it, but must guard above all else is this: they must not introduce innovations that contravene what is prescribed for physical and intellectual education, but preserve it as far as possible and feel alarm whenever anyone says that:

presumably leave this matter undiscussed), S. is brought back to the topic, and reminded of what he said here, by Adeimantus and Polemarchus.

ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπιφρονέουσ'² ἄνθρωποι,
ἧτις ἀειδόντεσσι³ νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται,

c μὴ πολλάκις τὸν ποιητὴν τις οὔηται λέγειν οὐκ
ἄσματα νέα ἀλλὰ τρόπον ὠδῆς νέον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπαινῆ.
δεῖ δ' οὔτ' ἐπαινεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον οὔτε ὑπολαμβάνειν.
εἶδος γὰρ καινὸν μουσικῆς μεταβάλλειν εὐλαβητέον
ὡς ἐν ὄλῳ κινδυνεύοντα. | οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινούνται
μουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγίστων,
ὡς φησί τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι.

Καὶ ἐμὲ τοίνυν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, θές τῶν πε-
πεισμένων.

Τὸ δὴ φυλακτήριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνταῦθά
d που οἰκοδομητέον τοῖς φύλαξι, ἐν μουσικῇ.

Ἡ γοῦν παρανομία, ἔφη, ῥαδίως αὕτη λανθάνει
παραδουμένη.

Ναί, ἔφη, ὡς ἐν παιδιᾷς γε μέρει καὶ ὡς | κακὸν
οὐδὲν ἐργαζομένη.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, ἔφη, ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ σμικρὸν
εἰσοικισαμένη ἡρέμα ὑπορρεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἥθη τε καὶ τὰ

² 424b7 ἐπιφρονέουσ' ADF Stob.: ἐπικλείουσ' Hom.

³ ἀκούοντεσσι Hom.

¹⁴ Hom. *Od.* 1.351. "Men extol more the song which is newest to do the rounds among its listeners." This may just be a variant Homeric text circulating at this time; but there is also a possibility that Plato was altering the text to suit his context here: for "extol" (ἐπικλείουσ'), Plato has "have regard for" (ἐπιφρονέουσ'), and for "listeners" (ἀκούοντεσσι), he has "singers" (ἀειδόντεσσι),

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Men have a higher regard for the song
which is the latest the singers bring with them¹⁴

in case there is the common idea that the poet means not new songs, but a new form of song and is praising this. We must not praise that sort of thing, nor understand that this is what the poet means. For one should beware of any change to a newfangled kind of music as being extremely risky. For the forms of music are nowhere altered without affecting the greatest political laws, as Damon in fact says, and I believe him.”¹⁵

“And you can count me in as one of the converted,” said Adeimantus.

“Indeed,” I said, “in my view it seems that that is where we must construct the safeguard¹⁶ for our guardians: in the arts.”

“Certainly disorderly habits¹⁷ of this kind easily creep in unawares,” he said.

“Yes.” I said, “as some part of a game, and as something that does no harm.”

“Nor does it achieve anything,” he said, “other than quietly make itself at home in a small way and infiltrates

thereby putting the emphasis on the moral influence of what is sung and on the moral responsibility of those singing (as opposed to those hearing) it. ¹⁵ On Damon see above, Book 3, n. 69.

¹⁶ Literally “garrison post” (*phulaktērion*); Plato continues the military metaphor from the discussion of the state’s military capacity at 422eff.; a correct education is the “garrison” against external enemies (as well as internal chaos).

¹⁷ *paranomia*. Shorey suggests a possible connection with the musical meaning of *nomos*, i.e., “lawless innovation in music” (n. ad loc). See also e7.

e ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
 συμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει, ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν συμβολαίων
 ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ πολιτείας σὺν πολλῇ, ᾧ
 Σώκρατες, ἀσελγεία, ἕως ἂν τελευτῶσα πάντα ἰδία
 καὶ δημοσία ἀνατρέψῃ.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει; |

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

425 Οὐκοῦν, ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, τοῖς ἡμετέροις παι-
 σὶν ἐννομοτέρου εὐθὺς παιδιᾶς μεθεκτέον, ὡς παρανό-
 μου γιγνομένης αὐτῆς καὶ παίδων τοιούτων ἐννόμους
 τε καὶ σπουδαίους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀνδρας ἀξιάνεσθαι ἀδύ-
 νατον ὄν;

Πῶς δ' οὐχί; ἔφη.

Ὅταν δὴ ἄρα καλῶς ἀρξάμενοι παῖδες παίζειν
 ἐννομίαν διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς εἰσδέξωνται, πάλιν τούναν-
 τίον ἢ | κείνοις εἰς πάντα συνέπεταί τε καὶ αὔξει,
 ἐπανορθοῦσα εἴ τι καὶ πρότερον τῆς πόλεως ἔκειτο.

Ἀληθῆ μέντοι, ἔφη.

Καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ ἄρα, εἶπον, δοκοῦντα εἶναι νόμι-
 μα ἐξευρίσκουσιν οὗτοι, ἃ οἱ πρότερον ἀπώλλυσαν
 πάντα. |

Ποῖα;

b Τὰ τοιάδε· σιγᾶς τε τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυ-
 τέροις ἃς πρέπει, καὶ κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις

people's habits and practices. As a result of this it grows and encroaches on their business dealings with each other and from these dealings indeed it works its way into their laws and constitutions with a great deal of licentiousness, Socrates, until it finally turns everything in public and private life upside down."¹⁸

"Well," I said, "is this really the case?"

"I think so," he said.

"So, as we were saying from the start, right from the beginning our youngsters must partake of a more lawful kind of play on the grounds that, if it becomes lawless and the children likewise, then it will be impossible for their children to grow into law-abiding and worthy men?"

"How can that not be so?" he said.

"Then indeed whenever the youngsters make a good start in their play and admit good order into it through their education in the arts—again the opposite to what we had just now—it follows them everywhere and fosters them and, if there was anything laid down before our state came about, it puts it right."

"Yes, that is true," he said.

"These people even discover conventions of apparently minor significance which their predecessors lost altogether."

"Which ones?"

"Let me give you an example: youngsters should keep quiet, as is proper for them, when in the presence of their elders; the way they recline and get up at mealtimes; the

¹⁸ For Plato's detailed "historical" scenario on the parallel between the decay of artistic expression and the decline of political and social life, see *Leg.* 700a–701d.

καὶ γονέων θεραπείας, καὶ κουράς γε καὶ ἀμπεχόνας
καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ ὄλον τὸν τοῦ σώματος σχηματισμὸν
καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἢ οὐκ ἰ οἶε;

Ἔγωγε.

Νομοθετεῖν δ' αὐτὰ οἶμαι εὐήθες· οὔτε γάρ που
γίγνεται οὔτ' ἂν μείνειεν λόγῳ τε καὶ γράμμασιν
νομοθετηθέντα.

Πῶς γάρ; ἰ

c Κινδυνεύει γοῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐκ τῆς
παιδείας ὅποι ἂν τις ὀρμήσῃ, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐπόμενα
εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ αἰεὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄν ὅμοιον παρακαλεῖ;

Τί μῆν;

Καὶ τελευτῶν δὴ οἶμαι φαίμεν ἂν εἰς ἓν τι τέλεον
καὶ ἰ νεανικὸν ἀποβαίνειν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ τού-
ναντίον.

Τί γὰρ οὐκ; ἢ δ' ὅς.

Ἔγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, διὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρήσαιμι νομοθετεῖν.

Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη. ἰ

d Τί δέ, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην, τάδε τὰ ἀγοραῖα, συμ-
βολαίων τε πέρι κατ' ἀγορὰν ἕκαστοι ἂ πρὸς ἀλλή-
λους συμβάλλουσιν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ χειροτεχνικῶν
περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ λαιδοριῶν καὶ αἰκίας καὶ δικῶν
λήξεως καὶ δικαστῶν καταστάσεως, καὶ εἴ που τελῶν
τινες ἢ πράξεις ἢ θέσεις ἀναγκαῖοί εἰσιν ἢ κατ' ἀγο-
ρὰς ἢ λιμένας, ἢ καὶ τὸ πάμπαν ἀγορανομικὰ ἅττα ἰ

BOOK IV

way they look after their parents; the way they cut their hair, their style of dress and their footwear; every aspect of their behavior, and all other such things.¹⁹ Or do you not think so?"

"I do."

"In my view it is silly to legislate for these things. For anything laid down by law, verbally or in writing, does not happen in my opinion, nor would it last."

"How could it?"

"Well anyway, it's likely, Adeimantus," I said, "that in whatever direction you set out from your education, everything else follows accordingly. Or does like not always encourage like?"

"Certainly."

"By way of conclusion then, I think we would say it turns out as a single entity, complete and full of vigor, good or bad."

"Of course," he said.

"So for these reasons I for my part would no longer attempt to lay down laws about such things."

"That is reasonable," he said.

"Then for heaven's sake what about all this market business: all the agreements they make with each other about contracts all over the market place? Then again, if you want, what about contracts with artisans, abuse, assaults, the allocation of lawsuits and the establishment of juries? Again I imagine, if the paying and exaction of taxes is necessary, either in the markets, or the ports and, taking everything together, whatever administration is necessary

¹⁹ S. is here advocating the kind of traditional social morality outlined (satirically) by Aristophanes in *Nub.* 961ff.

ἢ ἀστυνομικὰ ἢ ἐλλιμενικὰ ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα,
τούτων τολμήσομέν τι νομοθετεῖν;

Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἄξιον, ἔφη, ἀνδράσι καλοῖς κάγαθοῖς
e ἐπιτάττειν τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτῶν, ὅσα δεῖ νομοθετή-
σασθαι, ῥαδίως που εὐρήσουσιν.

Ναί, ὦ φίλε, εἶπον, εἴαν γε θεὸς αὐτοῖς διδῶ σωτη-
ρίαν τῶν νόμων ὧν ἔμπροσθεν διήλθομεν. |

Εἰ δὲ μή γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, πολλὰ τοιαῦτα τιθέμενοι αἰεὶ
καὶ ἐπανορθούμενοι τὸν βίον διατελοῦσιν, οἴομενοι
ἐπιλήψισθαι τοῦ βελτίστου.

Λέγεις, ἔφην ἐγώ, βιώσεσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους ὥσπερ
τοὺς κάμνοντάς τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπὸ | ἀκολασίας
ἐκβῆναι πονηρᾶς διαίτης.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

426 Καὶ μὴν οὗτοί γε χαριέντως διατελοῦσιν· ἰατρευ-
όμενοι γὰρ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν, πλὴν γε ποικιλώτερα
καὶ μείζω ποιοῦσι τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐλπίζοντες,
εἴαν τις φάρμακον συμβουλεύσῃ, ὑπὸ τούτου ἔσσεσθαι
ὑγιεῖς. |

Πάνν γάρ, ἔφη, τῶν οὕτω καμνόντων τὰ τοιαῦτα
πάθη.

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίεν, τὸ πάντων

²⁰ The piling up of diverse examples here and the crescendo of alliterative jingles (see Greek text) indicates a contemptuously dismissive attitude to all these practical everyday matters.

for the markets, the policing of the state, the ports and everything else of this kind: are we going to have the stomach for legislating for them?"²⁰

"Well no," he said, "it isn't right to give good decent people²¹ orders, as in my view they will easily discover most things for themselves in as far as they need legislating for."

"Yes, my friend," I said, "if god grants them the preservation of those laws we discussed before."

"If not," he said, "they will spend their lives for ever passing such laws and amending them thinking that they are going to get the best."

"So you are saying," I said, "that these sorts of people will live like those who are ill and are unwilling to escape from a life of poor quality through a lack of self-discipline."

"I certainly am."

"What's more, these people end up in a pretty state. They gain nothing through medical treatment except to make their illnesses more complicated and worse, and if someone recommends a medicine to them, they always expect to be cured by it."

"These are very much typical symptoms of people who are ill in this way," he said.

"What about this?" I said. "Isn't one of their unattractive characteristics to think that when someone tells them

²¹ "Good, decent people": Plato is here appropriating class terminology from conventional Athenian society; the guardians are here being assimilated to the *καλοὶ κἀγαθοί*, i.e., the traditional upper class of Athenian society (see Dover, *Greek Popular Morality*, 41-45).

ἔχθιστον ἠγείσθαι τὸν τάληθῆ λέγοντα, ὅτι πρὶν ἂν
 μεθύων καὶ ἐμπιμπλάμενος καὶ ἀφροδισιάζων καὶ ἀρ-
 b γῶν παύσθαι, οὔτε φάρμακα οὔτε καύσεις οὔτε τομαὶ
 οὐδ' αὖ ἐπωδαὶ αὐτὸν οὐδὲ περιήπτα οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν
 τοιούτων οὐδὲν ὀνήσει;

Οὐ πάνν χαρίεν, ἔφη· τὸ γὰρ τῷ εὖ λέγοντι χαλε-
 παίειν οὐκ ἔχει χάριν. †

Οὐκ ἐπαινέτης εἶ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικας, τῶν τοιού-
 των ἀνδρῶν.

Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.

Οὐδ' ἂν ἡ πόλις ἄρα, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὅλη
 τοιοῦτον ποιῆ, οὐκ ἐπαινέσῃ. ἢ οὐ φαίνονται σοι
 ταῦτὸν ἐργάζεσθαι τούτοις τῶν πόλεων ὅσαι κακῶς
 c πολιτευόμεναι προαγορεύουσι τοῖς πολίταις τὴν μὲν
 κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως ὅλην μὴ κινεῖν, ὡς ἀπο-
 θανουμένους, ὃς ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ· ὃς δ' ἂν σφᾶς οὔτω
 πολιτευομένους ἠδιστα θεραπεύῃ καὶ χαρίζεται ὑπο-
 τρέχων καὶ προγιγνώσκων τὰς σφετέρας βουλήσεις
 καὶ † ταύτας δεινὸς ἢ ἀποπληροῦν, οὗτος ἄρα ἀγαθός
 τε ἔσται ἀνὴρ καὶ σοφὸς τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τιμήσεται
 ὑπὸ σφῶν;

Ταῦτὸν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι δρᾶν, καὶ οὐδ'
 ὀπωστιοῦν ἐπαινώ.

d Τί δ' αὖ τοὺς ἐθέλοντας θεραπεύειν τὰς τοιαύτας
 πόλεις καὶ προθυμουμένους; οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς ἀνδρείας
 τε καὶ εὐχερείας;

Ἐγώ γ', ἔφη, πλήν γ' ὅσοι ἐξηπάτηνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν

BOOK IV

the truth, it is the most hostile thing of all to do, because until one stops getting drunk, stuffing oneself, indulging in sex, or being idle, neither drugs, nor cautery, nor surgery, nor even magic spells, nor again amulets or anything else of this sort will do the slightest good?"

"It is not at all attractive," he said. "Being cross with someone who offers good advice has no attraction."

"I can see you're no fan of people like this," I said.

"Zeus no!"

"Then you wouldn't approve if the whole state were to do the sort of thing we were talking about just now? Or do you not think that those states which are badly governed achieve the same as these invalids, when they warn their citizens not to change the state's entire constitution, because any one who does will be put to death? Yet whoever serves them most agreeably when they are governed in this way and gratifies them by flattery, and anticipates their wishes, and is clever at fulfilling them, is the one who by their account will be a good man, wise in the important things and one who will be rewarded by them."

"Yes I do think they are doing the same thing," he said, "and I do not approve in any way whatsoever."

"There again, what about those who are willing and keen to serve such states? Do you admire them for their courage and bravado?"²²

"I do indeed," he said, "except those who have been

²² "Bravado" = *euchereia*. ("The lightheartedness with which such politicians rush in where wiser men fear to tread," Shorey, n. ad loc). Subsequent exchanges indicate S.'s ironic sympathy for such people.

καὶ οἴονται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πολιτικοὶ εἶναι, ὅτι ἐπαινοῦνται ὑπὸ | τῶν πολλῶν.

Πῶς λέγεις; οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς ἀνδράσιν; ἢ οἶει οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνδρὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ μετρεῖν, ἐτέρων τοιούτων πολλῶν λεγόντων ὅτι τετρά-
 e πηχὺς ἐστίν, αὐτὸν ταῦτα μὴ ἠγείσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ;
 Οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

Μὴ τοίνυν χαλέπαινε· καὶ γάρ πού εἰσι πάντων χαριέστατοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι, νομοθετοῦντές τε οἷα ἄρτι διήλθομεν καὶ | ἐπανορθοῦντες, αἰεὶ οἰόμενοί τι πέρασ εὐρήσειν περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις κακουργήματα καὶ περὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ὥσπερ Ὑδραν τέμνουσιν.

427 Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἄλλο τί γε ποιοῦσιν.

Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας οὔτ' ἐν κακῶς οὔτ' ἐν εὖ πολιτευομένη πόλει ὥμην ἂν δεῖν τὸν ἀληθινὸν νομοθέτην πραγματεύεσθαι, ἐν τῇ | μὲν ὅτι ἀνωφελῆ καὶ πλέον οὐδέν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὅτι τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κἂν ὅστισοῦν εὔροι, τὰ δὲ ὅτι αὐτόματα ἔπεισιν ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

b Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἔτι ἂν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῆς νομοθεσίας εἴη;

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἡμῖν μὲν οὐδέν, τῷ μέντοι

²³ About 7 feet (2.13 meters).

misled by the masses and think they are truly statesman-like because they are commended by them.”

“What do you mean? Do you not feel something for these people,” I asked, “or do you think it is possible for a man who does not know how to measure, when many such people say that he is four cubits tall,²³ not to think this is true about himself?”

“I am sure it isn’t,” he said.

“So don’t be hard on them, for I am sure that such people are the nicest of all who pass laws of the kind we were discussing a moment ago and amend them, always thinking that they will discover an end to the fraud contained in business contracts we were just talking about, unaware that in reality it is like cutting off the Hydra’s head.”²⁴

“And yet,” he said, “they do nothing else.”

“Well as far as I’m concerned,” I said, “I would not have thought that a true lawgiver would have to bother himself with this kind of model when it comes to the laws and constitution of either a badly or well run state: in the former because they are useless and nothing more, in the latter because any one may easily discover some of them for himself and the rest follow automatically from their past practices.”

“So what legislation would we still have left over?” he asked.

I replied: “We would have nothing, but for Apollo in

²⁴ The Hydra was a monster with many heads which Heracles had to slay as one of his labors; when one head was cut off, more grew in its place. Plato appears to have been the first to use the myth as a metaphor.

Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα
καὶ πρῶτα τῶν νομοθετημάτων. |

Τὰ ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἱερῶν τε ἰδρύνσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλαι θεῶν τε
καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων θεραπείαι· τελευτησάντων
<τε> αὖ θῆκαι καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἐκεῖ δεῖ ὑπηρετοῦντας
ἴλεως αὐτοὺς ἔχειν. τὰ γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα οὐτ' ἐπιστάμεθα
c ἡμεῖς οἰκίζοντές τε πόλιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλω πεισόμεθα, ἐὰν
νοῦν ἔχωμεν, οὐδὲ χρησόμεθα ἐξηγητῇ ἄλλ' ἢ τῷ
πατρίῳ· οὗτος γὰρ δῆπου ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
πάσιν ἀνθρώποις πάτριος ἐξηγητῆς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς
ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγεῖται. |

Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ποιητέον οὕτω.

Ἰουκισμένη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη ἄν σοι εἶη,
d ὦ παῖ Ἀρίστωνος, ἡ πόλις· τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο
σκοπεῖ ἐν αὐτῇ, φῶς ποθὲν πορισάμενος ἰκανόν, αὐ-
τός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει καὶ Πολέμαρχον
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐὰν πως ἴδωμεν ποῦ ποτ' ἂν εἶη ἡ
δικαιοσύνη καὶ ποῦ ἡ ἀδικία, καὶ τί | ἀλλήλοιον δια-
φέρετον, καὶ πότερον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα
εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἐάντε λανθάνῃ ἐάντε μὴ πάντας
θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους.

Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων· σὺ γὰρ ὑπέσχου
e ζητήσῃν, ὡς οὐχ ὀσιόν σοι ὄν μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν δικαιο-
σύνη εἰς δύναμιν παντὶ τρόπῳ.

²⁵ The oracle of Apollo at Delphi was an international author-
ity on religious matters. Apollo was also closely associated with S.

BOOK IV

Delphi²⁵ there would remain the greatest, the finest and the foremost of laws."

"Such as?" he asked

"The foundation of sanctuaries, sacrifices and other services paid to the gods, spirits and heroes; then again the graves of the dead and all the things those who serve those beyond the grave must do to keep them propitious. For we indeed understand nothing of such things and in establishing our state we shall obey none other, if we have any sense, and we shall use no other interpreter, but the god of our forefathers. For this god I assume is the interpreter for all mankind in such matters and sits at the center of the earth on his sacred stone and guides them."²⁶

"Indeed you are right," he said, "and that's the way to do it!"

"So then, son of Ariston, your state would at last seem to have been founded. But consider what follows on from this: when you have got enough light from wherever, look yourself and bring in your brother and Polemarchus and the rest, if we manage somehow to see where justice and injustice would be in it and in what respect they differ from each other, and which of the two a person must acquire if he is to be successful, and whether or not it will elude all gods and men."

"You're talking nonsense," said Glaucon, "for you yourself promised to look, on the grounds that it was not permitted for you not to come to the aid of justice with all the power at your disposal."²⁷

on a personal level (cf. the oracle's declaration that nobody was wiser than S. at *Ap.* 21a; cf. *Phd.* 60d).

²⁶ I.e., Apollo. The stone (*omphalos* = "navel") marked the center of the earth.

²⁷ At 2.368b7-c3.

Ἄληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὑπομιμνήσκεις, καὶ ποιητέον μέν γε οὕτως, χρῆ δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς συλλαμβάνειν. |

Ἄλλ', ἔφη, ποιήσομεν οὕτω.

Ἐλπίζω τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐρήσειν αὐτὸ ὧδε. οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς γε ᾤκισται, τελέως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι σοφὴ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαία. |

Δῆλον.

Οὐκοῦν ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν εὐρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ ἠύρημένον;

428 Τί μήν;

Ὡσπερ τοίνυν ἄλλων τινῶν τεττάρων, εἰ ἔν τι ἐζήτοῦμεν αὐτῶν ἐν ὄψοῦν, ὁπότε πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο ἔγνωμεν, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν ἡμῖν, | εἰ δὲ τὰ τρία πρότερον ἐγνώρισαμεν, αὐτῷ ἂν τούτῳ ἐγνώριστο τὸ ζητούμενον· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν ἢ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν.

Ὄρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἐπειδὴ τέτταρα ὄντα τυγχάνει, ὡσαύτως ζητητέον; |

Δῆλα δῆ.

b Καὶ μὲν δὴ πρῶτόν γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ κατάδηλον εἶναι ἢ σοφία· καὶ τι ἄτοπον περὶ αὐτὴν φαίνεται.

²⁸ S. is begging the original question in his argument with Thrasymachus (Book I) in assuming that he has now conclusively shown that justice is good; this is taken up in the discussion of

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“Now you mention it, that’s true,” I said, “and I must do accordingly; but you must join in too.”

“Indeed we shall,” he said.

“Then I hope we shall find it in the following way,” I said: “I think that our state is perfectly good, if it has been set up in the right way.”

“It must be,” he said.

“Then clearly we shall find that it is wise, courageous, temperate and just.”²⁸

“Clearly.”

“In that case whichever of the qualities we discover there, the remaining one will be the one we haven’t found.”

“Of course.”

“Indeed just as in the case of any four other qualities, if we were looking for one of them in anything, as soon as we first recognized it, that would be sufficient for us. But if we had recognized the other three first, by this very fact the one we were looking for would have been recognized, for clearly there was no longer anything else there except the one left behind.”

“You’re right,” he said.

“So too in the case of these qualities, since there happen to be four of them, we must look for them in the same way, mustn’t we?”

“Obviously!”

“Well first and foremost I think that wisdom is clearly there: and there is something that seems strange about it.”

“one man, one job” below at 433a. This is the first mention in *Republic* of the four “cardinal virtues” (see further the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 4 (b))).

Τί; ἢ δ' ὅς.

Σοφὴ μὲν τῷ ὄντι δοκεῖ μοι ἢ πόλις εἶναι ἢν διήλθομεν· εὐβουλος γάρ, οὐχί;

Ναί.

Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε αὐτό, ἢ εὐβουλία, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστίν· οὐ γάρ που ἀμαθία γε ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμη εὖ βουλευόνται.

Δῆλον. |

Πολλὰί δέ γε καὶ παντοδαπαὶ ἐπιστήμαι ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσίν.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Ἄρ' οὖν διὰ τὴν τῶν τεκτόνων ἐπιστήμην σοφὴ καὶ εὐβουλος ἢ πόλις προσηρέα;

c Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, διὰ γε ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική.

Οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην, βουλευομένη ὡς ἂν ἔχοι βέλτιστα, σοφὴ κλητέα πόλις.

Οὐ μέντοι. |

Τί δέ; τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἢ τινα ἄλλην τῶν τοιούτων;

Οὐδ' ἠντινοῦν, ἔφη.

Οὐδὲ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καρποῦ τῆς γενέσεως ἐκ τῆς γῆς, ἀλλὰ γεωργική. |

²⁹ "Knowledge" translates *epistēmē*, which has the connotation of professional understanding in a wide range of skills (as S.'s examples go on to illustrate). Other related terms used by Plato in this section of *Resp.* are *sophia*, "wisdom" (used almost interchangeably with *epistēmē*, but nb. S.'s persuasive definition of *sophia* to refer to the guardians' wisdom at 429a2); *phronēsis*,

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"What's that?" he asked.

"I think the state we discussed is in fact wise because it has been well advised, isn't that so?"

"Yes."

"And there is another clear fact about good counsel in that it is a kind of knowledge. For I am sure that men don't give good counsel as a result of ignorance, but because of their knowledge."²⁹

"That is clear."

"There are of course many different kinds of knowledge in our state."

"Of course."

"Are we then to call our state wise and good in counsel because of the knowledge of our carpenters?"

"No, not because of that: you'd have to call it good at carpentry."

"Then we must not call the state wise when it deliberates how to achieve the best because of its knowledge of the properties of wood?"

"Indeed no."

"Well what then? Is it the knowledge of the properties of bronze, or of anything else like this?"

"Not of that sort either," he said.

"Then it is not to be called wise through the knowledge of the production of crops from the earth either, but this is the science of farming."

"practical wisdom," "prudence" (432a5); and *euboulia*, "good counsel" (428b5, b8, where it is closely associated with *epistēmē*): but *euboulia* has connotations of the practical political advice offered by the *Boulē*, the advisory council in the Athenian, and other Greek city-states.

Δοκέι μοι.

Τί δ'; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῇ ἄρτι ὑφ'
 d ἡμῶν οἰκισθείσῃ παρά τισι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἣ οὐχ ὑπὲρ
 τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλευέται, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς
 ὅλης, ὄντινα τρόπον αὐτὴ τε πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰς
 ἄλλας πόλεις ἄριστα ὀμιλοῖ;

Ἔστι μέντοι. |

Τίς, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἐν τίσιν;

Αὕτη, ἣ δ' ὅς, ἣ φυλακικὴ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἄρ-
 χουσιν οὖς νυνδὴ τελέουσ φύλακας ὠνομάζομεν.

Διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί τὴν πόλιν προσ-
 αγορεύεις;

Εὐβουλον, ἔφη, καὶ τῷ ὄντι σοφὴν. |

e Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῇ πόλει οἶει ἡμῖν χαλ-
 κέας πλείους ἐνέσεσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας
 τούτους;

Πολύ, ἔφη, χαλκέας.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐπιστήμας
 ἔχοντες ὀνομάζονται τινες εἶναι, πάντων τούτων οὗτοι
 ἂν εἶεν ὀλίγιστοι;

Πολύ γε. |

429 Τῷ σμικροτάτῳ ἄρα ἔθνει καὶ μέρει ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῇ
 ἐν τούτῳ ἐπιστήμῃ, τῷ προεστῶτι καὶ ἄρχοντι, ὅλη
 σοφὴ ἂν εἴη κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθείσα πόλις· καὶ τοῦτο,
 ὡς εἴοικε, φύσει ὀλίγιστον γίγνεται γένος, ᾧ προσήκει
 ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης μεταλαγχάνειν ἢ μόνην δέ
 τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν σοφίαν καλεῖσθαι.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. |

BOOK IV

"I think so," he said.

"Then what about the following?" I said. "Is there any knowledge among any of the citizens of the state we have just established which is called upon when counsel is taken, not for any particular matter in the state but for the state as a whole, to determine how it may best deal with its own affairs and with other states?"

"Yes, there is."

"What is it," I asked, "and who has it?"

"It's the knowledge of how to guard the state," he said, "and it's those ruling the state we called perfect guardians just now³⁰ who have it."

"So what then do you call the state on account of this knowledge?"

"Good in counsel," he said, "and really wise."

"So do you think," I said, "we shall have more copper-smiths in our state than true guardians?"

"Coppersmiths," he said, "a lot more."

"Does that then mean that of all those who are named as having knowledge, these guardians will be fewest in number?"

"Yes, by a long chalk."

"So it is by virtue of this smallest class and sector of it, and in the knowledge that is in it—the leading and governing part—that a state that has been constructed by natural principles would be wise as a whole; and it looks as if this group is naturally the smallest, the group which is entitled to have a share in that knowledge which alone of all sorts of knowledge should be called wisdom."

"What you say is very true," he said.

³⁰ At 414b.

Τούτο μὲν δὴ ἐν τῶν τεττάρων οὐκ οἶδα ὄντινα τρόπον ἠύρηκαμεν, αὐτό τε καὶ ὅπου τῆς πόλεως ἴδρνται.

Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ἀποχρώντως ἠύρησθαι.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἀνδρεία γε αὐτή τε καὶ ἐν ᾧ κείται τῆς πόλεως, δι' ὃ τοιαύτη κλητέα ἢ πόλις, οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. |

Πῶς δὴ;

b Τίς ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψας ἢ δειλήν ἢ ἀνδρείαν πόλιν εἴποι ἄλλ' ἢ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ὃ προπολεμεῖ τε καὶ στρατεύεται ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς;

Οὐδ' ἂν εἷς, ἔφη, εἰς ἄλλο τι. |

Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι, εἶπον, οἷ γε ἄλλοι ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ δειλοὶ ἢ ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες κύριοι ἂν εἶεν ἢ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἢ τοίαν.

Οὐ γάρ.

c Καὶ ἀνδρεία ἄρα πόλις μέρει τινὶ ἑαυτῆς ἐστί, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἔχειν δύναμιν τοιαύτην ἢ διὰ παντὸς σώσει τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, ταῦτά τε αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ τοιαῦτα, ἃ τε καὶ οἷα ὁ νομοθέτης παρήγγελλεν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ. ἢ οὐ τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔμαθον ὃ εἶπες, ἀλλ' αὐθις εἰπέ. |

Σωτηρίαν ἔγωγ', εἶπον, λέγω τινὰ εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Ποίαν δὴ σωτηρίαν;

Τὴν τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμου διὰ τῆς παιδείας γεγонуίας περὶ τῶν δεινῶν ἃ τέ ἐστί καὶ οἷα· διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν τὸ ἐν τε λύπαις ὄντα

BOOK IV

"Indeed somehow we have discovered this one of the four, and whereabouts in the state it is established."

"To me, at any rate, it seems we have found it adequately," he said.

"But again let's take courage itself and its place in the state: it's not very difficult to see why the state should be called brave."

"How do you mean?"

"Who would label a state cowardly or courageous by looking at anything else than that section which leads the fighting and military campaigns on its behalf?"

"Not a single one would look at anything else."

"No," I said, "for I don't think that the rest of the population, whether cowardly or courageous, would determine whether the state was either one or the other."

"No, they wouldn't."

"That means that a state is also courageous in a part of itself because it has such power within that part which will preserve through everything its teaching about things to be feared: these things and the sort of things which the lawgiver has laid down in our system of education. On the other hand isn't this perhaps what you call courage?"

"I didn't exactly get what you said," he replied; "just tell me again."

"I am saying that courage is a kind of guarantee of safety."

"What kind of guarantee?"

"One which upholds the belief that has come into use by law through education concerning dangers, both what and what sorts of things they are; but by 'through every-

d διασφύζεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις καὶ μὴ ἐκβάλλειν. ᾧ δέ μοι δοκεῖ ὁμοιον εἶναι ἐθέλω ἀπεικάσαι, εἰ βούλει.

Ἄλλὰ βούλομαι.

Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἱ βαφῆς, ἐπειδὴν βουληθῶσι βάψαι ἔρια ὥστ' εἶναι ἀλουργά, | πρῶτον μὲν ἐκλέγονται ἐκ τοσοῦτων χρωμάτων μίαν φύσιν τὴν τῶν λευκῶν, ἔπειτα προπαρασκευάζουσιν, οὐκ ὀλίγη παρασκευῆ θεραπεύσαντες ὅπως δέξεται ὅτι e μάλιστα τὸ ἄνθος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ βάπτουσι. καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ βαφῆ, δευσοποιὸν γίγνεται [τὸ βαφέν], καὶ ἡ πλύσις οὐτ' ἄνευ ῥυμμάτων οὔτε μετὰ ῥυμμάτων δύναται αὐτῶν τὸ ἄνθος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. ἂ δ' ἂν μὴ, οἶσθα οἷα δὴ γίγνεται, ἐάντε τις ἄλλα χρώματα βάπτῃ ἐάντε καὶ ταῦτα | μὴ προθεραπεύσας.

Οἶδα, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ ἐκπλυτα καὶ γελοῖα.

Τοιοῦτον τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπόλαβε κατὰ δύναμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὅτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατι- 430 ῶτας καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν μουσικῆ καὶ γυμναστικῆ· μηδὲν οἷον ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι ἢ ὅπως ἡμῖν ὅτι κάλλιστα τοὺς νόμους πεισθέντες δέξοιντο ὥσπερ βαφῆν, ἵνα δευσοποιὸς αὐτῶν ἡ δόξα γίγνοιτο καὶ περὶ δεινῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ τῆν τε | φύσιν καὶ τὴν τροφήν ἐπιτηδείαν ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἐκπλύναι τὴν βαφῆν τὰ ῥύμματα ταῦτα, δεινὰ ὄντα ἐκκλύζειν, b ἢ τε ἡδονή, παντὸς χαλεστραίου δεινότερα οὔσα τοῦτο δρᾶν καὶ κούιας, λύπη τε καὶ φόβος καὶ ἐπι-

BOOK IV

thing³¹ I meant the preserving of it in pain as also in pleasure,³² in passion and in fear, and not expelling it. I am willing to give you a comparison to show what I think it resembles, if you like."

"Yes, please do."

"You know, then, that whenever dyers want to dye their wool purple, they first of all choose from so many colors the one which is the brightest of such a color, then they make their preparations and take a good deal of trouble to ensure that the wool takes as much of the dye as possible, and so they complete the process? Whatever is dyed in this way the color becomes fast and no amount washing with or without soaps can remove the dye. If the wool is not treated like this, you know what happens, whether you use this dye or any other color, without the initial preparation."

"I do," he said, "they look wishy-washy and pathetic."

"Then imagine," I said, "that we too were working to the best of our ability in this way when we were selecting our soldiers and educating them in the arts and physical education. You shouldn't suppose that our designs had any purpose other than to see to it that they would obey us as best they could and absorb the laws like dye, so that their beliefs might become colorfast, both about dangers and all the rest because they had the right nature and the right upbringing; and that those soaps which are remarkably effective at cleansing do not wash the dye out: pleasure, which is far more effective at doing this than any soda or lye, and pain, fear and passion which are far more effective

³¹ See b9 above.

³² For courage as resistance to pleasure, see e.g., *La.* 191d.

θυμία, παντὸς ἄλλου ρύμματος. τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μὴ ἰ ἀνδρείαν ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, λέγω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγонуῖαν, τὴν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον⁴ ἠγείσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν.

c Ἀληθέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις.

Ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τούτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξῃ· αὐθις δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ βούλη, ἔτι κάλλιον δίμην. ἰ νῦν γὰρ οὐ τούτο ἐζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην πρὸς οὗν τὴν ἐκείνου ζήτησιν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἰκανῶς ἔχει.

