Arguments about the alteration of triennial elections of Parliament. In a letter to a friend in the country

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ARGUMENTS About the ALTERATION of TRIENNIAL ELECTIONS OF PARLIAMENT.

In a LETTER to a Friend in the Country.

SIR,

YOUR last Letter expresses your great Concerns and Fears about the Design now on foot for the Alteration of the Act for the frequent Meeting and Calling of Parliaments in one Particular, that is, the Changing the Term for Elections of Parliament, from three to more Years; and at the same time gives me an Account of the several Objections, which make the greatest Noise around you upon that Subject. The same Fears, and the same Objections, I find to be very common, and very warmly propagated in all Conversations here in Town.

For my self, I acknowledge that it is with me, in this Case, as it is in many others of Importance; the first Surprize gave me the like Uneasiness to what you express: But I am very well satisfied, that the most likely Way to cure that Uneasiness, is, to debate the Matter as Friends; and to examine, Whether that Surprize be the Force of meer Prejudice, or of good Judgment. And for this, I am very sure, I am in one Respect, at least, well qualified, That as to my own private Advantage, or Interest, it is not of the least Importance to me, Whether the Parliament may, with the Consent of the King, sit three Years, or seven Years, or twenty Years. I have no Designs, nor Views; no Piques, nor Resentments; to incline me one way or other: And therefore, if you will put your self into the same Posture of Mind, we will, if you please, enter upon this Subject.

In all Debates of this Nature, there are Two principal Points, which will comprehend under them all other Particulars. The One is, Whether the Thing proposed be lawful, with regard to the Nature of our Constitution? The Other is, Whether it be expedient, or useful, to the Good Ends which ought always to be in the View of those who make Laws?

The Lawfulness of the Thing can't be denied by any Persons, tho' never so great Enemies to the doing it. Nor do I find, amongst all the Topicks employed against it, that any thing of Moment is 〈◊〉 against the Right or Authority of the 〈◊〉 Legislature to do it. It is no more a Fundamental of our Constitution, That a New Parliament must be summon'd every three Years, than at any other Interval. It is equally just, as far as Right and Authority are concern'd, for the King, Lords and Commons, to six it for one Term, as for another: And if it were not out of their Right to make that Great Alteration, which fix'd it for three Years, it certainly cannot be out of their Right to make a much less Alteration, by fixing it once more to another Term.

As to the Sense and Mind of the Electors, the Truth of the Matter is this: They are suppos'd to have no other View in their Choice of Persons, than to send such to Parliament as they think best qualified, by their Estates, Wisdom and Integrity, to do whatever is to be done in Parliament, without regard to the Time of their Sitting there. And there is no other End in the electing Representatives, but that they, from Time to Time, may make, and alter Laws, in such manner as best to consult and promote the Good of the whole Community: The very Election is, and must be supposed to impower the Elected Persons, faithfully, and impartially, to do every Thing that is necessary, or expedient, for the Preservation and Establishment of the Common Interest, whether it falls in with the Humours or Opinions of the Electors, or not. This brings us to the only Point to be consider'd, when any Alteration of a former Changeable Law is proposed; and that is, Whether, (all Things consider'd,) it be Expedient and Useful?

And of this, as far as the Time past is concern'd, Experience is the best Judge. When a Law hath been long tried, and the Consequences and Effects of it in a Nation, have been many Years open and sensible, it requires but little Thought to judge, whether it be best to continue it in every Respect, as it is, or to model it anew. And now, if you please, we will consider the Effect the Triennial Elections have had amongst our selves at Home; and then it will be proper to think of the Effect they have had, and still must naturally have, Abroad.

At Home, the least Evil is, that the Tempers and Spirits of Men are put into a Fermen•, and boil'd up into a Rage, which never is cooled, because the Returns, at which this Rage is useful to some Persons or other, are so quick, that it is not Politick in such Men to let it cease; nor perhaps possible for them to make it cease, even if they were willing to do so. Riots, Tumults, Mutual Abuses, odious Nick-Names, Personal Affronts, are kept alive and warm, from Three Year to Three Year, by Men of Design and Dexterity in the Management of other Men's Passions; improved and heighten'd by such quick Returns: These are what we see and feel of the Effects of it upon the Temper of a Nation, that if ever it is ruined, can be ruined by nothing but its divided Affections and Interests.

