A further search into the conduct of the allies: and the late ministry, as to peace and war. Containing also a reply to the several letters and memorials of the States-General. ...

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A Further Search INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES, &c.

THE Reception a former Work of this Kind has met with in the World, and the little which has been said against it, as to Matters of Fact, must be acknowledged to be all owing to the Truth, coming with an irresistible Force upon the Minds of Men, and which always carries its own Evidence along with it; when we have met with the Enemy descanting upon it, we have heard them, even in the midst of a Thousand Curses, and hard Names, which they cast upon the Author, yet at every Pause cry out, Damn the Circumstance, I doubt there is too much Truth in it, tho' I hate the Design of making it Publick. This makes it clear, which has often, and upon many other Occasions, been said, that our late People had a kind of Popery in their Politicks, (viz.) that much of their Success consisted in keeping the People Blind and Ignorant in the Main and most Essential Points of their Affairs, and which it was most necessary for them to know; that they were so far from knowing what Usage they had received Abroad from their Allies, that when they came to be a little rightly inform'd, they could not Frame Idea's of so much Knavery in their Heads, or think it possible that any People, who called themselves Allies, could at the same time carry themselves in such a Manner, to those for whom they had made the least Professions of any Respect, or for whose common Safety they had the least Concern.

As the Truth of what has been thus spoken, is hereby acknowledged and confest by the Enemy, which is the best kind of Evidence; so the Seasonableness of making that Truth Publick in the Manner it hath been by the former Tract, and as it shall or may be in this, is justified and clear'd beyond all Possibility of Objection, by the late Publick Resolutions of the Honourable House of Commons, where it comes into the World with the Sanction and Authority of the great Representative of the Nation; it is true, the Particulars in the Votes amount to a most excessive Height; and tho' it was known and believed by many to be very great, yet I must confess few imagined them to be so surprizing, the Account so large, and the Particulars so many, as they appear to be; also one Thing is obtain'd by this Report of the House of Commons, which the Credit of a single Author was by no Means sufficient for, (viz.) that the Dutch had any Share in the Deficiency, and in the Injuries which this Nation has suffered under the Weight of this Confederacy; many would be brought by the Power of Reasoning, and the Force of Demonstrations, which are Things all People are not equally furnished to resist; they would, I say, be brought to confess, that there might have been Defects in general, and that those Defects appeared in the Affairs of the Empire, the Portuguese, and such like, any Thing but the Dutch; but such an Ascendant had the Influence of the Politicks, and the Confederacy of the late Administration with the Parties concern'd, obtain'd over the People, that tho' any thing would go down with them against other People, yet if the Dear Dutch came into the Dispute, nothing could be born with, but all the rest was the pure Effect of Jacobitism, and the French.

How fatal this has been to us I may hereafter have Leisure to examine, and every Day is like to discover more and more of it to us; indeed Things were mounted to such a violent Prepossession upon us in Favour of the Dutch, that we began to think even our own Constitution stood in need of further Security from them, and politickly brought the Dutch into our National Concerns; thus making ourselves beholden to them for a Guarantee, or Safety to the Succession of Hannover, that this might be a Handle to our doing other Things for them, so exorbitant in their own Nature, as that no Nation, but such as depended upon them for something very weighty and significant, would ever consent to, or could upon any other Pretence be perswaded into; yet this was not all, for when we had brought our People to stoop to so mean a Thought, as that our Succession, Ratified by both Kingdoms, and Incorporated by both the Parliaments of England and Scotland, in the late Solemn Treaty of Union, could receive any Addition of Strength from Abroad, more than that of the Interest and Alliance of so powerful a Prince, as his Electoral Highness of Hannover, and his Allies; that we stood in Need of that incoherent Article of a Dutch Guarantee; when I say we had stoop'd so low, as to level our Constitution to the Common Notion of Leagues and Treaties between other and differing Nations, and that it should receive a farther Sanction thereby, it was not hard then to fill the Heads of the poor People with a Belief, that whoever made the least Objection against any Thing hereafter, which either the Dutch might do by us, or which we might do by them, acted therein against the Protestant Succession: This was a Point so well gain'd by the Dutch, that on the Faith of a Man, if they gain'd it for nothing, it was the best Bargain they made during the whole War; and if our late Managers granted it so also, they must either have given up their Sences to the Dutch, or had most despicable Thoughts of the Strength of Great-Britain, and of our being able to support our own Settlement; or which I speak most unwillingly, there must have been some private Bargain driven, of which I shall venture to say no more, but that I hope no Englishman could be found that would be guilty of it.

To wave therefore a Reflection so unwelcome, let us go back to the Observation before, viz. this Threefold End we have seen it answer to the Dutch; what End it will ever answer to us remains a Mystery, and will in all Probability remain so for many Years to come, if not for ever; the Ends which I say it answered for the Dutch were Three.

1. The Barrier Treaty, which with the separate Article, was join'd as the Advance Money of a Loan, by Way of what our People call Prompt-Payment, and which the Dutch had the Confidence to Paum upon us as a small Matter, and a Thing due to them for the great Kindness done for us by them, in taking upon them to secure our Succession. I am not ignorant of that weak and foolish Use which the Enemies of Peace made of that Objection spoken of in the other foremention'd Tract, p. 21. viz. "That it may not be right in Point of Policy, or good Sense, that a Foreign Power should be call'd in to confirm our Succession, by Way of Guarantee, but only to acknoledge it; otherwise we put it out of the Power of our own Legislature to change our Succession without the Consent of that Prince or State who is Guarantee. However, our Posterity may hereafter, by the Tyranny and Oppression of any succeeding Princes, be reduced to the Fatal Necessity of breaking in upon the Excellent and Happy Settlement now in Force."

This by all Means they will have as an Aim taken for the Pretender, as if, because we ought not to put it out of the Power of our Legislature to limit the Succession, whatever Necessity may happen; even when this Race may be all in their Graves; that therefore we have an immediate Alteration of the Succession in our View; these People who contend thus, forget the mighty Noise we have had from them about Parliamentary Limitations, a Word the Whigs have made so Sacred, that it has been like the Magna Charta of their Liberties, and with which they run down the Hereditary Right of their Princes, as if there had been nothing at all in it but Tyranny, and Arbitrary Government, till at Length it was happily discovered, that they were very well consistent together; and that they who best understood Hereditary Right, had proved it to be agreeable to Parliamentary Limitation, and then all was well again. But after all this Bustle, was it to be imagined that the same People could so easily give up the Parliaments Right of limiting the Succession to a Foreign Nation; and by making a League of Guarantee for the Succession, legitimate the Impertinence of Strangers, who may hereafter intermeddle with our Constitution, and may tell a British Parliament, they have no Power to alter or meddle with the Settlement of the Crown, for that it is already Settled, and they are Guarantees of it? What has been, may be; and what may be, may be supposed to be; if then any of the Family of Hannover should Tyrannize or Abdicate, or the same, or like Circumstances should happen, as have happened before, the Parliament would be disabled from declaring the Throne vacant, and filling up the same with such other of the Family as they find convenient; which according to all the Whig Principles which we have so often heard of, is inseparable from the Constitution, and much more Sacred than any Thing which has been Hereditary in the World. I do not encline to concern these Papers with the popular Disputes which have troubled the World so much and so long, about the Difference between Hereditary and Parliamentary Right; how far they are the same, or which is best furnished with Authorities, and Originals, whether of Divine or Civil Right; it is enough to take hold here of the Whigs own Argument, and allowing all they have said on this Head to be Orthodox, whether it really be so or no; it must necessarily follow, that this Parliamentary Right cannot, or ought not, to be given out of our Hinds, and put, by a Treaty, into the Hands of Foreigners; so that it shall be in their Power to put their Negative into our next Limitation of the Crown. If this be not to give away our Liberties, I would be glad to know what it is to keep them; if there be any Choice of Tyrants, and if it weighs any Thing, when our Priviledges are given up, who is it they should be given up to? I confess myself more willing to be a Slave at Home than Abroad, and to be tyranniz'd on by a Prince of our own, than by a Foreign Nation; and if there were no other Reason for that than this, it would be sufficient to justifie the Choice, (viz.) that there are more Ways to avoid the Mischief of it, that an oppressing Prince has some times chang'd his Measures, or he may be restrain'd, or may die, and thereby a Nation may be delivered; but such a Convention as this, made with a Foreign Nation, engages that whole Nation upon all Occasions to embark itself, and its whole Strength, in Defence of the Capitulation agreed on; and thus by this Method the Power of Parliament in future Limitations of the Crown seems to be effectually given up: How the Whigs would have liked this Doctrine if it had come from any one but themselves, may be best guess'd at by the Warmth they shewed about the League said to be made by the late King James and the King of France; which put this whole Nation into a Flame, and Reason good so far as that League appear'd; for what was it, or what could we imagine it to be, but a Treaty of Guarantee with the French for the securing the Succession of Popery in England? Whereas the Settling the Religion and Liberties of this Nation was the undoubted Right of the People in Parliament, and so by the same Rule must the Succession of our Princes be. The Sum of all this is, that by the Whigs own Arguments, and by their own Principles, which they have always professed, and adher'd to, and by the same Rule from which they acted in the Revolution, the accepting a Guarantee, for the securing the Succession of the Crown of this Kingdom to any Family, or Branch of a Family, Race, or Line whatsoever, is no less than giving up the Privileges of the People, and divesting the Parliament of the Power of limiting the Succession to the Crown.

It may be remember'd, that in the late Treaty of Union with Scotland, some Secret Overtures were made, to have engaged the Dutch to be Guarantees of that Treaty; and though that Proposal seem'd to come from such Hands, as gave Reason to believe it was rather a Design to destroy, than secure the said Treaty, the Dutch having at that Time discover'd Willingness enough to have prevented the Conclusion of that Treaty, yet those that knew any Thing of the Resentment expressed at that Time here against that Proposal, as dishonourable to England, and destructive of the Constitution of both Kingdoms, would wonder that ever the same Ministry should so far change their Notions, as to admit the same Guarantee in so Nice an Affair, as the Succession to their own Crown, which they rejected with Contempt in a Treaty with the Neighbouring Nation.