Ἄλλὰ καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

d Δύο μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι λοιπὰ ἃ δεῖ κατιδεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἦ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ οὐδὲν δὴ ἕνεκα πάντα ζητοῦμεν, δικαιοσύνη.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Πῶς οὖν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὔροιμεν, ἵνα μηκέτι πραγματευώμεθα περὶ σωφροσύνης; ἰ

Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, οὔτε οἶδα οὔτ' ἂν βουλοίμην αὐτὸ πρότερον φανῆναι, εἴπερ μηκέτι ἐπισκεψόμεθα σωφροσύνην· ἀλλ' εἰ ἔμοιγε βούλει χαρίζεσθαι, σκόπει πρότερον τούτο ἐκείνου.

⁴ νόμιμον ADF: μόνιμον Stob., Slings

than any other soap. Such power and guarantee of a right and lawful belief in every respect about what is danger and what isn't I for my part call and regard as courage, unless you have something different to say."

"No, I have nothing to say," he said, "for I think you have the view that correct belief about these same matters which has come about without education, which is typical of animals or slaves, is quite outside the law,³³ and you call it something other than courage."

"What you say is very true," I said.

"Then I accept this as courage."

"And accept it, at any rate, as courage relating to the citizen," I said, "and you'll be right to do so. If you wish we can go through our discussion of it another time even better, but that's not what we're looking for right now, but for justice. So I think that as far as that inquiry goes, we've done enough."

"Yes you're right," he said.

"There are still two things remaining that we must see in our state: temperance³⁴ and the object of the whole enterprise: justice."

"That is very much so."

"So how could we discover justice so that we would no longer have to busy ourselves with temperance?"

"Indeed I don't know," he said, "nor would I have wanted to discover that first if that means that we are no longer going to examine temperance. So if you want to humor me, let's look at it before the other."

³³ Reading *νόμιμον* with ADF.

³⁴ *sōphrosunē* (see Book 3 n. 27).

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βούλομαί γε, εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ. |

Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη.

e Σκεπτέον, εἶπον· καὶ ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν, συμφωνία τινὶ καὶ ἄρμονία προσέοικεν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρότερον.

Πῶς;

Κόσμος πού τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, | ὥς φασι κρείττω δὴ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα τρόπον, καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἴχνη αὐτῆς λέγεται. ἦ γάρ;

Πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.

431 Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν κρείττω αὐτοῦ γελοῖον; ὁ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ κρείττων | καὶ ἥττων δῆπου ἂν αὐτοῦ εἶη καὶ ὁ ἥττων κρείττων· ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν τούτοις προσαγορεύεται.

Τί δ' οὐ;

Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φαίνεται μοι βούλεσθαι λέγειν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὥς τι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ἔνι, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, | καὶ ὅταν μὲν τὸ βέλτιον φύσει τοῦ χείρονος ἐγκρατὲς ᾖ, τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ κρείττω αὐτοῦ—ἐπαινεῖ γοῦν—ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ τροφῆς κακῆς ἢ τινος ὀμιλίας κρατηθῆ ὑπὸ πλήθους τοῦ χείρονος σμικρότερον τὸ βέλτιον ὂν, τοῦτο δὲ ὡς b ἐν ὀνειδίει ψέγειν τε καὶ καλεῖν ἥττω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀκόλαστον τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον.

Καὶ γὰρ ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

“Well, I’m very willing to do that,” I said; “It would be wrong not to.”

“So, go ahead with your examination,” he said.

“We must,” I said. “What’s more, looking at it from this angle it’s more like a harmonious matching together than the previous two.”³⁵

“How is that?”

“Temperance is a kind of order,” I said, “and control over some pleasures and passions in some way, ‘greater than itself’ as the saying goes. And there are other expressions with echoes of this phrase aren’t there?”

“Absolutely,” he said.

“But isn’t this phrase ‘greater than itself’ absurd? For he who is greater than himself I could suppose also be less than himself and *vice versa*. You see the same person is referred to in all these phrases.”

“Why not?”

“But it seems to me,” I said, “that this phrase means that there is something better in a man with relation to his soul, but also something worse, and whenever the better part is naturally in control of the worse, this is what ‘greater than himself’ means: at any rate it is a term of approval. But whenever the better part is less and overwhelmed by the mass³⁶ of the worse part as a result of a bad upbringing or bad company, this is to attribute blame as a reproach, and to call someone in this position as ‘less than himself,’ and licentious.”

“Yes that seems to be the case.”

³⁵ I.e., wisdom and courage (see above, 427e).

³⁶ *plēthos* = “crowd, mob”; the use of the word underlines the parallelism Plato intends between individual and state.

Ἀπόβλεπε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὴν νέαν ἡμῖν πόλιν, καὶ ἰεὺρήσεις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων ἐνόν· κρείττω γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτῆς δικαίως φήσεις προσαγορεύεσθαι, εἴπερ οὐ τὸ ἄμεινον τοῦ χείρονος ἄρχει σὺφρον κλητέον καὶ κρείττον αὐτοῦ.

Ἄλλ' ἀποβλέπω, ἔφη, καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐπι-
 c θυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας ἐν παισὶ μάλιστα ἄν-
 τις εὖροι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων
 λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἰ

Τὰς δέ γε ἀπλᾶς τε καὶ μετρίας, αἱ δὲ μετὰ νοῦ τε
 καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῶ ἄγονται, ἐν ὀλίγοις τε
 ἐπιτευξῆ καὶ τοῖς βέλτιστα μὲν φύσιν, βέλτιστα δὲ
 παιδευθεῖσιν.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ὀρᾶς ἐνόητα σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ
 ἰ κρατουμένας αὐτόθι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολ-
 d λοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῆς
 φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσί τε καὶ ἐπιεικεστέ-
 ροις;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα πόλιν προσαγορεύειν κρείττω
 ἡδονῶν ἰ τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτῆς, καὶ
 ταύτην προσρητέον.

Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ σὺφρονα κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Καὶ μὴν εἴπερ αὐτὴ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ἢ αὐτῇ δόξα ἔνεστι

BOOK IV

“Now,” I said, “have a look at our new state and you will find one of these two in it. For you will rightly say that it can be referred to as greater than itself, if that of which the better part governs the worse is to be called temperate and greater than itself.”

“Well, I’m looking,” he said, “and you’re right.”

“And as well as that, many different kinds of passion and pleasures and pains are what you would find especially in children, women and slaves, and even in many inferior types among those so-called free men.”

“Very much so.”

“Then there are the moderate and temperate kinds, which are led with sense and with regard to correct belief, and you will come across them in a few people who are naturally very good or have been well taught.”

“That is true,” he said.

“Then do you see that you have all this in your state and that the passion in those many inferior people is under control there as a result of the passions and prudence of the fair-minded minority?”

“Yes I do.”

“If then one should call any state greater than its pleasures and passions, and greater than itself, our state too must be so-called.”

“Undoubtedly, in every way,” he said.

“And it is temperate in all these respects, isn’t it?”

“Indeed, very much so,” he said.

“And if again the same belief exists in another state

e τοῖς τε ἄρχουσι καὶ ἀρχομένοις περὶ τοῦ οὐστίνας δεῖ
ἀρχειν, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ἐνόν, ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα.

Ἐν ποτέροις οὖν φήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ σωφρονεῖν
ἐνεῖναι | ὅταν οὕτως ἔχωσιν; ἐν τοῖς ἀρχουσιν ἢ ἐν
τοῖς ἀρχομένοις;

Ἐν ἀμφοτέροις που, ἔφη.

Ὅρας οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπιεικῶς ἐμαντενόμεθα
ἄρτι ὡς ἀρμονία τινὲ ἢ σωφροσύνη ὁμοίωται;

Τί δῆ;

432 Ὅτι οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ σοφία ἐν μέρει
τινὶ ἐκατέρᾳ ἐνοῦσα ἢ μὲν σοφήν, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρείαν τὴν
πόλιν παρείχετο, οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖ αὐτὴ, ἀλλὰ δι' ὅλης
ἀτεχνῶς τέταται διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένη συνάδοντας
τούς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους
καὶ τοὺς μέσους, εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, | εἰ δὲ
βούλει, ἰσχυί, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν ἢ ἄλλῳ
ὀτφούν τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε ὀρθότατ' ἂν φαῖμεν ταύ-
την τὴν ὁμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χείρονός τε καὶ
ἀμείνονος κατὰ φύσιν συμφωνίαν ὀπότερον δεῖ ἀρχειν

b καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ.

Πάνν μοι, ἔφη, συνδοκεῖ.

Εἶπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὰ μὲν τρία ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει
κατῶπται, ὡς γε οὕτωςι δόξαι· τὸ δὲ δὴ λοιπὸν εἶδος,
δι' ὃ ἂν ἔτι | ἀρετῆς μετέχοι πόλις, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη;
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη.

37 "Fitting together" = *harmonia*.

BOOK IV

among both the rulers and their subjects as to who are to be their rulers, then this would be found in this state of ours. Or do you not think so?"

"No, I very much agree," he said.

"So which of the citizens will you say have this temperance whenever they are in this situation: the rulers or their subjects?"

"Both, I suppose," he said.

"So then you can see," I said, "that we made a reasonable prediction just now that temperance is like some kind of a fitting together?"³⁷

"Why is that?"

"Because it does not operate like courage and wisdom, which each exist in one part of the state, the one making the state courageous the other making it wise. No, it doesn't work like that; it is distributed literally across the whole population and makes the weakest and the strongest and those in between sing together in unison,³⁸ in their prudence, if you like, or in their strength, if you like, or again in their numbers, or in their *resources*, or anything else like these. The result is that that we would say most rightly that this unanimity is temperance, is the natural harmony of the worse and the better man as to who should rule both in the state and in the individual."

"I fully agree with that," he said.

"Well then," I said, "we've had a look at three of the qualities, as far as our judgment goes: but whatever could the remaining one be which would allow the state to share still further in excellence? I think that this is clearly justice."

³⁸ *συνάδοντας . . . τὰντὸν*. The musical metaphor is maintained here.

Δῆλον.

Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν δὴ ἡμᾶς δεῖ ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας τινὰς θάμνον κύκλω περιίστασθαι προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν, μή πη διαφύγη ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀφανισθεῖσα ἄδηλος γένηται. φανερόν γάρ δὴ ὅτι ταύτη c πη ἔστιν ὅρα οὖν καὶ προθυμοῦ κατιδεῖν, εἴαν πως πρότερος ἐμοῦ ἴδῃς καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις.

Εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, εἴαν μοι ἐπομένῳ χρῆ καὶ τὰ δεικνύμενα δυναμένῳ καθορᾶν, | πάνυ ἐμοὶ μετρίως χρήσῃ.

Ἔπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐξάμενος μετ' ἐμοῦ.

Ποιήσω ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ μόνον, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἡγοῦ.

Καὶ μήν, εἶπον ἐγώ, δύσβατός γέ τις ὁ τόπος φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσκιος· ἔστι γοῦν σκοτεινὸς καὶ δυσδιερεύνητος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ | ὅμως ἰτέον.

d Ἰτέον γάρ, ἔφη.

Καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδών, Ἰοῦ ἰού, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων· κινδυνεύομέν τι ἔχειν ἵχνος, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ οὐ πάνυ τι ἐκφευξείσθαι ἡμᾶς. |

Εὖ ἀγγέλεις, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἦ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βλακικόν γε ἡμῶν τὸ πάθος.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Πάλαι, ὦ μακάριε, φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἑωρῶμεν ἄρ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡμεν | καταγελαστότατοι· ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν e ἔχοντες ζητοῦσιν ἐνίοτε ὃ ἔχουσιν, καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸ

“Clearly.”

“So, Glaucon, we must now surround the covert like huntsmen and concentrate to ensure that justice does not escape and disappear out of sight, mustn’t we? It’s quite clear that it’s somewhere about the place. Have a look; keep your eyes peeled and see if you can see it before I do and tell me about it.”³⁹

“If only that were any use,” he said. “But if you will let me follow you, since I am capable of only seeing things pointed out to me, you will use me very reasonably.”

“Say a prayer,” I said, “and follow me.”

“I will,” he said, “just lead the way.”

“And truly” I said, “the ground seems hard to cross and is in shadow. It is quite dark and difficult to make out the path. But the fact is we must go on, come what may.”

“Right, we must go then,” he said.

So I looked and said: “Look, look,⁴⁰ Glaucon! It looks as if we have found a track and I don’t think it has completely eluded us.”

“That’s good news,” he said.

“Well,” I said, “we really have been stupid!”

“What do you mean?”

“It looks, dear boy, as if it has been rolling around in front of our feet for ages since we started and we didn’t even notice it. We were very silly: like people looking sometimes for what they already hold in their hands, and we didn’t look in the right direction, but were gazing

³⁹ The elaborate hunting metaphor extends through to 432e. For hunting as a metaphor for intellectual search in Plato, see e.g., *La.* 194b, *Leg.* 654e, *Lys.* 218c.

⁴⁰ *Iou, Iou*, a hunting cry of joy (scholiast on *Ar. Pax* 318).

μὲν οὐκ ἀπεβλέπομεν, πόρρω δέ ποι ἀπεσκοποῦμεν,
ἦ δὴ καὶ ἐλάνθανεν ἴσως ἡμᾶς.

Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Οὕτως, εἶπον, ὡς δοκοῦμέν μοι καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸ
καὶ ἰ ἀκούοντες πάλαι οὐ μανθάνειν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι
ἐλέγομεν τρόπον τινὰ αὐτό.

Μακρόν, ἔφη, τὸ προοίμιον τῷ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἀκού-
σαι.

433 Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄκουε εἴ τι ἄρα λέγω. ὃ γὰρ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ἐθέμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖν διὰ παντός, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν
κατωκίζομεν, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἥτοι τούτου
τι εἶδος ἢ δικαιοσύνη. ἐθέμεθα δὲ δήπου καὶ πολλακίς
ἐλέγομεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἰ ὅτι ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐν δέοι ἐπι-
τηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν, εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἢ φύσις
ἐπιτηδαιοτάτη πεφυκυῖα εἶη.

Ἐλέγομεν γάρ.

Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ
πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε
b πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλακίς εἰρήκαμεν.

Εἰρήκαμεν γάρ.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει τρόπον
τινὰ γιγνόμενον ἢ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ
πράττειν. οἶσθα ἰ ὅθεν τεκμαίρομαι;

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ λέγ', ἔφη.

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν

41 E.g., 2.370a-c.

42 "Being a busybody" (*polupragmoneō*, a8) had pejorative

BOOK IV

somewhere in the distance; and that is perhaps the reason we failed to spot it.”

“What do you mean?” he said.

“It’s like this,” I said: “I think that although we were talking about it and exchanging views all this time, we didn’t understand what we were saying, that in a way we were talking about it.”

“For someone keen to listen, that was a long introduction,” he said.

“Well, listen,” I said, “and see if what I say makes sense. What we proposed from the start that we must do right the way through, when we were establishing our state, that, it seems to me, or some form of it, is justice. We proposed, I believe, and we repeated it quite a few times, if you recall, that each individual should do the one job, from those that are pursued in the state, for which his natural capabilities were most suited.”⁴¹

“Yes, we did say that.”

“Then again, that each man doing his own business and not dabbling in a large number is justice, and we have heard many others and have said so ourselves many times.”⁴²

“We have indeed.”

“Then, my friend,” I said, “somehow it turns out that this is in a sense what justice is: doing your own business. You know where I get my proof of this from, don’t you?”

“No, but do tell me,” he said.

“It seems to me,” I said, “that of the qualities we’ve

connotations in Athenian society and politics (see Dover, *Greek Popular Morality*, 188) and the converse equated to being prudent or just. See also below, 434b6.

(*: ων) ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ
 φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν
 παρέσχει ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, | καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε σω-
 c τηρίαν παρέχειν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνῆ. καίτοι ἔφαμεν δικαιο-
 οσύνην ἔσεσθαι τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν ἐκείνων, εἰ τὰ τρία
 εὔροιμεν.

Καὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δέοι γε κρῖναι τί τὴν
 πόλιν ἡμῖν τούτων μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν ἀπεργάσεται |
 ἐγγενομένοι, δύσκριτον ἂν εἴη πότερον ἢ ὁμοδοξία
 τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ ἀρχομένων, ἢ ἡ περὶ δεινῶν τε
 καὶ μῆ, ἅττα ἐστί, δόξης ἐννόμου σωτηρία ἐν τοῖς
 στρατιώταις ἐγγενομένη, ἢ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρό-
 d νησίς τε καὶ φυλακὴ ἐνοῦσα, ἢ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν
 αὐτὴν ποιεῖ ἐνὸν καὶ ἐν παιδὶ καὶ ἐν γυναικὶ καὶ
 δούλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ καὶ δημιουργῷ καὶ ἄρχοντι καὶ
 ἀρχομένῳ, ὅτι τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος εἰς ὧν ἔπραττε καὶ
 οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει. |

Δύσκριτον, ἔφη πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῆ
 τε σοφία αὐτῆς καὶ τῆ σωφροσύνη καὶ τῆ ἀνδρεία ἢ
 τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. |

Οὐκοῦν δικαιοσύνην τό γε τούτοις ἐνάμιλλον ἂν εἰς
 ἀρετὴν πόλεως θείης;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

e Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τῆδε εἰ οὕτω δόξει. ἄρα τοῖς ἄρχουσι
 ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰς δίκας προστάξεις δικάζειν;

BOOK IV

looked at in our state, temperance, courage and prudence, the one remaining is the one that gives them all the ability to come into existence and gives security to those that come into existence for as long as it is there. And indeed we said justice would be the one remaining of them if we were to discover the other three.”⁴³

“Yes, that has to be so,” he said.

“But on the other hand,” I said, “if it were necessary to determine which of these could make our state especially good if it was present in it, it would be difficult to decide whether it is the unanimity of our rulers and their subjects, or the security of lawful belief which has been inculcated in our troops with regard to danger, or the lack of it, whatever it is, or the prudence and guardianship in our rulers, or the fact that what especially makes our state good is to be found in children, women, slaves, freemen, artisans, rulers and their subjects: namely that each one being an individual would carry out one job and not involve himself in any number of them.”

“It is difficult to decide, of course,” he said.

“Then it seems that the ability of each individual to do his own job in the state is an equal match for the virtue of the state in wisdom, temperance and courage.”

“Very much so,” he said.

“So would you then put justice on a par with these qualities with respect to the virtue of the state?”

“Oh yes, absolutely!”

“Then look at it this way and see if it’s right: you will of course instruct the rulers in our state to settle lawsuits?”

⁴³ At 427e–28a.

Τί μήν;

Ἡ ἄλλου τινὸς οὖν μᾶλλον ἐφιέμενοι δικάσουσιν ἢ τούτου, | ὅπως ἂν ἕκαστοι μῆτ' ἔχωσι τὰλλότρια μῆτε τῶν αὐτῶν στέρωνται;

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τούτου.

Ὡς δικαίου ὄντος;

Ναί. |

Καὶ ταύτη ἄρα πῃ ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις
434 τε καὶ πρᾶξις δικαιοσύνη ἂν ὁμολογοῖτο.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Ἴδὲ δὴ ἐὰν σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοὶ συνδοκῆ. τέκτων σκυτοτόμου ἐπιχειρῶν ἔργα ἐργάζεσθαι ἢ σκυτοτόμος τέκτονος, ἢ | τὰ ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνοντες τὰλλήλων ἢ τιμάς, ἢ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπιχειρῶν ἀμφοτέρα πράττειν, πάντα τᾶλλα μεταλλαττόμενα, ἄρά σοι ἂν τι δοκεῖ μέγα βλάψαι πόλιν;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ' ὅταν γε οἶμαι δημιουργὸς ὢν ἢ τις ἄλλος | χρηματιστῆς φύσει, ἔπειτα ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ
b πλήθει ἢ ἰσχύϊ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ εἶδος ἐπιχειρῆ ἰέναι, ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν τις εἰς τὸ τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ καὶ φύλακος ἀνάξιος ὢν, καὶ τὰ ἀλλήλων οὗτοι ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνωσι καὶ τὰς τιμάς, ἢ ὅταν ὁ αὐτὸς | πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα ἐπιχειρῆ πράττειν, τότε οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖν ταύτην τὴν τούτων μεταβολὴν καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην ὄλεθρον εἶναι τῇ πόλει.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ἡ τριῶν ἄρα ὄντων γενῶν πολυπραγμοσύνη καὶ

BOOK IV

"Yes, certainly."

"Then when they give their verdicts, will their concern be other than this: to make sure that individuals neither end up with other people's belongings, nor are deprived of their own?"

"No, that will be their only concern."

"On the grounds that this is just?"

"Yes."

"So by this argument then it would be agreed that to possess and work with one's own person and property would be justice?"

"That is so."

"Now see if you agree with me on this one: if a carpenter tries to do a cobbler's work, or vice versa, or if they exchange their tools and status, or if the same man tries to do both jobs, everything else being swapped around, do you think any great harm would come to the state?"

"No, not at all," he said.

"Yet I think that whenever a born craftsman or any other wage earner who goes on to better himself in wealth, or in the elections for public office, or in strength, or by any other such means, and tries to enter the military class, or one of the military class tries to get onto the council or into the guardian class, even though he is not qualified to do so, and these people exchange their tools and their statuses with each other, or whenever the same man tries to do all these things at once, then I think this swapping about and involvement in a number of activities is fatal to the state."

"Yes it is, in every way."

"Then, there being three classes, this involvement in

c μεταβολή εἰς ἄλληλα μεγίστη τε βλάβη τῇ πόλει καὶ ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο μάλιστα κακουργία.

Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν. |

Κακουργίαν δὲ τὴν μεγίστην τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πόλεως οὐκ ἀδικίαν φήσεις εἶναι;

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἀδικία. πάλιν δὲ ὧδε λέγωμεν· χρηματιστικοῦ, ἐπικουρικοῦ, φυλακικοῦ γένους οἰκειοπραγία, ἐκάστου τούτων τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττοντος ἐν πόλει, τοῦναντίον | ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνη τ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὴν πόλιν δικαίαν παρέχοι;

Οὐκ ἄλλη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔχειν ἢ ταύτη.

d Μηδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πω πάνυ παγίως αὐτὸ λέγωμεν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ εἰς ἓνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰὸν τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ὁμολογῆται καὶ ἐκεῖ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, συγχωρησόμεθα ἤδη—τί γὰρ καὶ ἐροῦμεν;—εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἄλλο τι σκεψόμεθα. | νῦν δ' ἐκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν ἣν ᾤθημεν, εἰ ἐν μείζονί τινι τῶν ἐχόντων δικαιοσύνην πρότερον ἐκεῖ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν θεάσασθαι, ῥᾶον ἂν ἐν ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ κατιδεῖν οἷόν ἐστιν.

e καὶ ἔδοξε δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο εἶναι πόλις, καὶ οὕτω ᾠκίζομεν ὡς ἐδυνάμεθα ἀρίστην, εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι ἐν γε τῇ ἀγαθῇ ἂν εἴη. ὁ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐκεῖ ἐφάνη, ἐπαναφέρωμεν εἰς τὸν ἓνα, κἂν μὲν ὁμολογῆται, καλῶς ἕξει· ἐὰν δέ

⁴⁴ I.e., the plan with which S. started the discussion at 2.368c ff. He is now moving the discussion from the larger to the smaller scale, i.e., the state to the individual.

BOOK IV

many activities and swapping about from one to another is most detrimental to the state and would be most rightly known as extreme evil.”

“Absolutely.”

“And will you not agree that the greatest villainy against one’s own state is injustice?”

“Of course I will.”

“Then this is injustice. Again let’s put it like this: if the artisan, the auxiliary and the guardian concentrate on their own business and each has his own function in the state, as opposed to what we were just saying, that would be justice and would make the state just.”

“I can’t imagine it can be anything other than that,” he said.

“Let’s not be too certain about this yet,” I said, “but if we are agreed that the notion here can apply reasonably well also to each individual member of the populace and that that is where justice is, then we shall already have reached an agreement. For what else will there be for us to say? However if not, then we shall look at something else. Now let’s complete the inquiry in which we thought that if we were to attempt to look first at something on a larger scale where justice may be found, it would be easier to see what it is like in one person.⁴⁴ Indeed we decided that this larger entity would be a state, and accordingly we began to construct the best we could, fully aware that justice would be present in the good one. Therefore let’s transfer what we found there back to our individual, and if we can agree, that’ll be fine. But if we discover some-

435 τι ἄλλο ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἐμφαίνηται, πάλιν ἐπανιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν βασανιοῦμεν, καὶ τάχ' ἂν παρ' ἄλληλα σκοποῦντες καὶ τρίβοντες, ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων ἐκλάμψαι ποιήσασιν τὴν δικαιοσύνην· καὶ φανερὰν γενομένην βεβαιωσαίμεθ' ἂν αὐτὴν παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς. |

Ἄλλ', ἔφη, καθ' ὁδὸν τε λέγεις καὶ ποιεῖν χρὴ οὕτως.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ γε ταῦτόν ἂν τις προσείποι μείζον τε καὶ ἔλαττον, ἀνόμοιον τυγχάνει ὃν ταύτῃ ἢ ταῦτόν προσαγορεύεται, ἢ ὅμοιον;

Ὅμοιον, ἔφη.

b Καὶ δίκαιος ἄρα ἀνὴρ δικαίας πόλεως κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶδος οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἀλλ' ὅμοιος ἔσται.

Ὅμοιος, ἔφη.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι πόλις γε ἔδοξεν εἶναι δικαία ὅτι | ἐν αὐτῇ τριττὰ γένη φύσεων ἐνόητα τὸ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἔπραττεν, σώφρων δὲ αὖ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφὴ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν ἄλλ' ἅττα πάθη τε καὶ ἔξεις.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

c Καὶ τὸν ἕνα ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, οὕτως ἀξιόσομεν, τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶδη ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἔχοντα, διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη ἐκείνοις τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθῶς ἀξιουῖσθαι τῇ πόλει.

Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

BOOK IV

thing else in the individual, then we shall go back to the state and evaluate it there, and perhaps by examining them side by side and rubbing one against the other, as you do with fire sticks, we may make justice blaze out, and, once identified, we may confirm it among ourselves."

"Well," he said, "your argument is methodical and that's the way we must proceed."

"So," I said, "given two objects, one large the other small that you would call by the same name, do they actually differ from one another in view of the fact that they are given the same name, or are they similar?"

"They're similar," he said.

"And so a just man will be no different from a just state in terms of the actual concept of justice, but similar in fact."

"Yes, he will," he said.

"But on the other hand we decided a state is just because three natural kinds of people in it were doing their own business individually; and there again it is temperate, courageous and wise because of some other properties and conditions of these same kinds of people."

"That's true," he said.

"And so, my friend, we will expect the individual likewise, having these same qualities in his own soul, rightly to be thought suitable for the same names as the state, since he exhibits the same conditions as they do."

"That has to be entirely so," he said.

Εἰς φαῦλόν γε αὖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, | σκέμμα
ἐμπεπτώκαμεν περὶ ψυχῆς, εἴτε ἔχει τὰ τρία εἶδη
ταῦτα ἐν αὐτῇ εἴτε μή.

Οὐ πάνν μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, εἰς φαῦλον· ἴσως γάρ,
ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθές, ὅτι χαλεπὰ τὰ
καλά.

d Φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ εὖ γ' ἴσθι, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ὡς
ἢ ἐμῆ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων,
οἷαις νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μὴ ποτε λάβω-
μεν—ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδὸς ἢ ἐπὶ
τοῦτο ἄγουσα—ἴσως μέντοι τῶν γε προειρημένων τε
καὶ προεσκεμμένων ἀξίως. |

Οὐκοῦν ἀγαπητόν; ἔφη· ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔν γε τῷ
παρόντι ἱκανῶς ἂν ἔχοι.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, ἐμοιγε καὶ πάνν ἐξαρκέσει.

Μῆ τοίνυν ἀποκάμης, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ σκόπει.

e Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολλῆ ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν
ὅτι γε τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἔνεστιν ἡμῶν εἶδη τε καὶ
ἦθη ἅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὐ γάρ που ἄλλοθεν ἐκείσε
ἀφίκται. γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἶ τις οἰηθείη τὸ θυμοει-
δὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγγεγονέναι,
οἱ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, οἶον | οἱ κατὰ τὴν
Θράκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδόν τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω
436 τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὲ περὶ τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν

⁴⁵ *phaulon* = "trifling," "insignificant." Obviously ironical (as it was at 423c5-6) as an introduction to the particularly difficult idea coming up, starting at 436a8: whether, and if so, how, the

BOOK IV

"Ah, there is once again a minor problem,⁴⁵ my dear fellow, we have hit upon as regards the soul: whether it has these three qualities in itself or not."

"I don't think we've found a minor one at all," he said. "Perhaps, Socrates, the saying is true, 'good things are difficult.'"

"So it seems," I said, "but you know well what I believe, Glaucon. We shall never get this precisely from such methods as we have been using in our discussion. The way leading to it is different, longer and more extensive, although it is perhaps in keeping with what we've already discussed and examined."

"Are we not to be content with that?" he asked. "It would be quite sufficient for me under the present circumstances."

"Well then," I said, "it will certainly do for me."

"So don't flag!" he said, "carry on with your inquiry."

"Is it not essential," I said, "that we agree on this at least: that there are the same concepts and character in each of us as in the state? I don't think they could get there any other way: for it would be ridiculous to think that passion did not occur in our states from individuals who are indeed the origin of it, such as across Thrace and Scythia and to some extent in the areas to the north; or love of learning, which one would claim originated particularly in

tripartite schema, established for the state, can be applied to the individual soul (the second part of the plan outlined way back at 368c). The validity of the analogy is vital for Plato's whole argument (see further the introduction to Books 1-5, section 2 (iii)). As usual, the irony appears to pass S.'s respondent by (c7).

REPUBLIC

μάλιστ' ἂν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον τὸ περὶ τοὺς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν οὐχ ἤκιστα.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. |

Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν γνῶναι.

Οὐ δῆτα.

Τόδε δὲ ἤδη χαλεπὸν, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἕκαστα πράττομεν ἢ τρισὶν οὖσιν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ· μανθάνομεν μὲν ἑτέρῳ, | θυμούμεθα δὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐπι-
 b θυμούμεν δ' αὖ τρίτῳ τιτὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν τε καὶ γέννησιν ἡδονῶν καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, ἢ ὅλη τῇ ψυχῇ καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πράττομεν, ὅταν ὀρμήσωμεν. ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ χαλεπὰ διορίσασθαι ἀξίως λόγου. |

Καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

ᾧδε τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν αὐτὰ ὀρίζεσθαι, εἴτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις εἴτε ἕτερά ἐστι.

Πῶς;

Δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτὸν τὰναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταῦτόν | γε καὶ πρὸς ταῦτόν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα, ὥστε
 c ἂν πού εὐρίσκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰσό-
 μεθα ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω.

⁴⁶ Plato is here reflecting stereotypical ideas of diverse racial characteristics based on the influence of climate and environment found in e.g., the medical writings of the Hippocratic Corpus (Hipp. Aer. 12).

⁴⁷ This is the first clear formulation of the Law of Contradic-

BOOK IV

the area around us; or the love of money, which one would say belongs not least to the Phoenicians and the Egyptians.”⁴⁶

“Indeed,” he said.

“So this is the way it is,” I said, “and it’s not difficult to discover.”

“No, indeed”

“This is now the problem, whether we carry out our separate activities with the same faculty, or if there are three of them, and we carry out one with one, another with another: that is, use one to learn, another when we become inwardly angry, and again a third when we desire the pleasures of food and sex and all those things akin to these. Or do we do each of these things one by one with the whole soul whenever we set about them? That is what will be difficult to determine in a way that is in keeping with our argument.”

“I think so too,” he said.

“Then let’s attempt to define whether they are the same as each other or different.”

“How?”

“It is clear that the same faculty cannot do opposite things nor experience them in the same respect and in relation to the same part all at the same time,⁴⁷ so that if we find these things happening in them I think that we shall know that it was not the same thing, but several parts.”

tion, which subsequently became formalized in logic by Aristotle (*Int.* 17a36–37, *Met.* 1005b22). The subsequent qualifications here made concerning time and respect (c10ff.) reflect answers to common earlier sophistic quibbles, e.g., *Euthyd.* 276–77.

Εἶεν.

Σκόπει δὴ ὁ λέγων. |

Λέγε, ἔφη.

Ἐστάναι, εἶπον, καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυνατόν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἔτι τοίνυν ἀκριβέστερον ὁμολογησώμεθα, μή | πη
προϊόντες ἀμφισβητήσωμεν. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ἄν-
θρωπον ἐστηκότα, κινουῦντα δὲ τὰς χεῖράς τε καὶ τὴν
κεφαλὴν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται ἅμα, οὐκ
d ἂν οἶμαι ἀξιοῦμεν οὕτω λέγειν δεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν τι
αὐτοῦ ἐστηκε, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται. οὐχ οὕτω;

Οὕτω.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ ἔτι μᾶλλον χαριεντίζοιτο ὁ ταῦτα
λέγων, | κομψευόμενος ὡς οἷ γε στρόβιλοι ὅλοι ἐστάσι
τε ἅμα καὶ κινουῦνται, ὅταν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πῆξαντες τὸ
κέντρον περιφέρωνται, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι κύκλω περιδὸν
ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἔδρα τοῦτο δρᾷ, οὐκ ἂν ἀποδεχοίμεθα, ὡς
οὐ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἑαυτῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα τότε μερόντων τε
e καὶ φερομένων, ἀλλὰ φαῖμεν ἂν ἔχειν αὐτὰ εὐθύ τε
καὶ περιφερὲς ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ εὐθὺ ἐστά-
ναι—οὐδαμῇ γὰρ ἀποκλίνειν—κατὰ δὲ τὸ περιφερὲς
κύκλω κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν δὲ τὴν εὐθυωρίαν ἢ εἰς δεξιὰν
ἢ εἰς ἀριστερὰν ἢ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἢ εἰς τὸ ὀπίσθεν |
ἐγκλίνη ἅμα περιφερόμενοι, τότε οὐδαμῇ ἐστάναι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη.

Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τῶν τοιούτων λεγόμενον ἐκπλήξει,
οὐδὲ μᾶλλον τι πείσει ὡς ποτέ τι ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὄν ἅμα

BOOK IV

"All right."

"Consider now what I am saying."

"Go on," he said.

"Is it possible for an object to be stationary and to move at the same time in the same respect?"

"No, not at all."

"Then let's agree more precisely to make sure that we don't get into a wrangle somewhere along the line. For if one were to say that a man who while standing still, but moving his hands and head, is still and moving at the same time, I don't think we would concede that we should express it like this, but say that part of him stays still, part of him moves: isn't that so?"

"Yes."

"So too, if he who says this took his ingenuity still further, quibbling that spinning tops, at any rate, are completely at rest and moving at the same time when they spin but have their pivot fixed on the same spot, or that this holds of anything else that goes round in a circle on the same spot, we would not agree, because it is not in the same respects of themselves that such objects are remaining still and revolving at that moment; but we would say that they have within them the vertical and the circumference and that with respect to the vertical they stand still, since they don't lean in any direction, but with respect to the circumference they move in a circle. However, whenever the axis veers to the right or left, or forward or backward while turning at the same time, then there is no way it is standing still."

"Yes, that's right," he said.

"Then no argument of this kind will put us off, and moreover it will not persuade us in any way that one and

437 κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τἀναντία πάθοι ἢ καὶ εἴη ἢ καὶ ποιήσειεν.

Οὐκουν ἐμέ γε, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ' ὅμως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ ἀναγκαζώμεθα πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐπεξιώντες καὶ βεβαιούμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἄληθεῖς οὔσας μηκύνειν, ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου οὔτως ἔχοντος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προϊόμεν, ὁμολογήσαντες, εἴαν ποτε ἄλλη φανῆ ταῦτα ἢ ταύτη, πάντα ἡμῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τούτου συμβαίοντα λελυμένα ἔσσεσθαι.

Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.

b Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ἀνανεύειν καὶ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις θείης εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων; οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτη διοίσει. |

Ἄλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, τῶν ἐναντίων.

c Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὐ πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνά ποι ἂν θείης τὰ εἶδη τὰ νυνδῆ λεχθέντα; οἷον ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἐφίεσθαι φήσεις ἐκείνου οὐ ἂν ἐπιθυμῆ, ἢ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν βούληται οἱ γενέσθαι, ἢ αὖ, καθ' ὅσον ἐθέλει τί οἱ πορισθῆναι, ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο πρὸς αὐτὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος, ἐπορευομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσεως;

Ἐγωγε.

Τί δέ; τὸ ἀβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μηδ' ἐπιθυμεῖν

BOOK IV

the same thing would ever undergo, be or even do opposing things at the same time and in the same respect."

"It wouldn't affect me, at any rate," he said.

"Nevertheless," I said, "in order not to be forced to go on at great length about all such differences of opinion by going through them in detail and confirming that they are not true, let's go ahead on the basis that what we've said before is the case, after agreeing that, if at any time it appears not to be the case, then everything that results from our inquiry will have been invalidated."

"Yes, we must do that," he said.

"Would you maintain that assent and dissent, the desire to take something and the refusal to do so, attraction and repulsion are all types of mutual opposites," I asked, "whether they are active or passive? You see I don't think the latter will make any difference."

"Well, I would say they are opposites," he said.

"Well then," I said, "would you not say that thirst and hunger and our appetites generally, and again our consent and will all belong somewhere to the same categories we've already discussed? For example will you not agree that the soul of someone who has a desire always longs for what it desires, or draws itself toward whatever it wishes to possess, or again in so far as it wants something to be supplied to it, approves this for itself, like someone making a request, reaching out for its realization?"

"I would."

"Another point: shall we not assert that the lack of will

οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντα τὰναντία ἐκείνοις θήσομεν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ἰ

d Τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἐπιθυμιῶν τι φήσομεν εἶναι εἶδος, καὶ ἐναργεστάτας αὐτῶν τούτων ἦν τε δίψαν καλοῦμεν καὶ ἦν πείναν;

Φήσομεν, ἦ δ' ὅς. ἰ

Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ποτοῦ, τὴν δ' ἐδωδῆς;

Ναί.

Ἄρ' οὖν, καθ' ὅσον δίψα ἐστί, πλέονος ἂν τινος ἢ οὐ λέγομεν ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἶη, οἷον δίψα ἐστὶ δίψα ἄρα γε θερμοῦ ποτοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, ἢ πολλοῦ ἢ ὀλίγου, ἢ καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινος πάματος; ἢ ἔαν μὲν τις θερμότης τῷ δίψει προσῆ, ἰ τὴν τοῦ ψυχροῦ e ἐπιθυμίαν προσπαρέχοιτ' ἂν, ἔαν δὲ ψυχρότης, τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ; ἔαν δὲ διὰ πλήθους παρουσίαν πολλὴ ἢ δίψα ἦ, τὴν τοῦ πολλοῦ παρέξεται, ἔαν δὲ ὀλίγη, τὴν τοῦ ὀλίγου; αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ διψῆν οὐ μὴ ποτε ἄλλου γένηται ἐπιθυμία ἢ ἰ οὐπερ πέφυκεν, αὐτοῦ πάματος, καὶ αὐτὸ πεινῆν βρώματος;

Οὕτως, ἔφη, αὐτὴ γε ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐκάστη αὐτοῦ μόνον ἐκάστου οὐ πέφυκεν, τοῦ δὲ τοίου ἢ τοίου τὰ προσγιγνώμενα.

438 Μήτοι τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀσκέπτους ἡμᾶς ὄντας θορυβήσῃ, ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ, καὶ οὐ σίτου ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ σίτου. πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· εἰ οὖν ἡ δίψα ἐπιθυμία

BOOK IV

or consent, or desire will lead to rejection and repulsion from the soul and the opposite of everything we've just talked about?"

"Of course."

"Shall we say that there is a category for desires of this type: the most obvious of these being thirst and hunger?"

"Yes," he said.

"One for drink and one for food?"

"Yes."

"Then in as far as it is thirst, would it be for something more than that for which we say there is a desire in the soul? For example thirst is a thirst for a hot or cold drink, isn't it, or for a lot or a little, or in short for a particular kind of drink? Or if some heat were present as well as the thirst it would arouse a desire for a cold drink in addition; and if there were cold, the desire would be for a hot drink, wouldn't it? If your thirst is great through the appetite for plenty, it will cause a desire for a lot; if there is little the desire will be small, won't it? But thirst itself would never turn into a desire for anything other than what it was intended for by nature: a drink; and the same goes for hunger and food?"

"Yes, that's so," he said; "each desire by itself is only for what is its natural object, but a desire for this or that sort is the result of things added."

"Let no one protest," I said, "that we have not thought this through, with the objection that nobody wants a drink unless it's wholesome; nobody wants food that isn't nourishing. Because, they claim, everyone wants good things. If therefore thirst is a desire, it would be a desire for a

ἐστί, χρηστοῦ ἂν εἴη εἴτε πάματος | εἴτε ἄλλου ὅτου
ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω.

Ἴσως γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, δοκοῖ τι λέγειν ὁ ταῦτα λέ-
γων.

Ἄλλα μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα
b εἶναί του, τὰ μὲν ποιά ἅττα ποιού τινός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ ἕκαστου μόνον.

Οὐκ ἔμαθον, ἔφη.

Οὐκ ἔμαθες, ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ μείζον τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον
τινὸς εἶναι μείζον; |

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκοῦν τοῦ ἐλάττονος;

Ναί.

Τὸ δέ γε πολὺ μείζον πολὺ ἐλάττονος. ἦ γάρ; |

Ναί.

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ ποτὲ μείζον ποτὲ ἐλάττονος, καὶ τὸ
ἐσόμενον μείζον ἐσομένου ἐλάττονος;

Ἄλλα τί μήν; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Καὶ τὰ πλείω δὴ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ τὰ διπλάσια
c πρὸς τὰ ἡμίσεα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ αὖ βαρύ-
τερα πρὸς κουφότερα καὶ θάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα,

⁴⁸ Plato is not questioning the Socratic doctrine that everyone automatically desires good things; he is here simply preparing for the argument that "good" or "bad" or other qualities are distinct qualifications of simple desires, like thirst, etc.

⁴⁹ Incomprehension of the interlocutor is a typical Platonic device to signal that a difficult idea needs further clarification (and it is difficult in English to match the concreteness of the

BOOK IV

wholesome drink, or what ever else is desired, and the same goes for the rest."⁴⁸

"Well, perhaps the man who says this has a point," he said.

"But surely," I said, "of things which are such as to be related to something, some are of such a kind as to be related to something else of similar kind, it seems to me; but others which are such as to be just themselves are related only to something else which is likewise just itself."

"I don't understand," he said.⁴⁹

"You do understand that 'the greater' is a comparative, such as 'to be greater than something'?"

"Certainly."

"Than 'the smaller'?"

"Yes."

"And the 'much greater' than the 'much smaller.' Isn't that the case?"

"Yes."

"And also 'the greater in the past than the smaller in the past' and the 'greater in the future than the smaller in the future'?"

"But of course" he said.

"It goes on: more in relation to less, double in relation to half and all such comparisons. Then again heavier in relation to lighter, quicker in relation to slower, and yet

Greek in a7-b2). The argument proper is resumed at 439a9; in the intervening sections S. attempts to explain (with examples) logical distinctions between unqualified and qualified objects (see the example of knowledge in c6ff.), in order to clarify the idea that thirst as such is simply an *unqualified desire* for drink.

καὶ ἔτι γε τὰ θερμὰ πρὸς τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ
τούτοις ὅμοια ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; |

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος;
ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὸ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν
ἢ ὅτου δὴ δεῖ θεῖναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη δέ τις
καὶ ποιά τις ποιῶν τινος καὶ τινός. λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε:
d οὐκ ἐπειδὴ οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη ἐγένετο, διή-
νεγκε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ὥστε οἰκοδομικὴ κληθῆ-
ναι;

Τί μήν;

Ἄρ' οὐ τῷ ποιά τις εἶναι, οἷα ἐτέρα οὐδεμία τῶν
ἄλλων; |

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ποιῶν τινος, καὶ αὐτὴ ποιά τις
ἐγένετο; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω τέχναι τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαι;

Ἔστιν οὕτω.

Τοῦτο τοῖνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, φάθι με τότε βούλεσθαι
λέγειν, εἰ | ἄρα νῦν ἔμαθες, ὅτι ὅσα ἐστὶν οἷα εἶναί
e του, αὐτὰ μὲν μόνα αὐτῶν μόνων ἐστίν, τῶν δὲ ποιῶν
τινων ποιά ἅττα. καὶ οὐ τι λέγω, ὡς, οἷων ἂν ἦ, τοι-
αῦτα καὶ ἔστιν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσῶδων
ἢ ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινὴ καὶ νοσώδης καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ
τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακὴ καὶ ἀγαθή· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ
οὐδὲρ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἐγένετο ἐπιστήμη, | ἀλλὰ ποιῶν
τινος, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὑγιεινὸν καὶ νοσῶδες, ποιά δὴ τις

⁵⁰ At a7-b2 above.

BOOK IV

again hot in relation to cold and all those things such as these are like this are they not?"

"Very much so."

"Then what about knowledge? Isn't it of the same order of things? Knowledge in itself is the knowledge of something learned in itself, or of whatever one must take the object of knowledge to be, but a particular knowledge is of a particular kind of thing. I mean for example when the knowledge about how to construct houses originated didn't it differ from other skills so as to be called 'house building'?"

"Certainly."

"It was through being a particular kind of knowledge unlike any of the others, wasn't it?"

"Yes."

"Since it was knowledge of a particular thing, it became a particular kind of knowledge itself, didn't it? And the same applies to the rest of the crafts and skills, doesn't it?"

"Indeed so."

"Then," I said, "you can agree that this is what I meant just now,⁵⁰ if you do now understand, that of all the things which are related to something, those which are just themselves are related to those which are just themselves, while those of a particular sort are related to those of a particular sort. Now I am not saying in any way that knowledge shares the same qualities as the objects of knowledge such that the knowledge of health and sickness is healthy and sick itself, or the knowledge of good and evil is good and evil. But when knowledge came into being not just as knowledge of the thing itself which knowledge is of, but of a particular object, for example the healthy and the

συνέβη καὶ αὐτὴ γενέσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὴν ἐποίησεν
μηκέτι ἐπιστήμην ἀπλῶς καλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποιοῦ
τινος προσγενομένου ἰατρικῆν.

Ἔμαθον, ἔφη, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν. |

439 Τοῦ δὲ δὴ δίψος, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τούτων θήσεις τῶν
†τινὸς εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν†; ἔστι δὲ δήπου δί-
ψος—

Ἔγωγε, ἣ δ' ὅς· πάματος γε.

Οὐκοῦν ποιῶ μὲν τινας πάματος ποιῶν τι καὶ
δίψος, δίψος δ' οὖν | αὐτὸ οὔτε πολλοῦ οὔτε ὀλίγου,
οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ, οὐδὲ ἐνὶ λόγῳ ποιῶ τινας,
ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ πάματος μόνον αὐτὸ δίψος πέφυκεν;

Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

b Τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ, καθ' ὅσον διψῆ, οὐκ
ἄλλο τι βούλεται ἢ πιεῖν, καὶ τούτου ὀρέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ
τούτο ὀρμᾶ.

Δήλον δὴ.

Οὐκοῦν εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτὴν ἀνθέλκει διψῶσαν, ἕτερον
ἂν τι ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος
ὥσπερ θηρίου ἐπὶ | τὸ πιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ, φάμεν, τό γε
αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰναντία
πράττοι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ὡσπερ γε οἶμαι τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν
ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπρωθούνται τε καὶ

⁵¹ This distinction is made by S. here in order to make as clear as possible the division between desire pure and simple (the appetitive part of the soul) and desire for e.g., a *good* (or a certain

BOOK IV

sick, it became, as a result, a particular kind of knowledge. And this is what made it no longer referred to as simply knowledge, but as knowledge of a particular kind, that is: medicine."

"I understand," he said, "and I think it's right."

"Now as to thirst," I said, "will you not propose that it is one of those things which is what it is by being related to something? Thirst is one of these, I imagine."

"I will," he said, "it's a desire for a drink."

"Is there then a particular kind of thirst for a particular kind of drink? But thirst of itself is for neither much nor little, good or bad, or in short for anything in particular; thirst pure and simple is for a drink pure and simple?"⁵¹

"I agree with you entirely."

"So the soul of a thirsty being, in as far as he is thirsty, wants to do nothing but drink, craves for it and hankers after it."

"That is quite clear."

"So if anything ever pulls the thirsty soul in a different direction there would be something else in it other than what is thirsty leading it like a wild animal toward a drink? I can assure you that, as we say, the same thing would not act in opposition to anything in the same respect of itself, in relation to the same circumstances, at the same time."⁵²

"It certainly would not."

"Just as it is not right to say of an archer, I think, that his hands both thrust the bow away and draw it toward him

quantity of) drink, which would bring in the reasoning part (see d4ff.).

⁵² See above, n. 47.

προσέλκονται, | ἀλλ' ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἢ ἀπωθοῦσα χεῖρ,
 c ἑτέρα δὲ ἢ προσαγομένη.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Πότερον δὴ φῶμέν τινας ἔστιν ὅτε διψῶντας οὐκ
 ἐθέλειν πιεῖν; |

Καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις.

Τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, φαίη τις ἂν τούτων πέρι; οὐκ
 ἐνείναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελεύον, ἐνείναι δὲ
 τὸ κωλύον πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὄν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύ-
 οντος;

Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ. |

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν κωλύον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγίγνεται,
 d ὅταν ἐγγένηται, ἐκ λογισμοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄγοντα καὶ
 ἔλκοντα διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων παρα-
 γίγνεται;

Φαίνεται.

Οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀξιόσομεν αὐτὰ διττά
 τε καὶ | ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται
 λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ᾧ ἐρᾶ
 τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας
 ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών
 τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἑταῖρον.

Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰκότως, ἔφη, ἡγοίμεθ' ἂν οὕτως.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύο ἡμῖν ὠρίσθω εἶδη
 e ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόητα· τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμούμεθα
 πότερον τρίτον, ἢ τούτων ποτέρω ἂν εἴη ὁμοφυές;

BOOK IV

at the same time, but that one hand is the one that thrusts it away and the other the one that draws it in."

"Yes, I agree entirely," he said.

"So can we say that there are times when thirsty people don't want to drink?"

"Yes indeed," he said, "a lot of people and frequently."

"What would one say about these people, then?" I asked. "That there is no urge in their soul to drink, but something which prevents them from drinking, it being a different force which overcomes that element which is doing the urging?"

"I think so," he said.

"So then, doesn't the force which prevents such things come into play, when it does, as the result of reason? The pulling and pushing are additional forces which arise through afflictions and illness?"

"It seems so."

"Not without reason," I said, "will we claim that they are two separate forces, differing from each other, on the one hand in calling that part of the soul which does the calculating the reasoning faculty, and on the other where desires such as love, hunger, and thirst are found and which is aroused over other passions too, the irrational and appetitive, related to certain gratifications and pleasures."

"No," he said, "we would think so with good reason."

"So then," I said, "let those be two divisions we have distinguished in the soul; now, is the faculty of passion by which we grow angry a third one, or would it share its characteristics with one of the other two?"

Ἴσως, ἔφη, τῷ ἐτέρῳ, τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ. |

Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τοῦτο·
 ὡς ἄρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς ὑπὸ
 τὸ βόρειον τείχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ
 440 δημίῳ κειμένους, ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δὲ αὖ
 δυσχεραῖνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτόν, καὶ τέως μὲν μά-
 χοιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοιτο, κρατούμενος δ' οὖν ὑπὸ
 τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διεκκύσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, προσδρα-
 μῶν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς, "Ἴδου ὑμῖν," ἔφη, "ὧ κακοδαί-
 μονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος." |

Ἦκουσα, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός.

Οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφη, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν
 πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὡς ἄλλο ὄν ἄλλω.

Σημαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἔφη, πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα,
 b ὅταν βιάζωνται τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμίαι,
 λοιδοροῦντά τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ
 ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντων σύμμαχον
 τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου; ταῖς δ'
 ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινωνήσαντα, | αἰροῦντος λόγου
 μὴ δεῖν ἀντιπράττειν, οἶμαι σε οὐκ ἂν φάσαι γενομέ-
 νου ποτὲ ἐν σαντῷ τοῦ τοιούτου αἰσθῆσθαι, οἶμαι δ'
 οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ.

⁵³ Possibly to be identified with a character in a fragment of the comic poet Theopompus (fr. 1 Kock), who was notorious for his love of boys "as pale as corpses."

⁵⁴ The north and south defensive walls (completed ca. 455)

BOOK IV

“Perhaps the second one,” he said, “the appetitive faculty.”

“Well,” I said, “I once heard a story, and I believe it, that Aglaion’s son Leontius⁵³ was coming up from Piraeus along the foot of the northern wall on the outside⁵⁴ and he noticed some corpses lying beside the executioner.⁵⁵ He felt the desire to look at them at one moment and turned away in disgust at the next. For a time he struggled and covered his face; then, overcome by his desire he opened his eyes wide and ran toward the corpses. “Look for yourself, you wretches,” he shouted, “and fill yourselves with an image of the beautiful.”

“I’ve heard that one too,” he said.

“Yet this story,” I said, “shows that passion sometimes does battle with our desires, as one thing against another.”

“Yes, it does indeed,” he said.

“Don’t we see this in many places elsewhere,” I said, “when desires force someone to do things contrary to reason, he reviles himself and grows angry with the violent force inside him and, as if there are two parties wrangling, such a person’s passion becomes an ally of his reason? But when passion has made common cause with your desires to act against reason, when reason forbids—I think you would say that you deny such a thing ever having arisen inside yourself and I think you would say it had never happened to anyone else.”

were built to give Athens a strategic corridor connecting with its port, Piraeus.

⁵⁵ The executioner was presumably in the process of throwing the bodies into a pit (a deep ravine outside the walls).

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη.

Τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅταν τις οἴηται ἀδικεῖν; οὐχ ὅσω
 c ἂν γενναιότερος ᾗ, τοσοῦτω ἦττον δύναται ὀργίζεσθαι
 καὶ πεινῶν καὶ ριγῶν καὶ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων
 πάσχων ὑπ' ἐκείνου ὃν ἂν οἴηται δικαίως ταῦτα δρᾶν,
 καί, ὃ λέγω, οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τούτου αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι
 ὁ θυμός; |

Ἄλλθῃ, ἔφη.

Τί δέ ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαι τις ἡγήηται; οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ
 τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ συμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ
 καί, διὰ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ ριγοῦν καὶ πάντα τὰ
 d τοιαῦτα πάσχειν, ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν
 γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξηται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ
 ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ'
 αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεῖς πραῦνθῇ;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔοικε τούτῳ ᾧ λέγεις· καίτοι γ'
 ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ | πόλει τοὺς ἐπικούρους ὥσπερ κύνας
 ἐθέμεθα ὑπηκόους τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ποιμένων πό-
 λεως.

Καλῶς γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νοεῖς ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν.
 ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τόδε ἐνθυμῆ;

Τὸ ποῖον;

e Ὅτι τούναντίον ἢ ἀρτίως ἡμῖν φαίνεται περὶ τοῦ
 θυμοειδοῦς. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικόν τι αὐτὸ ὀόμεθα
 εἶναι, νῦν δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖν φαμεν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
 αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὄπλα πρὸς
 τὸ λογιστικόν. |

Παντάπασι, ἔφη.

BOOK IV

"Indeed no by Zeus!" he said.

"Then what about when someone thinks he is doing wrong?" I asked. "Is it not a fact that the more high-minded he is the less he is able to become angry, even if he is suffering from hunger and cold and anything else of this kind at the hands of that man who he may think is doing these things rightly and, as I have been saying, won't his passion not want to get aroused against him?"

"That is true," he said.

"But what of when a person thinks he is being wronged? Does his spirit not seethe inside him, rage and ally itself with what he believes to be right? Doesn't it suffer because of hunger and cold and all such things, and, by enduring, overcome them without ceasing from noble acts until it achieves its end, or dies, or, like the dog called to heel by the shepherd, calms down and is brought back to itself by reason and so is pacified?"

"I think it is very much as you say," he said. "Moreover, in our state we make our auxiliaries, like dogs, obedient to our rulers who are, so to speak, shepherds of the state."

"Then you have grasped my meaning beautifully," I said, "but I wonder if you have considered the following in addition."

"What is that?" he asked.

"That the opposite of what we were just saying about the passionate part is true. For then we thought that it was something appetitive, but now we are saying that, far from it, in the struggle within the soul it is far more likely to take up arms on the side of reason."

"I agree in every way," he said.

Ἄρ' οὖν ἕτερον ὄν καὶ τούτου, ἢ λογιστικοῦ τι εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ τρία ἀλλὰ δύο εἶδη εἶναι ἐν ψυχῇ, λογιστικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν; ἢ καθάπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει
 441 συνείχεν αὐτὴν τρία ὄντα γένη, χρηματιστικόν, ἐπι-
 κουρητικόν, βουλευτικόν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον
 τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπίκουρον ὄν τῷ λογιστικῷ
 φύσει, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῆ;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τρίτον. ἰ

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἂν γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἄλλο τι φανῆ,
 ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἐφάνη ἕτερον ὄν.

Ἄλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη, φανῆναι καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
 παιδίοις τοῦτό γ' ἂν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς
 γεγόμενα μεστά ἐστι, λογισμοῦ δ' ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε
 b δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ
 ποτε.

Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλῶς γε εἶπες. ἔτι δὲ ἐν
 τοῖς θηρίοις ἂν τις ἴδοι ὃ λέγεις, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. πρὸς
 δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὃ ἄνω που ἐκεῖ εἶπομεν, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου
 μαρτυρήσει, τὸ— ἰ

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·

c ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ σαφῶς ὡς ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ ἐπιπλήττον
 πεποιήκεν Ὀμηρος τὸ ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ τοῦ βελ-
 τίονός τε καὶ χείρονος τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ.

Κομιδῆ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

⁵⁶ Hom. *Od.* 20.17, previously quoted at 3.390d5, there in an ethical context as a poetic sentiment which is morally suitable to

BOOK IV

"Is it then different from it, or is it some aspect of the rational, so that there are two, not three faculties within the soul, one rational, one appetitive? Or, just as in the state, there are three classes which would hold it together: the moneymaking, the auxiliary and deliberative, so too in the soul passion is the third class which is naturally auxiliary to the rational, unless it is destroyed by a bad upbringing?"

"It must be a third one," he said.

"Yes," I said, "if it is shown to be something other than the rational faculty just as it was shown to be different from the appetitive."

"Well it's not difficult to demonstrate," he said. "You can be sure to find this in children because at birth they are immediately full of spirit, but some seem to me never to have any share of reason, although most of them do sometime later."

"Yes, by Zeus!" I said, "well said. Again one can see in animals that what you were saying is true. In addition to all this and, as we said before, I think, Homer's line will bear witness:

'He struck his breast and rebuked his heart'

for here Homer has clearly described the part which has calculated the better or worse course upbraiding the irrational passionate part, as one entity upbraiding another separate one."⁵⁶

"You are absolutely right," he said.

be heard by the young. Here it serves as a simple illustration of interactions of different parts of the human soul.

Ταῦτα μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μόγις διανευέκαμεν,
καὶ ἡμῖν | ἐπιεικῶς ὁμολογεῖται τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν ἐν πόλει,
τὰ αὐτὰ δ' ἐν ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ γένη ἐνεῖναι καὶ
ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμόν.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνό γε ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς πόλις ἦν σοφῆ
καὶ ᾧ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τούτῳ σοφὸν εἶναι;

Τί μῆν; |

d Καὶ ᾧ δὴ ἀνδρείος ἰδιώτης καὶ ὡς, τούτῳ καὶ πόλιν
ἀνδρείαν καὶ οὕτως, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν
ὡσαύτως ἀμφοτέρα ἔχειν;

Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ δίκαιον δὴ, ᾧ Γλαύκων, οἶμαι φήσομεν ἀνδρα
εἶναι | τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ πόλις ἦν δικαία.

Καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.

Ἄλλ' οὐ πῆ μῆν τοῦτό γε ἐπιλελήσμεθα, ὅτι ἐκείνη
γε τῷ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττειν τριῶν ὄν-
των γενῶν δικαία ἦν. |

Οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, ἐπιλελήσθαι.

e Μνημονευτέον ἄρα ἡμῖν ὅτι καὶ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος,
ὅτον ἂν τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττη, οὗτος
δίκαιός τε ἔσται καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων.

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μνημονευτέον.

Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ
ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμη-
θειαν, | τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόω εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ
τούτου;

BOOK IV

"Well then," I said, "I think we have just about managed to swim through that⁵⁷ and we are reasonably agreed that that there are the same classes, and the same number of each, in the state as in the soul of each individual."

"There are."

"And does it not now follow of necessity that as our state is wise and in what respect it is so, so the individual is wise in that respect also?"

"Certainly."

"Is the state courageous in the same respects and manner as an individual, and do both have everything required for virtue in the same way?"

"This must be so."

"In that case, Glaucon, I think we can agree that a man is just in the same way as a state is just."

"That too is completely inevitable."

"But surely at no point have we lost sight of the fact that the state with its three classes is just by virtue of each class seeing to its own affairs within it."

"No, I don't think we have," he said.

"We must also remember that each of us too, in whom each of the faculties within him performs its own function, will be just and seeing to his own business."

"Yes, we must remember that," he said.

"Is it then fitting for the rational to govern, as it is wise and has forethought for the whole of the soul, and for the passions to be subject to and an ally of it?"

⁵⁷ The first appearance in *Republic* of swimming as a metaphor for progress through argument, which becomes prominent later in the need to deal with the successive "waves" of argument (Books 5 and 6).

Πάνυ γε.

442 Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κρᾶσις σύμφωνα αὐτὰ ποιήσει, τὸ μὲν ἐπιτείνουσα καὶ τρέφουσα λόγοις τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθήμασιν, τὸ δὲ ἀριεῖσα παραμυθουμένη, ἡμεροῦσα ἄρμονία τε καὶ ῥυθμῶ;

Κομιδῆ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Καὶ τούτῳ δὴ οὕτῳ τραφέντε καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς | τὰ αὐτῶν μαθόντε καὶ παιδευθέντε προσ(ατ)ήσεται τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ—ὃ δὴ πλείστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον—ὃ τηρήσεται μὴ τῷ πίμπλασθαι τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλουμένων ἡδονῶν πολὺ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν γενόμενον οὐκ αὖ τὰ αὐτοῦ
b πράττη, ἀλλὰ καταδουλώσασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσήκον αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ σύμπαντα τὸν βίον πάντων ἀνατρέψῃ.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. |

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τοὺς ἕξωθεν πολεμίους τούτῳ ἂν κάλλιστα φυλαττοίτην ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενοι, τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν, ἐπόμενοι δὲ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιτελοῦν τὰ βουλευθέντα;

Ἔστι ταῦτα. |

c Καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ οἶμαι τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλούμενον ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασφύξῃ διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου⁵ παραγγελλθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μῆ.

⁵ τοῦ λόγου Adam: τῶν λόγων ADF, Slings

BOOK IV

“Certainly.”

“Then as we were saying,⁵⁸ won’t a combination of the mental and physical make them harmonious, tuning and nurturing the one with fine literature and learning, relaxing, encouraging and civilizing the other⁵⁹ with harmony and rhythm?”

“Absolutely,” he said.

“Indeed when these two have been nurtured in this way and have truly learned their own business and have been educated, they will take control of the appetitive side where the largest part of the soul is situated in each individual and is naturally most greedy for material things. They will watch in case, by being filled with so-called physical pleasures and becoming large and strong, it won’t perform its proper functions and will attempt to enslave and rule the things that this very class should not, and altogether turn everyone’s whole life upside down.”

“Very much so,” he said.

“Then would these two be best,” I asked, “to guard against external enemies on behalf of the whole soul and body, one by its counsel, the other by its defensive measures, following its ruler and carrying out the ruler’s intentions courageously?”

“Yes, they would.”

“Also, in my opinion, we shall call each and everyone brave in this latter part of his nature, when through pain and pleasure the spirited part of him keeps firmly to what he has been taught he must fear and what not, by the dictates of reason.”

⁵⁸ At 3.411e–412a

⁵⁹ “The one . . . the other”: i.e., referring back to *to logistikon* and *to thumoeides* (441e2, 5).

Ὅρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

Σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, τῷ ὃ ἢ ἤρχεν τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν, ἔχον αὖ κακέينو ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐκάστῳ τε καὶ ὄλω τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δέ; σάφρονα οὐ τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχομένῳ τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζωσιν αὐτῷ;

Σωφροσύνη γοῦν, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ τοῦτο, πόλεως τε καὶ ιδιώτου. ἰ

Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ δίκαιός γε, ᾧ πολλάκις λέγομεν, τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως ἔσται.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Τί οὖν; εἶπον ἐγώ· μή πη ἡμῖν ἀπαμβλύνεται ἄλλο τι δικαιοσύνη δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐφάνη; ἰ

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

ᾧδε γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παντάπασιν ἂν βεβαιωσαίμεθα εἴ τι ἡμῶν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμφισβητεῖ, τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες.

Ποῖα δὴ;

Οἷον εἰ δέοι ἡμᾶς ἀνομολογεῖσθαι περὶ τε ἐκείνης ἰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνη ὁμοίως πεφυκότος τε καὶ τεθραμμένον ἀνδρός, εἰ δοκεῖ ἂν παρακαταθήκην χρυσίου ἢ ἀργυρίου δεξάμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀποστερη-

"That is right," he said.

"And wise in that small part which ruled⁶⁰ in him and passed on those instructions, that part moreover having an understanding of what is beneficial to each of the three classes individually and the whole of them in common."

"Very much so."

"Then what about this: isn't he called temperate by virtue of the friendship and harmony of these same parts when the ruling part and the two subject to it agree together that the rational must be the ruler, and they do not argue with it?"

"Temperance," he said, "is certainly nothing other than this, in the state and in the individual."

"Well then indeed, as we have been saying repeatedly, it's through this and in this way that the just man will be just."

"That has to be true."

"What then?" I asked. "Has justice in any way become blurred, so as to stop us seeing it as anything other than what we have discovered in our state?"

"I don't think so," he said.

"No, because we could make perfectly sure whether there is still any dispute about this in our soul in this way: by advancing commonplace comparisons to test it."

"Such as?"

"For example, if we had to come to an agreement about that state and the man who was similar to it in character and upbringing. If such a man had received a deposit of gold or silver, would he seem the sort of person to steal it?"

⁶⁰ Past tense, "because the instructions must be given *before* they can be obeyed." (Adam, n. ad loc).

443 σαι, τίν' ἂν οἶε οἰθηῆναι τοῦτο αὐτὸν δράσαι μάλλον ἢ ὅσοι μὴ τοιοῦτοι;

Οὐδέν' ἄν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἱεροσυλιῶν καὶ κλοπῶν καὶ προδοσιῶν, ἢ ἰδία ἐταίρων ἢ δημοσία πόλεων, ἐκτὸς ἂν οὗτος εἴη; |

ἐκτός.

Καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν ἄπιστος ἢ κατὰ ὄρκους ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ὁμολογίας.

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

Μοιχεῖται μὴν καὶ γονέων ἀμέλεια καὶ θεῶν ἀθεραπυσία | παντὶ ἄλλῳ μάλλον ἢ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσήκουσι.

Παντὶ μέντοι, ἔφη.

b Οὐκοῦν τούτων πάντων αἴτιον ὅτι αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἕκαστου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι;

Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

Ἔτι τι οὖν ἕτερον ζητεῖς δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἢ | ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ πόλεις;

Μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἔγωγε.

c Τέλεον ἄρα ἡμῖν τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἀποτετέλεσται, ὃ ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεῦσαι ὡς εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζουσαν κατὰ θεόν τινα εἰς ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κινδυνεύομεν ἐμβεβηκέναί.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

BOOK IV

Who do you think would consider that he, rather than men not of this sort, would do such a thing?"⁶¹

"No one," he said.

"And in the case of temple robbery, theft and treason, whether in the private domain among friends, or at large in public, he would be excluded, wouldn't he?"

"Yes."

"And what's more, he would not be in any way untrustworthy either as regards his oaths or other agreements."

"How could he be?"

"Again adultery, neglect of one's parents and failure to do service to the gods are characteristic of every other person rather than such as one as this."

"Yes indeed," he said.

"Isn't the reason for all this that every one of his faculties within him is performing its own functions of ruling or being ruled?"

"Yes, that and nothing else."

"Are you still looking for justice to be something other than this power which produces men and states such as this one?"

"No, by Zeus!"

"Then our perfect dream is realized, which as soon as we began to construct our state, we said we suspected would, by some divine guidance, result in the origin and a pattern of justice."⁶²

"I agree with that in every way."

⁶¹ The trustworthiness of the just man in guarding deposits recalls Polemarchus' attempt at a definition of justice in Book I.333c8.

⁶² At 432d-33b4.

Τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα, ὦ Γλαύκων—δι' ὃ καὶ ὠφελεῖ—
εἶδωλόν τι | τῆς δικαιοσύνης, τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτομικὸν
φύσει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν σκυτοτομεῖν καὶ ἄλλο μηδὲν πράτ-
τειν, τὸν δὲ τεκτονικὸν τεκταίνεσθαι, καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ
οὕτως.

Φαίνεται.

Τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτον μὲν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ
δικαιοσύνη | ἀλλ' οὐ τι περὶ τὴν ἔξω πράξιν τῶν αὐ-
d τοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντός, ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ
τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐάσαντα τὰλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον
ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ
ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γε-
νόμενον ἑαυτῷ | καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ
ὄρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης
καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἅττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα,
e πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα γενό-
μενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σῶφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, οὕτω δὴ
πράττειν ἤδη, ἐάν τι πράττη ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν
ἢ περὶ σώματος θεραπείαν ἢ καὶ πολιτικόν τι ἢ περὶ
τὰ ἴδια συμβόλαια, | ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ
ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν πράξιν ἢ ἂν ταύ-
444 τὴν τὴν ἔξιν σφίξῃ τε καὶ συναπεργάζηται, σοφίαν δὲ
τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην, ἄδικον
δὲ πράξιν ἢ ἂν αἰεὶ ταύτην λύῃ, ἀμαθίαν δὲ τὴν ταύτην
αὐτὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν δόξαν.

BOOK IV

“And so, Glaucon, it actually was—and this is why it was so helpful—a sort of image of justice that it is right that a man who has an innate gift for cobbling should stick to his last and not do anything else, and a carpenter likewise, and so on with the rest.”

“So it would seem.”

“And it’s true that justice, it seems, was something of this kind, but not something to do with a person’s external activities, but the internal ones, that are really to do with one’s self and one’s own functions. A man does not allow the individual faculties within him to get involved in the functions of others, nor the parts of the soul to meddle with each other, but he puts what are really his own interests in good order, directs and disciplines himself, becomes a friend to himself and arranges those three elements together like, simply, the three defining notes of the scale, lower, upper and middle, and any others that happen to lie in between. He binds these all together and from many elements becomes in every respect a unity, temperate and harmonious; then and only then should he act, if he is having anything to do with the earning of money, or looking after his physical needs, or any business of the state, or his own private business arrangements: in every one of these he evaluates them and calls his activity as just and fair which preserves and helps to complete this state of affairs. The understanding which oversees this activity he calls wisdom, while the unjust action is that which would continually ruin all this, and the belief which oversees it, ignorance.”⁶³

⁶³ The first mention in *Republic* of the key polarity “knowledge” (*epistēmē*) and “belief” (*doxa*); see e.g., 6.506ff.

Παντάπασιν, ἣ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· | τὸν μὲν δίκαιον καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ὃ τυγχάνει ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄν, εἰ φαῖμεν ἠύρηκέναι, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τι οἶμαι δόξαιμεν ψεύδεσθαι.

Μὰ Δία οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη.

Φῶμεν ἄρα;

Φῶμεν.

Ἔστω δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο σκεπτέον οἶμαι ἀδικίαν. |

Δῆλον.

