Chains of slavery: A work wherein the clandestine and villianous attempts of princes to ruin liberty are pointed out, ... — Chains of slavery. French.

Table of contents

- [halftitle]

- [titlepage]

- TO THE ELECTORS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

- CONTENTS.

- CHAP. I. Of the Power of Time.

- CHAP. II. Of Public Entertainments.

- CHAP. III. Of Public Enterprizes.

- CHAP. IV. Of gaining the Affections and Confidence of the Subjects.

- CHAP. V. Of the Pomp of Power.

- CHAP. VI. To abase the People.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CHAP. VII. Of the Fine Arts and Sciences.

- CHAP. VIII. Of corrupting the People.

- CHAP. IX. Of procuring Opulence.

- CHAP. X. Of Luxury.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CHAP. XI. To cherish the People's Avarice.

- CHAP. XII. Of Debauchery.

- CHAP. XIII. False Ideas of Liberty.

- CHAP. XIV. Of getting Creatures.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CHAP. XV. Of rooting out the Love of Glory.

- CHAP. XVI. Of encouraging Servility.

- CHAP. XVII. Of turning virtuous Men out of Places.

- CHAP. XVIII. Of disuniting the People.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CHAP. XIX. Of multiplying the Tools of Power.

- CHAP. XX. Of placing corrupted Men at the Helm.

- CHAP. XXI. Of securing the Tools of Power from the Sword of Justice.

- CHAP. XXII. Of filling the Courts of Judicature with corrupted Men.

- CHAP. XXIII. Of secret Practices.

- CHAP. XXIV. Of making Innovations.

- CHAP. XXV. Of disarming the Subjects.

- CHAP. XXVI. Of providing for the Pay of the Military.

- CHAP. XXVII. Of Acts of Power against Law, and of Judgments of Law against Liberty.

- CHAP. XXVIII. Of Unconcernedness.

- CHAP. XXIX. To wear out the Zeal of the People by false Alarms.

- CHAP. XXX. Of ill grounded Writings.

- CHAR. XXXI. Of Satirical Writings.

- CHAP. XXXII. Of Invectives.

- CHAP. XXXIII. Of bad Writings.

- CHAP. XXXIV. Of too great a Multiplicity of Writings.

- CHAP. XXXV. Of the excessive Moderation of the People.

- CHAP. XXXVI. Of concealing public Grievances.

- CHAP. XXXVII. Of preventing the Redress of public Grievances.

- CHAP. XXXVIII. Of the Artifices made use of in order to suppress public Clamours.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CHAP. XXXIX. Of the Hypocrisy of Princes.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CHAP. XL. Of Ignorance.

- CHAP. XLI. False Idea of Tyranny.

- CHAP. XLII. Of Superstition.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CHAP. XLIII. Of the Confederacy between Princes and Priests.

- CHAP. XLIV. Fruitless Efforts of the People.

- CHAP. XLV. Of Treachery.

- CHAP. XLVI. Constant Pursuit of the same Designs.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CHAP. XLVII. Of Corrupting the Legislature.

- CHAP. XLVIII. Of the want of Spirit and Steadiness in the Represen tatives to oppose ministerial Attempts.

- CHAP. XLIX. Of preventing Insurrections.

- CHAP. L. Of suppressing those Offices which share Power.

- CHAP. LI. To incapacitate the People from attempting any Insurrection.

- CHAP. LII. Of accustoming the People to military Expeditions.

- CHAP. LIII. Of securing the Fidelity of the Army.

- CHAP. LIV. To secure the military from civil Power.

- CHAP. LV. To inspire the Military with Contempt for the Citizens.

- CHAP. LVI. Of Usury, Exactions, and Extortions.

- CHAP. LVII. To undermine the Supreme Authority.

- CHAP. LVIII. To usurp Supreme Power.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CHAP. LIX. Of violent Measures.

- CHAP. LX. Inconsideration and Folly of the People.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

- CHAP. LXI. Inconsiderate Vanity of the People.

- CHAP. LXII. Of Flattery.

- CHAP. LXIII. The Subjects forge their own Chains.

- CHAP. LXIV. Of Despotism.

- CHAP. LXV. Of the Fear of Torments.

THE CHAINS OF SLAVERY.

IT appears the common lot of mankind not to be allowed the enjoyment of liberty: Princes every where are aspiring to despotism, and the people sinking to servitude.

The History of Despotism is replete with uncommon events: On one side, we survey the bold designs of some ambitious men, their villainous attempts, and the secret springs they put in action to attain illicit power: on the other side, we see the people, whilst reposing under the shade of their own laws, enslaved; we behold the vain efforts of an unfortunate multitude to shake off oppression, and the numberless evils constantly attendants on slavery. Scenes at once horrible and magnificent, wherein alternately appear peace, plenty, sports, pomp, festivals, dissentions, misery, artifice, treachery, treason, banishments, contests and carnage.

Sometimes Despotism is established at once by the force of arms: but this rapid progress of power to absolute Empire is not the subject of my present work: it is the slow and gradual efforts of policy, which by degrees subject the necks of the people to the yoke, depriving them at the same time both of the means and desire of shaking it off.

From attentively considering the establishment of despotism, it is evident that Slavery is only the effect of time, and the necessary consequence of the defects of political constitutions. Let us endeavour, therefore, to discover how by their means the Magistrate usurps the title of Master, and substitutes his will for the law. Let us review that multiplicity of machines, which the sacrilegious audacity of Princes has recourse to, in order to sap the foundation of liberty: let us follow their dark projects, their crafty proceedings, their secret plots, enter into a detail of their fatal policy, unfold the principles of that deceitful art, and reduce to one point of view the various attacks that have been made upon Public Freedom. But in arranging my observations, I shall less regard the order of time than the connection of the subject.

When once the dangerous trust of public authority is committed to a Prince, and the care of enforcing obedience to the laws to Magistrates, the people see themselves sooner or later subdued by those rulers they have made choice of, and their liberty, their property, their lives at the discretion of those who have been appointed to protect them. No sooner has the Prince cast his eyes upon the trust reposed on him, but he endeavours to forget from what hands he received it: Full of himself and of his power, he supports impatiently the idea of his dependance, and constantly labours to free himself from every sort of restraint.

The people are never voluntary slaves, they yield not to power, but when they believe it to be a duty, or are unable to oppose it. Hence in a state newly founded or reformed, the subjects are not at once enslaved, however imperfect the constitution might be. Despair, that prompted them at first to throw off the yoke, would prompt them to throw it off anew whenever they should feel its weight. To commence with open attacks upon liberty, and to attempt to destroy it by violence, would prove therefore a rash undertaking. When those who govern, daringly dispute the supreme power with open force, and the people perceive their rulers attempting[*] to enslave them, the latter ever prevail, and the Prince in a moment loses the fruit of all his efforts. At his first attempt the subjects unite against him, and his authority is at stake, if his conduct be not more submissive than imperious. It is not therefore by open attacks Princes first attempt to enslave the people, they take their measures in secresy, they have recourse to craft: it is by slow but constant efforts, by changes almost imperceptible, by innovations of which it is difficult to observe the consequences, and such as are scarcely taken notice of.

FINIS.

Notes

*

If we properly attend, we shall find, that no State is in its origin of great extent, and that all owe their increase to no other cause but conquest or alliance.

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THE CHAINS OF SLAVERY.

THE CHAINS OF SLAVERY. A WORK WHEREIN THE CLANDESTINE AND VILLAINOUS ATTEMPTS OF PRINCES TO RUIN LIBERTY ARE POINTED OUT, AND THE DREADFUL SCENES OF DESPOTISM DISCLOSED.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED An ADDRESS to the ELECTORS of GREAT BRITAIN, in order to draw their TIMELY ATTENTION to the Choice of proper REPRESENTATIVES in the next PARLIAMENT.

—Vitam impendere vero.

LONDON: Printed for T. BECKET, Corner of the Adelphi, in the Strand; T. PAYNE, at the Mews Gate; J. ALMON, in Piccadilly; and RICHARDSON & URQUHART, near the Royal Exchange.

MDCCLXXIV.

TO THE ELECTORS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

GENTLEMEN,

IN time of security, when prosperity smiles upon the land, the eloquence of an angel would not be attended to; but, when Princes, to become sovereign masters, trample under foot, without shame or remorse, the most sacred rights of the people, attention is excited by the most minute object, and even the voice of a man so unsupported as myself may have effect upon the minds of the public.

If by collecting into one point of view under your eyes the villainous measures planned by Princes to attain absolute empire, and the dismal scenes ever attendant on despotism, I could inspire you with horror against tyranny, and revive in your breasts the holy flame of liberty which burnt in those of your forefathers, I should esteem myself the most happy of men.

Gentlemen, the present parliament, by law, must soon expire; and no dissolution was ever more earnestly wished for by an injured people. Your most sacred rights have been flagrantly violated by your representatives, your remonstrances to the throne artfully rejected, yourselves treated like a handful of disaffected persons, and your complaints silenced by pursuing the same conduct which raised them. Such is your condition, and if such it continues, the little liberty which is yet left you, must soon be extinguished: but the time for redress is now approaching, and it is in your power to obtain that justice you have so many times craved in vain.

As long as virtue reigns in the great council of the nation, the prerogative of the crown, and the rights of the subjects, are so tempered that they mutually support and restrain each other: but when honour and virtue are wanting in the senate, the balance is destroyed: the parliament, the strength and glory of Britain, becomes a profligate faction, which, partaking of the minister's bounty, and seeking to share with him the spoils of their country, joins those at the helm in their criminal designs, and supports their destructive measures,—a band of disguised traitors, who, under the name of guardians, traffic away the national interests, and the rights of a free-born people: the Prince then becomes absolute, and the people slaves. —A truth of which we have unfortunately had but too often the sad experience.

On you alone, Gentlemen, depends the care of securing the freedom of parliament; and it is still in your power to revive that august assembly, which, in the last century, humbled the pride of a tyrant, and broke your fetters: but to effect this, how careful must you be in your choice of those into whose hands you shall trust your authority?

Reject boldly all who attempt to buy your votes; they are but mercenary suitors, who covet only to enlarge their fortune at the expence of their honour, and the interest of their country.

Reject all who have any place at court, any employment in the disposal of the great officers of the crown, any commission which the King can improve. By men thus dependant, and of which the senate is chiefly composed at present, how can you hope to be represented with fidelity?

Reject all who earnestly mendicate your voice; there is no good to be expected from that quarter. If they had nothing at heart but the honour of serving the public, do you imagine that they would submit to act such a disgraceful part? Those humiliating intrigues are the transactions of vice, not of virtue. Merit indeed is fond of honourable distinctions; yet satisfied with proving worthy of them, it never debases itself to beg them, but waits till they are offered.

Reject men of pompous titles; among them there is little knowledge and less virtue: nay, what have they of nobility but the name, the luxuries and the vices of it?

Reject the insolent opulent; in this class are not to be found the few virtues which are left to stock the nation.

Reject young men; no confidence is to be placed in them. Wholly given up to pleasure in this age of degeneracy; dissipation, amusements, and debauchery, are their only occupation; and, to support the expensive gaieties of the capital, they are ever ready to act with zeal in the interests of a minister. But supposing them not corrupt, they are but little acquainted with the national interest; besides, naturally incapable of long continued attention, they are impatient of restraint, they would have nothing to do, but to give their votes, and cannot attend to what they call the dry business of the house, and fulfil the duties of a good senator.

Select for your representatives men distinguished by their ability, integrity, and love for their country; men versed in the national affairs, men whom an independent fortune secures from the temptations of poverty, and a disdain of ruinous pageantry from the allurements of ambition; men who have not been corrupted by the smiles of a court, men whose venerable mature age crowns a spotless life; men who have ever appeared zealous for the public cause, and have had in view only the welfare of their country, and the observance of the laws.

Confine not your choice to the candidates who offer themselves; invite men worthy of that trust, wise men who desire to be your representatives, but cannot dispute that honour with the rich without merit, who labour by bribes to force it out of your hands; do it in such a manner, that for the pleasure of serving their country, they shall have no occasion to dread the ruin of their fortune; and scorn even to eat or drink at prostituted tables.

The utmost efforts will be exerted, as usual, by the ministry to influence your choice. Are the alluring baits of corruption to triumph over your virtue? Is the British spirit so sunk that none durst scorn to receive a bribe? When your great common interest ought to direct you, shall the selfish passions dare to raise their voice? Are they worthy to be indulged at such a price? Behold the dismal scenes arising from neglect of national interest; behold your senators busy in making, altering, and amending acts for securing the property of their dogs, whilst half of the subjects, lingering in misery from the villainy of monopolizers, cry to them for bread; behold your country bleeding at the feet of a minister of the wounds she has received.

Gentlemen, the whole nation cast their eyes upon you for redress; but if your heart be shut to generous feelings, and justice to your fellow subjects cannot move you, let your own interest at least animate you.

To you is left a power to secure the liberty of the people, or enslave the nation; during the time you proceed to election you are, it may be termed, the arbiters of the state, and can teach those to tremble before you, who would make you tremble before them. Be made sensible of the importance of your functions; let honour raise its voice, and a becoming pride elevate your minds. How can the dignity of your office be united with the infamy of corruption?

Most of the candidates are lavish of fawning caresses, and spare no baseness to gain you to their interests, but look upon you with disdain, from the instant they have extorted your votes. Resent such affront, reject their hypocritical courtesy, think on the insolent contempt which follows, and fix your choice upon men who are conscious of what they owe to their constituents.

Parliament under undue influence will do no act to promote the public welfare: Nay, those who have carried their election with money, not satisfied with neglecting your interest, treat you as a mercenary gang of slaves; eagerly seeking to be repaid any way, they traffic away your rights, and use the power you have trusted them with, to ruin you. Are the baits of corruption so attractive as not to be counterbalanced by the solid advantages tendered by virtue? But what are the bribes taken for votes, to the losses suffered by a neglect of your interests, to the advantages you would reap from being represented with ability and fidelity?

Besides what you owe to your country and yourselves, consider what you owe to posterity.

How careful were your ancestors, although with hazard of their lives, to transmit those rights as entire to their children as they had received them from their fathers. What they did with labour, you may do with ease; what they did with danger, you may do with safety. Will the holy flame of liberty which burnt in their breasts never burn in yours? Will you disgrace the names of your forefathers? Will you not shudder with horror at the idea of injuring your posterity? Is the age of liberty passed away? Shall your children, bathing their chains with tears, one day say, —These are the fruits of the venality of our fathers?

Gentlemen,

With virtue and courage a people may ever maintain their liberty: but when once this inestimable treasure is lost, it is almost impossible to recover it; and it is very near being so, when electors set a price on their votes.

CONTENTS.

- Chap. INtroduction, Page 1

- Chap. I. Of the Power of Time, Page 4

- Chap. II. Of Public Entertainments, Page 6

- Chap. III. Of Public Enterprizes, Page 6

- Chap. IV. Of gaining the Affections and Confidence of the Subjects, Page 7

- Chap. V. Of the Pomp of Power, Page 12

- Chap. VI. To abase the People, Page 14

- Chap. VII. Of the Fine Arts and Sciences, Page 20

- Chap. VIII. Of corrupting the People, Page 22

- Chap. IX. Of procuring Opulence, Page 23

- Chap. X. Of Luxury, Page 24

- Chap. XI. To cherish the People's Avarice, Page 30

- Chap. XII. Of Debauchery, Page 30

- Chap. XIII. False Ideas of Liberty, Page 32

- Chap. XIV. Of getting Creatures, Page 33

- Chap. XV. Of rooting out the Love of Glory, Page 35

- Chap. XVI. Of encouraging Servility, Page 37

- Chap. XVII. Of turning virtuous Men out of Place, Page 39

- Chap. XVIII. Of disuniting the People, Page 40

- Chap. XIX. Of multiplying the Tools of Power, Page 45

- Chap. XX. Of placing corrupted Men at the Helm, Page 46

- Chap. XXL. Of securing the Tools of Power from the Sword of Justice, Page 47

- Chap. XXII. Of filling the Courts of Judicature with corrupted Men, Page 48

- Chap. XXIII. Of secret Practices, Page 50

- Chap. XXIV. Of making Innovations, Page 53

- Chap. XXV. Of disarming the Subjects, Page 56

- Chap. XXVI. Of providing for the Pay of the Military Page 62

- Chap. XXVII. Of Acts of Power against Law, and of Judgments of Law against Liberty, Page 62

- Chap. XXVIII. Of Unconcernedness, Page 67

- Chap. XXIX. To wear out the Zeal of the People by false Alarms, Page 68

- Chap. XXX. Of ill grounded Writings, Page 69

- Chap. XXXI. Of Satirical Writings, Page 71

- Chap. XXXII. Of Invectives, Page 71

- Chap. XXXIII. Of bad Writings, Page 72

- Chap. XXXIV. Of too great a Multiplicity of Writings, Page 72

- Chap. XXXV. Of the excessive Moderation of the People, Page 73

- Chap. XXXVI. Of concealing public Grievances, Page 75

- Chap. XXXVII. Of preventing the Redress of public Grievances, Page 77

- Chap. XXXVIII. Of the Artifices made use of in order to suppress public Clamours, Page 82

- Chap. XXXIX. Of the Hypocrisy of Princes, Page 90

- Chap. XL. Of Ignorance, Page 98

- Chap. XLI. False Idea of Tyranny, Page 103

- Chap. XLII. Of Superstition, Page 112

- Chap. XLIII. Of the Confederacy between Princes and Priests, Page 139

- Chap. XLIV. Fruitless Efforts of the People, Page 121

- Chap. XLV. Of Treachery, Page 134

- Chap. XLVI. Constant Pursuit of the same Designs, Page 141

- Chap. XLVII. Of Corrupting the Legislature, Page 145

- Chap. XLVIII. Of the want of Spirit and Steadiness in the Representatives to oppose ministerial Attempts, Page 147

- Chap. XLIX. Of preventing Insurrections, Page 148

- Chap. L. Of suppressing those Offices which share Power, Page 151

- Chap. LI. To incapacitate the People from attempting any Insurrection, Page 154

- Chap. LII. Of accustoming the People to military Expeditions, Page 158

- Chap. LIII. Of securing the Fidelity of the Army, Page 159

- Chap. LIV. To secure the military from civil Power, Page 161

- Chap. LV. To inspire the Military with Contempt for the Citizens, Page 162

- Chap. LVI. Of Usury, Exactions, and Extortions, Page 164

- Chap. LVII. To undermine the Supreme Authority, Page 168

- Chap. LVIII. To usurp the Supreme Power, Page 172

- Chap. LIX. Of violent Measures, Page 184

- Chap. LX. Inconsideration and Folly of the People, Page 184

- Chap. LXI. Inconsiderate Vanity of the People, Page 227

- Chap. LXII. Of Flattery, Page 229

- Chap. LXIII. The Subjects forge their own Chains, Page 231

- Chap. LXIV. Of Despotism, Page 241

- Chap. LXV. Of the Fear of Torments, Page 243

CHAP. I. Of the Power of Time.

THE first attack Princes make upon the public liberty, is not the violating audaciously the laws, but the causing them to fall into oblivion. To enchain their subjects, they begin by setting them asleep.

Whilst men have their heads heated with ideas of liberty, and whilst the bloody image of Tyranny is still before their eyes, they detest despotism, and watch with inquietude every motion of the Ministry. The Prince at that time is cautious not to form any attacks upon public freedom; he appears the father of his people, and his reign the aera of justice. At first his administration is so mildly conducted, that it might be apprehended he has a design of extending Liberty, far from having any intent of ruining it.

Having nothing to dispute relating to their privileges, which are not contested, nor to their liberty which is not attacked, the people gradually become less watchful over the conduct of their rulers, they insensibly discontinue to be upon their guard, and finally lay aside all solicitude, resting tranquil beneath the shade of the laws.

Thus in proportion as the people recede from the stormy times, in which the constitution took its rise; they gradually lose sight of Liberty. To set their minds at rest, there is occasion only to let things proceed in their natural order. But Princes do not always rely on the power of time alone.

CHAP. II. Of Public Entertainments.

THE entrance of Despotism is sometimes pleasing and joyous: plays, feasts, dances and songs being its chearful attendants[*] But in these feasts and plays, the people perceive not the evils prepared for them; they resign themselves to pleasure, and their joy is unbounded. But whilst the inconsiderate multitude is abandoned to joy, the wise foresee the remote calamities threatening their country, and by which it is at last to be overwhelmed: they perceive the chains concealed with flowers, ready to be fixed on the arms of their countrymen.

Notes

*

To draw the attention of the nobles from matters of state, the Emperor Manuel Commenus invented the Tournaments. Panciral. lib. ii. cap. xx.

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CHAP. III. Of Public Enterprizes.

TO the power of time and influence of entertainments, is joined an attention to national affairs. Some war[†] is undertaken, public edifices are built, highways are made, &c. The multitude, judging from appearances alone, believe the Prince is attentive to the welfare of the state only, whilst he is wholly taken up with his projects; they grow careless more and more, and at last they cease to be watchful over their enemy.

While the minds of the people cease to be engaged, the defects of the constitution begin to unfold: the Prince, ever intent upon his own interests, is seeking means to extend his power; but now takes care not to give the least room for disturbing that profound security.

Notes

†

Charlemagne continually engaged his nobility in different expeditions, and by obliging them thus to concur in his designs, he never gave them time to examine into his conduct.

Ferdinand of Arragon made use of this artifice during almost his whole reign. First he attacked Granada, next expelled the Moors from his dominions, he then carried the war into Africa, Italy, France; and by these continual enterprizes, entirely engaged the unquiet busy minds of his subjects.

"We command, said Charles V. to Francis I. people of such fierce and restless dispositions, that unless we were engaged in frequent wars in order to amuse them, our subjects would not indure us." Matthieu, Hist. de la. Paix, lib. i. narrat. xi.

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CHAP. IV. Of gaining the Affections and Confidence of the Subjects.

AMUSING the people is not sufficient, the prince endeavours to have them well affected towards him: and what some do to divert the attention of their subjects, others do to gain their affection.

The Roman people, those absolute masters of the earth, were extremely fond of public shows; and the magnificence of entertainments was a mean made use of, to captivate them, by those who deprived them of their power and liberty.

When Charles II. ascended the throne of Spain, the first business of the minister was to restore plenty to the kingdom, and to indulge the people with shows; never in that country were seen so many bull-fights, plays, and other entertainments after the taste of the nation[*].

To conciliate the affections of the people, princes have recourse sometimes to grants, &c.[†]

Caesar used to confer largesses on the people; and the easy multitude, not perceiving the snare, exhausted their gross imaginations in bestowing encomiums on the despot.

Louis XIV. applied himself to win the hearts of his subjects, by his engaging manners, his prodigality and magnificence. He was careful no one should depart dissatisfied from his presence, he secured by lucrative employments those whom he suspected, and by favours gained to himself even the insatiate croud of courtiers. At court, he amused the people with feasts, fireworks, balls, masquerades, tournaments, shews of every kind. In his campaigns, he repeated the feasts, he visited in his wonted pageantry the towns that had submitted to his power; he invited to his table women of quality, conferred gratifications on the military, scattered gold among the populace, and was applauded to the skies. But it is not by grants only[*], that Princes attempt to gain the affections of their subjects.

Louis I. of Spain signalized the beginning of his reign by loading with kindness all those who approached him.

Ferdinand VI. on ascending the throne, endeavoured to gain popularity by apparent airs of goodness: he ordered the prisons to be opened to all who had been committed for no capital crimes; he granted a general amnesty to deserters and smugglers, and appointed two days a week for receiving petitions and hearing grievances[*], &c.

Princes often-times apply themselves by an affected condescension to win the hearts of the subjects.

The people of Venice admire the goodness of their masters, when they see the Doge at the head of the Senate making the yearly procession to St. Maria Formosa, to discharge a promise of one of his predecessors, and not scorning to accept of a straw hat and two bottles of wine, that the artisans of the parish present him for his trouble: when they see the Doge on the 1st of August accepting of a few melons presented to him by the gardeners, and allowing them to kiss him: when they see the Senators assisting with the Doge on Shrove-Tuesday at the slaughter of a bull, or at some other popular entertainment: when they see the grand-council on Corpus Christi day passing in procession through St. Mark's place, each Noble yielding the right hand to a beggar.

How strange soever it may appear, Princes sometimes attain to despotism by means which in appearance tend to produce a contrary effect. In order to encrease their authority, some by a refinement of policy assume the character of justice, goodness and mercy; to deceive others, they take the outside of plain dealing. Ximenes, became the idol of the Castillians by an apparent purity of manners, by his charity and munificence: the people not suspecting him, left him to make what attempts upon their liberty he pleased, to keep in pay out of the revenue of his benefices mercenary troops, and augment the regal authority[*].

The people of Terra Ferma boast of the lenity of the government of the Seignory, when they see the popularity of the podestates, and the attention given by the inquisitors of state to their complaints against the nobles they hate; and from the opinion they entertain that the whole is done for their advantage alone, they bless the equity of their masters.

At other times, those who govern, that they might conceal their own corruption, attempt to corrupt others; that they might conceal their own ambition, they flatter that of the people, they speak to them perpetually of their rights, affect an extreme zeal for their interests, and raise themselves to tyranny by affecting to protect them.

But in order to enslave mankind, Princes have even affected an aversion to Empire: Some have laboured to promote the public happiness; and taking advantage of that moment when the subjects exulted in their well-being, they pretended themselves tired of the sceptre, and resolved to abdicate; expecting to be importuned to hold the reins of the Empire. The greatest of evils this, since the Prince has the blind confidence of his people, and the means of abusing it.

Notes

*
Desormeaux, Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espag.
↵

†
It must be confessed, that this crafty wile succeeds but too well with the multitude—a stupid animal whose affection largesses ever secure. Whilst from a balcony of the Hotel de ville, Mazarine, on his return to Paris, scattered money among the rabble, it was curious to hear the people passing from the greatest imprecations to the greatest encomiums. Hist. du Card. de Mazarine, Vol. IV.
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*

Every grant of the Prince to the people ought to be suspected, unless conferred at the time of any sudden calamity. The only method a Prince, who has no designs upon liberty, can make use of to relieve his people, is the lessening of their taxes.

↵

*
Desormeaux, Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espag.
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*
Bandier, Hist. de Ximenes.
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CHAP. V. Of the Pomp of Power.

THE Majesty of Princes constitutes part of their power[*]. Hence most of them have assumed a majestic gravity, an imperious air, a pompous attendance[†].

Whenever they appear in public, it is with the attributes of sovereign power. Sometimes they have the fascia, the sceptre, the sword of justice carried before them: oftentimes they are attended in pomp by all the great officers of the crown or a multitude of courtiers, and always by a formidable band of satellites[*].

They are solicitous likewise to maintain the splendour of their houshold; and fearing if they ceased to act the masters, the great who approach their presence would cease to act the subjects, they ever affect an imperious tone. To teach the people to approach them with ceremony, and render themselves more and more the object of respect, they have all introduced a degree of state dignity into their court. Some have even prohibited any from either serving them or speaking to them unless on their knees[†].

The eagerness of being respected, Princes have extended to their civil officers; less attentive to display in the persons of magistrates, the ministers of the laws, than men constituted in dignities.

Among the regulations which James I. enacted in the year 1613, in the council of Scotland, the councellors were ordered either to ride in the streets with foot-cloths, or to go in coaches; but never to be seen on foot[*].

Philip II. of Spain ordered, by a particular decree, all the members of his councils and the chancellors of his kingdoms, never to appear in public unless cloathed with a long robe and unshaven[†].

Princes are not less attentive, reciprocally to support their dignity out of their dominions.

Whenever they visit each other, they are received with pomp, treated with magnificence, indulged with every honour; and that the people might be the more struck with the importance of a Prince, great marks of distinction are ever shewn to any individual of a royal family.

Notes

*

Richelieu was well convinced of this truth, as he strongly blamed that weak Prince Louis XIII. for having neglected such a material point. See his Political Testament.

↵

†

It was the magnificence of the first Cosmo di Medici, that gave him so great an ascendance over the minds of his fellow-citizens: it was this, that notwithstanding the democratical form of government at Florence, notwithstanding the attachment of the people to their privileges, notwithstanding the popularity of those who were at the helm, rendered him the head of the Republic, and so blinded the citizens as to permit him to usurp the supreme authority.

↵

*

Formerly kings used to walk without guards among their subjects, like the father of a family among his children: But as soon as they had it in their power, they formed to themselves a formidable retinue of guards; and there are few monarchs at present without several regiments of satellites.

↵

†
Philip II. of Spain expressly commanded this. Desormeaux, Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espag.
↵

*
Spotswood.
↵

†
Desormeaux, Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espag.
↵

CHAP. VI. To abase the People.

WHEN once the minds of the people are seduced and given up to dissipation, an attempt is made to abase them.

Vigilance, frugality, disinterestedness, love of glory and one's patria[*], are the virtues by which people preserve their liberty: accordingly that they might enslave their subjects, Princes who aspired to despotism, have obliged them to renounce those virtues.

In order to subject the necks of the Spartans to the yoke, Philopaemen forced them to quit the austere way of educating their children, and to adopt an effeminating one: Thus he succeeded to extinguish[†] that elevation of spirit, that greatness of soul, which he so much dreaded.

After Edward I. had united the principality of Wales to his dominions, from a conviction that nothing contributed so much in maintaining the warlike genius and eagerness after glory of his new subjects, as the poetical traditions of their prowess, which were sung in their martial feasts, he ordered a strict perquisition to be made after the Welsh poets, and put them to death[‡].

From a like conviction, and actuated by the same motives, did the ministry during the last reign oblige the Highlanders to throw aside their ancient dress, and renounce their martial feasts.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

ARTIFICE is generally made use of to abase the people, violence but seldom. Accordingly[*] places allotted for entertainments and debauchery are ordered to be erected; talents which serve to amuse the people are encouraged; actors, musicians, tumblers, puppet-players, mountebanks of every kind[†] are patronized, &c. The public being hereby wholly engaged, pry not into the conduct of administration.

Cyrus, having conquered Lydia, was told that the inhabitants of that country had revolted; but not thinking fit to demolish their cities or secure them with strong garrisons, instituted therein public plays, theatres, taverns, houses of ill fame: by these means the Lydians were rendered so effeminate as never to oppose him[*].

Those who governed Athens expended immense sums in support of the theatre.

At Rome, the Emperors oftentimes entertained the people with shows: and a fondness for these pleasures extinguished in the minds of the Romans that idea of liberty which their ancestors so tenderly cherished.

To subdue the spirit of their English subjects, the kings of the house of Stuart countenanced the general dissipation. Under James I. spacious buildings were erected for exhibiting theatrical performances to the multitude. Masks and mummings, drolls and dancings were the chief occupation of life. During Charles I.'s reign, the number of play-books were immense, the multitude of London play-hunters so augmented, that five houses were not sufficient to maintain their troops[†]. And under Charles II. all ranks of men were given up to dissipation, debauchery and riotous banquetting.

Modern Princes are very careful to have theatres constructed in the principal cities of their dominions. The Venetians especially are careful that the public attention should be continually engaged by entertainments.

It is a matter of wonder how compleatly this artifice answers[*] the end intended. When a people has once tasted these pleasures, careless of every thing else, they can no more forbear them, and are never so much discontented as when deprived of these their favorite amusements.

The civil war in England of 1641 was not kindled till the theatres were shut: and a people has been seen groaning under the weight of their misfortunes, desire these shows as the only remedy of their evils[*].

Thus plays, entertainments, shows, are the allurements of servitude, and the tools of tyranny.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

IF, to that eagerness for dissipation and frivolous entertainment that the theatre affords, the plays which are performed contain loose sentiments, base maxims, refined flattery to persons in dignity, as most of the dramatic productions of foreign nations; if encomiums are bestowed on the follies and vices of reigning Princes, as in some of those allegoric pastorals which were performed at the Court of Charles I. or of Louis XIV; the stage then becomes the most fatal school of servitude.

Notes

*

All, even our best authors, have ever expressed the amor patriae by the love of one's country, two things which ought to be carefully distinguished. The one is but the love of one's native land; the other, is the affection or tie of a country where one enjoys all the privileges a freeman is entitled to. Turks have no patria, though they do not want a name for it: The English have a patria, and no word to express it.

↵

†
Plutarc. in Vit. Philopaem.
↵

‡
Sir J. Wynne, p. 15.
↵

*

I know none but the Greeks among whom the theatrical and other public entertainments had not such aims: hence they denominated their dramatic poets 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the preservers of cities.

↵

†

Some Princes have even persecuted those who have attempted to reform the people. Charles I. had W. Prynne sentenced to a cruel punishment by the Star-Chamber, for having written against theatrical amusements.

↵

*
Herodot. lib. i.
↵

†
Prynne's Histrio-Mastix, p. 5.
↵

*

We had once found out the method of turning this artifice against its aim, by performing plays which breathed a high spirit of liberty: But the depravation of the age has at last spread itself over all ranks. Except a few, who retain purity of manners and soundness of judgment, debauchery has corrupted every heart, luxury conquered every mind among us: and in the state of abjection we are reduced to, we have but a frigid admiration for heroism; the image of exalted virtues makes but a slight impression on our languishing souls, their heavenly attractives affect us no more.

Our dramatic authors, depraved as the rest, or degraded to servile flatterers, have complied with the taste of the age; and, to their eternal shame, are busy only in corrupting it still more. Instead of shewing us on the stage wise men, heroes, protectors and benefactors of their country, they shew us lovers, fops, coquets, &c. Instead of disclosing the dark designs of bad Princes, the plot of perfidious citizens, the outrages of wicked men; they disclose only amours, broils of private families, and adventures of taverns. Instead of rendering the theatre a school of virtue, they render it a school of vice.

If now and then some good drama is performed, its impression is wholly destroyed by the entertainment, which follows. The salutary reflections, to which it gave birth, are obliterated by the jests of an Harlequin, the foolings of a Punchinello, or the tricks of a waiting maid: the noble feelings which it has produced, exhale in laughing, and thus the audience is dismissed.

Will it be said that I attribute too great an influence to theatrical representations? Let it be remembered, that theatres are the only places in this realm, where an author is not allowed to expose his ideas with freedom. Have not our Princes been solicitous to reserve for the inspection of their ministers, whatever is to be performed on the stage?

↵

*
The inhabitants of Treves, after the plunder of their city.
↵

CHAP. VII. Of the Fine Arts and Sciences.

BY encouraging the fine arts and the sciences among the Romans, Augustus subjected them to the yoke; and by the same method, his successors subdued the barbarians they had vanquised[*].