Secondly, Another End answered by this Treaty of Guarantee, was giving an Opportunity to the Dutch to play their own Game with us, with Respect to other Treaties, Quota's, Proportions of Payments, Ships, Troops, and the like; of this so much has been said already, and is yet like to be said farther in Publick, that I shall need say the less to it here, my Design being rather to justifie the Resentment all honest Men entertain, at the mean Politicks and Submissions of our People here, and to show the Necessity of taking wiser for the future, than to Animate People against any of our Confederates. I am as forward as any to agree, that the Advantages of a strict Union among the Confederates are very great; and that, as Her Majesty exprest it, the Interest of the States of Holland be looked upon as our own; but this by no means hinders us from desiring that the Dutch should use us well, should shew a Reciprocal Kindness, and should act with a mutual Concern for the General Confederated Interest; and that we should not be willing to see them impose upon us in any of those Particulars, or be easie, and submit quietly to it when they do; and this is so much Justice, that none can object against; and what is the best, if not the only Way, to cultivate and maintain that Friendship, and good Understanding, on both Sides, which is so much the Interest of the Confederacy in General, and of the Dutch themselves in Particular. They who contend, that the enquiring into these Things seems to show a Disregard to the Confederacy in General, or to the several Parties concerned in Particular, seem to make severer Satyrs upon the Dutch than they are aware of. The Deficiencies of the Performance they cannot deny, the want of a due Regard then to the Confederacy must certainly lye rather in those that have been the Cause of those Deficiencies, than those that have not; for who are most justly to be charged with slighting and disregarding the mutual Interest of the Consederacy, they that have failed in the Performance of the Condititions, or they that complain of it, in order to have them performed? Britain has all along shown, by a Zeal Fatal to herself, her Willingness to push on the War with all imaginable Vigour; in order to which, when Her deficient Allies, having less Concern for the general Good, have run the Venture of Miscarriage, to shorten their Expence; Britain, as if the whole Charge of the War had been her Due to pay, has zealously supply'd both their Quota's, and her own: While she was willing to do thus, her Confederates daily encreas'd their Deficiencies, and her Expence, as they might very well do, finding her so easie; and while she was willing to sit still, and see herself, thus used, it was very remarkable how Augmentations, and Increase of Forces, was every Year proposed by the Confederates, as well in Flanders, as in Spain, and none so forward as the Emperor himself to increase the Quota's of the Troops, and the Charges of the War, upon the rest of his Confederates; quietly waiting for their supplying Additional Troops, and taking Care to have very few of his own.

While we submitted to all these Things, the War went quietly on, but whether so successfully, or no, as it might have done, if the Allies had answered what we had Reason to expect from them, is left for them to Answer. At last, the British Court entering into a more narrow Inspection of Things, have not thought fit so calmly to suffer the Weight of the War to lye heavier upon one Shoulder than another; and tho' equally willing to bear their Share of the Burthen, yet not forward to carry that Load, which ought to lye upon other Shoulders. They are now calling upon their Confederates, to consider a little the Justice of their several Treaties, and to look back, and see what they are obliged to do, if they expect the War should be carried on any farther; if they are diffident of the Success of these Remonstrances from their Experience, how fruitless the like have been before, and have therefore at the same Time embrac'd the Occasion that has offer'd, towards putting an End to the War, by an Honourable Peace; they will be justified in it before all the World, both now, and for ever; when it shall be at the same Time understood, in what Manner, and for how many Years, this War has been carried on; nor can the Artifices of an Adverse Party among us delude many in their suggesting to the World, that the Government here is in the Interest of France, since they can have no other Reason to back that Suggestion, than that they were not willing to carry on a War upon unequal Terms, and in a Confederacy with Allies, who would not perform their own Conditions, and in which those, who expected the greatest Advantages from it, paid the least Part of the Expence towards it.

Thirdly, the Third End which this general Complaint against a Peace has been Calculated to Answer, and which the Party has taken Care to make as popular as they can, is a general Notion, that those who are for a Peace, do it with a Design, by the Assistance of France, to introduce the Pretender; however weak and inconsistent such a Consequence may be, nothing is more certain, than that many innocent, and well-meaning People, have been prevailed upon to believe it; and tho' the Improbilities of the Thing in its own Nature, and the steady Zeal of the Persons who they charge with it, and who have all along, in a Course of many Years, testified their Abhorrence of that Interest, and taken such Steps against it, as have been most effectual to the cutting off all Hope, both from him and his Party, might suffice to any reasonable People; yet this seems to be one of those Difficulties which can be solved only by a little Patience and Time: To those who will be convinced by Argument, it seems sufficient, that our putting a stop to a War, which we carried on at so much Disadvantage, and which had in View rather an utter Empoverishing the Nation, than a timely Reducing our Enemies to Reason, however, was not only necessary on many other Accounts, but greatly our Advantage on this Account, in especial Manner; that thereby we might be left in a Condition to defend our Constitution, and to preserve Power to maintain our Succession, as our Parliament had thought fit to limit it, without the Help of the Dutch, and without being put to so weak, so scandalous, and so dishonourable a Shift, as to accept of the Guarantee of Foreign States, to preseve our own Acts of Parliament.

When I look farther into this scandalous Thing, called a Guarantee for our Succession, methinks it represents to me our People on their Knees to the Dutch for the Mighty Favour of taking us into their High and Mighty Protection; and indeed, when this is compared with the Manner with which the States of Holland carried on the Geentruydenbergh Treay, wherein the making a Peace for us was also left wholly to, or engrossed by, the States of Holland, the Thing seems very much of a Peice. The Barrier Treaty also has much of the same Manner in it, which being handled at large by itself, I say no more to here. I have observed, that at the Time when we began to talk here of Peace, and when the French Articles began to appear, we were mightily amused with the Dutch making Offers, that they would take away the Excuse from us of want of Money, or Credit, and the Dutch would advance to us Four Millions Sterling, to encourage us to carry on the War. That the Dutch made such an Offer Publickly in Form is known to be a Mistake; but that the Dutch might be willing to lend, or to give as much as that amounts to, to have the Sole Direction of making the Peace, that so their particular Interest, which they never forget, might be principally provided for, this there can be no great Question of; and the Dutch are not without Cunning enough to make it so well worth their while, as that such a Sum of Money should not be ill laid out. But those People should do well to consider Two or Three Things which lye hid in this Notion, of the Dutch lending us so much Money, and which by Way of Corollary, may be of great Use to us, in the understanding of other Parts of Management on that Side. (1.) That if the States of Holland for the carrying on the War, could spare us so much Money to encourage us that we might not make a Peace without them, tho' that has not yet been thought of, them however, all they thought fit to say in former Times, of their being impoverished, and exhausted, and not in a Condition to pay their Quota's, must be a manifest Fraud and Cheat, and must be with Design to put upon us the Necessity of carrying it on upon unequal Conditions; and this they could not have entertained a Thought of, without first being sensible that they had us at so much Advantage, as that they knew, whenever they thought fit to ease their own Charge, they might-put the Hardship upon us. (2.) Since it was obtained by the Arts of their other Conduct, that the Dutch had the Sole Direction of the Peace, it followed then, that we were under an Obligation to carry on the War at their bidding; from whence it was most natural to believe, they were not dark-sighted enough not to make their other Advantages. (3.) These Things make it no longer a Mystery, why the Dutch would advance any Sum of Money for the encouraging us to carry on the War, because it followed, that we should carry it on under the same Inequalities and Disadvantages which we did before; but now these Things are detected, and if we should come to a Necessity of carrying on the War, which God forbid, yet that it should be more than probable we may not only demand that they begin upon a new Foot, and make up all their Quota's for the Time to come, but also may call upon them for what is past; also it is more than probable, that they may then plead Poverty with us, as they did before, and talk no more of the great Sums they would lend us. (4.) There is yet another Remark to be made upon this Head, viz. of the Dutch advancing such great Sums of Money to us; we have never found but these Sums were to be all lent upon good Parliamentary Security and on the Interest current in England; and we might not be thought ungrateful to the Lenders, if we asked them, where was the Advantage of all that? Was it to us, or to themselves? They must not know the Dutch so well as we have Reason to know them, who expect to find them ever forgetful of their own Interest in any Proposal they may make. It is true, we have complained of our being impoverislsed and exhausted, and not in a Condition to carry on the War, especially at the rate which it hath been carried on at, without great Inconveniencies, and Involving, Mortgaging, and Anticipating for us, and our Posterity, at a Rate, which neither are like to see the End of; but what is our Defect? We do not want Lenders, but Funds to borrow upon; we have Usurers enough among us to devour us, we want no Help from the Dutch; we are not without a Sort of Men among us, who having little or no Interest in the Freehold, have amassed infinite Sums of Money in Cash, with which they Trade upon the rest, and live upon the Blood and Vitals of the Government; these, like the Eagles where the Carkass falls, gather together; and if the Parliament can but find Funds, tho' they boast of having the Power of Credit in themselves, and often think of making themselves Formidable, by threatning the Government that they will lend no Money, and that they can ruin the Publick Credit, by refusing to advance their Money, yet they can no more forbear, than a Vulture can forbear his Prey; the Funds are the Carkass they feed on; they are as Hungry for them, as a Lion that has been Hunting, and found no Food; and in spight of their Faith, often Pledg'd to their Party and Friends, to run down Credit, and lend no Money, let but the Ministry find a Fund, and the Parliament establish a Lottery, or Subscription, or Loan, and they are ready to trample one another to Death to get in their Money. So that after all that hath been said of the Dutch lending us Money, we see nothing to be said to it, but what was said in Answer to some Bantering Lines in the Time of King Charles II. made upon the King, which his Majesty by Repartee answered himself thus.

" Charles at this Time having no Need,

" Thanks you as much as if he did.