Besides this, there could not be contrived a Method more effectual to the Debauchery of the Subject's Morals, not only in one, but in all, Respects, than this hath proved. Bribery, known and open, (without a Remedy) which supposeth a Corruption of Mind, and naturally leads to an Insensibility to every thing Great and Honourable; and by Degrees, to a perfect Disregard to every thing Sacred and Useful. A Scene of Bestial Intemperance encouraged and paid for in many Places, for fear Friendship should cool, if it be not kept hot by such Methods.—And the Crimes that often accompany this, need not be mentioned. The least is a General Disposition in Men to leave the Thoughts of Diligence and Industry in their Business, for the more agreeable Entertainments of Idleness, and a luxurious Beggary.

I do not suppose or argue that this Alteration of the Term will put a full Stop to this Corruption of Morals, either as to Bribery, or to the other Instances named. But it is certain that the Returns being not so quick, the Tempers of Men must, in the Nature of Things, become much more easy to one another by Degrees; which is itself an Advantage greatly to be valued. It is certain, that the Scent of Bribery cannot be so strong, nor the Avowal of it so constant, when there is such an Intermission. And, as for that never-ceasing Current of Debauchery, requisite for so frequent Elections, it must be this way interrupted; and, in a good Degree, broken into. The Crimes often accompanying it must diminish: And the Men, brought up to laborious Callings, must exchange their Idleness for Industry; and become much more useful to their Families and the Publick.

I mention not the Ruin both of the Estates and Morals of Gentlemen, so frequently Candidates at our Elections: They know best how well they can bear such Evils; and whether it tends to make themselves better Patriots to their Country, or better Fathers to their own Families, that they are to make their Way by so quick Returns of Bribery and Corruption.

We have hitherto considered the ill Effect of these evil Consequences at home, supposing them to terminate in the Concerns of Private Men. But this Supposition is not to be continued. For you will see presently, that all these Things have a visible Influence upon the Publick. The General Topick amongst the Adversaries of this Alteration, as well those who hate, as those who love, Liberty; truly so called, is, the seeming Advantage of this Part of the Act to that great and lovely Good. I call it seeming; because, as it never was designed at first, by many of the most zealous Promoters of it, for any thing but to cramp the Endeavours of a Good Prince, for the settling our Liberties: So it hath never had any better lasting Effect that Way, than they design'd it should have; but, as I think, visibly tends, in its Consequences, to the Destruction of our legal Liberties. The Reason is short and plain. Nothing in the World can make Men more supinely negligent of the Publick Interest, or dispose them more to receive their Chains, than a State of Bribery, Corruption, Debauchery and Idleness. And this is the constant State of most of our Electors, meerly thro' the quick Returns, and the pleasing Prospect of Elections. The more lasting and uninterrupted this State is, the less sensible are they of the Evils it inclines them to. They are by degrees brought to think the highest Bidder to have the best Right to their Votes. And will act in Time agreeably to that Thought, whether the Money be offer'd them from Abroad, or at Home. The little Interruption to their Vices and their Expectations, is the Thing which makes the Danger so great: And this is owing to the frequent Returns of Elections, at so short, certain, Periods of Time.

Nor doth this Argument touch the Electors only, but the Elected also, to a very great degree. For as long as Humane Nature is capable of Corruption; as long as there is a Probability, or even a Possibility, of any Part of Mankind being induced to sell their Country and their Posterity, for a present Advantage to themselves; so long it is evident to a Demonstration, that Gentlemen, who have, by so frequent Returns of Chargeable Elections, exhausted their Estate, and impoverished their Families, will be much more likely to seek, or to embrace Opportunities of re-imbursing themselves, and preventing their own immediate Ruin, at the Expence of the publick Liberty and Security; much more likely I say, to act this Part, than if the Term were made longer; and if by that Means they might hope to be at rest from Expence for a much longer Time.

