An additional dialogue of the dead, between Pericles and Aristides: being a sequel to the dialogue between Pericles and Cosmo

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- Lately published by L. DAVIS and C. REYMERS.

AN ADDITIONAL DIALOGUE OF THE DEAD.

PERICLES and ARISTIDES:

ARISTIDES.

I AM glad to have found you, PERICLES: Since your Conversation with COSMO, (which, you know, I overheard) I have been revolving the Subject of it in my Mind; and begin to think, you left the Matter short.

PERICLES.

Your Sentiments on this Subject will give me Pleasure. Tell me, ARISTIDES; in what Respect do you esteem the conclusion of our Argument to have been defective?

ARISTIDES.

With Regard to yourself, I think your Conclusions were just: I grant you, ‘that by weakening the Power of the Court of the AREOPAGUS, you tore up that Anchor, which SOLON had fixed, to keep his Republic stedfast and firm, against the Storms of popular Faction.’ On this Account, I farther must allow, that ‘notwithstanding the Integrity which you preserved in your public Conduct, and the great Virtues which you exerted, your Place in Elysium is justly below that of those, who have governed Republics, or limited Monarchies, not merely with a Concern for their present Advantage; but with a prudent Regard to that Balance of Power, on which their permanent Happiness always depends.’

PERICLES.

If you allow me this, it is all I contend for. What could remain farther to be adjusted in the Debate?

ARISTIDES.

I am of Opinion, that the Question was decided in too general a Manner: And that for Want of a little more Particularity of Argument and Proof, Conclusions might be plausibly drawn, which would be very distant from the Truth.

PERICLES.

Pray, explain yourself a little farther, ARISTIDES; for as yet I do not clearly comprehend you.

ARISTIDES.

What I mean is this: That Free States, or limited Monarchies, though they may greatly resemble each other in their external Construction, may yet be so very unlike in their internal Condition, that no just Conclusions could be drawn concerning their Prosperity and Welfare, merely from their external Resemblance. Thus we will suppose two States to be equally free, in their legal Constitution: But let us farther suppose, that the Manners or Principles, which prevail in these two States are widely different; and, in that Case, I apprehend, that if you regard only the legal Form of the Constitution, without weighing the Manners and Principles of the Members of the State, you will be in great Danger of imposing false Conclusions on yourself and others.

PERICLES.

I did not force any of these Conclusions upon you. They are of your own making.

ARISTIDES.

It is true, you did not force them upon me: Yet they are not of my own making. For some of the Shades, who overheard your Conversation, have since told me, that the general Turn of your Discourse obliquely led to these Conclusions; and therefore thought that it would become ARISTIDES to discuss this Point with a little more Precision.

PERICLES.

I am ready to hear any thing you have to say on this interesting Subject.

ARISTIDES.

You will give me leave then, to examine some things that passed in your Discourse with COSMO.

PERICLES.

Pray be as free with them as you please. I rely on the Candor as well as Justice of ARISTIDES.

ARISTIDES.

I will endeavour to deserve your favourable Opinion. You may remember, you said ‘That by weakening the Power of the Court of AREOPAGUS, you tore up that Anchor, which SOLON had fixed, to keep his Republic stedfast and firm, against the Storms of popular Factions.’ This, I think, was the first Foundation of your Argument.

PERICLES.

It was.

ARISTIDES.

Is it a safe Practice, PERICLES, to build an Argument on a Metaphor?

PERICLES.

I should think it is; provided the Metaphor contain a just Image of the Fact in Question.

ARISTIDES.

That I allow: but still the Question remains, whether the Metaphor contain that just Image or not. So that we are not yet advanced a Step towards the Discovery of Truth.

PERICLES.

At least it is an Illustration.

ARISTIDES.

Then, I think it had better have come after the Discovery. I believe I can give you another Metaphor which shall lead directly to the contrary Conclusion. 'Tis a wise Practice, you say, to keep fixed the Anchor. In general, I grant you, it is so. Yet you know, that in Times of Tempest and Distress, the most experienced Admiral, when anchored near a rocky Shore, is forced to slip his Cables, and commit his Fleet to the wide Sea, till he can anchor on a safer Bottom.

PERICLES.

That is a dangerous Practice.

ARISTIDES.