It is apparent in our Case we want no Lenders; we have been devoured with Harpies already, who think, as no doubt the Dutch would also think, and perhaps say too, that the Borrower is Servant to the Lender. But we must acknowledge we want Funds to borrow, and where to find them, such excepted as will plunge us yet farther and farther into a Gulph, whence no less than a Hundred Years can redeem us, is past the Skill of the best Advocates for a War to find out; indeed I cannot but wonder, that in all the Noise the Faction have made at these Things, they have not descended to one Argument against the Difficulty of raising Funds; they have indeed told us Great Things, a la Gasconade, that there are Funds enough, that England is vastly rich, that there is Money enough, that we can with Ease carry on the War this Seven Years, and such Rhodomontade, that they have Surfeited the People with it for some Time; but we do not see one of them that offers any Scheme how, and upon what destructive ruinous Fund, this Money may be raised, that the People may judge whether what is alledged be true, yea, or no; and whether those Funds they shall so propose, shall not be as fatal to the general Good, as those that have gone before; with such fallacious Ways have the People been managed, till they have led them on to the brink of inevitable Ruin; and now, as if it were not enough, that the Nation hath for so many Years been oppressed by the War, through the Negligence or Knavery of our Consederates, we are modestly desired to proceed in the War upon the same Foot. I confess, this among our own People is a Sign of some National Stupidity and Blindness, which one would hardly think possible; but for our Neighbours, whether the States General, or others, to desire in, seems to smell of something we want a Word for in our Tongue, and may be better express'd in French by Marveillieux Surprenant, and the like. I must needs say I have not yet met with any Man so weak, but what begins to feel the Force of this Argument enter into his Soul, if the Allies have not perform'd according to their Agreement, they should be reminded of it; and if we cannot prevail with them to make up former Defects, we ought at least to be careful that they comply punctually for the Time to come. Can any People be so besotted to a Party, as to expect or desire that a Nation, already impoverished by the unfair Impositions of Her Allies, and not able to carry on the War on the Terms she hath done for some Time, should not insist upon more Justice for the future, that she may be able to hold it out?

Neither is this an unnecessary Argument at this Time, for if we can carry on this War at the Expence of Three Millions and Half Yearly, instead of Seven, then we are better able to go on Two Years upon the Square with our Allies, than One Year upon the unequal Foundation we have gone upon all along; so that to bring our Allies to do us Justice, and to exert themselves to the uttermost, in carrying on the War, is the truest and best Step towards the main Point, (viz.) of carrying it on, if we are assured we shall no more be imposed upon; if we see the full Quota's of Troops in the Field, the full Numbers of Ships in the Mediterranean, and all Things in Readiness in Time, and fit for Action; if any Thing will revive the drooping Spirits of the Nation it must be this; it must be that they have some Hopes of not being cheated again, and that the powerful Assistance of the Allies will be a Means of putting a happy and speedy End to the War, that a safe Peace may follow; and it is easie to find that nothing but this wil• do it; nothing else can perswade an exhausted Nation to bleed anew, but some Assurance that they shall not be suffered by their Allies to bleed to Death, that there shall be some End of their Sorrows and Miseries, and that every Hand is fairly engaged in bringing Things to a happy End.

But these Things seem to call for no further Remark from us, they are so natural and plain in themselves, that every Child in these Affairs may understand them; for if we must carry on the War; it must be needful that we suffer ourselves to be no more abused by our Allies; if we are not to expect Justice from our Allies, then we must be unaccountably besotted if we carry on the War; nay, tho' a worse Peace were to follow than Her Majesty hath good Reason to expect from the Negotiations now on Foot.

But it may not be amiss to enquire here what Prospect there appears of these Things, and what Hopes our Allies do put us in, of expecting for the future better Treatment; and that in the Pursuit of the War they will go on upon a different Foot from that which they have hitherto gone upon; for if there was but some Appearance of an Amendment for the future, it might be some Encouragement to us to think of prosecuting the ensuing Campaigns with more Comfort; but instead of this, all we yet see amounts to little that Way, for at Home all the Fruit of the Discovery shows only a kind of Regret that it is made publick, an inward fretting that the Fact is too obvious, so that they cannot contradict it, and an envious Warmth at the Justice done their own Countrey in it, because it touches upon the States-General, as if to touch them were fatal to us all; and perhaps it may indeed be fatal to some Projects the Party had ser on Foot here, destructive enough to the Liberty of their Country, and of which a little Time may give us a farther View: This is clear, in that all the Reply we have here to the detecting the hard Usage we have met with from our Allies, issues in Exclamations at our exposing the Dutch, and falling upon the Dutch, spreading Reports that we design to fall out with the Dutch, and that we are for a Peace with France, and a VVar with the Dutch; as if we must refrain a due Inspection into our own Affairs, for fear of the Effects it will or may have upon the Hollanders; it is no less the Duty of every. Faithful Representative to enquire how other Nations may impose upon the People, and waste and destroy us, than it is how we are embezzelled at Home, for every Breach of Treaty is in this kind a Depredation upon the People; and it is most reasonable, that when they have thus discovered the Fraud, and by who, as well as by what Means, the Nation is exhausted and worn out, they should so far expose the Matters of Fact, and the Persons, that the People may know by what Means they are impoverished; this hath been the constant Method and Usage of Parliaments, and the Members of Parliament could not have discharged the Trust they have committed to them by the People they Represent, it they had omitted it. Nor can this be called exposing the Dutch; they lay open the Truth, if that exposes the Dutch, or any other Persons or States, the Misfortune is their own to be liable to such a Charge; but let such People answer what they would have had the House of Commons have done, when upon Enquiry into the State of the War, they found that we had not been fairly used by the Confederates; if they had held their Peace, had they not been Criminally Silent? Had they not betrayed their Countrey? Had they not been Accessary to all the Frauds of the like Kind which should have happen'd for the Future? And what would the Language of Posterity have been, when they should have seen that the House of Commons knew these Things, but took no Notice of them, or any Care to have the Nation informed of them? Must it not have been a just Reproach upon them, as it is now upon those who knew it before, and yet took no. Notice of it, or made any Application to former Parliaments to have it redressed? But it is evident these People, who make now such loud Complaints of the Reflections cast upon our Allies, appear more concerned that the Matter is made Publick, than that it is true; and are so far from desiring any Cure for the Disease, that they spend all their Heat and Resentment at the Discoveries of it; and it is to be observed from their Conduct, that they make Ten Reflections upon the House of Commons, and the Present Ministry, for the Industry and Pains taken in finding out how, and by whom, the Nation has been abused, for One just Remark upon the Integrity and Zeal in the War of those Allies, who have used us in such a Manner: Whence such a Spirit can proceed, and what Reason can be given for it, is not so hard to find out, as it is melancholy to reflect, that so it should be.

I might go forward in this Observation to expose the Foundation from whence all this proceeds, and by which we should soon see for what Uses and Purposes some People are so desirous of pushing on the War; and how to do it they care not, upon what Disadvantages, and unequal Conditions, they did it; being willing to bear any part of the Burthen, nay, all the Burthen, so the beloved War were but to be pursued; the Enquiry into this will open many Scenes of private Treachery, not yet brought to Light, and for that I purpose to do it in a Tract by itself; I shall leave it to a fit Occasion.

It falls next in View to Interrogate the Ministers at Ʋtrecht, how they proceed, and see thereby what Measures the Dutch take to convince us, that we shall have a better, and more equal, Ballance kept up among us, in case the War is to be continued. But here you shall find Measures calculated rather to compel the Queen of Great-Britain to carry on the War, than to invite Her Majesty to it by Assurances of performing Treaties better than in the Times past. This is a Temper so different from what might be expected from a People, who had so treated their Allies, to us who complain of being so treated, that it is as before, Marvellieux; or to put it plainer, a kind of throwing off the Mask; as if we were obliged to submit to be cheated, after we had first discovered that it was so; and that what before was done covertly, and under the Appearance of a Treaty, was now to be done more effectually, openly, avowedly, and in the Teeth of the rest of the Allies.

This appeared upon the first Conference after the French Plenipotentiaries had delivered in their Paper of Explanation, as they called it, on the Proposals of the Peace, which they had formerly given in. It came then to the Turn of the Allies to consider in what manner to deliver in their Answer to the French Proposals; this it was resolved should be by the Confederate Ministers delivering in their Demands, or the several Pretensions of their respective Principles, without taking any Notice of the Project contain'd in the Paper given in by the Ministers of France; it should have been noted here in the first Place, that after all the Dutch had said, and after all that had been said to them, in order to come to this Treaty, prepared to preserve a good Understanding among the Allies, and to bring the Treaty to the desired Conclusion, viz. a good Peace: The Dutch Ministers appeared there without any Character, having neither Powers as Plenipotentiaries, or as Ambassadors, or any Thing more than meer Commissioners, Empowered only to hear what was said, make Report to their Masters the States, and give back their Answers, which one of the Queen's common Messengers may as well do on our Side. Nor were the Persons, the Equipages, or the Sallaries allowed to their said Commissioners, any more than what was suitable to common Messengers, whose Business it was to carry a Message, and return with an Answer; so that in the Conferences, either General or Particular, there was no debating Things with them, only just giving in what any one had to say, and all the Answer these Men could give, was that they would Report it to their High-Mightinesses the States General, and would bring their Answer. The French Plenipotentiaries presently objected against these Powers, as not sufficient to admit the Dutch Ministers into the Conferences. The British Plenipotentiaries, tho' they were sensible of the Affront offered in it to their Royal Mistress, after such Assurances on Her Majesties Part, of Her sincere Intention to make the Interest of all Her Allies to be as Her own, yet willing to wave every Thing that might give an Obstruction to the happy Issue of the Peace, did not insist on this; though they could not but complain that it greatly obstructed that happy Concert of Measures, which they hoped might have been the constant Fruit of the private Conferences of the Confederate Ministers, which the Dutch having no Powers that extended any farther than barely to Hear, and Report, and bring back a Resolution; was for want of those Powers quite disappointed; so that the Dutch Ministers might as justly be deemed and termed Porters, as Plenipotentiaries. Well, notwithstanding all this, the British Plenipotentiaries, willing to promote the great End for which they assembled, which, as the Lord Bishop of Bristol exprest it, was in the Name of God, to bring the Wars to a happy Conclusion, in an Equitable and Honourable Peace, all these Obstructions were past over on their Side, and they labour'd to have the Powers of the Dutch Ministers accepted, as at last they were, with some Difficulty; and thus they proceed to the Affair of the Demands, as above, which were to be delivered in as the 5th of March. The Dutch Ministers concealing the Resolution taken at the Hague, to give in no Demands, but the very immediate Copy of the Preliminaries last treated on, insisted that all the Confederates Demands should be formed into one Instrument, and be given in jointly by all the Plenipotentiaries, as the general Demands of the whole Alliance. This, tho' something surprizing in itself, yet was the less so, when it was more known that this was, in order to execute the Measures above noted, (viz.) of bringing in the Preliminaries of Geertruydenbergh, as the Summary Demands of the Allies. But the British Plenipotentiaries taking Notice of it, insisted, that this seem'd to be destructive of the Treaty itself, that France had Twice ventured to carry on the War, rather than agree to those Preliminaries. That they had been declared Impracticable, and could not be treated on here; and to insist on the very literal Form of those Preliminiaries now, and prescribe the Plenipotentiaries to treat on them, was to declare against a Treaty at all. That this Meeting was understood by all Parties, to be not a Treaty of Preliminaries in order to a Treaty of Peace, but a General Treaty of Peace itself, wherein the Specifick Demands of every Ally were to be heard, debated, and finally discussed, adjusted, and answered, to their Satisfaction, which could by no Means be done by Preliminary Articles, which had in them several References to a farther Treaty, and some suggested Demands left to be farther discussed at another Time; whereas they were now met to make a final and general Conclusion of all Demands and Pretensions whatsoever, that there might be no more Blood shed in the Christian World, that an End might be put to the Miseries of Europe; it was also alledged, that the said Preliminaries had not been concerted with a due Regard to the Interest of all the Allies; in especial Manner it was asked, what Article there was to be found in them which regarded the Interest of Her Britannick Majejesty, farther than what meerly respected Her Title to the Crown, and the Banishment of the Pretender; whereas there seemed a great deal of Reason for admitting farther Demands for the Security, and enlarging the Commerce and Possessions of Her Majesty, and Her Subjects; for this Reason, as well as in Behalf of the rest of the Confederates, the said British Plenipotentiaries insisted upon giving in the Instrument of their Demands in particular, every Ally by themselves.