Add to this, that Personal and Party-Revenge, which is, of all others, the most strong Principle in the Bulk of Men, never fails to actuate both the Candidates and the Electors. If ever our Ruin be effected, it is too probable this will be the great Engine of it. And let every one judge, whether any thing could be devised more likely, either to raise, or actuate, or preserve that Spirit in its Keenness and Bitterness, than the Triennial Returns of Elections, and the Expectation of them: Or whether any thing can give us any Respite from that Spirit, and its fatal Consequences, but an Alteration of those Returns to a longer Distance.

There is another Consideration very well worth mentioning on this Subject, which is the Distribution of Justice in the Countries: It is manifest, that nothing hath diverted the Course of it from its proper Current, so much as the Party-Views of Men, kept up to such a Degree by the expected Returns of frequent Elections; and that nothing can recall it again, but some Rest from those Views which turn'd it aside. Men will not have the Temptation, and therefore not the Inclination, either to suspend Justice, or to act contrary to it, in many of those Instances, in which now their constant Hopes or Fears, actuated by the Frequency of Elections, are too apt to draw them aside. Besides that, when some Intermission is given to the Heats and Quarrels of Neighbours, the Occasions and Opportunities of Partiality or Injustice, must, in good measure, cease.

The Effects which I have now gone over are but too certain, as they are the natural Product of the Passions of Men, in a divided Nation; and they are Evils, which will be, by degrees, at least very much abated by the present Design.

We have hitherto consider'd our Triennial Elections, their Influence upon Us at Home. Now, let us consider what Effect They have had, and still naturally have, Abroad. And here it must be remembred, that We are a Nation, not separated in Interest (as We are in Situation) from the rest of Europe. We have Enemies at Home, acting in Concert with Enemies Abroad: And Friends Abroad, without regard to whose Interests and Alliances, We must sooner or later, become a Sacrifice to those Enemies. We have a Pretender to guard against; Many here are his profess'd Friends; and many more act either blindly or designedly with Those who are so; bearing a sensible part in their Interests, and ever encouraging, or at least, not discouraging, Them. That which keeps up the Views of those Abroad, who think it their Concern, to make us the Scene of Civil War, if not a Province to themselves, under that Pretender; That, I say, alone, which keeps up their Views, is, the knowing They have Friends here; and the finding that these Friends are never in despair, but always representing their Cause, as promising well. And that which keeps them in this Temper, is, the constant Expectation of New Elections, in which They hope for more, but are certain at least, of this Advantage, that our Heats, and Hatreds, and Desire of Revenge, are still perpetuated and improved. This is constantly represented abroad; and with such Success, that They who wish Evil to our Happy Establishment, seem really to believe it; and they who wish well to it, receive Impression enough from it, to look upon Us with Diffidence, as a People, always fluctuating and uncertain. It was this great disadvantage, arising from our Condition at home, that brought King William to make a Peace, even against his own good Judgment, and his own great Views; for which nothing could be urged, but that distress, to which our wretched and uneasy State here, had reduced his Affairs. And no wonder now if after that great Unhappiness, and what is still more dreadful, after a late Fatal Experience, the best Friends we have Abroad, cannot be so confident of us, as our Interest makes it requisite they should be. In a Word, Our Enemies both Abroad, and at Home, can't be reduc'd even one step towards a state of Despair, in the Methods We are in at present: Nor our best Friends be throughly assured of our secure Estate: The Former must look upon us still, with a good degree of Contempt; and the Latter with a great deal of Uneasiness and Diffidence, till We have some resting Time, to Settle, not only the Tempers, but the Affairs, and the Interests of this Nation: Which never will be done, as there is Reason to fear, as long as Parliaments continue limited to the present Term.