No people was ever so independent as the ancient Germans. Without fixed establishments, continually engaged in some expedition for pillaging, excessively fond of liberty, and ever continuing in arms, they were but little restrained by laws, their Princes had but little authority over them; and even that authority was but little respected. But, when once they had secured their conquests, their Princes in order to extending and securing their power, laboured to inspire them with the love of tranquil employments, to acquaint them with the sweet fruits of industry, to engage them to cultivate the arts of peace, and devote themselves to a contemplative life.

As soon as the crown of England was secured on the head of Alfred, this Prince took great care to inspire his subjects with the love of arts and sciences; and the better to encourage them to apply themselves to study, he set them the example, and was attentive to reward merit[*].

Spain, almost continually torn by factions, sedition and civil wars, was, till the reign of Ferdinand V. sunk into barbarity, its inhabitants being only superficially acquainted with war and politics: but in order to extend his power, Ferdinand begun to introduce into his dominions the love of letters, by distributing favours to those who addicted themselves thereto[†].

Philip II. and Philip III. both eager after absolute command, befriended with all their power the arts and sciences, and a great number of Spaniards cultivated them.

Not satisfied with encouraging letters by his liberality, Philip IV. recommended the study of them by his example. And as soon as Philip V. was firmly established on the throne, he erected universities, patronized the literati, and rewarded those who were distinguished for eminent talents.

Francis I. of France encouraged the sciences, erected universities, and attracted men of learning to his kingdom; his successors, chiefly Louis XIV. have followed his example.

Notes

*

It may appear strange, says a celebrated historian, that the progress of the arts and sciences, which among the Greeks and Romans encreased every day the number of slaves, became in late times a general source of liberty; and, to clear this phenomenon, he has recourse to a series of vain arguments; whilst a simple distinction is sufficient.

When the rights of mankind are not the subject of our enquiries, study, by fixing the mind on foreign objects, necessarily causes it to lose sight of liberty: but when the sanctuary of learning is opened to a barbarous people, by a natural progression, they must necessarily turn their thoughts to the relations nature and society have established among men. The Romans were acquainted only with matters of war or state; and in order to divert them therefrom, Augustus brought the fine arts into esteem among them. Under feudal government, the people were extremely ignorant; they lost in their fetters even all sense of liberty: but when they had begun to cultivate the sciences, and turn their minds to meditation, they at last reflected their thoughts on themselves, and were made conscious of their rights.

↵

*
Asser. p. 13. Flor. Wigorn. p. 588.
↵

†
Zurita. Annal. d'Arag. tom. vi. p. 22.
↵

CHAP. VIII. Of corrupting the People.

NO constitution maintains itself unaltered but by virtue. If this spring be long unbent, adieu liberty. Instead of concurring to the public welfare, every one seeks his own interests only; the laws fall into contempt, and the magistrates themselves are the first in violating them. Thus the people being abased, an attempt is made to corrupt them.

CHAP. IX. Of procuring Opulence.

EVER by ways strewed with flowers, Princes have begun to drive their subjects to slavery.

At first the subjects are indulged with feasts and shows, but as these entertainments cannot long continue, unless the Prince has the disposal of the spoils of the whole world, a lasting source of corruption is then opened to the people: industry is encouraged, and commerce rendered flourishing[*], in order to procure opulence. Now opulence is always attended by luxury.

Notes

*

This assertion will undoubtedly appear very strange to those, who have their eyes fixed on the feudal government degenerated into despotism or oligarchy. Princes encourage industry and commerce in their dominions, they will say, in order to increase their revenues, not to abase their subjects: I request the reader to consider, that I do not speak of a people already under the yoke, but of those who are intended to be subjected thereto. Thus, not mentioning the efforts made some centuries ago, in the states of Venice, Genoa, Florence, in France, Spain, England, &c. to encourage industry, arts and commerce among the subjects, let us consider what attempts in that respect have been made by Princes of a free people. The antient Britons, like the Goths, and other Celtic nations, were almost entirely independant; and as long as they remained split into many small tribes, with no other possessions but their arms and flocks, it proved impossible to their chieftains to become absolute. But in order to subject them, the Romans introduced the arts of peace, commerce and urbanity. Agricola chiefly taught them to procure themselves the conveniencies of life, he endeavoured to render their condition pleasing; and the Britons so much submitted themselves to the domination of their new masters, that, once subdued, they gave them no more uneasiness, and lost all desire, even all idea of their former independency. Tacit. in Agricol.

Thus likewise did Alfred, to subdue the Anglo Saxons.

↵

CHAP. X. Of Luxury.

ONE effect of luxury is the extinguishing the heroic virtues; for, when men can attract notice by sumptuous equipages, costly dress, long retinue of servants, they are no more solicitous of attracting it by upright manners, noble sentiments, glorious deeds.

Luxury is immediately attended by a looseness of manners, which is the beginning of their depravation: both sexes meet together in order to render their intercourse more agreeable, and corrupt themselves reciprocally; gallantry is introduced; this produces a frivolous turn of mind, puts a value on trifles, depresses whatever is of any concern; and duty is soon forgotten.

The arts which luxury maintains, and the pleasures it promises, rendering society delightful, hurry us away to effeminacy; they soften our manners, and enervate that haughtiness which endures neither fetters nor restraint.

By concealing with flowers the chains which are prepared for us, they extinguish in our souls the sense of liberty, and make us in love with servitude.

Hence Princes generally neglect nothing which may bring luxury into esteem: they recommend it by their[*] example; they display every where pageantry and magnificence, and are the first to sow in the minds of their subjects those seeds of corruption[†].

If Princes recommend not luxury by their example, they at least countenance it, or refuse to restrain it. The Roman Senate, still composed of grave Magistrates, proposed to Augustus the reformation of the manners and of the luxury of women; but though obliged by his office of Censor to attend to it, he ever artfully avoided the importunate request of the Senators[†].

Some have gone even so far as to force their subjects to sink into effeminacy. In order to subdue the inhabitants of Cuma, Aristomenes laboured to enervate the courage of the youth: he ordered the boys to let their hair grow, to adorn their heads with flowers, and, like girls, to wear long gowns of various colours; he commanded them, when going to their dancing or singing masters, to be attended by women with umbrellas and fans; in the bath they were to be served with looking-glasses, combs and perfumes: this way of education was continued till they were twenty years of age[‡].

Thus by enervating and corrupting the people, luxury subdues them without resistance to the will of an imperious Master, and forces them to purchase, at the price of their liberty, the quiet life and soft pleasures they are permitted to enjoy.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

LUXURY not only enervates the minds, but nothing is better calculated to divide them; when once introduced into a state, the union of its members is destroyed; every one endeavours to attract notice, to become more conspicuous than his neighbour, and rise above the common level. Careless of the good of the public, they then attend to their private interests only; the love of one's patria is extinguished in every heart; the citizen disappears, and the man remains.

Luxury, as it extends itself, ranks superfluity among necessaries. At first the people abandon themselves to dissipation; it becomes habitual to them; pleasures are necessary; and as every one cannot enjoy them equally, they are actuated by various sentiments: on one side are envy, jealousy, hatred; on the other, pride and contempt—new seeds of discord![*]

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

WHEN once men are corrupted by luxury, new desires prey alternately on the mind. If the means of indulging them are wanting, every one busies himself to support the extravagances in which he delights.

The evil grows worse every day, since from much endeavouring to be distinguished, no one at last distinguishes himself any more; but as a rank is taken, and as a desire of attracting the eyes of the public still continues, every nerve is bent in order to get out of that intolerable uniformity. From that time there is no proportion between the wants and the means; every one is eager after riches, and bows down in the temple of Fortune. How many voluntary slaves!

Finally, a multitude of subjects, needy by their new wants, and vexed to be the meanest of all, vainly agitate themselves to get off their humiliating poverty, and are at last reduced to wish for their country's destruction.

Such is the powerful influence of luxury, that oftentimes nothing more is wanting to compleat the destruction of liberty, even in countries the most fond of it.

As long as Rome was inhabited by poor citizens, honesty, honour, courage, and love of liberty, were inclosed within its walls; but when once it was enriched with the spoils of vanquished nations, these ancient virtues gave way to a multitude of vices. Notwithstanding the wisdom of the laws, no sooner were its gates open to the riches of the enemy, but Rome ceased to acknowledge its degenerated offspring; manners and duties became opposite to each other; poverty, till then honoured, fell into contempt; gold became the object of every one's desire; luxury expanded itself with rapidity; all plunged headlong into voluptuousness: and when pleasures had once impoverished these Sybarites, a multitude of lavish citizens, ashamed of their poverty, caballed from ambition, and disturbed public tranquillity; whilst some powerful men alternately put themselves at the head of the mob, tore the state to pieces, spilled the blood of the citizens, usurped the supreme power, and silenced the laws. Thus perished liberty at Sparta, and thus it will perish among us.

Notes

*

As luxury so much charms the multitude, as to induce them to be guilty of a thousand extravagancies, ever attended with the ruin of the state, Princes, after having countenanced it, were often obliged to restrain it. But by a contrast not uncommon, while they repressed luxury by their proclamations, they encouraged it by their example.

Whilst Lewis XIV. prohibited, by his edicts to the lieutenants-general and other officers of his armies who kept an open table, the serving up of any other dishes, except pottage, roast-meat, and the like, he himself displayed on his table the productions of all climates. Whilst he fixed the quantity of gold or silver to be allowed for plate, furniture, equipage, dress, &c. he himself squandered the public money in magnificent extravagancies.

Let Princes issue out as many proclamations as they please, luxury will not the less prevail. Those ordonances act even against the purpose they are intended for, as they give more value to what they prohibit, and encrease the desire of enjoying it. From this very consideration they are sometimes made.

↵

†

The excessive love of pleasure, that possessed the courts of James I. Charles II. Louis XIV. &c. infected all ranks of men. Every day produced some feast, and every night some mask, in which people of fortune engaged: dissipation and luxury took place of simplicity and application.

↵

†
Dio Cassius, lib. liv.
↵

‡
Dionys. Halicarn. lib. vii.
↵

*

How many Princes have fomented these divisions by their ordonances. In an edict of 1294, Philip the Fair prohibited the burgesses from wearing ermine, gold and jewels, all which were permitted to the nobility. To burgesses worth 2000 livres he allowed cloth of 12 pence a yard; to the less rich, cloth of 8 pence; but prelates and barons were permitted to wear cloth of 25 pence a yard.

Other Princes have made similar ordinances.

↵

CHAP. XI. To cherish the People's Avarice.

WHENEVER riches are the price of every thing which attracts consideration, they soon supply the place of birth, virtue, and talents, and are sought after as the summum bonum. Thus, in order to corrupt the subjects, those at the helm are careful to cherish the people's avarice by keeping up the spirit of gaming among them.

Such is the craft of the cabinet in France, England, Holland, but chiefly at Venice[*].

By this artifice people are also prevented from reflecting and knowing their situation.

Notes

*

Not to mention lotteries, which are so frequent at Venice, it is a fact, that during the whole Carnival, many public Ridotti are opened for games of chance; but what will appear more extraordinary, at each table a member of the great council in his gown sits as banker.

↵

CHAP. XII. Of Debauchery.

ANOTHER method, put in practice for subduing the subjects, is the keeping them in idleness, and not controuling their pleasures. They then, careless of liberty, take no concern in public affairs, and are ever busied in contriving the means of indulging their base passions.

When once the people become fond of money, if none is to be got but by giving up their birth-rights, they submit to the yoke, and impatiently wait for their salary.

If the Prince is moreover attentive at times to entertain them, they are base enough to bless their tyrant.

In order to render the Persians good slaves, Cyrus kept them in idleness, plenty, and luxury; and these effeminate men called him their father[*].

The Roman emperors, using this crafty policy, oftentimes entertained the people with feasts or shews, and then the deluded multitude exerted themselves in exalting the goodness of their masters[†].

The Venetians take great care to maintain their subjects in plenty, to set them free from moral restraint, and indulge them with shews. Far from controuling the pleasures of the citizens, they give encouragement to lewdness, by publicly protecting houses of ill fame; and thus divert the subjects from taking any concern in matters of state. The clergy themselves they allow to be dissolute, and so greatly countenance their scandalous manners[*], that these wretches highly praise the mild government of the Seignory.

Thus this idle and lewd life, which the people call liberty, is one of the chief causes of their slavery.

Notes

*
Xenoph. Cyropaed.
↵

†
Tacit. Hist. lib. iv.
↵

*

By countenancing the corruption of the clergy, the senate aims likewise to render the ecclesiastics odious to the people.

↵

CHAP. XIII. False Ideas of Liberty.

WHILE sports, festivals, merriments, shews, entertainments of every kind, engross the mind, people by degrees lose sight of liberty, and think not of it any more. By entirely neglecting to think of liberty, the true idea of it is obliterated, and false notions take place. To men always engrossed by their pleasures or private affairs, liberty is soon no more than the mean of amassing wealth without obstacles, of possessing it with safety, and making merry without opposition. Thus the love of independency, for want of fuel, is extinguished in every breast.

CHAP. XIV. Of getting Creatures.

IN a country, where the Prince disposes of benefices, places and dignities, though by their means he ever gets friends, he at first grants none but to deserving persons; but when once he has succeeded in abasing and depraving his subjects, he thinks of getting creatures.

The great, being masters of the lower classes of people, are so in some sort of the state; and with them the Prince begins to share authority: he dazzles the sight of one by a ribbon, seduces another by an employment, temptations are offered every one according to his favourite passions, and men eagerly present their necks to the yoke.

Besides the small number of powerful men, who fill up the first places of the state, he holds by hope those ambitious men who continually seek after favour and preferment. Those he cannot draw in by realities, he prevails upon by promises, regards and caresses; he cajoles his courtiers, who, proud of these marks of consideration, endeavour by their servility to secure them.

To the number of the creatures of Princes, must be added the multitude which courtiers and placemen support by their credit, or captivate by their fortune.

Thus deficient of every principle of honour, and careless of their duty, those at the helm are ever seeking to court the Prince, that they might share his authority; and submit themselves to the yoke, that they might impose it on others. These likewise seek after favour, every one aims to be exalted; men of a mean condition themselves wish to rise, that they might assume an imperious air.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

WHEN the Prince has extensive demesnes or disposes of the public money, he makes use of gold to increase the number of his creatures[*]. As luxury, so the greedy desire of riches possesses every rank, and both the poor and the rich, more fond of money than of liberty, are ever ready to give way to bribery, and set a price on their honour[†].

How greatly are things already altered! The love of liberty tyed the heart of every one fast to his patria, by confounding private in public interest. Now the love of pageantry, of dignities, of gold, breaks off these sacred bands, and concentrates men in their selfish views.

Seeing the discord, avarice, and venality of the people, one might imagine that already liberty is undone; but of so many men who seek to sell themselves, the Prince gets only those whom he can purchase; others, with regret, remain faithful to their country.

Notes

*

From Charles V. to Philip V. 50,000 l. were paid yearly out of the royal treasury for pensions to the grandees of Spain. Deformeaux, Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espag.

↵

†

While poverty was honoured at Rome, the consulship, and other offices of magistracy, were conferred on the most deserving, on those who were most able to command armies, or rule the commonwealth; but when opulence had once depraved the Romans, those only were appointed to the conduct of affairs, who best entertained the people.

↵

CHAP. XV. Of rooting out the Love of Glory.

WHILST the desire of acquiring fame burns in the breast of the subjects, and they are greedy after glory alone, liberty is never more secure. They stand unshaken at dangers, disheartened by no obstacle, and restrained by no consideration; less fearing the most horrid torture, than the opprobrium of betraying their country to a tyrant.

Princes accordingly lose no opportunity of changing the object of glory. For fame, which the public dispenses, they substitute honours which they alone distribute; and instead of making dignities the reward of services done the patria, they make honours the salary of services tendered to them. Thus their creatures are covered both with infamy and marks of dignity, and these marks of note are soon valued at the expence of merit, virtue and talents.

Hence arise two opposite effects: men of abject principles seek after dignities, men of an elevated mind despise them. Disgraced by the use they are made of, and the persons on whom they are bestowed, to become worthy of them is no more the pursuit of noble souls. When once honours are discredited, an incentive to generous actions, to great deeds, is wanting; and the love of glory, for want of fewel, is extinguished in every heart.

CHAP. XVI. Of encouraging Servility.

WHEN the Prince is the only source of consideration, favour becomes the object of every one's desires. To be accounted something, those who approach him exert themselves to please him; the inestimable advantage of being free is therefore sacrificed on all sides to dazzling servitude, and the love of one's patria to ignominious marks of note.

In order to be in favour with the monarch, they speak emphatically of his little merit; they allow him to possess virtues of every kind, and extol the happiness of being under his empire[*].

More than that, all who approach him abase themselves, are earnest to cringe at his feet, disdain all those who scorn to imitate them; and proud of their chains, seek for the disgracing privilege of being his laughing stock.

Destitute of virtue, they cannot bear it in others; and exert all their address in ridiculing them: on all occasions they depress glorious deeds, asperse good men, and by the most humiliating epithets stigmatize the lovers of liberty.

At first, their base discourses are despised; but, by constantly repeating the same without blushing, they amaze their adversaries, and humble them by despising their blows. Besides, as such effrontery in facing ridicule imposes upon the multitude, incapable of appraising things at their just value, contempt ends and admiration begins.

On his part, the Prince scarcely rises any to dignities but in proportion as they prove servile. Never sure of his favour, unless ever ready to betray their engagements, they are disgraced from the moment they remember their duty. Mean flatterers, and those wretches who sell their conscience that they might sell their protection, are therefore the only persons who can bear themselves up in such a thorny place. Thus all vices reign at courts; there flattery, perjury, and contempt of all duty, parade with effrontery.

Not being allowed to live as one might wish, every one lives according to the times, men, and affairs; even the wisest have but a frigid admiration for virtue, and the best patriots are but little concerned for the public good.

Notes

*

It is oftentimes the case with both houses of parliament, not to proportion words to things in their addresses of thanks to the throne. How little soever be the desert of the monarch, they always give him overstrained encomiums. Let him do right or wrong, they praise him for every thing, thank him for every thing, and never so much as when he deserves neither thanks nor praises. For the rulers of the British Empire, what a disgraceful part! It will be said, that these fawning addresses are but empty words; but whilst praises are prostituted, what remains to be said to a good king, to a true father of his people? Where are the allurements of virtue, whilst flattery bestows on others the encomiums which belong to virtuous men alone? And so long as this shameful practice endures, what Prince will be afraid of being branded with infamy, or be incited to grace the throne? Fortunately those base flatteries sink into contempt; those venal discourses, censured by the public, are reduced to their just value.

It is not in those addresses, it is said, that one must look for the spirit and love of liberty. So much the worse: flattery and venality are linked together, the one goes rarely without the other, and both are always attended with slavery.

↵

CHAP. XVII. Of turning virtuous Men out of Places.

IN a free, but newly established government, men who have best served their country, are ever seated at the helm; and men of avowed honesty ever sit on the bench. If the Prince is trusted with the power of disposing of places for the future, it is on condition that he shall prefer none but deserving persons. But in order to become absolute, far from calling to him talents and virtue, he imperceptibly removes from office men that are popular, wise, and incorruptible, and puts in their places men of easy terms.

CHAP. XVIII. Of disuniting the People.

HAVING engaged the people to lose fight of their patria, an attempt is made to annihilate the love of it in their hearts. Men united by liberty and for liberty must remain free, as long as they remain united; to be enslaved they therefore ought to be divided, and time never fails to offer an opportunity for it.

Almost in every state, there are from its foundation various ranks of people; nobles ever disdain the plebeians, and plebeians ever hate the nobles, or rather, every one who belongs to any rank, hates or despises those who belong to another: these base passions Princes make use of to sow dissention, and alienate the affections of the people from their patria.

If there is originally no diversity of ranks, those at the helm labour to introduce it: they divide the people into different classes, and to every one assign particular employments, rights or privileges. The one is appointed to magistracies, the other to military services; this to ecclesiastical benefices, that to trade and mechanical arts.

Till the secession of the Romans, the patricians only were nominated to the magistracy; and till the emperors, every order of citizens was not admitted to military service.

None but noblemen were to be admitted into the order of knights templars, and none are to be admitted into that of knights of Malta, but those whose nobility can be proved by many descents.

In France, noblemen, military men, and the king's honorary councellors alone, are free from a land-tax, called la taille.

In order to incite jealousy among his subjects, Philip II. of Spain, settled in 1586, by proclamation, a ceremonial to be observed in regard to the grandees, ministers, and prelates; he likewise fixed the titles by which the citizens were to be stiled, and ordered the refractory to be prosecuted by law.

At Venice, the different orders of[*] cytadini are distinguished the one from the other, and all from the vulgar, by peculiar privileges. The first order is appointed to the residentship of foreign courts, and to the secretaryship of counsels and embassies; into their families patricians are permitted to marry; sometimes some of them are incorporated into the body of the nobility, instead of those families which become extinct: the other cytadini are permitted to take the gown of the nobles. Thus they are all engaged to unite with the masters of the commonwealth against the rest of the people.

But as if this craft was still insufficient, the administration sows dissention among the rabble of the different wards of the city, and constantly keeps up two opposite parties[*] by secretly encouraging fighting among them on one particular day of the year.

Of their subjects of Terra Ferma, the burgesses are treated with indulgency, the nobles with severity.

Looking upon the Paduans as the antient masters of Venice, the seignory took particular care to keep them disunited. For that purpose, the most powerful families were transported to Venice, and such privileges granted to the students of the university as to incense the jealousy of the citizens.

Princes, not satisfied with dividing the people into various orders, enjoying divers privileges, artfully incite discord in every order by means of odious distinctions[*]. They grant peculiar prerogatives to individuals, and give pensions to courteous officers, to adulatory academicians, poets, comedians, &c.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

IN order to sow discord among their subjects, almost all Princes have tolerated different religious sects: some of them have even countenanced particular sectaries; others, with the same views, have persecuted them.

These artifices prove so destructive to liberty, that by their aid many Princes have governed their people in an arbitrary manner.—A truth of which we ourselves have more than once had the sad experience.

When the reformation had extended itself among us, this kingdom was divided into two parties, who alternately having recourse to the king, obliged him oftentimes to hold the balance between them; but to crush them both with their own hands, he made it incline now towards one side, then towards the other.

"As Henry VIII. was a slave to his furious passions, each party flattered themselves that a blind compliance with the king's will would throw him fully into their interests, and they implicitly put themselves into his hands."

While the people were in succeeding times divided into Whigs and Tories, and as soon as these two factions were made irreconcileable by the artifices of the court, and could counterbalance the forces of each other, Charles II. pulled off the mask, dissolved the parliament; and the nation beheld with astonishment, a king who had received so many mortifications from the legislative powers, and had been so often obliged to submit, on a sudden, without fleet, without army, without money, and without foreign assistance, become absolute master of his kingdom; letting his opposers feel the terrible effects of his vengeance, sacrificing the most spirited patriots to his rage, and governing his subjects with a tyrannical sway.

Notes

*

The body of the cytadini is composed of the secretaries of the commonwealth, of the notaries, physicians, lawyers, woollen and silk merchants, and of the glass-makers of Maron; that is to say, of the most powerful citizens.

↵

*
The Nicoloti and Castellani.
↵

*

Louis XI. was continually sowing discord among his barons, and to succeed in dividing them, employed the most refined policy.

The Venetians did the same with the nobles of Terra Ferma. Peter Erizza being podestate at Udina, as the nobility of the Frioul were then in very good correspondence among themselves, was ordered to set them at variance; and for that purpose received from the senate the power of granting the title of count or marquis to whom he should think proper. Hence soon arose great jealousies between the families who claimed those titles and those that did obtain them. Amelot de la Houssaye, Gouvern. de Venice.

↵

CHAP. XIX. Of multiplying the Tools of Power.

TO increase their power, Princes increase the number of placemen.

Under those Princes of the Austrian house who mounted the Spanish throne, the number of civil and military places was prodigious. There were thousands of titulars, and scarcely any man of some consideration without an office, or dignity[*].

Hitherto the attempts made against liberty have not alarmed the subjects. As these changes have been gradual, and as these new manners have taken place without offending the minds of the people; far from entertaining any sinister suspicion, they believe their well-being to be augmented. But an alteration is soon to follow. Already there are no more public feasts, no more mirthful shews. Sad scenes succeed, the subjects feel their grievous situation, and futurity offers them but an afflicting perspective.

Full of himself, and conscious of his force, the Prince grows every day impatient at the idea of his dependency, and hastes to rid himself of it.

Notes

*
Desormeaux, Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espag.
↵

CHAP. XX. Of placing corrupted Men at the Helm.

PRINCES cannot alone ruin liberty, they absolutely want some aid; and as their ministers are to be their chief tools of tyranny, they commit the execution of their dark designs to crafty men, to men without honour, honesty, and conscience. Some of the most artful confer no office, no place of any authority, but to men of new families, who being sensible that they owe every thing to royal favour, are content to support the power of the crown, though at the expence of justice and national privileges; and the better to secure their projects, they even admit but few into the cabinet.

Henry VII. ever ruled by a faction, and that by the lesser faction. To give full scope to his tyrannical rapacity, he nominated for his ministers Empson and Dudley, two profligate men, equally enabled by their knowledge in the law to pervert the forms of justice to the oppression of the innocent, and perfectly qualified to prey upon the defenceless people.

Louis XI. trusted none with the first places of government, but men that were corrupt and of base extraction: these were his sole confidents, and the ministers of his ambitious designs.

To become absolute, Charles II. established a cabinet council, known by the name of the Cabal, composed but of few men, equally destitute of honour, and virtue, even boasting of their own vices.

When we consider what sort of men Princes generally make choice of for their servants, what are we to think of the masters themselves?

CHAP. XXI. Of securing the Tools of Power from the Sword of Justice.

FAVOUR always proves sufficient to render ministers zealous, but impunity alone renders them audaciously enterprising. Princes take care therefore to protect them against the laws, and free them from punishment, whatever be the crimes they are guilty of.

Henry VIII. granted to Wolsey the following pardon: ‘"THAT THE KING, OUT OF HIS MERE MOTION AND ESPECIAL FAVOUR, DID PARDON ALL AND ALL MANNER OF TREASON, MISPRISION OF TREASON, MURDERS, FELONIES, AND OUTRAGES WHATSOEVER, BY THE SAID WOLSEY COMMITTED, OR TO BE HEREAFTER COMMITTED."’

Such was the pardon granted to the Earl of Somerset by James I. and such the pardon granted to the Earl of Danby by Charles II.

What did not Charles I. to free Strafford from punishment? At first he refused to sign the death-warrant; next he interceded by tears and supplications; then demanded that the punishment should be commuted into perpetual imprisonment; afterwards prayed for a respite, and in fine reluctantly submitted.

Has not Louis XV. lately snatched out of the hands of justice the Duc d'Aguillon, charged with having made an attempt to poison that troublesome patriot —M. de la Chalotaye?

CHAP. XXII. Of filling the Courts of Judicature with corrupted Men.

LIBERTY is established on the laws alone; but as the laws ever speak by the mouths of men, in order to render them delusive and useless, Princes set on the benches corrupted judges, or they corrupt those who are sitting.

The constant policy of Henry VII. consisted in nominating to every place of trust, churchmen, lawyers, and new men, who were all more dependant on him than the great.

Louis XI. studiously filled all the departments of government with men of base extraction.

Under James I. the Star-chamber, the Council of York, the High Commission-court, &c. were wholly composed of the King's creatures, and all causes of any concern brought before them.

Charles I. bribed the judges of the high-court of justice; and not content with this, under colour of reforming abuses, granted a commission to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and other members of the privy-council, for regulating the jurisdiction of all the courts of judicature in the kingdom. These commissioners were to examine all questions, controversies, and debates, arising about the jurisdiction of the courts, civil and ecclesiastical. They were constituted with power to call before them, as often as they would, any of the judges of the said courts, or contending parties; to examine upon oath the officers and clerks; to hear and debate the questions and causes; to consider and advise on the subject: then to lay before the King the said considerations, that he might determine by his authority the matter in dispute[*].

After the dissolution of the parliament held in 1634, all the magistrates, judges, justices of peace, governors and lords-lieutenants, were changed, and the most violent tories put in their places.

Charles II. used to closet the judges, to serve him his own way[†].

The accounts of Graham and Burton, the wicked solicitors of James the Second's illegal prosecutions, having been inspected by the committee appointed in relation to the state prisoners, it appeared, "that, from the year 1679 to the year 1688, they had received near 40,000 pounds out of the Exchequer, which they alleged to have paid to witnesses, jurors, solicitors, counsellors, and other persons concerned in their prosecutions of indictments, informations, and trials of persons in capital and other pretended criminal causes, and in the name and on behalf of the King."

Notes

*
Whitlocke, pag. 13. Rym. Foed. vol. xix. pag. 280, &c.
↵

†
Rapin by Tindal.
↵

CHAP. XXIII. Of secret Practices.

WHILST the subjects abandon themselves to dissipation, the Prince, seeing himself surrounded with men careless of watching his motions, attempts to attack liberty. But he first drops some proposals calculated to support his secret views. If the proposals pass, they form a basis upon which he hastens to build. If they pass not, and yet the opposition be not strong, he takes advantage of the circumstance, has recourse to craft, endeavours to varnish over his designs with the pretence of promoting the public good[*], and begs they would rely on his word; then, without being ashamed of basely perjuring himself, he takes God to witness the uprightness of his intentions, and his reverence for the laws he is about to infringe: and the people are so silly as to trust to such protestations.

At other times, those at the helm induce some of their tools to propose, in the name of the public, the projects in view; deceived by appearance, the people again fall into the snare.

Thus the ministry, during Pitt's administration, had proposed, by some pretended patriots, the settling of the militia; and the project was executed.

Thus the Court has since proposed, by other pretended patriots, the settling of the militia on the same footing with regular troops; but God forbid that this project should likewise be put in execution.

The Prince, being about to make an open attempt, in order to cast a mist before the eyes of the public, repeats feasts and shews; he gains the public confidence by performing some engagement of his own, or he keeps up the spirit of gaming[*].

In order to prepare the people to receive Mazarin, the very day that this minister was to return to Paris, Louis XIV. issued out a proclamation, commanding the immediate payment of all arrears on the rentes viagéres sur l' Hotel de Ville [†].

The very day of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, this monarch exhibited a magnificent tournament[‡]; and he used to be lavish of feasts and shews, whenever he intended to invade some important branch of government, or to incroach upon the subjects.

If the Prince is making any hazardous attempt, he is ever careful to reserve some means of justification.

Charles II. having formed a design of rendering himself absolute, engaged, through the intrigues of the Duke of Lauderdale, the parliament of Scotland, held in 1669, to pass an act approving the raising of the militia, and ordering that it might be employed in any county of the crown's dominions, without any application to the king for his express order; and that it should be obliged to obey any order from the Scotch council. Thus, taking in appearance the militia out of the royal hands to put it into those of the council, it was in the king's power to order them whenever he had occasion for them, without his appearing openly to call them into England; and any complaint, in case of a miscarriage, would be brought against the council[*].

Notes

*

This is one of the great maxims of Machiavel, that in order to subdue easily their subjects, Princes ought to be perfect masters of the art of deceiving. "E necessario, (says he in his Prince) saper bene colorize et esser gran simulatore e dissimulatore: e sono tanto semplici gli huomini, e tanto obedienti alle necessità presenti, che colui chi inganna, tre verà sempre chi si lascierà ingannare."

↵

*

As in an extensive state, the proceedings of administration are seldom inquired into but by men near the court, these villainous scenes of deception are commonly exhibited in the capital only.

↵

†
Hist. du Card. Mazar. vol. iv.
↵

‡
Voltaire Siecle de Louis XIV. vol. i.
↵

*
Rapin by Tindal.
↵

CHAP. XXIV. Of making Innovations.

IN no political constitution are the rights of the people well enough established, to prevent the arbitrary proceedings of administration: In no political constitution has the legislature been wary enough to render innovations unnecessary; and it is by means of these innovations that Princes lay the foundation of tyranny.

On any plausible pretence they begin by creating some office, some dignity, or erecting a new court of justice. At first they have this court regulated as the old ones, they then alter its form of proceeding, and gradually make it arbitrary.

The power of creating peers without the assent of parliament was contrary to the ancient laws of the realm: this power was usurped by Henry III.[†]

Under colour of clearing the kingdom of banditti, Edward I. established the Commission of Trial-Baton, with a power to research and punish all kind of disorders and crimes. These commissioners took their turn in the several counties, and without distinguishing the innocent from the guilty, they prosecuted on the most trifling suspicion, condemned on the slightest charge, and filled the gaols with pretended malefactors, who were permitted afterwards to redeem their liberty by paying heavy fines, with which the king's treasury was filled[‡].

Under the specious pretence of easing those subjects, who had no money to prosecute their suits in the courts of Westminster, Henry VIII. without any authority from parliament, erected a council at York, the judicature of which extended over several shires. At first this unconstitutional court acted according to the rules of other criminal courts; but James I. from the very beginning of his reign, made it dependant on the King's instructions. Charles I. afterwards made it independant of every rule of law in the kingdom, and ordered those who should fly from that bloody tribunal to be dragged before it from any part of the realm.

If the Prince erects no court of justice, he changes the established forms of law, alters the tenure by which the judges hold their places, sets them above the censure of the legislative powers, makes their judgments arbitrary, and calls before them all causes.

In a statute of Henry IV. it is enacted, that the judgments given in the King's courts shall not be examined in Parliament or elsewhere, unless[*] made by attaint and error.

Having made the power of the Star-Chamber arbitrary, Charles I. ordered all civil causes between himself and his subjects to be brought before that court: —a bloody tribunal, where right and courage were useless; where bribery and villainy were seated on the bench, holding the balance of justice; where resentment and ferocity quenched their thirst in the blood of innocent victims.

It is not, however, by open and violent attacks that Princes commonly begin to overturn the constitution; they rather undermine it; they innovate by degrees, and make things yield insensibly to their will. If sometimes they follow violent measures, it is only in relation to some notorious villain, whose punishment, though arbitrarily inflicted, is always agreeable to the people, more mindful of their own interests than jealous of their liberty, and ever ready to confirm the unjust power which is at last to oppress them.

Notes

†
Lord Beauchamp was the first who took his place in parliament by virtue of a letter patent. Hume's Hist. of England.
↵

‡
Hume's Hist. of England, Ann. 1275.
↵

*
Rym. Foed. vol. xix. pag. 414.
↵

CHAP. XXV. Of disarming the Subjects.

TO become absolute, craft without force avails but little[*].

In a free country, it is with his subjects as volunteers, that the Prince attacks the enemy; with them he makes a conquest or defends the state. But at the head of men wedded to their country he dares not make any attempt against liberty; mercenary troops are therefore thought necessary to subvert the government. Princes accordingly have all laboured, as soon as it was in their power, to have such troops; and in order to succeed, they have employed many artifices.

