The evident advantages to Great Britain and its allies from the approaching war: especially in matters of trade. To which is added two curious plans, one of the port and bay of Havana; the other of Porto-Belo

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- PREFACE.

- CHAP. I. That the first Scheme of the Spaniards Designs might be said to have some Weight in them. That the Disappointments they have met with ought to have made them despair, and give over; but that their obstinate pursuing those broken Measures, notwithstanding their Disappointments, makes them appear Ridiculous and Absurd.

- CHAP. II. Of the Advantages which offer by this War to the Hanover Allies, and to Great Britain in particular, as they relate to the Trade of the Spanish West-Indies.

- CHAP. III. The State of the Spanish Trade in America. How tho' it is the Property of Spain, yet it depends upon the Justice and Friendship of the rest of the Powers of Europe. How those Powers (if they think fit to withdraw that Friendship, or are provok'd to do them selves Justice upon the Spaniards in Europe) are able to lay open the Trade to New Spain at one Blow, and never suffer it to return to its former Channel.

- CHAP. IV. Of the Condition of the Spaniards and their Colonies in the West-Indies; and the Manner how this War may be carried on, to the Advantage of Great-Britain, without making any Conquests upon the Continent of America; or to do no Injury, or of fer any Affront to any of the Hanover Allies.

- CHAP. V. Of the particular Advantages the present Prospect of a War offers to the British Nation, with respect to the Commerce of the Spanish West-Indies.

THE EVIDENT Advantages to GREAT BRITAIN, and its ALLIES, from the Approaching WAR.

FINIS.

THE EVIDENT ADVANTAGES TO Great Britain and its ALLIES FROM THE Approaching WAR: Especially in Matters of TRADE.

To which is Added Two Curious Plans, One of the PORT and BAY of HAVANA; the other of PORTO-BELO.

LONDON: Printed; And Sold by J. ROBERTS in Warwick-Lane; and A. DODD in the Strand, 1727. [Price 1s.]

February 2, 1726/7. This Day is Publish'd the SECOND EDITION of

The Evident Approach of a WAR; and Something of the Necessity of it, in order to Establish PEACE, and Preserve TRADE. Pax Quaeritur Bello. To which is Added, an Exact Plan and Description of the Bay and City of Gibraltar.

PREFACE.

THE evident Approach of a War having been spoken to, with some Approbation; the evident Advantages of it to Great-Britain seem as natural to be spoken to, as they are necessary.

The same Hand therefore applies it self to this Part however officiously, yet with the same Sincerity, to encourage the Nation in the prosecuting of the War, when it shall be begun.

If the many Disappointments which the Spaniards have met with in forming their Designs, and the dull Prospects they have before them in carrying them on, have not prevail'd on them to take better Measures, or to act a wiser Part; but that they will go on, in spight, not of Reason only, but even of Nature; that very Obstinacy is an Encouragement to us, who have so many Assurances of Success in every Branch of the War.

But when the Advantages to our Commerce come to be weighed also, and added to the Advantages of the War, one would be apt to say that as the Spaniards seem infatuated in the Beginning it; we should all be infatuated, if we did not take hold of the Occasion.

The Author desires to capitulate for so much Favour, (however otherwise discouraged,) that as this Tract is written with the same sincere Affection to the publick Interest, as well of the Government as of the whole Nation, as the former, it may be accepted in the same manner; he earnestly wishes that the Advantages to our Commerce, which so evidently offer on the Occasion of this War, may be embrac'd; that our Trade, which at this Time suffers under many other Difficulties, may at least revive upon the Follies of our Enemies, and by those very Steps by which they think to ruin it.

He is also ready at any time to disclose some remaining Advantages of this War, as they relate to Commerce, which seem yet not to be noticed by our Superiors, and to recommend them to Practice, and that without any Prospect of Interest, or Hopes of Reward.

CHAP. I.
That the first Scheme of the Spaniards Designs might be said to have some Weight in them. That the Disappointments they have met with ought to have made them despair, and give over; but that their obstinate pursuing those broken Measures, notwithstanding their Disappointments, makes them appear Ridiculous and Absurd.

WHAT has hitherto been spoken of the Certainty and Necessity of a War, and of its Evident Approach, has been founded upon the Discoveries made by the Enemy themselves, or by the general Knowledge of Things; as the Publick Affairs of Europe had an evident Tendency in their Consequences to a Rupture. What can't be otherwise, must be so.

It is no great Concession in this Argument, for an Author to say he is no Privy-Counsellor, no Secret-Service Man; that he sees only without Doors, and judges only from what is, to what may be. The Spaniards, and even the Imperialists, (who in this Discourse, and for this Occasion in particular, we call the Enemy) have taken care to act, not as if they design'd the Thing should be a Secret, or that they would amuse the World about it, and that we should be at an Uncertainty in the Question, whether they design'd to make a War of it, or no; they seem rather to be removing all possible Doubts about it from our Thoughts, and making it appear, not that they really intended it, but that it can be no otherwise; that the Rubicon was past, the Thing determined, and that it could not be avoided.

This made the former Discourse upon this Subject bear the Title of Evident, The Evident Approach, &c. intimating, that the War was Evident and Visible in its Approach, and that they must have some Defect in their Understanding, who made any longer Doubt of it; that the Parties were as they say of Armies, in full March to Engage. Indeed, it seems to cost the Spaniards some Pains to obtain a Belief among Mankind, that they were in Earnest; for such Difficulties offered themselves in the Thing it self, to the meanest and most common Observation, that it was not easy to bring People to believe the Spaniards Weak enough to be in Earnest, or that they were really entering upon a War (and especially making themselves Aggressors) in which they were as certain to be Losers, as as they were to be Parties; as certain to be beaten, as to fight, and in which indeed it could (by the Nature of Things) be no otherwise.

For this Reason, I must confess it seemed a necessary Piece of Work, to perswade the People to believe the Spaniards intended a War, and that therefore That was first to be laid down as a Principle, and rendered as Undeniable as all Principles in Matters of Dispute ought to be; and how could this be done better, than by the concurring Testimony of the Enemy themselves, either declared in plain Words at length, or gathered as the Natural Consequences of all their Actions?

When I say, the Meaning of an Enemy appears from the natural Consequences of their Actions, I must be allowed to argue thus: When I see plainly, that a Man resolves to put such Hardships, such Pieces of Injustice, and such Affronts upon me, as he has good Reason to know I will not and ought not to bear, without the most Scandalous Reproach to my Character, the utmost Damage and Loss to my Interest, and the utmost Danger and Hazard to my Life; and that therefore he knows at the same Time, such Usage of me will force me to resist him, and repel Force with Force; when I see him, I say, acting in such a Manner, I may (without Injury to him) conclude, That in short he designs to Quarrel with me; it is the natural Consequence of the Thing; the Language of his Behaviour speaks it as plain, as if he sent me a Challenge, or defy'd me in Words at length.

Thus in Case of the Conduct of the several Powers we are now speaking of: When we see them Leaguing and Confederating together, forming a Strength of Interests, entering into Secret Engagements, and those Secret Engagements pointed directly and particularly at the Interest of Great Britain, at the Person, Honour, and Royal Dignity of his Majesty, as King of Great Britain:

It we see them concerting Measures for the somenting Divisions, Feuds, and Factions among the People, and raising Rebellion and Civil War in the Heart of his Majesty's Dominions:

If we see them breaking all Faith and Honour, Pledg'd and Engaged in the most solemn Manner, by espousing that despicable Interest which they had Renounced, and Promised effectually to Abandon and Reject; I mean that of the Pretender, whom they had mutually engag'd not to Assist or Support in any manner whatsoever; and that those Engagements were entered into in such Terms[a] as could not be broken without a Violation of Honour, in such a Manner, as few Persons of such Dignity, in the World, could ever satisfie themselves to be guilty of:

If we see them, tho' Crowned Heads, tho' Princes, and Christian Princes, stooping so far below the Dignity of Crowned Heads, as to encourage Treason and Rebellion, supporting Subjects in Traiterous Designs against their Sovereign; which Sovereign, both these Crowned Heads had Own'd and Receiv'd in the Quality of Lawful and Rightful; and had Solemnly, and in a particular Manner Engaged, not to disturb in the Possession of his said Lawful and Rightful Government, as above:[b]

If we see them Leaguing and Confederating, for the forming Interests destructive to the Commerce of these Kingdoms; laying open such Branches of Trade as by former Leagues and Conventions were expresly Limited and Restrain'd; Invading the Commerce, which it was expresly Stipulated should not be invaded, and breaking in upon the Property of a Nation, as well as of particular Persons in the said Commerce:

If, I say, these things are evident, and that we know they are such as the Nation of Great Britain will not sit down satisfied with, or, as we may justly say, cannot but resent, and that with the utmost Indignation; and that the said Enemy must know they would be so resented; we must conclude them likewise in earnest to quarrel with the People of Great Britain, and to begin a War.

It has not therefore been insignificant, in Order to convince the People of Great Britain, of the stated and settled Resolutions of the said Spaniards and Imperialists to insult and affront his Majesty, and to bring about a War in Europe, for the carrying those Designs and Resolutions on; I say, it has not been insignificant to those Ends, that Methods have been taken to expose the private, and, as I may call them, Clandestine Methods of the said Confederating Powers, for the encouraging Treason and Rebellion among the King's Subjects, for animating disaffected Parties, and for forming unjustifiable Schemes of Trade, such as must necessarily end in War and Confusion.

To prove that the Enemy resolve to bring the Allies to a Necessity of making War in their own Defence, is to prove that a War will necessarily be the Consequence; and in such Case, if the Spaniards resolve to prompt that Necessity, 'tis the Spaniards make the War, not the Confederates.

To put things upon us which it is not reasonable we shou'd bear, which no Nation in their Senses can bear, and which they may depend upon his Majesty will not bear, or his Allies either, is indeed to begin the War, or at least to declare the War to be inevitable.

It was not therefore so remote from the Question in hand to say we shou'd go to the King of Spain, and to the Emperor, and ask them whether we shall have War or Peace; it is for them to answer that Question; and their Actions have indeed determin'd it already, they have made the War a thing not only Certain, but, as I say, Inevitable; nay they have begun the War by a secret clandestine Conduct, full of Machinery, full of Secret, and yet Evident Acts of Hostility; and by carrying on such Mines and subterranean Attacks against the Hanover Allies, as they might easily know and be sure those Allies would not bear, and such as indeed they ought not to expect wou'd be born with.

In a Word, all the Conduct of the Hanover Allies has been Pacific, Healing, and visibly endeavouring to heal and make up the Breaches which have appear'd, and to preserve a good Understanding between the Powers of Europe; on the other hand, all the Conduct of the Enemy has been menacing, provoking, and insulting; Clouds big with Thunder, tho' empty of Force; Brutum fulmen; Noise without a Bolt; Threats without a Hand to execute; pointing, but not pointed. In a Word, They have breathed War on every Occasion, that if possible they might make it necessary to the Allies to begin it.

It seems they have 'till this time been able to do little more than Urge and Provoke, using all the Methods possible to show their ill Will, except that of Force; which tho' they have been unable to make much use of, they have shown evidently, that they intend all that is or shall be in their Power, to injure and offend the Hanover Allies, and his Britannick Majesty in particular, that so a War may follow of Course.

Not but that this Consequence may happen much sooner than they will find for their Advantage, and before they may be thoroughly ready for it; yet it might be very needful to ask upon what particular Foundation they, who are in reality so ill able to carry it on, seem so very hasty for bringing it to pass? Whether they have not met with some Disappointments since they begun thus to show themselves, and whether those Disappointments ever made any visible Alterations in their Schemes, or no?

That they have met with some Disappointments, is evident, and that in several Articles. Nothing is more certain than that they had a View of several things, which in their Embrio appear'd probable and encouraging, which they have since found Reason to conclude will not answer their End, and the Deficiency of which renders their Designs far less promising and hopeful than at first. For Example:

- 1. 'Tis evident, they had Hopes of obtaining some tolerable Conditions for the Preserving the East-India Trade, that is to say, for upholding the East-India Company erected at Ostend; by which Commerce, the Imperial Court depended upon it, a large Revenue would accrue to the Publick, as does by the like Company to the Governments in England, Holland and France.