This puts me in mind of another very material Point, which tho' absolutely necessary to procure Us the Confidence of our Friends, and to command Respect from our Enemies; yet seems impossible to be Effected without a greater steddiness of Counsels, a more uninterrupted Application to publick Business, and a more Mature and Disinterested Deliberation, than the Experience we have had of frequent Elections gives room to hope for: This is the Paying off the Debts of the Nation, which must otherwise Eat out the very Vitals of the Publick, and expose Us to the greatest Danger from such foreign Powers, as are using the most violent Methods to be before hand with Us in this signal Advantage. To work out this inveterate Evil, there appears but one Method, consistent with the Faith of Parliamentary Securities (which ought to be preserved inviolable) and at the same time, free from the Odium of imposing new Taxes on the Country, and in which consequently the Landed, and the Monied Interest, would be likely to join, without eithers thinking themselves in the least aggrieved. This is to Raise and Support the Publick Credit to such a Height, as may enable the Government to Borrow, at a lower Interest, what may Pay off such Debts as carry a greater; which was attempted last Year, but hindred by the Rebellion. Now Experience shews, that publick Credit will be subject to perpetual Fluctuations and Inequalities, or even fall to an Ebb from whence it is next to impossible to make it re-ascend, while the Measures of one three Years are liable to be Unravell'd and Reversed by the Three next succeeding, and those again by the next; and whilst under the Shelter of frequent Elections, such Tumults, Commotions and Disorders, are Introduced, as, however opposite in themselves, conspire in shaking the Foundation of all Government, keep Mens Minds in suspence, and make them look on every Thing as precarious, that is any ways involved with the Publick.

After many Enquiries, I can meet with but one Good Event, in favour of the Triennial Term for Elections, which a long Experience hath furnish'd us with: And that is, that it is suppos'd to have been the occasion of throwing out the Destructive Bill of Commerce; some Gentlemen not daring to Vote for it out of fear, of their next Elections. But this you will see, cuts both ways. For, as Gentlemen may by accident, not do a Bad thing for fear of their Next Election; so it is as plain, that they may, as often, not do the most necessary good thing, if it happens to be Unpopular, for the same fear. So that this holds at least equally against that Bill, as for it. But then many, who knew those Times, will deny the Fact, and affirm, that a multitude of little Piques, and great Passions, concurr'd in that Affair; and that the Awe of Electors, happen'd at that time to have but little Share in it. Private History would be useful to us upon this occasion. But this We all saw in publick, that however that Fear might then be suppos'd to work so far, as to hinder those few Gentlemen from openly espousing that fatal Bill; it did not work so far, as to keep them immediately from entering into an Address, and Voting for such Methods, as must have been as Fatal, as that Bill it self, if Providence had not interposed. What would it have avail'd us, that the Bill had not pass'd then, if these Designs, at the same Time on Foot, had prevail'd? And what doth it avail to say, that the Triennial Term did Us that good, (supposing it so,) when it is plain, it had not the Power to preserve that Good; and that the same Persons, who seem'd to fear it, yet were induc'd to undo their own Work, and to enter into Measures, which must have ended in the same Evils, and indeed, in Universal Destruction? It signifies little, therefore, whether this was the great occasion of that lucky Incident or not; because it is plain it had not power enough to hinder the Ill Effects of that Bill, in another Method: Nor would have hindred them, had not something else intervened. But supposing it had; certainly that one particular, so purely accidental, cannot be set against a Train of Constant, and too certain, Evil Consequences, which we feel every Day we live. These Evil Consequences, are so many undeniable-Arguments for an Alteration of it; and weigh exceedingly and particularly at this Juncture, when all our Happiness depends upon the Firm Establishment of our Excellent King, upon this Throne; when all our Enemies at Home and Abroad, visibly place their Hopes in our Disturbances, owing to nothing so much as to the constant Expectation of Triennial Elections; when all our true Friends, both here and elsewhere, wait with Impatience to see our Security firmly and throughly Established: When the going on with proper Measures, for such Establishment, has been unavoidably put off, by the Attention given to the Rebellion, and so the longer Continuance of this Parliament is become particularly necessary; And when We all may observe, if We please, that, tho' the Rebellion be in great Measure quell'd, yet, the Spirit of it, is so far from being lay'd asleep, that it walks about still, even at Noon-day, in defiance of all Authority; and with a strubborness, never to be reduced to a settled Despair, without some such Method, as is now talk'd of.