- b Οὐκοῦν στάσιν τινὰ αὖ τριῶν ὄντων τούτων δεῖ αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἀλλοτριπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐπανάστασιν μέρος τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἕν' ἀρχῇ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐ προσῆκον, ἀλλὰ τοιούτου ὄντος φύσει οἷου πρέπει αὐτῷ δουλεύειν, †τοῦ δ' αὖ δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι;⁶ | τοιαῦτ' ἅττα οἶμαι φήσομεν καὶ τὴν τούτων ταραχὴν καὶ πλάνην εἶναι τὴν τε ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶσαν κακίαν.

- c Αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἄδικα πράττειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ αὖ τὸ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ταῦτα πάντα τυγχάνει ὄντα κατάδηλα ἤδη σαφῶς, εἶπερ καὶ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη; |

Πῶς δὴ;

BOOK IV

“Socrates,” he said, “what you are saying is utterly true.”

“Well then,” I said, “if we were to say we have found the just man and state, and what thing justice actually is in them, I don’t think we would be far wrong.”

“No indeed, by Zeus,” he said.

“Shall we say it then?”

“Let’s say it.”

“So be it,” I said. “Now after that, I think we need to look at injustice.”

“Evidently.”

“So doesn’t it have to be infighting among these three categories: involvement in multiple activities, meddling in one another’s functions and insurrection of some part against the whole of the soul to take control where it doesn’t belong, whereas its nature is such that it should be †subordinate to the ruling element†?⁶⁴ Something of this sort, I think, we will say, and that the confusion and drifting about of these is injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, ignorance and, in a nutshell, every evil.”

“It is indeed,” he said.

“So are doing wrong and being unjust, and again doing right in fact already absolutely clear, if this is what is meant by injustice and justice?”

“How do you mean?”

⁶⁴ The text is corrupt, but the general sense is clear. Slings adopts the MSS readings.

⁶ τοῦ δ’ αὖ δουλεύειν . . . ὄντι ADF: τῷ δ’ οὐ δουλεύειν . . . ὄντι Burnet: alii alia

Ἵτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυγχάνει οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῶν ὑγιεινῶν τε καὶ νοσῶδων, ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἐν σώματι, ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῇ.

Πῆ; ἔφη.

Τὰ μὲν που ὑγιεινὰ ὑγίειαν ἐμποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ νοσώδη νόσον.

Ναί. |

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαια πράττειν δικαιοσύνην
d ἐμποιεῖ, τὸ δ' ἄδικα ἀδικίαν;

Ἄνάγκη.

Ἵστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσον | παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλον.

Ἵστι γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν αὖ, ἔφην, τὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι | ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ ἀδικίαν παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλον;

Κομιδῆ, ἔφη.

Ἄρετῇ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ
e κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἰσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια.

Ἵστιν οὕτω.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα εἰς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν φέρει, τὰ δ' αἰσχροῖα εἰς κακίας; |

Ἄνάγκη.

Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἦδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἐστι σκέψασθαι

BOOK IV

"The fact," I said, "that they do not differ at all from healthy cases and diseased ones, since the one is physical and the other mental."

"In what way?" he asked.

"Well I suppose that healthy activity promotes health, and unhealthy activity leads to illness."

"Yes."

"That means doing right leads to justice and doing wrong leads to injustice, doesn't it?"

"Of course it does."

"To create health is to make the parts of the body control each other and be controlled by each other naturally; while to bring about sickness is caused when to rule and be ruled by each other happens unnaturally."

"Yes, that is so."

"Consequently this means that to create justice is to set up the parts of the soul to rule and be ruled by each other naturally and injustice is to rule and be ruled by each other unnaturally, doesn't it?"

"Absolutely," he said.

"Then it seems that virtue would be a kind of health, beauty and good condition of the soul, while sickness is evil, a disgrace, a weakness."⁶⁵

"That is so."

"So too, good habits lead to the acquisition of virtue, bad ones to vice, don't they?"

"They must do."

"Then what remains for us to do, it seems, is to consider

⁶⁵ Anticipated in *Cri.* 47d-e.

445 πότερον αὐτὸ λυσιτελεῖ δίκαιά τε πράττειν καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἕαντε λανθάνῃ ἕαντε μὴ τοιοῦτος ὢν, ἢ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι, ἕάνπερ μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενος. |

Ἄλλ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γελοῖον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ σκέμμα γίγνεσθαι ἤδη, εἰ τοῦ μὲν σώματος τῆς φύσεως διαφθειρομένης δοκεῖ οὐ βιωτὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ μετὰ πάντων σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ παντὸς πλούτου καὶ
 b πάσης ἀρχῆς, τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου ᾧ ζῶμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται, ἕάνπερ τις ποιῇ ὃ ἂν βουλευθῆ ἄλλο πλὴν τούτου ὀπότεν κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγῆσεται, δικαιοσύνην δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν κτήσεται, ἐπειδήπερ ἐφάνη γε ὄντα ἐκάτερα οἷα ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν. |

Γελοῖον γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπέειπερ ἐνταῦθα ἐληλύθαμεν, ὅσον οἶόν τε σαφέστατα κατιδεῖν ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει οὐ χρὴ ἀποκάμνειν.

Ἦκιστα, νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, πάντων ἀποκμητέον.

c Δεῦρό νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς ὅσα καὶ εἶδη ἔχει ἢ κακία, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἃ γε δὴ καὶ ἄξια θέας.

Ἐπομαι, ἔφη· μόνον λέγε.

Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς μοι φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου, | ἐν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας, τέτταρα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄττα ὦν καὶ ἄξιον ἐπιμνησθῆναι.

⁶⁶ This repeats the challenge to S. made by Glaucon and Ad-

BOOK IV

whether it is beneficial to do just deeds and cultivate good habits and be just, whether you are observed or not, or to be wrong and unjust, provided you go unpunished, and don't improve by punishment."⁶⁶

"Well, Socrates," he said, "the question now looks ridiculous to me at least, now that both of these states are seen to be such as we have described them: if it seems that life cannot be lived when the natural condition of the body is destroyed, not even if you have all manner of food and drink, wealth and power, but that life would apparently still be worth living if one does whatever one wishes, anything except that which gets us away from evil and injustice and brings justice and virtue, and the natural state of that thing by which we live⁶⁷ is upset and destroyed."

"It is ridiculous," I said, "nevertheless since we have got so far as to be able to see very clearly how things are, we mustn't flag and give up."

"Indeed, by Zeus!" he exclaimed, "the very last thing is to give up."

"Come on then so that you can see how many kinds of injustice there are," I said, "or at least those that I think are worth looking at."

"I'm following you," he said, "just tell me."⁶⁸

"Indeed," I said, "it appears, looking from a watchtower, as it were, since we have reached this point in our discussion, that virtue has one form, but evil has countless forms and there are four of these worth mentioning."

eimantus in 2.357a-67e, which Glaucon, at least, now considers that S. has met with the soul/body analogy (a5-b4).

⁶⁷ I.e., the soul.

⁶⁸ For Glaucon as "follower," see 432c3-4.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

Ὅσοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτειῶν τρόποι εἰσὶν εἴδη ἔχοντες, τοσοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι.

d Πόσοι δῆ;

Πέντε μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτειῶν, πέντε δὲ ψυχῆς.

Λέγε, ἔφη, τίνας.

Λέγω, εἶπον, ὅτι | εἷς μὲν οὗτος ὃν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν πολιτείας εἶη ἂν τρόπος, ἐπονομασθείη δ' ἂν καὶ διχῆ· ἐγγενομένοι μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἐνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος βασιλεία ἂν κληθείη, πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν εἶδος λέγω· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν πλείους οὔτε εἷς ἐγγενομένοι | κινήσειεν ἂν e τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως, τροφῆ τε καὶ παιδεία χρησάμενος ἢ διήλθομεν.

Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ἔφη.

BOOK IV

"How do you mean?" he asked.

"There are as many varieties of constitutions of specific types," I said, "as perhaps there are varieties of the soul."

"How many?"

"Five of each," I said.

"Tell me, what are they?" he asked.

"I reckon," I said, "that one variety of constitution would be the one we have already discussed, but it could be called by two names: when one man stands out among the rulers, it is called a monarchy; when there are more than one, an aristocracy."

"That's true," he said.

"This then is one form I mean," I said. "For whether there are several or only one in power, they could not remove any of the laws of the state of any importance as long as they stick to the upbringing and education we have discussed."

"It doesn't seem likely," he said.

E

449 Ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοῖνον τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ πολι-
 τείαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καλῶ, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον· κακὰς
 δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, εἶπερ αὕτη ὀρθή, περί
 τε πόλεων διοικήσεις καὶ περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου
 κατασκευήν, | ἐν τέτταρσι πονηρίας εἶδεσιν οὔσας.

Ποίας δὴ ταύτας; ἔφη.

Καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἦα τὰς ἐφεξῆς ἐρῶν, ὥς μοι ἐφαίνοντο
 b ἕκασται ἐξ ἀλλήλων μεταβαίνειν· ὁ δὲ Πολέμαρχος—
 σμικρὸν γὰρ ἀπωτέρω τοῦ Ἀδείμαντος καθῆστο—
 ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου ἄνωθεν
 αὐτοῦ παρὰ τὸν ὦμον, ἐκείνόν τε προσηγάγετο καὶ
 προτείνας ἑαυτὸν ἔλεγεν ἅττα προσκεκυφώς, ὦν ἄλλο
 | μὲν οὐδὲν κατηκούσαμεν, τόδε δέ· Ἀφήσομεν οὖν,
 ἔφη, ἢ τί δράσομεν;

Ἦκιστά γε, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος μέγα ἤδη λέγων.

Καὶ ἐγὼ, Τί μάλιστα, ἔφην, ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε;

¹ An important intervention, reiterating the motif of “not letting Socrates go” when he appears to be avoiding difficult issues (see also 1.358c10 and 4.419a). Here, in this dramatic interruption, Adeimantus (as before at 419a) is notably more critical and

BOOK V

"It is this kind of state and constitution, and the corresponding kind of man, I call good and right. If this kind is right, the rest are evil and wrong as regards the internal administration of their states and the way they train the souls of their private citizens. They can be grouped into four types of deficiency."

"Indeed, which are they?" Glaucon asked.

Well I was going to relate in order how I thought each of them had changed into different forms from each other; but Polemarchus, who was sitting a little distance away from Adeimantus, stretched out his hand and catching hold of his cloak by the shoulder from above he pulled Adeimantus toward him, and leaning forward whispered something in his ear of which all we heard was "Shall we let it go then," he said, "or what?"

"Certainly not," said Adeimantus, this time out loud.¹

And I said: "What exactly is this you won't let go of?"

assertive than his brother Glaucon, who at a6 appears prepared meekly to follow S.'s lead. Adeimantus and Polemarchus prevent S. from leaving the ideal constitution and passing on to others, a move which is now postponed until Books 8–9. Structurally a long digression, Books 5–7 actually contain the philosophical core of *Republic*.

Σέ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

c Ὅτι, ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα;

Ἀπορραθυμείν ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καὶ εἶδος ὄλον οὐ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκκλέπτειν τοῦ λόγου ἵνα μὴ διέλθῃς, καὶ λήσειν οἰηθῆναι εἰπὼν αὐτὸ φαύλως, ὡς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ ἰ παιδῶν παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται.

Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε;

Ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ τᾶλλα, λόγου δέεται τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας· πολλοὶ γὰρ d ἂν γένοιτο. μὴ οὖν παρῆς ὄντινα σὺ λέγεις· ὡς ἡμεῖς πάλαι περιμένομεν οἰόμενοί σε που μνησθήσεσθαι παιδοποιίας τε πέρι, πῶς παιδοποιήσονται, καὶ γενομένους πῶς θρέψουσιν, καὶ ὄλην ταύτην ἣν λέγεις κοινωνίαν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν· ἰ μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα φέρειν καὶ ὄλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον. νῦν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ἄλλης ἐπιλαμβάνη πολιτείας πρὶν ταῦτα ἱκανῶς διελέσθαι, δέδοκται ἡμῖν 450 τοῦτο ὃ σὺ ἤκουσας, τὸ σε μὴ μεθίεναι πρὶν ἂν ταῦτα πάντα ὥσπερ τᾶλλα διέλθῃς.

Καὶ ἐμὲ τοίνυν, ὁ Γλαύκων ἔφη, κοινωνὸν τῆς ψήφου ταύτης τίθετε. ἰ

Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, πᾶσι ταῦτα δεδογμένα ἡμῖν νόμιζε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

² See 4.423e5–24a2. See *Leg.* 5.739c2–3, where this phrase is used to describe the best constitution.

³ The support of Thrasymachus here (and see n. 5) as well as the brief, but telling, intervention by Polemarchus above (449b6)

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"You!" he said.

"What?" I said. "What exactly do you mean?"

"You seem to us to be losing your grip on things," he said, "and you've cheated us out of an entire section of the discussion, not some trivial part of it, so as not to have to explain it to us: and you think you can get away with it by stating casually that of course as regarding women and children it is completely clear that the property of friends will be held in common."²

"Well, Adeimantus," I asked, "wasn't I right?"

"Yes," he said, "but this word 'right' as in everything else needs discussing: how is this common ownership going to work? There could be many ways of doing it, you know. So don't pass over the topic you have been talking about, as we have been waiting for some time thinking you would presumably make some mention of the procreation of children: how they will be born, and once born how they will be brought up, including the whole of this common ownership of women and children which you were talking about. We think, you see, that it has an important bearing on whether a state has been constituted correctly or wrongly: indeed it makes all the difference. So as you are now taking another constitution in hand before you have analyzed these matters adequately, we resolved, as you heard just now, not to let you go before you've explored all these matters just as you did the rest."

"And you can take it that this gets my vote too," said Glaucon.

"As a matter of fact," said Thrasymachus, "you can take it that this resolution has unanimous support, Socrates."³

and S.'s complaint about "starting from scratch" (a8 below) suggests a new start reminiscent of the beginning of the dialogue.

Οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰργάσασθε ἐπιλαβόμενοί μου.
 ὅσον λόγον πάλιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς
 πολιτείας· ἦν ὡς ἡδὴ διεληλυθὼς ἔγωγε ἔχαιρον,
 b ἀγαπῶν εἴ τις ἐάσοι ταῦτα ἀποδεξάμενος ὡς τότε
 ἐρρήθη. ἂ νῦν ὑμεῖς παρακαλοῦντες οὐκ ἴστε ὅσον
 ἐσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρετε· ὃν ὁρῶν ἐγὼ παρήκα τότε,
 μὴ παράσχοι πολὺν ὄχλον.

Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Θρασύμαχος· χρυσοχοήσοντας οἶει
 τούσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε | ἀφίχθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγων ἀκου-
 σομένους;

Ναί, εἶπον, μετρίων γε.

Μέτρον δέ γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, τοι-
 ούτων λόγων ἀκούειν ὄλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. ἀλλὰ
 τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον ἔα· σὺ δὲ περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶμεν μηδαμῶς
 c ἀποκάμης ἢ σοι δοκεῖ διεξιῶν, τίς ἢ κοινωνία τοῖς
 φύλαξιν ἡμῖν παίδων τε πέρι καὶ γυναικῶν ἔσται καὶ
 τροφῆς νέων ἔτι ὄντων, τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ
 γιγνομένης γενέσεώς τε καὶ παιδείας, ἣ δὴ ἐπιπνοω-
 τάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι. πειρῶ οὖν εἰπεῖν τίνα τρόπον | δεῖ
 γίγνεσθαι αὐτήν.

Οὐ ράδιον, ὦ εὐδαιμον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διελεῖν· πολλὰς

⁴ S.'s disingenuousness here in suggesting that in Book 4 he deliberately suppressed the radical proposals about social organization he is now being "forced" to reveal, is perhaps a dramatic means whereby Plato indicates just how radical they are and conveniently postpones them until he has S. outline the basic structure of the state in Book 4.

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“Think what you’ve done by laying into me like this,” I said. “Think of how much discussion about the state you are setting in motion again as if we were starting from scratch. And to think how pleased I was myself at how much ground we had already covered and delighted if anyone accepted what was said at that point and allowed it to stand. What you have now demanded that I do, don’t you realize what a hornet’s nest of a debate you’re stirring up? When I realized this just now, I let it pass in case it should produce a vast swarm.”⁴

“What of it?” said Thrasymachus. “Do you think these people have come here now to prospect for gold, but not listen to our discussion?”⁵

“Yes,” I said, “as long as it’s of a reasonable length.”

“To those with any sense, Socrates, the whole of their life would be a reasonable amount of time to listen to such discussions,” said Glaucon. “But don’t worry about us; don’t fight shy of answering our questions as you explain your views on what common ownership our guardians will have regarding the women and children, and their upbringing in their earliest years, and the intervening period between their birth and education, which certainly looks to be the most laborious. So try to explain to us how it should come about.”

“It isn’t easy to explain, my dear fellow” I said. “It ad-

⁵ A proverbial expression for people who ignore the matter in hand to go after more immediately attractive diversions. A characteristically forceful (and final) intervention by Thrasymachus; the expression, and putting the words into Thrasymachus’ mouth, recalls S.’s words at 1.336e4–9, where, in reply to Thrasymachus, he rates the search for justice above that for gold.

γὰρ ἀπιστίας ἔχει ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὧν
 διήλθομεν. καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπιστοῖτ' ἄν,
 καὶ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα γένοιτο, ὡς ἄριστ' ἄν εἴη ταῦτα,
 d καὶ ταύτη ἀπιστήσεται. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὄκνος τις αὐτῶν
 ἄπτεσθαι, μὴ εὐχὴ δοκῆ εἶναι ὁ λόγος, ὧ φίλε
 ἑταῖρε.

Μηδέν, ἧ δ' ὅς, ὄκνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγνώμονες οὔτε
 ἀπιστοι οὔτε δύσνοι οἱ ἀκουσόμενοι.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ ἄριστε, ἧ που βουλόμενός με
 παραθαρρύνειν λέγεις; |

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Πᾶν τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦναντίον ποιεῖς. πιστεύ-
 οντος μὲν γὰρ ἐμοῦ ἐμοὶ εἰδέναι ἃ λέγω, καλῶς εἶχεν
 e ἡ παραμυθία· ἐν γὰρ φρονίμοις τε καὶ φίλοις περὶ
 τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ φίλων τάληθῆ εἰδότα λέγειν
 ἀσφαλές καὶ θαρραλέον, ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα
 451 ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιείσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ, φοβερόν
 τε καὶ σφαλερόν, οὗ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν—παιδικὸν γὰρ
 τοῦτό γε—ἀλλὰ μὴ σφαλεῖς τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ μόνον
 αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους συνεπιπασάμενος κεί-
 σομαι περὶ ἃ ἥκιστα δεῖ σφάλλεσθαι. προσκυνῶ δὲ
 Ἀδράστειαν, ὧ Γλαῦκων, | χάριν οὐ μέλλω λέγειν
 ἐλπίζω γὰρ οὐδ' ἑλαττον ἀμάρτημα ἀκουσίως τινὸς
 φονέα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπατεῶνα καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ

⁶ Another name for Nemesis (divine retribution). S. (semi-humorously) utters a formula to avert punishment for voicing an eccentric opinion, namely that imparting false beliefs to others about basic values is worse than committing murder.

BOOK V

mits of many doubts: even more than the matters we discussed before. For I can assure you that one might refuse to believe what we're proposing is possible, and even if it were actually to turn out to be so, even here there might be disbelief as to whether it is for the best. For this reason I feel a certain reluctance to touch on these matters in case the discussion looks like wishful thinking, my friend."

"Don't hold anything back. Your audience is neither lacking in judgment or trust, nor ill-disposed toward you."

And I said: "My dear fellow! Is your intention by any chance to encourage me?"

"It is," he said.

"Well you're actually doing the complete opposite," I said, "because if I were confident that I myself know what I am talking about, encouragement would be fine. Among intelligent people and friends I can be sure and confident that I know how to tell the truth about both highly important and personal issues. However when I'm not confident and at the same time I'm trying to find the right way to express myself, as indeed I am right now, it is nerve-racking and tricky, not in fear of being thought of as ridiculous, for that really is childish; but afraid of being misled in the truth not only myself, but also, having dragged my friends down with me, I shall find myself in a position which is the last place in which one ought to be deceived. I bow myself down before Adrasteia,⁶ Glaucon, because of what I am about to say. You see, I really do suppose it a lesser misdemeanor to become the involuntary murderer of someone than to lead people astray about principles of what is fine

δικαίων [καί] νομίμων περί. τούτο οὖν τὸ κινδύνευμα
κινδυνεύει ἐν ἐχθροῖς κρείττον ἢ φίλοις, ὥστε εὐ¹ με
παραμυθῆ.

b Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων γελάσας, Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη,
εἰάν τι πάθωμεν πλημμελὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἀφίεμέν
σε ὥσπερ φόνου καὶ καθαρὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀπατεῶνα
ἡμῶν. ἀλλὰ θαρρήσας λέγε. †

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, καθαρὸς γε καὶ ἐκεῖ ὁ ἀφεθείς,
ὡς ὁ νόμος λέγει· εἰκὸς δέ γε, εἴπερ ἐκεῖ, κἀνθάδε.

Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, τούτου γ' ἕνεκα.

c Λέγειν δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, χρὴ ἀνάπαλι αὖ νῦν, ἃ τότε
ἴσως ἔδει ἐφεξῆς λέγειν· τάχα δὲ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς
ἔχοι, μετὰ ἀνδρείου δράμα παντελῶς διαπερανθὲν τὸ
γυναικίον αὖ περαίνειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ σὺ οὕτω
προκαλῆ. Ἀνθρώποις γὰρ φύσι καὶ παιδευθείσιν ὡς
ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν, † κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη
ὀρθὴ παίδων τε καὶ γυναικῶν κτησίς τε καὶ χρεία ἢ
κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν ὀρμὴν ἰούσιν, ἥνπερ τὸ πρῶτον ὠρ-
μήσαμεν ἐπεχειρήσαμεν δέ που ὡς ἀγέλης φύλακας
τοὺς ἄνδρας καθιστάναι τῷ λόγῳ.

Ναί.

d Ἀκολουθῶμεν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τροφήν

¹ εὐ¹ A: οὐκ εὐ¹ DF: οὐ Hermann

⁷ I.e., not requiring ritual purification, as in the case of murder. The use of imagery associated with homicide continues the humorous tone of the exchange.

and good and just. This then is a risk that it is better for you to face among your enemies than your friends, so that you do well to encourage me."

Glaucon laughed and said: "Well, Socrates, if we suffer any damage as a result of our discussion, we acquit you, as we would in a case of murder, as untainted⁷ and as no deceiver of us. So, take courage then, off you go!"

"Well certainly in that case," I said, "the acquitted goes away cleared of the charge, as the law says, and if that is reasonable in that instance, so it is in this one."

"Then go on," he said, "on that assumption, at any rate."

"Indeed," I said, "I must now go over some of the ground again which perhaps we should have discussed in sequence.⁸ Perhaps, after going through the man's role thoroughly it would be right to go through the woman's,⁹ especially as that is what you are demanding. For men born and educated in the way we have discussed, according to our teaching have no other right to possess and make use of children and women than to follow that direction in which we set them at the beginning. We tried, I think, in our discussion to set our men up as guardians of a flock."

"Yes."

"Then let's follow that by allowing them pretty much

⁸ See 450a7-b3 and n. 3 above, for S.'s disingenuous excuse for postponing the detailed discussion.

⁹ Possibly an allusion to the mimes of Sophron (fifth century) which were divided into male and female.

παραπλησίαν ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἡμῖν
πρέπει ἢ οὐ.

Πῶς; ἔφη.

᾽Ωδε. τὰς θηλείας τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν πότερα |
συμφυλάττειν οἴομεθα δεῖν ἄπερ ἂν οἱ ἄρρενες φυλάτ-
τωσι καὶ συνθηρεύειν καὶ τᾶλλα κοινῇ πράττειν, ἢ
τὰς μὲν οἰκουρεῖν ἔνδον ὡς ἀδυνάτους διὰ τὸν τῶν
σκυλάκων τόκον τε καὶ τροφήν, τοὺς δὲ πονεῖν τε καὶ
πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν περὶ τὰ ποίμνια; |

Κοινῇ, ἔφη, πάντα· πλὴν ὡς ἀσθενεστέραις χρῶ-
μεθα, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἰσχυροτέροις.

e Οἶόν τ' οὖν, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ χρῆσθαί τινα
ζῶψ, ἂν μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἀπο-
διδῶς;

Οὐχ οἶόν τε.

Εἰ ἄρα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἐπὶ ταῦτά χρῆσόμεθα καὶ |
τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ταῦτά καὶ διδακτέον αὐτάς.

452 Naί.

Μουσικὴ μὲν ἐκείνοις γε καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἐδόθη.

Naί.

Καὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἄρα τούτῳ τὸ τέχνα καὶ τὰ |
περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀποδοτέον καὶ χρῆστέον κατὰ
ταῦτά.

¹⁰ A radical suggestion in the social context of the general seclusion of citizen women in Athens and elsewhere in the classical period. S.'s argument from analogy with animals here has limited value, since animals do not have a "society" in the human

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the same birth and upbringing and see whether or not that suits our purpose.”

“How do you mean?”

“Like this: do we think that female guard dogs should join in guarding whatever the males do, take part in hunting and do everything else in common; or should the females stay indoors and look after the house, being incapable, owing to their producing and bringing up the puppies, while the males do the hard work and have the entire care of the flocks?”

“They should do everything together,” he said, “except that we treat the females as weaker and the males as stronger.”

“Is it possible then,” I asked, “to use an animal for the same tasks if you don’t give it the same nurture and training?”

“No, it isn’t.”

“Then if we use women and men for the same job, we must also give them the same training.”¹⁰

“Yes.”

“We gave the men cultural and physical training.”

“Yes.”

“That means that in addition to these two sorts of training, we must also give the women instruction in warfare and use them the same way as men in war.”

sense. Aristotle notes this specific weakness at *Pol.* 1264b4–6, in the course of a wide-ranging criticism of *Republic* (*Pol.* 2, chs. 1–2). At 466d5–7 Plato appears to realize that the argument by analogy on its own is not adequate. On Plato and the role of women in the state, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 2 (iv).

Εἰκὸς ἐξ ὧν λέγεις, ἔφη.

Ἴσως δὴ, εἶπον, παρὰ τὸ ἔθος γελοῖα ἂν φαίνοιτο
πολλὰ περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, εἰ πράξεται ἢ λέγεται.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. |

Τί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γελοιότατον αὐτῶν ὀράς; ἢ δῆλα δὴ
ὅτι γυμνὰς τὰς γυναικὰς ἐν ταῖς παλαιστραῖς γυμνα-
b ζομένας μετὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐ μόνον τὰς νέας, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἤδη τὰς πρεσβυτέρας, ὥσπερ τοὺς γέροντας ἐν
τοῖς γυμνασίοις, ὅταν ῥυσοὶ καὶ μὴ ἡδεῖς τὴν ὄψιν
ὅμως φιλογυμναστῶσιν;

Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· γελοῖον γὰρ ἄν, ὡς γε ἐν τῷ
παρεστῶτι, φανείη. |

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπεὶπερ ὠρμήσαμεν λέγειν, οὐ
φοβητέον τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώμματα, ὅσα καὶ οἷα
ἂν εἶποιεν εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολὴν γενομένην καὶ
c περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα
περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄπλων σχέσιν καὶ ἵππων ὀχῆσεις.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶπερ λέγειν ἠρξάμεθα, πορευτέον πρὸς τὸ
τραχὺ | τοῦ νόμου, δεηθείσιν τε τούτων μὴ τὰ αὐτῶν
πράττειν ἀλλὰ σπονδάζειν, καὶ ὑπομνήσασιν ὅτι οὐ
πολύς χρόνος ἐξ οὗ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἐδόκει αἰσχρὰ
εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα ἅπερ νῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβά-
ρων, γυμνοὺς ἀνδρας ὀράσθαι, καὶ ὅτε ἤρχοντο τῶν
d γυμνασίων πρῶτοι μὲν Κρήτες, ἔπειτα Λακεδαιμόνιοι,

¹¹ Probably a reference to Aristophanes' comedy *Eccleziiazousae* (composed ca. 392), in which women are comically seen as

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"That would seem a reasonable conclusion."

"Now," I said, "perhaps many of the things we are now discussing which are contrary to tradition would look absurd if they are pursued in the way they are described."

"Very much so," he said.

"What do you think is the most ridiculous?" I asked. "It's surely quite clear that it's the women exercising naked in the gymnasia alongside the men, not just the young ones, but also those past their prime, like the old men at their training despite their wrinkles and the fact that it's no pleasant sight: yet they love their exercise."

"Zeus, yes! That really would look silly in present day circumstances."

"Since we've started our discussion, we mustn't be afraid of the gibes from the smart set, must we: the many sorts of things they may say when such changes take place in both this kind of physical exercise and cultural activity, and not least in weapon handling and horse riding?"¹¹

"You're right," he said.

"Well, since we've begun our discussion, we must proceed to the harsh reality of the law by demanding that they don't give us their usual stuff, but be serious, and remind them that it is not so long since the Greeks thought it shameful and ridiculous, as the majority of foreigners do now, to see men naked, and that when the Cretans first began to exercise naked, followed by the Spartans, the wits

taking over the running of the city and introducing common property. "Weapons handling" and "horse riding"; terms also used to refer respectively to the male genitals and sexual intercourse (see also 454e1).

ἐξ᾽ ἧν τοῖς τότε ἀστείους πάντα ταῦτα κωμωδεῖν. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

Ἔγωγε.

Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ οἶμαι χρωμένους ἄμεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ | συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρῆν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου· καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείξατο, ὅτι μάταιος ὅς γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὄψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοίου ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἄφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὐτὸ σπουδάζει πρὸς² ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στησάμενος ἢ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

e Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνομολογητέον, εἰ δυνατὰ ἢ οὐ, καὶ δοτέον ἀμφισβήτησιν εἴτε τις | φιλοπαίσιμων εἴτε σπουδαστικὸς ἐθέλει
453 ἀμφισβητῆσαι, πότερον δυνατὴ φύσις ἢ ἀνθρωπίνη ἢ θήλεια τῇ τοῦ ἄρρενος γένους κοινωρῆσαι εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ ἔργα ἢ οὐδ' εἰς ἓν, ἢ εἰς τὰ μὲν οἶα τε, εἰς δὲ τὰ οὐ, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ποτέρων ἐστίν; ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως ἂν κάλλιστα τις ἀρχόμενος ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ κάλλιστα τελευτήσειεν; |

Πολύ γε, ἔφη.

Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡμεῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμφισβητήσωμεν, ἵνα μὴ ἔρημα τὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου λόγου πολιορκῆται;

Οὐδέν, ἔφη, κωλύει.

² πρὸς ADF: del. Slings: εἰς Stob.

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of the day made fun of all this. Or perhaps you don't think so?"¹²

"Yes I do."

"Well then, when it appeared better to those taking part in all this, I think, to undress rather than to cover up, then what was ridiculous to the eye vanished away when discussion of the matter showed it was best; and this showed that the man who thinks that anything other than baseness is ridiculous is a fool, as is he who tries to make a joke at the sight of anything except that of what is foolish and bad, and conversely, is serious about any mark of what is beautiful other than the good."

"I agree in every way," he said.

"We must agree, mustn't we, in the first place on whether our ideas are possible or not, and allow for someone fond of a joke, or someone serious minded who wants to debate whether female human beings actually have the natural attributes in common with the male sex for all activities, or none at all, or some of them, but not others. Then on the question of war, which group are they in? Wouldn't it be best to start in this way, and so be likely also to make the best ending?"

"Yes, very much so," he said.

"Are you willing," I asked, "for us to debate against each other on behalf of the others so that the arguments from the other side don't go undefended?"¹³

"There's nothing to stop us," he said.

¹² Thuc. 1.6.5-6 says that the practice was introduced by the Spartans.

¹³ Putting the case for a hypothetical opponent is a rhetorical device used by Plato elsewhere, e.g., *Resp.* 1.365c7ff., *Cri.* 50aff., *Tht.* 166-67.

b Λέγωμεν δὴ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὅτι “Ὁ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Γλαῦκων, οὐδὲν δεῖ ὑμῖν ἄλλους ἀμφισβητεῖν αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κατοικίσεως, ἣν ὠκίζετε πόλιν, ὁμολογεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἓνα ἐν τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.” |

Ὁμολογήσαμεν οἶμαι πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

“Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως οὐ πάμπολυ διαφέρει γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς τὴν φύσιν;”

Πῶς δ’ οὐ διαφέρει;

“Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο καὶ ἔργον ἑκατέρῳ προσήκει προσταττειν τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν;” |

Τί μὴν;

c “Πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἀμαρτάνετε νῦν καὶ τὰναντία ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγετε φάσκοντες αὖ τοὺς ἀνδρας καὶ τὰς γυναικας δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράττειν, πλείστον κεχωρισμένην φύσιν ἔχοντας;” ἔξεις τι, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς ταῦτ’ ἀπολογεῖσθαι; |

Ὡς μὲν ἐξαίφνης, ἔφη, οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον ἀλλὰ σοῦ δεήσομαί τε καὶ δέομαι καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λόγον, ὅστις ποτ’ ἐστίν, ἐρμηνεύσαι.

Ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι προορῶν ἐφοβούμην τε καὶ ὤκνουν ἄπτεσθαι τοῦ νόμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων κτῆσι καὶ τροφήν.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν.

d Οὐ γάρ, εἶπον. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὦδ’ ἔχει ἄντε τις εἰς | κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἄντε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεῖ οὐδὲν ἦττον.

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"Then let's say this on their behalf: 'Socrates and Glaucon, there's no need for others to argue with you, since you yourselves agreed at the founding of the state which you were setting up, that every citizen must each engage in one job to which he is innately suited.'"¹⁴

"We did, I think; yes, we did."

"So are there not aspects where a woman is by nature completely different from a man?"

"How can she not be different?"

"So is it appropriate to assign different jobs to each of them according to their innate ability?"

"Certainly."

"So how can you not now be wrong and contradict yourselves by asserting that men and women must do the same jobs despite being naturally very different from each other? Have you any defense against this, you splendid fellow?"

"As this is out of the blue, it's not very easy," he said. "But I shall ask you, and I am indeed asking you to interpret our side of the debate as well, whatever it is."

"This is precisely what I was afraid of, Glaucon, when I foresaw this and many other problems a while ago, and it's why I was reluctant to get onto the law about the possession of women and the upbringing of children."

"Zeus, no!" he said, "I don't think it is easy."

"It isn't," I said, "I can tell you; but it goes like this: if you fall into a small swimming pool or into the middle of the greatest ocean, you swim regardless."

¹⁴ At 2.369e-70c

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέον σῶζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ἥτοι δελφίνα τινα ἐλπίζοντας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἂν ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἢ ἄπορον σωτηρίαν.

Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. ἢ

e Φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴαν πη εὖρωμεν τὴν ἕξοδον. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ ἄλλην φύσιν ἄλλο δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύειν, γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἄλλην εἶναι τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις τὰ αὐτὰ φάμεν νῦν δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύσαι. ταῦτα ἡμῶν κατηγορεῖται; ἢ

Κομιδῆ γε.

454 Ἦ γενναία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης.

Τί δῆ;

Ἵτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἢ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἶεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

Ἔστι γὰρ δῆ, ἔφη, περὶ πολλοὺς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦτο τείνει ἐν τῷ παρόντι;

¹⁵ The story of Arion saved from drowning by a dolphin is told by Herodotus (1.23–24).

¹⁶ “Disputation” (*antilogikē*) is presenting contradictory conclusions (associated with the sophists and satirized by Plato in *Euthydemus*) as is “arguing” (*erisdein*), i.e., refuting an opponent,

“Of course.”

“So we must swim too and try to rescue ourselves from the argument, whether we’re expecting some dolphin to pick us up, or some other unlikely form of rescue, mustn’t we?”¹⁵

“It looks like it,” he said.

“Come on then,” I said, “let’s see if we can find the way out. We do agree that people of differing natural abilities must do different jobs. Men and women are different by nature. But now we are saying that these different natures must do the same job. That’s the case against us, isn’t it?”

“Absolutely,” he said.

“My, what a wonderful thing the force of the art of disputation can be, Glaucon!” I said.

“Why is that?”