It must be something astonishing to such true Lovers of their Countrey, who can look back on these Things with unprejudiced Judgements, to reflect on the Temper reigning in this Part of Europe at the Time of the Treaty aforesaid, when in all the numerous Articles adjusted at the Hague, and afterwards debated again at Geertruydenberg by the Dutch and French, the former left out nothing which concerned their own Interest, Security or Advantage; nay, engaged the British Court to concern and engage themselves for their particular Security and Advantages, but not one Word. Clause, Article, or Debate, was ever thought of for the English, either as to the Security of their Commerce, as it then stood, or the Encrease of it for the future. On the other Hand, all the Stress on the British Side, and for which we were to think ourselves infinitely obliged to the Dutch, was to engage their Assistance to keep out the Pretender, and secure the Succession of the Crown of Great-Britain to his Electoral Highness of Hannover; a Thing which is so the Universal Resolution of all the People and Parties in Britain, and to which they think all the Opposition that can be made from either French, or any else, is so trifling and insignificant, that they cannot be sensible of the exceeding Obligation on that Behalf to their Confederates, or of the great Danger which they were in of the Pretender, although no Foreign Assistance had been engaged on that Behalf, esteeming the Favourers of the Pretender in Britain, not withstanding their great Clamours of a Party among us, to be so sew, and so inconsiderable, as that there is nothing to be seared from them; but supposing there had been more Danger of this Clause, (viz.) the Succession, then we are willing to hope there is Ground to apprehend it cannot but be reminded, that it is as much the Interest of the States-General to secure that Succession in the Illustrious House of Hannover, as it is even of GreatBritain itself, and much more than it can be supposed to be to Britain to secure to them the Barrier of Flanders; for should the Dominions of her Britannick Majesty ever fall into the Hands of a Popish or French Interest, or into the Hands of a Prince, who is or may be in the Interest of France, the Territories of the States-General being stript of the Powerful Assistance of the British Troops by Land, and Fleets by Sea, must inevitably be exposed to the Powerful Invasion of French and British Fleets united, and their Trade in particular eaten up and destroyed, as was verified by woful Experience to the said States in the Year 1672, when, if the English Court had not broken off from the said French Alliance, the States-General had inevitably sunk under the Power of France, and their Government been dissolved and destroyed; so that upon the whole it is manifest there was no need on our Part to engage the Dutch to appear for the Security of our Succession to the House of Hannover; for that the Sovereign Law of their own Preservation will always put them under a Necessity of doing it, the contrary being most sure to be a great Step in their Injury, if not their evident Destruction: It may be argued, that in Rules of Government we are not to depend upon this or that State being obliged by their own Interest to assist us, but we are to regard what Necessity, either for Security of Trade, common Safety of Government, or other Political Inteterest, we are in, or may be in, of the Assistance of the Powers we are treating with, and if that Necessity appears it is a sufficient Reason for us to secure that Assistance; and this we have frequent Examples of, as of the Dutch themselves treating with us in 1676, when notwithstanding it was the undoubted Interest of England not to let Holland upon any Terms whatever fall into the Hands of France; and if ever the French do again make that Attempt, we ought to assist the Dutch with all our Troops and Power; and that not so much from any Care and Kindness to them as a Nation, but for our own Interest and Preservation; yet the Dutch knowing the Eyes of a Nation are not always open to their own Interest, thought fit to tie us to assist them in that Case, and even Articled with us for the Proportion, viz. the Number of Ten Thousand Men. This is brought for a Reason why, not withstanding its being so much the Interest of the States of Holland to preserve the Succession of the House of Hannover to the Crown of Great-Britain, we ought also to bind them to it by Treaty: But tho' we were to grant all this, it will not follow that this Treaty should have such a Price put upon it, that the Dutch should demand of us all they want for this little Equivalent; and the Reasons above, tho' they should not be allowed to subsist against the Treaty of Guarantee itself, will certainly take off much of that High Price which the Dutch have put upon it, as if we were under such Infinite Obligations to them to secure it for us, as that we were quite out of Condition to defend it ourselves, or as if they had no Concern, or were to receive no Security, Benefit, or Advantage, at all by it to themselves: Again, it might pass for some Argument in this Case, that if any Power in Europe ought to have sought this Guarantee from the States-General, it should have been the Elector himself, who on his Part might probably have some more Occasion to secure his Passage over to England, and the March of any Troops which his Highness might find necessary to bring with him, to assist his Faithful People of Britain to place him on the Throne, in Case a French or Popish Interest should make Opposition. Here indeed the States-General might be very useful Allies, and his Electoral Highness would have thought very well of such a Guarantee of the States; but it cannot be conceived that Britain can be under like Necessity of such a Security: The Succession, which is their own Act and Deed, being universally approved by the whole Nation, a few People excepted, who are contemptible either for their Number or Interest; so that on all these Accounts it seems however a Treaty of Guarantee may be useful enough for our Succession, and no Harm in it; yet it cannot be a Thing of that Weight as to have so great a Value set upon it, and that Britain should suffer herself so much to be impos'd upon for it, as it is apparent to all the World she has been on that Account.

We return now to the Manner of the carrying on of the Treaty of Peace at Ʋtrecht: The British Plenipotentiaries having, as I said above, insisted upon the giving in the Demands of the Allies in a separate Manner, have by this Means an Occasion of securing for the Subjects of Her Majesty some other Advantages than by the former Treaty was thought of; and the People of Britain may now see, not only on what Disadvantage for us the former Treaty was negotiated, when we were to have our Markets made for us by our Dutch Neighbours; but they may see that all the Noise that hath been made of the Present Ministry; and of the present Managers being in the Interest of France, amounts only to this, That whereas the other gave up all our Interest to the Dutch and the Emperor, these Men are careful that Britain may reap some Advantages by the Treaty as well as the rest of the Confederates.

Indeed it has been something wonderful in the common Discourse of the People on these Subjects to find the Generality poisoned by these self-denying Notions, viz. that all which can be obtained from France must be given to the Emperor, and the Dutch, and the King of Portugal, but nothing to the Queen of Great-Britain; as if our Strength were no Acquisition, or our Power any Safety, to the Alliance; nay, rather, as if it were dangerous to the Confederacy to entrust any Part of that we have fought so long for, and bought so dear, to the Queen of Great-Britain: One would think the Dutch themselves went on that Notion, when, as was apparent, they appeared uneasie and jealous at the Preparations made by Her Majesty to send a Fleet and Forces to Canada; while not knowing the Design, they apprehended it to be for the taking Possession of some Place or other in the Spanish America, altho' by the _+th Article of the Grand Alliance it was agreed that Her Majesty might lawfully have done so if she had thought fit. These Things, however of no other Consequence, yet serve to let us see how different, as respecting us, the Manner of the Allies hath been in all the Transactions of this War, and how different their Views have been in all their Steps towards a Peace, from our constant Behaviour in the same Heads as they respected them; and that in all these Occasions it has been the constant Maxim of our Confederates, that we were to have no Share in any Thing, but that the Dutch, under a Notion of a Barrier and Security to their Frontiers, should make large Acquisitions, both to their Territory and their Commerce, both which have been consented to from hence; whether it be to the Honour or to the Infamy of those who have given in to these Measures is left to the Impartial Part of Mankind to determine: It is evident that at length the Just Representations of the British Ministers took Place, and the Dutch after much Difficulty have yeilded that the Demands of the Allies be given in to the French, altho' in one and the same Instrument, yet in separate Heads; and the British Plenipotentiaries agree and propose to add at the End of every Head this General and Satisfaction of all the rest of the Allies, a Clause sufficient to remove the Scandal and Reproach early cast upon the Present Management, (viz.) That they designed to make a Separate Peace, and had actually concluded the Conditions there of with France before the Congress was to begin; I must crave Pardon if I make these several Instances of the Usage of Her Majesty hath met with from Her Allies, Rank in with their other Conduct relating to Forces and Quota's, which have already been made Publick, and all together to come under the Title of Deficiencies; for if there had been a more disinterested Conjunction of Counsel and Assistance of Measures in the Proceedings of the Allies, to and with Her Britannick Majesty, and Her Ministers, no Question this Treaty had been with more Ease brought on, with more Mutual Assistance to, and Confidence in one another entred into, and perhaps the Success might have been more promising also.