Charles VII. of France, availing himself of the reputation which he had acquired in expelling the English out of his kingdom, and taking advantage of the impression of terror which the enemy had left on the minds of his subjects, effected the[*] establishment of a standing army. Under pretence of putting the state in a posture of defence on any sudden invasion, he retained in his service a body of sixteen thousand infantry and nine thousand cavalry; he appointed officers to command them, and stationed them at his pleasure in different parts of the kingdom. Thus, instead of the auxiliary tenants of the barons, attached only to the chieftain whose banner they followed, and accustomed to obey no other command, the King had troops that were taught to acknowledge a master, to obey his orders, and expect from him the reward of their services.

Under the pious pretence of keeping always on foot a force sufficient to oppose the frequent incursions of the Moors from Africa, and to resist the progress of the infidels, Ximenes, regent of Castile, issued out a proclamation commanding every city in that kingdom to enroll a certain number of its burgesses; he ordered them to be trained to the use of arms, engaged officers to command them, and took this new militia into his service[*].

While we were under feodal government, the military power was lodged in the hands of the barons; but as it always proved but very little serviceable to the crown, and sometimes dangerous, Henry V. exchanged,[†] under various pretences, military service for pecuniary contribution, and substituted to the military tenants of the nobles a new militia, much more disposed to execute his orders. Henry's successors pursued his plan; some of them even attempted to have a standing army, and at last succeeded. Immediately after Monmouth's invasion, James II. demanded a subsidy for keeping on foot some regular troops, under pretence of being ready at any time to face a new danger[*]. But a standing army, properly speaking, was unknown in England till the accession of the house of Brunswick. Through the very earnest desire of George I. a considerable body of troops was taken into constant pay, to maintain the tranquillity of the kingdom, and answer the ends of the treaty of Hanover.

In the other states of Europe, the scheme of standing armies has likewise been pursued with eagerness, and executed with such success, that, the Swiss excepted, there are no patriotic soldiery; every where mercenaries stand armed by tyranny against liberty.

As these troops were raised under the specious pretence of defending the state, men tied to their country by some establishment were at first enrolled. Such soldiers proved but little submissive: in order to get soldiers more devoted, Princes were sensible that their armies ought to be composed of men, who having no property, no principle, might be ever as ready to march against their countrymen as against the enemy.

In proportion as industry increases and commerce flourishes, inequality extends itself; part of the people swallows up all the riches, the remainder, abased by misery or contemptible employments, subsists only by the vices or follies of the opulent, and possesses an industry which weds them to no country. Of this abject populace, destitute of all knowledge, of every virtue, of every principle of honour, without patrimony, and ashamed of their indigence, Princes compose their armies.

But as if national mercenaries were not sufficiently devoted to tyranny, Princes, to oppress their subjects, have recourse to foreigners.

In France, there are in the regal armies, Swiss, Corsicans, Italians, Scotch, Irish, &c.

In Spain, there are Italians, Swiss, Germans, &c.

In Prussia, half of the troops are French or Polish.

In England, there are indeed no foreign soldiery, but several Scotch regiments are constantly stationed there, and from the good harmony which reigns between the two nations, the king resigns to them the odious part of oppressing his English subjects.

Some Princes are not satisfied with having at their command foreign troops, but will even keep no others.

In all their expeditions, offensive or defensive, the senate of Venice have avoided, with the greatest care, arming the citizens, even on the most urgent occasions[*].

Most Princes have carried their policy so far as to disarm their subjects on different pretences; fearing they should ever be made sensible of their own force, and should use it to repel oppression.

Under colour of public safety, the regency of Spain in 1669, issued out a proclamation, forbidding the citizens of Madrid keeping fire-arms[†].

In France the peasants have been disarmed under pretence of preventing their hunting; and in the whole kingdom, the capital excepted, only noblemen, military men, and honorary officers of the king are permitted to wear arms.

At Venice, the wearing of arms is prohibited by the most severe law.

Thus Princes, having armed mercenary troops against the people; under pretence of securing public tranquillity, tie the hands of their subjects, the more easily to enslave them.

Notes

*

"La puissance, says the Card. of Richelieu in his Political Testament, etant une des choses les plus essentielles à la grandeur des Roys, ceux qui ont la principale conduite de l'êtat sont particulierement obligés de ne rien obmettre qui puisse contribuer à rendre leur maitre si autorisé, qu'il soit par ce moyen consideré de tout le monde; et il est certain, adds he, qu'entre tous les principes, la crainte qui est fondée sur la révérence a cette force, qu'elle interesse d'avantage chacun à son de voir — Ainsi pour se rendre redoutable, il faut qu'il ait un grand nombre de gens de guerre, et de l'argent dans ses coffres."

↵

*
Histoire de France, par Velly & Villaret, tom. xv. p. 332, &c.
↵

*

The Nobles of Castile, alarmed at the repeated attempts made by Ximenes for extending the power of the crown, began to utter loud complaints, and formed many cabals; but before they proceeded to extremities, they deputed some of their number to the Cardinal, to enquire into the power in consequence of which he exercised acts of such authority. In answer to their demand, Ximenes produced the testament of Ferdinand, by which he was appointed regent of the Spanish monarchy; then leading them towards a balcony, from which they had a view of a large body of troops under arms, and of a formidable train of artillery—Behold, says he, pointing to these, the power which I have received from his Catholic Majesty; with these I govern Castile, and with these I will govern it." Ferrera's Hist. lib. viii.

↵

†

The first commission of inspectors of the troops, mentioned in our history, was granted in 1415. Rym. vol. ix. pag. 2641.

↵

*
See his speech to parliament in 1685
↵

*

In the time of the league of Cambray, the senate seeing the wretched state of their affairs, took into service soldiers of the enemy at a zequin a day.

↵

†
Desormeaux, Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espag.
↵

CHAP. XXVI. Of providing for the Pay of the Military.

TO establish standing armies avails but little, if the means of keeping them are wanting. Accordingly Princes, whilst they laboured to get mercenary troops, have applied themselves to appropriate funds for the regular payment of them; and they needed only the same pretences.

CHAP. XXVII. Of Acts of Power against Law, and of Judgments of Law against Liberty.

THE Prince, having now grounded his authority, forms attempts upon liberty with less caution. As it is seldom the case that a whole nation is concerned for an injured subject[*], the Prince attacks the privileges of the people by incroaching upon the rights of individuals.

If the injured parties make any expostulation about the violence offered them, awed by power, too feeble to contest with the minister, or unable to bear the charges of a law-suit; they are obliged to suffer the injury, and submit to oppression. Thus the question not being determined, the outrages of the Prince pass unrepressed; and, instead of appearing firmly in support of those who suffer in the public cause, the others basely desert them, and the unfortunate fall like victims devoted to their ill fate.

If the Prince has to do with men able to contest with him, he attempts to prevail over them. If his efforts prove unsuccessful, he lets slip no opportunity to weary the adverse parties by formality, adjournment, and expences; he is intent in perplexing them by cavilling at law, in order, if possible, to prevent the matter being finally decided.

When he cannot dismiss the adverse parties, he sometimes makes an attempt upon their lives.

If sword and poison prove ineffectual, how many resources still remain? Interest, fear, hope, pride, prejudice, craft, seduction, calumny, perjury, all are in favour of the man arrayed with honours and constituted in power.

To defend his own rights, a private man has no resource but to make application to a court of judicature, almost always presided over, and oftentimes wholly composed of ministerial tools[*]. Let his claim be ever so legal; justice and law, too weak against power and secret practices, are impotent supporters of his rights. Even those who argue, generally restrained by fear or respect, are not so bold as to make good his title with spirit[*]; whilst the counsel of the adverse party, safe under the royal banners, and emboldened by favour, extenuate it, or put upon it a false construction. Cunning is opposed to justice, sophism to reason, falsehood to truth; no pains are wanting to seduce the judges in favour of tyranny. The judges themselves, seduced or corrupted, run into oppressive vengeance; and, to gratify their interested views, prostitute justice to power[†]. So that the unhappy sufferer is almost always, not only deprived of redress, but meets with new oppression, even sometimes without having been suffered to offer any thing in his defence[‡].

Thus men, fated to command, crush those who have spirit enough to inform against arbitrary acts of power; make[*] sophistry and clamour triumph over the most sacred privileges, and rashly complete, under the form of justice, the destruction of their enemies.

Would the evil had been circumscribed here! But these acts of injustice soon produce many others: whilst any newly injured person complains against oppression, he is ironically answered, What do you complain of? We do you no wrong.—See the precedents. Thus outrages pass into use; and, as if tyranny became lawful because it remained unpunished, they alledge antient usurpations as sacred prerogatives, and plead violences formerly offered to the laws, in vindication of those violences which are now offered to them[†].

Notes

*

Some tools of the ministry have raised their clamours against the Society of the Bill of Rights; they have even carried their effrontery so far as to upbraid this society with the rank of its members. Let their rank be what it will, their attempt is bold, it is praiseworthy, noble, and generous. Instead of giving ear to those detractions, the nation ought rather to have followed such a spirited example, and established a fund for prosecuting, at the public expence, the minister, whenever he injures any unsupported subject. In order to maintain their liberty, the people ought to espouse, against administration, the cause even of the meanest individual, when oppressed. Whilst the members of the state separate their interest, the constitution has no strength, and slavery is approaching.

↵

*

James I. Charles I. Charles II. and James II. used to offer violence to their subjects; and then to inform against them in a corrupt court. Whitlocke.

In our days, bribery disgraces sometimes the courts of justice among us. The president, being commonly a creature of the Prince, is not wanting in prepossessing the judges in favour of the crown, and in forestalling their opinion: the judges themselves often yield to bribery; and in every cause where administration is concerned, a devoted jury may always be got. Of this we have a clear proof in the case of Mr. Wilkes, relating to the secretaries of slate. "The day before Mr. Wilkes's trial, letters signed The Summoning Officer, were sent to several of the jury, acquainting them that Mr. Wilkes's trial was put off to another day; which prevented those to whom these letters were sent from attending their duty at Westminster-hall, at the real time of his trial. In the interim another jury was packed, which found him guilty." History of the late Minority.

↵

*

I confess with pleasure that such is not commonly our case. There are still among us patriotic lawyers, and their number is not small: but amidst so many zealous supporters of the rights of the people, the name of Glynn will ever grace the annals of liberty.

↵

†

During the fatal reigns of Henry VII. Henry VIII. Mary, James I. Charles I. Charles II. and James II. with what shocking profligacy did the judges prostitute themselves to the crown: With what unexampled insolence they oppressed the unfortunate, prosecuted by those tyrants! Without shame, scruple, or remorse, they followed with a blind devotion every order from the court, and for the same deed condemned one day the man whom they had acquitted a day before. Amidst so many instances of this kind, let this suffice.—The king's counsel, who were against the famous Titus Oates, prosecuted by James II. had been for him in the trial of the five Jesuits, particularly the attorney-general and solicitor-general.

↵

‡

In 1628, the attorney-general exhibited an information in the exchequer against Samuel Vassal, a merchant of London, for refusing to pay the new duty of five shillings and six-pence on every hundred weight of currants. To this information Vassal pleaded the statutes of Magna Charta, the statute de tallagio non concedendo, and that this duty was imposed without assent of parliament. The barons of the exchequer refused to hear Vassal's counsel argue for him, and said, "that the king was in possession, and that they would keep him in it." Macaulay's Hist. of England, Vol. II. page 19.

In the causes brought before the high courts of justice against the crown under the Stuarts, the sword was always lifted up on the head of those who dared to defend the rights of the people; whilst those who were for regal prerogative, safe under the banners of the crown, urged with effrontery the most palpable falsehoods.

↵

*

Has not the maxim, that the king can do no wrong, been alledged in vindication of illegal acts of power; and the title of pater patriae in proof that the king loved his people, at the very time he tyrannized over them? Parl. Hist. Vol. VIII. page 34, &c.

↵

†

Thus the attorney-general and the king's counsel undertook to vindicate the unlawful imprisonments ordered by Charles I. by alledging those ordered by Elizabeth. Parl. Hist. Vol. VIII. page 47.

And thus the ministers who persecuted the printers and publishers of the North Briton, No. 45, undertook to vindicate their illegal proceedings.

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CHAP. XXVIII. Of Unconcernedness.

THE people seldom foresee their fate. Render their birthrights illusive, undermine their liberty; they perceive their miserable servitude only when they feel it, when they hear the names of the proscribed, when they see the blood of their fellow subjects, or when crushed under the yoke, they, trembling, expect the punishment they are to undergo.

The subjects, in order to maintain their liberty, ought to watch the motions of the ministry with a jealous eye. Men are never so easily undone, as when they suspect no danger; and too great security in a nation is almost always the forerunner of slavery.

But as a continual attention to public affairs is above the reach of the multitude; in a state jealous of its liberty, there never should be wanting some men to watch the transactions of the ministers, unveil their ambitious projects, givean alarm at the approach of the storm, rouse the people from their lethargy, disclose the abyss open before them, and point out those on whom the public indignation ought to fall. The greatest misfortune, therefore, which can attend a free country, where the Prince is powerful and enterprising, is, that no party, no commotion, no faction agitate the minds of the subjects. All is undone, when the people are unconcerned for public affairs; on the contrary, liberty constantly springs up out of the fires of sedition.

CHAP. XXIX. To wear out the Zeal of the People by false Alarms.

BUT in order that the efforts of watchful patriots may be attended with success, great care ought to be taken, not to alarm the people causelessly;— made dupes to many false alarms, they become at last unconcerned at real dangers.

Great care ought to be taken likewise not to alarm them upon slight occasions. If the grievances are not so apparent as to be universally assented to, there is but little hope of seeing them redressed: since the multitude are persuaded by evidence alone, and by the efforts of the multitude only are the projects of tyranny confounded.

Great care ought to be taken chiefly not to incite them to the pursuit of a false, or even doubtful object. When the subjects proceed so far as to put themselves in a posture of defending their rights, it is of great concern to liberty that they be not overcome. By checks, the victory of administration is only delayed; but by checks, the people is disheartened and abased.

CHAP. XXX. Of ill grounded Writings.

WHEN administration is censured, the charges against it ought constantly to be supported by incontrovertible facts. If the subjects, in a just cause, make any inconsiderate step, it suffices to ruin their affairs. The Prince, who at first trembled under the lash of the malcontents, while they confined themselves within the bounds of prudence, triumphs as soon as they go beyond; he complains in his turn, he prosecutes those who have handled the pen; and leaving the public grievances for his private injuries, he oftentimes succeeds in making the people lose sight of the principal object. Thus the friends of liberty, who, by cautious proceedings, might have been victorious, lose by a single act of imprudence the fruit of their past efforts.

Of this truth we have a convincing proof before us. While the author of the North Briton contented himself with censuring the government, with disclosing the secret views of the favourite, with pursuing and prosecuting him closely, he kept the ministry in perpetual alarm, and made them tremble under the lash of his spirited writings. But when he disgraced his pen, by employing it in grossly aspersing the character of a certain Princess, instead of attacking arbitrary power, he furnished his enemies with weapons to his own destruction.

CHAR. XXXI. Of Satirical Writings.

THE manner in which the cause of the public is defended, is not of little concern to liberty. When tyranny is complained of, let it be always in a grave and animated stile. Satirical writers attack indeed the tyrant, but not tyranny; and far from reminding him of his duty, they mortally wound his pride, they exasperate and incense him the more.

Satirical strokes avail not but to promote servitude: and although sensible men might look upon them not as upon exaggerated charges, they go not the less against the aim intended. For by affording fewel to public malignity[*], they ease the people's griefs, weaken the sense of their injuries, and prevent their resentment; they make them laugh at their own misfortunes, and patiently suffer tyranny.

Notes

*

It is a constant practice with the French to ease their grief about public misfortunes with songs and epigrams.

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CHAP. XXXII. Of Invectives.

THE want of decency likewise prejudices the cause of the public. Gross invectives indispose peaceable men, scandalize well bred men, and alienate all those cool patriots, who are tied but by a thread to the cause of liberty.

CHAP. XXXIII. Of bad Writings.

IF it is of great concern that the public cause be not defended but in a serious stile, it is of no less concern that it be pleaded in a masterly manner. All those stupid writers, who stand forth as the champions of liberty, only prejudice it. Their languid productions do not awaken, do not persuade, do not animate the reader; and the languor they inspire prevents any spirited attempt.

CHAP. XXXIV. Of too great a Multiplicity of Writings.

IT has been said, that in a state jealous of its liberty, some men ought never to be wanting to reclaim the laws when violated by the Prince, to rouse the people from their lethargy, to guide them in difficult cases, and bring them back to their rights. But as the human mind, when too long intent upon any object, becomes weary of it; all is undone, if in exciting the patriotic zeal of the people, their spirits be exhausted, and their zeal rendered extinct.

This unfortunately has happened to us in our late dissensions. Plagued with so many writings, and exhausted by our own efforts, we are at present reduced to such an apathy that nothing is able to fix our attention.

CHAP. XXXV. Of the excessive Moderation of the People.

TO overturn the constitution, Princes commonly undermine it, they innovate by degrees, seldom in a flagrant manner. But the people are neither attentive nor sagacious enough to observe those innovations, nor foresee the consequences of them; and if they were, they have not spirit enough to oppose them. The first innovations, however, ought to be strongly opposed, in order to maintain liberty. When once abuses are grown inveterate, with the more difficulty are they reformed, they even many times admit of no remedy.

To maintain themselves free, the people ought readily to espouse the cause of any individual oppressed by the Prince. When subjects separate their interests, they are subdued one after another, and liberty is undone. Far from being ready to protect the rights of others, every one must have seen his own rights many times flagrantly attacked, before he resolves to defend them; and it is difficult to conceive how great advantage the government takes from that want of spirit to oppose its criminal attempts, and how much it concerns liberty that subjects be not so patient.

When Charles I. began to put his impure hands into the purses of his subjects, or to offer them the shocking scene of a savage cruelty in the persons of the unfortunate wretches who were doomed to destruction, had the people taken arms, marched against the tyrant, and condemned the ministers of his vengeance to the scaffold, they never had so long groaned under the most odious oppression.

Yet I would not advise a people to have recourse at every instant to violent measures: but under colour of not disturbing the public tranquillity, quiet men do not perceive that they gain nothing by their indulgence, but to be oppressed with more impunity; that they encourage tyranny, and that when they at last undertake to stop its progress, it often proves too late.

The sacrilegious ambition of Princes prompts them to make attempts upon liberty; but the cowardice of the people alone permits their fetters to be forged. Ambitious as they are, Princes would be less enterprizing if they were always to make themselves a way to absolute power by force and violence. When we peruse attentively the history of despotism, we sometimes behold with astonishment an handful of men[*], keeping in awe a whole nation. That inconsiderate moderation of the people, that timidity, that fatal propensity to separate their common interests, are the true causes of this surprising phenomenon; for where is the voice of the public, when every one continues silent?

Notes

*

The judges of the Star-Chamber, of the High Commission court, of la Chambre ardente, of the Inquisition, &c.

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CHAP. XXXVI. Of concealing public Grievances.

WHEN the clamours of the oppressed subjects are at length excited, the Prince strives to prevent the voice of the public from being heard: he sends his emissaries every where to seduce the meanest class of the people, and engage them to present flattering addresses, which are artfully put in opposition to the just remonstrances of the nation; then adding mockery to injury, he boasts of the lenity of his government, and endeavours to make the multitude of the malcontents pass for an handful of illminded people[*].

But the better to conceal national grievances, the Prince kindly receives those addresses which approve of his conduct, and distinguishes the bringers with particular marks of favour; whilst those who venture to present addresses in a contrary stile are received with evident[*] tokens of displeasure, if they are not even denied admittance.

Not satisfied with discouraging those who might have presented disagreeable addresses, the Prince silences the printers of news who are not devoted to him, whilst others are allowed to publish daily invectives against the patriotic party, and bestow encomiums on the administration.

If these measures do not succeed, the leaders of the malcontents are bribed, and engaged to extinguish the zeal of their own adherents[†]

Notes

*

These artifices were made use of by Charles II. after the dissolution of the parliament at Oxford, and are even put in practice in our days: unfortunately there are not now wanting hypocritical patriots ready thus to connive with the ministry.

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*

These artifices were made use of by Charles II. after the dissolution of the parliament at Oxford, and are even put in practice in our days: unfortunately there are not now wanting hypocritical patriots ready thus to connive with the ministry.

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†

Such were the means, as reported, put in practice in our late dissentions, in order to make the designs of the supporters of liberty miscarry.

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CHAP. XXXVII. Of preventing the Redress of public Grievances.

IT is a maxim in the cabinet, that the injuries offered to the people, if they remain unredressed, acquire to the crown the prerogative of offering them new ones. Accordingly, when public grievances are brought before a supreme tribunal, the prince makes use of every possible artifice to prevent its taking cognizance of them; he attempts to divert therefrom the attention of the judges, by laying before them new objects[‡], or prevails upon the president to dissolve the assembly when about taking any spirited resolution[*].

If these artifices prove abortie, he labours to set the senate at variance, by exciting jealousies among its[†] members, by bribing some and intimidating others[‡].

If this proves not sufficient, he removes the patriotic members by nominating them to places[*] which incapacitate them from having a seat in the senate; or if there be no other mean, he stops all proceedings by proroguing the session.

When the Prince dares not prorogue it, from a consideration of the administration being charged with misdemeanors, if called to an account, he attempts to clear himself, endeavours to extend a veil over all his illegal transactions, by exempting his ministers from appearing before any judge[†].

If the Prince entertains some suspicions of his creatures, lest they should reveal the fatal secret they have been trusted with, he is before-hand with them, and himself charges them with misdemeanors[‡].

If any fatal discovery is made, the Prince throws all the blame upon bad counsellors, and requests the judges to be tender of his honour. To prepare them in his favour, he affects to reform his administration[*], endeavours to clear himself, promises redress of grievances, entreats them to confide in his word, and without shame of being guilty of perjury, calls God to witness the sincerity of his intentions[†].

If they refuse to yield to his vague promises, he offers some equivalent to the desired satisfaction, or makes some specious concessions.

After so many fruitless attempts to prevent the redress of public grievances, if the Prince is at last obliged to yield, he submits; but as soon as he discovers the consequence of his concessions, he endeavours to recal what has been done[‡], and again gives sull scope to his illegal proceedings.

Notes

‡

Hurrying the subsidy-bill was the usual craft of our kings of the house of Stuart, every time the parliament took into consideration national grievances; and to carry that point, they employed every possible artifice; they even worked upon the most tender passions of the human heart, and then turned against the legislators the nobleness of their sentiments.

"In the year 1605, the ministers of James I. entreated an immediate supply to the King's necessities. But as the bill for subsidies went on heavily in the lower house, and the redress of grievances was thought very necessary to precede the grant; in the heat of debate, an alarm of the King's being murdered at Oking threw the whole house into confusion. The frighted members sent message after message to the council to know the truth of the various reports. In a little time they became less strong, then doubtful, and in some hours James sent word that he intended being in London that day. Whilst the minds of men were yet agitated by the double surprize, whilst the tide of affection ran yet high on account of the supposed accident, the courtiers pushed the supply so warmly, that notwithstanding all that the clear-sighted could do, they carried the motion, and the parliament was suddenly prorogued." Macaul. Hist of Engl.

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*

During the perpetual disputes of Charles I. with his parliament, the King engaged the Speaker of the Commons to interrupt all debates by breaking up the meeting whenever any patriotic orator affected the House, and thus to prevent any spirited resolution. This artifice has been oftentimes made use of, but chiefly when the Commons had taken cognizance of the infraction of the petition of rights. Crew's Proceed. of Com.

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†

Charles I. used to sow discord between the two houses of parliament; in all his speeches he flattered the Lords, reminded them of their pre-eminence, and invited them to support the throne against the Commons, as being nearer to it.

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‡

When Henry VIII. Mary, Elizabeth, James I. and Charles I. met with great opposition from the lower house, they used to send to the Tower the members who distinguished themselves most by patriotic zeal.

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*

In 1625, Charles I. meeting with an extreme opposition from the Commons, in order to incapacitate Sir Edward Coke, Sir Robert Philips, Sir Thomas Wentworth, Sir Francis Seymour, the leading popular members, from being chosen representatives, he nominated them to serve as sheriffs in the counties, and again ventured to call a parliament.

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†

"Charles II. fearing that the parliament should once more fall upon the Earl of Danby, who, in prevention to his own danger, might be obliged to reveal the King's secret practices with the court of France, which it was his interest to keep concealed, granted him, under the great seal, as compleat a pardon as could be drawn up." Rapin.

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‡

Charles I, lest the Earl of Bristol should disclose the secrets of the odious administration of Buckingham, charged him with high-treason, Rushworth, vol. i. p. 268.

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*

When the Commons proceded against the Earl of Danby by bill of attainder, "Charles II. to extricate himself out of those extremities, and make the parliament believe that he was resolved entirely to change his manner of governing, with a view only to amuse the public, formed a new council, into which were admitted some of the patriots most opposite to him, as the Earls of Shafresbury and Essex; but he took care to secure a majority of such members as were devoted to him, and leaving the great number for shew, had few only in his confidence." Rapin.

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†

Charles I. used to assuare the parliament, that he would be as careful of their rights as of his life and crown, at the very time the complained of a breach of privilege.

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‡

In 1628, the Commons took the resolution of granting no subsidies to Charles I. until he had redressed the national grievances. But instead of giving his assent to the petition of rights, which was to be presented to him by both houses, the King used every means to engage them to drop it. At first he persuaded the Lords to prevail upon the Commons to be satisfied with a confirmation of Magna Charta, or some other concession; he next, in order to frustrate the intent of the said petition, wrote to the lower house, "That he could not give up the point of committing in matters of state; he promised for the future to be very tender of the privileges of the people, to commit none for not lending money, and declared that the causes of all commitments should be exposed as soon as they could with safety; he then sent them continual importunate messages for engaging them to confide in his word."

"When the petition had passed both houses, and the Commons imagined themselves at the point of receiving the fruit of their labour, they received the following answer: "The King willeth that right be done according to the laws and customs of the realm, and that the statutes be put in due execution, that the subjects will have no cause to complain of any wrong or oppression contrary to their just rights and liberties, to the prosecution whereof he holds himself as much obliged as of his own prerogative."

At last, seeing that his secret design of bringing into England a body of German horse had taken vent, and that he was publicly charged with the opprobrium of the darkest suspicions, he complied with the request of the Commons. But not having been acquainted with the importance of the petition when he gave it his consent, he repaired in haste to parliament, protested that he had not intended to give away the profit of tonnage and poundage, and ordered this protest to be entered in the Journal of the Commons. He then proceeded to seize the goods of several merchants who denied the arbitrary imposition. Macaul. Hist. of England.

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CHAP. XXXVIII. Of the Artifices made use of in order to suppress public Clamours.

THE subjects, to keep themselves free, have no other means but watchfulness, spirit and virtue; the Prince, to subdue them, has so many means that he is embarrassed only in his choice of them: that, however, which he mostly makes use of is cunning. People are easily deceived in many things, and those at the helm take advantage of it.

When the oppressed subjects are about taking some resolution in order to oppose the progress of tyranny, they always meet with some obstacle. Let them form what design they please, the Prince prevents the execution of it immediately. Let them entreat the redress of grievances, their petitions are fruitless; the Prince alledges his scruples, refuses to comply, and oftentimes returns mockery to their complaints; he answers, "That he is always ready to hear the grievances of his subjects; that he is never so much concerned as about the well-being of his people," and dismisses them with fair words.

If the subjects persist in their resolution, the Prince persists in his conduct. Ever applying their minds to the maxims of a fraudulent policy, those at the helm learn the art of not being disheartened by difficulties, of taking advantage of the weakness of men, of cajolling into acquiescence the easy multitude; and as it is their method, when they mean to prevail over the people, to promise them every thing, with a view of performing none; whilst the malcontents are earnest in their request, the Prince amuses their credulity with fair promises, and without any shame of breaking his word, repeats this mean artifice.

In the time of la Fronde, public safety having been attacked by many arbitrary exiles and imprisonments, the parliament of Paris at last obtained from the king a law[*] for securing the liberty of the subject; but soon after this law was infringed in the person of Chavigni. When the parliament remonstrated against this infraction, they were answered by the Queen Regent, "That the imprisonment complained of ought to deter no body, that she passed her word for public safety, and that her word would be inviolable." She broke, however, that inviolable word not long after, in respect to the Princes of Condé and Conti. The parliament remonstrated again, and again the Regent assured them, "That for the future the law should be strictly observed [*]." Thus Princes mock the people.

If incensed at so many false promises, and weary with seeing their hopes so many times baffled, the malcontents exclaim loudly for justice, the Prince even then attempts to delay; he sends them deputies to amuse them, he stops the provoked multitude, diverts their fury, or cools it by vain consultations, till the moment when he can without danger encounter them[†].

If he is forced to treat, he at first makes them such offers as he knows will be rejected, next he makes proposals more reasonable but expressed in a vague manner, calculated to conceal his duplicity, and which binding him to no particular obligations, leaves him always master of the terms of accommodation; or he adds to clear concessions some obscure clause which renders them void, if false engagements rather are not taken.

Alarmed at the secession of the people to the Sacred Mount, the Senate of Rome seeing themselves obliged to treat, made it their only business to stipulate in a vague manner the rights of the tribunes who had been just elected, in order to make no grant to the Plebeians, or rather to secure a pretence for recovering their grants at more favourable junctures.

In 1641, Charles I. wanting to find, for the legislative body, employment of such consequence as should engross their whole attention, and make the people believe he was willing to consent to whatever should be productive of a perfect reconciliation between him and his parliament, whilst he was making preparations to vindicate his own terms, sent them the following message: "That they would with all speed fall into consideration of all those particulars which they should hold necessary, as well for the upholding and maintaining his Majesty's just and regal authority, and for the settling his revenues, as for the present and future establishment of their privileges, the free and quiet enjoying their estates and fortunes, the liberty of their persons, the security of the true religion now professed in the Church of England, and the settling of ceremonies in such a manner as should take away all just cause of offence. Which when they had digested and composed into one entire body, that so his Majesty and themselves might be able to make the more clear judgment on them, it should then appear, by what his Majesty should do, how far he had been from intending and designing any of those things which the too great fears and jealousies of some persons apprehended, and how ready he would be to exceed the greatest examples of the most indulgent Princes in their acts of grace and favour to their people[*]."

In the insurrection of 1647 at Naples, as the people entreated the delivery of the charter of their privileges, the Viceroy, solely intent on dissipating the impending storm, ordered a copy of it to be forged, which he tendered for the original[†].

To the fury of the insurgents empty sounds only are oftentimes opposed. Some men, skilled in the art of seducing the people, preach to them, and the easy multitude yielding to fair words, become the sport of a few florid orators.

Even a single tale is sometimes sufficient to baffle the designs of revolted subjects.

Weary of the oppression of the Senate, the Roman people had just abandoned their Lares to go in search of an asylum far from their cruel country, when Menennius Agrippa, by command of the senate, goes to the malcontents on the Sacred Mount, delivers them a tale, and brings them back to their native city[*].

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

TO defeat the people, the Prince sometimes opposes to them even their own supporters.

Considering the esteem of the public for their leaders as destructive of his projects, mercenary scribblers are engaged for attempting to vindicate the proceedings of administration, for aspersing popular men, and defaming those who are so spirited as to oppose the villainous attempts of power. A prostituted multitude are directed to go from place to place to spread rumours calculated to excite the people to entertain suspicions of the popular leaders, and ruin the confidence of the public towards them[†].

Sometimes attempts are made to engage the popular leaders to disgrace themselves.

As Manlius incited the Romans to set themselves free from the tyranny of the Senate, the Senators had him apprehended; but being obliged to set him at liberty in order to suppress the sedition, they laboured to make him appear odious to the people. Accordingly they charged him with aspiring to royalty, they raised him several accusers from among the populace, and thus turned his adherents into judges and enemies[*].

During the minority of Louis XIV. as the parliament of Paris exclaimed aloud against the odious exactions made on the subjects; with a view of engaging the magistrates to defend for the future their own interests only, and thus to disgrace and ruin themselves in the minds of the people, the Regent encroached upon their rights, by appropriating to government for a while their salaries[†].

When Barnavelt set himself against Maurice of Nassau, who attempted to assume a monarchic power over Holland, Maurice caused him to be charged with being the head of the Arminians; and under that pretence had him dragged into a prison by his ungrateful fellow citizens, and thence to a scaffold.

Another extraordinary artifice sometimes made use of by Princes, in order to confound the designs of the subjects, is the setting against popular leaders some corrupted men, who, by going much beyond the request of the leaders, labour to make them appear endowed with but little patriotic zeal.

With a view of delivering the people from the oppression of the Nobles, the Tribune C. Gracchus proposed a law advantageous to the plebeians; but the Senate abstained with great care from any opposition; on the contrary, they engaged L. Drusus to go beyond the request of his colleague, and to publish, in the mean while, that Caius was only the tool of the Senate. Deceived by such artifice, the Romans were at a loss to know which they ought to adhere to, and thus had their hands tied by that false protector[*].

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE Prince has a thousand means for attacking liberty, the subjects but few for defending it; and it is not easy to imagine how narrow is the way whereon they can walk with safety. Whilst he commits with impunity so many outrages upon the laws; they, on the contrary, are ruined by the least fault. If the people show themselves but little resolute, they are insulted without pity. If they give proofs of great resolution, they are provoked beyond the bounds of prudence. If they pass over those bounds, they are attacked even in their very intrenchments. The Prince in his turn vents complaints; he has recourse to the courts of justice, drags before them those malcontents, who prove the most audacious, and cries for vengeance.

Then, too weak against power and secret practices, justice avails them nothing; and the Prince completes the destruction of his enemies, by the very laws which were intended to protect them.

Notes

*
See an edict of the 22d Oct. 1645.
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*
Hist. du Card. Mazar. vol. iii. liv. v. chap. 2.
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†

Amidst the various instructions Charles V. delivered to his son, he advised him "to yield when the tempest blows high; not to oppose the fury of angry destiny; to eschew those strokes he cannot resist; to beg quarter, and watch a favourable opportunity." Silhon's Ministre d'Etat, liv. iii. chap. 6.

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*
Parliam. Hist.
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†
Giannone Hist. di Nap.
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*
Tit. Liv. Decad. i. lib. 4.
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†

Such was the craft of the favourite in respect to Mr. Pitt. Hist. of the late Minority.

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*
Tit. Liv. Decad. i. lib. 6.
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†
Hist. du Card. Mazar. vol. iii.
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*
Tit. Liv. Decad. i.
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CHAP. XXXIX. Of the Hypocrisy of Princes.

THERE is no artifice, however strange, which those at the helm have not made use of to ruin liberty, even turning against the subjects their noblest sentiments.