- 2. 'Tis Evident, they hoped for a mutual Assistance and Communication between the united Powers of Vienna and Madrid, the one assisting the other with Money, and the other reciprocally supplying Powerful Bodies of Troops to carry on an offensive War. The Imperial Court, I doubt not, depended upon vast Supplies of Money in Specie; at least all the stipulated Sums, which were very great; by which Money the Imperial Armies, great and numerous already, wou'd be still made greater and more powerful, and the War be carry'd on into the Dominions of the Hanover Allies to great Advantage.

- 3. 'Tis Evident, they hoped to bring off France from its Attachment to the Interest of the Allies of Hanover, and particularly from its warm Adherence to all such farther Measures as might embarrass the said Courts of Spain and Vienna in a War with France; believing perhaps, that at the worst, France would not have come into an offensive Alliance against Spain, and have turn'd its Arms against a Branch of the House of Bourben; in which also we doubt not they are happily disappointed.

- 4. It is evident, Spain is particularly under a most mortifying Disappointment, in the British Squadron blocking up their Plate-Fleet at Porto-Belo, and stopping the Returns of those immense Sums of Money which should have been brought to Europe by the Galeons and the Flota; which had they come safe, had (as they tell us) brought them at one time forty Millions of Pieces of Eight in Specie, which, with the Merchandizes loaded on board those Ships at the same time, amounted to above Ten Millions Sterling; which immense Sum, tho' much the greater Part of it was the Property of their own Subjects, and of the Subjects of the Allies, as Merchants; yet perhaps the King of Spain might have thought fit, at such a Juncture as that of a War, to have borrowed some of, or otherwise to have appropriated it to the publick Uses, for the maintaining the Engagements mentioned above; perhaps however making Satisfaction to the Proprietors by some other way▪

I may name several other Heads of Disappointment in the first Views which the Spaniards had of these things, in their Order, and which had they foreseen, they would perhaps have acted something more warily than they have done, and so have given less Umbrage to the Allies, or at least stopp'd their Hands, 'till they had gotten the Money, upon which all the Rest so much depended, into their Hands.

But I must note as I go, that here they have been overshot in their own Bow: Here the Allies have been too old for them: And now it seems they are going on without their Crutches, walking without their Legs, and in a word, making the War without the Money. I return to the Disappointments.

It is evident, besides all this, that the Spaniards met with a very great Disappointment in the Baltick, where we are pretty well assured they promised themselves great Assistance; and from whence we are told they expected a Supply of Naval Strength; which Supply they found as effectually lock'd up in the Port of Revel, as they did the Money (that was to pay for it) in the Haven of Porto-Belo.

The Muscovites could no more part with their Ships, or cause a Squadron of Men of War to sail without Money, than the Imperialists could cause their Armies to march without the same Supply; and if they (the Spaniards) expected it otherwise, if they expected fifteen Sail of Russian Men of War would come to their Assistance without Money, they were much mistaken, and acted more like F_+s than the Spaniards generally used to do.

Nor is it less wonderful to me, that the Spaniards, who used to act in former Days with such consummate Wisdom, and by such impenetrable Councils, that it was said of Don Lewis de Haro, he obey'd the Scripture in his Politicks, whatever he did in his Alms, and that he did not let his right Hand know what his left Hand did; that these very wary circumspect Spaniards should let so much of their secret Service come to light, and act in such an unwary and impolitick Manner, as to have their Measures be talk'd publickly of, in the ordinary Conversation at Petersburgh, as I have been inform'd has been the Case.

Nothing can excuse the Folly of it, in my Opinion, unless I shall with some People suggest, that the Improbability of their Schemes and Chimeras being Successful, should argue they were not at all in earnest about them: But this has so much of the Jacobite in it, and so little of the Politician, that I think 'tis scarce worth repeating; 'tis much more certain, that the locking up the Muscovite Fleet was an inexpressible Disappointment to the Spaniards; and that it could not have been, if their Expectations of Help from that Russian Fleet had not been very great.

It is true, under all these Disappointments, and more which I shall speak of presently, it might have been expected the Spaniards and the Imperialists, notwithstanding their Confederacy, should have laid aside the Design it self, and should have carried on the Project no farther; and indeed, this gave Occasion to my calling the Design in general absurd and ridiculous, supposing the Spaniards could not be so weak as to go on with it, and that if they were in Earnest before, they could not be so now.

But since it is so, that the Spaniards, or the Imperialists, think themselves still able to carry on their Designs, and that they are not sufficiently discourag'd by their Disappointments, let us then turn the Tables as they do, and talk seriously of it as a thing really intended. And here, as I said before, tho' the Spaniards are not so Considerable as to fright us, I hope we may allow that they are not so Inconsiderable as not to awaken us. They are certainly strong enough to justifie our Preparations, tho' not so strong as to fill us with Apprehensions.

Hence all the Precautions which have been made use of by our Government, and by his Majesty's particular Direction, have been not justified only, but are to be esteem'd as Effects of the most wise and successful Councils imaginable; a Prudence that has had something more than common in it, and which has been the Foundation of all those (happy) Disappointments to the Enemy: Happy Disappointments I say to us, Unhappy enough to them, and which at this time may be said to compleat the History of the Conduct and Success of the Vienna Alliance.

These Precautions and Provisions, at the same time that they have disappointed the Executions of the Spaniards Design, have also made the carrying it on farther, absurd and foolish; have really turn'd the Tables upon the Enemy, and made their too-well-concerted Schemes become ridiculous; the Measures which, as first proposed among themselves, appear'd rational and probable, agreeable to a wise and prudent Nation, and to the Counsel of able Statesmen and Ministers, are by these Means become scandalously vain and imprudent; and we may bless the Precaution, I say, at the same time that we make a Jest of the Spaniards Obstinacy, in carrying on these Designs, after they were so render'd ridiculous.

To justifie this Argument, let us return to the first Scheme; let us examine the first Prospects upon which they were form'd, the Foundation upon which the Spaniards and the House of Austria united, and upon which the Treaty of Vienna was made; and in doing this, we shall not perhaps find the Spaniards such weak People as they seem to be now: We shall find, that 'tis rather their obstinate persisting in their Pursuit of a blasted Undertaking that renders them ridiculous, than any Absurdity or incongruous Acting in the first Scheme, or in the Foundation those Schemes were built upon.

Had the Spaniards (close in their Councils, and prudent in their Conduct) kept their Affairs within the Compass of their own Cabinet, as they formerly used to do, and secured the Secret in their own Breasts; Had they been so far the Masters of their own Schemes, as to have secur'd the Supports and Supplies they wanted, so that they could neither have been kept from a Squadron by blocking up Revel, or from the Galeons by blocking up Porto-Belo;

Had they first receiv'd the Support of fifteen Men of War, which is said to be the Number they expected from the Czarina, and the Supply of forty Millions of Pieces of Eight from Porto-Belo; had they brought in the King of Sardinia, and the King of Sweden, and the King of Poland, and the King of _____ and several other Princes and Powers into the Vienna Treaty, as I make no doubt they at first expected, and as they indeed at first reported;

Had they brought his most Christian Majesty, and the States-General to a Neutrality, as they say they have obtain'd of the King of Portugal, and the Duke of Lorrain, and as I doubt not they earnestly endeavour'd with the two first:

In a word, had all these Points been gain'd, and had they met with none of the other Disappointments already mention'd, I most readily grant they had form'd a Body of Power truly terrible and formidable to the Protestant Interest; and we had had more Reason (much more Reason) to be alarm'd, and indeed frighted with the Apprehensions of what might have been the Consequence of these things, than I hope we have had yet, or are like to have now.

Not but even with all those I should still say, and hope it would appear, that the Naval Strength of Great Britain might, under Providence, have been our Protection against them all.

But they have been disappointed in almost every Part. Even the Venetians themselves, tho' a State under infinite Obligations to the House of Austria, and to the Crown of Spain, ever since the Battel of Lepanto, yet so ill have they manag'd, that we do not find they have been able to bring that wise People to espouse their Cause, or so much as to promise a Neutrality, or to act as Auxiliars, by Land or by Sea.

This Consideration however may serve to give us the useful Reflection mention'd above; (viz.) How Just have been the Cautions, and how Prudent have been the Measures taken on this Side, (be it by who you will) to dive into these Secrets, to detect these Contrivances! and, which is still more, how Successful, happily Successful the Discovery! How many Ways has it been advantageous, and particularly how useful, in having given time for the Preparations of the Hanover Allies; nay, for the forming the Treaty it self; and in having opened the Eyes of other Powers, and bringing Them into it, who seem'd doubtful whether they should accede or no!

Again; Of what Use has the preventing those things been to us! that from such a formidable Appearance, from such a deep-laid Design, that was capable of being made thus terrible, they should be brought to so despicable, and truly concontemptible a Figure, that 'tis hardly reasonable to talk of them at the same Time, or hardly think of them in the same Class, or under the same Rank.

Had not his Majesty's penetrating Councils evidently reach'd to the Bottom of all their Designs, gotten the Knowledge of their Schemes, and div'd into the Depth of all their most considerable Projects, None of all these preventive Measures had been taken, none of these preventive Medicines had been made use of; the several mischievous Things which they had concluded on, had not been calmly countermin'd and unhing'd, or the Contrivers of them been so effectually detected and disappointed, as now they are.

I am far therefore from saying, or suggesting, that the Designs and Schemes of those Powers had not been capable of great Attempts; that the Naval Power of Spain and Muscovy join'd, might not have been sufficient to have brought the Pretender upon the Stage in some Part or other, or at least to have given him some Expectations, and have put him, and his easily deluded Party, in hopes of great things to be done for him that Way: Or that the numerous Armies of the Muscovites, and the King of Spain, united, with such Allies too as are mentioned, might not have been able to have given us great Uneasiness, and to have even endanger'd the Safety of all the Protestant Interests of Europe, as well as of these united Kingdoms of Great Britain.

As then I grant the Danger to have been thus Great, had they gone on uninterrupted; I must allow also, that the Discovery having been thus happy, it behoves us to keep the Hold that is gain'd, to preserve the Advantages of the Discovery, to keep the separated Powers in the same state of Separation; to keep up the engag'd Powers to their Engagements, and by all lawful means to preserve the Consederacy of the several Nations that are thus confederated; to cultivate the Union that they are now brought to, and if possible to encrease it; This I think is the only way to preserve our Religion and Liberties, our Superiority of Power, and also our Commerce, in the Condition it stands in at this Time.

Heav'ns be prais'd! the Snare is laid open; the Enchantment is broken; the Plot for the cementing the Powers proposed is discovered: No Application can be too Great, no Charge or Expence ought to be spar'd to keep it where it is: and therefore all that his Majesty has recommended to the Two Houses of Parliament, for their engaging themselves vigorously in their own Defence, is of sufficient Weight on that Side: Nor can any one object that the utmost Application ought not to be used, to render all those Attempts as Abortive, as I think they are now become Ridiculous.

To do this, the proper Steps are taken indeed; the Money is lock'd up, and the Ships are lock'd in; the Spaniards are disappointed, and nothing remains but so to double and redouble the same Efforts, as to make those Lockings-up more effectual, and to take from the King of Spain all Hopes of removing those Obstructions.

I am told, while these Sheets were writing, that I write too much with an Air of Contempt, when I mention the Spanish Affairs; as if a Squadron of Ships at Porto-Belo could effectually stop the whole Channel of Silver, and that not a Ship could escape us, that nothing could pass from America to old Spain without our Leave; and that we are as sure of intercepting all the Ships that shall stir out, as if we had them in Tow.

But the Objector is mistaken: I no where suggest that the King of Spain shall be able to bring no Money home, that we shall stop it all, so that nothing shall go by us: But I may venture to say, the British Squadrons, if well posted, and if the Commanders do their Duty, will so narrowly watch the Spaniards, that they must run great Hazards, if they attempt to come away with any great Quantity; and that such Hazards, as I am perswaded the Spaniards will not think fit to venture their Treasure upon it.