These Particulars, I say, are so many undeniable Arguments, for an Alteration of the Term of Years fix'd in the Act, unless it shall appear that the Objections against doing it, are of more Weight and Importance. Those which I have been able to hear of, together with such as you tell me are most talk'd of in the Country, We will now just run over.

The most general Objection (and that which seems in reality to lye at the Bottom of all the rest) is, that this Step will be so unpopular among the Electors, and raise such a Clamour all over the Nation, as must for ever sink the Interest of those who have any Share in promoting it. To this I answer, that it will wholly depend on the Parliament it self, to render this proceeding Popular, or Unpopular, by the right or wrong Use they shall make of the Prolongation thereby accruing to themselves. If their After-behaviour should be such, as to shew they had no wiser, nor more generous View in making this Alteration, than merely to save themselves the hazard, trouble and expence of a New Election, they must, no doubt, be content to reap the Rewards of their Selfishness, by forfeiting all Title to the future good Will of their Electors. But if their Zeal and Industry for promoting the Ease and Safety of the Nation, shall appear to rise in proportion to the Time allowed them for accomplishing the great Work they have begun, the End will sufficiently commend the Means; and the Advantages arising to the whole Kingdom from this Change, will easily Reconcile it to all such, with whom a good Man ought ever to wish to Maintain the Character of Popularity. It will certainly be in the Power of those who most apprehend the Odium, and Unpopularity of this Action, to Secure it from all possible Mis-representations, by making Use of the Power it will bring with it, to just and wise Purposes; to ease the Debts, to perfect the Tranquility, and to perpetuate the Peace of the Nation. Raising Money by Taxes upon Land, Windows, Soap, or any thing else, is always Unpopular, and always raises Clamours, when it is first resolved upon. Every thing that hath been done for the Security of His present Majesty; the suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, without which We must have been destroyed; the granting Him a Power to Raise, and Hire, Forces for his own, and the Nation's Defence; the putting his Friends into any Possibility of consulting his Safety and Honour; Every particular of this sort hath been represented all over the Nation, in such Colours, that it hath been highly unpopular, and been attended with great Clamours: But Necessity and Expedience are the things to be consider'd in all such Points. These will always make things pleasing to the true Friends of the Nation. But in order to be popular with the King's Enemies, the first Step he must take, must be, to lay down his Crown; and if his Ministers be resolved to be moved by Clamours, they must resign their Posts, and yield up all Power to those who wish to destroy them. The only Consideration is, whether the Nation's Affairs require a thing to be done: When that is fix'd, Popular or Unpopular, Clamours or no Clamours, ought not to affect any farther, than about the manner of doing it. Every thing that touches particular Men's Purses, or retrenches from their Luxury, will generally be Unpopular with those Men: But a little Time makes such things easy, when the Publick finds it's Advantage in it, and Men's Passions have had Time to cool.

Another thing which I find generally shews it self, at first hearing of the Design, is, an Uneasiness, as if this were Repealing the Act: When, in truth, I will venture to affirm, that it is so far from that, that it is indeed Restoring it to its best Design; and making it effectual to all that Good which was originally purposed, and intended, by any of those honest Patriots who joined in the first framing of it. The Designs were, that a King of England should not be without a Parliament; and that one and the same Parliament should have a Term fixed, beyond which it should not be in the Power of the Prince to continue it. And in both these respects the Act will be left as it was. All the Difference is, that the Parliament then in being, thought Three Years the proper Term. Experience hath assured us of a Multitude of Evils proceeding from so quick a Return of Elections. And therefore, in that part of the Act, and in that only, is the Alteration intended, in order to remedy or abate those Evils, without bringing in greater.