True: and therefore never to be tryed, except in a Time of extreme Danger.

PERICLES.

Well: I will grant you that a Metaphor proves nothing.

ARISTIDES.

That is the only Purpose for which I intended mine. We will proceed, therefore, with our Argument. And the sum of what I have to say, will only tend to the Proof of this single Point; ‘That a free State, or limited Monarchy, resembling that of Athens in it's external Form, may yet be so differently circumstanced in it's internal Condition, that a Conduct in many Respects similar to Yours, shall be the only means of saving that State from Ruin, though Your well meant Conduct led the State of Athens to it's Destruction. ’

PERICLES.

It seems to me, ARISTIDES, that you undertake a Task of no small Difficulty. Proceed: I am all Attention.

ARISTIDES.

Pray tell me, PERICLES: Was the Court of the AREOPAGUS wise, courageous, uncorrupt, and bent upon the public Service in Opposition to all self-interested Views, when You set about to lessen it's Authority?

PERICLES.

To my Confusion, I must confess it was. For in Fact;

The annual Magistrates, the Guardians of the Laws, the Governors of the sacred Rites, and Chieftains in War, were all chosen by Lot: and they who had acquitted themselves well in the Discharge of these Trusts, were advanced, and taken into the Court of the AREOPAGUS [*].

ARISTIDES.

You are right in your Idea of this wise and disinterested Court. Tell me farther now. Was the Body of the Athenian People sensible, honest, and united, when you threw yourself into their Arms, and increased their Power?

PERICLES.

I cannot say much, either for their Good Sense, their Uprightness, or their Union; on the Contrary, I fear they were ignorant, self-interested and disunited. Nay, I must farther confess, that I myself was the Cause and Promoter of their Vices and Factious Temper. For I not only gained and ruled them by my Eloquence, as I confessed in my Conversation with COSMO; but

by giving them the Plunder and Possession of the Lands taken from the Enemy, and by squandering the public Monies (formerly reserved for the Uses of War) in Shows and Plays for their Entertainment, and by giving them Largesses or Pensions, I brought them from a sober, modest, and thrifty People, who maintained themselves by their own Labours, to become riotous and debauched through these mistaken Methods of Policy: Thus it was that I turned them against the Court of the AREOPAGUS [†].

ARISTIDES.

It gives me Pleasure to find you so much more full and explicit in this Affair, than you were in your Discourse with COSMO. — So then, you took Power from a Body of Men, wise, disinterested, and uncorrupt, to put it into the hands of Men ignorant, self-interested, and factious.

PERICLES.

Too true: I did: ‘Because I knew that my Eloquence would (with these other Methods, still more powerful) subject the People to me, and make them the Instruments of all my Desires: whereas the AREOPAGUS had an Authority and a Dignity in it which I could not controul.’

ARISTIDES.

So you said in your Discourse with COSMO. Let us now reverse these Facts, and suppose the Court of the AREOPAGUS had deserted the Principles of their first Institution: That either Luxury, the Love of Gain, or a Spirit of false Ambition, had crept in among them; and rendered them either incapable, and corrupt: And farther let us suppose, that the Body of the People had been sensible, honest, and united: What had been the Consequence?

PERICLES.

The Case indeed had been altogether different. I would give all the Wreaths I ever was honoured with, to have built my Conduct on so noble a Foundation.

ARISTIDES.

I commend your Wisdom, though it comes too late. The Case indeed had been not only altogether different, but altogether contrary. Instead of destroying the Commonwealth, you had restored the tottering Fabrick. You had then taken Power from Folly and Corruption, to bestow it on Sense and Integrity. And, depend upon it, in whatever Body of Men Sense and Integrity are found, these are the Anchors of the State.

PERICLES.

Your Maxim looks plausible: Yet still I cannot but regard it as a dangerous Practice, to make a Breach in the established Constitution of a free State.

ARISTIDES.

So do I. And I think your Principle is so far from overturning, that it confirms, my Argument.

PERICLES.

That appears to me a strange Paradox.

ARISTIDES.

Tell me, PERICLES: Is not a Breach made in the political Constitution of a free State, when it's wholesome Laws and Institutions have lost their Power and Efficacy?

PERICLES.

Certainly.

ARISTIDES.