When the Prince foresees that he will be overpowered, he sometimes feigns to lay down arms, he expresses much concern for the public distractions, makes a shew of disinterestedness, demands leave to resign; and oftentimes the easy multitude, deceived by this act of hypocrisy, yield to their generous emotions. The Prince being then entreated to continue to hold the reins of empire, at first wavers, affects reluctance, asks time to consider it, then accepts upon certain terms, and at last lays new chains upon the people or adds to their former ones.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

IF, when the people loudly reclaim their rights, the Prince has been obliged to make some concession in order to disperse the storm, he no sooner discovers a favourable turn to his affairs, but he begins to alter his tone, he complains that his justice, his religion, and his conscience have been imposed upon, he refuses to fulfil his engagements, and, though the subjects are evidently in the right, he attempts to recall affairs into dispute. In proportion as his party increases or diminishes, he says Yes or No, and without shame, without scruple, without remorse, acts that part, till his projects are secured.

The French administration, seeing the bad state of the finances, the alienations, even the mortgaging of the crown-lands, was reduced during the disturbances of la Fronde, to have recourse to new ways of oppression: but as the people refused to pay the taxes, as the provinces were ready to rise, as the confederates, for want of money, were on the point of breaking off, as the enemy threatened the borders, and the regal army was in want of every thing, the regency entreated the parliament of Paris, that had complained loudly of the late vexations, to consider the times, and resolve on the means of providing for the necessities of the government. In such junctures the parliament stipulated something in favour of public liberty. But no sooner had the news of the victory of Lens reached the Court, but the regency broke their engagements, and thought only of being revenged of those members of the parliament who were the most popular[*].

After the Scots had revolted against the oppressive government of Charles I. they sent him, at York, a petition for redress of grievances, to which the king answered, "That he required the petitioners to express the particulars of their desires, he having been always ready to redress their grievances." But in the mean while he was studious to make a trial of the affection of the Yorkshire gentlemen, he endeavoured to incense them, by false insinuations, against the Scots, and attempted to call together the lords of England in order to obtain a subsidy. Obliged finally to treat, he ordered his commissioners not to stipulate any important article, he wasted the time in long preliminaries, demanded that both armies should be disbanded, or at least reduced, kept secret intelligence with the enemy's party by means of the traiterous Montrose, and concluded not till reduced to the last extremity. His perfidious duplicity did not end here. Scarcely had the parliament of England met, but Charles entreated them to declare themselves against the Scots; he solemnly assured them, that he was resolved to gain the affection of his English subjects, and promised redress of national grievances. In fine, all his measures proving abortive, he returned to the Scots, laboured to bribe the army, to draw them to London, in order to seize the Tower and make themselves masters of the parliament[*].

James II. alarmed at the designs of the Prince of Orange, attempted a reconciliation with the Church of England. In a proclamation, he invited his subjects to lay aside all prejudices, jealousies and animosities; and, in order to regain their affections, he restored the bishop of London to his see, and returned to this city the charter of its privileges. In proportion as his fears increased, he took, with reluctancy, some other steps towards the redress of grievances, he dissolved the High Commission Court, ordered the bishop of Winchester to restore Magdalen college according to its statutes, commanded the lord lieutenants of the several counties to inform of the abuses committed on the late regulation of corporations, restored to corporations their ancient charters; Popish justices of peace, mayors, recorders, and other magistrates were removed, and Prostestants put in their places. Thus actuated by necessity, he destroyed with his own hands the work which himself had raised, a reform which continued no longer than his danger. Upon the news of the dispersion of the Prince's fleet by a tempest, he revoked some of his acts of grace granted to his subjects. The bishop of Winchester was recalled on some frivolous pretence, and the restoration of the college deferred. When the Dutch army had landed, the King, having great confidence in the superiority of his own forces, upon hearing that the city of London were preparing to address him for an accommodation with the Prince of Orange, declared publicly, that he would look upon all those as his enemies, who should pretend to give him such advice. But the Prince's troops being joined by a multitude of subjects, and some lords petitioning him to call a free parliament, he returned answer, "That he most passionately desired what they asked, and promised, upon the faith of a king, that he would have a parliament, and such a one as they asked for, as soon as ever the Prince of Orange had quitted this realm." He then published a proclamation for calling a free parliament; but repenting his resolution, he caused the writs that were to be issued to be burnt, and imagining that it would not be possible to call a lawful parliament without his concurrence, he threw the great seal into the Thames, that nothing might be done legally in his absence, then left his dominions to go and implore foreign assistance against his people[*].

If Princes prepare themselves to subdue their subjects by force, they complain of being obliged to have recourse to violence, as if they had at heart only the welfare of the people: then, to get time for securing their projects, they propose some ways of accommodation[†].

But when once they are conscious of their superiority, they assume the imperious tone of masters, they have in their mouths only the words—duty and passive obedience, they require that the people should confide in their promises, and yield without terms, never willing to allow them to be free, but at their pleasure[*].

If they meet with opposition, they order troops to inforce obedience to their tyrannical laws, and but too often exert severe revenge on their unhappy subjects[†].

The Queen Regent, having so many times violated public faith by breaking her word, resolved to be revenged on the Frondeurs, by entirely overturning their city. But in order not to be involved in the storm she had gathered, the court left Paris. Twenty-five thousand men were ordered to block up that city, and every term of accommodation was refused[‡].

In the revolt of 1647 at Naples, the viceroy availing himself of the treaty concluded with Thomaso Aniello, artfully took out of the hands of the people the ammunition and provisions necessary for supplying the castles; then, instead of the confirmation of the treaty agreed on, he got from Spain a body of troops, and, in concert with Don John of Austria, on a sudden assaulted the Neapolitans, and entered their city, carrying every where fire and sword[*].

Philip IV. having wasted the immense treasures of India, in order to carry on the bloody war he had kindled, alienated part of his dominions, and exhausted Castile; as the Catalans refused to submit to his exactions, under pretence that they were useless to the crown, he demanded vast sums of them. Incensed at such a violation of their privileges, some of their representatives had resolution enough to present a spirited address to the king; but they were immediately arrested. Upon the arrival of the news of their imprisonment, the inhabitants of Barcelona took arms, excited an insurrection in the other parts of the kingdom, and put some Castilians to the sword. Then breathing only revenge, Philip commanded a numerous body of troops into Catalonia, with orders to burn down the houses, to root up the trees, to burtcher all men upwards of fifteen years of age, to mark women with an hot iron on both cheeks: and these cruel orders were executed with the most shocking barbarity[*].

Notes

*
the counsellors de Broussel, du Blanc-Menil, Charton, Lainé, and Loisel, were taken into custody. Hist. du Card. Mazar. vol. iii.
↵

*
Rushworth, vol. ii. p. 1297.
↵

*
Tindal.
↵

†

Whilst Charles I. levied war against his people, alarmed at the weakness of his party, he attempted to delay till he had encreased his forces: accordingly, in order to amuse the parliament, he sent them the following message; "That the king had, with unspeakable grief of heart, long beheld the distraction of his kingdom, that his soul was full of anguish, till he could find some remedy to prevent the miseries of a civil war, which were ready to overwhelm the nation:" he proposed to them to appoint persons to treat with a like number authorised by him, that nothing should be wanting on his part that might contribute to secure the laws of the land. Parl. Hist. vol. xi.

↵

*

As Charles I. had met with great opposition from parliament, and had resolved to be revenged on the popular leading members, he issued out a proclamation, which ended "with an assurance of a good government, but that to depend on the king, and not on the strength, vigour, and goodness of the laws, to oppose a bad one."

↵

†

Non vè modo piu sicuro a posseder le città libere che la loro ròvina, says Machiavel in his Prince; this infernal advice, those at the helm follow but too often.

↵

‡
Hist. du Card. Mazar. vol. iii.
↵

*
Giannone, Hist. of Naples. Mémoires du Duc de Gui
••
.

↵

*
Desorm. Abr. Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Esp.
↵

CHAP. XL. Of Ignorance.

DESPOTISM owes its support greatly to ignorance.

It is ignorance which, by obstructing the sight of the people, prevents them from being acquainted with their own rights, and vindicating them.

It is ignorance which, concealing from them the ambitious designs, the secret practices, the low artifices of Princes, prevents them from obviating tyranny, from stopping the progress of lawless power, and ruining it entirely.

It is ignorance which, enforcing obedience to many false maxims, ties the hands of the people, subjects their necks to the yoke, and makes them submit with reverence to arbitrary commands.

It is ignorance, in a word, which induces the people to pay willingly to tyrants all those duties they arrogantly require, and the credulous vulgar to reverence them as if they were Gods.

In order to subdue his subjects, the Prince labours to blind them. Conscious of the unlawfulness of his own designs, and sensible of what he has to fear from clear-sighted men, he endeavours to deprive the people of every means of acquiring knowledge.

How many crafty devices have not Princes employed to oppose the progress of learning? Some banish science out of their dominions; others prohibit their subjects from travelling into[*] foreign countries; others again divert the people from reflecting, by continually entertaining them[†] with feasts and shews, or keeping up among them the spirit of gaming[†] and all stand up against men of spirit, who dedicate either their voice or their pen to defend the cause of liberty.

When Princes cannot restrain the people from freely speaking or writing, they oppose error to truth. If any exclaim against their outrageous enterprizes, they at first endeavour to bribe the clamorous patriots, and to extinguish their zeal by gifts, but chiefly by promises.

If the virtue of the patriots be incorruptible, they oppose to them prostituted scribblers, who, ever ready to vindicate tyranny, abuse, from their obscure cells, the friends of liberty, exert all their malice in blackening the views of the supporters of the rights of the people, and causing them to be looked upon as disturbers of the public tranquillity.

If these artifices prove ineffectual, in order to silence the protectors of liberty, the most horrid expedients are made use of—dungeons, sword, poison.

To silence the malcontents is indeed to prevent the people from awaking out of their lethargy; but the chief point is to remove the means of extending the complaints, by suppressing all correspondence between the several parts of the state: Princes accordingly labour to restrain the liberty of the press.

At first, not daring to attack it openly, they wait till the subjects have furnished a plausible pretence for it; and as soon as such a pretence is offered, they seize it eagerly.

When a book contains very striking notions respecting the rights of the people, any bold reflections on the bounds of the regal power, some violent strokes against tyranny, they immediately prohibit the reading or selling of it, under pretence that it contains pernicious maxims against religion and good manners[*].

They rise up against all writings calculated to keep up the spirit of liberty, and denominate libels all performances wherein is attempted to disclose the mysteries of administration, and under colour of repressing licentiousness[*], prosecute authors of spirit. They go farther: in order to keep the people in ignorance, and to leave no way open to important truths, they appoint inspectors, censors, revisors, licensers of the press;—those base Arguses who constantly guard tyranny.

When any writings against their oppressive government appear in foreign countries, Princes cause the edition of them[†] to be suppressed, and let no book be exposed to sale in their dominions[‡], unless it has been previously examined by their creatures.

Notes

*

The rigour with which the Czars have banished the sciences out of their empire, and prohibited their subjects from travelling into foreign countries without an express permission, has very much contributed to continue that gross ignorance, in which they still remain, and that ignominious slavery which disgraces them.

From the zeal that the reigning Empress has shewn in patronizing learning, one might imagine that she intends to abate of her excessive power, and to renounce despotism, did not her mode of governing prove that such are not her views. Academies, universities, courts of judicature, have indeed been erected in her dominions, but it is only from a spirit of imitation. She desires to establish at home what is established abroad; and, like other monarchs, she institutes schools where all things are to be taught except the duties of princes, the privileges of the people, and the rights of men.

↵

†

For fear the subjects should become conscious of their situation, it is a maxim with the Venetians to engage the attention of the cytadini by shews, feasts, and gaming. Every month in the year there are some public ceremonies, and a public lottery, at Venice; and in some particular seasons the public shews are very numerous.

↵

†

For fear the subjects should become conscious of their situation, it is a maxim with the Venetians to engage the attention of the cytadini by shews, feasts, and gaming. Every month in the year there are some public ceremonies, and a public lottery, at Venice; and in some particular seasons the public shews are very numerous.

↵

*

What farce is more ridiculous than to see Princes making use of such a pretence for tyrannizing over their people. Indeed it well becomes them to set up as the defenders of good manners, when their behaviour is so edifying, when they are so scrupulous as not to prey upon their subjects, not to debauch their wives, not to bribe the magistrates, not to be guilty of criminal attempts; whilst their principles are so honest, their actions so blameless, their life so pure, whilst they have such elevated minds, such excellent hearts, and are so fond of virtue!

↵

*

Such were the maxims of the Decemviri, as appears by the laws of the Twelve Tables. Actuated by the same spirit, Augustus condemned satirical writers to capital punishment; as did Tiberius, Nero, Caligula, Domitian, &c.

Under James I. the Star-Chamber restrained by a decree the printing of books, and prosecuted with cruelty those who were spirited enough to exclaim against tyranny. The barbarous punishment inflicted on Alexander Leighton, for having written against the abuse of power, is not yet forgotten.

After the commotions of la Fronde, Louis XIV. appointed a commission, under the name of Chambre des Vacations, in order to repress the spirited writings which were published against the Premier.

In Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Germany, &c. no writing is permitted to be printed without an approbation from the licensers of the press.

↵

†

Frederick III. King of Prussia, has caused lately the suppression of a pamphlet, published in Westphalia, against his invasion of Poland.

↵

‡

The Chancellor of France has not long ago given the fatal blow to freedom of thinking, by prohibiting the sale of any book which had not previously been examined by the Royal censors. The same prohibition has been made in the states of Rome and Venice.

One of the most valuable privileges of English subjects, and that which most contributes to stop the progress of despotism, is the liberty of the press. Any one among us may publicly disclose the transactions of the ministry, censure their pernicious undertakings, exclaim against their villainous attempts, and call them to an account at the tribunal of the public.

That inestimable privilege will long support liberty in England; and may we ever be sensible how carefully it deserves to be maintained!

If ever parliament prove so unmindful of their duty as to strike at this privilege, there might be a way of making that wretched attempt prove abortive. In such case no petition should be made to the throne; the people without delay ought to do themselves justice by entirely disregarding the edict of their representatives. All wise men, all spirited men, all true patriots, ought at once to take up the pen against parliament itself, and all the presses in the kingdom work for that good purpose. Astonished at the multitude of refractories, the senate would decline to take cognizance of the infraction, and see in silence their decree violated. Made sensible of their fault by so spirited an opposition, they would recall the bill, and let liberty be triumphant.

But although such a step should be perillous, it ought nevertheless to be taken. When those who are appointed the guardians of the rights of the people are the first to attack them, what remains to good patriots but to despise those false rulers, to embrace the pillars of the temple of Liberty, and to bury themselves under its ruins?

↵

CHAP. XLI. False Idea of Tyranny.

IN proportion as knowledge disappears, despotism makes its progress.

If the want of a true idea of liberty be a cause of slavery, the want of a true idea of tyranny is likewise a cause of it.

History ought to celebrate only the moderation of Princes, their wisdom, their steadiness in enforcing obedience to the laws, zeal in promoting public happiness, and tenderness for the people; but it celebrates almost always only their magnificent follies, their villainous attempts and their outrages. History ought to bestow encomiums on those Princes alone who are studious of governing the people in peace; but it seldom applauds any but Princes skilled in the art of desolating the world.

Abased by fear, seduced by hope, or corrupted by avarice, those who write history inculcate no aversion to absolute power, excite in us no horror against tyranny; they expatiate on the undertakings of a prince, when great or bold, however pernicious they be to the welfare of mankind, and however wickedly supported; they bestow encomiums on deeds for which the voice of all ages should brand with infamy the names of the authors, and basely insinuate the maxims of slavery[†].

When they treat of governments, they declaim against the popular and extol the monarchical. They represent the people in a democracy, as being ever ready to yield to the seditious speeches of orators earnest in deceiving them for private views, and the state as a ship without anchor on a stormy sea, continually tossed by contrary winds; whilst they compare the subjects of a powerful monarch, as a numerous family, which rests happy under the wings of a good father.

When it so happens that a province shakes off the yoke, they term the inhabitants, rebels, or revolted slaves, who ought to be again put into fetters. They describe the spirited efforts of a people against oppression as a rebellion, a guilty revolt, and the friends of liberty as perturbators of the public peace; they wrest the views of good patriots, blast their reputation, and brand their memory instead of respecting their virtues[*].

If a bad Prince is informed against by a virtuous minister, according to them, he is an unfortunate master, betrayed by a perfidious servant [†].

But on the Prince whose actions they record they always bestow exaggerated praises; they emphatically speak of his little deserts, extol his pretended penetration, his concern for the glory of the state, and his liberalities; they account a conquest as a very fortunate event, and describe it as the greatest epoch of his reign. Whilst writing the history of a great villain, although from the mere force of truth, they make now and then some disagreeable concessions; they ever speak so faintly of his defects, they so greatly palliate his vices, so artfully extenuate his criminal attempts, that from their descriptions no one can distinguish the tyrant who so much disgraced human nature.

The miseries of the people, during any fatal reign, they generally attribute, not to the follies or outrages of those who command, but to the irresistible influence of destiny[*].

They never give to things the real names. They term the art of governing, that of spreading every where terror and desolation; they call magnificence pageantry and odious prodigality; they cover usurpations under the fair names of extension of power, addition of privileges, and new prerogatives acquired by the crown; extortions, rapacity, robberies, under that of conquest; craft, duplicity, treachery, perfidiousness, treason, under that of the art of negociating; and outrages, murders, poisoning, under that of acts of great policy. Thus they succeed in destroying that impression of horror, which the bare sight of those actions ever excites in the spectator.

But as if the false pictures offered in history were not sufficient, there is every where a multitude of writers who, actuated by their base passions, are ever ready to vindicate tyranny. Authors in their dedications, poets in their verses, orators in their speeches, every one with emulation basely offers his incense; they give Princes the most flattering appellations, they call them fathers of the people, benefactors of mankind, the glory of the age, and we are so silly as to credit them.

It is not my design here to unveil the gross impostures of those writers, it is sufficiently obvious to readers not prepossessed; but I shall offer a few words on their ignorance or insincerity in those very encomiums, which even men of sense have credited.

Popular government is represented by pensioned sophists as ever stormy and unsettled. A people is restless and seditious only when leading an idle life, as the Greeks and Romans did; because, for want of private affairs, men are then always prompted to meddle with matters of state: but men, wholly engaged in private employments, are unfortunately already but too much unconcerned about the affairs of administration.

However, let this false assertion pass. Undoubtedly there are now and then some disturbances in a democratical government; but is there none in aristocratical and monarchical ones?

Besides, these disturbances arise less from a popular constitution than from its corruption; for if the people are generally inconsiderate, if they oftentimes engage themselves in false steps, and sometimes eagerly pursue their misery, they are likewise, when not bribed, always ready to yield to men whose virtue and judgment they respect. It is the fault of the constitution if such men are not constantly set at the helm, if subjects are deprived of the means of being acquainted with their true interests, and if any individual is permitted to be powerful enough to bribe a multitude.

We are told of the frequent factions, seditions, and rebellions, in popular governments; but has a people ever took arms but to secure their liberty, to oppose the pernicious designs of ambitious men, and to free themselves from oppression?

We are terrified at public dissensions. From the fires of discord, however, all those laws, which were made formerly at Rome in favour of liberty, took their origin; and from the fires of discord liberty has arisen among us.

Men are too easily imposed upon by the noise of civil discords. During the long disturbances which agitated Rome from the Tarquins to the Gracchi, there were but few banishments, but few imprisonments, and almost no blood shed; but from those tranquil reigns, which are so much boasted of, let as long a period less fertile in tragic scenes be pointed out; how many were incomparably more so! What mischiefs were ever caused at Rome by the dissensions of the Forum, to be compared with the horrors of the calm reigns of Tiberius, Nero, Caligula? What evils were ever suffered by any people under popular government, to be compared with those we suffered under Henry VII. Mary, Charles I. and James II. And that so much extolled calm of monarchical states, what is it, but the sad silence of an unfortunate people, who dare not vent their griefs?

Thus the praises bestowed on governments, where the Prince is too powerful, are so many traits which point out their deformity.

Conquests are ever represented as the most happy events in a reign. But not to speak of those acts of violence and injustice which are inseparable therefrom, what generally are conquests, but the ruin of nations, even of conquerors themselves? How dear the conquest of a new province to the ancient ones? If the pride of a monarch is sometimes indulged by the glory of being accounted a conqueror, how much is the well-being of the subjects lessened thereby! Let the benefits that a state receives from that vain glory be put in comparison with the evils it is productive of.

What did the ambition of a Charles V. avail, but to desolate Europe, to ruin his subjects, to see the conquered provinces wrested from his hands, and to force him at last to bury in a monastery his grief and shame?

What the ambition of a Philip II. but to kindle war every where, to shed torrents of the blood of his subjects, to cause the ocean to swallow up his numerous fleets, to allow no rest to his people, to squander the immense treasures of Spain and India, to ruin his extensive dominions, and to bury with himself the eclat of his crown.

What the ambition of a Charles XII. but to carry terror over Europe, to enlarge his empire, to lose in a few hours the fruits of nine years victories, and to abandon his own dominions to the sword of the enemy?

Such are almost constantly the fruits of the ambition of Princes:—a plague the most fatal with which Heaven punishes those nations that dare not free themselves therefrom.

Writers emphatically praise the magnificence and liberalities of monarchs; why not rather censure those odious prodigalities, which in order that pageantry be displayed, and that a few individuals may abound in riches, oblige the greatest part of the nation to live sparingly, or linger in misery. But even were the people the constant objects of royal munificence, how is it possible to give them much without taking much more from them?

Writers exhaust themselves in praising the generosity of Princes; but can Princes even possess that virtue? What are gifts which cost nothing but the trouble of a command?

That which is gained with difficulty and labour, or deducted from conveniency and necessity, when given with discernment; that alone, I say, is to be accounted a valuable gift. But let Princes be ever so much lavish of their favours, are they the less at ease for it? Do they repose the less on the pillows of luxury? Are they the less clad with purple? Is their table the less delicate? Are their palaces the less magnificent? their groves the less voluptuous?

When an hungry scribbler gets a pension, all is well; but the oppressed multitude groan in silence: and whilst the sighs of the unhappy sufferers remain inclosed within the walls of their wretched habitations, the praises given to bad Princes by prostituted sycophants fly through every climate on the wings of Fame.

Notes

†

I know there are some historians to be excepted, and with pleasure I class the names of a Ralph and a Macaulay with the respectable one of Tacitus.

↵

*

All the Spanish historians, who have written of the civil wars of Castile, under Charles V. have blasted the memory of the brave Padillo; and almost all the writers who have mentioned the punishment of Charles I. have represented as barbarous parricides those spirited patriots who sentenced that tyrant to death.

↵

†
See l'Abreg. Chron. de l'Hist. d'Esp. de Desormeaux, tom. ii.
↵

*

"C'est ainsi (says the Author of l'Abrege Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espagne, on account of the oppressive administration of Olivares, which obliged the Portuguese to shake off the Spanish yoke) que le maitre des empires príve de leurs lumieres et de leur sagesse ces ministres profonds, ces genies perçants, quand il veut briser ou donner des septres."

↵

CHAP. XLII. Of Superstition.

IT is not possible to consider the progress of power to despotism, without considering at the same time the force of opinion. How great its influence on the human mind!

Opinion formerly made the intrepid Roman shiver at the sight of the sacred chickens refusing to eat.

Opinion, penetrating the Pagan with the fear of the Gods, made him tremble, when looking at the idol he had just framed.

Opinion, reflecting the Stoick within himself, surrounds his heart with ice, prevents it from palpitating with joy amidst pleasures, from being moved to pity at the hearing of doleful cries, from shaking for fear among dangers; it concenters all his passions in pride, and, confirming him in his passive virtue, causes him to live without ties, and die without weakness.

Opinion, in a word, obstructing our sight with the bandage of superstition, subjects our necks to the yoke of priests; and its power Princes make use of in order to enchain us.

If we turn our sight upon antiquity, we shall every where see the Prince labouring to make the subjects look upon himself as upon a favourite of Heaven. Zoroaster published his law under the name of Oromasis; Trismegistes, under that of Mercury; Minos made use of the name of Jupiter; Lycurgus that of Apollo; Numa that of Egeria, &c. &c.

Every polity has some Deity at its head, and how many times has a ridiculous respect for the Gods again plunged the people into slavery[*]?

In order to re-enter the citadel of Athens, whence he had been expelled, Pisistrates dressed a woman like Minerva, then mounted on a chariot with that goddess of his own making, he traversed the city, whilst she, holding him by the hand, cried aloud to the people, "Here is Pisistrates; I bring him back to you, and I command you to receive him:" hearing these words, the Athenians again submitted to the tyrant.

At present few Princes affect to be inspired; but many have recourse to the voice of the ministers of religion to subdue their subjects.

Ambitious, timid, or ignorant priests, cause Princes to be looked upon as the representatives of Deity on the earth, at whose feet other men ought to prostrate themselves in silence; then confounding obedience to the laws with obedience to arbitrary mandates, they continually preach in the name of the Gods passive submission and servitude.

Thus, to stamp on their authority a sacred character, and secure their empire, all Princes cause Heaven to interpose.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

EVERY religion countenances despotism, but none so much as the Christian.

Instead of being connected with the political system, the Christian religion is universal in its principle; it has nothing exclusive, nothing more peculiar to any country than to another; it embraces equally all mankind in its charity, takes away the bar which separates nations, and unites all Christians in a fraternity.—Such is the true spirit of the gospel.

Liberty depends on the love of the patria; but the reign of Christians is not of this world; their patria is in heaven, and to them earth is a place of pilgrimage only. How then can a people, longing but for things above, be concerned for things below?

All human institutions are grounded on human passions, and supported by them only; the love of liberty is united to that of well-being, to that of temporal enjoyments: but the Christian doctrine inspires us with an aversion for those enjoyments, and is continually combating our terrestrial inclinations. Wholly engrossed by another life, men are but little concerned about this.

To maintain themselves free, the people must have an eye ever upon government; they must watch all its motions, oppose all its illegal attempts, and curb its audacity. How can men, whom religion prohibits being suspicious, be thus watchful; how can they put a stop to the secret practices of the enemies to liberty, how detect them, how even suppose that such men exist? Without suspicion, without cunning, without wrath, without resentment, a true christian is at the discretion of the first who forms an attempt upon him.

The spirit of the gospel is a spirit of lenity, of charity[*], of peace; its disciples are full of patience and love for their enemies. When struck on one cheek, they must offer the other; when stripped of their gown, they must give their cloak besides; when forced to march a league, they must march two; when persecuted, they must bless their persecutors: they are not allowed even to protect their own lives. Dragged to the altar of death, they have tears only to oppose to their tyrant. Ever resigned, they suffer in silence, they melt into compassion for their enemies, and pray for their executioner. Patience, tears, prayers, blessings, are their only arms, and whatever is attempted against them, they never disgrace themselves with revenge; they groan, and humble themselves under the hand which strikes them. How then would they take up arms against the disturbers of public peace, how combat the usurpers of their own rights, how repel by force the enemies of liberty, how spill their blood for the sake of their country? To so many dispositions contrary to those of a good patriot, add the express command of obeying the supreme powers, good or bad, as being established by God [*]

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

"NOTHING is more necessary to a King, than being religious, says Aristotle in his Politics, for the subjects approve of every thing as being just, which is ordered by a godly Prince, and the malcontents are not so bold as to attempt upon one, whom they believe to be under the protection of the Gods." Accordingly most Princes endeavour to be accounted pious.

The statue of Fortune, was ever in the room of the Roman Emperors; in order to persuade the people that the Goddess watched for their safety.

From a desire of regaining the affection of his people, Henry II. affected an extreme devotion to the ashes of Becket, whom he had persecuted: and victory, crowning soon after his arms against the Scots, caused this Prince to be looked upon as a favourite of Heaven, and the audacity of opposing him, to be considered as a sacrilege[*]

Notes

*

Religion ought to contribute to render men good patriots; when it has such a tendency, it is one of the greatest pillars of liberty; but when it has a contrary one, it is attended with the most humiliating servitude.

↵

*

If religion influenced the Prince as well as the subjects, that spirit of charity which is the great characteristic of a true Christian, would undoubtedly mitigate the exercise of power; but when we consider that the lessons of the Gospel cannot take root in a heart given up to pleasure and dissipation; when we consider that its precepts cannot resist pernicious maxims constantly repeated, bad examples ever under the eye, temptations ever new, we are made sensible that religion cannot rule those who live at court.

Some religious Princes have however been seen, it will be said. If by religious Princes, bigots, hypocrites, or fanatics, are meant, I agree; and yet these were men whose youth had been spent under the direction of priests, men whose passions were not naturally violent, men whose hearts worn out by pleasures, or brought back by age to the timidity of infancy, caused them to be credulous; men, in a word, who, separating morality from the tenets of faith, like the Pharisee, admitted that part of religion only, which indulged their vicious propensities.

But if the precepts of the Christian religion have but very little influence on the heart of a Prince, it is chiefly in Catholic countries, where the priests grant dispensations to the rich for money, furnish them a thousand pretended means of atonement, and sometimes incite them to redeem, by new crimes, a whole life spent in iniquities. Now when the sinner may hope for Paradise without fearing Hell, religion has no more any empire.

↵

*

Is it not that fatal doctrine of passive obedience, which in the last century prevented our forefathers from shaking off their yoke? Fortunately for liberty, faith is no more our weak side.

↵

*
Hoveden, page 539.
↵

CHAP. XLIII. Of the Confederacy between Princes and Priests.

BUT as if it did not suffice, that the subjects should learn from the Gospel to kiss the rod of power with devotion, in order to render them more servile from principle, there is a confederacy between priests and Princes. These borrow the tongue of the divine, to subject the people to despotism: the others borrow the arm of the magistrate, to subject them to superstition.

Under the Princes of the house of Stuart who mounted the throne of England, priests were instructed to teach speculative despotism, and graft on religious affections systems of civil tyranny.

In 1622, orders were given by James I. "That no preacher, of what title or denomination soever, from henceforth should presume in any auditory within this kingdom, to declare, limit or bound out by way of positive doctrine, the power, prerogative, and jurisdiction of sovereigns, or otherwise meddle with matters of state, and the differences between Princes and the people, than as they are instructed by precedents in the homilies of obedience."

In order to render his authority absolute in Scotland, Charles I. restored episcopacy; and by his command, priests published several canons containing superstitious and arbitrary matter; among which some asserted "That the king's power and prerogative were in every thing equal to those of the Jewish kings, absolute and unlimited; that no one should teach schools without a licence from the bishop of the diocese, and that no person should be admitted into holy orders, or perform any ecclesiastical function, without first subscribing these canons."

A conformity to such doctrines was exacted through the whole kingdom, and disobedience was liable to be punished by the High-Commission Court, with deprivation, fines, confiscation, imprisonment, &c.

Any word or writing which tended towards schism was punished by the Commissioners. These inquisitors were not limited to proceed by legal information; rumour, and suspicions were sufficient grounds. To the party cited before them they administered an oath by which they were bound to answer any question that should be proposed to them, and a refusal was punished with imprisonment.

CHAP. XLIV. Fruitless Efforts of the People.

MEAN while despotism makes its progress, and the chains of slavery become heavier.

When despotism establishes itself by slow steps, the longer it is established, the less it is felt: it at last arrives, however, to such a degree as to force the people to open their eyes. Whenever the Prince audaciously attacks rights sacred to all[*] mankind; whenever he tramples under foot the objects of public veneration, or exhibits too frequently scenes of blood, the minds of men are affected with indignation, sighs are changed into complaints, a refractory spirit prevails among persons of all ranks, confusion begins to reign, and murmurs, clamours, and seditious speeches are to be heard every where. Then the authority of government every instant diminishes, its orders are disregarded, in these moments of confusion no act seems illicit, and the Prince in appearance retains a vain title only. But how many means still remain to support his overgrown power?

If the subjects, driven to despair, at length take a tragic resolution, it seldom avails but to expose them. Whilst the insurgents loudly crave justice, the Prince in his turn vents his complaints against them, sends them deputies, magistrates, satellites, has the most audacious apprehended, treats them as disturbers of the public peace, and oftentimes the disorder is hereby suppressed.

The efforts made by the people for securing their liberty are commonly fruitless[†]. When the violent symptoms of universal dissatisfaction break out, unless the insurgents be headed by some great personage, unless the measures of an unruly and fluctuating multitude be planned by wise men, and carried into execution by spirited and audacious ones, the insurrection instead of being a revolt, is but a sedition—ever easily suppressed, and ever unsuccessful.

But the engaging as a leader of the insurgents is dangerous; to head a faction is to draw upon oneself all the storm; and the uncertainty of the success or the apprehensions of a miscarriage, always restrain the most resolute[*].

Besides, how difficult oftentimes to excite a people to take up arms! When Manlius endeavoured to free the Romans from the oppression of the senate, full of zeal as long as danger was remote, they displayed the greatest audacity; but no sooner was Manlius apprehended and brought before the dictator, but they lost all resolution. In vain did this unfortunate leader entreat their assistance; neither the sight of those wounds he had received for the sake of their country, neither the view of the capitol he had delivered, neither reverence for those temples which he had prevented being prophaned, nor piety for the gods, moved them; they remained inactive spectators, and beheld calmly their chief dragged into a dungeon.

If much is ever wanting to excite an insurrection, very little is commonly wanted to suppress it.

When the Sicilians, weary of groaning under the oppressive domination of the viceroy Los Velos, had revolted; the inhabitants of Palermo placed at their head one Alexis; but terrified by the warlike preparations of Spain, they basely attempted to purchase their pardon by murdering their captain.

On the day of the first Barricades, as the populace flocked together to surround the hotel of the president Molé,—a traitor to his country, and prepared to break open his doors; Molé himself immediately had them opened, and without emotion appeared before the insurgents. Amazed at this bold step, they retired without noise, and suffered themselves to be disarmed[*].

He must be very little acquainted with history who knows no instance of such want of courage in almost every revolt.

When subjects prove so little resolute, the Prince disregards their clamours, or rather silences their complaints by persisting in the same conduct which raised them; and their resentment exhales in vain murmurs.

But suppose the subjects want not resolution, their rising avails little, unless it be general. When a city takes arms to defend its privileges, if its example is not followed by the rest of the nation, mercenary troops subdue it, the Prince treats the inhabitants as rebels, and they feel their yoke lay heavier upon them[*].

Notwithstanding the insurrection be general, yet how seldom is there any union between the subjects? Commonly the people is divided into many parties, and this want of union is one of the greatest resources of tyranny. The Prince then counterballances the respective forces of the different parties by each other, he equally avails himself of their weakness and jealousies, and crushes them with their own hands.

If the people is not divided into factions, it is the craft of administration to sow discord among them, and foment dissention.