Perhaps it may not be possible so effectually to shut up all the Ports which the Spaniards possess on the Coast of America, or so effectually to ply off and on upon all the Coast of Old Spain, as that no Ship, not one Ship, shall be able to slip out on the one hand, or find its way in on the other, without falling into our Hands, or into some of the Hands of those that would be willing to snap and lay hold on them; and I could fruitfully employ some Pages here to show how and which way such things might probably be done, and might more probably be prevented.

But as, in the first place, our Governors do not seem to want Directions for the preventing it; so, on the other hand, I am not Spaniards enough to show the Enemy, if they stood in more need of it than they do, how to defeat the Measures taken by Great Britain, to meet with and surprise them.

But to go on. I may grant, that it is not probable the Confederate Fleets or Squadrons, however Vigilant, or how diligently soever they may guard the Coast, and spread the Seas, either on one side or the other, should ever be able to surprise the Spaniards so effectually, that not one Ship should be able to come safe in.

The Sea is a wide Place, and it must be very well spread to secure every Ship, and lie upon every Point of the Compass, so that nothing should be able to go by: We see here that notwithstanding Admiral Hosier's Squadron on the Coast of the Isthmus, and notwithstanding Admiral Hopson is cruising off of the Southward Cape; yet Fame tells us, that three or four Ships have found their way into the Ports of Spain; and coming by such different Courses as they have done, it is not at all strange that they should: It is true, we are told they bring no Silver, at least, none that we know of; and had they been all deeply loaden with Silver, it might have been the same thing, and no Body to blame neither.

On the other hand, we must have exceeding bad Luck indeed, and such as we have no reason to expect, considering the Numbers of our Ships, and the Vigilance and expert Knowledge of our Seamen, if they shou'd go all safe, and none of them shou'd fall into our Hands; in which Case I must add, that the Spaniards Treasure comes in such good round Lumps, and such merry Sums together, that if it shou'd be but now and then that a Galeon shou'd fall into our Hands, it would make the Fortune of the War go smilingly forward on our Side; a few such Prizes might make good a Summer's Service, and help the Government to carry on the War.

How often do we find the Loading of but one Ship amount to four, five or six Millions of Pieces of Eight; and if we shou'd chance to make such a Ship or two find their way up to Woolwich in a Year, or to' deliver her Loading at Towerwharf, it would go a great way towards carrying on the War, and would be a much better way of raising Money, than four Shillings in the Pound upon Land.

This very Consideration will no doubt exceedingly weigh with the Spaniards in that particular Case, viz. as to venturing out with their Silver; I mean not the Loss only to themselves, tho' that would be very considerable; (and the Discouragement and Damage to them in case of such a Loss, is not easily describ'd:) But the Encouragement it wou'd be to their Enemies. The Loss to themselves would be inexpressibly great; especially as they have no other Source of Wealth, no other Fund of Treasure; all the Produce of their own Dominions is able to do little for them, compar'd to this; and if either the Galeons are kept entirely back, or shou'd miscarry in coming forward, and fall into the Hands of the Hanover Allies, we may, without affronting the Spaniards, say they will be but in a sorry Condition to carry on the War, and to support their new-bought Friends.

But that is not all: The Triumph of their Enemies over them, shou'd the Money fall into the Hands of the Hanover Allies, would be infinitely a greater Mortification to Spain, as well to their Pride as their Power, than the Loss of the Money; for this wou'd be enabling the said Allies to carry on a War against Spain at the Spaniards Expence; and this I make no question they shall do, though they shou'd not take the Treasure at Sea at all. But of that by it self.

In the mean time we need not fear but we shall catch some by the way, though it may not come all to Hand: As I said above, we must have very bad Luck indeed if none of their Ships fall in our way; and if any are taken, they are generally worth bringing home.

The Probability of this is one of the Reasons on which it has been so openly said, that England may Gain by a War with France, but never Loses by a War with Spain; of which we shall have room to say more from a particular Enquiry into our English History, where (unless upon taking a Spanish Flota, a Vigo Account shou'd be given of it, (viz.) where much shou'd be lost, and but little gain'd,) we might find large Sums have been brought into England, taken from the Spaniards on all Occasions of a War; as particularly at the taking of Cadiz by the English and Dutch, when it was said that besides the publick Gain upon redeeming the City, and other Articles; all the Officers and Soldiers got not enough only, but enough to make them rich. But of this again in its Place.

In the mean time, though the Prizes we might take should be but few, yet 'tis not unlikely we may have some Share of Booty in such a War, as well private as publick; such as may amount to another Disappointment to Spain, and that, such a Disappointment as Spain will not easily recover, and of which they may have time enough to repent. And this brings me most naturally to the chief Design of this Work, (viz.) the Advantages Spain is likely to make of this War which they are so forward to engage in: or, to speak plain, the Advantages the Hanover Allies are likely to make of it. In our Enquiry after which, it may be determin'd by the most ordinary Judgment, whether I have pass'd a wrong Censure in saying that the Conduct of the Spaniards is absurd and ridiculous, or no.

Notes

a
The Terms of the mutual Engagement between the two Courts of Vienna and Madrid, are said to be expresly thus: To Undertake to place the Pretender upon the Throne of Great Britain.
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b
The Sixth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, runs thus:
'The Catholick King doth Promise, as well in his own Name, as in that of his Heirs and Successors. That they will not at any Time disturb or molest the QUEEN, her Heirs and Successors of the Protestant Line, being in Possession of the Crown of Great Britain, and the Dominions Subject thereunto: Neither will the said Catholick King, or any of his Successors, give at any Time any Aid, Succour, Favour or Counsel, directly, or indirectly, to any Person or Persons, who on any Cause or Pretence, shall hereafter endeavour to Oppose the said Succession, by Open War, or by any Conspiracies, against such Prince and Princes possessing the said Throne of Great Britain, as aforesaid.'

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CHAP. II.
Of the Advantages which offer by this War to the Hanover Allies, and to Great Britain in particular, as they relate to the Trade of the Spanish West-Indies.

THE Necessity of a War has been spoken to. The Conduct of our Enemies, however ridiculous, as well as the Conduct of Great Britain, however deliberate, concur to make that Necessity evident. Let the Spaniards go on, (as the Clarks say to a Prisoner who they know will be hang'd,) God send them a good Deliverance.

How backward have the Hanover Allies been to quarrel? How have they been so far from seeking Occasions, that they have even refus'd to take Occasion when offer'd?

How reluctant have the British Court been in drawing the Sword? how willing to prevent the feeble Enemy from blust'ring with theirs?

What Pacific Measures have they all along pursu'd? what Opportunities of offending have they pass'd over? nay, what needful Defendings have they seem'd to omit? Let us see a little into the Nature of all these things.

Whether has the Backwardness of the Allies to a War been occasion'd by their Fear of the formidable Power of the Enemy? or, Has it been from a full Persuasion that the Enemy having no Advantages in view from the War could not be in earnest, in all or in any thing they have said or done about it, or at least would remain so but a very little while?

As nothing they have said about War has been rational, so nothing they have done towards a War hitherto seems to have been founded in Reason.

No Man fights meerly because he Hates, but because he Hopes. Defensive War is entred into by Force and Necessity, but it is too with Hopes of being able to defend, able to repell the Force they fear.

But Offensive War is founded on a firm Belief of Victory and Hope of Conquest; it can stand upon no other Bottom; and therefore in old Times, entring into War was usually call'd an Act of Faith, rather than of Hope, being an Opinion, nay a Confidence, of Success; either trusting in Heaven for it from the Justice of the Cause, or in themselves from the Strength of their Arms.

But here's a War to be undertaken, with neither Faith in Heaven, or Hope on Earth: Neither a View of Defending, or Hope of Offending. How the Heroes of Spain will come off with the Credit of their Understanding, That we see nothing of; Time must discover it.

Since then we cannot see any Gain the Spaniards can make of the War, nor any Loss we can sustain by it; let us see what are like to be the Consequences of it, one way or other. 1. If the Spaniards are not like to Gain, let us enquire, What they are like to Lose by it; for War is a Game in which the Parties seldom draw Stakes, they generally gain much, or lose much. 2. Since the Allies cannot (with any manner of Reason) apprehend much Loss by the War, let us see what Gain may be made by it on their Side.

The Learned in Politicks have an ancient Way of Talking (as old as Queen Elizabeth) about England's making War, which (with a little Amendment) reads thus: ENGLAND may Gain by a War with France, but never Loses by a War with SPAIN.

'Tis my stated Opinion (speaking without National Prejudice) that England is so far from being in Danger by a War with Spain, that it would be no Loss to us if we never had any Peace with them; and I believe we have much more to say for a continued War with Spain, than the Spaniards have for a continued War with the Turks and Moors.

'Tis plain (as the Spaniards themselves say) they have carried on the War in Africk, these Eighty Years past, without Fighting, and a Commerce these Hundred Years, without Trading. The Moors have indeed besieged Ceuta (after their way) for above Forty Years; but the Spaniards say, that by the Commissary's Account of Ammunition, the Garrison of Cadiz have spent more Powder at the Puntals there in Salutes, than the Garrison of Ceuta have spent in Defending themselves, during all the Siege; the late particular Expedition of the Marquis de Lede excepted, which was but short.

This Resolution of Spain, never to enter into any Treaty with the Moors, has been derived from one or both of these two following simple Causes: 1. A religious, rigid Separation, and fiery Zeal against Paganism, and against Mahomet; resolving that the true Catholick Church should have no Commerce, no Peace, no Communication with the Enemies of Christ; the same futious Zeal which they have likewise carried on against the Jews. Or, 2. and which I take to be the truer and more rational Account of it, A haughty Insolence, founded on the cruel Animosity of that War, which for so many Years was carried on against the Moors in Spain, 'till their utter Extirpation; in which War they gave no Quarter, took no Prisoners, not would admit even the Remains of those People (tho' willing to become their Subjects) so much as to live among them.

Unhappy Pride! How many Nations, as well as private People, has it struck blind, and cover'd their Eyes from their own Felicities? The Spaniards could carry on no Trade in the World more to their own Advantage, than that with the Moors of Africa, and yet they won't trade with them, either from a Civil Pride, that they will only make Slaves of them, or from a Religious Pride, that they will not converse with Infidels.

Trade knows no Religions, no Sects, no Parties, no Divisions. We may ('tis hoped) be as zealous to hate God's Enemies, as the Spaniards; and yet we trade with the Turks, Jews, Mahometans, Moors, or Pagan Negroes; and deal with the Idolaters of China and Malabar, as well as with the Native Savages and Cannibals of Virginia and the Carribees.

There's no Idolatry in Commerce; if the Spaniards reject the gainful Trade of Africa, on Pretence of Sanctity and Religion, Is that a Religious Separation? I say, No: 'Tis not because they are Wiser or Better, but because they are Spaniards, that is to say, eaten up with Pride, Self-Opinion and Haughtiness.

That the Spaniards might trade with the Moors to great Advantage, is evident, in that the little Trade they have to Africa (and which they may be said to have with the Place, not with the People) is very much to their Gain, and would be much more so, if they extended it as they might do. But they trade with the English and French Merchants residing in Africa, not with the Moors; and rather buy the Goods they demand there, at second and third Hand, than take them directly of the Moors; so they give away their Profit of the Trade to the European Nations, to gratify the Aversion they have to the People.

It is an undoubted Maxim in Trade, That we ought to Trade with every Nation, and with every People that we can get Money by. This the Spaniards are so far from pursuing, that they will not deal with the Moors, even for the Things which in Commerce they may be said to be in Distress for, only because they won't deal with them.

In the utmost Distress which the Spaniards are sometimes in for want of Corn, how do they chuse to send to England, to Holland, to the Levant, or indeed any where for Corn, rather than to Africa, rather than deal with the Barbarians, tho' the Barbary Coast sometimes has a great Plenty, and tho' they give two Dollars per Bushel for the Corn, which they could buy there for 3s. or thereabouts, and sometimes for much less.