There seems to be no Occasion here of Entring into the Clauses which the Dutch have obtain'd in any of their Treaties and Agreements with us, by which they have gain'd Advantages in Commerce, particularly to our Prejudice, because even the Dutch themselves acknowledge them in their late Letter to Her Majesty; only declaring. That they do not design to take the Advantage of those Articles. I am very willing to believe the States-General, especially while a good Understanding among the Allies, and particularly between Them and Us, is so necessary to them, would not make Use of the Advantages which were given them by that Treaty; but this does by no Means deny, nay, it not Tacitly only, but even Explicitly, as it seems to Indifferent Judgments, grants that such Advantages are given to the Dutch by that Treaty. See the Declaration of the Dutch on this Head more particularly, as follows.

'For having learnt that the Principal Exceptions taken to the said Treaty were, that it might prove Prejudicial to the Commerce of Her Majesty's Subjects in the Spanish Netherlands; and that some had entertain'd an ill-grounded and erroneous Opinion, that the States might design to take Advantage by it to make themselves Masters of the said Spanish Netherlands, their High Mightinesses did declare postively, and by this Letter do voluntarily repeat it, that it never was their Intention, nor ever will be, to make use of the said Treaty, or of their Garrisons in the Fortified Places of the Country, to prejudice in any Manner the Commerce of Her Majesty's Subjects; but that their Opinion is, That whatever relates to Navigation and Commerce there, ought to be settled on an intire Equality, that so Her Majesty's Subjects may not be charged with higher Duties of Importation or Exportation than theirs, to the end Commerce may be carried on there by both Nations on an equal Foot.'

Here the States-General acknowledge, That whatever relates to Navigation and Commerce in the Spanish Netherlands ought to be settled on an entire Equality: This is owning what Her Majesty has since claimed to be Just, and yet that it has not been so is apparent also; and in the same Letter they acknowledge it again, by adding. 'That if there be some Articles of the said Treaty which without affecting the Essentials of it, may be thought to want Explanation, Her Majesty shall find them willing and ready to treat thereupon, with all the Facility and Condescension that can reasonable be required of them.'

Now however Satisfactory such an Offer is from the Dutch, who indeed cannot be suppos'd to be Ignorant of the Justice of Her Majesty's Demands in this Case, as not to come to a farther Explanation on these Heads; yet all this adds to, and confirms, the Complaint against the Conduct, at least of those employ'd from hence, who in behalf of their own Country could pass such a Treaty, and sign such a Convention, by which it appears, were not the Dutch willing to explain themselves upon it, there was Effectually given up to them both the Sovereignty and the Commerce of the Spanish Netherlands, the last being Exclusive of the English. There is no doubt to me that this was evident at that Time, and therefore it is that I cannot place it to the Account of Ignorance or Inadvertency; for the Duke of Marlborough saw into it, and therefore how willing soever in other Cases to oblige the Dutch, he had not so little Concern for his own Safety, as not to know a British Parliament would certainly one Time or other call a Treaty so Dishonourable and Prejudicial to Britain in question, and therefore no doubt whatever other Reasons his Grace might have also, he thought fit not to be drawn in to set his Hand to it, but refus'd to be a Party to it, tho' at that Time a Plenipotentiary from hence; but another Hand and other Management effected it; and now the Dutch are willing to explain these Things to our Satisfaction, which would admit of many Remarks as to the former Part of it, which I omit, because Satisfaction will be now obtain•d: Only this cannot in Justice to the Present Ministry and Parliament be omitted, viz. That if this Enquiry into these Things had not been begun, those Explanations had never been obtain'd, and the Dutch had been left in a Capacity when they thought fit to exclude the Subjects of Britain from all Trade and Commerce in the Spanish Netherlands; and had been enabled, whenever their Occasions made it for their Purpose, to have seiz'd upon the Spanish Netherlands, and have made themselves entire Masters thereof; so that the preventing these Things seems wholly owing to the Vigilance of the Present Ministry, and to the vigorous Resolutions of the Present Parliament.

There seems indeed one Clause in the said Letter, which some People are very forward here to take hold of; insinuating, That the Dutch complain of being trick'd in England into a Consent to a Negotiation of Peace, by being put in Hopes, that after they should do so, the other Affair of the Barrier should be adjusted to their Satisfaction; the Words are these, 'That however, having not long since been inform'd, that in England some were of Opinion, that the said Treaty in some Articles might be prejudicial to Her Majesty's Subjects, the Commissioned M. Buys, their Envoy Extraordinary then going to England to inquire what those Points were that might be thought Grievances, and authorized to treat about them with Her Majesty's Ministers, and to remove, it possible, the Difficulties by all the Explanations that should appear necessary; which they were put in Hopes would not be very hard to do, when once they should have consented to concur with Her Majesty, as they did, to procure a Congress for the Negotiation of a General Peace. But that the Misfortune was, that the said M. Buys, during his Residence in England, was not able to finish that Affair to reciprocal Satisfaction; and that it having been remitted to the Hague, no Way has hitherto been found to terminate it there neither; tho' their High Mightinesses think they have shewn all the Readiness to comply with any Just Expedient that could reasonably be expected from them.'

This seems to be very ill turn'd by a Party among ourselves, and implies, as they pretend, as if the British Court had made Light of the Matter, and promised to adjust it if the Dutch would do so and so; but that after the Dutch had complied and concurr'd with Her Majesty to procure a Congress for the Negotiation of a General Peace, they could never obtain the promised Condition, altho they had shewn 'all the Readiness to comply with any just Expedient that could reasonably be expected from them.'

This is a Black Charge, and had not the Dutch with much more Integrity than these People, anticipated this Calumny, and given the true Reason for their said Concurring with Her Majesty, to be their Disposition and Persuasion of the Absolute Necessity there was in the present Conjuncture, for the Cultivating and Maintaining a good Friendship, Perfect Confidence and Ʋnion, between their said States and Her Majesty, which for the better Authority, I give you also from their own Letter, 'That during the whole Course of Her Majesty's Glorious Reign they have had nothing more at Heart than to cultivate and maintain with Her a Good Friendship, Perfect Confidence and Union, and to corroborate them the most they possibly could; having always judged them absolutely Necessary, and especially in the present Conjuncture. That they likewise judged they could not give a better Proof of this their Disposition and Persuasion, than that which they lately gave in agreeing to the Proposition which Her Majesty had caused to be made to them, to begin the Negotiation of a General Peace with the Enemy, and in concurring with Her Majesty to facilitate the bringing together of the Ministers of all the High Allies to the Congress at Ʋtrecht.'

This effectually Contradicts what as before is suggested, viz. That they were induced 'to concur with Her Majesty, as they did, to procure a Congress for the Negotiation of a General Peace.' Upon their being put in Hopes that it would not be very hard to do after they had consented so to concur with Her Majesty; I say, this is so contradicted by what is said before, that I was tempted to doubt both the said Paragraphs could not be in one and the same Letter; and indeed it seems shocking to any Reader, that their High Mightinesses should say in one Part of their Letter, that they concurr'd with Her Majesty, to give the best Proof of their Disposition to cultivate a good Friendship, Perfect Confidence and Ʋnion with Her Majesty, and in another Part of the same Letter to say, that they concurr'd 'with Her Majesty, as they did, to procure a Congress for the Negotiation of a General Peace.'

These Considerations being too hard for my Understanding, are left to the Logical Discussion of the Party here, whole Talent so eminently lyes in Equivocation and Insignificant 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 Railery; who when they have chewed it, and mumbled it, like an Ass upon Thistles, will bring it out the same thorny crabbed Inconsistency that they found it.

But while we are leaving them to this difficult Work, it may be needful to look farther, for we have yet much more Work cut out from Holland than in the foregoing Piece; the States-General having receiv'd a new Brush from the British Parliament, are very solicitous to wash their Negro Skin as clean as they can from the Imputations which have lain so plainly against them; but now they find it more difficult than they did before; for till now they had only Pamphlets and general Clamours to answer, such as the Suspicions of the People, and the Information of a Few had made loud; and which began to make them uneasy, these were treated with some Contempt by the States, and more by their Friends here.

But the Parliament finding more Truth in these Things than perhaps they expected, and much more than the Faction pretended, thought it requir'd an Extraordinary Sanction to make them less disputed, and thought it Just to make them Publick with an undisputed authority, that the People ought to be undeceiv'd, and that the Quarrels about the Truth of Fact ought to cease among the People; for this Reason, having caused all the Particulars to be exactly and faithfully laid before them, by the Report of the Commissioners of the Admiralty, and other proper Officers, and those Particulars to be critically examin'd, they deduced from thence the Matters of Fact as they really were, and making all the Cases plain in which the Government had been impos'd upon by their Allies, and the Dutch Deficient among others; they came to several Resolves about the same, and drawing those Resolves up into General Heads, referring to the Particulars for their Demonstration, they Humbly represented all in an Address to Her Majesty, and caused both the said Resolves and the Address to be Printed, for the Conviction of all Her Majesty's good Subjects, and to confute and silence a Party, who, as abovesaid, had made it their Business to ridicule all that had been said of these Matters as false and empty Notions infused into Peoples Heads, to raise ill Blood and create Prejudices against the Dutch. If these Things coming forth with such an undisputed Authority did a little surprize the World, and consequently open the Eyes of the People, much more would they surprise the States-General, whose Interest it had so long been to have the People of Britain kept as ignorant as possible of these Matters; and finding it absolutely Necessary that something should be said to puzzle the Cause a little, and to furnish their Friends with Arguments for their Defence, they issue a Paper, Entituled, as follows.‘A Memorial, serving to prove that the States-General of the Ʋnited Netherlands are unjustly charged by the Resolutions or Votes of the House of Commons of the Parliament of Great-Britain, and by the Subsequent Address of the said House of Commons thereupon presented to Her Majesty the Queen of Great-Britain, with having been deficient in divers Respects during the present War, in furnishing what according to their Quota or Contingent they stood engaged for, towards carrying on the said War.’