When the representatives of the people of Venice usurped the supreme authority, as the most powerful families were divided between empire and servitude, and this usurpation had raised a spirit of universal dissatisfaction, to disunite the malcontents, the usurpers opened anew the door of the council to several families that had been shut out, restrained many others by hope, and then audaciously faced the rest.

When the Castilians took arms to vindicate their rights violated by their deputies in the Cortes assembled in Gallicia, and to obtain satisfaction for the outrages committed by the Flemish ministers, Charles V. with a view of dividing the malcontents, issued circular letters to all the cities of Castile that had revolted, exhorting them in most gentle terms to lay down their arms, published a general amnesty, promised such cities as had continued faithful, or should return to obedience, not to exact from them the subsidy granted in the late Cortes, and engaged that no office of government should be conferred for the future upon foreigners. On the other hand, he wrote to the nobles, exciting them to appear with vigour in defence of their own rights, against the exorbitant claims of the people, and instigating them, by a mean jealousy of that spirit of independance which they saw rising among the commons, to vindicate the prerogative of the crown[*].

In the Commotions of la Fronde, Mazarine managed for the king, by his intrigues with the marshall d'Aumont, the party of the great army, and engaged them to depute the earl of Quincé to assure his Majesty, in the name of all the officers, of their devotion to his commands[*].

In our civil wars of the last century, it was the constant artifice of the court, to sow dissention among the tories and whigs; among papists, anglicans and presbyterians.

If the intrigues of the cabinet to set the malcontents at variance prove fruitless; the measures fixed upon by the malcontents themselves to secure their liberties, oftentimes produce the desired effect. For although the subjects be all united against tyranny, all have not the same views. Every class among them has peculiar claims, the several provinces, even the towns of the same province have peculiar interests. And all these different pretensions are so many sources of discord[†].

Subjects, though united against tyranny, agree very seldom in the choice of a chief; but what is more surprising, that which ought to render them unanimous, serves oftentimes to set them at variance; and this want of harmony ever ruins the interests of the people[‡].

Let us suppose, however, that the malcontents are unanimous in their choice, and that they make a good one; how many resources still remain against the people?

At first, attempts are made to bribe their leaders, which are always successful, unless they be proof against every temptation.

If they prove incorruptible, the Prince endeavours to have them delivered up to him, or labours to seduce their adherents; and how many times have insurgents attempted to obtain pardon, or regain favour, with the head of their chief in their hands?

If these measures are fruitless, Princes are acquainted with others,—sword and poison[*].

Not satisfied with exterminating the leaders, some Princes have involved even the whole party in the same fate.

Charles IX. of France, by incessantly persecuting his protestant subjects, forced them to revolt: as their party encreased every day, and terrified the tyrant, too pusillanimous to encounter the insurgents at the head of his army, he took the resolution of exterminating them any way, and meditated this horrid project for two years. Having at last fixed on the measures to carry it into execution, he concluded with them a fraudulent peace, amused their chiefs by false caresses, neglected no pains to lull them into a fatal security, and had them, with sixty thousand of their adherents, murdered on the night of St. Bartholomew.

Popular leaders themselves sometimes ruin their own party. The great care they take to repress licentiousness, and to prevent pillaging, ever renders them odious to the rabble, who having thus no profit by the revolt, are soon weary of bearing arms for the sake of liberty alone[‡].

If a popular leader has much to dread from his severity, he has no less to dread from his ill success. The people, who obeyed him with zeal as long as his efforts were successful, lose their spirits, and desert him as soon as fortune declares against him.

But supposing the leaders of the malcontents well manage their party, and victory befriends them, yet this avails little, unless they take advantage of every juncture.

Delay constantly ruins bold undertakings. When once the moment which was to fix fortune is let slip, all is lost; the enemy has time for recovering from his fears, and preparing himself against the intended stroke; and, even in these critical moments, the party of tyranny has great advantage over the party of liberty.

Although the Prince has levied war against his people, if he finds himself unable to attack them, in order to get time, he makes proposals of accommodation, and, whilst preparing to crush them, complains of being compelled to have recourse to violence, makes the most solemn protestations of love for the public, and displays marks of concern for the national disturbances[*]. The people, still dazzled by some remains of respect for royal Majesty, or seduced by an appearance of grief, almost always feel a return of affection, and oftentimes, as children who dare not lift up the hand against their parent, let their arms fall out of their hands. The Prince, on the contrary, has scarcely ever the tender mercy of a father; but considering his opposing subjects as revolted slaves, as soon as he has the power in his hands, he makes them feel the most terrible effects of his vengeance.

To avail themselves of favourable junctures is not yet enough, unless the insurgents unite their councils and arms.

When Charles V. ascended the Spanish throne, notwithstanding the spirit of dissatisfaction which universally prevailed, as the inhabitants of the different kingdoms in Spain still maintained the prejudices of their ancient rivalship, and as the remembrance of their long hostilities was still recent, their national antipathy prevented their acting in concert. Each kingdom chusing rather to depend on its own efforts, formed a separate plan, followed separate measures, and each party combated for its own liberties. Thus, for want of harmony, all their efforts proved impotent[*].

Nay, although the patriots all unite in a common plan, their party is not always triumphant. Who would believe, had not experience proved it, that subjects oftentimes combat with less courage for their patria, than mercenary soldiers for a tyrant?

If subjects oftentimes combat with less courage for their patria than mercenary soldiers for a tyrant, they generally combat with less success[†]; for with what disadvantage must undisciplined citizens, under chiefs unexperienced in war, take the field against regular troops, under experienced captains?

But was the Prince's party defeated, all resources are not exhausted.

Subjects, seldom animated with a high sense of their rights, fight but to free themselves from actual oppression; never willing to purchase dearly the inestimable advantages of liberty[‡]. Hence oftentimes, after a few efforts, they lay down their arms; soon tired of their own agitations, they long for repose, and, in the tranquil leisure they are permitted to enjoy, they recollect liberty but with the ideas of heavy contributions, fatigues and slaughter. The Prince, on the contrary, ever animated with a violent desire of securing his power and enlarging his authority, combats with steadiness, and stands till the last extremity.

The efforts made by the people to secure their liberty, when fruitless, serve only to confirm their servitude[*].

Notwithstanding his repeated defeats, the Prince oftentimes loses nothing. Though vanquished and at the mercy of his subjects, he maintains that haughtiness, that imperious air, that arrogance, which he displays in his prosperity; he speaks only of his prerogatives, he still presumes to give law, and generally the people suffer themselves to be deprived of the fruits of their victory[†]. But if once vanquished, how different the fate of subjects! After many vain attempts to shake off their yoke, they are treated as subdued enemies; the unmerciful Prince dictates his orders with a menacing tone, and the unfortunate wretches ever patiently suffer themselves to be enslaved; they oftentimes present their necks to the yoke, and are earnest to regain the favour of their Master by ignominious submissions[*].

Notes

*

In a small slate where the manners of the people are not degenerated, these violent outrages of Princes are ever attended with the ruin of their authority.

When Tarquin made an attempt upon Lucretia's chastity, as he attacked rights sacred to all the citizens, every one was filled with indignation at such an outrage, and his power was at an end.

↵

†

In almost every insurrection, the populace alone hostilities, men of fortune declare for no party at first, and are at length only hurried along by the torrent. What is to be expected from the attempts of a rabble? They have never great interest for taking arms against tyranny, they cannot depend one upon another, and they want secrecy. In their fits of resentment or despair, the populace divulge their designs, and ever give their enemy time to render them abortive.

↵

*

How easily did those who were masters of the commonwealth render abortive the designs the Gracchi had formed of setting the plebeians free from oppression. If it proved so easy to ruin these protectors of the people notwithstanding their tribunitial power, how much easier is it to ruin a popular leader, who having no public character, may always be treated as a disturber of the public tranquillity.

↵

*
Hist. du Cardin. Mazarin.
↵

*

Powerful, noble, and wealthy men, new men who owe their fortune to the Prince, ambitious men who look upon a court as the only source of dignities, wretches who seek their fortune amidst public disorders, priests, academicians, pedants, and that prostituted herd that subsists by the extravagancies and vices of the great, all generally stick to the party of the court: whilst men of a middle rank, sensible and wise men, generous souls who will obey the laws only, and elevated minds who scorn servility, espouse the cause of liberty.

↵

*
Sandov. Hist. of Civil Wars in Castile.
↵

*
Hist. du Cardin. Mazarin.
↵

†
See Sandov. Hist. of the Civil Wars in Castile, p. 143. P. Mart. Epist. p. 686.
↵

‡

When the Commons of Castile, in order to vindicate their liberties, took the field against the king and nobles combined, violent disputes arose concerning the command of the army. Padilla was the only person worthy of this honour; but as he was the darling of the people and soldiers, many of the most eminent members of the Junta, jealous of his merit and popularity, procured Don Pedro de Giron the office of General, who being entirely destitute of abilities equal to such a trust, soon gave them a fatal proof of their having ruined their affairs. P. Mart. Epist. p. 688.

↵

*

In the commotions of la Fronde, the court appointed four troopers to assassinate the President Charton, who excited the people to oppose the tyrannic administration. Hist. du Card. Mazarin.

In the revolt of 1647, at Naples, the viceroy, unable to subdue the insurgents, was obliged to stipulate. Accordingly a general amnesty was granted, and Thomaso Aniello, at the head of the inhabitants, repaired to the governor to have the treaty ratified. The governor seeing the zeal of the people for their leader, bestowed on him many kindnesses, confirmed the title of Captain General he had received from the public, and, as if he minded to crown the victim before sacrifice, adorned Aniello's neck with a golden chain, then gave him a venomous drink, and had him assassinated. Giannone, Hist. of Nap. Lussan. Hist. de la Revolut. de Naples. Memoires du Duc de Guise.

While the Dutch laboured to shake off the tyrannical yoke of Spain, as Philip II. could not reduce to subjection those brave confederates, he had the Prince of Orange, their captain, assassinated; &c. &c. &c.

↵

‡

This was seen in Naples when the Duke de Guise attempted to crush the Spanish yoke. Memoires du Duc de Guise.

↵

*

Thus did the deceitful Charles I. when he levied war against his people. Parliam. Hist. vol. xi.

↵

*
Sandoval. Hist. vol. i.
↵

†

Of so many people who have risen in arms to shake off the yoke, how few have recovered their liberty?

↵

‡

When Charles I. attempted to enslave the nation, how many times did the zeal of the patriotic party begin to subside, and at what infinite pains were many spirited patriots to support it?

↵

*

After civil wars, despotism commonly makes its most rapid progress. When the principal leaders have perished, the people wearied by their own agitations long for repose, and permit the monarch to enlarge the boundaries of prerogative, or usurp a boundless authority. When Henry VII. and Charles II. came to the throne, the nation, tired with intestine commotions, willingly submitted to every outrage, rather than plunge themselves anew into a civil war.

↵

†

How little was wanting to enable Charles I. to reascend the throne, and again give law?

↵

*

When Mazarine triumphantly reassumed the reins of the government, those who had inveighed most bitterly against him, and most eagerly sought his ruin, basely solicited his favour.

↵

CHAP. XLV. Of Treachery.

HOWEVER, if in a critical moment, the Prince makes any concession to the people, it is generally delusive;—too jealous of his authority not to reassume with one hand what he grants with the other.

Amidst the dissensions of the Forum, the people having obtained that a consul should be elected from among them, the Patricians prevented any cause being brought before him, and thus rendered his magistracy useless.

To calm his angry subjects, the Prince sometimes orders his ministers to retire into some port during the storm, or even sacrifices them to public vengeance; but[*] the same plan of operations is still laid down. In the place of those dismissed or sacrificed ministers, others of the same stamp have been substituted, and the simple multitude is satisfied.

But if subjects obtain any real concession, the Prince is at the same time considering only how to deprive them of the fruits of it.

The Plebeians had just obtained the privilege of sharing with the Patricians the honour of the Fascia, when, Rome being afflicted with a famine, Coriolanus made a motion in full senate not to assist the people, unless they renounced the rights granted them on the Sacred Mount[†].

King John, being obliged by his Barons to sign Magna Charta, concealed his resentment till he had found a favourable juncture for annulling his concessions. The better to deceive the people, he publicly declared that his administration was henceforth to run in such a tenor as to give his people no cause of complaint, he sent writs to all his sheriffs, ordering them to constrain every one to swear obedience to the twentyfive Barons appointed to secure the execution of the several articles of the great Charter, and then retired into the isle of Wight to plan the measures of a fatal vengeance: from his retreat he secretly sent abroad his emissaries to enlist foreign soldiers, and to invite the rapacious Brabançons into his service by the prospect of sharing the spoils of England: he dispatched a messenger to Rome in order to be absolved from all his oaths of maintaining the liberties granted to his subjects. When the foreign forces arrived, he pulled off the mask, repealed all his grants to the subjects, marched at the head of ravenous mercenaries, laid waste the lands of the nobles, pillaged their houses, carried every where fire and sword, and spread devastation all over the face of the kingdom[*].

Edward I. on his return to England from his expedition into France against Philip, being requested to ratify solemnly the confirmation of the charters to which he had affixed his seal, evaded as long as possible: at length, being obliged again to comply, he expressly added a salvo for his royal prerogative,—a clause which enervated the force of the whole Charter[*]. But after so many solemn engagements contracted, whilst he could not give full scope to his ambition, and whilst his subjects flattered themselves with having secured their liberties, he applied to Rome, and procured an absolution from all his oaths.

Charles I. having given his assent to the petition of rights, repaired in haste to parliament, and protested that he had not intended to give away the profit of tonnage and poundage; ordered this protest to be entered in the Journal of the Commons; and again proceeded to seize the goods of merchants for denying the arbitrary imposition of tonnage and poundage. In the next session, he ended his speech by blaming the Commons for enquiring into the infraction of the petition of rights, and engaged the Speaker to interrupt all debates on the subject. Not satisfied with this, and incensed that parliament had circumscribed royal power within so narrow limits, he resolved to overthrow them, and to accomplish his design, employed the meanest artifices. Accordingly the patriotic party, by the intrigues of the court, diminished every day. As soon as the King had secured a majority in the House of Commons, and had at his devotion almost the whole House of Lords, elated at the accounts of his courtiers respecting public affairs, he pulled off the mask, filled anew the first places of government[*] with his creatures, attempted to strike the fatal blow to his half-vanquished enemies; and in order to abrogate at once all his concessions to the people, charged a member of the upper house and five of the lower house, with misdemeanor, hightreason, and with having extorted by fear all the[†] acts made to secure public liberty, which being proved, as he pretended, rendered them null ipso facto. This scheme proving abortive, Charles spared no pains to incite discord between the English and the Scots. To accomplish this, he at first strove to outvie the parliament in courtesy towards the Scots; he forwarded every motion which had been made in their favour; every thing that they demanded for the security of their civil rights was granted them: he afterwards endeavoured to corrupt their army. Henderson, the popular covenanting preacher, was appointed his chaplain; the great officers of the army were treated with high marks of favour, and the commissaries themselves bribed. He then set out for Scotland, attempted in his journey to engage the army to prove refractory, secured a strong party in the Scotch parliament by the intrigues of his creatures, and laboured to induce the Irish catholics to rise against England.

Charles II. under colour that there were many conspirators against him, and that there were men who, under pretence that the parliament was at an end by virtue of some clause in the triennial bill, fancied they might assemble themselves to chuse new members, desired the parliament held in 1663, not to leave an act in being which was such a disgrace to the crown, and they basely complied with his request.

What a trifling cause sometimes suffices to give those at the helm an opportunity for repealing their concessions, and again assuming the power into their hands!

Whilst M. AEmilius and Q. Fabius laid waste the enemies lands, the tribunes M. Furius and Cn. Cornelius, in order to make the Agrarian laws pass, refused to levy the tribute, and incited the people to rise. But although the army, busy without, was in want of every thing, and the senate dreaded a revolt within, the people at that juncture, in appearance so favourable to their claims, obtained only that a consular-tribune should be selected from among the plebeians. Elated with this little success, the popular leaders with eagerness urged on the execution of their scheme, and succeeded in having at the next comitia chiefly plebeians elected consular-tribunes. But while the people resigned themselves to joy, and boasted of their victory, the senate was taking steps to deprive them of the advantage of it[*]. At first, it engaged some of the most illustrious patricians to set up as candidates, expecting that the people would not be so daring as to except against them; afterwards, exerting their utmost efforts to carry on that scheme, they vented clamours against the past comitia, they said the gods were incensed that the magistracies had been prostituted by rendering them vulgar, and alledged in proof, the sharpness of winter that had just been felt, and the plague which raged over the city and the fields. The people, dazzled with the eclat of the candidates, and terrified at the idea of the wrath of the gods, elected consular-tribunes patricians only, renounced the supreme power, and put it, trembling, into the hands of the senate.

Soon after, the waters of the lake in the forest Albana being much increased without any apparent cause, this phenomenon engaged the public attention, and the oracle at Delphos was consulted. Mean while the senate industriously propagated a rumour that the gods were incensed that the ranks in the commonwealth had been confounded, and that the only means of disarming their wrath was the abdication of the military tribunes; and an interregnum followed[*].

Notes

*

When the Frondeurs had obliged the Regency to dismiss Mazarine, this favourite, yielding to the storm, retired safe into the harbour; but before he took leave, he left secret instructions for the conduct of affairs: even from his retreat he continued to plan all the measures of the cabinet, and, as soon as the revolt was suppressed, returned triumphant, and was again set at the helm. Hist. du Card. Mazar.

↵

†

Such was the spirit of the whole body, since one of its best members was animated therewith.

↵

*
M. Paris, p. 181, 182.
↵

*
Heming. vol. i. p. 167-8.
↵

*
Acherl. Britan. Constit. p. 412.
↵

†
Parl. Hist. vol. x. p. 157-8.
↵

*

After their victory, the multitude ever abandon themselves to security, whilst they ought to be never more watchful. What terrible attacks could be made then upon liberty! The situation of a people, jealous of their rights, is extremely embarrassing: since by a fatality attached to their station, all is against them; disheartened by defeat, supine in victory, they have no less to fear from good than from bad fortune.

↵

*
Tit. Liv. Dec. i. Lib. 5.
↵

CHAP. XLVI. Constant Pursuit of the same Designs.

IN every government, a favourable juncture for the recovery of liberty sometimes offers; people let it generally slip, not perceiving it: but the juncture for establishing slavery, those at the helm seize very often. To avail themselves of the opportunity is their chief care, and their first maxim in politics.

I and Time, said Charles V. defy any two others [†].

The people have but momentary leaders, and as soon as they are deprived of them, their forces are dispersed; but the council of Princes is lasting: always set up against liberty, it employs its time in forming projects, concerting measures, contriving means of execution; and this is a peculiar advantage.

By watchfulness, people succeed sometimes in making the attempts of Princes prove abortive; but how can they constantly oppose their various attacks? The ministry having their eyes ever fixed on the people, seize, at length, a favourable moment, and this suffices to accomplish their designs.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

AS soon as the cabinet council is permanent, there is no truce during the slow war Princes carry on against liberty, not even in the beginning of their reign;—a juncture where the monarch, sinking under the load of his grandeur, and his heart overflowing with joy, entertains only sentiments of benevolence and affection, lays aside all designs, and gives some respite to his unfortunate subjects: not even when they wholly resign to pleasure or idleness; since the reins of government, they abandon, are trusted to ministers who, that they might share the authority of their master, seek continually to increase his power: not even when they have no ambitious projects, unless themselves be at the helm.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

WHEN the cabinet is composed of powerful men, rivalship, jealousy, pique, and ambition, oftentimes incite them to traverse each others projects, and make them miscarry. When it is composed of many members, the various turn of their minds generally sets them at variance, respecting designs and the means of execution. Hence Princes, impatient to attain absolute power, have always composed their cabinet of few men, and men of new families. Such was the craft of Ferdinand of Arragon, of Philip II. Louis XI. Henry VII. Henry VIII. &c.

Some Princes, by a refinement of policy, have even laid down a fixed plan of operations.

It was the pursuit of the same projects during the reigns of Louis XIII. and Louis XIV. that so much increased the power of the crown: for Mazarine punctually followed the maxims of Richelieu, and le Tellier those of Mazarine.

It was the pursuit of the same projects that so much enlarged the boundaries of the prerogative of the crown of Spain, from Charles V. to this day; for a change of ministers causes no change in the Spanish cabinet, and although the hands that hold the reins of government be changed, the mind that directs them is always the same[*].

It is, on the contrary, to a want of harmony in the council that the weakness of government, during inter-reigns and minorities must be attributed.

It is likewise to a want of harmony in the council, that we owe in part the slow increase of royal power among us; and this want of harmony fortunately arises from the constitution itself. Altho' the king disposes of all offices, as he cannot render himself formidable, he is ever obliged to keep fair with his ministers: those who are in favour are therefore oftentimes traversed by those who endeavour to supplant them. As he cannot satisfy all ambitious men, those who are admitted into the cabinet are frequently opposed by those who seek to set themselves in their place. As the designs of the King so much the less succeed, as his party is the more openly attacked, he is oftentimes obliged to trust the conduct of affairs to those who have most offended him, and to dismiss those who have served him best. In fine, as his favour is limited, and his hatred impotent, new parties ever spring up. Happy discord! which supplies the want of the virtues among us, and like them supports liberty.

Notes

†
Yo y et tempios para dos ostros. Hist. of the Duke d'Alba, Book iii. c. 24.
↵

*

The cabinet of Madrid, and that of Venice are, perhaps, the only ones in Europe, where there is a fixed plan to attain despotism.

↵

CHAP. XLVII. Of Corrupting the Legislature.

THE most fatal blow Princes strike at liberty, is the subduing their subjects in the name of the law; and the expedient they most willingly employ for it, is the most analogous to their vile character—bribery.

Considering the legislature as a formidable censor of his conduct, the Prince labours to have them his dependents, or rather, earnest to see the Sovereign[*] made his slave, he endeavours to have its representatives at his disposal. Thus all the arts, which influence popular assemblies, are employed to win those members who oppose his projects. Temptations are offered to the vain, the ambitious, the needy, according to their desires: all those who chuse to espouse the party of the crown, may now have their price; and the rulers of the empire soon prostitute themselves to power, sell the cause of liberty to indulge their base passions, betray their country in contempt of their most sacred engagements, and the legislature themselves become the contemptible tools of tyranny.

As soon as a senator was elected at Sparta, Agesilaus presented him with an ox[*].

Charles V. demanding from the cortes of Castile a new donative before the time for paying the former was expired, was openly refused. But, availing himself of a mean spirit of jealousy, which instigated the nobles against the commons, whom they saw endeavouring to secure their independence, he employed bribes, promises, caresses, threats, and even force, in order to gain members. Thus having secured a majority, he engaged them, in contempt of the fundamental laws of the constitution, to vote the grant of the subsidy for which he had applied[†].

How frequently have been, and still are, such arts employed among us, to corrupt parliament! In that august assembly, wherein none ought to be admitted but the real friends of their country, there is no less venality than elsewhere. Part of the members are pensioners of the court, or related to pensioned persons; another part are occasionally bribed by what they call douceurs; a great number seek to get into office, and affect to display their rhetoric against the court only in order to oblige it to stipulate; a greater number, dependent on the tools of the court, are constantly devoted to the minister; few are faithful to their constituents; and the rest fluctuate alternately according to circumstances between duty and temptation. Such are the patres patriae, the rulers of the empire, the guardians of our liberties[*].

Notes

*

It is a constant custom to give Monarchs the title of Sovereigns. All, even our best authors, have fallen into this error; the parliament itself—the representative of the real Sovereign, has blindly followed this practice.

↵

*
Plutarch. in vita Agesil.
↵

†
P. Martir. Epist. 663. Sandoval. Hist. page 32.
↵

*

It is curious to see in Whitlocke, Strafford's Letters, the Parliamentary History, &c. the artifices employed by the court to corrupt the legislative power: but how much more so to see the refinements of modern policy in this respect!

It will, perhaps, be deemed imprudent to give things their real name, but I leave subterfuge to timid patriots. It is the cause of truth, of justice, of honour, that I plead, and ever will, even at the price of my blood.—He deserves not to enjoy liberty, who dares not openly espouse its cause.

↵

CHAP. XLVIII. Of the want of Spirit and Steadiness in the Representatives to oppose ministerial Attempts.

IF the representatives are not all infatuated with a lust of dignities, if there be some who cast not longing looks towards office, if there be a few who have even such greatness of soul as to disdain a bribe, yet their want of spirit and steadiness in opposing the ministerial attempts ever renders their virtue fruitless.

Whilst the creatures of the Prince eagerly pursue some illegal scheme, let the current run ever so strongly, if the patriotic members were determined to strive against it to the last, although they may not be able to stop or turn its course, their resistance would at least restrain its fury. But instead of defending with indefatigable zeal the cause of liberty, the languid patriots give way, satisfied with having made a feeble resistance or entered a protest.

Disgusted at their little influence, many of them give not even a constant attendance, and let their antagonists obtain the advantage of an undefended cause over a scattered party.

Thus, from a want of spirit and steadiness in the unbribed representatives, power advances with rapid steps towards despotism.

CHAP. XLIX. Of preventing Insurrections.

THE Prince, when his designs prove abortive, loses only his time; but when the efforts of the subjects to shake off their yoke prove unsuccessful, they generally lose the means of making a new attempt.

After Princes have plunged their dominions into the calamities of civil war, instead of reforming their administration, and regaining the affections of their injured people, they think only how to suppress their complaints, and render their efforts fruitless: They cannot renounce that supreme power, that boundless authority, that absolute empire, which has already cost them so many efforts, so many crimes.

From experience, they learn how to prevent insurrections. In the beginning of a storm, the mischief is not discovered: when it blows with fury, the remedy is not perceived. Thus they have their eyes ever open on the slightest commotions, careful to appease them as soon as raised.

Not satisfied with this, they oftentimes are intent to extirpate the seeds of them. Under colour of securing public tranquillity, they forbid all routs, conventicles, clandestine meetings, and tumultuous assemblies: Some, even by a more refined craft, will not allow any persons to crowd about popular men, and are so wary as to make away with those who are the darlings of the people.

On his return to Paris, J. J. Rousseau used to pass a few moments at a coffee-house[*] in his neighbourhood; but as his presence attracted great crowds of curious people, he was forbid by the lieutenant of the police to frequent any coffee-house.

The watermen at Venice quarrelling one day with the populace, they came to blows. As the magistrates could not suppress the disorder, a patrician of the house of Lauredano interposed, and the mutineers yielded to his entreaties; but the inquisitors of state, dreading the great influence of this nobleman over the people, dispatched him secretly[†].

Nay, in order to obviate all insurrection, it is the craft of those who rule at Venice, to persecute till death the persons they have once injured; and that the friends of these unfortunate persons, or such as have escaped from their hands, might not conspire, the Council of the Ten issues out from time to time certain proclamations[‡], promising large sums to any one who should reveal any crime of state, or bring the head of a proscript.

Notes

*
Le Caffé de la Regence.
↵

†
Amelot de la Houssaye, Governement de Venice, tom. ii. Machiavel, in his Prince.
↵

‡

These proclamations are called vulgarly, Bando contaglia.

↵

CHAP. L. Of suppressing those Offices which share Power.

TO secure their power, Princes multiply offices and dignities: but when once secured, to enlarge its boundaries, they reduce the number of them.

Not content with being at the head of affairs, they are anxious to dispose of every thing. Having filled with their creatures the high places of government, they proceed to invest in themselves all offices which share authority, or to suppress them[*]. Ever fixing their eyes on those on whom high trusts have been conferred, they wait only for an opportunity to dispossess them. When an opportunity offers not itself, they start it: they raise enemies to the high officers of the state to charge them with negligence or misdemeanor. If they find any guilty, they utter loud complaints against these bad servants, and suppress the functions of their office under pretence of reforming abuses[*].

To those, they cannot convict of any misdemeanor, they give many causes of disgust, they make them feel the weight of authority, and artfully provoke them to furnish reasons for being dismissed, or to resign a place they can hold no longer: but great care is taken to leave these places vacant, or to grant them as commissions under pleasure only[†].

But to veil their designs, and not to discontent every one, Princes substitute for offices of trust places without authority, dignities which flatter avarice or pride without feeding ambition, and thus secure the concerned party. Those they cannot pay with realities, they pay with promises.

When the Prince cannot seize all offices and dignities which share authority, and vest them in the crown, he associates himself thereto, places himself at the head of orders, corporations, tribunals, and soon usurps all their power[*].

At other times, instead of suppressing offices, he lets them become extinct[†].

At length, to remain the sole master of the state, he boasts of being the father of his people, and wholly engaged[†] with the care of promoting public happiness, he takes upon himself the management of affairs, orders his subjects to address directly his person, takes cognizance of every thing, examines every thing, and disposes of every thing. The simple multitude then beholds with admiration his air of benevolence, his attendance to public affairs, his zeal for their well-being; they expect their felicity therefrom, but perceive not that the Prince conceals his ambitious designs under this outside of goodness, and seeks only to render himself independent.

Notes

*

To enlarge his authority, Edward I. united the jurisdiction of the dignity of an Earl, which was hereditary, to that of the office of a sheriff, which was during pleasure: he moreover suppressed the office of high justice, which he considered as formidable to the crown itself. Hume's History of England.

After the death of the Marshal Lesdiguieres, Louis XIII. suppressed the office of Constable of France. Le Vassor. Hist. de Louis XIII. vol. vii.

Alphonso de Vago, in his expedition against Arragon, ordered Don John de Lanuza, great justiza of that kingdom, to be executed; and with him were buried the immense prerogatives of this office. Desormeaux, Abreg-Chronol. de l' Hist. d'Espag.

At the death of the Infant Don Philip, the dignities of great Admiral and great Prior of Castile were abolished. Idem.

Philip V. having concluded a treaty with the Emperor Charles VI. who at length acknowledged him for King of Spain, suppressed the office of Constable of Castile. Idem.

Louis XIV. having resolved to sit in person at the helm, took upon himself the direction of the finances, and suppressed the office of Colonel of the French Infantry,—an office of very great consequence, as it had the prerogative of disposing of all military places. Voltaire, Siecle de Louis XIV.

↵

*

After the revolt of the Duke de Montmorency, Louis XIII. deprived the governors of provinces almost entirely of their power. At present they have no authority in their own government, unless by virtue of a particular commission; they are not even permitted to reside therein without permission: and when a critical juncture requires their presence, temporary commanders are sent in their room.

↵

†

There are at present in France no offices of any authority but in the hands of the king's commissioners. The office of farmer general, of engineer of the king's roads, controller of finances, inspector of manufactories, commissary of war, marshall and admiral, subdelegate, intendant, chancellor, &c are all places during pleasure: and it is much the same in other kingdoms.

↵

*

To deprive the military orders of St. Jago, Calatrava, and Alcantara, of their power, Ferdinand of Arragon artfully prevailed on the knights of each order to place him at their head, and thus annexed the mastership of them to the crown. Marian. Hist. Lib. xxv.

In order to divest wholly the inquisition of Portugal of its authority, Joseph de Braganza placed himself at the head of it.

↵

†

Thus became extinct the Spanish council of state, formerly so celebrated, wherein all grandees who had distinguished themselves in the dignities of viceroy, ambassador, commander of armies, had a right to be admitted. Desormeaux, Abreg. Chron. de l'Hist. d'Esp.

↵

†

Philip V. before suppressing the office of constable of Castile, and modelling anew the army, issued out a proclamation, expressed in the most specious terms, wherein he says, among many other flattering things, "that he so eagerly sought for peace, in order only to apply himself with success in promoting the happiness of his people;— a people whose services, zeal, courage, and fidelity, he could never extol too much." Idem.

↵

CHAP. LI. To incapacitate the People from attempting any Insurrection.

POWER now advances by rapid steps towards despotism. The Prince, on the point of making any bold attempt, prepares his engines. If he can do without the legislature, he carefully abstains from assembling them; if their concurrence is absolutely necessary, he again employs his former arts to influence them, and by bribes, promises, threats, secures a strong party; when secured, he ventures to assemble this pretended sovereign, and makes it resolve what he pleases.

The subjects, wholly engaged with their private affairs, or careless of public interests, take no notice of the blind devotion of the senate to the court, and the Prince continues with eagerness to urge on the execution of his designs. Yet if any one should attempt to open the eyes of the public, the ministry, under pretence of maintaining good order, persecute this zealous patriot; then confounding the cause of the crown with that of the laws, they charge him with refractory proceedings, and have him punished as a disturber of the public peace.

If the public open their eyes and complain, they are amused by frivolous objects, calculated only to fix unquiet minds, or their attention is engaged by a politic war.

Under colour of securing national interests, or vindicating the glory of the state, the Prince arraigns a neighbouring power, demands subsidies from his people, raises new troops, nominates to military[*] offices restless and suspected men, gives secret orders to the commanding officers to expose them in dangerous stations, or has them dispatched in the dark.

Attentive to what passes out of the state, the people perceive not what passes within, and the Prince continues to enlarge the boundaries of prerogative, or rather to usurp power.

To carry on the war, new subsidies are demanded, a part of which are carefully laid by.

The war being at an end, the people, elated with their victories or depressed by their calamities, resign themselves to joy, or labour to retrieve their losses: and whilst they, wholly engaged by private affairs, lose sight of public ones, the Prince eagerly pursues his ambitious projects.

During the course of a long government, liberty is destroyed by gradual alterations, and is ever recovered by violent efforts only: but the Prince takes such cautious measures that, once subdued, the subjects may never be enabled to break their yoke again. Under pretence of securing the safety of the realm, he undertakes to become absolute master of it. Accordingly he begins by having the old fortresses repaired, then proceeds to have new ones constructed[*], at first on the borders, afterwards in the interior part of the country; in fine, he orders citadels to be built in every important town, increases the garrisons, and renders the military establishment numerous and formidable. Thus under the fair name of public good, the Prince seizes, by degrees, every post which leaves a communication between the inhabitants of the several parts of the state, and cuts off every means of ever uniting[†] their forces again, or appearing in detached parties, without being cut in pieces by mercenary troops[*]. When once the people can no longer appear in a body, the sovereign is considered as being annihilated.

Notes

*

It was in order to make away with troublesome subjects, not to stop the progress of Philip, that Henry III. of France sent, in 1589, a fleet to the Terceres, and an army to the Duke d'Alençon.

↵

*

Philip II. of Spain, to render himself absolute, ordered a great number of fortresses to be constructed in his dominions, and a citadel in every large town. Desormeaux, Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist. d'Espag.

The duke d'Alba, governor of the Netherlands, intending to lay a grievous tax, nominated alcavala, ordered a citadel to be built in almost every town. Idem.