“Because,” I said, “many people seem to me to fall into it, even unwillingly, and think that they are not arguing, but having a conversation, because of their inability to look at the subject under discussion by dividing it up into categories, but pursue literally the contradiction in what has been stated, practicing eristic and not dialectic on each other.”¹⁶

“Yes,” he said, “this fault indeed applies to many people, but you’re not saying this extends to us in our present discussion, are you?”

as opposed to “having a conversation” (*dialogesthai*) or “dialectic” which is cooperative discussion aimed at discovering the truth. S. is saying here that they are in danger of falling into disputation by arguing both sides of the thesis (that men and women can and cannot do the same tasks) without first sufficiently defining their terms, as S. goes on to demonstrate.

b Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ· κινδυνεύομεν γοῦν ἄκοντες ἀντιλογίας ἄπτεσθαι.

Πῶς;

Τὸ τὴν ἄλλην³ φύσιν ὅτι οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖ | ἐπιτηδευμάτων τυγχάνειν πάνν ἀνδρείως τε καὶ ἐριστικῶς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκομεν, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δὲ οὐδ' ὅπη- οὖν τί εἶδος τὸ τῆς ἐτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τί τείνον ὠριζόμεθα τότε, ὅτε τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἄλλη φύσει ἄλλα, τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπεδίδομεν.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα. |

c Τοιγάρτοι, εἶπον, ἕξεστιν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνερωτᾶν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις φαλακρῶν καὶ κομητῶν καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐναντία, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ὁμολογῶμεν ἐναντίαν εἶναι, ἐὰν φαλακροὶ σκυτοτομῶσιν, μὴ ἔαν κομήτας, ἐὰν δ' αὖ κομήται, μὴ | τοὺς ἐτέρους.

Γελοῖον μεντὰν εἶη, ἔφη.

Ἄρα κατ' ἄλλο τι, εἶπον ἐγώ, γελοῖον, ἢ ὅτι τότε οὐ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἐτέραν φύσιν ἐτιθέμεθα, d ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τείνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα; οἷον ἱατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἱατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐτα τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐλέγομεν ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

Ἐγωγε. |

³ τὸ τὴν ἄλλην Baiter: τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν ADF Galen, Slings: τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν Bessarion

BOOK V

"Absolutely," I said. "At any rate there is the risk that we unconsciously fasten upon opposing arguments."

"How?"

"In that we are pursuing very boldly and contentiously on a literal level the idea that people of a different nature¹⁷ should not find themselves performing the same functions. But we did not consider at all what type of difference and sameness of nature we had in mind and what was our aim in reaching a definition when we assigned different tasks to different natures, but the same tasks to the same nature."

"No, we didn't take that into account," he said.

"Well," I said, "that means, apparently, that we can ask ourselves whether bald people share the same natural make up as those with full heads of hair, or the opposite, and when we agree it's the opposite, if bald men are cobblers we cannot let those with hair be cobblers, or if it's those with hair who are the cobblers, we mustn't allow the bald ones to be so."

"But that would be absurd," he said.

"Is it absurd for any other reason," I asked, "than that earlier we did not specify in every sense those natures that are the same and those that are different? We only kept to that form of difference and similarity which directed us toward the functions themselves. We meant, for example, that a man and a woman whose souls have an aptitude for medicine have the same nature: or do you not think so?"

"I do."

¹⁷ Reading Baiter's conjecture τὸ τῆν ἄλλην φύσιν. For a defense of the MSS reading, see Slings, *Critical Notes on Plato's Politeia*, ad loc.

Ἰατρικὸν δέ γε καὶ τεκτονικὸν ἄλλην;

Πάντως που.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν
 γυναικῶν γένος, εἴαν μὲν πρὸς τέχνην τιὰ ἢ ἄλλο
 ἐπιτήδευμα διαφέρων φαίνεται, τούτο δὴ φήσομεν
 ἐκατέρῳ δεῖν ἀποδιδόναι· εἴαν δ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ φαίνεται
 e διαφέρειν, τῷ τὸ μὲν θῆλυ τίκτειν, τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν ὀχεύειν,
 οὐδέν τί πω φήσομεν μᾶλλον ἀποδεδείχθαι ὡς πρὸς
 ὃ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν διαφέρει γυνὴ ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἔτι οἴη-
 σόμεθα δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς τε φύλακας
 ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν. |

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο κελεύομεν τὸν τὰ ἐναντία λέ-
 455 γοντα τοῦτο αὐτὸ διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς, πρὸς τίνα τέχνην
 ἢ τί ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν περὶ πόλεως κατασκευῆν οὐχ ἢ
 αὐτῇ ἀλλὰ ἑτέρα φύσις γυναικός τε καὶ ἀνδρός;

Δίκαιον γοῦν. |

Τάχα τοίνυν ἂν, ὅπερ σὺ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες,
 εἴποι ἂν καὶ ἄλλος, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ παραχρήμα ἱκανῶς
 εἰπεῖν οὐ ράδιον, ἐπισκεψαμένῳ δὲ οὐδέν χαλεπόν.

Εἴποι γὰρ ἂν.

Βούλει οὖν δεώμεθα τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντιλέγοντος
 b ἀκολουθῆσαι ἡμῶν, εἴαν πως ἡμεῖς ἐκείνῳ ἐνδειξώμεθα
 ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐπιτήδευμα ἴδιον γυναικὶ πρὸς διοί-
 κησιν πόλεως;

Πάνυ γε.

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"Whereas those natures inclined toward medicine and those inclined toward carpentry are different."

"In every way, I would say."

"And doesn't the same go for the two sexes, male and female? If they appear different with regard to some trade or other job we shall agree that we must assign them separately, but if they appear to be different only in that the female conceives, while the male fathers the child, then we shall say that nothing has yet been discovered to say that a woman is different from a man in relation to what we are talking about, so we shall still think that our guardians and the women should do the same job."¹⁸

"Yes, rightly so," he said.

"After that then won't we compel the person who holds the opposite view to instruct us on this very point: in respect of which skill or job concerned with running the state are the natures of a man and a woman not the same but different?"

"That's fair, at any rate."

"Perhaps then, as you were saying a little while ago,¹⁹ the other person too may say that it is not easy to give adequate expression to one's opinion on the spot, but after some reflection it is not difficult."

"He may do."

"Do you want us then to ask the one who argues against this view to go along with us if we can somehow demonstrate to him that there is no job exclusive to women in the running of our state?"

"Yes certainly."

¹⁸ For S.'s argument here, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 5 (a)).

¹⁹ At 453c7–9.

Ἴθι δὴ, φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀποκρίνου· ἄρα οὕτως ἔλεγες ἢ τὸν μὲν εὐφυνῆ πρὸς τι εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀφυνῆ, ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν ῥαδίως τι μαθάνοι, ὁ δὲ χαλεπῶς; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ βραχείας μαθήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ εὐρετικὸς εἴη οὗ ἔμαθεν, ὁ δὲ πολλῆς μαθήσεως τυχὼν καὶ μελέτης
 c μὴδ' ἂ ἔμαθε σφύζοιτο; καὶ τῷ μὲν τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετοῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, τῷ δὲ ἐναντιοῖτο; ἄρ' ἄλλα ἅττα ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα, οἷς τὸν εὐφυνῆ πρὸς ἕκαστα καὶ τὸν μὴ ὠρίζου;

Οὐδέεις, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἄλλα φήσει. ἢ

Οἷσθ' ἂν τι οὖν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μελετώμενον, ἐν ᾧ οὐ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ μακρολογῶμεν τὴν τε ὑφαντικὴν λέγοντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ποπάνων τε καὶ ἐψημάτων
 d θεραπείαν, ἐν οἷς δὴ τι δοκεῖ τὸ γυναικείου γένος εἶναι, οὗ καὶ καταγελαστότατόν ἐστι πάντων ἡττώμενον;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅτι πολὺ κρατεῖται ἐν ἅπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τὸ γένος τοῦ γένους. γυναιῖκες μέντοι πολλαὶ πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ βελτίους εἰς πολλὰ· τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις.

Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν πόλιν διοικούντων γυναικὸς διότι γυνή, οὐδ' ἀνδρὸς διότι ἀνήρ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως διεσπαρμέναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῦν ζῶον, καὶ πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνὴ ἐπιτηδευμά-

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“Right, come on then,’ we shall say to him ‘give us an answer: was this what you meant by someone being naturally suited to a job, another not, namely that the first learns easily, the other with difficulty? That the first after brief instruction would be able to discover much for himself on the basis of what he has learned, but after long instruction and practice the other would not even keep hold of what he has learned? Again that the physical powers of the first would adequately serve the needs of his mind, but those of the second man would hold him back. So are there any other factors than these by which you would distinguish the one who is naturally suited to each of these functions, and the one who isn’t?”

“No one will disagree with that,” he said.

“Do you then know of anything practiced by human beings in which the male sex is not superior to the female in all these aspects? Or do we have to string it out by mentioning weaving and looking after the baking and the cooking where the female sex has a reputation, though if outclassed, they are the most absurd of all?”

“What you say is true,” he said; “the one sex is truly surpassed in everything, so to speak, by the other. However there are a lot of women who are superior to men in a lot of ways, but on the whole what you say holds true.”

“In that case there is no job among those who serve the state which is given to a woman because she is a woman, nor any to a man because he is a man, but the natural aptitudes are distributed similarly between the two sexes, and a woman has as much a share in all the jobs depending

e των κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων δὲ ἀνὴρ, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀσθε-
νέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός.

Πάνυ γε.

Ἦ οὖν ἀνδράσι πάντα προστάξομεν, γυναικὶ δ'
οὐδέν;

Καὶ πῶς; |

Ἄλλ' ἔστι γὰρ οἶμαι, ὡς φήσομεν, καὶ γυνὴ ἰατρική,
ἢ δ' οὐ, καὶ μουσική, ἢ δ' ἄμουσος φύσει.

Τί μήν;

456 Καὶ γυμναστική δ' ἄρα οὐ, οὐδὲ πολεμική, ἢ δὲ
ἀπόλεμος καὶ οὐ φιλογυμναστική;

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

Τί δέ; φιλόσοφος τε καὶ μισόσοφος; καὶ θυμοειδής,
ἢ δ' | ἄθυμός ἐστι;

Καὶ ταῦτα.

Ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ φυλακικὴ γυνή, ἢ δ' οὐ. ἢ οὐ τοι-
αύτην καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν φυλακικῶν φύσιν ἐξελεξά-
μεθα;

Τοιαύτην μὲν οὖν. |

Καὶ γυναικὸς ἄρα καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις εἰς
φυλακὴν πόλεως, πλὴν ὅσα ἀσθενεστέρα, ἢ δὲ ἰσχυ-
ροτέρα ἐστίν.

Φαίνεται.

b Καὶ γυναικες ἄρα αἰ τοιαῦται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρά-

²⁰ To say that no woman is stronger or better than any man in any activity would contradict d4-5 above; here S. is merely mak-

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on her nature as a man does, but for all of them the female is weaker than the male."²⁰

"Very much so."

"Shall we then give all the jobs to the men and none to the women?"

"How could we?"

"Well it's possible, I think, as we shall see, that one woman may have a natural aptitude for medicine, another won't; one will be suited to the arts, but another one won't."

"Of course."

"Is one woman not suited to physical exercise and fighting, and another unwarlike, with no inclination for physical exercise?"

"I think so."

"What about this: is one keen on the pursuit of knowledge, while another hates it? And again is one spirited while another is lackluster?"

"Yes, this is true."

"Then one woman can be a suitable type for a guardian, another can't, or did we not select such a temperament for our male guardians as well?"²¹

"Yes we did."

"Then a woman will have the same nature in respect of becoming a guardian of our state as a male, except in so far as she is feebler rather than stronger."

"It seems so."

"Then we must select women of this kind to live in and

ing the general point that the physical weakness of women is a relevant factor in all activities (see 451e1-2, 456a10-11).

²¹ At 2.374e4ff.

σιν ἐκλεκτέαι συνοικεῖν τε καὶ συμφυλάττειν, ἐπεὶπερ εἰσὶν ἱκαναὶ καὶ συγγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν.

Πάνυ γε.

Τὰ δ' ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέα ταῖς αὐταῖς | φύσεσιν;

Τὰ αὐτά.

Ἦκομεν ἄρα εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξὶ μουσικὴν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἀποδιδόναι.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

c Οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὅμοια ἐνομοθετοῦμεν, ἐπεὶπερ κατὰ φύσιν ἐτίθεμεν τὸν νόμον· ἀλλὰ τὰ νῦν παρὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνεται.

Ἔοικεν. |

Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἐπίσκεψις ἡμῖν ἦν εἰ δυνατά γε καὶ βέλτιστα λέγοιμεν;

Ἦν γάρ.

Καὶ ὅτι μὲν δὴ δυνατά, διωμολόγηται;

Ναί.

Ἦτι δὲ δὴ βέλτιστα, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο δεῖ διομολογηθῆναι;

Δῆλον.

d Οὐκοῦν πρὸς γε τὸ φυλακικὴν γυναιῖκα γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν ἡμῖν ἄνδρας ποιήσει παιδεία, ἄλλη δὲ γυναιῖκας, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν παραλαβοῦσα;

Οὐκ ἄλλη.

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protect the state together with men of this sort, if they are competent and share a similar nature."

"Very much so."

"That means we must give the same jobs to those of similar nature, mustn't we?"

"Yes, they must do the same."

"In that case we have come round to our previous position and agree that it is not unnatural to give training of mind and body to the females of our guardians."

"I agree in every way."

"In that case we did not lay down the impossible, nor was it wishful thinking since the law we proposed is in accord with nature. But rather, what is currently done contrary to this is, it seems, turning out to be contrary to nature."

"So it seems."

"Now wasn't our investigation to see if what we were saying was possible and the best."

"Yes, it was."

"And it was agreed it was possible?"

"Yes."

"And the follow-up to this, that it is the best must also be agreed?"

"Clearly."

"So then, with a view to producing a woman fit to be a guardian, one kind of education will not produce for us men and another women, especially since it is taking in hand the same nature in each case?"

"No, it'll be the same."

Πῶς οὖν ἔχεις δόξης τοῦ τοιούδε πέρι;
 Τίνος δῆ; |

Τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν παρὰ σεαυτῷ τὸν μὲν ἀμείνω
 ἄνδρα, τὸν δὲ χείρω ἢ πάντας ὁμοίους ἡγή;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἐν οὖν τῇ πόλει ἢν φκίζομεν, πότερον οἶει ἡμῖν
 ἀμείνους ἄνδρας ἐξεργάσθαι τοὺς φύλακας, τυχόν-
 τας ἢς διήλθομεν | παιδείας, ἢ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους, τῇ
 σκυτικῇ παιδευθέντας;

Γελοῖον, ἔφη, ἐρωτᾶς.

Μαυθάνω, ἔφη. τί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν οὐχ
 οὔτοι ἄριστοι;

Πολύ γε.

e Τί δέ; αἱ γυναῖκες τῶν γυναικῶν οὐχ αὐται ἔσονται
 βέλτισται;

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, πολύ.

Ἔστι δέ τι πόλει ἀμεινον ἢ γυναικᾶς τε καὶ ἄνδρας
 ὡς | ἀρίστους ἐγγίγνεσθαι;

Οὐκ ἔστιν.

457 Τοῦτο δὲ μουσική τε καὶ γυμναστικὴ παραγιγνόμε-
 ναι, ὡς ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν, ἀπεργάσσονται;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δυνατὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄριστον πόλει
 νόμιμον ἐτίθεμεν. |

Οὕτως.

Ἄποδυντέον δὴ ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν, ἐπεὶπερ
 ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἱματίων ἀμφιέσονται, καὶ κοινωνητέον
 πολέμου τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης φυλακῆς τῆς περὶ τὴν

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"What is your belief about this kind of thing?"

"Of what?"

"Making the assumption that one man is better, while another is worse: or do you think they're all the same?"

"No, not at all."

"So, in the state we are setting up, who do you think will become better men, the guardians when they have received the education we have described, or the cobblers when they have been educated in shoemaking?"

"That's a silly question," he said.

"I realize," I said, "but what of it? Compared with the rest of our citizens, are the guardians not the best?"

"Yes, by a long way."

"And what about the women: won't they be the best of them?"

"Yes again, by a long way."

"Is there anything better for a state than that its women and men turn out to be the best possible?"

"No."

"And they will achieve this, won't they, as we described, by their combined education in cultural and physical exercise?"

"Of course."

"Then our proposal for what is lawful for the state was not only possible, but also the best."

"Yes."

"Then the guardians' women must strip off since they will be wearing virtue instead of clothes and they must take their part in war and all the other duties protecting

πόλιν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρακτέον τούτων δ' αὐτῶν τὰ
 ἐλαφρότερα ταῖς γυναιξίν ἢ ἰ τοῖς ἀνδράσι δοτέον διὰ
 b τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀσθένειαν. ὁ δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ
 γυμναῖς γυναιξί, τοῦ βελτίστου ἔνεκα γυμναζομέναις,
 ἀτελῆ τοῦ γελοίου σοφίας δρέπων καρπὸν, οὐδὲν οἶ-
 δεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ᾧ γελᾷ οὐδ' ὅτι πράττει κάλλιστα
 γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν
 ὠφέλιμον καλόν, ἰ τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ὥσπερ κῦμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν
 τοῦ γυναικείου πέρι νόμου λέγοντες, ὥστε μὴ παν-
 τάπασι κατακλυσθῆναι τιθέντας ὡς δεῖ κοινῇ πάντα
 c ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς τε φύλακας ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς φυλακίδας,
 ἀλλὰ πη τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι ὡς
 δυνατὰ τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα λέγει;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὐ σμικρὸν κῦμα διαφεύγεις.

Φήσεις δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἰ ὅταν
 τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἴδῃς.

Λέγε δὴ, ἴδω, ἔφη.

Τούτῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔπεται νόμος καὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν
 τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ὅδε.

Τίς;

d Τὰς γυναικας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάντων

²² An adapted quotation from Pindar fr. 197 Bowra. The ad-
 dition of "laughter" is Plato's.

²³ The elaborate and long drawn-out swimming metaphor was
 introduced at 453c10-d7. There are three increasingly dangerous

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our state: that's all they must do. But the lighter of these same duties must be given to the women rather than the men on account of the weakness of the sex. But the man who laughs at the women naked, who are exercising for the best of reasons, 'reaping the unripe fruit of laughter's wisdom,'²² knows nothing, so it seems, of what he is laughing at or even what he is doing. For this is the finest saying that has and ever will be expressed, that what is beneficial is fine, what is harmful is shameful."

"I agree in every way."

"Are we to say then that we are escaping safely through one wave, as it were, in discussing the law on women, so as not to be wholly engulfed by proposing that our male and female guardians must perform all their duties in common but only where the argument is consistent with itself in stating that this is possible and beneficial?"

"Indeed," he said, "that's no small breaker you've escaped."

"You'll say it's no big wave," I said, "when you see what follows."²³

"Go on, tell me: let me see," he said.

"I think the following law is the natural consequence of this and all preceding laws."

"What?"

"These women shall all be the common property of all

waves "*trikumia*" (472a4) (i.e., difficult and controversial ideas) they have to "swim through" in this part of *Republic*, of which they have just surmounted the first. For the second, see immediately below at 457d, and for the third and biggest, see 473c-d. On the "waves" as arguments, see further the introduction to Books 1-5, section 1 (Book 5 (b)).

πάσας εἶναι κοινάς, ἰδίᾳ δὲ μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν συνοικεῖν·
καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὖ κοινούς, καὶ μήτε γονέα ἔκγονον
εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτοῦ μήτε παῖδα γονέα.

Πολύ, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐκείνου μείζον πρὸς ἀπιστίαν |
καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ πέρι καὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου.

Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ γε τοῦ ὠφελίμου
ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἄν, ὡς οὐ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κοινὰς
μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι, κοινούς δὲ τοὺς παῖδας, εἴπερ
οἶόν τε· ἀλλ' οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ εἰ δυνατὸν ἢ μὴ πλείστην
ἂν ἀμφισβήτησιν γενέσθαι.

e Περὶ ἀμφοτέρων, ἦ δ' ὅς, εὖ μάλ' ἂν ἀμφισβη-
τηθείη.

Λέγεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λόγων σύστασιν· ἐγὼ δ' ὦμην
ἔκ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀποδράσεσθαι, εἴ σοι δόξειεν ὠφέ-
λιμον εἶναι, λοιπὸν δὲ δὴ μοι ἔσεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δυνα-
τοῦ καὶ μή. |

Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀποδιδράσκων, ἀλλ' ἀμ-
φοτέρων πέρι δίδου λόγον.

458 Ὑφεκτέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκην· τοσόνδε μέντοι χάρισαί
μοι· ἔασόν με ἐορτάσαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀργοὶ τὴν διάνοιαν
εἰώθασιν ἐστιᾶσθαι ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν, ὅταν μόνοι πορεύ-
ωνται. καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοί που, πρὶν ἐξευρέειν τίνα
τρόπον ἔσται τι ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τοῦτο παρέντες, ἵνα
μὴ κάμνωσι βουλευόμενοι περὶ | τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ μή,
θέντες ὡς ὑπάρχον εἶναι ὃ βούλονται, ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ
διατάττουσιν καὶ χαίρουσιν διεξιόντες οἷα δράσουσι

²⁴ I.e., not only about whether it is possible but also (which S. takes for granted at d6-7) whether it is actually beneficial.

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the men: none shall live with any man privately. Their children too shall be held in common and no parent will know his or her offspring, nor any child his or her parent."

"This is far greater than the previous point," he said, "when it comes to challenging our incredulity as to what is possible and what is beneficial."

"I don't think there would be any argument about the benefit of it," I said, "that sharing wives and children is not the greatest benefit—if it is indeed possible. But as to it's being possible, I'm not sure it won't lead to a great deal of disagreement."

"There could well be much dispute about both,"²⁴ he said.

"You're giving us a combination of the arguments," I said, "but I thought we would at least avoid one of them, if you agreed it was useful, and that would leave me to discuss whether or not it is possible."

"Well your attempt to get out of it didn't fool me," he said. "Go on, give me both arguments!"

"I must produce my defense," I said, "but just grant me this: let me take a break, just as lazy people like to make a feast of ²⁵ their thoughts when they are traveling alone. For these are the sort of people, I presume, who, not waiting to discover how their desires will be realized, abandon the subject so that they don't have the bother of deliberating what is possible and what isn't. On the assumption that what they want does exist, before you know it they have worked out the rest and enjoy explaining what they will do

²⁵ For the metaphor, see 1.354a12.

b γενομένου, ἀργὸν καὶ ἄλλως ψυχὴν ἔτι ἀργότεραν
 ποιοῦντες. ἤδη οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς μαλθακίζομαι, καὶ
 ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐπιθυμῶ ἀναβαλέσθαι καὶ ὕστερον ἐπι-
 σκέψασθαι, ἣ δυνατά, νῦν δὲ ὡς δυνατῶν ὄντων θεῖς
 σκέψομαι, ἂν μοι παριῆς, πῶς διατάξουσιν αὐτὰ οἱ
 ἄρχοντες γιγνόμενα, καὶ ὅτι | πάντων συμφορώτατ'
 ἂν εἴη πραχθέντα τῇ τε πόλει καὶ τοῖς φύλαξιν. ταῦτα
 πειράσομαί σοι πρότερα συνδιασκοπέσθαι, ὕστερα
 δ' ἐκεῖνα, εἴπερ παριεῖς.

Ἄλλὰ παρήμι, ἔφη, καὶ σκόπει.

c Οἶμαι τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ἔσονται οἱ ἄρχοντες
 ἀξιοὶ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἳ τε τούτοις ἐπίκουροι
 κατὰ ταῦτά, τοὺς μὲν ἐβελήσειν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιταττό-
 μενα, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιτάξειν, τὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς πειθόμενους
 τοῖς νόμοις, τὰ δὲ καὶ μιμουμένους, ὅσα ἂν ἐκεῖνοις
 ἐπιτρέψωμεν. |

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

d Σὺ μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς,
 ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξέλεξας, οὕτω καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
 ἐκλέξας παραδώσεις καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε ὁμοφυεῖς· οἱ
 δέ, ἅτε οἰκίας τε καὶ συσσίτια κοινὰ ἔχοντες, ἰδίᾳ δὲ
 οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον κεκτημένου, ὁμοῦ δὴ ἔσονται,
 ὁμοῦ δὲ ἀναμειγμένων καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ
 ἄλλῃ τροφῇ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης οἶμαι τῆς ἐμφύτου ἄξονται
 πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μεῖξιν. ἣ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖά σοι δοκῶ
 λέγειν; |

²⁶ On the topic of community of wives and children, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 5 (b)).

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once they have got it, thus making their already lazy souls even lazier. In the same way, I too am giving in to this weakness and am keen to postpone those previous points and look at them later to see in what respect they are possible. But for the moment, having assumed that they are possible, if you will allow me, I shall examine how our rulers will administer them when they are in place and how they can be enacted in the most beneficial way of all for both the state and its guardians. This is what I shall try to discuss with you first, and the rest later, if you let me."

"Well I'm letting you," he said. "Carry on with your inquiry."

"I think then," I said, "that if our governors are going to be worthy of the name, together with those who are their auxiliaries on the same principle, the latter will be willing to carry out orders, while the former will be the ones who give the orders, partly by obeying the laws themselves, partly by emulating them in ways we entrust to them."

"That is a reasonable point," he said.

"Right then," I continued, "as their lawgiver, just as you chose the men, so you will choose the women to hand over to them, who as far as possible share a similar natural make-up. Inasmuch as they hold their homes and eating places in *common*, since none of them will have acquired anything of this sort through their own private means, they will live together and when they have of necessity mingled together in their physical exercises and every other aspect of their daily lives, I think they will be drawn together by their natural inclinations to have sexual relations. Or do you not think that what I am saying follows from this of necessity?"²⁶

Οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλ' ἐρωτικάις ἀνάγκαις, αἱ κινδυνεύουσιν ἐκείνων δριμύτεραι εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν τε καὶ ἔλκειν τὸν πολὺν λεών.

Καὶ μάλα, εἶπον. ἀλλὰ μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἀτάκτως μὲν μίγνυσθαι ἀλλήλοισι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ποι-
e εἶν οὔτε ὅσιον ἐν εὐδαιμόνων πόλει οὔτ' ἐάσουσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες.

Οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ἔφη.

Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι γάμους τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποιήσομεν ἱεροὺς εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα· εἶεν δ' ἂν ἱεροὶ οἱ ὠφελιμώτατοι. |

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

459 Πῶς οὖν δὴ ὠφελιμώτατοι ἔσονται; τὸδε μοι λέγε, ὦ Γλαύκων· ὁρῶ γάρ σου ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ καὶ κύνας θη-
ρευτικούς καὶ τῶν γενναίων ὀρνίθων μάλα συχνοὺς·
ἀρ' οὖν, ὦ πρὸς Διός, προσέσχηκας τι τοῖς τούτων γάμοις τε καὶ παιδοποιᾷ; |

Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

Πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν τούτων, καίπερ ὄντων γενναίων, ἀρ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τινες καὶ γίνονται ἄριστοι;

Εἰσίν.

b Πότερον οὖν ἐξ ἀπάντων ὁμοίως γεννᾷς, ἢ προθυμῆ
ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων;

Ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων.

Τί δ'; ἐκ τῶν νεωτάτων ἢ ἐκ τῶν γεραιάτων ἢ ἐξ
ἀκμαζόντων ὅτι μάλιστα;

"It will certainly not be by geometric but by erotic necessity, which is likely to be keener to persuade and drag the majority of the population along with them," he said.

"True indeed," I said. "But following on from this, Glaucon, it is not to be sanctioned in a state of happy people to have indiscriminate sexual relations with each other, or to do anything else whatsoever indiscriminately, nor will the government allow it."

"No, for it's not just," he said.

"It's clear that what follows from this is that we shall make marriage a sacred thing as far as possible within our powers: sacred marriages would be those which are most beneficial."

"Absolutely," he said.

"How then are they going to be most beneficial? Tell me this, Glaucon: I see you have hunting dogs in your household and a large collection of fine birds. My goodness! Have you paid any attention to their mating and breeding?"

"In what way?" he asked.

"Of these, firstly, although they are true-bred, are there not also some which are born best of the breed?"

"There are."

"So do you breed from all alike, or do you endeavor to breed as far as possible from the best?"

"From the best."

"So what does that mean? Do you breed from the youngest, the oldest, or, as far as possible, those in their prime?"

Ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων.

Καὶ ἂν μὴ οὕτω γεννᾶται, πολὺ σοὶ ἡγῆ χεῖρον ἔσεσθαι | τό τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τὸ τῶν κυνῶν γένος;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Τί δὲ ἵππων οἶε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων; ἢ ἄλλη πη ἔχει;

Ἄτοπον μετᾶν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἶη.

Βαβαῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε, ὡς ἄρα σφόδρα
c ἡμῖν δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων, εἴπερ καὶ περὶ τὸ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὡσαύτως ἔχει.

Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔχει, ἔφη; ἀλλὰ τί δὴ;

Ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φαρμάκοις πολλοῖς
χρηῆσθαι. ἰατρὸν δέ που μὴ δεομένοις μὲν σώμασι
φαρμάκων, | ἀλλὰ διαίτη ἐθελόντων ὑπακούειν, καὶ
φανλότερον ἐξαρκεῖν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι ὅταν δὲ δὴ καὶ
φαρμακεύειν δέη, ἴσμεν ὅτι ἀνδρειότερον δεῖ τοῦ
ιατροῦ.

Ἀληθῆ; ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί λέγεις;

d Πρὸς τόδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ; συχνῶ τῷ ψεύδει καὶ τῇ
ἀπάτῃ κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν δεήσειν χρηῆσθαι τοὺς ἄρχον-
τας ἐπ' ὠφελία τῶν ἀρχομένων. ἔφαμεν δέ που ἐν
φαρμάκον εἶδει πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη. |

Ἐν τοῖς γάμοις τοίνυν καὶ παιδοποιίαις ἔοικε τὸ
ὀρθὸν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι οὐκ ἐλάχιστον.

Πῶς δὴ;

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"From those in their prime."

"And if this were not your way of breeding, do you think the pedigree of your birds and hounds would be much worse?"

"I do," he said.

"And what do you think about horses," I said, "and other animals? Or is theirs a different case?"

"That would be absurd if it were," he replied.

"Good lord!" I exclaimed, "in that case we are going to need some top-notch rulers, my good friend, if this is also the case with the human race."

"But it is the case," he said, "but so what?"

"The fact is," I said, "that they will have to use a lot of drugs. I suppose that if the body doesn't need drugs, and the patients are happy to follow a diet, we consider even a less qualified doctor is adequate for it; but whenever medication is required, we know that we need a more enterprising doctor."

"True, but what is the point you're making?"

"It's this," I said: "there is every chance that our governors will have to use frequent doses of lies and deception for the benefit of their subjects. We did agree, I think, that under the guise of 'medicine' everything of this sort is available."²⁷

"And rightly so," he said.

"Now it seems that in sexual intercourse and child rearing this notion of 'right' occurs not infrequently."

"How do you mean?"

²⁷ On lies as "medicine," see above, 3.389b. On the role of the "noble lie," see 414b8ff. and the introduction to Books I-5, section 2 (ii).

Δεῖ μὲν, εἶπον, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων τοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίγνεσθαι ὡς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτάταις τοῦναντίον, καὶ τῶν
 e μὲν τὰ ἔκγονα τρέφειν, τῶν δὲ μὴ, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποίμνιον ὅτι ἀκρότατον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γιγνόμενα λανθάνειν πλὴν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ αὖ ἢ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὅτι μάλιστα ἀστασίαστος ἔσται. †

Ὅρθότατα, ἔφη.

Ὁκοῦν δὴ ἑορταί τινες νομοθετητέαι ἐν αἷς συννάξο-
 460 μεν τὰς τε νύμφας καὶ τοὺς νυμφίους καὶ θυσίαι, καὶ ὕμνοι ποιητέοι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ποιηταῖς πρέποντες τοῖς γιγνομένοις γάμοις· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ποιήσομεν, ἕν' ὡς μάλιστα διασφύζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὸς πολέμους τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοποῦντες, † καὶ μήτε μεγάλη ἡμῖν ἢ πόλις κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν μήτε σμικρὰ γίγνηται.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη.

Κλήροι δὴ τινες οἶμαι ποιητέοι κομφοί, ὥστε τὸν φαῦλον ἐκεῖνον αἰτιᾶσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστης συνέρξεως τύχην ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἄρχοντας.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

²⁸ "Herd" (*agelē*) continues the animal imagery; the word is also used of "bands" of young men reared in military units in Sparta and Crete, to whose social arrangements Plato's state organization bears some resemblance.

BOOK V

"From what we have agreed," I said, "our best men should make their match with the best women as often as possible; but with men and women of lower status, it's the reverse. We must nurture the offspring of the first group, but not those of the second, if our flock is to be of the highest quality, and all such goings-on must be kept hidden from all but the rulers themselves, if indeed our 'herd' of guardians is to be free as far as possible from internal factions."²⁸

"That is absolutely correct," he said.

"Doesn't that mean we must legislate for some celebrations in which we shall bring together the brides and bridegrooms and make sacrifices, and our poets will compose hymns suitable for the marriage rituals? We shall leave the number of marriages to the discretion of the rulers so that they can maintain the same number of the male population as far as they can, while keeping an eye on the effects of war and disease and all those sorts of things, so as to ensure that as far as it lies within their control, our state will not grow or diminish."²⁹

"That's right," he said.

"We shall have to devise a clever system of allocation, I think, so that when each pair is formed, our inferior fellow will blame his luck and not the government."

"Yes indeed," he said.

²⁹ On the need to legislate for the ideal size of the *polis*, see above, 4.423b4.

- b Καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γέ που τῶν νέων ἐν πολέμῳ ἢ ἄλλοθί που γέρα δοτέον καὶ ἄθλα ἄλλα τε καὶ ἀφθονεστέρα ἢ ἐξουσία τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν συγκοιμήσεως, ἵνα καὶ ἅμα μετὰ προφάσεως ὡς πλείστοι τῶν παίδων ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σπείρωνται. †

Ὅρθῶς.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ αἰεὶ γιγνόμενα ἔκγονα παραλαμβάνουσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐφεστηκυῖαι ἀρχαὶ εἴτε ἀνδρῶν εἴτε γυναικῶν εἴτε ἀμφοτέρα—κοινὰ γάρ που καὶ ἀρχαὶ γυναιξί τε καὶ ἀνδράσιν—

Ναί.

- c Τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δοκῶ, λαβούσαι εἰς τὸν σηκὸν οἴσουσιν παρά τινας τροφούς χωρὶς οἰκούσας ἐν τιμὴ μέρει τῆς πόλεως· τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐάν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν † ὡς πρέπει.

Εἴπερ μέλλει, ἔφη, καθαρὸν τὸ γένος τῶν φυλάκων ἔσεσθαι.

- d Οὐκοῦν καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι ἐπιμελήσονται τὰς τε μητέρας ἐπὶ τὸν σηκὸν ἄγοντες ὅταν σπαργῶσι, πᾶσαν μηχανὴν μηχανώμενοι ὅπως μηδεμία τὸ αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ ἄλλας γάλα ἐχούσας ἐκπορίζοντες, ἐὰν μὴ αὐταὶ ἱκαναὶ ᾖσι, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐπιμελή-

BOOK V

“And I imagine we must give to those of our youngsters who show prowess in war as well as in other activities prizes and rewards, and especially more generous permission to have intercourse with the women in order that there may at the same time be a pretext for as many children as possible being fathered by such men.”

“That’s right.”

“Consequently this means that the constant supply of offspring will be taken under the wing of the authorities who have been appointed to take charge of such duties regardless of whether they are male, female or both, doesn’t it? For surely the authority is distributed equally between both women and men.”

“Yes.”

“I think they will take the offspring of good parents to the public nursery to some nurses who live apart in some quarter of the city. But as to the children of the lower orders, including any of those of other ranks who are born at all defective, they will conceal them in some secret out of the way spot, as is appropriate.”³⁰

“If the class of guardians is to be pure,” he said.