In their rejecting now the Manufactures of Europe, how easy would it be to supply themselves with a Quantity of Wool from Barbary, which, with a small Application, would mix and work up with the Spanish Wool, and make all the several Manufactures of England to Perfection, and to the infinite Advantage of Spain it self: But, forsooth, they must not Buy or Sell with the Mahometans and Enemies of Christ; tho' Himself gave them a quite different Example, accepting of a Draught of cold Water from the Samaritan, with whom the Jews (Spaniard-like) had no Dealings.

But (contrary to the Beneficent, Humble, and Gracious Example of Christ himself) the proud Spaniards (pretending Religion) throw away their Commerce, scorn the Blessings of an advantageous Trade, and rather maintain a constant unreconciled National Feud, a foolish, faint, and unactive War; refusing to trade with the Moors, and carrying on neither Peace or War.

As this Case stands with Spain and the Barbary Shore, the Former is infinitely to blame, and may be said to act ridiculously, because, as above (speaking in the Language of Merchants) every Body should be Traded with that you can gain by. No Nation willingly interrupt their own Commerce, or refuse to let their Subjects trade with such other Nations as they can gain by. For a Trading Nation to Prohibit the Importation of such Goods as they want, is like Prohibiting the bringing in Corn in a Famine, or Prohibiting Arms and Ammunition in a War. When the War was hottest between England and France, and the French King prohibited almost all the rest of our English Goods, forbidding, upon the severest Penalties, the bringing any of those Goods into any Part of his Dominions, it was observable however that they always excepted Wool, Leather, and Lead; these were never Prohibited; the Reason was plain, they had none, or but very little of their own, and very much wanted them all; nor could they be supplyed (at least not sufficiently) from any other Place.

Now the Spaniards act by none of these Prudentials, for they refuse to Trade with the Moors, or Merchants of Africa, though they might gain very considerably by it. The Africans have Corn, Copper, Wax, Wool, all which the Spaniards extremely want, and yet will not buy, because (forsooth) they don't like the Moors worshipping Mahomet; as if Religion had any thing to do with Commerce, and as if the Bread made of African Corn, would infect their People with Idolatry.

Now I alledge, and insist upon it, That in a constant State of War between England and Spain, the Case would be quite otherwise, for here would be War without Prohibition; as in their Management with the Moors, they have Prohibition without War. I explain my self thus:

As we Trade with Spain, the State of Things lies so much to the Advantage of Spain, that tho' the most violent War that it is possible to imagine was to be carried on between the Nations, the Spaniards (that is to say, the Merchants) would endeavour with the utmost Art to carry on the Trade, notwithstanding the strictest Prohibitions: The Reason is plain;

They would Trade, because they gain by the Trade; the Trade to Great-Britain takes off the Growth and Produce, which they are ruin'd if they do not Sell, and supplies them with Necessaries which they are ruin'd if they cannot Buy: In a word, they have no Commerce without us; their whole Export is stagnated; their Fruits (their Wines, and their Oyl) would rot upon the Trees, and not be worth gathering; their Lands lye uncultivated, and no Hands be employ'd; the Poor would starve, and the Rich be beggar'd and undone: In short, we buy nothing of Spain, but what we can very well be without, and the Spaniards take nothing of us, but what they extremely want.

On the other Hand, take the Alternative in the Commerce; what the English buy in Spain, as it is the Growth and Produce of the Country, 'tis essential to the Spaniards to have those Goods taken off their Hands, and by the English too in particular; the Reason is, because if the English do not take them off, no other Nation can do it. For Example:

The Growth and Product of Spain consists (so far as it regards Trade) of Wines, that is to say, Sherry, Alicant, Tent, Mountain-Malaga; Galitia and Viana Reds; Barcelona and Bene Carlo Reds, and Canary Whites; Barcelonian Brandy, &c. also Fruits, such as Malaga and Alicant Raisins, Oranges, Limons, Almonds: besides Spanish Wool, Spanish Iron, and lastly, Oil and Soap.

These Things being the Growth of Spain, the English buy in very great Quantities; if they are not bought off, Spain, as to the Trade of it, is ruin'd and undone: whereas if England bought none of those Goods from Spain, they could either do without them (for neither Wine, or Brandy, or Raisins, or Oranges, or Lemons, are so necessary to Life, or to Trade, as that we cannot, as to the most of them, live without them) or as to Trade, have them somewhere else.

So that upon the whole, there is no absolute Necessity on our Side, to have the Growth of Spain; but there is a Necessity on the Side of Spain to be Traded with, so as to have their Goods taken off.

It is true, the taking off the British Manufacture by the Spaniards, is very much the Advantage of Great Britain; but all that is Advantageous is not Necessary: We are able to subsist in Trade, without the Profits of our Manufactures, better than the Spaniards are able to subsist in Life, without the Use of them. Nor is that all; for let the King of Spain pass what Negatives and Prohibitions he pleases, the Necessity of those Manufactures will make their own Way, and the People must wear them, or wear nothing at all, for they have no equivalent Manufacture to place in the room of them; and if they have them not from England, they will have them from Portugal, from Italy, or from other Places, as has been the Case in all the Wars which have happened between England and Spain, in which Commerce has been Prohibited.

But the Weight does not lye in this Part. The Spaniards may Prohibit Trade with England when they please, they will punish themselves infinitely more than England. But take the Trade of America into the Consideration, and truly there let the Spaniards have a Care what they do: Let them take heed, lest instead of Prohibiting their People Trading with us, that is, with England; I say, let them take heed that we (England) do not Prohibit their Trade with one another, and among themselves.

By Prohibiting the Trade among themselves, and with one another, I mean (for it requires Explanation) that it is in the Power of England (in consequence of this War, and by the Means of it) entirely to Interrupt, nay, to Stop the Commerce between America and Old Spain: And thus I am come to my Text, namely, to enquire into what the Allies may gain by this War: How it may be carried on by the English or British Nation, in such a Manner, as that Old Spain should never more have any Commerce with America; that is to say, not Exclusively, that they should no more call it their own Trade, but the Spaniards in America shall be entirely set free, as to Trade; shall be Independent of Old Spain; receive no Laws or Limitations from them; but be at full Liberty to Trade with all the World, if they please; or if we please, rather; for it would be meet to insist upon some Limitation on our Side too.

Nor do I concern the Civil Government of New Spain, in any Part of this Provision; England (or Great-Britain) seeks no Conquests; all they covet is to establish Peace, and extend Trade, and this we seem to have fairly before us in the approaching War. If the Spaniards cannot see the Fate that attends them in it (as it seems to me they do not) they must go on, and venture the Consequences; the thing is plain to me, they run the Hazard of losing all the Sovereignty of their Trade in America, by a War.

They may keep the Sovereignty of the Country, if they please, or if they can; that is, if the Natives will submit to it: but they would soon have no Commerce to it, no Communication with it, other than in common with the rest of Europe.

This, I say, England will have it in their Power to limit and restrain; that is, it shall be in the Power of England to take off all the Restraints and Limitations of Trade, which the Spaniards have imposed, and do now impose upon the Americans, and upon their own People there, and lay the Trade open to the whole World; holding the Hands of the Spanish Government so, that they should have no Power to impose any Terms of Commerce upon them in America, any more.

This is explaining my self fully, as to the General Head of Commerce; and as that Commerce is now Stated by the Spanish Government, between their Colonies in America, and Old Spain, or indeed all the rest of Europe.

It is observable, that the State of the Trade between Old and New Spain, stands thus: The Spaniards having Planted Mexico, and Peru, and all the vast Country between, in the Nature of a Colony; conquered, or extirpated the Natives, and taken Possession of the Country as their own; in consequence of this Right, they give Laws of Commerce to the Inhabitants, as well Natives, as Spaniards settled there; these Laws (like our Act of Navigation) are made up briefly thus, viz. That the Spanish Colonies in America should drive no Trade, or in any manner Correspond or Negotiate with any Nation of Europe, Directly, or Indirectly, but by the Licentiate, or Allowance of the Consulade at Seville, that is to say, the Chamber of the Contractration at Seville, and by their Order; and in such Spanish Ships, and no other, as shall be Licensed in the same Consulade, or Council of Trade: which, by the way, is call'd a Royal Council of Commerce, and so it is the License of the King.

This Council of Commerce not only limits what Ships shall go out, but the Persons who shall be allowed to go over in those Ships, and all the Cargoes or Quantities of Goods that they shall carry with them, and the Returns made for them; which are all Registred in their Books: They have also other particular Powers and Limitations, which the Spanish Trade is bound to submit to; but I am now upon Generals only, I shall come farther into the Particulars presently.

As America is to Old Spain what we properly call a conquer'd Country, so they (even the Spaniards that are settled there) are Govern'd in an Arbitrary Way, as a conquered Nation, and that notwithstanding their being Subjects of Old Spain. Under the weight of this Arbitrary Government, they submit to this among the rest, That no Ships are allowed to come into any of their Ports from any Place in the World, except from Old Spain, or by Assiento from Old Spain, as above, or some Place or other limited in the first Establishment of Old Spain; that is to say, from Guinea, or any Part of the Coast of Africa, they may come loaden by the said Assiento with Negroes, and with them only.

From the Canary Islands they may go so far as the Havana, carrying no other Goods but Wines and Pipe-staves, the Growth of that Island; and even of that, the Quantity is limited, as well as the Ships.

Thus the whole Spanish Interest is brought under one Head of Universal Commerce, and is call'd the Trade of New Spain, or America; and is strictly confined, limited, and restrained to Old Spain in particular, as is mentioned above; and the Spaniards in America, and the Spaniards in Old Spain, or New Spain, have no Commerce, or Liberty of Commerce one with another, but by the License of their Government.

Now there remains a Question or two fit for the Government of Old Spain to answer, rather than an English Author; but which if they cannot answer to their own Satisfaction, it will be yet harder for them to answer another Grand Question which follows it. The first Questions are,

- 1. Are the People of New Spain (whether Natives, that is Indians, or natural Spaniards) compleatly easy and satisfied with those Limitations? And would they not shake them off if it lay in their Power?

- 2. Are the Government and People of Old Spain able to keep fast those Bolts and Bars by which the Trade is limited, and prevent the People of New Spain trading with the Europeans, in case of a War?

Then the Grand Question follows, viz. How are the Spaniards sure, that if the Inhabitants of America shall at any time come into a free Trade with Europe, by the Means of a War, they will ever be brought to quit that Commerce again, having tasted the Sweets of it, especially if they in Old Spain cannot force them to it?

These Questions, rightly inquir'd into, will let the Spaniards see (if their Eyes are not closed) upon what precarious Terms and Conditions their Tenure of the American Trade stands, and how soon they may irrecoverably lose it, if they put the Powers of Europe upon a Necessity of Humbling their Insolence by a War. I shall speak more particularly to it in its Place.

CHAP. III.
The State of the Spanish Trade in America. How tho' it is the Property of Spain, yet it depends upon the Justice and Friendship of the rest of the Powers of Europe. How those Powers (if they think fit to withdraw that Friendship, or are provok'd to do themselves Justice upon the Spaniards in Europe) are able to lay open the Trade to New Spain at one Blow, and never suffer it to return to its former Channel.

IN almost all the Treaties which the Spaniards have made with the rest of the Powers of Europe, whether Treaties of Peace, or of Commerce, they have always (from a Sense of their own Weakness in this particular Case) taken care to Guarrantee their American Commerce, by Negative Clauses; wherein the said Nations and Powers have generally consented, Not to Interfere in the said Trade, that is to say, Not to suffer, or at least not to authorize, their Subjects to carry on any Trade immediately to New Spain; contenting themselves with carrying on the said Commerce, or such Share of it as their Subjects respectively carried on, in the ordinary Channel, and that the Spaniards should enjoy the said Trade in Property as their own.

It is needless to look back to the several Clauses in the Treaties with Spain and other Nations, for the Confirmation of this Article; 'tis enough that it is particularly Stipulated in the several Treaties between England and Spain, and confirm'd by subsequent Treaties since that of 1670: Which I mention here, not to enquire how well those Treaties have been observ'd, either on one Side or other; (tho' it may not be improper to speak of that also in its Place) but I mention it here, I say, to let it be seen how sensible Spain has always been of its own Weakness and Inability to preserve that Commerce, notwithstanding all the Right they may claim to it, without the voluntary Consent of the European Powers stipulating to yield and give it up, as above.