In France, every province is thick set with strong places, and there is no considerable town without a citadel. Almost all other countries in Europe exhibit the same scene. Fortanately we are an exception, and how carefully is this advantage to be preserved! As long as administration shall consine their projects to have strong places constructed on the sea-coasts, let them carry them into execution undisturbed: but from the instant they shall attempt, under any pretence whatsoever, to have any fortress or citadel built in the interior part of the kingdom, we are undone, unless a national opposition ensues.

↵

†

Princes dread nothing so much as the union of their subjects. When Charles I. under colour of securing the safety of the realm, exacted a loan to the full value of the subsidies voted in the parliament hold in 1628, the following instruction, among others, was given to the commissioners appointed to levy the loan, "That they treat apart with every one of those who were to lend money, and not in the presence or hearing of any other, unless they see cause." Macaul. Hist. England.

The French administration were at infinite pains during the minority of Louis XIV. to prevent the conferences of the chambers of the parliament of Paris, on account of an edict relative to the tarif et droit annuel. "As in these sort of conferences," said the minister, "the freedom of speech is not any way curbed, they ought not to be held without the express permission of the king. The regency," added he, "is ready to hear the remonstrances and demands of all the chambers, but of every one apart." Hist. du Card. Mazarine.

↵

*

"Gli huomini," says Machiavel in his Prince, "si vindicano d'elle legiere offese, d'elle gravi non possono; si chè l'offesa che si fà all' huomo deve effer in modo chè non si tema la vendetta." Princes strictly follow this odious lesson, and far from leaving any means to their subjects of defending their liberty, they even deprive them of every mean of attempting it.

↵

CHAP. LII. Of accustoming the People to military Expeditions.

HAVING incapacitated the inhabitants of the several provinces from ever uniting their efforts for their common defence, and those of the towns from making any attempt for their own safety, Princes accustom the people to military expeditions; and, under colour of securing public peace, soldiery are by degrees substituted for civil officers.

Soldiers are appointed to arrest offenders, soldiers are appointed to wait on malefactors going to execution, soldiers are appointed to clear highways. In places of public diversion, in auction rooms, in places of public exhibition, sentinels are placed at the doors: in all places where the people meet, soldiers watch over them, and for fear of any nocturnal attempt, soldiers even then serve as guard.[*]

Notes

*

I am sensible that many things in this work have no relation to our own actual situation; and in this we are to be accounted happy: how much more so should we be, had we not so great a concern in the rest!

↵

CHAP. LIII. Of securing the Fidelity of the Army.

IN order that those men who are placed at the head of the troops, might support the overgrown power of the crown, and not controul it, Princes are not satisfied with having suppressed every military office of too great influence, but divide the army into many small bodies, among which they incite jealousy by means of peculiar distinctions. The command of these small bodies they confer on devoted men alone, and the better to secure their fidelity, they establish in every body several degrees of command, which officers are promoted to slowly by rotation, and rapidly by preferment. Hence every subaltern officer not only considers him who fills the next superior degree to his own as an obstacle to advancement, and looks upon him with a jealous eye: but the most ambitious among them seek to rise by fawning adulations, vile services, and assiduity in courting the Prince; whilst those who are raised labour to secure favour by a blind devotion to his commands.

In regard to the high military offices, great care is taken not to confer them on any darling of the people, and never to join them to any civil office. Distrust is sometimes carried so far as to place at the head of the army soldiers of fortune only, to change frequently the general officers, to incite between them competition, to set inspectors over them, and never to allow the troops to be long stationed in the same place[*].

When the Prince dispenses with commanding the army in person; in order to trust the command without danger into other hands, he gives it to several, who have never a full power granted them to act as they should think fit; their operations being always inspected by a council of war, if not directed by the cabinet itself. Having modelled the army at will, he caresses the military, ties them to his interest by largesses, and renders them the sole objects of his favour.

Thus Princes form to themselves a devoted party, ever on foot against the people, and impatiently look for an opportunity of making use of it.

Notes

*
Such is the craft of the Venetians.
↵

CHAP. LIV. To secure the military from civil Power.

THE soldier, being in a free country ever subject to the laws and restrained by the magistrates, acknowledges his duty, and preserves in his new station some notions of justice; he is taught to respect the citizens, and is prevented from being made conscious of his influence[*]. Hence the Prince, in order to teach the military to depend on[†] him only, and render them the devoted instruments of his will, secures them[*] from civil power: they are made accountable to him alone; and if they either plot, mutiny, pillage, commit rapes, or murders; always a Martial Court is appointed to judge the delinquents.

Notes

*

The supreme power is possessed in every society by those who have arms in their hands.

↵

†

In almost every state in Europe, the military take the following oath of fidelity: the soldiers, that they shall obey no other command but that of their officers; and the officers, that they shall defend the throne, and never attack it.

↵

*

In this country, the Prince indeed takes no such steps: but he frequently renders null the sentence passed on military malefactors; and, in favour of notorious villains, makes use of a prerogative conferred on the crown to save unfortunate, not wilful offenders.

↵

CHAP. LV. To inspire the Military with Contempt for the Citizens.

AS the military are the instruments destined to enlarge the Prince's authority, in order to prepare them to act against the people in a favourable juncture, they are separated from them[†], quartered in barracks; and afterwards inspired with contempt for every profession except their own. But to render them conscious of their pre-eminence, many marks of distinction are conferred on them[*]. Used to despise the citizens, they soon become desirous to oppress them, and ever ready to fall upon that part of the realm which should attempt to make an insurrection[†].

Notes

†

I am not ignorant of what has been alledged against the quartering of soldiers upon free subjects; but however grievous a burthen it may be to have such vicious guests, I am far from assenting to the common opinion. The nuisance complained of may be removed by enacting severe laws against the encroachments and violences of soldiers, by not authorizing them to demand for their groat a day more than is in the power of the landlord to afford, by commissioning civil officers alone to billot them, and by enforcing them to do it in an impartial manner. On the contrary, to lodge the military in barracks, is at once to divest them of that little humanity which they pick up by conversing with the honest part of the world, to corrupt them the more by their abandoned intercourse, and to qualify them for a military government. In the first case, the evil is accidental, but is unavoidable in the last; and since, from the criminal ambition of Princes, we are to undergo one or the other under pretence of common safety, let us submit to the least of them.

When, in the reign of William III. administration induced the commons to enact a law for quartering of soldiers either in public or private houses, they knew not how favourable it would prove to their projects to crowd soldiers together in barracks: but this they have since learned from other powers. An attempt is now making to separate the soldiery from the people. Already troopers, under pretence of keeping them near their riding houses, are quartered in a sort of obscure barracks, till they may be quartered in proper ones; the progress is slow, but God forbid we should behold such establishments with indifference.

↵

*

In Russia every body is obliged to yield the precedency to military men. At Berlin the same regard is paid to a detachment of soldiers passing in the streets, as in Catholic countries to the viaticum.

In France, the soldier looks upon the burgesses with contempt, and believes himself privileged to insult them: the officer disdains merchants, men of letters, and magistrates: the nobility de l'Epée, as they are called, despise the nobility de la Robe. So likewise in Spain, Portugal, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, &c. and in all these countries every sentinel has a scandalous prerogative to wash away the least affront with the blood of subjects.

↵

†
This is to be seen in Turkey, China, Indostan, France, Spain, Russia, &c.
↵

CHAP. LVI. Of Usury, Exactions, and Extortions.

IT is a favourite maxim with the cabinet, that if the people are too rich, or even too much at ease, it will prove impossible to keep them submissive; whilst men rendered dependent by their wants, destitute of the means of opposing resistance, and ashamed of their poverty, are conscious of their subjection, and much more disposed to obey[†]. Hence, far from releasing the people, Princes ever charge them with heavy taxes. But as if this did not suffice, among the various means they have recourse to, in order to impoverish their subjects, usury, exactions, and extortions are oftentimes made use of.

The Roman senate, not satisfied with levying the taxes, disposing of the public money, and appropriating to themselves the lands of the vanquished enemies, used to prey on the plebeians by usury.

Such was the craft of the antients, that of the moderns is much more refined: they borrow at large interest the money of the public; and these depositums of the fortunes of the subjects, like chains, tie the people two ways. On one side, they are a badge of subjection, the subjects being ever afraid to furnish a pretence for forfeiture from attempting to revolt: on the other side, they are arms in the hands of the Prince which enable him to crush those who have trusted him therewith.

Besides, when a favourable juncture offers, the Prince, either by retaining the interest for a long time, repaying the capital when the value of money is below par, or even by retaining the capital itself, reduces, by a single stroke, his subjects to that point of misery which they could not have been reduced to but gradually, by pursuing the former plan.

In these points of view, public funds trusted to government in France, Spain, the kingdom of Naples, &c. are to be considered.—A truth which those people have but too often sadly experienced.

In England such steps have never been taken, and perhaps never will; yet public loans bind us not the less strongly: for by their means the government has intertwined itself with the property of the people, in such a manner that it is impossible to lay the ax to the root of the former without destroying the latter.

As soon as the government becomes debtor, those who are creditors, made sensible that the sums intrusted are lost if government securities fail, are ever ready to subscribe fresh ones, in order to furnish it with means for defending them. And this newly raised money may be employed for a different purpose.

If to secure a fund for the payment of interest, any regulation destructive of liberty should be thought absolutely necessary, the party concerned, that is, that part of the nation which is the most regarded, would consent to it, rather than run the risk of being ruined by a state bankruptcy. If any one should treat this as a chimerical supposition, let them remember the excise laws. Moreover, as by the negociation of loans, and the creation or management of funds, the interest of moneyed men is intimately connected with that of the court; not only the factors for administration and those dealers in the funds, who, for the sake of a lucrative share in some contract, are under ministerial influence, turn courtiers, and cringe at levees, procure themselves seats in parliament, and assist the Prince to enslave their country; but the locust tribe of subscribers, brokers, ticket-mongers, and all those who act or seek to act that dirty part, on all occasions appear the avowed advocates of every corrupt minister, induce the timid, the weak, the fickle, the sordid, and the indolent, to follow their example, furnish their patron with a pretence to urge in excuse of his misconduct, raises their clamours against the complaints of true patriots, smother the voice of the nation, and become a dangerous faction in support of tyranny.

Nor are even these the worst measures that are planned by some Princes to ruin the people.

Sometimes, in order to impoverish their subjects and enrich themselves, they debase the coin, that is, reduce its intrinsic value without altering its current one.

At other times, they prey upon the subjects by the most flagrant extortions; they even commit them to prison, in order to oblige them to recover their liberty by paying heavy ransoms.

Thus having induced their subjects to contract many wants by encouraging luxury, it is the craft of Princes to deprive them afterwards of the means of indulging them, or rather to drive them from dependance to servitude.

Notes

†
See the Political Testament of the Cardinal of Richelieu.
↵

CHAP. LVII. To undermine the Supreme Authority.

THE Prince, having secured the army, now labours to secure the legislature, or to render its power vain. When on the point of making any bold attempt, if he can do without the concurrence of the representatives of the sovereign, he carefully abstains from calling them together. If their concurrence is absolutely necessary, they are not suffered to proceed to any other transaction, but that for which they have been assembled.

Charles V. having summoned the cortes of Castile to meet at Compostella, engaged them to grant him a subsidy. With this grant, the cortes laid before the king a representation of those grievances whereof his people craved redress; but he having obtained from them all that he could expect, paid no attention to their petition[*].

Such was the practice of Charles I. When he was in want of money, he assembled parliament, and hurried the bill for subsidies: then to prevent them from taking cognizance of the public grievances, he lulled them into security by fair promises, assured them that he would be ever careful to preserve the liberties of his people; engaged the speaker to interrupt every debate foreign to the bill for subsidy, expelled out of the house the warmest patriots, by incapacitating them from serving as representatives, or prorogued, if not dissolved the parliament.

To accomplish their designs, Princes sometimes again put in practice their former arts, they corrupt the legislature, and make it speak as they please.

At other times they terrify the party in opposition by threats, or they have the register of the votes altered.

It was by terror that Henry VIII. kept the parliament submissive to his will. The members, free only in the senate, were, as soon as the sessions was prorogued, left defenceless to the mercy of this tyrant.

Charles I. intending to have an act passed in the parliament of Scotland, for the resumption of those church lands and titles, which had been alienated in the minority of the former reign, was careful to be present at the debate. But meeting with a great opposition, he pulled out of his pocket a list of all the members that composed the house, adding, "Gentlemen, I have all your names on this paper, and I will know who will do me service, and who will not, this day." Notwithstanding the king's threatenings, the bill was rejected by the majority; but the clerk of the register, who gathered the votes, removed this difficulty by declaring that it was carried in the affirmative[*].

Princes, in order to influence at will the legislative body, oftentimes endeavour to procure a choice of representatives favourable to their designs. Thus Henry VIII. and Mary, when they desired to carry any important point, used to write circular letters to the lord lieutenants in the counties, directing a proper choice of members[†].

Actuated by the same views, James II. artfully resumed the charters of all corporations in the kingdom, and granted them new ones, drawn up in such a form that it was in a manner left to the king to nominate the representatives.

If this suffices not, Princes have sometimes recourse to another method. They suffer none to fit in the senate but those who are known to have no virtue, after having excluded all others who are suspected to have any.

In the exigencies of affairs in 1656, a parliament was summoned, but Cromwell finding that the majority of the members returned would be unfavourable to his interests, placed guards at the doors of the house; and, under pretence of excluding men of corrupted principles, permitted none to enter but such as produced a warrant from his council.

Some Princes, in order that the legislature should be entirely at their disposal, have even by violence altered the constitution.

In 1539, Charles V. demanded extraordinary subsidies from the cortes of Castile; but having vainly employed entreaties, promises, and threats, in order to obtain his demand, he dismissed the assembly with indignation, and excluded out of these assemblies the nobles and prelates, under pretence that such as pay no part of the public taxes had no vote to claim in laying them on. Hence none were admitted to the cortes but the deputies of the towns, who being in too small a number, and too feeble to oppose the king, were all at his devotion[*].

Other Princes have divided the legislative body, and made the prostituted part pass for the whole.

During our civil war of 1641, Charles I. in order to abate the veneration paid to the patriotic representatives, and avail himself of the name of the legislature, with a view of levying the sums which were necessary to carry on the war, summoned the parliament at Oxford; and having collected there all the members of either house, who adhered to his interests, he endeavoured to insinuate, that the two houses sitting at Westminster were not a legal convention, attempted to prevail with the earl of Essex, general of the parliament, to treat with those proscripts, and engaged that prostituted assembly to pass several acts, to grant him subsidies, and to declare the faithful members guilty of high treason[*].

The Prince, by engaging the legislature to yield constantly to his will, and having hereby abased them, has no more recourse to craft; he assumes the stile of a master, and if he still continues to assemble them, it is only to give law.

Notes

*
Sandoval. 84.
↵

*
Burnet, vol. i. p. 21.
↵

†
Mem. of Cramm. p. 344.
↵

*
Sandoval. Hist. vol. ii. p. 269.
↵

*
Husband's Collections.
↵

CHAP. LVIII. To usurp Supreme Power.

ARRIVED to this point, Princes eagerly consummate their iniquitous designs. Earnest to see the people their slaves, to reduce them to servitude, they oftentimes turn against them the constitution itself.

In a government wherein the activity of the legislative power depends on the will of the executive one, the legislature never can appear but when the Prince gives his orders, and never answer but when he interrogates them: in order, therefore, to annihilate their power, they are no longer called together. When once the legislature are sunk into oblivion, the Prince imperceptibly usurps their functions: he ventures to issue, by his own authority, some ordinances, at first on trifling objects, afterwards on objects more important; he then by degrees repeats this practice, accustoms the people to that usurpation of authority, and at length finds himself invested with the power of enacting laws.

Thus the kings of France have usurped sovereignty. At the origin of that monarchy, royal prerogative was limited to the executive power; the supreme power resided in the general assemblies[*] of the nation, which met annually at stated seasons, and in which every freeman had a right[†] to assist. Their authority was extended to every department of government. Such as electing kings, granting subsidies, enacting laws, redressing national grievances, passing judgment in the last resort with respect to every cause[*], in a word, whatever related to the general welfare of the nation, was submitted to their deliberation, and determined by their suffrages[†]: the King having only a right to give his assent to the public resolutions, and none to refuse it[‡]. Such was the French government under the monarchs of the first race.

Notwithstanding the power and splendor which Charlemagne added to the crown by his conquests, the general assemblies of the nation continued to possess extensive authority, under the kings of the second race. They determined which of the royal family should be placed on the throne: the Prince elected, consulted them regularly with respect to every affair of importance to the state, and without their consent no law was passed, and no new tax levied.

Under the degenerate posterity of Charlemagne, royal authority was reduced almost to nothing. Every baron had formed his lands into a small state almost independent of the king. The kingdom being thus broken into so many small districts, every one of which acknowledged a distinct lord, was governed by local customs, and pursued separate interests, hardly any common principle of union remained. Hence the general assemblies scarcely considering the nation as forming one body, could no longer enact common laws; and thus part of the legislative power was left inactive.

Under the descendants of Hugh Capet, the jurisdiction of these assemblies extended no further than to the imposition of new taxes, the determination of the successor to the crown, and the settling the regency, when the preceeding monarch had not fixed it by his will.

It was left to the king to summon the national assemblies; but as the ordinary charges of government were supported by the crown demesns, he called them together but seldom, and only when he was compelled by his wants or his fears to have recourse to their aid. Thus the obligation of summoning them regularly forming no essential point of the constitution, in order to render their power null, the Prince artfully avoided assembling them.

When the functions of this power had been a long while suspended, the kings assumed them, but ventured at first on acts of legislation with great reserve, and took every precaution that could prevent the people from being alarmed at the exercise of a new power. Concealing their authority as much as they could, they began to issue their ordinances, not in a tone of command but of request; they appeared to treat with their subjects, they pointed out what was best, and allured them to comply with it.

As the power of the crown extended, this humble stile gave place to an imperious tone; and in the beginning of the fifteenth century the king openly assumed the stile of a law-giver.

The last of the Capitularia collected by Baluze, was issued in the year 921, under Charles the Simple. In the middle of the eleventh century, were published some royal ordinances, contained in the collection of Lauriére; but the first ordinance extending to the whole kingdom, and being, properly speaking, an act of legislation, is that of Philip Augustus, issued in the year 1190. The establishments of St. Louis were not published as general laws to the whole kingdom, but as a code of laws, to be of authority within the crown domains only. The veneration of the people for this Prince procured this code a favourable reception throughout the whole kingdom, and contributed not a little to reconcile the nation to the usurpation of the legislative authority. The people, accustomed to see their monarch, by his private authority, issue ordinances in points of the greatest importance, were not surprised when they saw him issue them for levying subsidies for the support of the government. When Charles VII. and Louis XI. first ventured to exercise this new power, the minds of the people were so well prepared by the gradual incroachments of the crown, that it scarce gave rise to any murmur.

In proportion as kings continued to exercise acts of legislation, their subjects ceased to be surprised; they forgot at last that the crown had usurped the legislative authority: and at present the idea of this authority having been vested in the crown during every period of the monarchy, is so universal in France, that any assertion to the contrary would be deemed absurd.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

WHEN the Prince cannot cause the legislature to sink into oblivion, he attempts to seize upon its authority by every mean whatever.

Justice, goodness, honour, virtue, are to be relinquished to private men alone, say the abetters of tyranny; those at the helm must act from other principles. All is permitted to the man who attempts to ascend a throne; when seated thereon, all must be sacrificed to enlarge the boundaries of his prerogative; on the least ground, suspected persons ought to be made away with; no word, no engagement, no oath, ever so solemn, ought to be regarded, no blood to be spared, when an obstacle to his obtaining absolute empire. These horrid lessons are erected into maxims of policy, and these fatal maxims have been a copious source of odious crimes, covered with the specious denomination of Acts of great Policy [*].

How many of these acts of great policy, are swallowed up by time and buried in the night of oblivion; yet how many are still recorded in history!

In order to seize the supreme authority at Syracuse, Agathocles summoned the senate and the people, ordered all the senators and the most conspicuous citizens to be put to death by his guards, and placed himself on the throne.

Alfonso, son of Ferdinand I. with a view to crush at once the power of the Neapolitan nobles, and render himself absolute, cut off the barons of the greatest reputation and influence among them[*].

Caesar Borgia, that he might intirely reduce the Romagna to subjection, deputed Renaro Dorca thereto with full power. But fearing the shocking cruelties committed against the insurgents had rendered his authority too odious, and desiring to appease the minds of the people, he joined perfidy to barbarity, disowned the conduct of his minister, and ordered him to be quartered in the public place[†].

The Venetians, weary of the long and tyrannic domination of their Prince, reassumed, in 1171, the reins of government. They continued, indeed, to elect a doge, but fixed such boundaries to his power, that scarce any thing was left him but a title. The supreme authority resided in the people at large: however, as the concurrence of every one to every thing was impossible, they transferred the sovereignty to a council composed of 470 citizens, nominated by 12 electors; but that every one might have his turn, there was to be yearly a new election on St. Michael's day. The authority of this council was unbounded, and by leaving it so, the people were soon reduced to subjection by their representatives[*]. On pretence of reforming abuses, the doge Pietro Gradenigo overturned the form of government; he had an act passed by the criminal quarantia, declaring, that all those who actually composed the council, or had composed it the four preceding years, should, they or their descendants, for the future continue to compose it[*]; thus investing the representatives of the people with the whole administration of affairs, he wrested all authority out of the hands of the sovereign[†].

Cromwell returning victorious from his expedition into Scotland, was honoured with a deputation from parliament, and other marks of distinction. He then entered the capital in triumph, and as every one earnestly sought his favour, this crafty dissembler only thought how to reconcile to himself all parties. At first he made use of his credit to obtain for the royalists better terms, he captivated the affections of the presbyterians by an affected austerity of manners, seduced the bigots by exclaiming against the looseness of the ministers of religion, flattered the army by causing them to entertain suspicions about the parliament, and gained the affections of the whole nation by earnestly soliciting a new election of representatives. He afterwards filled with his creatures all military places, and the first civil offices, incited the malcontents to rise, repaired to parliament followed by a band of devoted satellites, charged the patriotic members with ambitious designs, and expelled them the house. No sooner did Cromwell become sole master of the government by this act of violence, but he formed a cabinet council of the chief officers of the army who were the most in his interests, placed himself at the helm, and had a new parliament elected: but not finding them enough submissive, he engaged the prostituted members to rise, and to resign into his hands their authority: in fine, he expelled the patriotic party, and usurped the supreme power under the specious denomination of Protector.

Whilst the senators were assembled, Christian III. of Sweden, complained to his guards of the little regard these Magistrates paid him; aided by them, he then secured their persons, obliged them to resign their places, which he conferred on his creatures, rewarded his adherents, assembled his troops, bestowed gratifications on the officers, exhorted his subjects to be submissive, and remained in peaceable possession of the sovereignty.

Notes

*
These assemblies were denominated Champs de Mars or de May. See Pasquier, Mezeray, le Pere Daniel, &c.
↵

†

The antient annals of the Francs describe the persons who were present at the assembly held A. D. 788, in these words: In placito Ingelheimensi conveniunt pontifices, majores, minores, sacerdotes, reguli, duces, comites, prefecti, cives, oppidani, &c. Sorberus, art. 304.

↵

*

The capitularia, that is, the laws enacted in those assemblies, were relating the one to political, the other to oeconomical, many to ecclesiastical, and some to civil government. See the Capitular. collected by Baluze.

In the Capitulare, A. D. 877, the oath Louis the Stammerer took at his coronation, begins thus, "Louis par la miséricorde de Dieu et l'election du peuple, je promets," &c.

↵

†
Amoinus de Gestis Francor. lib. iv. Bouquet Recueil, iii. 116, &c.
↵

‡
See Capitular. of Charles the Bald, A. D. 822, and 857.
↵

*

People ought to be governed by wise and virtuous men alone; but to their misfortune, and to their shame, they are almost ever ruled by fools or knaves.

↵

*
Giannone, Hist. di Nap. lib. xxviii. cap. 2.
↵

†
August. Niphus, de regnand. perit. lib. iii. cap. 9.
↵

*

When the sovereign acts by deputies, unless their power be limited by the fundamental laws of the state, a single attempt is oftentimes sufficient to ruin liberty. In this respect, the English constitution is extremely defective. Our representatives are the guardians of our rights; they must always defend, never attack them. But no boundaries have been fixed to their authority, in order to secure the constitution against their attempts. They enter into no engagements with their constituents. After they are elected, they take their place in the senate; and instead of considering themselves only as the defenders of the constitution, they believe themselves to be the arbiters of it; they have even altered it many times.

It was a fundamental law of the kingdom, that parliament should be held once every year, or more frequently, if necessary. During the reign of Edward I. this law was confirmed, but afterwards altered. Under Henry VIII. the parliament passed an act for prolonging its duration to seven years. This act was made triennial under Charles I. Under Charles II. it was changed to an act for the assembling and holding a parliament once in three years at least, and again rendered septennial in 1716. In every one of these acts of legislation, the parliament has overpassed the boundaries of its power. The right of determining the frequency of elections and sessions, unquestionably belongs to the people at large, and to the people at large alone. For if the representatives have a right to fix the duration of their commission to three or seven years, why not to extend it to fifteen, twenty, thirty, or rather to render it perpetual, that is to say, a right to render themselves independant, to overturn the constitution, to oppress their constituents, and reduce the nation to slavery?

One might imagine that the fatal consequences of this abuse have escaped and still escape our notice, when, among our most spirited patriots, many inconsiderate men are at infinite pains by their frequent motions for a triennial bill, to induce the people to acknowledge, as lawful, the authority of the parliament on that point.

What I say, on the frequency of elections, I say likewise on that of sessions, and generally with respect to whatever belongs to the fundamental laws of the state. With an unbounded power to redress public grievances, the representatives of the people ought to have none to alter the constitution, not even to render it perfect, without previously taking the advice of the nation. Notwithstanding the parliament have for a long time arrogated to themselves the right of extending their authority in every point, this right must be claimed by the people, and the utmost influence ought to be exerted in order to put themselves in possession of it. According as this point is gained or lost, we are free or slaves. As long as the power of our representatives is not confined within proper limits, liberty may be enjoyed, but is not firmly established; we have no other laws but the decrees of our deputies; thus absolute masters of our birth-rights, they may subject us to the yoke, tyrannize over us, and forbid us even to complain.

I do not say, that the legislature intends to make so iniquitous an use of their power; but they can, when they please, as long as their power is not reduced within proper bounds. But how is their power to be reduced? The union of the people, not the step which ought to be taken, is the chief point to be attended to. However our measures be planned, they will always prove successful when we pursue them in concert, and we may do it, as soon as willing.

When, under Henry VIII. the parliament passed the septennial act, under Charles I. the triennial act, and under Charles II. the act for assembling and holding of parliament once in three years at least, the electors might be excused for not having disavowed their deputies; in those times of discord and confusion, to rescue the state from the brink of destruction was the only object in view: But at present, that superstition no more enflames and divides the minds of the people, if parliament should be ever so inconsiderate as to prolong its duration, and refuse, at the request of the nation, to recall the act, however hard be the necessity of vindicating liberty by force, the nation ought not to defer a moment to take up arms. This is the case of a just revolt.

↵

*
That act of policy the Venetians have denominated, Il serrar d'el Consiglio.
↵

†
Contarini Hist. Venet. lib. viii.
↵

CHAP. LIX. Of violent Measures.

WHEN the people, incensed at such outrageous attempts, make an insurrection, the Prince orders troops to march against them, and if his own forces be not sufficient, he has recourse to his neighbours[*]; he then exhorts his subjects to return to obedience, threatens to employ force in case they should oppose, and gives them to understand that they must submit without terms.

Thus Princes begin by craft to reduce their subjects to subjection, and afterwards enslave them by violence.

Notes

*

There is a tacit covenant between Princes, they reciprocally offer their arms to each other, and reciprocally unite their forces in order to crush the people who rise against oppression. When our forefathers had sentenced Charles I. to death, all the Princes in Europe proposed to make a league in order to vindicate their authority, which, as they pretended, had fallen into contempt by the punishment of that bad monarch.

↵

CHAP. LX. Inconsideration and Folly of the People.

NOT only the ambitious projects of Princes, their dark dealings, their villanous attempts, establish slavery; but the inconsideration and folly of the people also prepare the way to tyranny.

In a free government, when care is not taken from time to time to bring back the constitution to its first principles, in proportion as the epoch of its origin becomes remote, the people lose sight of their rights, they soon forget them in part, and afterwards retain no notion of them. The people, by long losing sight of their rights, by ever seeing the Prince at the helm, and by ever obeying his commands, at length consider themselves as mere cyphers, and the Prince as sole master.

The only just aim of a political association, is the happiness of the people, and whatever be the pretensions of Princes, all other considerations ought to yield to public welfare; but the people are inclined to look upon the Prince's authority alone, as being sacred; they never believe themselves authorised to oppose by force his arbitrary mandates; to prevail with him they believe no means lawful but supplications[*], and are ever ready to submit to the most grievous oppression, rather than punish the Lord's anointed.

When subjects groan under the yoke of a cruel Prince, hardly any person finds fault; but when a whole nation passes sentence upon a tyrant, every one expresses his disapprobation[*].

As soon as the Prince can secure malefactors from punishment, duty is disregarded, and protection sought after.

Men, when protected, become proud of the disgraceful yoke of a despot, and are ashamed of the honourable restraint of laws[†].

Kings, magistrates, commanders of armies, and all those who, adorned with marks of power, hold the reins of the empire or direct public affairs, are objects of public admiration—Like antient idols, stupidly admired and adored.

Besides pageantry, the people respect in Princes the advantage of birth[*], a fine[†] stature, beauty; and these frivolous endowments serve not less to encrease their empire, than they do that of love.

The good successes of Princes supply their want of merit with the people: for although events be ever so much accidental, they always consider brilliant successes as the effects of ability in those who command, and this much contributes to increase the veneration the people show to them[‡].

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

BUT nothing contributes to it so much as the stupid admiration of the people for certain striking characters.

Let a Prince be diligent, resolute, valiant, enterprising, and magnificent, no more is wanting; if disgraced by a thousand vices, those few good qualities are thought to be a sufficient endowment.

We do not pass the same judgment upon Princes as upon private persons. We only consider their actions as being bold, great, extraordinary, instead of considering them as being just, good or virtuous. We overlook their disregard of their word, their want of honour, their treachery, perjury, treason, unmercifulness, cruelty; we admire their magnificent follies, instead of looking upon them with indignation; we praise their iniquitous undertakings, instead of branding them with infamy; and oftentimes are so inconsiderate as to reward with a crown, crimes which merited capital punishment.

Let us overlook the encomiums bestowed on Alexander, Caesar, Henry VIII. Charles V.; and from the many instances recorded in history, select that of Louis XIV. whom courtiers, poets, academicians, and historians have so greatly cried up, whom inconsiderate men have so stupidly admired, but whose memory good men ought to detest.

A good Prince ought to have constantly in view the welfare of his people; but, if the conduct of this monarch be attentively enquired into, it will appear, that during the whole course of his long reign, he only sought after what could be undertaken to his own glory: all his desires, all his discourses, all his actions ever aimed at fame: and to this deplorable folly he continually sacrificed the happiness of his subjects.

Instead of applying the public money to promote the true interests of the nation, he distributed it to his creatures; squandered it in feasts, balls, tournaments, in making cascades and waterworks amidst arid plains, and in forcing nature.

Instead of permitting his subjects to enjoy the fruits of industry and honest diligence amidst the blessings of peace, he sacrificed to the ambition of being distinguished as a conqueror, their tranquillity, their well-being, their blood: and, whilst disputing the laurels with the enemy, let them starve in the career of his victories[*].

To indulge his caprice, his pride, his wants ever new, not content with exhausting the produce of past years, he destroyed the promises of years to come, deeply involved the public in debt[†], and brought the greatest calamities upon his dominions.

Infatuated with a lust of power, he attempted to make all bow under him, crushed all those who opposed his will, and in order to show how unbounded was his authority, exerted his tyrannic empire over even the minds of his people, and armed a ferocious soldiery[*] against those subjects who refused to betray their consciences.

He erected indeed for the public some monuments of ostentation, hitherto so much celebrated; but had he remitted to his people the immense sums they cost, that money would have incomparably more contributed to the good of the public. Instead of a few infirm soldiers maintained in the Invalides, a multitude of husbandmen would have been preserved from beggary; with those sums he exacted from them, they had cultivated their fields, improved their small patrimonies, secured their subsistence, and their unhappy issue would not now linger in misery.

For a few idle persons to pass away their time in those spacious gardens which surround his palaces, what a multitude of useful labourers were reduced to wretched habitations! what a great number of them buried in the mud[†]!

He indeed promoted commerce, arts and sciences; but what are these advantages to the miseries he brought upon his dominions? what are they to the torrents of blood shed by his boundless ambition, to the indigence in which his overbearing pride plunged his people, to the sufferings of the multitudes he reduced to beggary? what are they to the calamities inseparable from that folly of ever keeping on foot a numerous army of idle satellites—a folly of which he first gave the example, and which, becoming epidemical, has seized Princes, and almost ruined Europe?

Monarchs are so accustomed to take advice in all public undertakings from their own passions only, and this abuse is the source of so many miseries, that the means of indulging such a fatal presumption cannot be too soon wrested out of their hands.

The true glory of Princes is the enforcing obedience to the laws, preserving the blessings of peace, and promoting the public welfare: but for our misfortune, and from our folly, it is not after this glory those at the helm aspire.

How inconsiderate is mankind! Are not the vices of Princes more than enough to effect our misery, without inciting them, by a stupid admiration of their follies, to aggravate our deplorable condition?

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

NOT only an extreme propensity in the people to be dazzled by the false lustre of pageantry, the ensigns or pomp of power, great undertakings and brilliant success, but their prejudices oftentimes contribute to confer new prerogatives on Princes.

The vulgar proportionate their respect to[*] power, not merit; they disregard monarchs who are not absolute, and reverence despots. Obedience on the throne is according to them equally ridiculous and contemptible. Sovereign without Power, Crowned Slave, these are the titles they give the Prince who is not powerful enought to crush them; but they admire him when he can silence the laws.

Men, far from opposing the attempts of the crown to usurp absolute authority, even dispute sometimes with each other who has the sad prerogative of being subject to the most powerful Prince.

The designs of administration must be private; they cannot be made public without divulging the secrets of government, and rendering its undertakings abortive: hence it is inferred, that the subject's glory consists in a passive obedience to the arbitrary commands of Princes.

The king having a right to appoint ministers, the people have no right to oppose them[*].

Certain people entertain the dangerous opinion that the glorious authority of a Prince consists in the servility[†] of his subjects: others pretend to the false glory of a loyalty proof against every consideration[‡]: and it is the folly of all nations to exult in the pretended wisdom of their own laws.