And can they so entirely lose their Power and Efficacy, in any other Way, as by the Incapacity and Corruption of those who govern?

PERICLES.

I allow, they cannot.

ARISTIDES.

Then you see, that upon Supposition that the Court of the AREOPAGUS had lost their Ability or public Virtue, 'tis they who first deprive the Laws of their Power and Efficacy, and consequently, 'tis they who make the Breach in the established Constitution.

PERICLES.

This seems to be true: But still, why should the People follow their Example, and, by insisting on extraordinary Powers and Privileges, make a second Breach in the Constitution?

ARISTIDES.

O PERICLES, you view the Question with a partial Eye: What you call a second Breach in the Constitution is indeed no more than the natural Effort of the sound Parts of the Body politic, to throw off the morbific Matter by which it is oppressed. Thus in the natural Body, all Diseases come to their Crisis, and a Cure is effected by the Vigour and Activity of the uninfected Parts. Whereever then the Disease lies, either in the Body politic, or the Body natural, the sound Parts must check and throw off that which is infected, or Death ensues. — Thus, you see, supposing the People to be sensible and honest, and the Court of AREOPAGUS corrupted or incapable, the only Means of saving the State is the Power which the People have to check and reform the Court of the AREOPAGUS.

PERICLES.

But is not this unhinging the Constitution?

ARISTIDES.

So far from it, that it is the only Way of fixing it; by bringing it back to it's first Principles. — How did this famed Constitution first arise? Was it not by the united Consent of the several Ranks of the Community, each of which had their several Privileges and Powers appropriated, on Condition of applying them to the public Good? The Court of the AREOPAGUS violates it's Engagements: The Voice of an honest and abused People rouzes them from their fatal Dream: What is the natural Consequence? Why, surely, the Reformation of the Court of the AREOPAGUS. An honest and sensible People never desires more than Redress of Grievances; and, when that is obtained, return chearfully to Subordination, and adore their Rulers.

PERICLES.

This is at best an unstable and fluctuating State of Things.

ARISTIDES.

Every political State must be, in some Degree, fluctuating and unstable, unless you load it with the Chains of Despotism. But I maintain, that the best Security, nay the only one to a Free Government, lies in the upright Manners and Principles of it's constituent Members; and that, whenever there is any Deviation from these, the only Possibility of a Restoration lies in the Prevalence of the sound and virtuous Part over that which is corrupted, in whatever Part of the Community the Infection may lie; whether it be the Court of the AREOPAGUS, or the Body of the People. For, as it was truly observed in your Discourse with COSMO,

Force or Caprice may give (immediate and temporary) Power; but nothing can give a lusting Authority, except Wisdom and Virtue [*]

.

PERICLES.

But is not this a dangerous Principle to instill into the Body of the People, that they have a Right to controul the Errors of the Court of AREOPAGUS? Does it not lead to Sedition and Anarchy? And was not this the Consequence of my mistaken Conduct?

ARISTIDES.

You are now puzzling the Question again by making it general. I reply then, that in your particular Case, the Practice was dangerous and fatal; because the Court of the AREOPAGUS was capable and honest, the People of Athens were incapable, self-interested, and factious. You therefore tore up the Anchor of the State. But suppose the Court of the AREOPAGUS to have been incapable, and venal, and you have seen that the Security of the Republic was already lost: You have seen (to use your own Metaphor, in the Way of Illustration) that the Anchor of the State was already torn up; and the only Bottom, on which it could be again safely cast, was the rational Influence of a sensible and honest People.

PERICLES.

But supposing I had not corrupted the Integrity of the Athenian People; do you think they could have remained secure against the Influence of ‘indiscreet or venal Orators, who, encouraged by my Example, might have misled their honest Intentions, ’ and rowzed them into Sedition against an uncorrupted Court of the AREOPAGUS?

ARISTIDES.

Tell me, PERICLES; what was the Number of the People of Athens?

PERICLES.

I cannot be precise in this: But I know, that the Number of those, whose Favour and Influence I courted, did not exceed that of a large Audience: I have often harangued them in one collective Body.

ARISTIDES.

What was their Rank, and what their Employments in Life?

PERICLES.

They were composed, as you know very well, of Labourers and Mechanics. All who were able to keep a Horse, were admitted into the se•ond Order of the Magistracy [*]. And therefore the Body of the People, whose Influence I courted, was composed of such as were not able to keep a Horse.