This is the Paper which I come now to examine, and in which if I should discover that the States-General have really been so far from clearing themselves of the Charge so positively laid upon them in Parliament, that in every Part they either directly or tacitly acknowledge it, then there will remain little Force in the rest of their Paper.

In considering this New and Great Affair of the Dutch Memorial, it seems very proper to make as few Circumlocutions as possible, and come directly to the Point. Our Introduction therefore shall consist rather of laying down a List of the Particulars which we shall leave out, than of what we shall put into the following Tract; what shall be dropp'd as foreign to the Case in Hand, and not worth either the Author's while to Note, or the Readers to be concern'd about. As First, It shall take up little of our Time to animadvert on the Insolence Unparallell'd, of a Scandalous Mercenary, who in Defiance of a British Parliament, and while that Parliament was actually sitting, should have the Face to publish the Answer or Defence of a Foreign Nation against his own Country.

If a Man have receiv'd an Affront from another, and meets one of his Servants, and says to him, you Jack, or you Thomas, pray tell your Master I say he is a Villain and a Rascal; will not the Servant if he have any Manners or Sense of his Duty say to him, Sir, let him be what he will, he is my Master, and it is not fit for me to tell him so, pray employ Somebody else? On the other Hand, if the Ignorant. Fellow should have so little Wit or Manners as to carry this Message to his Master, would not the Master say to him, let the Man be what he will, you are an Unmannerly Rascal for bringing me such a Message, since you were my Servant, and not his? And would he not very justly cane him, and turn him out of his Service for his Impudence.

This Case, as it is unprecedented, unless in the same Person who did the like once before, so it will be doubly unprecedented in the Publick Justice, if he is uncorrected for it. Nay, by how much more the Party glory in and boast of having insulted the Parliament and the Government in this Publication, by so much the more Necessity they bring upon the said Parliament to vindicate themselves, and punish the Persons with their utmost Rigour: But this is Humbly left and submitted to the Parliament, who no doubt will do themselves and their Defender Justice in this Case.

Next it shall take up no Part of this Discourse to enquire whether the Dutch have ordered these Sheets to be thus published in England, or no. We are not ignorant how many Ways of Late the Foreign Powers concern'd in this War have privately endeavour'd to make themselves and their Actings with Her Majesty Popular here, appealing at it were from Her Majesty to her Subjects; but we shall not suppose however that they are yet arrived to such a Contempt of their Alliances with Her Britannick Majesty, as to appear in an Action which derogates so much from the usual Civilities due from one Ally to another, as that they should openly and avowedly make an Attempt of this Nature.

This Leads us to consider how prudently the Parliament of Britain has acted in this Case, in which perhaps the Dutch, as subtle a Nation as they are, and how good soever their Politicks have been in other Cases, will be put to it, how to behave themselves between the Two Extreams of Owning or Disowning this Publication of their Memorial.

The Parliament have first stigmatiz'd the Paper itself as a False and Scandalous Libel, but in this Censure they do not call it the Memorial of the States-General, but a Pretended Memorial: Now as the Lie is here given by the whole British Nation, and that most justly also, it remains for the Dutch to show us how they please to take it; if they own the Paper and the Publication of it here, they take the Lie aforesaid to themselves, and are obliged to fall under the Charge, hush it up, and thereby own in Just, or resent it, which we suppose they will consider of, before they go about it. On the other Side, if they take upon them to mention, answer, or vindicate this Paper, they own not the Paper only, but the mean Step of Causing it to be published in England in especial Insult to Her Majesty, and to the Parliament of Britain then sitting, and what evil Consequences may follow such a Thing must lye at their Doors. It is true, that as the Parliament has not thought fit to take it but as a spurious and pretended Paper, we might very well do so also; but as we see it published in all Parts of Europe, as allow'd in those Prints in Holland, who are said to write cum Privilegio; and as it is in these Countries stiled, The Answer of the States, &c. we cannot but treat it as such, or at least as an Answer for the States, if not, The Answer of the States. And that this may be justified by good Evidence, the Reader may observe, that our Prints after the Resentment of the Parliament of Britain had made it too dangerous for our Newsmen to go on with the Printing it, gave this Account, April 4th.‘Hague April 17. All our Publick Prints, Published by Authority, have been and continue full of the States Reply to the Resolutions of the Commons of Britain, in Vindication of their Conduct.’

This we cannot but think gives sufficient Authority to a Writer, whether the States-General are concern'd in the Publication at London or no, to suppose them to be the real Authors of the Paper itself, and that it is really the States Reply, as above, and as such we shall therefore consider it.

The First Thing meet for Observation in it, is what we ought not by any Means to pass over, viz. That the States-General confess the Charge, acknowledging the Fact, directly, viz. That the Quota's for Sea Service were not supply'd, or as the Resolution of the House of Commons express it, viz. That the States-General have been desicient in their Quota's for Sea Service in Proportion to the Numbers of Ships provided by Her Majesty, &c.

To this the States in their Memorial, after a very long Introduction, answer Two Things; First, That the Quota the British Court proposed to fit out, particularly in the Years 1704 and 1705, were too many, or more than was needful for the Service; viz. More than was needed to make the Confederates Superior to the French in the Mediterranean, and that therefore they the States did not think themselves obliged to furnish so many. That whereas we should have Seventy-four Ships the Year 1704, and Seventy-nine the Year 1705, they thought the Rate of Twenty-four Ships of their State a Proportion against Sixty of Her Majesty's, and that they concerted it so with Admiral Mitchel. So that it is plain here from this very Memorial, that the States do no Manner of Way deny the Deficiency itself, but evade the Force of the Charge by Disputing the Proportions; and explaining what they understood by the Two Fifths to Three Fifths, so insisted on by the Parliament, and how they ought to be understood by others. Again, they would patch up the Deficiency aforesaid, by bringing in the Number of their Men of War employ'd in the North Seas to make up their Quota, and they express this very Subtilly, as a Thing which they think ought to be set against the Number of Ships employ'd by the British in the Narrow Seas; this may be consider'd immediately in their own Terms; but First, it is fit to Note, that both these Arguments confess the Charge in Fact, only offer these Explanations or Extenuations: So that the Truth of what the Parliament has publish'd in their Representation and Address stand fast, is acknowledg'd and confess'd by the States, and needs no farther Defence. But it comes next of Course to see what Force this Allegation of the Dutch as to their Ships in the North Seas ought to have in this Argument; and if it appears that these are not, and ought not to be reckon'd in the Proportion above, and that they were not reckon'd in the First Proportion stated and agreed with the States-General, then all the Consequences drawn from those Proportions will stand the States in no Stead, as to any Defence to be made by them against the Charge. In the Examination of this, we meet with this Clause in the State of Proportions laid before the House; by the Lords of the Admiralty, which stands Diametrically Opposite to what the States alledge in their Memorial, in these Words, viz. That by the Treaties between the Queen of Great-Britain and the States-General, their Proportion of the Ships of the Line of Battle, to act in Conjunction with those of this Kingdom in the Channel, and in and about the Mediterranean, ought to be Three to our Five. The First Observation meet to be made here, is, that the Treaties between the Queen of Great-Britain and the States, have expresly settled their Respective Proportions, which indeed the Memorial seems to evade, by alledging, that in the Grand Alliance the Respective Parties were to assist with all their Forces; then Complimenting Britain (I do not say Flattering) with being more Powerful than the States, they thence deduce the Reasonableness of the Forces of one being more than the other. But the States-General would think themselves but ill answer'd if this Way of Argument was made use of with them, for what is all this to the Equality of Proportions? Have not the Dutch always, as the Memorial acknowledges, treated every Year with the Queen upon the just Proportions of every Year's Service? And has not the Queen sent Admiral Mitchel always to settle that Point? Now the present Question is not whether Nation is most Powerful, or whether we are to send more Troops than the States-General, or more Ships; but whether the Proportions being settled Annually by Agreement, the States-General have supply'd the Numbers agreed on by those Treaties, and sent as many as they agreed to send or no; if they have done this, then it is true, the First settled Proportions are of no Weight. On the other Hand, if they have not the General Treaty of Empolying all their Forces, or any other are Equally of no Force.

Now it is apparent that the States-General have not supply'd their Quota of Ships for the Services for which they agreed to supply them, and therefore we on our Side justly Complain, and the Account as it was laid before the House by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and by Her Majesty Command, is very plain in the Case, admitting of no Dispute; wherefore we have for a further and more effectual Convincing the Advocates for the States-General in this Case, caused it to be annexed at large, and is as follows.‘By the Lords Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great-Britain, Ireland, &c. of all Her Majesty's Plantatious.’

HER Majesty's Pleasure having been signify'd to Us by Mr Secretary St. John, that we should in Pursuance of an Address from the House of Commons) prepare an Account of the Quota's of Her Majesty's Ships and those of Her Allies during this present War, and what Agreements and Conventions have been made for the said Quota's, and how the same have been observd, We do in Obedience to Her Majesty Command Humbly Report.

That by the Treaties between the Queen of Great-Britain and the States-General, their Proportion of the Line of Battel to act in Conjunction with those of this Kingdom in the Channel and in and about the Mediterranean, ought to be Three to our Five.

That since the Commencement of this War, not only Sir David Mitchel but Sir James Wishart have been appointed by Her Majesty's Command to go to Holland, and adjust with the States-General or their Deputies, the Quota's of their Ships of War to act in Conjunction with those of Her Majesty's, as aforesaid, and what was done in Pursuance of those Treaties was sent to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, to which we Humbly refer.

And as to the Number of Ships in the Line of Battle which the States-General each Year during the War have join•d to Her Majesty's on the foremention'd Services, the same will appear by the following Account, which hath been computed with as much Exactness as the Nature of the Things will bear, viz. In the Year 1702, Her Majesty had Forty four Ships employ'd in the Channel and Soundings of the Line of Battel, and Thirty in and about the Mediterranean, making in the whole Seventy-four, and they were join'd with no more than Thirty-three of the States-General, whereas they should have been Forty-four.