It is not thus with our Possessions in America; the English, and even the French also, have indeed the same exclusive Right to the sole Trade of their own Colonies in America, as the Spaniards claim to these of New Spain; and they have Laws likewise respectively enacted, such as the Act of Navigation in particular, binding their Subjects to such particular Restraints and Limitations of Commerce, as are proper to secure the Property and Sovereignty of those Trades to the respective Powers whose Subjects they are.

But the English and French, secure in their own Strength, and always believing themselves able to support and defend their own Right, have trusted to that Strength for their Defence; not at all seeking the Guarantee or Protection of any other Powers, for the Security of their Trade.

The first Inference I draw from these Premises, is, that a War breaking out, supposing that Part to be certain, and especially the Spaniards becoming Aggressors, and beginning that War, the Powers with whom such a War is begun are then evidently discharg'd from all the former Obligations of those Treaties; their Subjects become from that Moment free from all the stipulated Engagements and Restraints relating to that Trade; our Ships may then as freely trade to the Ports of New Spain, as they may to any other Part of the World: I mean freely, with respect to any Restraint to be laid upon them from their own Respective Sovereigns; as to the Spaniards, they must do as well as they can; if their Ships of War attack our Merchants, that's allowed to be but fair, and we must bear it as well as we can; but if their People will come off to our Ships or Sloops, and buy or sell, that can be no Breach on our Side; for the War is begun already, and all Obligations to limit that Commerce ceases.

The Argument is Short, and to the Purpose; the Spaniards may indeed punish their own American Subjects as they please, and treat them as Traytors for entring into this Commerce, as it is contraband and prohibited by their own Laws, which Laws are binding to their own Subjects.

But the Allies are, by vertue of the War mutually declar'd against Spain, and by Spain against them, effectually, and ipso Facto, discharg'd from all Limitations of former Treaties forbidding this Commerce: And I take the more Notice of it, because 'tis to be hoped the said Allies, especially the Powers of Great Britain and the States-General, will consider very well of it, at any subsequent Treaty, before they consent again to limit their own Subjects from a Commerce, which is so many ways advantageous to them.

What Reason have trading Nations to tye themselves down to the arbitrary Laws of Commerce, which the Spaniards may think fit tyrannically to impose upon their own People? 'Tis enough that they refuse to admit any of the Protestant Nations of Europe so much as to set foot among them, much less to trade and live among them; a Liberty which we no where deny to the Spaniards. I say, 'tis enough to be thus excluded from residing among them; but if their own People, at whatever Hazard, are content to trade with us, I cannot see why we should pay so much Veneration to their Government, and their Arbitrary Laws, as to tye down the Merchants from a fair Correspondence and Commerce together.

Let Trade take its Course; let Exchange of Goods and Money take its due Course, and be uninterrupted on all Sides; let the Spaniards and the Ally'd Powers come to a good Understanding, as soon as our Government pleases; let them fight and agree as his Majesty thinks fit; let the Merchants be at Liberty to extend the British Commerce with their utmost Skill; this need be no Interruption to a Peace; for what has the peaceable Merchant to do with War and Government?

It is a strange fit of religious Strictness, which the Spaniards think good to practise by the Power of their right bloody Inquisition; (viz.) that they will suffer no Strangers whatsoever, unless Roman Catholicks, so much as to set a foot in New Spain, much less to live among them; and if any Englishman or Dutchman attempt to live among them, if they are discover'd, they are condemned to the Mines, and must go to work at Potest

Nay, so cruel are they, and so unmerciful, that if an English Ship should come upon their Coast, in the greatest Distress; whether in Distress by Storm, and so wanting perhaps Masts or Sails, Anchors or Cable, or Carpenters; or in Distress for Provisions, and are wanting Fresh-water, Bread, and other Provisions; in none of these Extremities will they (as I have been inform'd) give them Relief, tho' they are by express Treaties oblig'd to do it: A Piece of Inhumanity, which I do not find the Turks or Pagans are arriv'd to, in any of the known Parts of the World.

But these Catholick Christians on the other hand, will, even in these Cases of Distress, which all other Christian Nations consider, use all possible Stratagems to get the Ship into their Hands; in which case the Cargo and Ship is consiscated, and the poor Men, tho' no way offending, are perhaps made Slaves, and sent to the Mines without Redemption. Which, by the way, (not to say any thing of the particular Cruelty with which the Spaniards treat their Slaves, and which few of them are able to survive many Years) is a degree beyond what is practis'd, either at Algier or Salle, Tunis or Tripoli, or by any the Moors of the Barbary Coast.

I need go no farther for the Proof of these Things, than the Authentick Relations of those of our own Country, who have been upon the Spot, and who have partly suffered under those Barbarities, and partly been Eye-witnesses to the Sufferings of others, and to the particular Method by which the Spaniards render themselves so odious to the rest of the Christian World for Cruelty and Injustice.

That no Nation but the Spaniards, at least no Christian or Mohometan Nation that I have read of, do this but the Spaniards, I think I may appeal for the Proof of, to the general Practice of the English, Dutch and French, in like Cases, and in the same Country.

It is true, that neither of these Nations permit any other Nations to trade in their respective Colonies: Reasons of Trade, the Interests of Nations, and the Property of Commerce demands it, that it should be so; that the Trade of the particular Colony may be reserv'd carefully, separately and distinctly, to the Use and Benefit of the respective Nation to which it of Right belongs.

But in any of the said Colonies, if a Ship belonging to another Nation is manifestly driven into the Port or Harbour by stress of Weather, or is in Distress for Fresh-water, or Provisions, the Government will allow them Shelter, and will allow them to take Fresh-water, and purchase Provisions for their Voyage; and this notwithstanding the strictest Prohibitions of Commerece: according to the express Scripture-Law; If thine Enemy be hungry give him Bread to eat, and if he be thirsty give him Water to drink. Prov. xxv. 21. For all Ships of another Nation are, in the Language of Trade, and in the Sense of those Laws of Navigation, a kind of Enemy; as to Commerce, I mean, tho' otherwise in full Amity; and even if they were in Confederacy it would be the same.

It is true, if the Ship so distress'd shall transgress the Law, and break in upon the Hospitality which they meet with, and shall clandestinely and privately offer to trade with the Inhabitants, shall break Bulk as they call it, and sell any Part of her Cargo, other than shall be allow'd by the Government of the Place, for the Payment of such Provisions as they are allow'd to buy, in such case they are liable to be stopp'd, feiz'd upon, and the whole Ship and Goods confiscated; and this is no Wrong done to them, because they are the Offenders, and know before-hand the Consequence of such a Trespass, if it was discover'd.

Yet even in this Case, tho' the Ship and Goods are confiscated, yet the poor Men are not made Slaves; on the contrary, they are let go, and may shift for themselves; and are oftentimes reliev'd and treated with Humanity; as may be prov'd by very many Examples, even upon the Spaniards themselves.

Again: If a Spaniard, or a Boat full of Spaniards, should come to any of the English or French Colonies, and land there, so be it, that they offer to bring no Goods to land there, against the Constitution of the Commerce mention'd above, they are admitted to come on Shore, may land, and go freely up and down, take themselves a Lodging, may trade as Merchants, or dwell as Strangers; submitting only to all the particular Laws of Commerce, which other People submit to; nor will they meet with any Molestation or Obstruction; while, on the contrary, the bare coming on Shore among the Spaniards, in any of their American Colonies, is Death, or perpetual Slavery, which, as the Spaniards order it, is worse than Death: For, without injuring the Spaniards, as they are but indifferent Servants, when Servitude is their Lot; so they are the worst Masters in the World, at least among either Christians or Turks,

This then being the State of the Spanish Colonies, and of the Commerce, and it being (as is said) conceded to by the European Nations, by sundry Treaties of Peace and Commerce; hence it follows, that if any of the Subjects of the said European Nations, tempted by the extraordinary Gain of a private Commerce with the Spaniards, do either lie off and on (as they call it) upon the Coast, with Sloops and Ships, and so trade in the Night with the Spanish Perioguas and Canoes which come off to them; as the English of Jamaica and the Dutch of Curacao frequently do; or do land in the Bay of Campeache, and cut Log-wood, as the English from Jamaica and New-England have always done; or trade by Force upon the Coast of Chili and Peru, as the French have done since their late License during the Time of War;

If, I say, in these Cases, the Spaniards happen to fall upon them, and take them, burn or sink their Ships, and use the Men after their usual Spanish Severity, tho' it be too inhumane even to mention, yet the several Nations to which they belong do not usually make this any Matter of Complaint, or reclaim the Ships or Men as if injuriously taken, the Trade it self being contraband; an Example of which we have lately had in some Dutch Ships taken on the Coast of Chartagena and Saint Martha, or thereabouts, by the Spanish Cruizers, who they call Garde de Costa's, or Guardships,

Not but that those Carde de Costa's, as the Spaniards call them, commit several Depredations and almost Pyracies in taking Ships, which are not Traders or trading; and this the English complain of at this Time, and that I believe with good Cause. But that by the way.

In General, it is true, that this Right of an exclusive Commerce, as it was at first assum'd by the Spaniards as a Property, so it is conceded to them by the Assent of their Neighbour Nations, and agreed to by Treaty; the very obtaining of which Treaty is a tacit Acknowledgment that they are not able to maintain the exclusive Commerce by their own Power; nor able either to restrain their own People, or keep the Ships of other Nations from their Coast; and this is the Reason of my entring thus far into the Case of the Limitations of the Commerce, which otherwise would not be to the purpose, in the Case before me.

But to bring it down directly to the Case in hand. With a War, (in which War, as it is evident, the Spaniards themselves are Aggressors) all these Limitations and Reserves of Commerce cease at once; the Trade is laid open, and it is fair working not only to break in upon their Trade by all such Methods as we find practicable, but to make such Gaps and Openings in it, as it shall never be in the Power of the Spaniards to close and make up again, no not by a Treaty of Peace.

Thus the Spaniards, (who, in Breach of those very Treaties, by which their exclusive Trade was conceded to them, have unjustly attempted to open the Trade to a Nation expresly shut out,) may find themselves left naked of the just Defence which those former Treaties always were to them, and so may never be able to recover the exclusive Commerce of the Spanish West-Indies, which has been of such infinite Advantage to their whole Nation, or to call the Trade their Own any more.

Nor would it be any Injustice to the Spaniards, especially as (I say) they are the Aggressors in this War; for if during the past Ages those European Nations, now ally'd against Spain, were less opulent and less powerful in Trade, and which is above all the rest, were less united in Interests (trading Interests I mean) than they may be now; and were perhaps willing to keep Measures with the Spaniards, which might in some things be to their Disadvantage, rather than to let them be laid too low, or perhaps rather than another shou'd reap the separate Advantage of it, as was the Case in the late War, when France obtain'd an Admission into the Trade to the Spanish America: I say, tho' in those Times these Concessions might be made to the Spaniards, and their Pretensions to an exclusive Trade were so far confirm'd, it may not be always so.

If this has been the Case, it was the Spaniards Business to have preserved the Advantages which that divided Situation of the Affairs and Interests of Europe gave them, and to have cultivated that Friendship which alone was the Safety of their Commerce; and not by such precipitate Councils as these to open the Door of that Commerce to a People no way in condition to carry it on, or to protect the Spaniards in it, and pretend (I might say, foolishly pretend) to shut those out who are able to let themselves in, and even to dispossess Spain it self, not of the Trade only, but of the very Country too, whenever they please.

These are the Advantages which I mean, when I speak of the Probable Consequences of this War; and this is that which I call going to the Bottom of things. A full Enquiry into which will open the Eyes of Europe, and let us see farther perhaps than ever before, whether I have wrong'd the Spaniards in saying they know not what they are doing; that their Measures are absurd and ridiculous: in a Word, if I had said they were mad, (that is to say their Ministers and Managers, whoever they are; I say, if I had concluded them mad, or next door to it;) it had been, in my Opinion, the kindest thing I could have said of them.