ARISTIDES.

What was their Capacity?

PERICLES.

You will not expect much of That. It was suited to their Station.

ARISTIDES.

Your Account is just: And therefore I confess, PERICLES, that, in my Opinion, they never could be secure against the Seduction of indiscreet and venal Orators. Their small Number, their continual Necessities, their general Ignorance, must for ever expose them to the Delusions of a powerful Rhetoric.

PERICLES.

Then, I think, my Consequence stands good: "That the united Voice even of an honest People can be no Ground of Security to a State.

ARISTIDES.

I grant you, it is not, where the People are such, in Number, Station, and Incapacity, as, in your Time, the Athenian People were. But take Heed, lest you make your Inference too general. The only just Consequence that can be drawn is this, that a Republic so circumstanced is absolutely void of all Security: For you see, that in Case the Court of the AREOPAGUS was delinquent, the People were not of sufficient Capacity or Weight to restore the Balance of the State. On the other Hand, supposing that Court to be uncorrupt, you see that the People were liable to be seduced to it's Destruction. Such a Republic, therefore, was formed for continual Factions while it lasted, and then for a speedy Death.

PERICLES.

Do you think, ARISTIDES, that, by a Change of Circumstances, these Evils could admit of any Remedy?

ARISTIDES.

I think they might. — In your Discourse with COSMO, you hinted at a limited Monarchy. I will therefore leave this imperfect Form, this Embryo of a Commonwealth, to speak of a more august Image of a Government. Suppose therefore, that the Athenian State, instead of a petty Province, had been a large, populous, and fertile Country, governed by a King, and two Courts, vested with higher Powers than that of the AREOPAGUS [*]; that one of them had been hereditary, the other chosen by the Body of the People; and that the Legislative Power was lodged in the united Suffrages of these three —

PERICLES.

You charm me, by the very Supposition. — What a glorious Republic! —

ARISTIDES.

Do not you see, PERICLES, that all I have said concerning the State of ATHENS, would gain new Strength, under such a Supposition?

PERICLES.

My Views must be narrow indeed, if I could not see some Differences arise: pray go on.

ARISTIDES.

In the first Place, what could shake such a Kingdom as this, if all the several Powers maintained the Purity and Vigour of their Institution?

PERICLES.

Methinks I see the Picture of an eternal Government.

ARISTIDES.

But suppose that, by the Excess of Commerce, and an Overflow of Wealth, or by any other Cause, a pernicious Luxury shou'ld creep in, and steal unperceived on the higher Ranks: Suppose farther, that the very Genius of the Constitution, formed for the noblest Ends, should yet have a natural Tendency towards political Venality and Corruption, unless strongly guarded by a Purity of Principle and Manners; and suppose this political Venality should, in Fact, creep in along with Luxury; what Consequences would you expect?

PERICLES.

You terrify me by the Representation: I behold the State on the Brink of Ruin. Instead of Ability, Courage, and Public Spirit, among the leading Ranks; I see them immersed in every fatal Indulgence. I see their Councils divided, their Fleets and Armies disgraced, and some neighbouring PHILIP in Possession of their Forts and Colonies.

ARISTIDES.

Where would you seek for the Cure of these enormous Evils?

PERICLES.

Certainly no Cure can take Place, till Ability, Courage, and Public Spirit should arise on the Ruins of their Contraries.

ARISTIDES.

Your Aim is good. But the grand Question is, by what Means this can be effected.

PERICLES.

I fear, the Means must be violent. I have heard you talk of a coercive Power, sufficient to reform Corruption.

ARISTIDES.

Where, do you think, this might most probably be found?

PERICLES.

I am casting about; but I cannot find it. My Experience makes me afraid of the Interposition of the People —

ARISTIDES.

What? even though they were honest and sensible? Why should you fear the Influence of a general good Sense and Integrity?

PERICLES.

I cannot conceive it probable, that the lower Ranks should be more sensible or more upright, than their Superiors in Station.

ARISTIDES.

I can suppse, nay I do suppose, that many of the higher Ranks are sensible, upright, and worthy, in several Respects: That they have many private Virtues: That Justice and Humanity are their allowed Qualities: That their chief Defect lies in their Want of Public Virtue, in their Neglect of the Public Happiness.