1703, Seventy-nine of Her Majesty's Ships were employ'd in the aforesaid Services, and but Twenty-two of the States-General, which should have been Fortyseven.

1704, There was Seventy-four of the Queen's Ships and Eighteen Dutch, which should have been Forty-four.

1705, Seventy-nine of Her Majesty's Ships and Twenty-eight Dutch, which should have been Forty-seven.

1706, There were but Fifteen Ships of the Dutch acted in Conjunction with Seventy-eight of the Queen's Ships, whereas they should have been Forty-six.

1707, To Seventy-two of Her Majesty's, they were no more than Twenty-seven of the States-General, instead of Forty-three.

1708, The States-General join'd Twentyfive Ships of the Line to Sixty-nine of Her Majesty's, instead of Forty-two.

1709, No more than Eleven Ships of the States were join'd to Sixty-seven of the Queen's, instead of Forty-three.

1710, Her Majesty had Sixty-two employ'd in the aforesaid Service, and the States-General appointed no more than Thirteen to act in Conjunction with them, instead of Thirty-seven.

1711, There was no more than Twelve Dutch Ships instead of Thirty-five appointed to act with Fifty-nine of the Queen's Ships, which as well as those in the Preceeding Year were employ'd in the Mediterranean, and not so much as one allotted by the States-General to act in Concert with those of Her Majesty against the Enemies Ships at Dunkirk and in the Channel.

Here seemeth a most convincing Proof of the Matter of Fact. Now let us see what Dutch Cunning will bring them off of this, for it is a home Charge, and they will not easily parry the Thrust. The Memorial in Truth does not attempt it, and therefore the Matter of Fact as I said before stands granted. But they plead then that we have not treated them fairly, for say they, 'Secondly, It must be observ'd, that in the aforesaid Account Notice is taken only of the Ships of this State, which in Conjunction with those of Her Majesty were employ'd in the Mediterr anean and the Channel, and that the North Sea, which this State, during the War, has generally had the Care of, is wholly omitted: Which Mention of those Ships only of this State which have acted in Conjunction with those of Her Majesty, and the Omission of the North Sea, make so great a Difference between the Number of Ships reckoned by the foresaid Account to have been furnished by Great-Britain, and that said in the same Account to be furnished by this State, that probably this Difference gave Occasion to the forming the foresaid prejudicial Resolution or Vote of the Lower House, which possibly would not have been formed, might this State have first been heard upon it.'

This Plea needs no farther Examination than to look back to the Second Paragraph of the Admiralty's Report above, where it is affirm'd, 'That by the Treaties between the Queen of Great-Britain and the States-General, their Proportion of Ships of the Line of Battle to act in Conjunction with those of this Kingdom in the Channel and in about the Mediterranean, ought to be Three to our Five.'

It must be surprizing to all that read the Memorial of the States, to hear them insist with so many Introductory Paragraphs, and lay so much stress upon their Employing Ships in the North Seas, when it is thus proved that the North Seas are quite left out of the Question, and the Treaties they had made were only for Ships to be employ'd in the Channel in and about the Mediterranean. Now if they have furnished their Quota as agreed upon with us for the Channel and the Mediterranean, tho' they had sent no Ships to the North Seas, we conceive the Commons had made no Representation; nor had they any Reason, for there was no mention of it in the Agreements of Treaties aforesaid; but if they have not furnished their Quota's for the Channel, altho' they had sent an Hundred Sail to the North Seas, it had been nothing to the Case any more than their sending Ships to Batavia, for the same Reason as above; the North Sea Guard being not mention'd in the said Treaties and Annual Agreements. To what Purpose then is all the long Description of the Necessity of the sending Ships to the North Seas? And what can be more surprizing than to find their High Mightinesses arguing what is, or was their Sentiments, against what is and was at that very Time concerted and adjusted by them, with the Persons actually sent over by the Queen of Great-Britain for that Purpose; and which in the very same Paragraph they acknowledge was so concerted and adjusted. For the more ready assisting the Reader to make a Full and Free Judgment hereof, the long pretended Defence on that Head is here copied out of the said Memorial, and is as follows, viz. 'It must be observ'd, That by the Seventh Article of the Treaty of the Ninth of June 1703, by which that Agreement was renewed, 'Tis provided, that the Number of Ships of War to be furnished by each for their whole Quota according to the said Agreement, should be regulated every Year, and that the Rendezvous, as well as the Places where the Ships should be employed, should likewise be agreed upon every Year; accordingly this has been concerted Yearly, Her Majesty having to that Purpose for several Years sent over one of Her Admirals, at which Times Two Things principally were taken into Deliberation, namely, the Number of Shipping and the Places where they should be employ'd; upon which the Projects on the Part of Her Majesty proposed commonly the employing a greater Number than was proposed by this State, and also more Regard was had to the Channel than to the North Sea, of which North Sea not the least Mention is made in the aforesaid Account of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, from which Omission it partly comes that they reckon so low what this State has furnished to the Sea-service. The Sentiment of this State upon this Subject has alway been, that the Number of Ships to be sent Yearly to Sea ought to be regulated according to the Force which it might reasonably be judged the Enemy could Yearly bring into the Mediterranean, the Channel, and the North Sea, so that Men might be morally sure that the Fleets and Squadrons which on the Part of Great-Britain and this State should act in Conjunction or Seperately, would be superiour to those of the Enemy. The Term, in Conjunction or Separately, was used, because it was ever the Opinion of this State, that Her Majesty's Ships, and those of this State, sent to Portugal and the Mediterranean, ought to act in Conjunction; and that the Security of the Channel ought to be left to the Care of Her Majesty, and that of the North Sea to the Care of this State, because the Channel is best situate for Great-Britain with respect to its Countries, Harbours, and Commerce, and the North Sea for this State with respect to its Countries, Harbours and Commerce; yet so, that if unexpectedly the Enemy should bring any Fleet or considerable Squadrons into the Channel, or into the North Sea, then the Squadrons on both Sides, in Whole or in Part, according to the Circumstances of Affairs, might join each other.'

It is observed here, the States General First acknowledge in this Paragraph of their Memorial, That both the Number of Ships to be furnish'd by each Party, and the Places where those Ships should be employ'd, was concerted Yearly, Her Majesty having to that Purpose for several Years sent over one of Her Admirals: Nay, they repeat it again, viz. At which Times Two Things principally were taken into Deliberation, viz. The Number of Shipping, and the Places where they should be employ'd. We can have no Occasion to make Answer to this in any other Manner than by Appeal to the StatesGeneral themselves, and Enquiring then whether in the Quota's of Ships at those Times agreed on, and the Place where they should be employ'd, any Place but the Channel and in and about the Mediterranean was ever included or incerted: If it were, then we must give it against the Representation of the House of Commons, and acquit the States-General: But if not, what means all the Preamble and Circumlocution of this long Memorial? And to what Purpose is it said this or that was the Sentiments of the States-General? The Representation and Address of the Commons, and the Report of the British Admiralty, can say nothing to what was, or was not, the Sentiments of the States-General. But to what was their Agreement, and what was concerted Yearly between the Queen of Great-Britain and the States, that they may enquire about, and that they do represent Fairly and Faithfully, viz. That the Dutch have not furnished the Quota's which they were obliged by Treaty to do, for the Service of the Consederates in the Channel, and in or about the Mediterranean; what they did in the North Seas as being no Part of the said Agreement, the said Representation has no Ground to meddle with it, nor does it take the least Notice of it as is supposed for that Reason.

It may not be foreign to this Case to enquire a little here into the Reason and Equity also of this Argument about the North S as Service, in doing whereof, if it shall be found that this Service ought not to be thought of in Establishing the said Quota's of Ships, as being wholly and solely a Work of Interest, Protecting their own Commerce Fishing, &c in which the Allies have no Concern, and that the English had at the same Time several Squadrons in those Seas which were never esteemed Part of the said Quota on the British Side, and therefore that the like ought not to be insisted on on the Part of the States-General, then all the Argument drawn from these Things will fall to the Ground, and the Impressions which those Resolutions of the House of Commons have made on the People must necessarily remain.

It is not question'd at all, nor does it seem material to this Case, but that in the several Alliances made between England and the States-General they were Mutually oblig'd to assist each other with all their Forces. But this is so far from taking off the Edge of the Complaint, that it rather fixes and confirms the same; for that we alledge that the Dutch have not assisted with all their Forces, and to determine the Signification of the said Term, and how the same is to be understood, we are to observe, that lest it should create hereafter any Misunderstanding among the Allies, the several Quota's or Proportions of the Allies were settled between every the particular Nations Annually. Now the Parliament's Complaint is clear in this, nor does the Memorial of the States offer one Word of Answer to it; they do not complain in general, that the States have not supply'd their whole Forces, but that they have not supply'd those several Proportions by which their whole Forces were by vertue of their Subsequent Agreement to be understood; and this appears from the very Memorial itself, where their High Mightinesses acknowledge it, and better Proof cannot be desired. See their own Words.

'By the Seventh Article of the Treaty of the Ninth of June 1703, by which that Agreement was renewed, 'tis provided, that the Number of Ships of War to be furnished by each for their whole Quota according to the said Agreement should be regulated every Year, and that the Rendezvous, as well as the Places where the Ships should be employed, should likewise be agreed upon every Year; accordingly this has been concerted Yearly, Her Majesty having to that Purpose for several Years sent over one of Her Admirals, at which Times Two Things principally were taken into Deliberation, namely, the Number of Shipping and the Places where they should be employ'd.'