“Then will these people also see to the feeding arrangements by taking the mothers to the nursery when their breasts are full, while taking every precaution to ensure that no mother sets eyes on her own child, and by providing other women who have a supply of milk in case the mothers themselves are dry? Will they see to it that they will suckle the child for a reasonable period of time and

³⁰ A probable reference to exposure of infants, which was commonly used as a method of birth control in Greece (see e.g., Arist. *Pol.* 7.1335b).

σονται ὅπως μέτριον χρόνον θηλάσονται, ἀγρυντίας δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πόνον τίθαις τε | καὶ τροφοῖς παραδώσουσιν;

Πολλὴν ῥαστώνην, ἔφη, λέγεις τῆς παιδοποιίας ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν.

Πρέπει γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς διέλθωμεν ὁ προυθέμεθα. ἔφαμεν γὰρ δὴ ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων δεῦν τὰ ἔκγονα γίγνεσθαι.

Ἄληθῆ.

e Ἄρ' οὖν σοι συνδοκεῖ μέτριος χρόνος ἀκμῆς τὰ εἴκοσι ἔτη γυναικί, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τὰ τριάκοντα;

Τὰ ποῖα αὐτῶν; ἔφη.

Γυναικὶ μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρξάμενη ἀπὸ εἰκοσέτιδος μέχρι | τετταρακοντούτιδος τίκτειν τῇ πόλει ἀνδρὶ δ', ἐπειδὰν τὴν ὀξυτάτην δρόμου ἀκμὴν παρῆ, τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει μέχρι πεντεκαπεντηκοντα-έτους.

461 Ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν, ἔφη, αὕτη ἀκμὴ σώματός τε καὶ φρονήσεως.

Οὐκοῦν ἕαντε πρεσβύτερος τούτων ἕαντε νεώτερος τῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γεννήσεων ἄψηται, | οὔτε ὅσιον οὔτε δίκαιον φήσομεν τὸ ἀμάρτημα, ὡς παῖδα φυτύοντος τῇ πόλει, ὅς, ἂν λάθῃ, γεννήσεται οὐχ ὑπὸ θυσιῶν οὐδ' ὑπὸ εὐχῶν φύς, ἄς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τοῖς γάμοις εὗξονται καὶ ἱέρειαι καὶ ἱερεῖς καὶ σύμπασα ἢ πόλις ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀμείνους καὶ ἐξ ὠφελίμων ὠφελιμωτέρους
b αἰετὸς τοὺς ἐκγόνους γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σκότου μετὰ δεινῆς ἀκρατείας γεγονώς.

BOOK V

then hand over the sleepless hours and all the other painful duties to wet nurses and their helpers?"

"You're making the rearing of children a great relief for our guardians' wives," he said.

"As it should be," I said. "Now let's go through what we proposed in order. You recall that we agreed that these children must be of parents in the prime of life?"³¹

"That is true."

"Do you agree then that for women a reasonable period for their prime is twenty years, and for men thirty?"

"Can you be more specific?" he asked.

"For a woman," I said, "she should start to produce children for the state in her twentieth year and go on to her fortieth. When a man passes the 'utmost peak of his racing career'³² he should father children for the state up to his fifty-fifth year."

"For both," he said, "this is at any rate the peak of their physical and intellectual abilities."

"Certainly if anyone older or younger than these engages in fathering children for the community, we shall declare the offense neither sanctioned nor just, on the grounds that someone has fathered a child for the state who, if it's not detected, will not be born under the protection of the sacrifices or the prayers which priestesses and priests and the entire state offer at every marriage, that the offspring of good and beneficial parents may always become better and more beneficial to the state than the previous generation; instead it will be born in darkness accompanied by foul incontinence."

³¹ At 459b3.

³² Quoted from an unknown poet.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Ὁ αὐτὸς δέ γ', εἶπον, νόμος, εἴαν τις τῶν ἔτι γεννιώντων μὴ συνέρξαντος ἄρχοντος ἄπτηται τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γυναικῶν· | νόθον γὰρ καὶ ἀνέγγυον καὶ ἀνίερον φήσομεν αὐτὸν παῖδα τῇ πόλει καθιστάναι.

Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

Ὅταν δὲ δὴ οἶμαι αἶ τε γυναῖκες καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐκβῶσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀφήσομέν που ἐλευθέρους αὐτοὺς συγγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν ἐθέλωσι, πλὴν θυγατρὶ
 c καὶ μητρὶ καὶ ταῖς τῶν θυγατέρων παισὶ καὶ ταῖς ἄνω μητρὸς, καὶ γυναικας αὖ πλὴν ὑεὶ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς τούτων εἰς τὸ κάτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἤδη πάντα διακελευσάμενοι προθυμείσθαι μάλιστα μὲν μῆδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύημα μῆδὲ ἔν, εἴαν γένηται, εἴαν δέ τι βιάσῃται, | οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ.

Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν γ', ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεται· πατέρας δὲ καὶ θυγατέρας καὶ ἅ νυνδὴ ἔλεγεσ πῶς διαγνώσονται ἀλλήλων;

d Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ἡμέρας τις αὐτῶν νυμφίος γένηται, μετ' ἐκείνην δεκάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ ἐβδόμῳ δὴ ἅ ἂν γένηται ἕκγονα, ταῦτα πάντα προσερεῖ τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα ὑεῖς, τὰ δὲ θήλεα θυγατέρας, καὶ ἐκείνα ἐκείνον πατέρα, | καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὰ τούτων

³³ Implying, most probably, exposure (see n. 30 above).

³⁴ Precisely the question put in a comical context by Chremes to Praxagora in Ar. *Eccl.* 636–37.

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"Rightly so," he said.

"The same law applies," I said, "if any of those who are still fathering children has intercourse with any of the women of marriageable age without being paired up by the authorities. We shall regard him as imposing on the state an unaccredited, unholy bastard."

"Very right," he said.

"When the women and men cease to be of the age to have children, we shall leave the men free, I think, to have intercourse with whoever they wish, except with a daughter, a mother or the daughter's children or the mothers' mothers; and the women likewise except with a son, a father and their sons and fathers. In all these cases we shall have given orders that they are to be particularly scrupulous not to bring to the light of day even a single fetus, if it is born, but if one does force its way out, so to dispose of it³³ on the grounds that there is no means of bringing up such a child."

"That is reasonably put," he said, "but how are they to distinguish fathers and daughters and those you have just mentioned from each other?"³⁴

"There is no way it can be done," I said, "but from the day any of them becomes a bridegroom, in the tenth or seventh month after that day, whatever offspring are born, he will call the males sons and the females daughters,³⁵ and they will call him father. They will call the children

³⁵ Reckoned in lunar months. Traditionally these were the months when an embryo was expected to be born alive (it was considered that a fetus of less than seven months would not survive).

ἔκγονα παίδων παῖδας, καὶ ἐκείνα αὖ ἐκείνους πάππους
 τε καὶ τηθῆάς, τὰ δ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γεγονότα, ἐν
 ᾧ αἱ μητέρες καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἐγένων, ἀδελφάσ
 e τε καὶ ἀδελφούς, ὥστε, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀλλήλων
 μὴ ἄπτεσθαι. ἀδελφούς δὲ καὶ ἀδελφὰς δώσει ὁ νόμος
 συνοικεῖν, ἐὰν ὁ κλήρος ταύτη συμπίπτῃ καὶ ἡ Πυθία
 προσαναίρῃ.

Ὅρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς. |

Ἡ μὲν δὴ κοινωνία, ᾧ Γλαύκων, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη
 γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων τοῖς φύλαξί σοι τῆς πόλεως·
 ὡς δὲ ἐπομένη τε τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτεία καὶ μακρῷ βελ-
 τίστη, δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ
 λόγου. ἦ πῶς ποιῶμεν;

462 Οὕτω νῆ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἦδε ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁμολογίας, ἐρέσθαι
 ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τί ποτε τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἔχομεν
 εἰπεῖν εἰς πόλεως κατασκευήν, οὗ δεῖ στοχαζόμενον
 τὸν νομοθέτην τιθέναι | τοὺς νόμους, καὶ τί μέγιστον
 κακόν, εἶτα ἐπισκέψασθαι ἄρα ἂ νυνδὴ διήλθομεν εἰς
 μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἵχνος ἡμῖν ἀρμόττει, τῷ δὲ τοῦ
 κακοῦ ἀναρμοστεῖ;

Πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.

b Ἐχομεν οὖν τι μείζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκείνο ὃ ἂν
 αὐτὴν διασπᾷ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; ἦ μείζον
 ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ὃ ἂν συνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν;

Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

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of children grandchildren and will be called grandfathers and grandmothers by them. Again those born at the time when the mothers and fathers are producing children they will call sisters and brothers so that they won't have sexual relations with each other, as we said just now. The law will allow brothers and sisters to live together, if the ballot falls out this way and the Pythian priestess gives her assent."

"That's very right," he said.

"This then, Glaucon, is the sort of common ownership of women and children that the guardians of your state will have. Now the thing to do after that is to establish beyond dispute that it is consistent with the rest of the constitution and that it is by far the best arrangement possible, isn't it? Or how shall we do it?"

"Zeus! Let's do it your way," he said.

"Well this is the first step of our agreement, isn't it: to ask ourselves what we can say is the greatest good our lawgiver must aim for when framing the laws for the constitution of our state, and what is the greatest evil; then consider whether what we have just discussed fits in with the footprints³⁶ of what is good and not with our notion of what is bad?"

"Yes, we must make a special point of that," he said.

"So do we have something which is of greater harm to our state than that which tears it apart and creates many states instead of one? Or do we have something good which is greater than that which binds the state together and unifies it?"

"No, we don't."

³⁶ Plato maintains the tracking/hunting metaphor here (see above, 4.432c, and Book 4 n. 39).

Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία συνδέει, ὅταν ὅτι μάλιστα πάντες οἱ πολῖται | τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων παραπλησίως χαίρωσι καὶ λυπῶνται;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἴη δέ γε τῶν τοιούτων ιδίωσις διαλύει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περιαλγεῖς, οἱ δὲ περιχαρεῖς γίνωνται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς παθήμασι τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει;

c Τί δ' οὖν;

Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκ τοῦδε τὸ τοιούδε γίγνεται, ὅταν μὴ ἅμα φθέγγωνται ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ τοιάδε ῥήματα, τό τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν; καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου κατὰ ταυτά; |

Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

Ἐν ἧτιμι δὴ πόλει πλείστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταυτά τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν, αὕτη ἄριστα διοικεῖται;

Πολύ γε.

d Καὶ ἦτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει; οἶον ὅταν που | ἡμῶν δάκτυλός του πληγῆ, πᾶσα ἢ κοινωνία ἢ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἦσθητό τε καὶ πᾶσα ἅμα συνήλγησεν μέρους πονήσαντος ὄλη, καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὅτουσὺν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ

³⁷ Principally, the guardians and auxiliaries are implied here (see 463b10ff. for the kinship of the top two classes). In this book,

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"Does that then mean that the sharing of pleasure and pain binds the state together when all the members of the community³⁷ celebrate as far as possible and grieve in pretty much equal measure at the same gains and losses?"

"Yes, in every way," he said.

"Whereas keeping such feelings to oneself is divisive, when one group feels extreme pain and the other extreme joy at the same experiences happening to the state and those in it?"

"Of course."

"Don't we always get a result like this whenever such sentiments are not expressed in unison within the state, but this is 'mine,' this is 'not mine' and in the same way this is 'somebody else's'?"

"Absolutely."

"The states where the majority speak on the same subject in the same sort of terms such as 'mine' and 'not mine' are the best administered, aren't they?"

"Very much so."

"And isn't it the one which most resembles a single person? For example, I imagine where we have a pain in one of our fingers, the whole relationship binding the body with the soul into one system of control perceives it and feels the pain as a whole with the part which suffers, and so we say that the person has a pain in his finger, don't we? Again doesn't the same argument apply to any other part

S., in talking about the "community" and "citizens," implicitly is little concerned with the third class of craftsmen and manual workers.

^{αὐτὸς} λόγος, περὶ τε λύπης πονοῦντος μέρους καὶ
περὶ ἡδονῆς ραΐζοντος;

Ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ, ἔφη· καὶ τοῦτο ὁ ἐρωτῆς, τοῦ τοιούτου
ἐγγύτατα ἢ ἄριστα πολιτευομένη πόλις οἰκεῖ.

Ἐνὸς δὴ οἶμαι πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτιοῦν ἢ
e ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ τοιαύτη πόλις μάλιστά τε φήσκει
ἑαυτῆς εἶναι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἢ συνησθήσεται ἅπαντα
ἢ συλλυπήσεται.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τὴν γε εὖνομον.

Ὅρα ἂν εἴη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπανιέναι ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τὴν
ἡμετέραν ἢ πόλιν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ λόγου ὁμολογήματα
σκοπεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ, εἰ αὐτὴ μάλιστ' ἔχει εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη
τις μάλλον.

Οὐκοῦν χρή, ἔφη.

463 Τί οὖν; ἔστι μὲν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν
ἄρχοντες τε καὶ δῆμος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ;

Ἔστι.

Πολίτας μὲν δὴ πάντες οὗτοι ἀλλήλους προσ-
ερωῦσι; |

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ἄλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις δῆμος
τοὺς ἄρχοντας προσαγορεύει;

Ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολλαῖς δεσπότας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημο-
κρατουμέναις αὐτὸ [τοῦνομα] τοῦτο, ἄρχοντας. |

Τί δ' ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δῆμος; πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί
τοὺς ἄρχοντάς φησιν εἶναι;

Σωτήράς τε καὶ ἐπικούρους, ἔφη.

b Τί δ' οὗτοι τὸν δῆμον;

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of a human being when part of the body is either suffering pain or finds relief through pleasure?"

"It is the same," he said, "and, to answer your question, the best run state resembles this very closely."

"I think that when one of the citizens experiences anything either good or bad, such a state will certainly claim that the experience belongs to itself and all of it together will join in the pleasure or the pain."

"It must," he said, "if it is well ordered."

"It would be a good time to revisit our state," I said, "and see if it, rather than any other, contains to the greatest degree what we agreed on in our discussion."

"Yes, we must" he said.

"Well then, I'm sure other states have rulers and a citizen body just as this one does, don't they?"

"Yes."

"And they will all refer to each other as citizens?"

"Of course."

"But as well as 'citizens,' what else do the people in other states call their rulers?"

"'Masters' in most of them, but in democracies they use just this term: 'rulers.'"³⁸

"And what about the ordinary people in our state? What do they say their rulers are in addition to being citizens?"

"Protectors and helpers," he said.

"What do they call the citizen body?"

³⁸ Athenian democracy had nine *archons* (rulers) in the fifth and fourth centuries, more accurately termed "magistrates," chosen by lot to serve for a fixed term, as opposed to autocratic rulers: "masters" (*despotai*).

Μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφείας.

Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἄρχοντες τοὺς δήμους;

Δούλους, ἔφη. |

Τί δ' οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀλλήλους;

Συνάρχοντας, ἔφη.

Τί δ' οἱ ἡμέτεροι;

Συμφύλακας.

Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, | εἴ τίς τινα ἔχει προσειπεῖν τῶν συναρχόντων τὸν μὲν ὡς οἰκεῖον, τὸν δ' ὡς ἀλλότριον;

Καὶ πολλοὺς γε.

Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν οἰκεῖον ὡς ἑαυτοῦ νομίζει τε καὶ λέγει, τὸν δ' ἀλλότριον ὡς οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ; |

Οὔτω.

c Τί δὲ οἱ παρὰ σοὶ φύλακες; ἔσθ' ὅστις αὐτῶν ἔχοι ἂν τῶν συμφυλάκων νομίσαι τινὰ ἢ προσειπεῖν ὡς ἀλλότριον;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· παντὶ γὰρ ᾧ ἂν ἐντυγχάνῃ, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῶ ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῆ ἢ ὡς πατρὶ ἢ ὡς μητρὶ ἢ υἱεὶ ἢ θυγατρὶ ἢ τούτων ἐγγόνους ἢ | προγόνους νομιεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν.

d Κάλλιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τόδε εἰπέ· πότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον οἰκεῖα νομοθετήσεις, ἢ καὶ τὰς πράξεις πάσας κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα πράττειν, περὶ τε τοὺς πατέρας, ὅσα νόμος περὶ πατέρας αἰδοῦς τε περὶ καὶ κηδεμονίας καὶ τοῦ ὑπήκοον δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων, ἢ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῶ ἀμεινον ἔσεσθαι, | ὡς οὔτε ὅσα οὔτε δίκαια πράττον-

BOOK V

"Their employers and providers."

"And what do rulers in other states call the people?"

"Slaves," he said.

"And what do the rulers call each other?"

"Fellow rulers," he said.

"And in our state?"

"Fellow guardians."

"Can you then say with regard to rulers in other states whether any of them can refer to one of their fellow rulers as a kinsman, another as an outsider?"

"Yes, many could at any rate."

"So he considers the one who is a kinsman as related to himself and uses the term, and the one who is an outsider as not related to himself?"

"Yes."

"What about the guardians in your state? Is it possible for any of them to consider or address any of his fellows as an outsider?"

"In no way," he said. "You see everyone he encounters he will regard as either his brother, or sister, or father, or mother, or son, or daughter, or the children or parents of these."

"Absolutely right," I said. "But now tell me this too: will you make them use only these family names by law, or must they also carry out all the duties that are associated with the names: as regards fathers, whatever the law commands by way of respect and care for fathers and the need to be obedient to one's parents; or, if they were to act otherwise, it would be worse for them in the eyes of gods and men, as people doing nothing sanctioned or just? Will

τος ἄν, εἰ ἄλλα πράττοι ἢ ταῦτα; αὐταί σοι ἢ ἄλλαι
 φῆμαι ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ὑμνήσουσιν εὐθὺς
 e περὶ τὰ τῶν παίδων ὄτα καὶ περὶ πατέρων, οὓς ἄν
 αὐτοῖς τις ἀποφήνη, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν;

Αὐται, ἔφη· γελοῖον γὰρ ἄν εἴη εἰ ἄνευ ἔργων οἰκεία
 ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνον φθέγγονται.

Πασῶν ἄρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ συμφωνήσου-
 σιν ἑνός τινος ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττουτος ὃ νυνδὴ
 ἐλέγομεν τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ ὅτι | τὸ ἐμὸν εὖ πράττει ἢ ὅτι
 τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς.

Ἄληθέστατα, ἢ δ' ὅς.

464 Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τούτου τοῦ δόγματός τε καὶ ῥήματος
 ἔφαμεν συνακολουθεῖν τὰς τε ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας
 κοινῇ;

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἔφαμεν.

Οὐκοῦν μάλιστα | τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνήσουσιν ἡμῖν
 οἱ πολῖται, ὃ δὴ ἐμὸν ὀνομάσουσιν; τούτου δὲ κοινω-
 νοῦντες οὕτω δὴ λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μάλιστα κοινω-
 νίαν ἔξουσιν;

Πολύ γε.

Ἄρ' οὖν τούτων αἰτία πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ καταστάσει ἢ
 τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν; |

Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ἔφη.

b Ἄλλὰ μὴν μέγιστόν γε πόλει αὐτὸ ὠμολογήσαμεν
 ἀγαθόν, ἀπεικάζοντες εὖ οἰκουμένην πόλιν σώματι
 πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ λύπης τε πέρι καὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς ἔχει.

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you have these, or different reports from all the citizens constantly ringing in the children's ears from their earliest years regarding whoever is pointed out to them as their fathers and other members of the family?"

"It must be these," he said. "It would be absurd if only the family names flowed from their lips without the obligations that go with them."

"Then of all cities it will be in ours that people will unite in uttering the word we were talking about just now, when someone is doing well or badly, it is 'mine' that is doing well; 'mine' that is doing badly."

"Very true," he said.

"We agreed then that having both pleasures and pains in common followed this teaching and saying, didn't we?"³⁹

"Yes, and rightly so."

"And therefore our citizens especially will share the same thing: what they call 'mine'? And in sharing this they will thus also experience pain and pleasure to the fullest in common?"

"Very much so."

"Isn't the reason for all this the common ownership of the women and children by our guardians, in addition to the rest of the constitution?"

"Yes, that is very much the most important reason," he said.

"But then, we have further agreed that this is the greatest good for the state by likening the well-run state to the way in which the body reacts to pain and pleasure in its particular area."

³⁹ At 462b4-c9.

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Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, ὠμολογήσαμεν. |

Τοῦ μεγίστου ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡμῖν
πέφανται ἡ κοινωμία τοῖς ἐπικούροις τῶν τε παίδων
καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν γε ὁμολογοῦμεν
ἔφαμεν γάρ που οὔτε οἰκίας τούτοις ἰδίας δεῖν εἶναι
c οὔτε γῆν οὔτε τι κτήμα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφήν
λαμβάνοντας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς, κοινῇ πάντας
ἀναλίσκειν, εἰ μέλλοιεν ὄντως φύλακες εἶναι.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. |

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὅπερ λέγω, τά τε πρόσθεν εἰρημένα
καὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται αὐτοὺς
ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας, καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ διασπᾶν τὴν πόλιν
τὸ ἐμὸν ὀνομάζοντας μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἄλλον ἄλλο,
τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίαν ἔλκοντα ὅτι ἂν δύνηται
χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων κτήσασθαι, τὸν δὲ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
ἑτέραν οὔσαν, καὶ γυναικὰ τε καὶ παῖδας ἑτέρους,
d ἡδονὰς τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ἐμποιοῦντας ἰδίων ὄντων
ἰδίας, ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δόγματι τοῦ οἰκείου περὶ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
τείνοντας πάντας εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμοπαθεῖς λύπης τε
καὶ ἡδονῆς εἶναι; |

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ
οἰχίσηται ἕξ αὐτῶν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον

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"Indeed we were right to agree!" he said.

"Then we have demonstrated that the source of the greatest good for the state is the common sharing by the auxiliaries of the children and women."⁴⁰

"Certainly," he said.

"And what is more, we are now agreeing with what we said before. I think we agreed that, if they really are to be our guardians, they should have no private houses, nor land, nor any property, but should receive their subsistence from everyone else as their pay as guardians, and all consume it in common."⁴¹

"That is right," he said.

"Is what I am maintaining not the case then: that what we agreed before and what we are saying now makes them even more true guardians, and prevents them from tearing the state apart by claiming as 'mine' not the same thing, but each one with a different 'mine,' with one man hauling off to his own house whatever he can get hold of away from the rest, another purloining whatever doesn't belong to him, including another man's wife and children, making pleasures and pains private experiences on the grounds that everyone is an individual. Shouldn't they all, with one belief about their common interests, strive for the same thing as far as possible, and have the same experience of pain and pleasure?"

"Absolutely," he said.

"Then what about this point? Won't lawsuits and accusations more or less disappear from among them be-

⁴⁰ Strictly speaking, auxiliaries *and* guardians (see a9 above), but auxiliaries are obviously at the front of Plato's mind, as being more likely to be of breeding age.

⁴¹ At 3.416d3ff.

ε
 ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα κοινά; ὅθεν δὴ
 ὑπάρχει τούτοις ἀστασιάστοις εἶναι, ὅσα γε διὰ χρη-
 μάτων ἢ παίδων καὶ συγγενῶν κτήσιν ἄνθρωποι στα-
 σιάζουσιν;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἀπηλλάχθαι.

Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαίων γε οὐδ' αἰκίας δίκαι δικάως
 ἂν εἶεν ἐν ἰ αὐτοῖς· ἤλιξι μὲν γὰρ ἡλικας ἀμύνεσθαι
 καλὸν καὶ δίκαιόν που φήσομεν, ἀνάγκην σωμάτων
 ἐπιμελείας τιθέντες.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη.

465 Καὶ γὰρ τόδε ὀρθὸν ἔχει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ νόμος·
 εἴ πού τις τῷ θυμοῖτο, ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πληρῶν τὸν
 θυμὸν ἦττον ἐπὶ μείζους ἂν ἴοι στάσεις.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἰ

Πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴν νεωτέρων πάντων ἄρχειν τε καὶ
 κολάζειν προστετάσσεται.

Δῆλον.

Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε νεώτερος πρεσβύτερον, ἂν μὴ ἄρ-
 χοντες προστάττωσιν, οὔτε ἄλλο βιάζεσθαι ἐπιχειρή-
 σει ποτὲ οὔτε τύπτειν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός. οἶμαι δ' οὐδὲ
 b ἄλλως ἀτιμάσει· ἰκανῶ γὰρ τὸ φύλακε κωλύοντε,
 δέος τε καὶ αἰδώς, αἰδώς μὲν ὡς γονέων μὴ ἄπτεσθαι
 εἴργουσα, δέος δὲ τὸ τῷ πάσχοντι τοὺς ἄλλους
 βοηθεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ὡς υἱεῖς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀδελφούς, τοὺς
 δὲ ὡς πατέρας. ἰ

Συμβαίνει γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη.

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cause no one has any private possessions apart from his own body: everything else is shared? Consequently, it is possible for them to be free of internal factions; the sort of things at any rate that people quarrel over because of the possession of money, children and relatives."

"It's absolutely certain they'll be free of those," he said.

"And again there would be no legal actions for violence or assault among them. I'm sure we shall declare that it is good and right for people to defend themselves against others of their own age-group by maintaining that it is essential for them to keep themselves physically fit."

"And rightly so," he said.

"This law is also correct for the following reason," I said: "if anyone were to be angry with another, by satisfying his feelings in such a manner he would be less likely to move on to a more serious dispute."

"Yes, very much so."

"Now, it will be laid down that an older man will control and punish all the younger ones."

"Clearly."

"And again, as is reasonable, a younger man, unless ordered to do so by the governors, will never make any attempt to strike an elder, or commit any other sort of violence against him, and I don't think he will show him disrespect in any other way. For there are two preventatives: fear and shame. Shame prevents them from laying hands on their parents, fear that the others will come to the aid of the victim, some as sons, others as brothers, yet others as fathers."

"That's how it ends up," he said.

Πανταχῆ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους
οἱ ἄνδρες ἄξουσιν;

Πολλήν γε.

Τούτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων οὐδὲν
δεινὸν μὴ ποτε ἢ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς
ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

- c Τὰ γε μὴν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν δι' ἀπρέπειαν
ὀκνῶ καὶ λέγειν, ὧν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν, κολακείας
τε πλουσίῳν πένητες ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ὅσας
ἐν παιδοτροφίᾳ καὶ χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφήν οἰκετῶν
ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχουσι, τὰ ἢ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δ' ἐξαρ-
νούμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάντως πορισάμενοι θέμενοι παρὰ
γυναϊκᾶς τε καὶ οἰκέτας, ταμιεύειν παραδόντες, ὅσα
τε, ὦ φίλε, περὶ αὐτὰ καὶ οἷα πάσχουσι, δηλὰ τε δὴ
d καὶ ἀγεννή καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

Δῆλα γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ τυφλῶ.

Πάντων τε δὴ τούτων ἀπαλλάξονται, ζήσουσί τε
τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου ὃν οἱ ὀλυμπιονῆκαί ζῶσι μακα-
ριώτερον. ἢ

Πῆ;

Διὰ σμικρόν που μέρος εὐδαιμονίζονται ἐκεῖνοι ὧν
τούτοις ὑπάρχει. ἢ τε γὰρ τῶνδε νίκη καλλίων, ἢ τ'
ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου τροφή τελεωτέρα. νίκην τε γὰρ νι-

⁴² Olympic victors, in Athens at least, were awarded free meals for life by their city. In a similar comparison to the one here, Plato's S., during his trial speech (at *Ap.* 36d5–9), provocatively

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"Indeed as a result of the laws, the people will live at peace with one another in all respects, won't they?"

"Yes, very much so."

"And furthermore if these people are not disputing among themselves, there is no danger that the rest of the state will ever find themselves at variance with them or among themselves."

"They certainly won't."

"I hesitate even to mention the pettiest of the bad points which they would be rid of, as they are so unseemly: the poor maintaining their flattery of the rich, the difficulties and pains they have to face up to when bringing up their children and earning money for the essential upkeep of the family, some of which they borrow, some they default on payment, depositing with wives and slaves all they provide, handing it over to them to manage. What they go through in these transactions and how much, my friend, is all perfectly clear and sordid, and not worth mentioning."

"Yes, it's clear even to a blind man," he said.

"Truly they will be rid of these problems; they will seek out a life more full of blessings than the most blessed life of Olympic victors."

"In what way?"

"Surely, because those men are considered blessed because of only a small part of what the latter enjoy. Not only is the victory of these people finer, but their upkeep at public expense is more complete:⁴² for they win a victory

asserts his greater right to such an honor in return for what he claims as his moral guidance of Athens.

c κῶσι συμπάσης τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν, τροφήν τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσων βίος δεῖται αὐτοῖ τε καὶ παῖδες ἀναδοῦνται, καὶ γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, καλά. |

466 Μέμνησαι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξεν ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῖμεν, οἷς ἐξὸν πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν; ἡμεῖς δέ που εἶπομεν ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν, εἴ που παραπίπτει, εἰς αὐθις σκεφοίμεθα, νῦν δὲ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας φύλακας ποιοῖμεν, | τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡς οἰοί τ' εἶμεν εὐδαιμονεστάτην, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἐν ἔθνος ἀποβλέποντες ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦτο εὐδαιμονοῦμεν;

Μέμνημαι, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ τῶν ἐπικούρων βίος, εἴπερ τοῦ γε τῶν ὀλυμπιονικῶν πολὺ τε καλλίων καὶ ἀμείνων
b φαίνεται, μή πη κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκνυτοτόμων φαίνεται βίον ἢ τινῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν ἢ τὸν τῶν γεωργῶν;

Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ὅ γε καὶ ἐκεῖ ἔλεγον, δίκαιον καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰπεῖν, | ὅτι εἰ οὕτως ὁ φύλαξ ἐπιχειρήσει εὐδαίμων γίγνεσθαι, ὥστε μηδὲ φύλαξ εἶναι, μηδ' ἀρκέσει αὐτῷ βίος οὕτω μέτριος καὶ βέβαιος καὶ ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' ἀνόητός τε καὶ μειρακιώδης δόξα ἐμπεσοῦσα εὐδαιμονίας περὶ ὀρμήσει αὐτὸν διὰ

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which is their protection of the whole state. Their garland of victory is that they and their children are well provided with food and all the other necessities of life, and they receive honors from their own state while they live and enjoy a worthy burial when they die.”

“And very good rewards they are too,” he said.

“So do you recall,” I asked, “that in our earlier discussion the argument—I don’t know whose⁴³—rebuked us for not making our guardians happy, since, while they could have everything that the citizens had, they themselves actually had nothing? However I think we said that should this crop up we’d look at it again, but for the moment we are making our guardians guardians, and our state the most happy we possibly can, and not looking to make just a single group within our state happy.”

“I do recall it,” he said.

“What then follows? If the life of our auxiliaries⁴⁴ appears to be much finer and better than the life of the Olympic victors, there’s no way it appears to be on the same level as that of a shoemaker, or any other manual or agricultural worker, is there?”

“I don’t think so,” he said.

“And yet, as we said before, and it’s right to repeat now, if the guardian is going to attempt to be happy in such a way as not to be a guardian even, and a life so moderate, secure and, as we described it, excellent, will not satisfy him, but instead some foolish youthful notion of happiness obsesses his mind and drives him with all his might to gain

⁴³ It was Adeimantus’ argument at 4.419a.

⁴⁴ This appears to imply the guardians also.

δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἅπαντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἰκειοῦσθαι,
 c γνώσεται τὸν Ἡσιόδον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἦν σοφὸς λέγων
 πλέον εἶναί πως ἤμισυ παντός.

Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ἔφη, συμβούλῃ χρώμενος μενεὶ ἐπὶ
 τούτῳ τῷ βίῳ. |

Συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν κοι-
 νωνίαν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, παιδείας τε
 πέρι καὶ παίδων καὶ φυλακῆς τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν,
 κατά τε πόλιν μενούσας εἰς πόλεμόν τε ἰούσας καὶ
 συμφυλάττειν δεῖν καὶ συνθηρεῦειν ὥσπερ κύνας, καὶ
 d πάντα πάντῃ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν κοινωνεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα
 πραττούσας τά τε βέλτιστα πράξειν καὶ οὐ παρὰ
 φύσιν τὴν τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, ἣ πεφύκατον
 πρὸς ἀλλήλω κοινωνεῖν;

Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη. |

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκείνο λοιπὸν διελέσθαι, εἰ ἄρα
 καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις δυνατόν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις ζώοις,
 ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ὅπη δυνατόν;

Ἐφθης, ἔφη, εἰπὼν ἣ ἔμελλον ὑπολήψεσθαι.

e Περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οἶμαι, ἔφην, δῆλον
 ὅν τρόπον πολεμήσουσιν.

Πῶς; ἣ δ' ὅς.

Ὅτι κοινῇ στρατεύσονται, καὶ πρὸς γε ἄξουσι τῶν
 παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον | ὅσοι ἀδροί, ἔν' ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν
 ἄλλων δημιουργῶν θεῶνται ταῦτα ἂν τελεωθέντας δεή-

⁴⁵ *Op.* 40: i.e., a smaller amount honestly acquired is better than a larger but unfair acquisition (Hesiod's context is relevant,

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possession of everything that is in the state, he will recognize that Hesiod was truly wise when he said that somehow 'half is more than the whole.'⁴⁵

"If he takes my advice," he said, "he'll stick with this life."

"Then do you agree," I said, "that the women sharing with the men—which we have been through—educating the children and protecting the rest of the citizens, means that whether they remain the city, or go out to fight, they must share in the guard duties and join in the hunting, like hounds:⁴⁶ indeed share everything as far as possible in every way, and in doing so they will do what is best and not act contrary to the nature of the female versus the male or the natural relationship which the two sexes were born to share with each other?"

"I agree," he said.

"So," I said, "it remains to determine whether it is possible for this partnership to be cultivated in human beings as in other animals, and if so, how."

"You've anticipated a point I was about to raise myself," he said.

"You see as regards those who are involved in war," I said, "I think it's clear how they'll fight."

"How?" he asked.

"They will march out together and with them they will take those children as well who are well grown, so that, like the children of other workers, they can watch the sort

dealing as it does with his quarrel with his brother Perses and his perception of the corruption of "bribe-eating kings" (*dōrophageis basileis*).

⁴⁶ See above, 451d.

467 σει δημιουργεῖν πρὸς δὲ τῇ θεᾷ διακονεῖν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ θεραπεύειν πατέρας τε καὶ μητέρας. ἢ οὐκ ἦσθησαι τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, οἷον τοὺς τῶν κεραμέων παῖδας, ὡς πολὺν χρόνον διακονοῦντες θεωροῦσι πρὶν ἄπτεσθαι ἢ τοῦ κεραμεύειν;

Καὶ μάλα.

Ἡ οὖν ἐκείνοις ἐπιμελέστερον παιδευτέον ἢ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐμπειρία τε καὶ θεὰ τῶν προσηκόντων;

Καταγέλαστον μεντᾶν, ἔφη, εἶη.

b Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ μαχεῖται γε πᾶν ζῶον διαφερόντως παρόντων ὧν ἂν τέκη.

Ἔστιν οὕτω κίνδυνος δέ, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐ σμικρὸς σφαλίσιν, οἷα δὴ ἐν πολέμῳ φιλεῖ, πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς παῖδας ἢ ἀπολέσαντας ποιῆσαι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν ἀδύνατον ἀναλαβεῖν.

Ἀληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ πρῶτον μὲν ἡγήσῃ παρασκευαστέον τὸ μή ποτε κινδυνεύσαι;

Οὐδαμῶς. ἢ

Τί δ'; εἴ που κινδυνευτέον, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ βελτίους ἔσονται κατορθοῦντες;

Δῆλον δῆ.

c Ἄλλὰ σμικρὸν οἶε διαφέρειν καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου θεωρεῖν ἢ μὴ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον παῖδας τοὺς ἄνδρας πολεμικοὺς ἔσομένους;

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει πρὸς ὃ λέγεις. ἢ

Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ὑπαρκτέον, θεωρῶνς πολέμου τοὺς

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of things they will have to work at when they're grown up. In addition to watching, they will have to attend to and assist in all the duties of war and look after their fathers and mothers. Or have you not noticed in the craft industries that those such as the sons of potters act as assistants and observe for a long time before they set their hand to making pots?"

"Indeed I have," he said.

"Are they then to educate their children more carefully than our guardians in their experience and observation of what is relevant to their future?"

"No, that would be absurd," he said.