To have said, they had taken these Steps with their Eyes open, with their Reason in its full Exercise, with their Politicks free from Distraction, must have been to have suggested worse things of them than I am willing to charge them with, and to have intimated, that they were a Set of Men in a Plot or Conspiracy to betray their Master, and ruin their Country.

But be it which of the two you please, it seems to me that Spain may have an Occasion to look back with some Reproach upon its late Politicks, in Leaguing with a Prince so very lately their Enemy, and so ill able to be their Friend; against two Powers, Great-Britain and France, so very able to ruin them, and which should have been the two last Nations in the World that Spain ought to have differ'd with; and out of which Quarrel they will not find it so easy to deliver themselves, as perhaps they imagine; that is to say, without deep Wounds in their Constitution, especially as to Trade. And this is what I meant, when I said, as the Clerks (Culprit) do to the Prisoner, who they know will be cast upon his Tryal, God send you a good Deliverance; intimating at the same time, that 'tis not at all likely.

CHAP. IV.
Of the Condition of the Spaniards and their Colonies in the West-Indies; and the Manner how this War may be carried on, to the Advantage of Great-Britain, without making any Conquests upon the Continent of America; or to do no Injury, or offer any Affront to any of the Hanover Allies.

TRading Nations seek no Conquest, aim at no Encrease of Power, or Agrandising of Persons or Families. Great-Britain is Rich, and Strong, and Opulent enough in her own Wealth, Power, and Commerce. She seeks no more but a peaceable Possessing her just Rights, and preserving to her People the free Extending their Commerce, that they may Trade in Peace with all the World, and all the World with them.

As is the Nation, so is the Prince that governs them; Satisfied in his own Greatness, King George fights for the Peace and Good of his own People, and of all Mankind. His Majesty enters upon this War on the most honourable, and most justifiable Grounds in the World, namely, to Establish the World upon the immovable Basis of Peace; that every Nation, and every Prince, and every Power, restrain'd only by Just and Capitulated Limitations, may with Safety enjoy their Own, and mutually Guarrantee the Property of all their Subjects.

Contrary to the meaner Principles upon which Princes too often make War, the King fights not for Fame: He is placed by Heaven on a Seat above all the empty Things we foolishly call Glory; and were my Business Panegyrick, or my Design Flattery, what could I not say here, to exalt the happy Prospect of his Majesty's present Undertaking!

Even the King himself cannot look upon it without lifting up some Thoughts to Heaven, and blessing the Power that has singled his Majesty out to act in a Scene of so much superior Glory; superior to all the Kings of the Earth, as it affimulates the Deity, and represents a King acting by immediate Commission from his Maker, and in a perfect Harmony with his Providence.

As Thunders dissipate the noxious Air,

And raging Storms the sequent Calms prepare;

So Nations, by his Pow'r restrain'd from Feud,

Are to their own Felicity subdu'd.

With awful Voice be calls at every Door,

And warns their Monarchs not to ronze his Pow'r.

His Sword, half drawn, makes their Commotions cease;

He Frowns, to Smile, and he contends for Peace.

His Rebels crush'd, are, under Conquest, free;

And only are confin'd to Liberty.

This seems then to be the State of the approaching War. Great-Britain acts the Part of the World's Protector. The King, linking the Nations in a strong Confederacy, opposes the aggressing Disturbers with such an early and superior Hand, that they find themselves disabled in the very Infancy of their Undertaking.

The Spaniards (obstinate and opiniatre) beginning at the wrong End of their Work, break out into a War, with so little Prospect of Success, that the World looks on with Surprize, to see them act so as their Friends can have no Hope, and their Enemies no Fear, from the Event of the Undertaking.

A Town impregnable, even by its Situation, and made more so by the Addition of terrible Fortifications; open to the Sea, and their Enemies Masters of the Bay, able to relieve it as often as they please: What strange, unaccountable Beginnings are these: Spain ought to remember their Ancestors ill Conduct at the Siege of Ostend, which on the single Article of its being easily reliev'd by Sea, held out a Siege of three Years and four Months, and cost the Spaniards 66000 Men to conquer; whereas being not to be reliev'd by Sea, the late Duke of Marlborough took it in twelve Days.

This Town, with all the Advantages of Situation and Fortification, has in it a numerous Garrison of old Veteran Soldiers, commanded by experienc'd Officers, furnished with all things needful for a vigorous Defence, and covered with a strong Squadron of twelve large capital Men of War, such as no twenty Ships that the King of Spain may get together will dare to engage.

To attack this Place, the Spaniards whole Infantry are about 20000 at the most, who (if I may speak without boasting) are no more able to attack the Town, to any purpose, than twenty Men would be to take the Tower of London.

If the King of Spain fails in this Enterprize, 'tis very likely he ruins the Infantry who are before it; and tho' his Kingdoms are indeed very large, yet we all know, that it is not the easiest thing in the World to raise a new Army in Spain; 'tis not like Germany, which (as one says, travelling thro' it) is an inexhaustible Store-house for Men, and those Men all born Soldiers.

But in Spain it is quite a different Case: not but that the Spaniards are very good Troops, when well paid, well cloath'd, disciplin'd, and led abroad from Home; but Spain is more fruitful of any thing than Men: there are so many go abroad, and so very few stay at home; so many turn Priests, and must not fight; are poor, dejected, and cannot fight; or are Lazy Dons among the Gentry, and will not fight, that it is the hardest thing in the World to raise an Army in Spain, at least with Expedition.

Thus stands their Affair at home, and in this unhappy Posture they are beginning the War; a Posture that I think they are the first People that ever began a War in before.

As soon as they strike a Stroke at Gibraltar, they ought to expect all the Allies to declare against, and fall upon them; France in the first Place, we may suppose will be expected upon their Frontiers with two Armies, one in Navarr, and the other in Rousillion; and in that Figure we shall soon see how they will go on.

Let us now take a View of the Situation of their Affairs as to Trade, and particularly as to that Part of their Commerce of which I have spoken so much, viz. the Trade of New Spain.

While the British Squadron remains on the Coasts of America, suppose in the Gulph of Mexico, or upon the Coasts of Porto-Belo and Carthagena, either the Spaniards must fight that Fleet, or otherwise remove it, or there's an end put to their Commerce on that Side, all at once.

It is objected, that a British Squadron may indeed interrupt the Commerce in this or that particular Place, but that this will not effectually ruin the Spanish Trade. The Coast of America (as possess'd by the Spaniards) is a large Place, 'tis extended in a vast Length, from the Gulph of Florida, or the North-most Part of the Gulph of Mexico, and in the Latitude of 24 to 25 Degrees to the Coast of Surinam, and even to the Month of the Gulph of Paria, and the lsle of Trinidado, and farther, to the Latitude of five Degrees: So that here is a Length of 1000 Miles, or thereabouts, in a Line North and South, besides reckoning the Depth of the Bay, and the Indentings of the Coast of Yacatan, the Bay of Campeachy, the Gulph of Honduras, Darien, and others, which make the Coast above 2500 Miles in Length; of all which I shall speak again in the next Chapter.

In the mean time, to give the Objection its utmost Stress, they add, that the Heat of the Climate, the Unhealthiness of the particular Places where the Station of such Ships must be, and the want of Provisions, are such, as that no European Fleet can bear to be constantly station'd in those Seas.

That as well at La Vera Cruz, as at Porto-Belo, which are the two Centres of the Spanish Commerce, the Air is so unhealthy by reason of the excessive Heats, that even the Spaniards themselves cannot dwell there, and only come at the particular times of Trade, when the Ships from Old Spain arrive, when they buy their Goods, deliver their Money, finish their Dispatches and Letters to Europe, and return again, the former to the great City of Mexico, and the latter to Panama, and thence to Lima, and the other Ports on the Coast of Peru and Chili in the South-Seas.

That this is evident at this time, for that the Galeons being (as it were) besieged, or block'd up by the English Squadron, their Men presently grow sickly, and dye a-pace; nor perhaps are the Men in the Squadron it self quite free, tho' being better furnish'd with Provisions than the Spaniards, for the Country yields little or nothing there-abouts; I say, the British Sailors being better furnished, and better taken care of, and better fed, the Men are by consequence better able to bear the Inconvenience of the Season: yet the Place is allowed to be such as admits no long Stay.

Porto Belo

That the Scots, in their Settlement at Darien, which is but a little South from Porto-Belo, found by sad Experience, that there was no bearing the Situation; tho' the Scots are as hardy a People, and as able to bear the Extremities of Weather, as most Nations in Europe.

I am the more willing to give the utmost Length to these seeming Objections, because when they shall be fully and unanswerably removed, they will leave the less to say by a Set of People who deal in Misrepresentations and Discouragements, as a particular Traffick of their own; and calculated for a particular Cause, which wanting some Cordials, knows not where to find or make any better.

It is true, the Coast of America (as now possess'd by the Spaniards) is exceeding large, as is described; and that the great Gulph of Mexico is not to be block'd up by a Squadron of Ships; the several Ports for Trade being so remote one from another, and that in the whole the Coast may lie extended above 2000 Miles.

It is likewise true, that the Ports of La Vera Cruz and Porto Belo, which are at present the Centre of the Spanish Commerce in those Parts, are unhealthy dangerous Climates, the Shores destitute of Provisions, the Heats excessive, airless, and not refresh'd with Land Breezes, as in other Places; and that even the Spaniards themselves are not able to bear the Extreams of the intemperate Seasons, such as the Summer's Heat, and the Winter's Rain, especially about Porto Belo.

But the Mistake of all this lies in the Ignorance of those that lay the Stress of this Cause, upon the posting an English Navy or Squadron only for the Interrupting this Commerce; whereas there is nothing more plain, than that the Ally'd Powers are able at once, not only to Interrupt the Spanish Commerce, but to put an entire End to it, and in a Word, break off all settled Correspondence between the two Countries, I mean of Old Spain and New Spain, and this without hazarding their Ships or Men to lye upon an unwholesome Coast, and poison themselves with the stagnate Air of Darien or the Bastimentos.

Not but that on this Occasion, the Galeons being in the Port, it became necessary to post a Squadron, as Admiral Hosier has been posted; to stagnate the Money, as well as give the Spaniards a Taste of the stagnate Vapours of the Place, and to keep them where they were. If they are ill furnish'd with Provisions, if the Country cannot supply them, if the Stores in their Ships are not sufficient for them, they are at home, they must take care of themselves; no doubt but by Land-Carriage, or by the great Lake of Nicaragua, which runs eighty Leagues within the Land, and reaches within fifteen Leagues of the South-Sea, they may be sufficiently furnished with Provisions, at least may have some Relief in their present Exigence; for it is very well known, that the Country of Guatimala, bordering on that great Lake, is the most fruitful, pleasant, and plentiful of any Part of Spanish America; or else their own Accounts of it are very false, and they have described it much more to their own Advantage, than they can make out, when they find occasion to make use of it.

But if it should be so, that they are distress'd, for Provisions, as I say above, they are at Home; they are under no Restraints; they have no Enemies landed upon them; they may send for Provisions where they are to be had, and may send Expresses to the Governours of the several Countries to supply them, and to find Means to convey them: Certainly the Governours will not suffer the King of Spain's Ships to want Victualing, or suffer the poor Seamen to starve upon their own Coasts, and (as may be said) at their own Doors.

But we are not speaking of an Advantage to Great Britain only in this present depending Article of Blocking up the Spanish Galeons, which is a thing of to-day, and, as we may say, will be over to-morrow; is done to serve a particular Occasion, and will serve that Occasion most effectually; for we see how ill able the Spaniards are to bear the Disappointment, and what a Check it gives to their Enterprizes, how low their Credit runs in Europe, and how even their Auxiliaries and Confederates (as it were) stand still 'till they see from what other Springs the promis'd Streams of Money will flow.

The Occasion therefore is abundantly served by the British A'dmiral posting his Squadron at the Entrance of the Harbour of Porto Belo, and hindering the Galeons from coming out, spreading the Sea with his Cruisers, and interrupting their Commerce; and in a Word, locking up their Money so, as that tho' it be in their own Possession, it is yet out of their Reach, and rendered (at least for the present) as useless to them, as if it was in the Mines at Potost.