Here it is acknowledg'd by the States that the Quota's were adjusted between us and them, both as to Number of Ships, and where to be employ'd. There are but Two Objections which the Memorial pretends to make after this, the First is, Whether the Ships which the States furnished for the Guard of the North Seas should not be esteemed Part of their Quota, and Secondly, Whether the Number of Ships mentioned to be employ'd by Her Majesty in the Channel and in the Mediterranean were necessary; these are also their own Words, to which may be briefly answer'd, First, That after they had acknowledged, as above is said, That the Number of Ships and Places where the same should be employ'd were every Year concerted, it can no more be asked whether they were necessary; the Question rather lyes fairly, Whether the Numbers concerted were respectively supply'd, if there had appear'd any subsequent Alteration in the Face of the War. So that if it had seem'd to the States less necessary to send so large a Number of Ships as was agreed, it must have been reasonable that a new Concert between the Allies should have been made, and some mutual Agreement offer'd for lessening the said Number on both Sides. But to agree First that such a Number on both Sides should be supplied, and then shortning that Number on their Side, without signifying to the British Court that they thought fewer Ships enough, so that the British should be left to send their full Quota as agreed, and the States only make an Abatement, this can be no Fair Treatment of the British, nor is it esteemed fair Dealing in our Country, whatever it may be in Holland; therefore the Complaint of the Commons in this Case seems very just, and is not at all answer'd by this Memorial, for that the States-General did not supply the Number of Ships which by their Annual Agreement was concerted between them and Her Majesty; Secondly, But say the States, we did supply a great Squadron in the North Seas, which ought to be esteemed a Part of our Proportion, and all the Reasons given for this Way of acting are, that such were the Sentiments of the StatesGeneral; yet in another Part of the said Memorial it is own'd, and in the Report of the Commissioners of the Admiralty it is expresly said, those Quota's were settled only for such Ships as were to act Conjunctly or Separately in the Channel and the Mediterranean. But because this Argument is of too much Value to have it depend upon the dubious Construction of Terms, it may be observ'd, First, That there is no Parity or Equality in this Argument, for that the Concert of Proportions of Ships to be supply'd by us and the States respected only the particular Seas, in which the Power of the French was particularly Formidable, and where their main Fleets were to be expected, as in the Streights, and the Channel, or on the Coasts of Portugal and Spain. And that the British Nation have kept great Squadrons and Fleets out in sundry other Parts of the World, as the Dutch have done in the North Sea, without reckoning any such Ships into the Quota or Proportions of the Fleets to be furnished as before, for the Carrying on the War, such have been the Fleets and Ships constantly sent to the West-Indies, to St. Helena, to the Canaries, &c. by which it appears, that whatever the Sentiments of the States of Holland have been, as above, the Sentiments of the British Court have always been, that each Ally ought to have supply'd their full Quota of such Ships as were concerted for the Service of the War in the Channel and in the Mediterranean, without esteeming such Ships as Part thereof which they respectively were obliged to furnish for the Protection of their Commerce in any other Part of the World; and that this was the real Sentiments of the States-General as well as of Her Majesty, appears for that in all the Ships sent by either of the Powers into other Parts of the World, as into the North Seas, the Baltick, the West-Indies, St. Helena, and the like, they very seldom acted in Conjunction, but sent their respective Squadrons separately, as the Necessity of their Affairs requir'd. Nor did those Ships act in Conjunction on any Occasion, save only as they found it necessary to take the Ships of each other Nation under Convoy, or in their Protection, and made use of the Harbours of each Confederate as there might be Occasion. This is manifest, in that notwithstanding the great Fleets which the States-General have upon all Occasions sent to the North Seas, as is alledg'd, the British Court have been oblig'd also to send Annual Squadrons to those Seas for the Safety of their Trade, as well to Russia as to the East-Country, the Elbe and the Weser, as also for the Defence of the Coast of Scotland and Ireland; which Ships, tho' equal, if not superiour, to the Numbers sent into those Seas by the States-General, have not been accounted by Her Maj•sty as any Part of the Proportion of Ships concerted as abovesaid with the States.

This therefore can never be the Reason of the Report of the Commissioners of the Admiralty; and it is surprizing to all those who know the State of those Things, to hear the Memorial say, the States General had the Care of the North Seas, as they do when they sum up that Part of their Case as follows, viz. 'It must be observed, that in the aforesaid Account Notice is taken only of the Ships of this State, which in Conjunction with those of Her Majesty were employed in the Mediterranean and the Channel; and that the North Sea, which this State, during the War, has generally had the Care of, is wholly omitted: Which Two Things, namely, the Mention of those Ships only of this State which have acted in Conjunction with those of Her Majesty, and the Omission of the North Sea, make so great a Difference between the Number of Ships reckoned by the foresaid Account to have been furnished by this State, that probably this Difference gave Occasion to the forming the foresaid prejudicial Resolution or Vote of the Lower House, which possibly would not have been formed might this State have first been heard upon it.'

It should seem Needful here to enter into an Enquiry what Number of Ships Her Majesty has from Time to Time sent into the North Seas, and how the States-General may be said to have had the Care of the North Seas, when it is well known the British Trade, nay, and even often the Dutch to Arch-Angel, have been Convoy'd Out and Home by Her Majesty's Ships; and the Coast of Scotland, the Mouth of the Baltick, and the Elbe, have been constantly Guarded by the British Ships.

Thus by the plainest Reasoning in the World the Memorial is fallacious, for that the Desiciencies complain'd of remain consest by the States themselves, the Reasons pretended to justify themselves are directly contrary to the concerted Proportions and Treaties made between the said States-General and the Queen's Majesty; and this is exactly agreeable to the Report of the Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the Resolutions of the House of Commons.

The like fallacious Way of Arguing appears in the Case of the Land-Forces or Troops, in which still their High Mightinesses do not deny the Matter of Fact alledged in the said Address, but excuse and extenuate the same by their Efforts otherways, as particularly, they alledge an Article of their Raising Troops before us, and this they say deserves some Compensation; that is, that they having raised Fifty Thousand Men before us, they should be therefore allowed to maintain Fewer than they agreed for afterwards; or to speak plainly, that because they were obliged to a quicker Armament than the British, therefore they were to have leave to break in upon future Concert, and fail in the Numbers they were to bring in afterward: This seems no unfair Construction of the First Clause of the Memorial relating to the Troops, which is as follows.

'In the First Place, it must not be omitted to observe on the said Estimate, that in the general Charge for the Year 1701, the Forty-four Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-two Men which the Ʋnited-Netherlands kept up after the Peace of Ryswick, are mixed with the Thirty-four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-six Men which were taken into Service immediately after the Death of Charles the Second King of Spain; and that for the Year 1702, not only the Troops which this State took into Service that Year, but those hired the Beginning of the foregoing Year, are reckon'd all together; which if put down more distinctly would have shewn, that this State had reinforced their I roops with above Fifty Thousand Men a considerable Time before Great-Britain came to make any particular Augmentation; which earlier Arming, to the excessive Expence of this State, well deserved to be allowed for by some kind of Compensation.'

What can the Words deserve some Compensation be suppos'd to signify, but that the States-General concluded from thence that their future Deficiency was to be allow'd because of their more Arming than the English? Which any one that remembers the Occasion may find other Reasons to give for, and which the States-General themselves seem to acknowledge, or at least to hint at, which was in short, that the Parliament and People of England did not come into the Measures for the last War, or perhaps believe it so necessary at first as the States did, and therefore did not Vote such large Sums for their Proportion as the States-General requir'd, and this they now alledge should be made up afterwards. This is gathered from the following Words in the Memorial.

'This State were obliged to be content with Great-Britain's furnishing in the Beginning of the War no more than Forty Thousand Men in the Netherlands, in so great a Disproportion with respect to this State; not because there was any Convention or Agreement made about it, or that it was at all reasonable, but because no more was consented to by the Parliament, the Reasons of which are probable fresh still in the Remembrance of many; and at that Time the only Course this State could take, was to burthen itself with so great a Disproportion, and to wait till in the Continuance of the War it should be made good to them'

This may imply that the States-General desired to have this Disproportion made good to them afterwards by the English, but does not prove that it ought to have been made good, or that the Queen of Great-Britian had agreed to make it good much less did it signifie that they were thereby Entituled to make it good to themselves by a Deficiency in such Quota's and Proportions as they should agree afterwards to bring into the Field.

Upon the whole then it seems the Sum of the Case is this, that the Dutch have really been Deficient in the said Quota's, but that according to their own Sentiments they might lawfully be so, notwithstanding express Treaties and Conventions to the contrary; and that these Sentiments arise from their thinking fit to make Reprizal or Stoppage upon England, for the Dutch coming into the War a Year before us; and because we did not think fit to come into the Alliance sooner, they are making us pay for our standing out.

More or less than this cannot be made of their long Memorial, and as to the Justice and Equity of this the World is left to judge of that Affair.

The Author of this had resolved to add here some Remarks about the Pretence of carrying on the War with all their Forces; and the States saying that Britain is more Powerful, and therefore must bring in more Forces, making themselves Judges of who is, or is not, most Powerful; but Her Majesty's Answer to the States, since published, has made this so clear, and prest it so close upon the Dutch, that it seems needless to say any more to that Point.

FINIS.

A Further Search INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES, AND THE Late Ministry, AS TO Peace and War.

Containing also A Reply to the several LETTERS and MEMORIALS of the States-General.

WITH A Vindication of the British Parliament in their late Resolves and Address relating to the Deficiencies of the DUTCH.

LONDON: Printed for John Morphew, near Stationers-Hall. 1712.

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A further search into the conduct of the allies: and the late ministry, as to peace and war. Containing also a reply to the several letters and memorials of the States-General. ...

Defoe, Daniel, 1661?-1731.

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http://ota.ox.ac.uk/id/4425

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1106014243

ID [isbn13]

9781106014245

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K056668.000

ID [BIBNO]

CW3306062738

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1146200300

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— A further search into the conduct of the allies: and the late ministry, as to peace and war. Containing also a reply to the several letters and memorials of the States-General. ..., Defoe, Daniel, 1661?-1731.. 77,[1]p. ; 8⁰. London :: printed for John Morphew,. 1712.. [Anonymous. By Daniel Defoe.] [Another issue of 'A farther search into the conduct of the allies'.] [Reproduction of original from the British Library.] [Moore, 242] [English Short Title Catalog, ESTCT65921.] [Electronic data. Farmington Hills, Mich. : Thomson Gale, 2003. Page image (PNG). Digitized image of the microfilm version produced in Woodbridge, CT by Research Publications, 1982-2002 (later known as Primary Source Microfilm, an imprint of the Gale Group).]

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