"And again every animal fights better when its offspring are present."

"That's true, but there is no small risk, Socrates, if they are defeated, as often happens in war and their children are killed as well as themselves, that it will make the rest of the state unable to recover."

"You're right," I said, "but do you think we should first prepare them never to take risks?"

"Oh no, not at all."

"What then? If they must face some risk, shouldn't it be where they will be better off if all goes well?"

"Clearly it should."

"But do you think it makes little difference and it's not worth the risk for children who are to become warriors either to observe the business of warfare or not?"

"No, it *does* make a difference in terms of what you're saying."

"Then this must be our starting point, to make the

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παῖδας ποιεῖν, προσμηχανᾶσθαι δ' αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλειαν,
καὶ καλῶς ἔξει· ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν οἱ πατέρες,
ὅσα ἰ ἀνθρώποι, οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ἔσονται ἀλλὰ γνωμονικοὶ
τῶν στρατειῶν ὅσαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπικίνδυνοι;

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

d Εἰς μὲν ἄρα τὰς ἄξουσιν, εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐλαβή-
σονται.

Ὅρθῶς.

Καὶ ἄρχοντάς γέ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τοὺς φαν-
λοτάτους αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήσουσιν ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐμπειρία τε
καὶ ἡλικία ἰ ικανοὺς ἠγεμόνας τε καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς
εἶναι.

Πρέπει γάρ.

Ἄλλὰ γάρ, φήσομεν, καὶ παρὰ δόξαν πολλὰ πολ-
λοῖς δὴ ἐγένετο.

Καὶ μάλα. ἰ

Πρὸς τοῖνυν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ φίλε, πτεροῦν χρὴ παι-
δία ὄντα εὐθύς, ἴν', ἂν τι δέη, πετόμενοι ἀποφεύγω-
σιν.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

e Ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναβιβαστέον ὡς νεω-
τάτους, καὶ διδαξαμένους ἱππεύειν ἐφ' ἵππων ἀκτέον
ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν, μὴ θυμοειδῶν μηδὲ μαχητικῶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι
ποδωκεστάτων καὶ εὐημιωτάτων. οὕτω γὰρ κάλλιστά
τε θεάσονται ἰ τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον, καὶ ἀσφαλέστατα, ἂν
τι δέη, σωθήσονται μετὰ πρεσβυτέρων ἠγεμόνων
ἐπόμενοι.

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children observe warfare and also devise a means of keeping them safe; then all will be well. Isn't that so?"

"Yes."

"So first of all, their fathers, as far as human beings can, will not be ignorant but aware of which aspects of warfare are dangerous and which are not, won't they?"

"That's reasonable," he said.

"So they will lead them into some situations and keep them away from others."

"That's right."

"And I imagine they will put them in the charge of leaders, not of the lowest rank, but those who are, by their age and experience, competent to be guides and escorts."

"Yes, that's the way to do it."

"Yet the fact is, I'm sure we'll agree, many things happen to many people they don't expect."

"Indeed they do."

"Bearing all this in mind then, my good fellow, our children must be provided with wings immediately, so that when necessary they can fly up and escape!"

"What do you mean?" he asked.

"Horses," I said. "They must mount as soon as they are old enough and when they have learned to ride, they must be taken to watch the fighting on horseback, not on fiery warhorses, but on the fastest and most obedient to the rein. In this way they will best observe what they are going to have to do, and they will escape most safely, if the need arises, keeping pace with the older ones as their leaders."

Ὅρθως, ἔφη, μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

Τί δὲ δῆ, εἶπον, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον; πῶς ἐκτέον σοι τοὺς στρατιώτας πρὸς αὐτούς τε καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους; ἄρ' ὀρθῶς μοι καταφαίνεται ἢ οὐ; |

Λέγ', ἔφη, ποῖα.

Αὐτῶν μὲν, εἶπον, τὸν λιπόντα τάξιν ἢ ὄπλα ἀποβαλόντα ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων ποιήσαντα διὰ κάκην ἄρα οὐ δημιουργόν τινα δεῖ καθιστάναι ἢ γεωργόν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τὸν δὲ ζῶντα εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀλόντα ἄρ' οὐ
b δωρεὰν διδόναι τοῖς ἐλοῦσι⁴ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἄγρα ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται;

Κομιδῆ γε.

Τὸν δὲ ἀριστεύσαντά τε καὶ εὐδοκιμήσαντα οὐ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ τῶν συστρατευομένων μερακίων τε καὶ παίδων ἐν μέρει ὑπὸ ἐκάστου δοκεῖ σοι | χρῆναι στεφανωθῆναι; ἢ οὐ;

Ἔμοιγε.

Τί δέ; δεξιωθῆναι;

Καὶ τοῦτο. |

Ἄλλὰ τόδ' οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτι σοι δοκεῖ.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Τὸ φιλησαί τε καὶ φιληθῆναι ὑπὸ ἐκάστου.

Πάντων, ἔφη, μάλιστα· καὶ προστίθημί γε τῷ
c νόμῳ, ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ ταύτης ὥσι τῆς στρατιᾶς, μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι ἀπαρηθηθῆναι ὃν ἂν βούληται φιλεῖν, ἵνα καί, εἴαν τις του τύχῃ ἐρών ἢ ἄρρενος ἢ θηλείας, προθυμότερος ἦ πρὸς τὸ τἀριστεία φέρειν.

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"I think what you're saying is right," he said.

"Again, what about the business of warfare?" I asked. "How should the troops behave toward themselves as well as the enemy? Do you think my ideas are right, or not?"

"Tell me," he said. "What kind of things do you mean?"

"If any of them have deserted the ranks, thrown away their shield, or done anything of this kind through cowardice, shouldn't they be demoted to workman or farmer?"

"Indeed they should."

"Any who fall into enemy hands alive should be given to their captors as a gift for them to use the catch in whatever way they want, shouldn't they?"

"Absolutely."

"When someone distinguishes himself and gains a good reputation, don't you think he should be honored in the first place, while still on the battlefield, by his fellow youths and boys each in turn: or don't you think so?"

"I do."

"And what about shaking his hand?"

"That as well."

"But there is one thing on which I don't think you will go so far as to agree with me."

"What is that?"

"To exchange kisses with everyone."

"By all means," he said. "I'd even add it to the law that as long as they are on this kind of campaign no one whom he wishes to kiss may refuse, in order that, if any is in love with one of them, male or female, he may be all the more keen to win honor."

⁴ ἐλοῦσι van Leeuwen: θέλουσι ADF

Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθῶ ὄντι | γάμοι
 τε ἔτοιμοι πλείους ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ αἰρέσεις τῶν
 τοιούτων πολλάκις παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔσονται, ἕν' ὅτι
 πλείστοι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου γίγνονται, εἴρηται ἤδη.

Εἵπομεν γάρ, ἔφη.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ καθ' Ὀμηρον τοῖς τοιοῖσδε δίκαιον
 d τιμᾶν τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἀγαθοί. καὶ γὰρ Ὀμηρος τὸν
 εὐδοκιμήσαντα ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νότοισιν Αἴαντα ἔφη
 διηνεκέεσσι γεραίρεσθαι, ὡς ταύτην οἰκείαν οὔσαν
 τιμὴν τῷ ἠβῶντί τε καὶ ἀνδρείῳ, ἐξ ἧς ἅμα τῷ τι-
 μάσθαι καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐξήσει. |

Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

Πεισόμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτά γε Ὀμήρῳ. καὶ
 γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πᾶσι τοὺς
 ἀγαθοὺς, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἀγαθοὶ φαίνωνται, καὶ ὕμνοις
 e καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τιμῆσομεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
 ἔδραις τε καὶ κρέασιν ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσι, ἵνα ἅμα
 τῷ τιμᾶν ἀσκῶμεν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυ-
 ναῖκας.

Κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις. |

Εἶεν· τῶν δὲ δὴ ἀποθανόντων ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς ὃς ἂν
 εὐδοκιμήσας τελευτήσῃ ἄρ' οὐ πρῶτον μὲν φήσομεν
 τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι;

Πάντων γε μάλιστα.

Ἄλλ' οὐ πεισόμεθα Ἡσιόδῳ, ἐπειδὴν τινες τοῦ τοι-
 ούτου γένους τελευτήσωσιν, ὡς ἄρα—

47 See above, 460b.

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"Good," I said. "We have already said that more opportunities for marriage will await the man who is good than for the rest, and that often more people of this sort will be chosen rather than the rest, so that as many children as possible will be born from this type."⁴⁷

"Yes, we did say that," he agreed.

"And there again according to Homer too, it is right to pay honor in such ways to those of our young men who are good. For Homer said that when Ajax distinguished himself in war he: 'was honored with whole slices from the chine'⁴⁸ since this is the proper reward for a brave man in his prime as a result of which he'll increase his strength along with his reputation."

"This is absolutely right," he said.

"Then we shall go along with Homer in this regard," I said. "Assuredly we too shall honor good men, in so far as they have shown themselves good, in all our sacrifices and such celebrations with songs as we have just been talking about, as well as with 'seats of honor, meat and many cups'⁴⁹ in order that, along with honoring them, we may train up brave men and women."

"Excellently put," he exclaimed.

"Well then: of those who fall in battle, shall we not agree first of all that whoever dies having won a fine reputation, is one of the golden race?"⁵⁰

"They more than anyone."

"Shall we not go along with Hesiod then that whenever any of this race dies:

⁴⁸ *Il.* 7.321. "Good" (*agathos*) has, in the Homeric context of warfare, strong connotations of bravery.

⁴⁹ *Hom. Il.* 8.162.

⁵⁰ See above, 3.415a.

469 οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἄγνοι ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν,
 ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων;
 Πεισόμεθα μὲν οὖν.

Διαπυθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ πῶς χρὴ τοὺς δαιμονίους
 τε καὶ θείους τιθέναι καὶ τίνι διαφόρῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταύτη
 θήσομεν ἢ ἂν ἐξηγήται; |

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλομεν;

Καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαιμόνων, οὕτω θερα-
 b πεύσομέν τε καὶ προσκυνήσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θήκας;
 ταῦτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομιοῦμεν ὅταν τις γήρα ἢ τινη ἄλλῳ
 τρόπῳ τελευτήσῃ τῶν ὅσοι ἂν διαφερόντως ἐν τῷ βίῳ
 ἀγαθοὶ κριθῶσιν;

Δίκαιον γοῦν, ἔφη. |

Τί δέ; πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πῶς ποιήσουσιν ἡμῖν
 οἱ στρατιῶται;

Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

Πρῶτον μὲν ἀνδραποδισμοῦ πέρι, δοκεῖ δίκαιον
 Ἑλληνας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι, ἢ μηδ'
 c ἄλλῃ ἐπιτρέπειν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τοῦτο ἐθίζειν, τοῦ
 Ἑλληνικοῦ γένους φείδεσθαι, εὐλαβουμένους τὴν ὑπὸ
 τῶν βαρβάρων δουλείαν;

51 Op. 122. "Spirits" (*daimones*) are semidivine beings (offspring of gods or gods and mortals) who serve as intermediaries between gods and mortals. This status was sometimes conferred on exceptional humans after their death (see a8–b3 below). Plato seems to be conflating his "golden race" from the Myth of Metals (see the reference in previous note) with that of Hesiod, which

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‘Some become undefiled spirits haunting the earth, noble men, defenders from evil, guardians of articulate men?’⁵¹

“We shall indeed.”

“When we have consulted the god⁵² therefore over how we must conduct the burial of these marvelous super-human beings and with what distinctions, whatever he directs then that’s the way in which we shall bury them, isn’t it?”

“Why shouldn’t we?”

“And shall we attend to them for ever after like divine spirits and worship at their graves? And shall we show these same honors whenever any of those who are judged to have been outstandingly good in life die from old age or any other cause?”

“That is certainly just,” he said.

“Then what about the way in which our troops treat the enemy?”

“What have you in mind?”

“Firstly enslavement. Does it seem right for Greek states to enslave fellow Greeks, or, as far as possible, should they prevent any other state from doing so, and make a habit of sparing the Greek race, in order to avoid slavery at the hands of barbarians?”⁵³

refers to a golden race of the distant past, the first and most blessed of the human races created by the gods. For *daimōn* as an individual guardian spirit, see Book 10 n. 52.

⁵² Apollo. See 4.427c2 above.

⁵³ I.e., non-Greeks. Plato appears to have in mind a situation where Greeks are divided and therefore vulnerable to attack from foreigners (see *Leg.* 3.693a).

Ὅλω καὶ παντί, ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ φείδεσθαι.

Μηδὲ Ἑλληνα ἄρα δούλον ἐκτήσθαι μήτε αὐτούς,
τοῖς τε ἄλλοις Ἑλλησιν οὕτω συμβουλεύειν; |

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη· μᾶλλον γοῦν οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς
βαρβάρους τρέποντο, ἑαυτῶν δ' ἀπέχοντο.

Τί δέ; σκυλεύειν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τελευτήσαντας
πλὴν ὄπλων, ἐπειδὴν νικήσωσιν, ἢ καλῶς ἔχει; ἢ οὐ
πρόφασιν μὲν τοῖς δειλοῖς ἔχει μὴ πρὸς τὸν μαχόμε-
d νον ἰέναι, ὡς τι τῶν δεόντων δρῶντας ὅταν περὶ τὸν
τεθνεῶτα κυπτάζωσι, πολλὰ δὲ ἤδη στρατόπεδα διὰ
τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρπαγὴν ἀπώλετο;

Καὶ μάλα.

Ἀνελεύθερον δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ φιλοχρήματον νεκρὸν
συλᾶν, καὶ | γυναικείας τε καὶ σμικρᾶς διανοίας τὸ
πολέμιον νομίζειν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ τεθνεῶτος ἀποπταμέ-
νου τοῦ ἐχθροῦ, λελοιπότος δὲ ᾧ ἐπολέμει; ἢ οἷε τι
e διάφορον δρᾶν τοὺς τοῦτο ποιῶντας τῶν κυνῶν, αἰ
τοῖς λίθοις οἷς ἂν βληθῶσι χαλεπαίνουσι, τοῦ βάλ-
λοντος⁵ οὐχ ἀπτόμεναι;

Οὐδὲ σμικρόν, ἔφη.

Ἐατέον ἄρα τὰς νεκροσυλίας καὶ | τὰς τῶν ἀναι-
ρέσεων διακωλύσεις;

⁵ τοῦ βάλλοντος DF Aristotle (Rhet. 1406b33): τοῦ βάλοντος

⁵⁴ This distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks with regard to enslavement reflects a general view (see e.g., Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.14). ⁵⁵ I.e., the soul (which is the real person) has left the body at death ("flown away": see e.g., Hom. *Il.* 16.856).

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“Sparing them would be far and away the better thing to do,” he said.

“Then they themselves should not acquire a Greek as a slave and should advise the rest of the Greeks to do the same?”

“Very much so,” he said. “In that way, they would be more inclined to turn against the barbarians, and keep their hands off their own people.”⁵⁴

“And what about despoiling the dead?” I asked. “Is it a good thing to strip the dead after you have defeated them, apart from taking their armor? Or is that an excuse for cowards not to engage with a fighting man on the grounds that they are doing something essential when they are poking about a corpse? And hasn’t many an army been wiped out as a result of this kind of plundering?”

“Indeed.”

“Don’t you think it’s niggardly and moneygrubbing to strip a corpse and the sign of a petty womanly mentality to consider the body of a dead man as an enemy when his real enemy has flown away and left the instrument with which he was fighting?⁵⁵ Or do you think those who do such things are any different from dogs who are furious with the stones that hit them, but do not go for the person who is throwing them?”

“There’s not the slightest difference.”

“So we must abandon the idea of stripping corpses, and any hindering of collecting up the dead?”⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Breaches of this important interstate observance were unusual: Thucydides (4.97–101) tells of the Boeotians’ reluctance to let the Athenians bury their dead after the battle of Delium (424).

Ἐατέον μέντοι, ἔφη, νῆ Δία.

470 Οὐδὲ μὴν που πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ὄπλα οἴσομεν ὡς ἀναθήσοντες, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, εἴαν τι ἡμῖν μέλη τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας εὐνοίας· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ φοβησόμεθα μή τι μίασμα ἧ̄ πρὸς ἱερὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων φέρειν, εἴαν μή τι δῆ ὁ θεὸς ἄλλο λέγη.

Ὅρθότατα, ἔφη. |

Τί δὲ γῆς τε τμήσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ οἰκίῶν ἐμπρήσεως; ποῖόν τί σοι δράσουσιν οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους;

Σοῦ, ἔφη, δόξαν ἀποφαινομένου ἠδέως ἂν ἀκούσασαιμι.

b Ἐμοὶ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τούτων μηδέτερα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐπέτειον καρπὸν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα, βούλει σοι λέγω;

Πάνυ γε.

Φαίνεται μοι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δύο ταῦτα ὀνόματα, | πόλεμος τε καὶ στάσις, οὕτω καὶ εἶναι δύο, ὄντα ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινοῦ διαφοραῖν. λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο τὸ μὲν οἰκείον καὶ συγγενές, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον καὶ ὀθνεῖον. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκείου ἔχθρα στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος.

Καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἔφη, ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεις.

c Ὅρα δῆ καὶ εἰ τόδε πρὸς τρόπον λέγω. φημὶ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτὸ αὐτῷ οἰκείον εἶναι καὶ

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"Indeed we must, by Zeus," he said.

"There again I don't suppose we shall carry off the spoils to the sanctuaries to dedicate them to the gods, especially those of the Greeks, if we have any concern for goodwill toward the rest of the Greeks. We should rather fear that in bringing such things from our own people some pollution may come upon the sanctuary, unless the deity somehow indicates otherwise."

"How very right you are," he said.

"What about the ravaging of Greek land and the burning of Greek houses? What sort of things do you think your troops will do to their enemies?"

"I'd gladly hear you expound your views on that one," he said.

"Well I can tell you I don't think it's right to do either, but it is acceptable to remove the year's harvest. And do you want to hear my reasons?"

"Very much so."

"It seems to me that just as we have two terms: war and faction, so there are two terms which correspond to differences between the two. I mean the words 'own' and 'family' on the one hand, and 'someone else's' and 'foreign' on the other. The word faction is applied to one's personal enemy, and war to an outsider."

"And there's nothing out of the ordinary in what you say," he said.

"Then see if you think this is to the point: you see I maintain that the Greek race shares a common culture and

συγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον.

Καλῶς γε, ἔφη. |

Ἐλληνας μὲν ἄρα βαρβάροις καὶ βαρβάρους Ἑλλησι μαχομένους πολεμεῖν τε φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίους φύσει εἶναι, καὶ πόλεμον τὴν ἔχθραν ταύτην κλητέον Ἐλληνας δὲ Ἑλλησιν, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον δρῶσιν, φύσει μὲν φίλους εἶναι, νοσεῖν δ' ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τὴν d Ἑλλάδα καὶ στασιάζειν, καὶ στάσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχθραν κλητέον.

Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, συγχωρῶ οὕτω νομίζειν.

Σκόπει δὴ, εἶπον, ὅτι | ἐν τῇ νῦν ὁμολογουμένην στάσει, ὅπου ἂν τι τοιοῦτον γένηται καὶ διαστῆ πόλις, εἰάν ἐκάτεροι ἐκατέρων τέμνωσιν ἀγροὺς καὶ οἰκίας ἐμπιμπρῶσιν, ὡς ἀλιτηριώδης τε δοκεῖ ἢ στάσις εἶναι καὶ οὐδέτεροι αὐτῶν φιλοπόλιδες—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἐτόλμων τὴν τροφόν τε καὶ μητέρα κείρειν— e ἀλλὰ μέτριον εἶναι τοὺς καρποὺς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοῖς κρατοῦσι τῶν κρατουμένων, καὶ διανοεῖσθαι ὡς διαλαγησομένων καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ πολεμησόντων.

Πολὺν γάρ, ἔφη, ἡμερωτέρων αὕτη ἢ διάνοια ἐκείνης.

Τί δὲ δὴ; ἔφην· ἦν σὺ πόλιν οἰκίζεις, οὐχ Ἑλληνίς ἔσται; |

Δεῖ γ' αὐτήν, ἔφη.

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is part of a kindred group,⁵⁷ whereas it is strange and foreign to non-Greeks.”

“Good point,” he said.

“In that case we shall assert that Greeks fighting foreigners and foreigners fighting Greeks both treat each other as enemies and are naturally enemies, and this kind of hostility is to be termed war. But whenever Greeks do this sort of thing to Greeks, although they are naturally friendly, in such a case Greece is sick and in a state of civil conflict, and this kind of hostility is to be termed faction.”

“I agree that this is how we should consider it,” he said.

“Then take it that whenever such a thing arises in what we have now agreed is a faction and a city is in dispute, if both sides ravage each other’s land and burn down their houses, then the conflict is deemed to be accursed and neither side is patriotic: they would never be so brazen as to ravage their nurse and mother.⁵⁸ But it is reasonable for the victor to carry off the harvest of the loser and to take the attitude that one day they will be reconciled and not permanently at war.”

“This is a much more civilized attitude than the former one,” he said.

“What about this?” I asked. “The state you are founding will be a Greek one, won’t it?”

“It must be.” he said.

⁵⁷ Not an original idea: for assertion of a common Greek culture, language, and religion as a unifying rallying cry against “barbarian” enemies, see e.g., Hdt. 8.144, Isoc. *Paneg.* 157.

⁵⁸ For the analogy, see e.g., 3.414e1–6.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ ἡμεροὶ ἔσονται;

Σφόδρα γε.

Ἄλλ' οὐ φιλέλληνες; οὐδὲ οἰκείαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἡγή-
σονται, οὐδὲ κοινωνήσουσιν ὧν περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἱερῶν;

Καὶ σφόδρα γε. |

471 Οὐκοῦν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας διαφορὰν, ὡς
οἰκείους, στάσιω ἡγήσονται καὶ οὐδὲ ὀνομάσουσιν
πόλεμον;

Οὐ γάρ.

Καὶ ὡς διαλλαγησόμενοι ἄρα διοίσονται; |

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Εὐμενῶς δὴ σωφροنيοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ κολά-
ζοντες οὐδ' ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ, σωφρονισταὶ ὄντες, οὐ πολέ-
μιοι.

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐδ' ἄρα τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ἑλληνες ὄντες κεροῦσιν,
οὐδὲ | οἰκήσεις ἐμπρήσουσιν, οὐδὲ ὁμολογήσουσιν ἐν
ἐκάστη πόλει πάντας ἐχθροὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄνδρας

b καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας, ἀλλ' ὀλίγους αἰεὶ ἐχθροὺς
τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς διαφορᾶς. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πάντα οὔτε
τὴν γῆν ἐβελήσουσιν κείρειν αὐτῶν, ὡς φίλων τῶν
πολλῶν, οὔτε οἰκίας ἀνατρέπειν, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τούτου
ποιήσονται τὴν διαφορὰν, μέχρι οὗ ἂν οἱ αἴτιοι |
ἀναγκασθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναιτίων ἀλγούντων δοῦναι
δίκην.

Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ὁμολογῶ οὕτω δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἐναν-
τίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους πολίτας προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς δὲ
τοὺς βαρβάρους, ὡς νῦν οἱ Ἑλληνες πρὸς ἀλλή-
λους.

BOOK V

"So the people will also be good and civilized?"

"Very much so!"

"And won't they be friendly to all Greeks? And won't they regard Greece as part of their common heritage and share in the same religious rituals as the rest?"

"Yes, most assuredly."

"So that means that they will regard their dispute with the Greeks who share their culture, as a civil conflict and not even refer to it as a war, doesn't it?"

"No, they won't."

"And they will approach the dispute with a view to reconciliation in the future?"

"Very much so."

"Then they will recall them to their senses in a kindly way. They won't punish them by selling them into slavery or destroying their city, since they are there to correct them, not to be their enemies."

"That's it," he said.

"Then being Greeks they will not ravage Greece, nor set their buildings alight. They will not accept that everyone, men women and children, in every city is an enemy, but that a few who are at any time hostile are responsible for the dispute. And it's for all these reasons they will be unwilling to ravage their land, and destroy their houses, as most of them are friends, but will pursue their dispute to the point where those responsible are compelled to be punished by those who are not, but who are nevertheless suffering."

"I agree that our citizens should behave in this way toward their opponents, but behave toward foreigners as the Greeks do now toward each other," he said.

c Τιθῶμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν νόμον τοῖς φύλαξι, μήτε γῆν τέμνειν μήτε οἰκίας ἐμπιμπράναι;

Θῶμεν, ἔφη, καὶ ἔχειν γε καλῶς ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν. Ἄλλὰ γάρ μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴαν τίς ἴσῃ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτρέπη λέγειν, οὐδέποτε μνησθήσεσθαι ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρωσάμενος πάντα ταῦτα εἴρηκας, τὸ ὡς δυνατὴ αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία γενέσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατὴ· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε, εἰ γένοιτο, πάντ' ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὰ πόλει ἢ γένοιτο, καὶ ἂ σὺ παραλείπεις ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἄριστ' ἂν μάχοντο τῷ ἤκιστα ἀπολείπειν ἀλλήλους, γινώσκοντές τε καὶ ἀνακαλοῦντες ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα ἑαυτοῦς, ἀδελφούς, πατέρας, υἱεῖς· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ θῆλυ συστρατεύοιτο, εἴτε ἴσῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει εἴτε καὶ ὀπισθεν ἐπιτεταγμένον, φόβων τε ἕνεκα τοῖς ἐχθροῖς καὶ εἴ ποτὲ τις ἀνάγκη βοηθείας γένοιτο, οἶδ' ὅτι ταύτῃ πάντῃ ἄμαχοι ἂν εἶεν· καὶ οἴκοι γε ἂ παραλείπεται ἀγαθὰ, ὅσα ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς, ὁρῶ. ἀλλ' ὡς ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι εἴη ἂν καὶ ἄλλα γε μυρία, εἰ γένοιτο ἢ πολιτεία αὕτη, μηκέτι πλείω περὶ αὐτῆς λέγε, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἤδη πειρώμεθα ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πείθειν, ὡς δυνατὸν καὶ ἢ δυνατόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶμεν.

472 Ἐξαίφνης γε σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ καταδρομῆν ἐποιήσω ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον μου, καὶ οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις στραγγενομένῳ.⁶ ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι μόγις μοι τῶ δύο κύματε ἐκφυγόντι νῦν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ χαλεπώτατον τῆς τρικυμίας ἐπάγεις, ὃ ἴσῃ ἐπειδὰν ἴδῃς τε καὶ ἀκούσης, πάνν συγγνώμην ἔξεις, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα

BOOK V

“Indeed are we to lay down this rule for our guardians not to ravage land or burn down houses?”

“We are,” he said, “and it is to hold good as the previous rule did. But the fact is, Socrates, that it seems to me that if anyone leaves it to you to discuss such things, you will never get round to mentioning what you put aside earlier in order to say all this, namely the possibility of this political system coming into being and how it could ever be done. Since I claim that, if it were to come about, everything would be good for the state in which it has come about, I also add what you are passing over, that they would fight very well against their enemies by virtue of the fact that they do not desert each other as they recognize and call each other brothers, fathers and sons. If, in addition, the women also were to join in the fighting, whether in the front line itself, or drawn up behind, both to strike fear into the enemy, or, if there is ever any need for reinforcement, I know that they would be unbeatable in battle in every way. I can also see whatever advantages they may have at home, which you have passed over. But as I agree there would be all these benefits and countless more if this constitution came into being, say no more about it, but let’s try to convince ourselves now on this one issue, that it is possible and how it is possible. Let’s forget the rest.”

“Suddenly,” I said, “you have made as it were an inroad on my argument and you have no sympathy for my loitering. For perhaps you don’t realize, as I have only just escaped the two waves, that you are now introducing the biggest and most difficult of the three which, when you see and hear it, you will fully understand that my reluc-

⁶ στραγγενομένῳ ex em. ad F: στρατενομένῳ ADF

ὄκνουν τε καὶ ἔδεδοίκη οὕτω παράδοξον λόγον λέγειν
τε καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν.

- b Ὅσῳ ἂν, ἔφη, τοιαῦτα πλείω λέγῃς, ἦττον ἀφεθήσῃ
ὑφ' ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἰπεῖν πῆ δυνατὴ γίγνεσθαι
αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία. ἀλλὰ λέγε καὶ μὴ διάτριβε.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε χρὴ ἀνα-
μνησθῆναι, ὅτι ἡμεῖς | ζητοῦντες δικαιοσύνην οἶόν
ἔστι καὶ ἀδικίαν δεῦρο ἤκομεν.

Χρὴ ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο; ἔφη.

- Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν εὐρωμένῳ οἶόν ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ἄρα
καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν δίκαιον ἀξιόσομεν μηδὲν δεῖν αὐτῆς
ἐκείνης διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ πανταχῆ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον
c δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν; ἢ ἀγαπήσομεν εἰ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα
αὐτῆς ἦ καὶ πλείστα τῶν ἄλλων ἐκείνης μετέχῃ;

Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἀγαπήσομεν.

- Παραδείγματος ἄρα ἔνεκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐζητοῦμεν
αὐτό | τε δικαιοσύνην οἶόν ἐστι, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως
δίκαιον εἰ γένοιτο, καὶ οἷος ἂν εἴη γενόμενος, καὶ ἀδι-
κίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνους ἀπο-
βλέποντες, οἷοι ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνωνται εὐδαιμονίας τε
πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν
d αὐτῶν ὁμολογεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἐκείνοις ὅτι ὁμοιότατος ἦ, τὴν
ἐκείνης μοῖραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἔξειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου
ἔνεκα, ἵν' ἀποδείξωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι.

⁵⁹ The third wave was proverbially the greatest (see above, n. 23). Once again, one of S.s' associates (on this occasion Glaucon) intervenes forcibly at a critical juncture (see above, 419a and 449b). On the question of how Plato regarded the practical fea-

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tance was reasonable and I was afraid to argue such a paradoxical case and try to see my way through it."⁵⁹

"The more you talk like this," he said, "the less we shall let you off for not telling us how this constitution can come into being. Come on, tell us and don't waste time."

"Shouldn't we first remind ourselves," I said, "that we reached this point while looking for a definition of justice and injustice?"

"We should, but what of it?" he said.

"Nothing. But if we discover what kind of thing justice is, won't we be right in thinking that a just man will be no different from justice itself, but will be of the same nature in every respect? Or shall we be content if he is as near to it as you can get and shares its characteristics more than any others?"

"We'll be happy with that," he said.

"It was in order to have a model,"⁶⁰ I said, "that we were looking for the actual nature of justice, and whether there could be a perfectly just man, and if there could, what kind of a person he would be: likewise with injustice and the totally unjust man, so that by examining them and what they would appear to be with regard to happiness and the opposite, we would be forced to agree about ourselves too, that whoever resembled them as closely as possible would have a destiny most like theirs. Our purpose was not to demonstrate that all this was possible."

sibility of his ideal state, as discussed in this and other passages, see the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (iii).

⁶⁰ For the significance of a "model" or "paradigm" (*paradeigma*) for Plato, and its relation to reality in the creation of his ideal state, see e.g., 6.484c6 and the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (iii).

Τούτο μὲν, ἔφη, ἀληθὲς λέγεις.

Οἶει [ἂν] οὖν ἥττον τι ἀγαθὸν ζωγράφον εἶναι ὃς ἂν γράψας ἢ παράδειγμα οἶον ἂν εἴη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἰκανῶς ἀποδοὺς μὴ ἔχῃ ἐπιδείξαι ὡς καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς, φαμέν, παράδειγμα ἐποιοῦμεν λόγῳ ἀγαθῆς πόλεως;

e Πάνν γε.

Ἦττον τι οὖν οἶει ἡμᾶς εὖ λέγειν τούτου ἔνεκα, εἰ μὴ ἔχωμεν ἀποδείξαι ὡς δυνατὸν οὕτω πόλιν οἰκῆσαι ὡς ἐλέγετο; ἢ

Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.

Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν ἀληθές, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο προθυμηθῆναι δεῖ σὴν χάριν, ἀποδείξαι πῆ μάλιστα καὶ κατὰ τί δυνατώτατ' ἂν εἴη, πάλιν μοι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόδειξιν τὰ αὐτὰ διομολόγησαι.

Τὰ ποῖα;

473 Ἄρ' οἶόν τέ τιπραχθῆναι ὡς λέγεται, ἢ φύσιν ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἥττον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι, κἂν εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ; ἀλλὰ σὺ πρότερον ὁμολογεῖς οὕτως ἢ οὐ;

Ὅμολογῶ, ἔφη. ἢ

Τούτο μὲν δὴ μὴ ἀνάγκαζέ με, οἷα τῷ λόγῳ διήλοιομεν, τοιαῦτα παντάπασιν καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ δεῖν γιγνόμενα <ἂν> ἀποφαίνειν· ἀλλ', εἰ οἰοί τε γενώμεθα εὐρέειν ὡς ἂν ἐγγύτατα τῶν εἰρημένων πόλιν οἰκῆσειεν, φάναι

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"In that respect, you're right," he said.

"Would you, then, think an artist is in any way less good who painted a model of what a most handsome man would look like, and put all his skill into the picture as far as he could, if he cannot show that such a man could actually exist?"

"Zeus no," he protested.

"What then? Were we not, as we said,⁶¹ in the process of constructing an image of a good state in this discussion?"

"We were indeed."

"Do you then think that our discussion is any less well-conducted, if we don't have the means to show that it's possible to build a city as we've described it?"

"Certainly not," he said.

"Then this is the truth of the matter," I said. "Yet if I must also make an effort to please you by showing you where and in what respects it would be most possible, then you must agree with me the same points again with regard to such a demonstration."

"What are they?"

"Is it possible something can be realized as described, or is it the nature of action to have less of a grasp on truth than words, even if some don't think so? Well, do you agree this is right, or not?"

"I agree," he said.

"Well then, don't insist that I must show that the kind of things we have looked at in our discussion must come into being in reality entirely in the same way. But if we reach the point where we are able to find out that our state

⁶¹ At 2.369a5ff.

b ἡμᾶς ἐξηγηρέκηναι ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἂ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις. ἢ οὐκ ἀγαπήσεις τούτων τυγχάνων; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀγαπῶην.

Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ἔφη.

Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, πειρώμεθα ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι τί ποτε νῦν κακῶς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττεται | δι' ὃ οὐχ οὕτως οἰκοῦνται, καὶ τίνος ἂν σμικροτάτου μεταβαλόντος ἔλθοι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλις, μάλιστα μὲν ἐνός, εἰ δὲ μή, δυοῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι ὀλιγίστων τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ σμικροτάτων τὴν δύναμιν.

c Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἐνός μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβαλόντος δοκοῦμέν μοι ἔχειν δεῖξαι ὅτι μεταπέσοι ἂν, οὐ μέντοι σμικροῦ γε οὐδὲ ραδίου, δυνατοῦ δέ. |

Τίνος; ἔφη.

Ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰμὶ ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσηκάζομεν κύματι. εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλῳτι τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κύμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλύσειν. σκόπει δὲ ὃ μέλλω λέγειν.

Λέγε, ἔφη.

d Ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλεῖς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσιν γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτόν συμπέσῃ, δύναμις τε πολιτικῇ καὶ

⁶² Plato has S. attribute the design of the ideal city to Glaucon (see 458c6), an example of a common Socratic ploy to interpret

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can be organized as closely as possible to what we've described, we can say for certain that we have discovered that the conditions you have laid down can be met.⁶² Or will you not be satisfied if you do meet these conditions? I certainly would."

"And so would I," he said.

"Our next step, it seems, is to try to look for and find whatever is badly done in our states today and which is the cause of their not being run in the way mentioned, and whether any slight change can be made for a state to match up to this model of a constitution: a single change most preferably, but if not, two, and if not that, then as few as possible and of the slightest effect."

"I agree entirely," he said.

"So then, by making one change," I said, "I think we'll be able to show that there would be a transformation, but it would not be insignificant, or easy, but it would be possible."

"What's that?" he asked.

"I'm actually facing what we compared to the greatest wave," I said. "Therefore it must be said, even if it'll swamp me, just like a wave, with ridicule and contempt. Take note of what I'm about to say."

"Go on," he said.