Another Reason against it, is taken from a Suspicion of some private and personal Views in the King's Ministers; as if the whole Aim were to establish themselves, for so much longer time, in their Power. But I observe, that the same Persons who make this Objection, generally contradict it, by affirming that the Ministers have nothing to fear, and that this present Design is wholly unnecessary, because a Court may be sure of another House of Commons, to their Mind. They must think the Ministry very weak, not to see this, which is so plain, that the Influence of a Court hath hardly ever fail'd in this Point, tho' at the same time, the Gentlemen who make this Objection, are apt to insinuate the necessity of some Measures for this purpose, which cannot be very agreeable to an honest and incorrupt Ministry. However, in the Opinion of such as allow this, it cannot be having a View to Themselves, but a general View to the Nation at Home, and to the Interest and Glory of it Abroad, which engageth the Ministers in this Design. They who know the Nature of such Affairs, judge the contrary, that Ministers, as to their own private Interest, might more probably find their Account in New Parliaments, than in One continued. Experience shews, that the most Courtly Parliaments have turn'd Uncourtly in their long sitting. And therefore, this Design can't be necessary for any private self-interested Views of their own, because it is allowed, that such Ends, (if they have any,) might be serv'd as well, at least, in the former Method, as in this. They, who find a Biass in their Minds, against every thing proposed by a Court, let it be what it will, should consider, in this Case, whether it be not probable that the present Views and Designs are of a Publick Nature, rather than of a Private; and should act accordingly, without prejudice, or affection, as they think it requisite, or not, for the Establishment of the King, and the Nation; and for the more effectual destroying all the Hopes of the Enemies of both.

The most powerful Objection of all, is, that the Alteration now design'd, may make it much more likely, that under a Bad Prince, sometime or other, Arbitrary Power may b• brought in. For the present, I am sure, we have nothing to fear. We have now a King upon the Throne, whose S•••… is fashioned to Right and Justice; and whose great enquiry upon all Occasions is, what our Constitution and what our Laws require of Him. We have a Prince, in View, to succeed Him, whose Native Honour and Integrity, guard Him against all suspicion. But I grant, this may not always be our Happiness, either in Possession, or in Prospect. And therefore if this All•…eration could be proved, I should be moved another way, than I am at present: There will be more Time, I acknowledge, in any one particular Parliament, for Attempts to be made that way. But, as I think, not at all more likely to succeed. On the contrary, there is more likelihood, that Gentlem•• should by degrees, become even ready to part with a Constitution, for which there must be such Contention by Bribery, and all the Arts of Iniquity, every Three Years, than if it were otherwise. And then again, supposing a Parliament chosen for Three Years only; a Prince resolutely bent upon doing it in a Pa•liamentary way, prepared with Treasures and Favours, might make such Attempts, before that Term be expired, that none could resist, who would not as certainly go on farther in their Integrity. One may venture to affirm, that a Parliament which keeps its Integrity for Three Years, will discourage the making any such Attempts for the remaining Four. And, to give an Instance, if I remember right, the Parliament which gave up the Liberties of Sweden, gave that Fatal stroke within the Term of Three Years▪ Whenever a Cour• can be bad enough for such a Design, they will first take care, at the time of Election, to set up Persons capable of the same bad Design. And then, there is no difference between Three or Seven Years. Only, here remember, what I have before observ'd to you, that the quick Returns of Trienn•al Elections. tend much more, to that Corruption, Bribery, Dissoluteness of Manners, as well as Party-Revenge, which pave the way to the loss of Liberty, than the longer Term, now proposed, can do. One might appeal to any who know the World, whether it be not more probable (as I have urged already,) that the Elected Gentlemen themselves, impoverish'd by so frequent Returns of their great Charges, will be inclined to listen to the Offer made them, with so pernicious a View, than if the Returns were not so frequent; and besides this, whether the Influence that way, from the powerful motive of Party-Revenge, will not have vastly more weight, when it 〈◊〉 roused and irritated, and set on Fire, by so quick Returns of Contention, than if it were otherwise. And, what is of great moment, in my opinion, since it is plain that every Instance of wickedness, and divi•ion, tending to destruction, is so heighten'd and infl•med by the quick Returns of Elections; there must be much greater Encouragement to a Foreign Enemy, to interpose with his Money, to purchase our Ruine, in a Triennial Choice, than in a Septennial. Especially now, before we are well settled upon that Bottom which is the only Foundation of our Happiness. It is well known how far the Neighbouring Powers intermeddle in the Elections of Poland and Germany, and with how much success they send their Agents and Factors to them; and what an abuse of Liberty this Corruption has introduced in those Countries, all the World can testify: Nor can we think the Election of a British Parliament, so very indifferent a thing to some neighbouring Powers, especially, at certain Junctures, that they should think One or Two Hundred Thousand Pounds misapplied, in purchasing Votes to their Mind. And I can say, that this is no whimsical Supposition, because I have my self seen an Intercepted Letter, written from hence into France, just before the last Election, by a Friend to the Pretender, who had taken the Oaths to King George, plainly hinting both that such a thing was then expected from the King of France, and that he did not doubt the Success of it. I think, this alone is enough to allarm any true Lover of his Country, in the present Situation of our Affairs, and of those of all Europe.