What people did ever deserve this last reproach more than ourselves? We never cease boasting of the excellencies of our constitution, and by continually extolling it, we are not sensible of its defects, and neglect to reform them.

The constitution of England is, no doubt, a monument of political wisdom, if compared to others; yet it is not so perfect as we are pleased to affirm, nor can it be so, considering its origin and its revolutions. If traced to its first principle, it will be found to be very simple, and such as suited uncivilized men; good enough for a people who subsisted by pillaging, but containing a thousand sources of anarchy.

As soon as these concealed causes unfolded themselves, the kingdom was tore by domestic factions, remained exposed to foreign invasion, became the prey of an usurper, and was reduced to the most deplorable subjection by its rulers. Under our kings of the houses of Plantagenet, Tudor, and Stuart, despotism was attached to the monarchy. The dispensing power, the power of rendering arbitrary judgments, of imprisoning, of exacting forced loans and benevolences, of pressing and quartering soldiers, of erecting monopolies, were all exercised in their turn.

Weary of groaning under oppression, we have sometimes attempted to shake off our yoke; but all our measures to recover liberty, far from being free national transactions, were mere acts of violence of the strongest party.

During our civil dissentions, every party, as it prevailed, has almost always been busy in crushing the others: and amidst the insolence of victory erected themselves as the masters of the nation.

Yet if ever the triumphing party stipulated for common liberty; unable, in the tumult of arms and the public agitation of mind, to establish it on a firm basis, in order to form a regular administration of justice, they have applied only a palliative remedy to the most urgent evils, and brought back the constitution to its first principles, or nearer its primitive institution.

The only favourable juncture for securing public liberty, was at the accession of the house of Brunswick; as the triumphant part then formed a great majority in the nation, and the Prince[*] was without ambitious designs; but this favourable juncture we let slip.

But I leave the consideration of defects which might have been reformed, for the examination of defects which still remain.

In a well constituted government, the people at large is the real sovereign, to them belongs supreme power: but among us the Prince has circumscribed the boundaries of national[*] liberties; whilst the nation ought to have circumscribed those of royal prerogative. This defect in the constitution is capital. Several of our kings have availed themselves of it to tyrannize over the subjects; it proved the cause of all the differences between Parliament and James I. Charles I. and Charles II. it was likewise in virtue of it that James II. reassumed the charters of the city of London, nay, those of all the corporations in the kingdom.

Yet let a veil be drawn over this humiliating origin of our birth-rights. Thus emancipated, had we at least recovered sovereignty: but we are still no more than an emancipated people; in no national transactions does the parliament appear conscious of their preeminence; in all their addresses to the throne, respecting affairs of public concern, they ever mention the king's person and prerogative in the first place; the religion, the laws, and liberty of the kingdom ever in the last.

The representatives of the people are admitted into the great council of the nation as trustees for the people, as well as councellors for the king; but in the oath of fidelity they take at their admission, they consider themselves as the king's servants only [*].

To the people at large only the legislative power ought to belong; this power they exercise either by themselves or by representatives: but among us one particular class of subjects share that power independently of any constitutive authority. By birth, they are the king's hereditary councellors, they make one of the three estates in conjunction with the lords spiritual, and with them, are supreme judges in the realm; nay, the arbiters of it: they dispose of the crown, when the throne becomes vacant, and pronounce in last resort upon all causes that have been decided in any of the courts of justice.

To such extensive power are annexed high dignity, and many prerogatives equally oppressive and insulting[*] to other subjects. It is for their sublime virtues and exalted merit, that they are honoured with a coronet? No, the fatal privileges which they claim and arrogate to themselves, are but the inheritance of the plunders, usurpations, and violences of their ancestors.

When the people at large cannot act by themselves, to them belongs the right of nominating their representatives; but among us this right is peculiar to a small part of the nation[†], to the prejudice of the rest. Nay, of this part of the nation, few individuals have as great influence as the most numerous corporations; many small boroughs having a right to send representatives in parliament. Let us overlook the monstrous abuse that four or five thatched houses should be upon a level in the great council of the nation with the largest cities of the kingdom: but these insignificant boroughts have been privileged by the crown for the purpose of corruption, and dependency; for by the influence of the court their members are always chosen.

In a moment of patriotic[*] fermentation, a law indeed was enacted for voiding all elections of parliament-men, where the elected members had been at any expence in meat, drink, or money, to procure votes: but was any provision made by that law for discovering and persecuting secret offenders; and do our elections the less exhibit scenes of scandalous transactions? Instead of seeing electors zealous to declare themselves for merit only, and candidates waiting for their lot with a becoming dignity: a cringing band of suitors are seen, bestowing, without shame, flatteries and bribes on men they look upon with contempt, the instant they have extorted their votes; and a prostituted herd of voters glutting themselves without remorse at lawless banquetings.

The people's representatives are the defenders, not the arbiters of the constitution. Guardians of the national rights, they ought always to defend and never attack them. Hence, although they may be intrusted with a boundless authority to redress public grievances, they ought to have only a limited one to enact statutes[*]: but where are the boundaries fixed to the power of our deputies, in order to secure from their attempts the sanctuary of the laws?

When the representatives are intrusted with an unlimited power, the people ought at least to have a constitutional authority to restrain or disown them as soon as they abuse their trust: By what obligations are our deputies restrained to the observance of the duties of their office? We have a right, indeed, to watch over their conduct; but when they make iniquitous laws, how are we to disown them? When they attack our liberties, how repress them? By petitioning the Prince? What a fine contrivance, to have recourse for redress of our grievances to the chief author of them! Has he not many times rendered illusive the right of remonstrating, by disregarding our petitions? How then are we to obviate this denial of justice? We have no other law, therefore, than the arbitrary commands of our representatives, who may at will neglect our interests, attack our liberties and sell our birth-rights; without being called to any account, or incurring any other damage, than not being chosen another time. Even this trifling restraint is wanting in our constitution! Have not our commissioners taken upon themselves to determine the duration of their commission? If they are authorized to extend it to seven years, why not to twenty, forty, sixty; why not to render themselves independent of their constituents? Thus we are reduced to the deplorable situation of seeing our liberties invaded without being able to oppose more than vain murmurs, or reduced to the situation still more deplorable of vindicating our rights with arms in our hands[*].

The representatives of the people, being intrusted with the interests of the public, ought to enter into an engagement with their constituents: our deputies, when at first admitted into the senate, take, indeed, an oath of fidelity, but in that oath there is not a single word mentioned about the nation[†].

The representatives of the people ought ever to act according to the instructions of their constituents: but our deputies exercise their delegated power without ever consulting us. When once elected, they take not any more notice of us. We have therefore no hand in the laws enacted by them; and how many times have the resolves of the house been directly opposite to the sentiments of the people they represent? What are then our representatives, but our masters?

The laws enacted in the great council of the nation ought to promote public welfare: but among us what a neglect of national interest; how seldom does any bill, but of a private nature, pass? Even to make a motion for these bills, friends in the house are always necessary, and frequently such friends are bought. Has it not been notorious in many instances, that parliament-men have been induced for lucre's sake to prostitute their abilities, and sacrifice their country in the furtherance of any job, how dirty and iniquitious soever? Open the journal of the British senate, and there you will find many proofs of this sad truth[*].

The representatives of the people ought to attend with diligence the duty of their office: but our deputies either sit or absent themselves just as they please, except in some extraordinary juncture; and by their negligence ever make it the more easy for the minister to carry his point. Neglect of duty is even at present an artifice several of them make use of to make their best advantage of that power they are trusted with: nay, the most infignificant among them, by thus absenting themselves, have found out a method to oblige the minister to stipulate; for in the great council of the nation matters are carried by the number of votes, not by the weight of arguments.

As the people alone have a right to select their representatives, they alone have a right to declare their choice, and to maintain it: but our deputies have arrogated to themselves the essential privilege of judging of returns, nay, of excluding such members as they object to, in spite of their constituents.

Talents and virtue ought to be the only qualifications required in representatives of the people; and the man whom they grace, whatever be his rank or circumstances, ought to be preferred to that honourable office: but our deputies constrain their constituents to select them from among a particular class of subjects which is not[*] the least ignorant, nor the least corrupted part of the nation.

Every Englishman of an unspotted character, a good understanding, and an independant, though small fortune, might have formerly offered himself as candidate: but now neither virtue, patriotic zeal, nor services are regarded; money without merit † opens the door of the senate, by which fools and knaves enter commonly in such droves as leave very little room for the admission of worthy men. In order to secure its freedom, parliament, it is said, has thus lodged more or less power in the several degrees of subjects, as they have greater or less interest in the common stock. I confess that those ought to have the care of public affairs, who, ceteris paribus, have the largest stake in public weal, because the public have then, in the property of wealthy men, a security for their good conduct, which is wanting in men without fortune; but wealthy men are not always those who have the greatest concern for public safety, and fortune alone is a very bad guarantee. I appeal to precedents. All those members who gave up to Henry VII. Henry VIII. and Mary, the birth-rights of the subjects; all those who prostituted themselves to the will of James I. Charles II. and James II; all those who had, by their violent proceedings relating to foreign affairs, so much disgusted the whole nation, and given cause to the Kentish petition[*], were they not men of property? all those likewise who have lately devoted themselves to the court, are they not men of property? If ever virtue has shone in parliament, it was only when the iniquitous practices of the court, and the very brink of destruction; and when the care of public safety obliged the electors to be determined in their choice of representatives only by probity, abilities, and patriotic zeal.

The allurements tendered to virtue are not of so palpable and striking a kind as the baits of corruption; and none but the wise and virtuous are greedy of them: men whose whole merit consists in their fortune, covet only to enlarge their estate at the expence of their honour, and the interest of their country; ever ready to join those at the helm in measures ruinous to the people, as long as they find in it their own interest.—To select our representatives from among wealthy men, is prudent, if they are not destitute of merit: but when luxury, extravagance, ignorance, debauchery, and venality, are their only characteristics, why not turn our choice upon the virtuous and wise, who grace the other classes of society?

Besides, from such an inconsiderate choice ever results a partiality in the laws. When deputies exercise acts of legislation, they seldom make any law which restrains themselves; and often make such as they may turn to their own advantage. We have no need to look for the proofs of this truth in foreign annals, it is unfortunately but too obvious in those of our own country.

To complain that the inferior classes of the people receive no advantage from the laws relating to property (since being without fortune, they have no share in lucrative establishments, and nothing to lose) would perhaps be deemed too great a presumption by those opulent Sybarites who, from their elevation, look down with contempt upon the poor, whom they believe not made to share their pleasures.

Let us then overlook the advantages of society, and confine ourselves to the prospect of its disadvantages. I shall not mention here the hearth-money, the gamelaws, and the heavy taxes laid on the necessaries of life, so oppressive to the poor[*]; there are more important instances of oppression.

The act for raising the recruits, passed in 1703-4, empowers the justices of peace to take up such idle persons as have no calling nor means of subsistence, and to deliver them to the officers of the army.

In a society originally formed among men much in the same circumstances, and wherein poverty should be constantly the consequence of bad conduct; such an act might have the sacred character of justice. But in a government established among men, where the strongest and most artful have invaded almost every thing; in a government where poverty is often the consequence of misfortunes, nay, of the injustice of knaves; where the industry and diligence of parents cannot always afford their giving any education to their family, or preserving their morals unspotted; where, without a proper capital, it is almost impossible to carry on any lucrative business, or even to get an honest livelihood, and where poverty becomes the everlasting lot of the poor, what law could be more unjust?

Reduced to linger in misery, are the indigents besides to be forced to protect, at the expence of their blood, the inheritance, or secure the peace of the posterity of their usurpers, and at the risk of their lives, to defend the power of their tyrants? Hear, however, their insolent oppressors giving, without the least remorse, their advice thereon: Wars sweep away, four or five times in a century, vagrants, beggars, and such like dregs of mankind.

There are foundations for poor among us, it will be said: but what pen, eloquent enough, could describe with propriety the shocking scene of a workhouse, or what man ever so savage could take a view of it without shaking with horror. Dismal places! wherein the needy is kept alive by unwholesome food, lays in nastiness, breathes an infected air, and groans under the severe hand of a warden; wretched habitations! wherein abuses, diseases and hunger reign constantly. Of those who are confined there, how many fall victims to their hard fate; and how few, rather than re-enter therein, unless compelled by intolerable necessity, prefer not starving at the door of the rich?

The poor, almost entirely destitute of assistance against hunger, find as little against disease. Who does not know that letters of recommendation are necessary among us, to be admitted into hospitals? Thus whilst the door of them is ever open to the servants of our gentry and nobility, it is almost constantly shut against the needy, the unsupported, the friendless wretch.

Among the many dismal and horrid scenes of oppression which, in our so much exalted government, are but too often disclosed respecting the poor, let one more suffice.

"The injured member of society, whom the jury acquit, or whom the villain by whose machination he was confined dares not appear to prosecute, is dragged back to his dungeon, where he is again confined, without mercy, by the tyrant of the gaol, till he has paid what he demands of him under the specious denomination of fees;" thus unjustly condemned to suffer punishments which ought to be inflicted on profligate malefactors alone, and reduced, in the horrors of his mind, incessantly to curse the day of his birth.

A few, a very few, benevolent members, after having received intimation of these cruelties, have indeed sometimes made a motion to enquire into the state of the gaols, but to no effect. The legislators, remote as they are from such a wretched condition, behold without concern those abominable abuses, and never think them worth being reformed. Who are the friends to the poor in a senate composed of rich men only; who are the members acquainted with the sufferings of the needy, the misery wherein he lingers, and the injuries he undergoes; or if they are acquainted with them, who are the members eager to rescue and relieve him? But they do not thus forget their own interests; and whilst leaving without pity a vast number of their fellow creatures to groan under the weight of the most cruel oppression, they, without shame, make, alter, and amend acts for securing the property of their dogs.

Be it again said, as long as the members that compose the legislature are selected from among one particular class of people, it must never be expected to see them applying themselves to promote common welfare: and like the parliament under Mary[*], having secured their own possessions, they will be unconcerned for all the rest.

But let us draw, with indignation, a veil over these mysteries of iniquity, to continue our examination.

Although at the mercy of our representatives, yet we have much more to dread from our Prince.

Our forefathers, indeed, have taken much care to circumscribe the prerogative of the crown, but not enought to curb its power.

The king ought to be only the prime magistrate of the people, but he is the arbiter of the nation.

Sole master of calling and dissolving parliament, if he but refuses to assemble them, legislature is annihilated: In such case what constitutional authority has a right to interpose? The law has provided for it, it is said, as it obliges the king, by his own wants, to call a parliament. But should a crafty Prince lay by, during many years, the fruit of his oeconomy, as well as the produce of selling the forest woods, creating dignities[*], granting letters patents for monopoly and grants of concealments, or have recourse to the expedient of levying loans, and shutting the exchequer, who can answer that a mean could not be thus contrived for doing without the legislature?

Did not Charles I. govern for twelve years together without a parliament? Yes, but he got money by levying arbitrary taxes, and forcing loans. Did not Charles II. become absolute master of his kingdom, without army, without money, without foreign assistance, and govern us with tyrannic sway? How little was then wanting to reduce us to perpetual servitude? Was it the wisdom of our constitution, or even our virtue, that rescued the state from the brink of destruction?

But let us suppose that what has once happened, never will happen again.

The session of parliament holds as long as the king pleases, and we are too well acquainted with the use our Princes of the Stuart line made of this prerogative, not to dread the consequences of it.

The king has no legislative power, but can procure a legislature at his devotion, by his great influence in the election of representatives. When a new parliament is called, besides the votes procured by the money which is privately distributed for that purpose, the minister disposes of all the votes of the tradesmen who serve his majesty in the several towns, and of all those that placemen and other creatures of the court command in the several boroughs: The lord lieutenants, and other persons in authority, in the counties and towns, exert, moreover, all their interests and address to get such members chosen as are favourable to the designs of the crown.

Not satisfied with secret practices, the administration even employs violence in order to fill the great council of the nation with court dependants. It is illegal to bring troops into the neighbourhood of an election; but the minister byasses the electors, by hiring a band of determinate villains to frighten them into a choice of a ministerial candidate: and of what crime soever such villains may be guilty, the Prince is not ashamed to screen them from punishment.

As the place-bill does not regard the upper house, by creating peers of the realm such commoners as have greatest influence in elections, and securing these new peers, it is in the power of the court ever to command a majority in the lower house.

If the king neglects to influence a choice of representatives; when they are chosen, he may influence their resolutions at his will.

The king has no demesnes within the kingdom; but he is the fountain of all honours, and disposes of all places, ecclesiastical, civil, and military. Hence a great number of hirelings in parliament; this number he can ever increase, it being in his power to multiply places and offices: nay, by only augmenting the number of the officers of his houshold, he may dispose at his will of the whole senate.

The place-bill, it is said, prevents in that respect the influence of the king, and is the great bulwark of parliamentary independence. A gross error this.

Does a commission in the army, the navy, or the militia, vacate a seat in parliament? Does even the place of attorney or solicitor general, lord lieutenant of the counties, receiver of the king's customs, keeper of his majesty's gates, roads, and bridges, director and clerk of the royal hospitals, lord of the board of trade and plantations, lord of the admiralty, member of the court of exchequer, and board of green cloth, commissioner of the treasury, groom of their majesties' bed-chambers, and any other office of the houshold; nay, does a place of privy councellor, or of secretary of state, incapacitate from being a representative? Suppose, however, that the place-bill incapacitates persons who have an office or place of profit under the king, or receive a pension from the crown, to serve as a member of the house of commons; does it incapacitate those who receive marks of dignity or titles of honour, does it incapacitate those whose relations and friends have places of profit under the court, those who receive secret douceurs, those who are dependant on placemen and creatures of the court; does it regard the house of peers, although it be well known that the lords dispose of a third part of the house of commons? In fine, that great bulwark of parliamentary independence was no sooner erected than subverted by private contracts; no provision having been made by that law for discovering secret offenders.

Besides the places and dignities, of which the king disposes, the exorbitant sums assigned for the maintenance of his houshold, the pensions he grants, the douceurs his ministers manage for his tools in negotiating public loans[*], the promises with which they feed the hopes of those hungry harpies who seek to feast on the vitals of their country, the tricks of craft[†] with which they deceive the simple, the smiles of the court which lull the vain into obsequiousness, the interested but warm rhetoric of his creatures which draws into his party all those who have not an understanding clear enough to secure their virtue; these means, I say, enable him to have at his disposal the greatest number of votes in the great council of the nation, to corrupt the members of the legislature gradually, make them speak as he pleases, and convert tyranny into law.

The commons nominate their speaker, but their choice is void, unless approved by the king; and the influence of a speaker on the proceedings and resolves of the whole house, is too well known, to consider this prerogative as of no consequence.

Even the polity of the legislature is favourable to the views of the crown. In parliament, every member gives his vote openly: this method of voting is excellent it itself; but as the ministers are admitted into the senate, it serves but to force the corrupted members to become traitors to their country.

Although the king cannot call to an account the members for freedom of speech in parliament; yet, if any of them, in giving full scope to his patriotic zeal, drops a few inconsiderate expressions, the creatures of the Prince exclaim against this want of consideration for royal majesty, and cry out, The Tower, the Tower; on the contrary, if the hirelings retained by the court display in their fawning speeches the most odious flatteries, they have nothing to fear but the bitter smiles of the friends of liberty.

When the commons have disregarded their duty, was there ever found any virtue among the lords? But we know too much of their proceedings to turn on that side our fond hopes. Even in the most critical junctures, and when the commons were struggling against the incroachments of the crown under the Stuarts, the lords remained idle, and seemed to show little concern at the fears and jealousies expressed by the people. Besides, there is in their house a sacred tribe, ever blindly devoted from principle to the court.

However, supposing there were in the upper house many virtuous members, as the place-bill does not regard it, by making new peers, the court may always secure a majority, as has been oftentimes the case.

The legislature is indeed a check upon the crown; yet only when it is intirely independent. For as soon as selfish interested views prevail among its members, the parliament—the strength and glory of Britain, turns a profligate faction, who, partaking of the Prince's bounty, and hoping to share with him the spoils of their country, join those at the helm in their criminal designs, and support their destructive measures; —a band of disguised traitors, who, under the name of guardians, traffic away the national interest and the rights of a free-born people.

A King of England will ever endeavour to make his progress to absolute empire by a pensionary parliament. I have shewn what considence the people may place in the great council of the nation, as long as our so much exalted constitution shall remain as it is. Under Charles II. the parliament was filled with a band of abject pensioners, and the nation wept at the sight of their senators clothed with the badges of slavery: what once was seen, may be seen again; alas, is it not in some sort already the case? Peruse the list of the house of commons, and you will find it chiefly composed of men who have offices, or places of profit under the king. Nor is even this the worst of the dismal prospect which lies before us.

The king has no right to lay any tax, but the crown has the prerogative of disposing of the public money, when deposited in an aggregated fund in the treasury. To prevent the misapplication of public revenue, it has been resolved to allow out of it separate incomes for the support of the government, and the maintenance of the crown dignity; the rest is under the command of the parliament, and the commons examine the current service of each year. But as the sum allotted for secret services has not been limited by law, a pretence of squandering the nation's money is left to the ministry, if not a safe and easy mean of filling up the king's coffers, and enriching themselves.

A warrant for paying money out of the treasury must, indeed, go through the hands of proper officers; but the king nominates these officers, and removes them at pleasure.

To prevent abuses, the commons have the right of inquiring into the disposal of public money; but this prerogative of the crown is liable to the controul of the house, only when parliament is assembled.

The house has a right to call the great officers of the crown to an account; but with money which has been embezzled, the minister can engage them not to take cognizance of his misdemeanor and plundering. An enormous defect in our constitution this, of which we had lately the sad experience!

Royal prerogative is not circumscribed here. The king alone has a right to make war, peace, and treaties, even without consulting the nation. Independently of that monstrous abuse of intrusting a sole individual with a power to sacrifice to his caprices the blood of a multitude, of diverting the public attention in a critical juncture, evading the redress of national grievances, and making away with many troublesome patriots, by nominating them to perilous employments; how many other inconveniencies!

The king's designs, when they have received the sanction of both houses, are ever carried into execution at the nation's expence: the sum they require may be employed against its destination: how many instances of this under Charles II.?

No war is made but a treaty follows, and few treaties are concluded without money. Thus when the Prince sells to the enemy the fruits of national victories, or to any power the weight of his influence on the affairs of Europe, the sums remitted remain in his hands; but the charges of ill success are always placed to the account of the public[*].

The king is the generalissimo[†] of the army; and though the parliament grants him subsidies for a year only; yet during that interval, what could not be done by an audacious monarch, who, having secured, for a long time, the affections both of soldiers and officers, should on a sudden pull off the mask?

The soldiers are patriots, it is objected, the officers are men of honour, and those at the head of the army, men of great property. What an objection this! The soldiers are patriots; but they are raised out of the most necessitous, the most ignorant, the most vicious part of the nation. What trust can be placed in such an abandoned race, whom idleness, debauchery, or crimes have driven to enlist for bread? Is it to be supposed that mercenaries who sell themselves for six-pence a day, would not be ready to obey any command of a Prince, who should flatter them with the hope of rendering their condition comfortable with the spoils of the citizens?

The officers are men of honour. Such among them who should prove incorruptible, might be removed; yet how few would refuse to purchase the smiles of a court at the expence of public liberty, and prefer duty to favour, riches, and dignities? Besides, when once the soldiers are secured, what is more easy than making officers?

Those at the head of the army are men of great property. Well, were they not men of property who, at the head of armies, have joined with Princes to reduce the people to subjection?

Were they not men of property who, at the head of the army of Charles I. attempted to enslave the nation?

Are they not men of property who, at the head of the army, keep their fellow subjects in foreign countries submissive to the government?

If the Prince should begin by bestowing on officers dazzling tokens of favour, is it to be imagined that they would refuse present profit from a fear of future disadvantage?

If the power of the crown be formidable to the people at large, it is much more so to individuals.

A minister can, when he pleases, have persons arbitrarily seized, together with their papers and books, or oppress them other ways: but when a plaintiff brings an action against a minister, how difficult for him to obtain justice! Although we boast of having the best digested and most excellent body of laws, which any nation on the face of the globe could ever possess; yet our laws are so prodigiously multiplied, and many of them so inaccurate, so obscure, that the subtle politics of a jesuistical ministry may very often evade the letter of them. Whenever the crown has incroached upon the subjects, in how many important points has the matter entirely rested upon the opinion of the judges? But how clear and indisputable soever the claim of the plaintiff may be; besides the secret dealings of the government to support their arbitrary proceedings, how many means are employed to avoid trying the legality of their proceedings? Casting essoigns, pleading privilege, standing out in contempt of the court, evading the judgment by bills of exception, special verdicts, motions for a new trial, writs of error, &c. are all made use of in their turn. Thus they prevent the cause being finally decided, by delaying until the poor prosecutor be overborn, in the long run, by dint of expence, or until an accidental event, if not some dark expedient deprive him of any further need of a court of justice. However, supposing it to be as easy as it is difficult, to obtain redress, the arbitrary proceedings of the government, although condemned, are but little, if the least, restrained. Let the encroachments of a minister be ever so outrageous, instead of meeting with a just retaliation, or having a severe censure passed on him; the punishment he suffers is but apparent, for the only satisfaction that the injured party can pretend to is damages, which are ever defrayed at the public expence. Thus administration, having trampled under foot the rights of the subjects, mocks the sword of justice.

These are enormous defects in our constitution, and more than sufficient to ruin liberty: yet how many more remain[*]?

We have laws, it is perpetually objected: but of what use are laws, the execution of which we have no power to secure?

Did they prevent Edward II. from tyrannically exerting the pretended prerogative of the crown; such as the dispensing power, the extension of the forests, the erecting monopolies, the exacting of loans, the stopping of justice by particular warrants, the renewal of the commission of the trail-baton, the extending the authority of the privy council and star-chamber to the decision of private causes[†], &c.

Did the great charter, so many times solemnly ratified, prevent the kings from violating it so frequently and so flagrantly?

Did the petition of rights restrain Charles I. from levying ship-money, exacting of loans, and governing his people with a tyrannical sway?

Did all our laws prevent Charles II. from enslaving the nation? And whilst we were groaning under the oppressive hand of James II. was it not accidentally that liberty sprung up from its ruins? If the audacity alone of some of our Princes proved sufficient to subject us to servitude; how much more so when aided by refined artifice? Times have changed, I allow, but the constitution is much the same.

Be it said, therefore, notwithstanding all those encomiums bestowed on our constitution, liberty is precarious among us, it depends on the want of genius and audacity of our Princes, and chiefly on that spirit of independency which prevails in these times all over the nation.

As long as this spirit shall prevail, liberty may be enjoyed; we are undone as soon as it becomes extinct.

Notes

*

Bonos imperatores voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare, says Tacitus himself, the zealous friend of liberty.

↵

*

It is strange to hear foreigners speak of the punishment of Charles I. The English, they say, committed an horrid crime, in violating the sacred majesty of Kings: and how many among us think in the same way?

↵

†

The rich citizens at Athens were ashamed to be looked upon as subject to magistrates.

↵

*

Men despise those they have once seen their equals. Among the invectives that the Castellani and Nicoloti at Venice bestow on each other, the former upbraided the latter with having had for their Doge an artizan of the ward of St Nicholas.

The antient Germans themselves, a people the most independent, were ever determined by nobility in their choice of a Prince. Tacit. de Mor. Germ.

↵

†

As Pepin was a short sized man, the nobles of his court had not always for him the becoming regard: but the majestic air of Francis I. and Louis XIV. kept those who approached them in awe, and commanded their respect.

The beauty of Philip IV. of Spain, rendered him the idol of the Castilians. Desormeaux, Abreg. Chron. de l'Hist. d'Espag.

The Ethiopians used to select for their king the most beautiful man among them. Herod. Thalia.

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‡

After the duke Pepin and Charles Martel had made the Austrasia triumph twice over Neustria and Borgogne, the Francs entertained such high opinion of the vanquishers, that their admiration was boundless. The national enthusiasm for the family of Pepin was carried so far, as to elect one of his grand children, although a child, Maire du Palais, and appoint him to superintend king Dagobert. Le Commentateur anonime de Frégedaire, sur l'an 714. ch. iv.

Our forefathers so much exulted in Richard the First's heroic actions in Palestine, and were so elated with the glory which those military exploits reflected on their name into the farthest Indies, that they permitted him to reassume all those grants which he had ratified before his departure for the Holy Land, and continued to adore him, although he had reduced them to subjection. Hoveden, pag. 733.

The high reputation which Edward III. acquired by the victory of Cressy, much contributed to render him absolute in his dominions.

↵

*
In 1664, there was an universal famine all over the kingdom.
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†

The debts he left at his death amounted to 200,000,000 pounds. He spent during his whole reign 782,500,000 pounds, which make near 16,521,740 yearly; whilst the public revenue under Colbert amounted to 5,090,044 pounds only: The deficiency was made up by retaining the interest of public funds, by circulating paper security without value, by selling offices and dignities, and by playing a thousand other sharping tricks.

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*
The Dragonade.
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†

Near sixty thousand labourers perished in draining the marshes of Marly.

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*

The majesty of the Roman senate was no longer reverenced, when its authority became divided.

The Czar rules his dominions with a tyrannic sway. Supreme arbiter of life and death! his commands are irresistible. This boundless authority, far from being odious to his subjects, seems much to their liking. The more powerful their Prince is, the more like a God he appears to them. When a Russian is asked a question he cannot answer, God and the Czar alone know it, says he instantly.

Is not the limited power of our kings a matter of raillery to the French?

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*
The tory maxim.
↵

†

The French are so much affected by royal majesty, as to consider in public undertakings only the interests of their Kings, la gloire du Roy, as they express it.

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‡

The Castilians boast of their inviolable loyalty for their Princes. When the Emperor Joseph attempted to dethrone Philip V. and had the Archduke proclaimed in Madrid, king of Spain; no citizen joined the acclamations of the soldiery. The peasants and burgesses, in the night, murdered all the soldiers they met with; the surgeons poisoned all the enemies they had under their hands, and the courtezans were purposely lavish of their virulency; the curates and parishioners inlisted themselves and fled to the assistance of Philip; the Bishops marched at the head of monks; all even women fought for their king. Desormeaux, Abreg. Chron. de l'Hist. d'Espag.

It was a saying of Charles V. That all other nations wanted to be cajoled, the Spanish alone to be commanded.

↵

*

In 1719, George I. proposed to establish the freedom of the constitution by securing that part which is the most liable to abuses—the limiting the prerogative of creating Peers; and that prerogative, so destructive to liberty, and which the king was very willing to divest himself, was, against his will, preserved to the crown.

↵

*
See the tenor of all the Charters, upon which our birth-rights are founded.
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*

I do promise and swear to be faithful, and to bear a true allegiance to his Majesty.—So help me God. Such is the oath of fidelity of the members of the house of commons.

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*

Let it not be said, that these prerogatives are no more than paying them a mock reverence, and sounding in their ears an empty title; the laws being made to restrain them as well as others. But allowing the laws to be impartial, are they not eluded by men of title? Except a single case—murder; in all others the dignity which inspires them with presumption to oppress the defenceless, is joined to an estate which affords them means to support their outrages: men of no large fortunes, or easy circumstances are therefore not safe from their insolence and caprice.

↵

†

In the reign of Henry IV. laws were enacted limiting the electors to such as possessed forty shillings (a sum equivalent to twenty pounds of our present money) a year in land, free from all burthen, within the county: although the letter of this law has not been maintained, we may learn from the following preamble of the statute, that this defect of constitution, I object to, proceeds from the licentious spirit and iniquitous pretensions of the nobility.

"Whereas the elections of knights have of late, in many counties of England, been made outrageous by an excessive number of people, many of them of small substance and value, yet pretending to a right equal to the best knights and esquires; whereby manslaughters, riots, batteries, and divisions among the gentlemen and other people of the same counties, shall very likely rise and be, unless due remedy be provided in this behalf," &. Statutes at Large, 8 Henry IV. cap. 7.

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*
In 1656.
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*

A free legislature, says a celebrated historian of ours, cannot do any thing illegal. According to this maxim, which is true only when a people at large exercise the legislative power, a whole nation is at the mercy of its representatives, having not even the right of complaining, when tyrannized over by them.

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*
How many times have they made it unlawful to resist their authority in any case!
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†
See the form of their oath of fidelity in a preceeding note.
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*
Among the many instances, I confine myself to the affairs of the India company in 1693.
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*

By virtue of an act of parliament, all its members must be men of a landed interest. All those who possess not three hundred a year in land, free from all burthen, are incapacitated from representing a city or borough; and all those who possess not six hundred from being knights of a shire.

↵

*
Pr. H. C. iii. 140.
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*
They are rendered still more so to them by their incapability of buying any thing wholesale.
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*
1 and 2 Philip and Mary, c. 6.
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*
What a large sum did James I. raise by selling the dignities of baronet, knight of Nova Scotia, baron, viscount, earl, &c. Winwood, vol. iii. p. 385.
↵

*

Public lotteries—a measure which the distresses of government alone ought to force, are commonly undertook in England for the noble purpose, not only of keeping up the spirit of gaming among the people, but to secure members of the lower house, by negotiating the loans in a way beneficial to the subscribers, and thus to buy friends to the ministry with the nation's money.

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†

The clear-sighted have too much sense to trust to bare promises, or accept of tenures unstable and resting upon uncertainties; with them the minister deals ready money: but how many are so silly as to accept of any terms? Having supported, by their dead vote, the interests of the court, they afterwards see themselves at the discretion of its; the minister using them as dogs, as they deserve, gives them but a bare bone to pick: their twelve or six hundred a year dwindle to three or two, without their daring to complain, for fear of proving their prostitution. Those who are skilled in the tricks of policy know that there are few places of one thousand pounds a year, but have two or three pensioners quartered upon them.

↵

*

Did not James I. receive 2,728,000 florins for the ransom of the towns that the Dutch had pawned to Elizabeth for 8,000,000 of florins borrowed of the nation.

Did not Charles II. sell Dunkirk to Louis XIV. for 5,000,000 of livres; and did not the louis d'ors of the French monarch engage Charles to sacrifice the interests of his allies, and the freedom of Europe?

↵

†

That these powers must be lodged somewhere, is an objection which naturally offers itself. I agree they must, but the fault is, that they are united in the same hand. A due balance of independency in the several parts of a constitution is absolutely necessary for its stability: but in the constitution of England, the royal prerogative so much overbalances the rest, that when a subtle audacious enterprizing Prince shall ascend the throne, the government will be subverted.