"Unless philosophers become kings in our states," I said, "or those we now call kings and potentates genuinely and competently pursue philosophy, and political power and philosophy combine into the same thing, and the

interlocutors' assent as accepting authorship of his (S.'s) ideas (see Book 1 n. 76).

φιλοσοφία, τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ' ἐκά-
 τερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης | ἀποκλεισθῶσιν,
 οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, ᾧ φίλε Γλαῦκων, ταῖς πόλεσι,
 δοκῶ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ πολι-
 τεία μὴ ποτε πρότερον φυῆ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ φῶς
 e ἡλίου ἴδῃ, ἣν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό
 ἔστιν ὃ ἐμοὶ πάλαι ὄκνου ἐντίθησι λέγειν, ὁρῶντι ὡς
 πολὺν παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθήσεται· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὅτι
 οὐκ ἂν ἄλλη τις εὐδαιμονήσειεν οὔτε ἰδία οὔτε δη-
 μοσία. |

Καὶ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον ἐκβέβληκας
 ῥῆμά τε καὶ λόγον, ὃν εἰπὼν ἡγοῦ ἐπὶ σὲ πάνυ πολ-
 474 λούς τε καὶ οὐ φαύλους νῦν οὕτως, οἷον ῥύψαντας τὰ
 ἱμάτια, γυμνοὺς λαβόντας ὅτι ἐκάστῳ παρέτυχεν
 ὄπλον, θεῖν διατεταμένους ὡς θαυμάσια ἐργασομένους·
 οὓς εἰ μὴ ἀμνητῆ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐκφεύξῃ, τῷ ὄντι
 τωθαζόμενος δώσεις δίκην. |

Οὐκοῦν σύ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτων αἴτιος;

Καλῶς γ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ ποιῶν. ἀλλὰ τοί σε οὐ προδώσω,
 ἀλλ' ἀμνητῶ οἷς δύνamai· δύνamai δὲ εὐνοία τε καὶ τῷ
 παρακελεύεσθαι, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἄλλον του ἐμμελέστερον
 b σοι ἀποκρινοίμην. ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχων τοιοῦτον βοθητὸν
 πειρῶ τοῖς ἀπιστοῦσιν ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ἔχει ἡ σύ
 λέγεις.

⁶³ This idea is echoed in *Epist.* 7.325dff. (whether or not by Plato is disputed). On the relation of this part of the Letter to *Resp.*, see the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (iii).

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many natures of those pursuing exclusively the one or the other are of necessity excluded, there can be no respite from evil in the state, my dear Glaucon, nor, in my view, even in the human race.⁶³ Until then, this state which we've outlined in our discussion can never grow to its full potential, nor see the light of day. But this is what has been making me hesitate for so long, seeing that much will be said that beggars belief. You see it's difficult to see that anyone, either as an individual or as part of the state, can achieve happiness in any other way."

He replied: "Socrates, you have uttered such words and arguments that you can expect very many, and no mean types at that, will tear off their cloaks, so to speak, and stripped, will seize any weapon that lies to hand and run at you with all their might in order to do dire deeds. Unless you can fend them off by your arguments and escape, you really will be mocked and punished."

"But aren't you the one who's responsible for this?" I asked.⁶⁴

"And it's a good thing I am," he replied, "but don't worry, I won't abandon you. I'll defend you with everything I've got. I can do it with goodwill and encouragement, and perhaps I can answer your questions more suitably than anyone else.⁶⁵ Well, as you've got such an assistant, try and show those who don't believe you that things are as you say."

⁶⁴ Literally true, in the sense that Adeimantus, and then Glaucon, insisted on S. "stirring up" the "swarm of arguments" at the beginning of Book 5 (450a10ff.).

⁶⁵ It is certainly the case that Glaucon, although generally less assertive, is the most philosophically sophisticated of S.'s associates in *Republic*.

Πειρατέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ οὕτω μεγάλην
 συμμαχίαν παρέχῃ. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μέλ-
 λομένῃ | ἐκφεύξασθαι οὓς λέγεις, διορίσασθαι πρὸς
 αὐτοὺς τοὺς φιλοσόφους τίνας λέγοντες τολμῶμεν
 φάσαι δεῖν ἄρχειν, ἵνα διαδήλων γενομένων δύνηται
 c τις ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι τοῖς μὲν προσήκει
 φύσει ἄπτεσθαι τε φιλοσοφίας ἡγεμονεύειν τ' ἐν πό-
 λει, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις μήτε ἄπτεσθαι ἀκολουθεῖν τε τῷ
 ἡγουμένῳ.

Ἔρα ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ὀρίζεσθαι. |

Ἴθι δὴ, ἀκολουθήσοῦν μοι τῆδε, εἰς αὐτὸ ἀμῆ γέ
 πη ἱκανῶς ἐξηγησώμεθα.

Ἄγε, ἔφη.

Ἀναμιμνήσκει οὖν σε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει, ἢ μέμνη-
 σαι ὅτι ὃν ἂν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτόν, εἰς
 ὀρθῶς λέγεται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ μή,
 ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα;

Ἀναμιμνήσκει, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικεν, δεῖ οὐ γὰρ πάν-
 γε ἐννοῶ.

d Ἄλλῳ, εἶπον, ἔπρεπεν, ὦ Γλαύκῳ, λέγειν ἂ λέγεις·
 ἀνδρὶ δ' ἐρωτικῶ οὐ πρέπει ἀμνημονεῖν ὅτι πάντες οἱ
 ἐν ὥρᾳ τὸν φιλόπαιδα καὶ ἐρωτικὸν ἀμῆ γέ πη
 δάκνουσί τε καὶ κινουσί, δοκοῦντες ἄξιοι εἶναι ἐπι-
 μελείας τε καὶ τοῦ ἀσπάζεσθαι. | ἢ οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖτε
 πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς; ὁ μὲν, ὅτι σιμός, ἐπίχαρις κληθεῖς
 ἐπαινεθήσεται ὑφ' ὑμῶν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ γρυπὸν βασιλικόν

⁶⁶ The idea was introduced at 4.437d8–e8.

"I must try," I said, "since it's you who are offering me so strong an alliance. Therefore, if we're going to escape somehow from the people you mention, it seems essential to me, with regard to the philosophers themselves, to distinguish who we mean when we are bold enough to state that they must be our rulers, in order that, when they have been clearly defined, one can defend one's view by demonstrating that it is naturally appropriate for some both to pursue philosophy and be rulers in the state, but not for others who should refrain from pursuing it and follow their leader."

"It would be a good moment to make the distinction," he said.

"Come on then, follow me and see if we can explain it adequately somehow or other in the following way."

"Lead on," he said.

"Do you need to be reminded," I asked, "or perhaps you remember that whoever we claim is in love with something must prove, if the claim is right, not that he loves one part, yet not another, but the whole lot."⁶⁶

"It looks as if I shall have to be reminded," he said, "as I can't think of it at the moment at all."

"Someone else should have said what you are saying, Glaucon. It isn't fitting for a man in love to forget that all those who are in the bloom of youth spur on and stir up the amorous lover of boys when they seem to him worthy of attention and loving embraces. Or is that not how you people react to handsome boys? One who is snub-nosed will be called charming and will be approved by you, another's aquiline nose you say is regal, and another who

φατε εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δὴ διὰ μέσου τούτων ἐμμετρώατα ἔχειν, μέλανας δὲ ἀνδρικούς ἰδεῖν, λευκοὺς δὲ θεῶν παῖδας εἶναι· μελιχλῶρους δὲ καὶ τοῦνομα οἶει τινὸς ἄλλου ποίημα εἶναι ἢ ἔραστοῦ ὑποκοριζομένου τε καὶ εὐχερῶς φέροντος τὴν ὠχρότητα, εἰς ἐπὶ ὥρα ἦ; καὶ
 475 ἐνὶ λόγῳ πάσας προφάσεις προφασίζεσθέ τε καὶ πάσας φωνὰς ἀφίετε, ὥστε μηδένα ἀποβάλλειν τῶν ἀνθούτων ἐν ὥρᾳ.

Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ὅτι οὕτω ποιούσι, συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου χάριν. |

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλοῖνους οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιούντας ὀρᾶς; πάντα οἶνον ἐπὶ πάσης προφάσεως ἀσπαζομένους;

Καὶ μάλα.

Καὶ μὴν φιλοτίμους γε, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, καθορᾶς ὅτι, ἂν μὴ στρατηγήσαι | δύνωνται, τριττυαρχοῦσιν, κἂν μὴ ὑπὸ μειζόνων καὶ σεμνοτέρων τιμᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ σμι-
 b κροτέρων καὶ φαυλοτέρων τιμώμενοι ἀγαπῶσιν, ὡς ὅλως τιμῆς ἐπιθυμηταὶ ὄντες.

Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

Τοῦτο δὲ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἄρα ὃν ἄν τις ἐπιθυμητικὸν λέγωμεν, | παντὸς τοῦ εἴδους τούτου φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μέν, τοῦ δὲ οὐ;

Παντός, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μέν, τῆς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάσης;

67 A *trittys* was one-third of one of the ten tribes which comprised the Athenian political and military organization.

BOOK V

is in between the two most harmoniously proportioned; swarthy ones are manly, fair ones the sons of gods. Do you think that 'honey-complexioned' is anything but a fabricated name for a lover who glosses over and tolerates a pallid complexion provided it belongs to a boy in his prime? In a word, you put forward every excuse and make all the right noises to ensure you reject no one who is in the bloom of youth."

"If you mean to take me as your example of how lovers behave," he said, "then I agree for the sake of our argument."

"What about this then?" I said. "Don't you see wine buffs doing the very same thing, chasing after every wine at any excuse?"

"Yes, indeed."

"And you have noticed, I am sure, that if ambitious types can't become generals, they take command of a *trit-tys*,⁶⁷ and if they can't be saluted by greater more august people, they are content to be hailed by inferior less exalted types, as they are obsessed by honor taken as a whole."

"Absolutely!"

"Agree with this or not, whoever we describe as a passionate follower of something, shall we say that he is keen on the whole of that kind of thing, or just on some parts and not others?"

"No, all of it," he said.

"So shall we say a philosopher too is an ardent pursuer of wisdom: not for this aspect of it and not that, but for the whole of it?"

Ἀληθῆ.

Τὸν ἄρα περὶ τὰ μαθήματα δυσχεραίνοντα, ἄλλως
 c τε καὶ νέον ὄντα καὶ μῆπω λόγον ἔχοντα τί τε χρηστὸν
 καὶ μῆ, οὐ φήσομεν φιλομαθῆ οὐδὲ φιλόσοφον εἶναι,
 ὥσπερ τὸν περὶ τὰ σιτία δυσχερῆ οὔτε πεινῆν φαμεν
 οὔτ' ἐπιθυμῆν σιτίων, οὐδὲ φιλόσιτον ἀλλὰ κακόσιτον
 εἶναι. |

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε φήσομεν.

Τὸν δὲ δὴ εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος
 γεύεσθαι καὶ ἀσμένως ἐπὶ τὸ μαθάνειν ἰόντα καὶ
 ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα, τοῦτον δ' ἐν δίκῃ φήσομεν φιλό-
 σοφον ἢ γάρ;

d Καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ἔφη· Πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἄτοποι ἔσον-
 ταί σοι τοιοῦτοι. οἳ τε γὰρ φιλοθεάμονες πάντες
 ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμαθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι
 εἶναι, οἳ τε φιλήκοοι ἀτοπώτατοί τινές εἰσιν ὡς γ' ἐν
 φιλοσόφοις τιθέναι, | οἳ πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην
 διατριβὴν ἐκόντες οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν ἐλθεῖν, ὥσπερ δὲ
 ἀπομεμισθωκότες τὰ ὄτα ἐπακοῦσαι πάντων χορῶν
 περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὔτε
 τῶν κατὰ κώμας ἀπολειπόμενοι. τούτους οὖν πάντας
 e καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτων τινῶν μαθητικὸς καὶ τοὺς τῶν
 τεχνυδρίων φιλοσόφους φήσομεν;

Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις.

Τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις;

⁶⁸ The "chorus" refers to the dramatic performances, including tragedy and comedy, which were the central feature of the

“True.”

“And we won’t say that he who is discontented with his learning, especially a youngster who does not yet have a rational understanding of what is useful and what isn’t, is a lover of learning or of wisdom, any more than we shall say that one who fussy about his food is hungry or desires food, or is a gourmet rather than a fastidious eater.”

“And we’d be right not to do so.”

“Now we would rightly call the person who is willing to sample all kinds of learning without qualms, who approaches his studies with pleasure and cannot get enough of them a philosopher, wouldn’t we?”

Glaucon said: “In that case there will be many strange people like this! For example I suppose all those who love spectacles are as they are because they delight in learning things, and those who like to listen are a very strange group to include among philosophers. They would not willingly go to debates and such activities, but just as if they’ve hired out their ears to listen to every chorus, they rush off to every festival of Dionysus whether in towns or in villages without fail.⁶⁸ Are we going to refer to all of these as philosophers as well as others keen on learning of any sort, even those who practice minor crafts?”

“Not at all,” I said, “although they do resemble philosophers.”

“Who do you mean then by the real ones?” he asked.

festivals of Dionysus, held not only in Athens itself, but around other districts of Attica. The focus on festivals as the favorite pastime of the “sight lovers” (*philotheamones*) and “lovers of listening” (*philēkooi*) recalls Plato’s criticism of dramatic poetry in Books 2 and 3.

Τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φιλοθεάμονας. |

Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν γ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς· ἀλλὰ πῶς αὐτὸ
λέγεις;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥαδίως πρὸς γε ἄλλον· σὲ δὲ
οἶμαι ὁμολογήσειν μοι τὸ τοιούδε.

Τὸ ποῖον;

476 Ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχυρῶ, δύο αὐτῶ
εἶναι.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δύο, καὶ ἐν ἐκάτερον;

Καὶ τοῦτο. |

Καὶ περὶ δὴ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ
κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περὶ ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ
μὲν ἐν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων
καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ
φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. |

Ταύτη τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαιρῶ, χωρὶς μὲν οὓς
νυνδὴ ἔλεγες φιλοθεάμονάς τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ
b πρακτικούς, καὶ χωρὶς αὖ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οὓς μόνους
ἂν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους.

Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Οἱ μὲν που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, | φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες
τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χροῶς καὶ σχή-
ματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα,
αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἢ διάνοια τὴν
φύσιν ιδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι.

BOOK V

“Those who love to observe the truth,” I said.

“That doubtless is right,” he said, “but what exactly do you mean?”

“It’s by no means easy to explain to someone else,” I said, “but you I think will agree with me on this.”

“What is that?” he asked.

“Since beautiful is the opposite of ugly, we have two distinct concepts here.”

“Naturally.”

“So, since we have two, each of them is one, isn’t it?”

“That also.”

“And the principle is the same with just and unjust, good and bad, and all other concepts, each one of them is an entity, but because of the combination everywhere with functions, physical forms, and with each other, each appears to have many manifestations.”

“You’re right,” he said.

“Now this is where I make the distinction,” I said: “the people you mentioned just now, those who are keen on spectacles, crafts and trades as one group, and on the other side, those with whom our argument is concerned, the only ones one would rightly call philosophers.”

“How do you mean?” he asked.

“I imagine that those who love listening and watching eagerly pursue beautiful sounds and colors and shapes and everything made up of such things,⁶⁹ but their minds are incapable of seeing and pursuing the nature of beauty itself.”

⁶⁹ For example, plays and paintings. The following argument anticipates ideas pursued further in Book 10.600e4–601b4.

Ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ, ἔφη, οὕτως.

Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἵεσθαι τε καὶ ὁρᾶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἄρα οὐ σπάνιοι ἂν εἶεν;

Καὶ μάλα.

c Ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μῆτε νομίζων μῆτε, ἂν τις ἡγήται ἐπὶ τὴν γνώσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος ἐπεσθαι, ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; σκοπεῖ δέ. τὸ ὀνειρώττειν ἄρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, εἴαντε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις εἴαντ' ἐγρηγορῶς | τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ μὴ ὁμοίον ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγήται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν;

Ἐγὼ γοῦν ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅς, φαίην ὀνειρώττειν τὸν τοιοῦτον.

d Τί δέ; ὁ τάναντία τούτων ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, καὶ οὔτε τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτὸ οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μετέχοντα ἡγούμενος, ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ αὖ καὶ οὔτος δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ὕπαρ.

Οὐκοῦν | τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γινώσκοντος γνώμην ἂν ὀρθῶς φαίμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί οὖν εἰάν ἡμῖν χαλεπαίνει οὔτος, ὃν φαμεν δοξάζειν ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκειν, καὶ ἀμφισβητῆ ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ

“Indeed, that is very much the case,” he said.

“But those who can approach and see beauty and observe it in and of itself will be few and far between, won’t they?”

“Very much so.”

“Does someone who believes in beautiful things, but who neither acknowledges beauty itself, nor is able to follow, if someone leads him to a knowledge of it—does he seem to you to be living asleep or awake? Look at it this way: isn’t it dreaming, whether asleep or awake, if one thinks that an object which resembles something is not a resemblance, but the actual thing it resembles?”

“I myself at any rate would say that dreaming is something of this sort.”

“What about this point? For someone with the opposite view, who thinks something is actual beauty and that he can distinguish both the actual and those things that partake of it, and doesn’t think that those things that partake of it are the actual thing nor the actual thing the things that partake of it, do you think he lives his life asleep or awake?”

“He is very much awake,” he said.

“So would we be right in saying that the thought of the one is knowledge because he knows, and that of the other is belief, because he believes what he does?”⁷⁰

“Certainly.”

“What then if the latter were to become angry with us, the one we say has an opinion but not knowledge, and

⁷⁰ For *doxa* = “belief/opinion,” see the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (i).

e λέγομεν; ἔξομέν τι παραμυθεῖσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ πείθειν ἡρέμα, ἐπικρυπτόμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιαίνει;

Δεῖ γέ τοι δῆ, ἔφη.

Ἰθι δῆ, σκόπει τί ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτόν. ἢ βούλει | ὧδε πυνθανώμεθα παρ' αὐτοῦ, λέγοντες ὡς εἴ τι οἶδεν οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ φθόνος, ἀλλ' ἄσμενοι ἂν ἴδοιμεν εἰδότα τι. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἰπέ τόδε· ὁ γιγνώσκων γιγνώσκει τι ἢ οὐδέν; σὺ οὖν μοι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρίνου.

Ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὅτι γιγνώσκει τί.

Πότερον ὃν ἢ οὐκ ὄν;

477 Ὅν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη;

Ἰκανῶς οὖν τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κἂν εἰ πλεοναχῆ σκοποῖμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὄν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὄν δὲ μηδαμῆ πάντῃ ἄγνωστον; |

Ἰκανώτατα.

Εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δῆ τι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μεταξὺ ἂν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αἰ μηδαμῆ ὄντος;

Μεταξύ. |

Οὐκοῦν (ἐπεὶ) ἐπὶ⁷ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνώσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι, ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ b μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἴ τι τυγχάνει ὄν τοιοῦτον;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Ἄρ' οὖν λέγομέν τι δόξαν εἶναι; |

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

⁷ <ἐπεὶ> ἐπὶ Hermann: ἐπὶ ADF Burnet

argues that we are not telling the truth? Will we have any way of soothing him and gently persuading him whilst concealing the fact that he is not well?"

"Well, at any rate we must find one," he said.

"Come on then, think about what we're going to say to him. Or do you want us to find out from him in the following way, by saying that if he knows something, then we don't grudge him his knowledge, but we would gladly see that he knows something? Well, you tell us: does a person with knowledge know something or nothing? Now you answer my question for him."

"I shall answer that he knows something."

"Something that is, or not?"

"Something that is. How could he know something that doesn't exist?"

"So are we satisfied that even if we look at this from a number of viewpoints, what exists entirely can be known, what doesn't cannot be known at all?"

"Yes, we're very satisfied."

"Well then, if indeed there is something such that it can both exist and not exist, would it not lie between what exists pure and simple, and what does not exist at all?"

"Yes, between the two."

"So, since knowledge is concerned with what exists and absence of knowledge necessarily with what does not, then something in between must be sought that is this middle ground between knowledge and absence of knowledge, if anything of that sort exists?"

"Very much so."

"So, is there something we can call belief?"

"Of course."

Πότερον ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐπιστήμης ἢ τὴν αὐτήν;
Ἄλλην.

Ἐπ' ἄλλω ἄρα τέτακται δόξα καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλω ἐπιστήμη, κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἑκατέρα τὴν αὐτῆς. |

Οὕτω.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γινώσκει ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν;—μᾶλλον δὲ ᾧδέ μοι δοκεῖ πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διελέσθαι.

Πῶς;

c Φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἄρα μαθηάνεις ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος. |

Ἄλλὰ μαθηάνω, ἔφη.

d Ἄκουσον δὴ ὃ μοι φαίνεται περὶ αὐτῶν. δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινὰ χρόαν ὄρω οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οἷον καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἀποβλέπων ἔνια διορίζομαι παρ' ἑμαυτῷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα· δυνάμεως δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ταύτῃ ἐκάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκάλεσα, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, | τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἐτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. τί δὲ σύ; πῶς ποιεῖς;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾧ ἄριστε. ἐπιστήμην

BOOK V

“Is it some other faculty⁷¹ than knowledge, or the same?”

“It’s different.”

“Then belief is formed for one purpose, knowledge another, each according to its faculty.”

“That’s right.”

“Knowledge therefore naturally relates to what exists, to know how what is, is? Yet if so, I think we should first make a distinction.”

“How?”

“We’ll say that faculties are a class of existing things by which both we and anything else are enabled to do what we and they can do: for example, I mean that sight and hearing are examples of these faculties, if you understand the type of thing I mean.”

“Well I do understand,” he said.

“Now listen to what my view is on this. In a faculty I do not see any color or shape or anything of the sort that many other things have which I can fix my gaze on to distinguish in my own mind that here is one group, here another. In the case of a faculty I can only look at it for its purpose and what it does, and that is how I call each of them a faculty; and the one which has the same purpose and function I call the same, and that which has a different purpose and function I give a different name. What about you? What do you do?”

“I do what you do,” he said.

“Good man! So let’s go back now,” I said. “Do you

⁷¹ Translating *dunamis* = “faculty/function/power”; see below, cliff.

πότερον δύναμιν τινα φῆς εἶναι αὐτήν, ἢ εἰς τί γένος τιθείς;

e Εἰς τοῦτο, ἔφη, πασῶν γε δυνάμεων ἐρρωμενεστάτην.

Τί δέ, δόξαν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος οἴσομεν;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ᾧ γὰρ δοξάζειν δυνάμεθα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ δόξα ἐστίν. |

Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ ὀλίγον γε πρότερον ὠμολόγεις μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δόξαν.

Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, τό γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταυτόν τις νοῦν ἔχων τιθείη;

478 Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἐπιστήμης δόξα ὁμολογεῖται ἡμῖν.

Ἔτερον.

Ἐφ' ἐτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι δυναμένη ἐκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν; |

Ἀνάγκη.

Ἐπιστήμη μὲν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ ὄν γινῶναι ὡς ἔχει;

Ναί.

Δόξα δέ, φαμέν, δοξάζειν; |

Ναί.

Ἡ ταυτὸν ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη γινώσκει; καὶ ἔσται γνωστόν τε καὶ δοξαστὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἀδύνατον;

Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων· εἴπερ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἄλλῃ δύναμις πέφυκεν, δυνάμεις δὲ ἀμφοτέραί b ἐστων, δόξα τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλῃ δὲ ἐκατέρα, ὡς

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agree that knowledge is a faculty, or what class do you put it in?"

"The one which is the most powerful of all the faculties."

"What about this? Shall we take belief as a faculty or put it in another class?"

"Certainly not," he said "for belief is nothing other than the faculty which enables us to believe."

"But only a little while ago you agreed that knowledge and belief are not the same thing."

"Of course!" he said; "what person with any sense would ever put together the infallible with the fallible?"

"Excellent!" I said. "Then we are clearly agreed that belief is something other than knowledge."

"It is indeed," he said.

"Then each of them, since it is a different faculty from the other, naturally deals with something different?"

"It must do."

"Knowledge I take it is about what exists: to know about the nature of what is?"

"Yes."

"Belief is for the purpose of holding beliefs?"

"Yes."

"Can it then know the same things as knowledge? And will what can be known and what can be a belief be the same? Or is that impossible?"

"From what we've agreed, it's impossible," he said. "If different faculties naturally deal with different things and both opinion and knowledge are faculties, each separate

φαμεν, ἐκ τούτων δὴ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γνωστὸν καὶ δοξαστὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ὄν γνωστὸν, ἄλλο τι ἂν δοξαστὸν ἢ τὸ ὄν εἴη;

Ἄλλο. |

Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζει; ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τό γε μὴ ὄν; ἐννόει δέ. οὐχ ὁ δοξάζων ἐπὶ τὶ φέρει τὴν δόξαν; ἢ οἷόν τε αὐτὸ δοξάζειν μὲν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν;

Ἀδύνατον.

Ἄλλ' ἔν γέ τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων; |

Ναί.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἔν τι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο;

Πάνυ γε.

Μὴ ὄντι μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνώσιν;

Ὄρθως, ἔφη. |

Οὐκ ἄρα ὄν οὐδὲ μὴ ὄν δοξάζει;

Οὐ γάρ.

Οὔτε ἄρα ἄγνοια οὔτε γνώσις δόξα ἂν εἴη;

Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

⁷² For the controversial question, raised by this and subsequent argument, of whether Plato is arguing that knowledge and belief are directed at separate objects (known as the "Two Worlds" interpretation), or whether particulars can be the object of knowledge, see the introduction to vol. 2, section 2 (i).

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from the other, as we are agreed, so consequently what can be known and what can be held as a belief cannot be the same.”⁷²

“So if what exists is knowable, then what can be held as a belief would be something other than what exists, wouldn’t it?”

“Yes, it would be something else.”

“Is it then belief about what doesn’t exist? Or is it impossible to have a belief about what doesn’t exist? Think about it. Doesn’t someone who has a belief apply that belief to some object? Or is it indeed possible to have a belief, but to have a belief about nothing?”⁷³

“That is impossible.”

“Well does someone who has a belief, have it about some one thing?”

“Yes.”

“But there again ‘not existing’ would be most properly described not as some single object, but as nothing.”

“That’s true.”

“But weren’t we forced to concede that ‘not existing’ equals ignorance and ‘existing’ equals knowledge?”

“Yes, and rightly so,” he said.

“In that case one can’t have a belief about what exists, nor even about what doesn’t?”

“No, one can’t.”

“So neither ignorance nor knowledge would constitute a belief?”

“It doesn’t look like it.”

⁷³ The idea that one can have knowledge or beliefs about that which does not exist was a puzzle much entertained by sophists: see *Euthyd.* 283aff. and *Gorgias* DK 82B3.

Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, ὑπερβαίνουσα ἢ γινώ-
σιν | σαφηνεία ἢ ἄγνοιαν ἀσαφεία;

Οὐδέτερα.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γνώσεως μὲν σοι φαίνεται
δόξα σκοτωδέστερον, ἀγνοίας δὲ φανότερον;

Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη.

d Ἐντὸς δ' ἀμφοῖν κεῖται;

Ναί.

Μεταξὺ ἄρα ἂν εἴη τούτοις δόξα.

Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν. |

Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἴ τι φανείη οἶον
ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν, τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταξὺ κείσθαι τοῦ
εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὔτε
ἐπιστήμην οὔτε ἄγνοιαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ
μεταξὺ αὐτῶν φανὲν ἀγνοίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης;

Ὅρθως.

Νῦν δέ γε πέφανται μεταξὺ τούτοις ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν
δόξαν;

Πέφανται.

e Ἐκείνο δὴ λείποιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν εὐρεῖν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ
ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ
οὐδέτερον εἰλικρινὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενον,
ἵνα, ἐὰν φανῆ, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν δίκῃ προσαγο-
ρεύωμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις τὰ ἄκρα, | τοῖς δὲ μεταξὺ τὰ
μεταξὺ ἀποδιδόντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

Οὕτω.

74 At 477a6-8.

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"Therefore is it outside of these, extending beyond knowledge in clarity, and beyond ignorance in obscurity?"

"No, neither."

"Well then," I said, "does belief seem to you something more obscure than knowledge, but clearer than ignorance?"

"Very much so," he said.

"Does it lie within the two?"

"Yes."

"Then belief will be between these two?"

"Absolutely."

"Didn't we agree earlier⁷⁴ that if something could be shown both to exist and not exist at the same time, such a thing would lie between what exists pure and simple, and what does not exist at all, and there would be no knowledge or nonknowledge about it, but that it would apparently be the province of the midpoint between not knowing and knowing?"

"That is right."

"So now what we call belief has been shown to lie between these two?"

"It has."

"Indeed then it seems it would remain for us to discover what shares both existence and nonexistence, and which cannot rightly be called purely and simply one or the other, so that if it is discovered, we would strictly speaking refer to it as a matter of belief by conceding the extremes to the extremes, and the middle to the middle. Or is that not so?"

"It is so."

479 Τούτων δὴ ὑποκειμένων λεγέτω μοι, φήσω, καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω ὁ χρηστός ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἠγείται ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει, ἐκεῖνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμῆ ἀνεχόμενος ἂν τις ἐν τὸ καλὸν φῆ εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἢ τᾶλλα οὕτω. “Τούτων γὰρ δὴ, ὦ ἄριστε, φήσομεν, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν ὃ οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὀσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον;”

b Οὐκ, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ καλά πως αὐτὰ καὶ αἰσχροὺς φανῆναι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐρωτᾶς.

Τί δὲ τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια; ἤπτόν τι ἡμίσεια ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται;

Οὐδέν. ἢ

Καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μή τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἂν φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τὰναντία;

Οὐκ, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ, ἔφη, ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἔξεται.

Πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν τοῦτο ὃ ἂν τις φῆ αὐτὸ εἶναι;

c Τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐστιάσεσιν, ἔφη, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἔοικεν, καὶ τῷ τῶν παίδων αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου, τῆς βολῆς πέρι τῆς νυκτερίδος, ᾧ καὶ ἐφ’

⁷⁵ Ironic, for the person who does not believe that such actualities exist.

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“With these assumptions I will say: let the worthy man⁷⁵ speak and answer my question—the man who thinks there is nothing actually beautiful, and no Form⁷⁶ of beauty itself that is consistent in the same respects, but thinks there are many kinds of beauty; someone who loves watching and never tolerates anyone who claims that the beautiful is an entity, and the same with the just and the rest likewise. ‘I can assure you, my good fellow,’ we shall say, ‘out of these many beautiful things, is there one which won’t appear to be ugly; out of all just things, one which won’t be unjust; out of sacred things one which won’t be profane?’”

“No,” he said, “but they must somehow appear to be both beautiful and ugly, and similarly with the rest that you asked about.”

“And what about the many things which are doubles? Can they be seen as any less as halves than as doubles?”

“No.”

“Again big and small, light and heavy, whatever we mention is there any reason to give them these names rather than the opposite?”

“No,” he said, “they will always have something of both in them.”

“So is each one of the many things any more whatever one claims it is, than not what one claims it is?”

“This reminds me of games of doubles at parties,” he said, “and children’s riddles about the eunuch: they ask the one about hitting the bat: with what and on what did he

⁷⁶ The first arguably technical use, in *Republic*, of *idea* = “Form,” “Idea” (see further Book 10.596a10ff.).

οὐδὲ αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὐτ' εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὔτε ἀμφοτέρα | οὔτε οὐδέτερον.

Ἔχεις οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι χρήση, ἢ ὅποι θήσεις καλλίω θέσιν τῆς μεταξὺ οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι; οὔτε γάρ που σκοτωδέστερα μὴ ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον μὴ εἶναι φανήσεται, οὔτε φανότερα ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον εἶναι.

d Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Ἡύρηκαμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξὺ που κυλινδείται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς. |

Ἡύρηκαμεν.

Προωμολογήσαμεν δέ γε, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον φανείη, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ ἄλλ' οὐ γνωστὸν δεῖν λέγεσθαι, τῇ μεταξὺ δυνάμει τὸ μεταξὺ πλανητὸν ἀλισκόμενον.

Ὡμολογήκαμεν.

e Τοὺς ἄρα πολλὰ καλὰ θεωμένους, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν μὴ ὀρώντας μηδ' ἄλλω ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἄγοντι δυναμένους ἔπεσθαι, καὶ πολλὰ δίκαια, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ, καὶ

⁷⁷ The relevant point about the puzzles is that they involve terms which are simultaneously what they are and what they are not: the riddle (found later in Athenaeus, 10.452c) is that a man not a man saw and did not see a bird not a bird in a tree not a tree; he hit and did not hit it with a stone not a stone: answer:

hit it?⁷⁷ These things too are ambiguous, and one cannot be absolutely certain that any of these things exists or does not, either as both or neither.”

“Can you make use of them then,” I asked, “or find a better place to put them than between being and not being? For I don’t think they’ll seem more obscure than not existing by involving some greater degree of not existing, nor clearer than existing by involving some greater degree of existence.”

“That’s very true,” he said.

“It seems then that we have discovered that the many notions of most people about beauty and the rest are rolling around⁷⁸ somewhere between nonexistence and pure existence.”

“We have.”

“We agreed before, if something like this were the result of our discussion, we would have to say that it was a matter of belief and not of knowledge. The one wandering about in the middle is caught by the middle faculty.”

“We did.”

“Then those who look at many beautiful things without seeing the beautiful itself, and are unable to follow anyone who leads them toward it, and likewise with many just things, not seeing the just itself, and so with everything

eunuch (man/not man), bad eyesight (he saw/did not see), bat (bird/not bird), rafter or reed (tree/not a tree), threw and missed (hit/did not hit), pumice stone (stone/not stone). The riddle implies the potentially contradictory nature of language used to describe things in the world.

⁷⁸ For the metaphor see e.g., *Phdr.* 275e, there specifically of the unreliability of written words.

πάντα οὕτω, δοξάζειν φήσομεν ἅπαντα, γιγνώσκειν δὲ ὧν δοξάζουσιν οὐδέν. |

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Τί δὲ αὖ τοὺς αὐτὰ ἕκαστα θεωμένους καὶ αἰὲν κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ὄντα; ἄρ' οὐ γιγνώσκειν ἄλλ' οὐ δοξάζειν;

Ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα.

480 Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τε καὶ φιλεῖν τούτους μὲν ταῦτα φήσομεν ἐφ' οἷς γνώσις ἐστίν, ἐκείνους δὲ ἐφ' οἷς δόξα; ἢ οὐ μνημονεύομεν ὅτι φωνάς τε καὶ χροῶς καλὰς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἔφαμεν τούτους φιλεῖν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ἀνέχεσθαι ὡς τι ὄν; |

Μεμνήμεθα.

Μὴ οὖν τι πλημμελήσομεν φιλοδόξους καλοῦντες αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφους; καὶ ἄρα ἡμῖν σφόδρα χαλεπανοῦσιν ἂν οὕτω λέγωμεν;

Οὐκ, ἂν γέ μοι πείθωνται, ἔφη· τῷ γὰρ ἀληθεῖ χαλεπαίνειν οὐ θέμις. |

Τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους ἄλλ' οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

⁷⁹ Plato invents the word *philodoxoi* = "belief lovers," coined from (and opposed to) *philosophoi* = "lovers of wisdom," i.e., philosophers.

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else: these people, we shall say, have an belief about everything, but have no knowledge about that of which they have a belief.”

“We must say that,” he said.

“What about those, on the other hand, who observe each of these things in themselves, always in an unchanging state, shall we not say that they have knowledge, and not just belief?”

“That is also necessary.”

“Shall we then agree that these people both pursue eagerly and love the things of which they have knowledge, while the former do so over what they hold a belief about? Or do we not recall that we agreed that these people love and contemplate beautiful sounds and colors and such like, but cannot accept that beauty itself is something that exists?”

“We do.”

“Then we won’t be too far out if we refer to them as ‘belief lovers,’⁷⁹ rather than lovers of wisdom? And they’ll be very cross with us if we call them so?”

“Not if they do as I say,” he said. “It is not sanctioned⁸⁰ to get upset by the truth.”

“Then we must refer to those who pursue the individual thing that exists in itself as lovers not of belief but of wisdom?”

“Absolutely so.”

⁸⁰ *Themis* = “right by divine law.” The use of this word here suggests a gravity appropriate for the end of what has been a complex philosophical argument.