There is one more Objection, I hear, is often urged, That We should have severely blamed such a Design in the late Administration: Nay, that great Horror was express'd, at the very supposition of the thing, at that time; I grant this, and that the Horror was just and reasonable. But upon what was this founded? Not upon the unlawfulness of the thing it self; not upon the Impossibility of it's ever being fit to be done; but upon a too wellgrounded Assurance, that they who were then in Power must have meant it, whenever they did it, for the same end, to which their other Acts tended, and that was, the utter Ruine of the Grand-Alliance, and of all the Hopes of our best Friends Abroad, and the inspiring full Vigour into the Cause of France and the Pretender. This was the Ground of all just dread upon that Head. Had it been so, that they had design'd it manifestly for the firmer Security of the Protestant Succession here, and the greater support of the Grand Alliance abroad, no true Britain could have had ground of Complaint, but must have acknowledg'd, if it tended, and was n••essary to so good ends, that it was not only lawfull, but highly praise-worthy. An Instance parallel to it may quite take off the Edg• of this Objection. What honest Mind would not have been filled with Uneasiness and Terror, supposing They had then attmpted to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, by which they might have confined all Men of great Capacity and Influence, whom they knew to be averse to their Proceedings, in favour of France? But would this have been any Argument, why the Friends of King George should not have secured Him and the Nation by such a Suspension, when made necessary by the Treasonable Practices of his avowed Enemies? Or because we blame a thing, lawful in it self, when we see it design'd for our 〈◊〉; therefore, must we be averse to a lawful thing, design'd, and tending to our Preservation? This is the whole strength of that Objection, which yet, I believe, weighs with many, for want of considering it.

As for the late Ministers, I verily believe they design'd no such thing. And my reason for believing so, is, that they did not at all want it; nay, that it would have done them more Hurt than Good. Their Designs were such as were to be manag'd solely by Artifice. The great Engines they made use of for keeping up a Spirit, against all Truth and Right, were those very Mobbs, Riots, and Tumults, which alone could keep a Multitude in such a Ferment, as to make them admire, and press for their own Ruine. They thought it their Interest to govern by the Passions of the Crowd: And were very peculiarly dextrous in the Management of them. They were possess'd of the full Cry, and Noise of the Nation, and likely, in all probability, so to continue: This was a much surer Hold to Them, and to their Designs, than the Continuance of One and the same Parliament: And therefore, they never attempted it. But certainly, as that same Spirit, which was then raised for the Service of the Pretender, made it unnecessary for them; so, it being still alive, and full of evil Influences upon our Happiness, this makes it highly prudent in Others, to do that in order to suppress and extirpate it, which They, in their Wisdom, would not do, for fear of quieting what they expected Benefit from. Their security consisted in keeping up that vile Spirit to the Heighth. It is the security of the King and his Government, to have a stop put to it, and to remove every Opportunity that may give Fuel and Encouragement to it, as far as is consistent with the Constitution and Liberties of the Nation.