And tho' it is far from being mention'd as any part of the Advantages hinted at in my Title, and which are offer'd to the Allies in the present War, any farther than it is an Accident to the Beginning, and a particular Circumstance which falls in to the Encouragement of our Friends, and the great Disappointment of the Enemy; yet it must be acknowledged too, that it is a very great Advantage in its Kind; and it shows the World, that the Spaniards, with all the Funds of their immense Treasure, which it may be said they are Masters of, beyond all the Nations of Europe; yet are so unhappily situated, that they must as it were be oblig'd to ask their Neighbours leave to bring it home, and dare not venture abroad with it, if but nine or ten Men of War appear upon their Coasts.

But notwithstanding all this, and supposing this Expedition of Porto-Belo were to be reckon'd as nothing in the present Account of the Advantages of the War; it is manifest that their whole West-India Commerce is in the Hands, and at the Mercy of the Allies, in this War; that we are able to put an End to it at once, if we think fit; and that not for the present only, but for the time to come, whenever the Government thinks fit to enter into Measures for that Purpose.

And not to pretend to lead our Leaders, or to direct them, in whose Direction the whole Government is already so wisely steer'd; I may venture to lay before you the Schemes of former Times, and make some small Inferences from them; which if our Governours please to make any Use of, they may doubtless very much improve; and if they do not think fit to make use of, they will, 'tis hoped, not be displeas'd at any well-designing Subject (however injuriously misrepresented) mentioning such things for their Service as are apparently capable of answering the End if accepted, and can be Hurtful to none if rejected.

Nor can it be said, that it is a discovering the Weakness of the Enemy to themselves, and putting them upon securing themselves where they lie open, since the Enemy are far from being ignorant of the Disadvantage they lie under; they are not so insensible of the weak Part, and have been sensible of it many Years ago, but find there is no Possibility of preventing the Consequences, but by being Masters at Sea; which is an Article that never was but once their Chance, and is never likely to happen to them again; at least it will not in this War, whatever it may do in After-times.

If some things offer in this War, which have not offer'd before, at least not to be so practicable in any former War; and if wiser Heads than mine have not yet seen them, or rather not look'd into them, so much as perhaps they may see reason to do hereafter; I hope it will be no Offence to give any Lights, however unworthy and ill-esteem'd the Person, who so officiously offers them for the publick Service, and however sinking under the Weight of unjust Calumny his Opinion may be slighted, yet he may boldly say, his Reasons shall not be confuted, nor any Scheme he lays down be justly objected against by the most envious, either on one Side or other. As to their being made use of, or not made use of, that is an Affair by it self, and which at present it becomes him to say nothing about, unless it is made his Duty.

CHAP. V.
Of the particular Advantages the present Prospect of a War offers to the British Nation, with respect to the Commerce of the Spanish West-Indies.

OLIVER CROMWELL, whatever other things may be said of him, and how ill soever his Name may sound at the Head of any Affair as a Precedent, yet was certainly no Fool; He was no more void of Counsel than of Courage. I do not find that his Enemies, even of those Times, ever gave it as a part of his Character, that he was either a Fool or a Coward.

In consequence of his Usurpation, and while the Administration might be said to be in his Hands; among all the Foreign Nations whom he differ'd with, he declar'd War against the Spaniards: The Reasons and Occasion of the War are known, History is full of them, and I have no room for Quotations, the Reading World know where to look for them.

In that War, France was a Confederate as now, and their Forces in Conjunction with the England took Dunkirk; but Oliver, who was not us'd to give up any thing he could keep, took care also to have that important Conquest put into his own Hands (and lest it to the Englash Government at his Decease) leaving the French to make the best of the War for themselves in remoter Parts. How the English kept it, publish it not in Gath,—

But Oliver, willing to touch the Spaniards in a more sensible Manner, and in Consequence of the Experience of former Ages, observing that by attacking Spain in the West-Indies, he should not only wound that Monarchy in the tenderest Part of its Government, but carry on the War in that Part of the World where most was to be gotten by it, turn'd his Eye towards America.

In calling up this short piece of History, I desire my Readers to keep their Eyes strictly upon the exact Parallel of Times and Circumstances, leaving the Persons quite out of the Question, and to stand and fall as their Fate has long ago directed; and let it be Oliver, or Oliver's Master, the—it matters not here, as the great Andrew Marvel said of him.

Tho' his Government did a Tyrant resemble,

He made England Great, and her Enemies Tremble.

His Measures at Home are nothing to me, nor much indeed to any of us, now they are over. Heaven suffer'd him to overturn things, and then Heaven over-turn'd things again; and having visited the Nation for their Crimes, visited their Afflictors afterwards, scourg'd the Scourgers, and restor'd the Government. Just as in ancient Times he delivered up his People to the Assyrian, and then restor'd his People again, and destroyed their Destroyers.

But I am talking not of Oliver's Conduct at home, or his Measures with his Governours, but his Measures with the Spaniards, and with them only.

It was about the Year 1655, when the War with Spain continuing, after several other Attempts, the Council of War received some Proposals laid before them by the Government's Order, for an Expedition to the Spanish West-Indies; (and as I had it not from History, but by a very Authentick, tho' Verbal Relation, from a Member of the very Council of War, to whom it was referr'd) a Descent was propos'd to be made upon the Continent of New Spain; This was in order to seize some Strength there, keep the Possession of it, fortifie and place a Garrison in it, to be defended afterwards against all the Power of the Spaniards, so by that means to extend themselves Gradually into the Country, plant and cultivate, still fortifying as they should go on, 'till at length they might establish a Colony there, and so share with the Spaniards the Possession of America; and perhaps lying between the two great Empires which the Spaniards possess, viz. North and South America, or as in particular they may be call'd, Mexico and Peru, cut off the Communication, and possess the Shores of both Seas, that is to say, the Ports of Nombre de Dios, (which is much the same as Porto Belo) and Panama.

By this Proposal, it was suppos'd, a Door would be immediately open'd to a Commerce with the Spaniards in America, that a Trade would be carried on to infinite Advantage, a vast Expence of the Woollen Manufacture follow, and a return in Specie be immediately and directly made to England; without trading about by old Spain, and under the Limitations and Restrictions of the Spaniards, as it always was before; and that in particular, while the War continued, very great Sums would frequently fall into the Hands of the English, by keeping a certain Number of Ships of War always cruising in those Seas; and having the Port of such Place as should be conquer'd to retreat into, refit, revictual, and shelter themselves upon all Occasions.

The Offer was specious, the Adventure bold, and the Success promising: But upon farther and mature Deliberation, tho' the Enterprise was accepted and undertaken in the General, yet the Measures were chang'd; the Place expected to be attack'd was rejected, and a new Scheme (as some said, of his own) was appointed for the Expendition, and that was to attack the Havana, the principal Port, and the chief Strength of the Spaniards in America; at least it was, and is still a Place of the greatest Importance to the Spaniards, of any in all their American Dominions, as shall appear presently; The Reasons given for this Alteration of Counsels were such, as presently made an Impression upon All that were consulted about it, and the new Undertaking was unauimously resolv'd on.

In order to carry on an Enterprise of such Importance, a Fleet and an Army was prepar'd, and that with all the Expedition and Secrecy, that such a Design call'd for: Nor 'till the Troops were ready to Embark, was it so much as guess'd at whither they were design'd.

However the jealous Spaniards, made afraid from the meer Importance of the Place, rather than by any certain Knowledge of the Design, sent away some Ships of War, with Stores of Ammunition and Supply of Troops for the Garrisons of the Havana, and of Chartagena, as the two most significant Places they possess'd in all their American Dominions, at least on that Side; and these Ships arriv'd before the English, some considerable time.

The Design was at last made known: only to amuse the Spaniards, Carthagena was given out as the Place intended to be attack'd: The Squauron sail'd, the Troops about 8 or 9000 Men, and commanded by the fam'd Colonels Penn and Venables.

The History of the Voyage is but short in it self, and I shall make it shorter still; the Design upon the Havana miscarry'd, principally by the Disagreement in Councils among the Officers; they were mistaken in every thing, landed in a wrong

The Port and Bay of Havana.

Place, (viz.) at Hispaniola; the Men were harrass'd and fatigued, and the Spaniards by that encourag'd; they were repuls'd in two or three Places, and at length they gave over the Enterprise, laying the Blame one upon another reciprocally, as in all humane Disappointments 'tis very frequent to do.

Failing in this Enterprize they reimbark'd their Troops; and tho' the Army had suffer'd some Loss, Abundance of Men dead, besides those kill'd and hurt in Action (which was too many) and the rest very sickly, the General very unavailing to come home empty-handed, and undertake nothing worthy an English Army, resolved to attempt the Island of Jamaica. Accordingly they sail'd directly to the Place, entred the Port, landed the Army; and being made wise by their Misfortunes, and resolving not to be beaten, unless cut in pieces, they went on with more united Councils, and a better Agreement than before; by which means, and the Spaniards being not well provided for their Defence, they took the Island, and, to shorten the Story, Jamaica has been English ever since.

It is not to be wondred at if the Spaniards, after this narrow Escape, went to work with the Fortifications of the Havana, and made it very strong; adding a strong Castle at the North Part of the Town it self, and adding several Batteries at the Entrance, whereof one under the Castle El Morro has a particular Battery of twelve exceeding long Brass Cannon, which they call the Twelve Apostles, and which carry, if the Spaniards may be believ'd, a fifty-six Pound Ball.

Since this, and even while they were alarm'd with the coming of a French Squadron into those Seas, in the late War under Monsieur Pointy, when they took Chartagena, the Spaniards apprehending the Design was against the Havana, they caused the whole City to be accurately fortified, and a Fort and a Cittadel to be re-built; by which the Town as well as the Port has obtain'd the Name of a very strong Place, tho' far from being what the Spaniards pretend to say of it, Invincible. But if it really were so at this time, or if it was five-fold stronger than it is, it is of no Value or Importance in the Scheme I am now to lay down, nor shall it be of any Use to the Spaniards in the Case before me, any more than the Strength of any other Place; for what signifies its Strength, when it is not to be attack'd?

It is not the Fortifications upon the Shore that will Import any thing in this War; the Superiority by Sea is the thing we lay the whole Weight upon, and being Masters of the Sea is that which the Sum of Affairs depends upon.

However 'tis necessary a little to state the Importance of this Port of the Havana, in as brief Terms as I can, because this was the Reason why Oliver and his Council pitch'd upon it to make their Attack. By the Import of it, I mean, the Import of it to the Spaniards, as they are now possest of it, and as it would have been to the English, if Oliver's General had happen'd to take it.

The Havana is the best Port without Dispute in all the Spanish West-Indies; it is situate on the North Side of the Iste of Cuba, opposite to the Gulph of Florida, in the Latitude of twenty three Degrees North.

The Gulph of Florida being the only practicable Out-let or Passage from the Gulph of Mexico, by which all the Spanish Ships make their Return from America, and by which they enter into Ocean, which they therefore call Disemboguing; I say, the Gulph being the only Practicable Way, all the Galeons from Porto-Belo, and the other Ships called the Flota, from La Vera Craz, come first to the Havana in their Passage home, and there being in Safety from either Seas or Enemies (for it is a Port as safe from Winds and Storms, as from Enemies) they wait 'till they meet from all Parts, and, as they call it, make up their Fleet.

N. B. There is another Way between Cuba and Hispaniola, which the Seamen call the Windward Passage, which the Ships from Jamaica sometimes venture thorough. But 'tis hazardous and difficult, and the Spaniards never make use of it, especially with their Fleet.

N. B. It should also have been observ'd, that the Fleets from old Spain, make this Port of the Havana be the first Place of their Arrival, when they are outward bound, and coming so far in a Body; they then separate as their Orders direct: the Ships for the South go away to PortoBelo, and those to the West go to La Vera Cruz; the Men of War attending them, or not, as they see Occasion, and as Inteiligence of things directs.