↵

*
Add to the foregoing, that the Prince actually on the throne, is of himself powerful, and keeps on foot in his electorate a large body of troops, which, without obstacle, might be embarked for these his dominions.
↵

†
See Cotton's Abridg.
↵

CHAP. LXI. Inconsiderate Vanity of the People.

THE inconsiderate vanity of the subjects, likewise, gives way to tyranny.

At the death of a despot, the only instant when subjects might display their true sentiments, instead of acclamations, they wear mourning as courtiers.

What hence? will it be said. Alas, is it not self-evident enough! By that inconsiderate vanity, you have deprived yourselves of the only mean which remained of being openly revenged of a bad Prince, and the only mean of honouring the memory of a good one; for if you display such marks of respect for a Tiberius, a Louis XI. a Henry VIII. what remains for a Marcus Aurelius, a Louis IX. a Henry V.?

By that inconsiderate vanity, you have wrested from your own hands the only rod which remained to repress the audacity of the successor to the crown, the only reward to encourage him to the pursuit of virtue[*].

By that absurd vanity, you have deprived yourselves of the only mean of distinguishing the secret enemies to their country, you have placed yourselves upon a level with the creatures of the court, and you blindly act the part of servile flatterers.

By such inconsiderate marks of respect, you have confounded the real relations of things. For the loss of a Prince who could scarce lisp, the whole state assumes a melancholy face, all is mournful, feasts cease, places of public entertainment are shut: whilst for the loss of the benefactors of the patria, of those who have defended it at the expence of their blood, of those who have enriched it by their knowledge, of those who have honoured it with their virtues, no marks of public grief are seen, feasts continue, and all appear gay. Nay, when an allied Prince dies, the subjects, imitating the court, wear black, whilst in those public calamities, when the plague lays waste the provinces, when the fire of heaven consumes the cities, when famine drives to despair useful labourers, no mourning, no public marks of affliction are seen.

In fine, from that servile spirit, Princes proceed to enforce, as a duty, those exterior marks of veneration; and establishing their tyrannic empire in our very hearts, they command us to bemoan when they bemoan, and to laugh when they laugh.

Henceforth political relations are subverted; the Prince is all, the Nation nothing.

Notes

*
Of the Princes who mounted the Egyptian throne, how many turned virtuous, from the consideration alone that sepulture was refused to a bad one.
↵

CHAP. LXII. Of Flattery.

IN order to obtain their demand, it is the constant practice of those who solicit any favour from Princes, to tell them, they have a boundless power, as God himself.

In order to share their authority, it is likewise the constant custom of the minister to tell them that they are absolute, that every thing must yield to their will, that they may dispose of the fortune of their subjects, and that every measure to render their power irresistable, is permitted when well planned, or attended with success.

On another side, pensioned lawyers and philosophers, confounding all notions of sound politics, continually repeat in their fawning speeches, that Princes alone have a right to command, and subjects none but to obey; they build systems of injustice, and basely prostitute their incense.

Vile authors publish these odious maxims; and, as if endeavouring to go beyond their own meanness, they assert that there is no[*] covenant between king and people; that Princes[*] are sole sovereigns; that, being above[†] the laws, they forget their dignity when they exact not that obedience which was sworn to them at the altar; that being the fathers of their subjects, they have a right to do what they think most conducive to the interests of the public, without taking advice of the nation, nay, in opposition to the laws[‡]; that they are accountable to God alone, from whom they have received their authority: then searching into antiquity, they show all nations under the yoke, and alledge those horrid abuses in vindication of tyranny.

Poets, in their turn, display these maxims in their verses. Men engaged in the conduct of public affairs begin to spread them, at first with caution, and afterwards with effrontery. The creatures of the Prince, and all those villains who build their fortune on the ruins of their country, join their prostituted voices. Thus dictated by flattery and treason, and repeated by interest, fear, hope, or stupidity, these maxims take place.

By continually hearing that Princes are absolute, the people at last believe it. The credulous father gives with devotion these lessons to his children; and children following blindly the prejudices of their father, royal prerogative establishes itself in every mind, and every one thinks himself bound in duty to submit to the yoke.

Thus these scandalous tenets, servilely propagated and stupidly received, become the firmest support of tyranny.

Notes

*
Hobbes, de Imperio.
↵

*
Barclay, advers. Monarch. lib. iii. Cowel. Blackwood. Manwaring. Sir Robert Filmer. The University of Oxford in their Decree on Republic. Rights. Grotius de Jure Bell. et Pac. lib. i. Puffendorff, du droit de la Nature et des gens, liv. vii. Bodin, de la Republique, liv. ii. Bossuet, Politiq. tirée de l'Ecrit. St. Pasquier, Recherches, liv. ii. Bignon, Excellence des Rois et du Royaume de France. De Real Science du Gouvernement, tom. ii. &c. &c.
↵

†
Le Gendre traité de l'Opinion, liv. v. The anonymous Author of l'Hist. du Card. de Mazar. tom. iii.
↵

‡
Bracton, de Legib. Anglor. Philipe de Comines, Mémoires, &c.
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CHAP. LXIII. The Subjects forge their own Chains.

THE people not only suffer themselves to be enchained, but oftentimes offer their necks to the yoke.

When a crafty man gains their confidence, he inspires them with what sentiment he pleases, and masters them at will.

Having assisted at the obsequies of Caesar, Antony ascends the rostra, and holding the bloody gown of the emperor, moves the populace; who instantly ran with the torches of the funeral pile in their hands to set on fire the houses of Cassius and Brutus.

But, considering what Mahomet, and other founders of sects have done, what need is there for any example?

Not satisfied with being dupes, the people run sometimes to servitude, and lend their own hands to forge their chains. Never thinking that in a free country, every subject has a right to inform against the servants of the public, they ever blindly abandon themselves to their zeal for those who have appeared in their defence; and, yielding to gratitude, ever strike at that very liberty, the defender of which they mean to vindicate.

As Timoleon, charged with misdemeanors by some orators of Syracusa, was summoned to appear before the people to clear himself, his fellow citizens were on the point of tearing his accusers to pieces[*].

In order to maintain themselves free, the people ought never to suffer the law to be made delusive; but they oftentimes obstinately violate it in favour of those they respect. Zaleuchus, legislator of the Locrians, having enacted a severe law against adultery, and his own son being soon after convicted of that crime, the people moved by the paternal sorrow, repeatedly entreated his pardon.

How many times, with a view to secure their liberty, have the people trusted in the Prince's own hands a tyrannic sway? The persecutions of the Protestant subjects under Mary I. rendered her domination odious. Accordingly, when Elizabeth mounted the throne, as she professed the reformed religion, the people, transported by an indiscreet zeal, vested her with an extensive power to extirpate papism; but the fear of religious persecutions was soon changed into fear of civil slavery, and the protestants with regret felt themselves crushed under the weight of that power they had erected to crush their enemies.

Nay, in order to reform the government or vindicate the state, they have trusted a few individuals with an absolute power! Of this the Decemviri, Marius, and Sylla, are famous instances. Vested with the whole power of the commonwealth, Rome beheld with astonishment the authority it had intrusted them with: in their presence the people cast their eyes down, the laws laid in silence, the names of the proscribed resounded every where, and blood was shed in abundance.

The Dutch, delivered from the domination of their master by the death of William II. again trusted the supreme authority into the hands of his son, murdered the zealous patriots who opposed such a rash step, and again erected a Prince against liberty.

Have we not ourselves many times forged our chains? When the people, incensed by the tax of three groats imposed by Richard II. on every person, male or female, above fifteen years of age, had risen against their oppressors, resolutely bent to better their condition; they required the abolition of slavery, freedom of commerce in market-towns without tolls or imposts, and a fixed rent on lands, instead of the services due by villenage. All these requests were complied with, and charters to that purpose were granted them. Soon after the nobility and gentry, hearing of these transactions, flocked to London with their adherents and retainers, Richard took the field, the charters of enfranchisement were revoked by parliament, and the inferior class of people were reduced to the same slavish condition as before[*].

The parliament, like a vile instrument destined to enlarge royal authority, subjected the whole nation to Henry VIII. in the most scandalous manner.

At first they conferred on the King the title of the only supreme head on earth of the church of England, and invested him with all the real power belonging to it, or rather, acknowledged his pretended inherent power "To visit, repress, redress, reform, correct, restrain, and amend all errors, heresies, abuses, offences, contempt, and enormities, which fall under any spiritual authority and jurisdiction;" and, as if it was not enough to trust him with these terrible weapons, they passed a law by which they ratified all the tenets which the commission, appointed by the crown to chuse a religion for the people, should establish with the king's consent, not being ashamed of expresly declaring that they had no other rule in religious concerns but the arbitrary will of their master.

Having thus resigned all their ecclesiastical liberties, they proceeded to an entire surrender of their civil rights; and, without scruple or deliberation, made, by one act, a total subversion of the English constitution;—they gave to the king's proclamations the same force as to statutes enacted by parliament[*]; they even framed this law as if it were only intended to explain the natural extent of royal authority, and to facilitate the execution of it, appointed that any one of the king's councellors should form a legal court for punishing all disobedience to proclamations. But to prove the more ready to gratify even the most lawless passions of the King, they ratified his divorce from Anne Boleyn, declared the issue of their marriage illegitimate, settled the crown on the king's issue by his new mistress, and in case he should die without children, empowered him, by his will or letters patent, to dispose of the crown. Not satisfied with this scandalous prostitution to the will of the monarch, a species of civil inquisition was established over the kingdom. Whoever refused to answer upon oath to any article of the act of settlement, was declared guilty of high treason.

But there are in our history other instances of baseness still more humiliating.

When Charles II. was recalled to the crown, with what eagerness did every order of the people run to meet him, and endeavour to outvie each other in their assurance of loyalty!

The nobility, papists, and tories, united in their insult over an assembly, whose patriotic spirit had hitherto foiled their combined efforts to reduce their country under the yoke of ancient tyranny, and celebrated the happy event. The presbyterians, stupidly imagining they were exulting in their own triumph, cordially joined their voice; the patriotic party themselves, giving up all those liberties they had purchased at the expence of their blood, imitated the crowd.

Every one was busy in removing whatever might offend the eyes of their new master: the arms of the commonwealth were pulled down, and those of the King put up in their place; the Scotch colours taken at Dunbar and Worcester were removed, and the great seals broken: whatever bore any stamp of liberty, or revived any idea of independance, was destroyed, and public thanksgivings were ordered.

No sooner was the Prince landed, but the people from every quarter of the kingdom flocked to him; the senate of the nation threw themselves at his feet; he entered the capital in pomp amidst public acclamations; rejoicings and illuminations were seen every where, whilst in the transports of their joy, the stupid multitude cursed the names of those who had so long deprived them of a King, threw in the flames the sad remains of the commonwealth, and racked their gross imaginations for invention to insult a government by whose paternal regard they could only hope to have been emancipated from that abject state of servitude they were subject to.

Hardly was the Prince ascended the throne, but the parliament deemed as the most execrable rebels, the opposers of Charles the First's usurpations: they decreed proscription, confiscation or imprisonment against the members of the tribunal that had sentenced the tyrant. By their order the bodies of Cromwell, Ireton, Bradshaw, and Pride, were taken out of their graves, drawn upon an hurdle to Tyburn, hanged there, and then buried under the gallows. By their order, the walls of Gloucester, Coventry, Northampton, Leicester,—towns which had distinguished themselves by their zeal for parliament, were rased to the ground.

Not satisfied with restoring Charles to his prerogative, the parliament proceeded to invest him with an unlimited power. Having settled on the King a greater revenue than that of his predecessor, they passed an act declaring the right of disposing of the militia and land forces to be in the king's hands only; recalled, at his desire, the triennial bill; enacted a law to prevent disaffected persons from being admitted into office, to have the succession of corporations perpetuated in the hands of the creatures of the court, and to oblige all their officers to take a new oath of allegiance and supremacy, declaring it unlawful, upon any pretence whatsoever, to rise in arms against the king, or those commissioned by him.

They vested in the crown new prerogatives, and did not cease to enlarge its authority, till they themselves, crushed under the weight of that power they had erected, beheld with trembling the work of their own hands.

But, as if ever fated through want of knowledge or virtue to effect their own misery, one idol was no sooner fallen down, but our forefathers erected another, and adored it with greater devotion.

As James II. ascended the throne, the parliament earnestly cringed at his feet, and amidst the several tokens of zeal they displayed for him, it was uncertain which of both houses was most earnest to run to slavery. The lower house voted that all the revenue enjoyed by the late King should be granted to his majesty during life; and thus settling upon him an immense revenue, enabled the crown to maintain an army and fleet without the assistance of the people, and subdue those who should dare to oppose: whilst the upper house, at the request of the attorney-general, entirely discharged the earl of Danby, and the popish lords who, upon indictment, had been prisoners in the Tower for the plot, annulled their former order[*], and brought in a bill to reverse the attainder of the viscount Stafford in the year 1680.

On their side, all the magistrates, judges, justices of the peace, served the king his own way, and as if those who were appointed to hold the balance of justice would leave no right in the state, they gave it as their opinion, THAT THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ARE THE KING'S LAWS, AND THAT IT IS A PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN TO DISPENSE WITH THEM.

The clergy of the church of England, likewise, distinguished themselves by their devotion to the maxims of the court. The pulpit every where refounded with the doctrine of passive obedience; and this doctrine was supported in the courts of justice by the judges and lawyers to the utmost of their power.

At length, to render at once the King absolute, all the corporations in the kingdom made a general surrender of their charters, and abandoned themselves to his mercy.

Thus, except a few men of a sound understanding, and exalted mind, the people are commonly composed of simple and timid persons, ever ready to accelerate their own servitude.

Notes

*
Plutarch. in Vita Timoleon.
↵

*
Froissart, liv. ii. cap. 77.
↵

*
31 Hen. VIII. cap. 8.
↵

*
Of the 19th of March, 1678.
↵

CHAP. LXIV. Of Despotism.

AS soon as the Prince has usurped the supreme power, the object of all public undertakings is no more the welfare of the people, but the display of his authority, of the dignity of his crown, or the gratification of his pride and caprice. Hence he considers the state as his patrimony, and the public money as his revenue; he sells offices and dignities, traffics away towns, provinces, subjects, and disposes at pleasure of all the national forces.

If incensed at such outrages, the people utter aloud complaints, the Prince pulls off the mask, assumes the imperious stile of a master, orders them to be submissive, and to their remonstrances answers, Such is our good pleasure. If he meets with opposition; he speaks but of punishing the audacity of his enemies. Complaints are then useless, and as the Prince has secured his authority, whatever be his arbitrary mandates, there remains only passive obedience.

Already public liberty exists no more, the Prince is all, and the nation nothing; however certain individuals, corporations, or orders of people, still retain particular privileges, which stand in his way, and as so many barriers, confine his power within certain limits.

When once the legislative power is vested in the crown, the Prince labours to become absolute, beholds with concern the enemies of his iniquitous empire, and makes away with them: he sees with a jealous eye those who still retain personal preeminences, and is earnest to deprive them of their prerogatives; he restrains the privileges of corporations, usurps those of towns, and adds oftentimes mockery to injury. Thus James II. having extorted from his subjects their charters, returned them thanks in a proclamation for the great confidence they had reposed in him; adding, that he, for that mark of honour, thought himself more than ordinarily obliged to continue as he had hitherto begun, to shew the greatest moderation and benignity in the exercise of so great a trust.

When the Prince is arrived at this point, his ambition has no limits; every day he ventures on new steps towards extending his power; every day commits new outrages, and, if he continues to have recourse to pretences, it is less from necessity than salving appearances.

CHAP. LXV. Of the Fear of Torments.

THE Prince, having engrossed every power which can be exerted in government, would that he were just; but woe to those who dare still to complain of his tyrannic empire. As he has spared no crime to get possession of the supreme power, he spares none to maintain it. Thus, when once the chains of the people are forged, they are afterwards riveted, and riveted so close, that the fate of their liberty is sealed for ever.

The last blow Princes strike at liberty, is the overturning the constitution under colour of defending it, and the punishing as rebels those who should attempt really to defend it.

Armed with the whole public force, invested with all authority, and interpreters of the laws, they make of them an arm defensive and offensive, which renders them sacred to their subjects, and terrible to their enemies.

If in the courts of judicature, before which the unfortunate victims of his vengeance are dragged, there is still a remain of humanity, they compose tribunals of their creatures[*]: The sword of tyranny is suspended over every head; and if any one dares to murmur, he is massacred in an instant. The people then live in perpetual anguish, and every one, trembling for his life, beholds in silence the outrages of the despot.

When the Prince has exterminated all those powerful men who opposed his usurpations, all those spirited men who refused to submit to his odious empire, all men jealous of their liberty, when he has overthrown all the barriers which set bounds to his ambition, silenced all the laws, and sacrificed every thing to his elevation, he gives then a little respite to the people, grants rewards to his creatures, bestows donations on the armies, procures abundance, and indulges the populace with[†] shews:—A fallacious image of public happiness!

To rise, an usurper depresses every one; but to support his overgrown power, he must engage the people to be concerned for him; by the mildness of his government alone he may attain this end. Accordingly he seems for a while as if he meant to restore public liberty[*]. He makes such regulations, as may prevent the disorders which have caused the ruin of the state, before he was the sole master of it; he restores the magistrates to the functions of their office; sometimes he permits a phantom of the sovereign to subsist, and takes its advice on every law he intends to enact, after he has dictated him its answer.

If he commits any violence to indulge his passions, it is under the forms of justice; if he sacrifices any subject to his resentment, it is by means of the magistrates; and thus gratifies his desires without being loaded with public hatred. But in order that the tribunals be ever blind instruments of his command, he confers no office but to men destitute of principle, and fills the courts with detestable villains[†]

At other times, to calm his fears or indulge his avarice, he engages ruffians to make away with troublesome subjects, and then, to appease the minds of the people, disowns the ministers of his vengeance, lays on them all the blame for the crimes he has committed[*], abandons them to their ill fate, or punishes them himself for having obeyed his orders.

Seduced by such artifices, the people rush to servitude, confirm to the Prince his usurpations, abandon themselves to his mercy, and confer on him the power of ordering what he thinks most conducive to the interests of his dominions, without taking advice of any but of himself.

But this appearance of justice soon vanishes. When once the despot has secured his authority, he renounces moderation, he sinks into pleasure, and abandons himself to every sort of debauchery and extravagance. The public revenue becomes the prey of this minions, of musicians, mimicks, curtezans, and even of the rabble, who no longer subsist but by his scandalous prodigalities.

To such odious wastefulness is joined licentiousness, the creatures scandalously traffick the power of their master; they sell offices, and even dispensations from discharging the duty of them.

By constantly squandering public money in indulging his passions and caprices, the despot exhausts, at last, his treasury; when exhausted, he labours to fill it again, and recovers by crimes, what he has wasted in extravagances.

Yet he does not begin by violent extortions; he at first employs craft, and covering his wants with the exigencies of government, he lays heavy taxes on the subjects.

These resources being drained, he has recourse to extortions, confiscations and pillaging[*]

In order to have a pretence for preying upon his subjects, to the punishments of those who are guilty of high-treason, he adds the forfeiture of their wealth; and, in order to find a multitude of criminals, he denominates high-treason an infinite number of guiltless actions, and is wholly busy in contriving new crimes, and finding out informers.

At the sight of the outrages of the tyrant, murmurs are revived, plots are formed, and again blood is shed in abundance[*]

As he becomes more odious, his alarms increase, and blood is shed in greater abundance.

To the care of personal safety, tyrants join that of securing their empire, and their cruelty augments with their terrors. To secure themselves against attempts, they know of no other mean but proscription, imprisonment, torture; maintaining one cruelty by another, and washing their bloody hands in blood is their sole employment.

To banish their fears, it is not enough to exterminate all jealous men, all malcontents, all suspected persons; if their children, their friends, their relations be not butchered. Thus the blood of the subjects is continually sacrificed to the pretended peace of the state.

Seeing none less worthy of the empire than themselves, they dread subjects who still maintain any virtue, are offended at any one displaying any merit, are jealous of those who enjoy the public esteem, of captains who have any influence over the soldiers, of magistrates who discharge the duties of their office, of placemen who are not deemed infamous; whatever announces a greatness of mind is to them matter of anguish, whatever appears with eclat offends their eyes, whatever excites admiration awakens their jealousy; they are alarmed by the very appearance of audacity, and to banish their terrors, their base hearts suggest murders only.

Dreading even the shadow of independence, they issue out proclamations against freedom of speech, they see with concern those who turn their eyes towards the calamities of their country, are incensed that any one should dare to recollect the fortunate but past days of liberty, or speak with respect of good citizens; they rank the love of the patria among crimes, and punish it as such.

When any one dares to write against tyranny, his performance is ignominiously burnt by public authority[†], and himself punished as a malefactor. If he escapes; his head is demanded from foreign powers, and he is persecuted till death.

Arrived at this point, they carry their suspicious caution farther; they will not allow any one to turn his eyes on matters of state[*], they endeavour to annihilate all notions of public interest, even the very name of the laws.

Not satisfied with punishing those who complain against tyranny, they deter those who might be tempted to follow the same example; and, as they dread no less private discourses than public ones, they impose silence on every one.

In order to prevent their conduct from being inquired into, and to reign peaceably in the name of the laws, it is too little, according to them, to have recourse to terror, but have their eyes ever open on their subjects; they have them continually watched, and this base employment they resign to a band of infamous villains.

Thus, under pretence to secure public tranquillity, and enforce respect to the majesty of the throne, they maintain legions of spies among their subjects, they erect secret tribunals, and inquisitions of every kind, the doors of which are ever open to informers.[*]

Nay, some Princes have carried distrust so far as to force their subjects to become informers[*], and even to accuse themselves, that is to say, to become the victims or satellites of tyranny. Hence every one entertains suspicions, brothers and friends distrust each other. But if any one is so bold as to murmur against oppression, he is instantly apprehended, loaded with chains, dragged into a dungeon, and all desert him like a victim devoted to its ill fate. Thus by crushing those who resist, and deterring those who have a mind to it, none are willing to defend the patria, and there remain in the state only abject slaves, and an insolent master.

Despots, in order the more easily to tyrannize over the people, endeavour to render them stupid. Every discourse or writing which elevates the mind, or tends towards engaging men to reflect, is fatal to its author: as if designing to annihilate every thing that bears the stamp of genius or virtue, these tyrants banish out of their dominions distinguished orators, celebrated philosophers, and brand their works with infamy[*].

Nothing is guiltless in the eyes of a despot, ever surrounded with villains who feed his suspicions, cherish his avarice, and incense his pride; villains, protected and enriched with the spoils of unfortunate victims. Henceforth tyranny is unbounded: all those who become suspected by the despot are sacrificed to his cowardise, all those whose riches he covets are sacrificed to his avarice, all those who cringe not at his feet are sacrificed to his pride. They are charged with having insulted the majesty of the Prince, disregarded his authority, uttered disrespectful words of his ministers, &c. The sword is then lifted up against every head, and the state exhibits scenes of horror and slaughter. Thus, at the mercy of a tyrant, every one is sensible that he must not be talked of, and that his safety depends upon his obscurity. Every one conceals his fears, his hopes, his desires; murmurs, complaints, sighs, are no more to be heard; a melancholy silence reigns, consternation seizes every heart; subjects groan in secret, and under the most racking anxieties of mind lament, like malefactors, having death ever before their eyes.

After the despot has sacrificed his subjects to his fears, avarice and pride, he sacrifices them to his lust; he takes away from them their wives, their daughters, their sons, and abandons himself to the most odious debauchery.

The subjects, once subdued, and conscious of the impossibility of shaking off the yoke, think only how to render their condition tolerable, and seek safety in baseness. Unable to be free any longer, they soon despise liberty.

Good patriots, if there are still any, sensible that they should be deserted by every one, venture not on measures which would serve only to bring destruction on themselves. Thus reduced to wish for a better condition, without daring to attempt any thing to rescue the subjects from their misery, and to applaud that which it would prove dangerous to blame, they, as the rest, resolve to be submissive. Hence a base servility prevails among the people, and every one offers incense to the idol they detest[*].

When the Prince is the supreme arbiter of the state, to be accounted something every one endeavours to prove the most servile. The courtiers, vile flatterers of his passions and vices, seek with eagerness the privilege of being his sport.

On pretence of maintaining his authority, but really to pay court to him, all who approach him denominate the love of independance licenciousness, rank among crimes patriotic zeal, torture and become the apologists of tyranny.

Writers, on their side, represent the Prince as a sovereign master, and subjects as his slaves; they inculcate that every one must kiss the rod, and take pains to spread that fatal doctrine; whilst, in order to show their zeal, ambitious villains set up as informers, and look every where for victims whose condemnation might be agreeable to the Prince. In fine, to carry infamy to its height, the grave magistrates join their voices to that of the public, and are earnest to outvie courtiers in servility[*].

Reduced to such an abject state, the people sink still lower. Extreme ignorance ever produces extreme credulity. When once the subjects are utterly unacquainted with their rights, and used to hear pompous titles, sublime names, divine honours, ever conferred on the despot, they soon consider him as the representative of Deity, his orders as oracles from heaven, and they rank blind submission among their duties.

The despot, then uncontrouled master of his dominions[†], ceases to have recourse to pretences in order to varnish over his outrages; but tramples laws under foot, and preys upon the subjects at pleasure. Having taken away their fortunes, their wives, he takes away their children and sells them by auction[‡], stains the courts of judicature, disgraces the offices[*], forces the magistrates to prostitute themselves by performing the part of buffoons[†], and crushes every one who opposes his will.

Despots, when their power is no more susceptible of any increase, are only intent how to make their subjects feel its weight; they issue out as laws the most arbitrary mandates; and, far from allowing those they oppress to complain, forbid them even tears and sighs[‡]. Whilst sentencing them to death, they force the unfortunate victims of their rage to pierce their own hearts, approve[§] of their sufferings, praise their tyrants......I cannot close these horrid scenes; I shudder with horror, and the pen falls out of my hand.

Prompted by a detestable pride, the tyrant adds oftentimes insult to outrage. Applauding himself that he inspires terror, he walks in public places, where consternation preceeds him. On his appearance, the people cast down their eyes, fall at his feet, and resound in his ears the highest encomiums, whilst he insults without pity over the state he keeps oppressed. Nay, vexed at not being able to satiate his rage, he oftentimes regrets his not doing more mischief.

Caligula wished that the Roman people had but one head, that he might have the pleasure to cut it off at a single stroke. But why produce instances of this? too many unfortunately are known.

In proportion as tyranny advances to its last period, the servility of the subjects proceeds to its lowest degree. How many, whilst crushed under the weight of their yoke, are not satisfied with kissing their chains, but become the vilest apologists of tyranny?

Nero having committed a horrid parricide, the citizens of Rome immediately flocked to the temples, to thank the gods for an action which demanded their vengeance: the senators themselves ascended the capitol, ordered a thanksgiving for the safety of the Prince, placed the birth-day of his mother among the days of ill omen, and offered their incense for a crime they ought to have punished with the utmost severity[*].

But what excesses have not tyrants committed?— After they have engrossed whatever power mortal beings can engross, they affect to be more than men, they have the insolent folly to pass for gods: and as if the abjection of the people would go beyond its own bounds, these slaves are heard conferring on the tyrant titles more pompous than he dares to assume.

Such are commonly the steps by which Princes advance to despotism. Thus Liberty has the fate of all other human things: It yields to Time which destroys every thing, to Vice which corrupts every thing, to Ignorance which confounds every thing, and to Force which crushes every thing.

Notes

*
Such were the commission of trail-baton, the star-chamber, the high commission court, the council of York, the chambre ardente, &c.
↵

†
Such was the conduct of Augustus, when he became master of the commonwealth.
↵

*

Caesar having usurped the sovereign power, said, with insolence, that the commonwealth was nothing, and that his orders were laws; but when Augustus had placed himself at the helm, he affected to be no more than the first magistrate of the people, and attempted to persuade the Romans they were still free.

↵

†

What was the Roman senate under Caesar, Augustus, and Tiberius? A beggarly, corrupt, and servile set of men, the most part of them appointed by the emperors, absolutely their creatures, and equally ready to be the creatures of any other fortunate usurper. The senate, however, still became more contemptible; for a Caligula, Claudius, Nero, appointed for senators emancipated slaves.

Louis XI. Louis XIII. Charles I. &c. conferred no commission of judges but to men disposed to prostitute themselves to power. But Charles II. and James II. appointed lord chief justices and judges the most prostigate villains that ever existed, &c.

↵

*

Such was the craft of Augustus, Tiberius, Nero, and such is the craft of the Venetians. Tacit. Ann. Amelot de la Houssaye, Gouvernement de Venice.

↵

*

We cannot refrain from wonder, when considering what a great number of persons were put to death by the Roman emperors, in order to confiscate their fortunes. We are filled with indignation in seeing the detestable artifices Philip the Fair made use of, in order to rob the knights-templars; but we lose all temper in perusing the infinite instances of the rapacity of Henry VII. and Henry VIII.

↵

*

The reader is incensed at the recital of the murders ordered by Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Domitian, or Nero, and feels with forrow the deplorable lot of a people abandoned to the mercy of a tyrant: but how nature shudders at the horrid slaughter ordered by James II. after Monmouth's invasions!

↵

†

Cordus having praised Brutus in his Annals, the senate, with a view to please Sejanus, condemned that book to the flames.

In 1678, lord Lucas delivered a speech in parliament against the prodigality of subsidies granted by the commons to Charles II. and the King ordered it to be burnt by the executioner.

The Abbé du Renald published lately, in France, a work wherein there are some strokes against the government, and Louis XV. ordered it to be publicly burnt, &c.

↵

*

Gallienus, in order to pay his court to Tiberius, made a motion in the senate for admitting the Pretorian soldiers into the equestrian places of the amphitheatre; for his reward, the Emperor had him expelled the senate. Tacit. Ann. lib. vi.

In 1624, James I. published a proclamation, which forbad any one to censure the scandalous conduct of his ministers. Rushworth.

As it was the common talk that Charles II. instead of beholding with concern the growing greatness of Louis XIV. saw it with pleasure, Charles, by a proclamation, suppressed all the coffee-houses, on pretence of their being the places where all disaffected persons met, and devised their calumnies against the King and ministers. Rapin.

In 1755, the counsellor de St. Maure, presented to the Minister a plan of the resources of the state, and was sent to the Bastile for his reward.

↵

*

This was to be seen under Tiberius, Caligula, Domitian, and Nero. Rome was then full of informers; the slave was a spy on his master, the client on his patron, the friend on his friends, the son on his father.

This is to be seen in Turkey, China, Japan, and almost in every state of Europe.

In France the ministry pay yearly out of the public money 600,000 pounds to spies and informers.

In Spain immense sums are likewise applied to the same purpose.

At Venice, besides the infinite number of spies who haunt the coffeehouses, the churches, the theatres, and those who are maintained in the bosom of private families, the council of the Ten allures from time to time, by rewards, all those who chuse to act the part of informers.

There were likewise a great number of spies among us, under Henry VII. Henry VIII. Mary, Charles I. Charles II. and James II. but they have disappeared with these tyrants.

↵

*

In 1621, James I. issued out a proclamation by which he forbad the conversing upon state affairs, and threatened to inflict severe penalties both on the concealers and utterers of those speeches.

In 1628, Charles I. exacting a loan from his subjects, the following instructions, among others, were given to the commissioners appointed to levy it; "That if any shall refuse to lend, and make delay or excuse, they examine such persons upon oath whether they have been dealt withal to refuse to lend, or make an excuse for not lending; who has dealt so with them, and what speeches have been used tending to that purpose; and that they shall also charge every such person in his majesty's name, upon his allegiance, not to disclose to any or alter what his answer was."

↵

*
Thus did Caligula, Domitian, Nero, Charles I. &c.
↵

*

No sooner did Tiberius ascend the throne, but the knights, senators, and consuls endeavoured to outvie each other in servility. Tiberius affecting to refuse the supreme authority, the senate immediately issued out a decree, commanding that every thing which the Emperor shall do, be deemed well done. A senator having, in favour of Tiberius, made a motion, not to denote henceforth the year by the consul, another directly moved to engrave the decree for that purpose in golden letters: young, old, all with emulation extolled Tiberius, even those who, bent under the weight of years, could reap from their baseness only eternal opprobrium.

Otho being proclaimed Emperor, the Romans flocked to the field, endeavouring to outrun each other, in order to be the first to applaud the choice of the army, and to cringe at his feet.

↵

*

The Roman knights courted the servants of Tiberius, and valued it as an honour to be acquainted with the door-keeper of Sejanus. Tacit. Ann. lib. vi.

In France, noblemen cringe in the antichamber of the minister, and are proud to be his favourite slaves.

↵

†
Caligula put to death, in a military manner, all those who displeased him.
↵

‡
Caligula converted his palace into a place of debauchery, and there sold to the rabble of Rome, the young boys and girls he had wrested from noble families.
↵

*
Caligula dishonoured the consular gown, and Nero the senatorial one, by using them as covering for their horses.
↵

†
It may be seen in Dio Cassius, how Nero forced the senators to perform on the stage the disgracing part of a mimic.
↵

‡
Tiberius enacted a law against those relations who should bewail the victims of his tyranny. Tacit. Ann. lib. 6.
↵

§

When Philip the Fair seized all the wealth of the knights-templars, he was earnest in wresting from them, by the most severe tortures, a confession of the pretended crimes he had charged them with. Trevotconc. lxxxi. 8.

It was the constant practice of Charles I. to constrain those he persecuted to acknowledge crimes they had not committed. Rushworth, vol. i. pag. 670.

↵

*
Tacit. Annal.
↵

Information about this book

Title statement

Chains of slavery: A work wherein the clandestine and villianous attempts of princes to ruin liberty are pointed out, ...

Chains of slavery. French.

Marat, Jean Paul, 1743-1793.

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ID [ota]

http://ota.ox.ac.uk/id/4392

ID [isbn10]

1106013913

ID [isbn13]

9781106013910

ID [TCP]

K053453.000

ID [BIBNO]

cw3303811091

ID [ECSS]

0044000700

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Source

— Chains of slavery: A work wherein the clandestine and villianous attempts of princes to ruin liberty are pointed out, ..., Chains of slavery. French., Marat, Jean Paul, 1743-1793.. xii,[4],259,[1]p. ; 4⁰. London :: printed for T. Becket; T. Payne; J. Almon; and Richardson & Urquhart,. 1774.. [Anonymous. By Jean Paul Marat.] [With a half-title.] [Reproduction of original from the British Library.] [English Short Title Catalog, ESTCT61511.] [Electronic data. Farmington Hills, Mich. : Thomson Gale, 2003. Page image (PNG). Digitized image of the microfilm version produced in Woodbridge, CT by Research Publications, 1982-2002 (later known as Primary Source Microfilm, an imprint of the Gale Group).]

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