All these Considerations put together, have, I confess, wholly taken off my First Surprize. And the same Considerations make me hope, that all true Friends to the King, and to the Publick Happiness, (which now depends entirely upon the firm Establishment of the present Royal Family) will not let their General Suspicion, or their Particular Biass, have such Power over them, as to move them, to join with their own Enemies, in a Point, in which if they should, by any unforeseen Accident, have Success, I am confident, they would very heartily, as well as fruitlesly repe••, of their own Proceedings. When Persons who have always shewn themselves Enemies to Liberty, and Professors of the Principles of Slavery; who have ever express'd a Hatred of the Revolution, and of every thing built upon it; and have ever been the Supports of the Popish and Jacobite Interest in these Nations: When such, I say, put on a Zeal for Liberty, it is a Moral Demonstration that it is all a M•ck-Shew; and that they themselves think quite otherwise of what they oppose, than they would seem to think. If it were really their Opinion, that the Alteration now proposed, would either help the Cause which they have espoused, or be any Prejudice to a Government which they hate, I am very confident, they would not enter into the Opposition of it, with that Warmth and Heat which they now profess. But they foresee that their Hopes must in Proportion abate, with those Heats and Disturbances which alone keep them alive; and for this Reason it is, that they now take into their Mouths the ••…rds and Topicks which they have ever hitherto ridiculed and exploded; in order to keep off the T••ng which they heartily hate, the Settlement of the present Government in Peace and Quiet at Home, and in Honour and Glory Abroad.

And this is one very good Reason, why All, who truly wish well to that Settlement, should unite in the Alteration of that which is the Chief, if not the Only, thing left to keep up the Spirits and Designs of its Enemies. But if, when it is in our Power, to put some Stop to our present Corruptions and Distractions, and to establish the Glory of our King, and the Happiness of our Country, in a Method perfectly confident with all our Rights and Liberties, we are guided by the Insinuations of those who hate us, and refuse to do it, we must thank our selves for all that follows. It will lie at our Door to answer for all the Consequences of such a Neglect. From these, with whom we join in it, we have no Returns to expect, but Contempt, Reproaches, and Insults.

In fine, I can consider the Triennial Return of our Elections, no otherwise, than as what hath made us, and still continues us, the most Divided and most Corrupted of Nations; what was at first by many contrived, and still in its own Nature tends to oppose the Designs of the Best Kings, and to promote those of the Worst; leading to an universal Debauchery of the Manners and Tempers of the Electors, as well as to make the Elected themselves weary enough of such perpetual Contests and Charge, to incline some Time or other to Thoughts which would not otherwise find Admittance; influencing the People to think easily of becoming a Prey to the Highest Bidder; keeping up the Spirits of our Common Enemies, and creating Diffidence and Uneasiness in our best Friends; introducing and increasing all Excesses of Violence and Mutual Revenge; serving a Multitude of bad Purposes, which have a peculiar Malignity at this particular Juncture, without having one good Effect, fit to be named in Opposition to them: And all this occasioned by the Shortness of the Interval allowed, either to put an End to such Evils, or to cultivate any thing that is Good. To cure all these entirely, nothing can perhaps be thought of, but what would introduce greater. To apply something that may put an End to some of them, and abate and diminish the rest, is a Matter that deserves the Regard of every good Briton. And, I believe, at this Time nothing at all effectual can be thought of, without an Alteration of the Triennial Elections. I am, &c.

LONDON: Printed, and Sold by S. Gray in Amen-Corner.

(Price Three Half-Pence.)

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Title statement

Arguments about the alteration of triennial elections of Parliament. In a letter to a friend in the country

Defoe, Daniel, 1661?-1731.

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ID [ota]

http://ota.ox.ac.uk/id/3618

ID [isbn10]

1106006178

ID [isbn13]

9781106006172

ID [TCP]

K021557.000

ID [BIBNO]

CW3304362574

ID [ECSS]

0084401700

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— Arguments about the alteration of triennial elections of Parliament. In a letter to a friend in the country, Defoe, Daniel, 1661?-1731.. 6 p. ; 2⁰. [London :: printed, and sold by S. Gray in Amen-Corner,. 1716]. [Anonymous. By Daniel Defoe.] [Drop-head title.] [Imprint from colophon.] [Reproduction of original from the British Library.] [Not in Moore] [English Short Title Catalog, ESTCT2583.] [Electronic data. Farmington Hills, Mich. : Thomson Gale, 2003. Page image (PNG). Digitized image of the microfilm version produced in Woodbridge, CT by Research Publications, 1982-2002 (later known as Primary Source Microfilm, an imprint of the Gale Group).]

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