So that both ways, whether out or home, the Havana is the only Place of Safety, where the Plate Fleet rendezvous, and where they are cover'd from all Dangers; nor wou'd the Voyage be easily made without such a Halfway-Port to stop in, to recruit, to take in Refreshments, Provisious, and especially Fresh-water; after so long a Run, as it is from Cadiz thither, in which they have no Place to touch at for-Refreshment, except it be the Canary-Islands, where their Stay is but very short, the Road being not at all safe, either from Wind or Weather, or Enemies, even the Turkish Rovers not excepted.

Having thus given you a full Account of the Import of this Place to the Spaniards, I have only this to add; That in the propos'd Advantages to us for cutting off the Spanish Commerce, and totally intercepting their Correspondence with one another, which is the Scheme to be proposed, This mighty Port, this well-fortified City, and this excellent Harbour, shall be of no Signification or Importance one way or other; it shall neither be worth any thing to us to take, or to the Spaniards to keep: Allowing England to have only the Superiority of naval Strength, and to be Masters of the Sea, which I think I may venture to say is not to be doubted, and all the rest shall fall in of Course; the Havana shall be as useless to the Spaniards, as Majorca in the Mediterranean (comparatively speaking) nor shall it be able, or the Spaniards by its help be able, to prevent our Interrupting their Commerce, and in short, taking it wholly into our own Hands.

The Case is Thus:

There is on the same Island of Cuba, and on the same North-Side of it, open to the same grand Passage of the Gulph of Florida, another Port or Harbour, call'd the Harbour or Gulph of Honda; it is about nine Leagues to the Westward of the Havana, and upon the very same Coast.

The Conveniences of this Port (among many others) are some in particular which relate to the Subject in Hand, viz.

- 1. That it is a convenient Place to form a Settlement upon, and to fortifie, so as with little Expence to make it unapproachable by Land, and consequently not to be interrupted by the Spaniards.

- 2. That it commands a fruitful, and plentiful, and healthy Country, where not only all manner of Provisions may be had, but where such easy and secure Planting would follow, as not Jamaica it self would go beyond it, as well for Trade, as supply of Inhabitants.

- 3. But that which is above all the rest, the Situation is such by Sea, that not a Ship, much less a Fleet of Ships, can go in or out, to or from the Havana, from or to the Gulph of Mexico, or the Coast of Carthagena, Porto-Belo, &c. but they must pass by this Port, and even in sight of the Men of War riding here; so that England has no more to do than to post a Squadron of Ships in this Port, making it their Station, and keeping some of them cruising upon the Coast of the Terra Firma, as they see Occasion; and let any one that understands the Situation of the Spanish Commerce, tell us how they will carry it on without our Leave, and which Way they will get out of the Gulph of Mexico, or out of the Gulph of Honduras, or (to use their own Language) how they will Disembogus, that is, get into the Ocean, wihtout (as I say) asking us Leave.

If this is their Case (to make the just Inference from Things as I go) will any Man say I was too arrogant in saying the Spaniards seemed not to know what they were doing, when they begin a Quarrel with England, that their Proceedings were absurd, and ridiculons, and that they seemed to be little off from Distraction?

The farther entering into this Scheme of Management, for the interrupting the Spanish Commerce, requires more Room than can be allowed to any thing from so mean a Pen. But if any Writer, or Writer's Master, can raise one Objection against it, that cannot with unanswerable Force be refuted, I would be glad to see it.

Let the greatest Friend to the Spanish Interest, or the greatest Enemy to the Author of this, tell me, if they can, which way the Flota's from La Vera Cruz shall get out into the Ocean, which way the Galeons shall beat it up against a Leeward Tide (as the Seamen call it) from Porto-Belo, and not come under the command of this Port, or that of Jamaica.

There is a Passage already mentioned, which sometimes our Ships from Jamaica do make use of, which is therefore called the Windward Passage, and which runs from the East Point of Jamaica, North-West, and then fleering North, goes between the Islands of Cuba and Hispaniola, and passing among innumerable Islands, Sands, Shoals, Rocks and other Dangers, leaves the Gulph of Florida on the Larboard Side, and goes out or disembogues into the Ocean, to the North-East of all the Bahama Islands; and it is true, that the Spaniards may (that is to say, now and then a Ship may) make their Escape this Way.

But I refer it to the Judgment of the skilful Mariner, whether this is a practicable Way for the whole Trade; and if it were so, whether then the Island of Jamaica, which is already British, would not be of the same use for that Course, as the Bay of Honda would be for the other.

I am no Projector, nor am I laying the thing down as a Proposal, at least not here; but I think it is plain (at least to me) that a British Squadron posted in this Bay, may when you please put an end to the Spanish Commerce in the West-Indies, in such a manner, that the Spaniards could never carry on any considerable Trade there again: Always supposing what we have reason to hope will ever be the Case, namely, that the British Fleet shall be Masters of the Sea.

It may be pretended, that the Spaniards may coast along the South Side of that they call the North Seas, that is to say, under the North, Share of the South America, the Coast of St. Marta, Venezcula, or the Carata's; and so to Bosco del Drago, the Gulph of Paria, and the Isle De Trimidada; and so going away East, get into the Ocean that way, and come home with the Portuguese Fleets from the Brasils.

All this, Eke what was said before of the Windward Passage, is no more than like a City not entirely invested, or that tho' besieged, may have some such secret Passages, as that now and then a single Messenger may escape in or out, to carry a Letter, or bring particular Intelligence, but which signifies nothing at all towards its Relief, much less towards raising the Stage, and opening a Communication.

Having thus stated the Case of the Spaniards, in case of a War, and on supposition of the British Superiority at Sea, how their Commerce with Europe shall be interrupted and broken off, and how they shall be no more able to trade, no not with their own Subjects, but by Leave from his Britannick Majesty, and his Allies: The Inference from hence is as natural, and as plain, as that mentioned above; viz. No Man need to ask what are our Advantages by a War with Spain.

I know some room lyes here for a Question, thus: Suppose you should thus Interrupt their Commerce, what immediate Benefit or Advantage would that be to us? seeing tho' they cannot trade so freely with one another, they may hinder the Commerce of their own Subjects with the Subjects of others; and so, tho' the Interruption of the Trade be a Loss to them, it will be no Gain to us.

I State this Question, not because it is a Question that any one who understands the Nature of the Commerce of New Spain will ask, but because there are some People that will ask more Questions in half an Hour, than—&c. and because some are (as Solomon says) Wiser in their own Conceit, than those that can render a Reason: The Reasons to be given in answer to such Questions, if any should be Weak enough to ask them, are resolved into not Argument but Demonstration.

If the Spaniards of New Spain cannot trade with the Spaniards of Old Spain, Experience tells us they will trade with any Body: If their own Ships cannot come at them, to bring the Merchandize of Europe to them, 'tis evident they must have those Merchandizes, and they will seek to be supply'd with them where they can.

The Spaniards themselves know this too well; the Marquis de Puzz• Bueno, in his late Memorial, complains of this as one of the Effects of Admiral Hosier's Squadron lying at the Bestimento's, viz. that it covers and protects what he calls the Contraband Trade, to the Prejudice of their Commerce.

Let any one grant me that taking Post, or Stationing a Squadron at the Bay of Honda, shall command the Commerce of Mexico and Peru, as I think it evidently appears it would, I will answer for the Spaniards, that they will grant it shall lay open their Trade Wholly to the Allies.

The Spaniards in America, rich and at case, abound in Money, and have Plenty of all manner of Provisions, Wine excepted. They have the most delicious Fruits; they have a Profusion of Sugars for Preserving, which they greatly delight in; the finest Sweet meats and Confections in the World being to be had there, in the greatest Plenty; they have the Cocoa in such Plenty, that their Chocolate (which is their ordinary Repast) costs them very little. They have Flesh, and Fowl and Fish in abundance, infinitely more than they can consume. And as for Money, their Houses are fill'd with Plate, and their Merchants Ware-houses piled up to the Ceilings with Chests of Silver Coin.

But with all this Affluence they have no Clothes; they have neither Linnen or Woollen, Silk or Hair of their own; I mean manufactured, and of their own making; they have indeed some Cotton, and some Wool, and the Indians, or Natives, do in some remote Places make some ordinary things for their own Cloathing, chiefly of Cotton, and some course peruvian Wool.

But the Spaniards (like the Lord-Danes formerly in England, from whole Pride and Laziness an Idle Fellow was afterwards call'd a Lurdan) are too proud to stoop to any thing called Work, so that they have no Merchandize, and consequently no Cloth, except what they receive from Europe; and some East-India Goods, such as Callicoes, and wrought Silks of China from the Philipine Islands, by the way of Acapulco.

This Supply of Manufactures is (generally speaking) the Loading of the Galeons, including some Wines, and Oyl, and Fruit of the Growth of Old Spain; and these Loadings chiefly consist of the Woollen Manufacture of England, the Silks of France and Italy, and the Linnen of Holland and Germany.

This Supply has sometimes been Interrupted by a War, as was in particular the Case in the first War with France, when the Galeons were stopped for two or three Years; then it was the oddest thing in the World, to see how shabby and ragged the Spaniards appeared, with their Pockets full of Gold, their Tables cover'd with Plate, and their Ware-houses (as above) heap'd up with Silver. And the Author of this speaks of particular Knowledge, that under one of these Disappointments a Spanish Merchant came on board a trading Sloop, on the Coast of St. Martha, in a Periagua, and bought as many Goods at several times as he paid 19000 Pieces of Eight for, and had himself not a Pair of Stockings on his Legs, and the rest of his Cloaths worn into such Rags, as an Englishman with but 50s. in the World would scorn to be seen in.

He acknowledged that they had Money enough, but no Cloths; that every thing bore such a Price as tempted them that were Merchants to sell till they were almost naked. He brought 5000 Pieces of Eight with him the first time, and looking over the whole Ship's Cargo, bought as much as came to 19000, (the Sum above-mention'd) stay'd in the Sloop all the next Day, when they stood off to Sea to be out of Sight, and went on Shore with his Goods the next Night; returning again the Night after with more Money; and so constantly, 'till he had brought all his Money, and then sent three other Merchants, who bought all the rest of the Cargo.

If this Trade was carry'd on thus, when at the extremest Hazard; what would it be when, under the Protection of the Men of War, the Ships and Sloops should come boldly to their Shores, and the Buyers be under no Restraint. Necessity obliging them to consive at one another on Shore, and no Guard de Costia's to take Cognisance at Sea?

Nay, what would it be when the Bay of Honda should be a free Fair, and that all the Spanish Vessels that thought fit to come thither, should trade under the Protection of the Place, and be safe going and coming, under shelter of the cruising Men of War?

Will any Man say that the Trade will not be wholly our own, that is to say, the Allies? for the Dutch at Curacao and Surinam, and the French at Martinico, would have their Share in the same Commerce; and any one may answer for it, the Advantage would be such, that we should never be concern'd, tho' there was never to be any more Peace with the Spaniards, either on this Side of the World, or on the other.

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The evident advantages to Great Britain and its allies from the approaching war: especially in matters of trade. To which is added two curious plans, one of the port and bay of Havana; the other of Porto-Belo

Defoe, Daniel, 1661?-1731.

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http://ota.ox.ac.uk/id/3619

ID [isbn10]

1106006186

ID [isbn13]

9781106006189

ID [TCP]

K021585.000

ID [BIBNO]

CW3306253430

ID [ECSS]

1185000400

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— The evident advantages to Great Britain and its allies from the approaching war: especially in matters of trade. To which is added two curious plans, one of the port and bay of Havana; the other of Porto-Belo, Defoe, Daniel, 1661?-1731.. [4],44p., plates : ill ; 8⁰. London :: printed; and sold by J. Roberts; and A. Dodd,. 1727.. [Anonymous. By Daniel Defoe.] [Reproduction of original from the British Library.] [Moore, 490] [Sabin, 23306] [English Short Title Catalog, ESTCT2617.] [Electronic data. Farmington Hills, Mich. : Thomson Gale, 2003. Page image (PNG). Digitized image of the microfilm version produced in Woodbridge, CT by Research Publications, 1982-2002 (later known as Primary Source Microfilm, an imprint of the Gale Group).]

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