PERICLES.

What Probability could there be, then, that the People should attend to this, when it was neglected by their Leaders?

ARISTIDES.

Tell me, PERICLES: When there are honest Inclinations in the Soul, whence can any Obstructions arise to their due Exertion?

PERICLES.

Why, sure, from some contrary Inclinations, which may tempt the Mind from it's natural Integrity.

ARISTIDES.

You are right. So then, if in a State thus circumstanced, the Body of the People should be more steady than their Leaders in their Zeal for the public Welfare; this must be, because they are not liable to the same Temptations, which might expose them to a like Neglect of the general Happiness.

PERICLES.

What you say, seems probable.

ARISTIDES.

Cannot you discern certain Circumstances, which would naturally arise, and prove strong Temptations to the Great, while the Body of the People might, for a Time at least, escape them?

PERICLES.

Let me weigh the Matter. — Yes, indeed; from what you said before, I think I can. — You supposed, as I remember, that Luxury had crept in —

ARISTIDES.

Go on: I see, you comprehend the Argument.

PERICLES.

I perceive, the natural Consequence of this must be, that the higher Ranks would be first infected with it; and therefore must be exposed to Temptations, which the Body of the People would escape: One Temptation must naturally arise from that unmanly or effeminate Character, which a refined Luxury tends to introduce: Another, from an intemperate Desire of supplying Expences, now grown exorbitant.

ARISTIDES.

You say true: But can you point out no farther Temptations, to which the leading Ranks would be naturally exposed, beyond the Body of the People?

PERICLES.

These are what offered themselves to my Thoughts. Do you see any more?

ARISTIDES.

Many, and strong ones.—In a Kingdom thus circumstanced, extensive, fertile, mercantile, rich, and populous, a countless Number of lucrative Offices must arise, and be established, for the Protection and good Order of the State.

PERICLES.

I grant it.

ARISTIDES.

What Part of the Community, do you think, would lay Claim to these? The superior Ranks, or the inferior?

PERICLES.

Doubtless, the Superior: Their Education, Rank, Wealth, and Influence, would naturally lead them to expect a Preference.

ARISTIDES.

And if you farther suppose, that Luxury and Expence prevailed, these Posts would be more eagerly sought for, in Proportion as they were more lucrative.

PERICLES.

True: The Profit, I fear, would often be a leading Motive.

ARISTIDES.

The higher Ranks, then, would be naturally assiduous to recommend themselves to those, who had the Disposal of these profitable Employments: while the Body of the People, because generally excluded from all Hope of being raised to them, would be more independent of those in Power.

PERICLES.

I must needs grant it.

ARISTIDES.

See you no Consequences arise?

PERICLES.

You have convinced me, ARISTIDES: I see, that the higher Ranks in such a State, though equally possessed of private Virtues, must be much more exposed to the Temptations of political Venality and Corruption, than the Body of the People.

ARISTIDES.

That is the Truth to which I meant to lead you.

PERICLES.

Yet still I fear the Effects of popular Power; because, by Experience, I know

the Influence of indiscreet and venal Orators, over the Passions of a misguided, infatuated Multitude, who thought their Freedom consisted in encouraging Calumnies against the best Servants of the Republic; and conferring Power on those, who had no other Merit, than falling in with, and soothing, a popular Folly [*].

ARISTIDES.

This Objection, as I said before, may be of Weight in a small Republic, such as that of Athens was in Your Days or Mine. But supposing it to have been augmented into a great, populous, civilized, and powerful, Kingdom, such as I have now represented, which contains more Square Leagues than Attica contains Acres, more Cities than Attica contains Villages, more Men of Fortune than Attica contains Mechanics, and the Objection vanishes into nothing. I can easily see, how a busy Orator may mount the Rostrum, and intoxicate an ignorant Multitude that surrounds him; and this, PERICLES, I fear was your Imprudence, nay, perhaps, my own. In a small State, like that of Athens, such an Event as this must affect the public Welfare: But, in a Kingdom so inlarged, and so inlightened, as that which I have supposed, the Harangues of an Orator, to any surrounding Audience of the People, can no more affect the general Welfare, than the buzzing of an eloquent Bee can affect a Province, when he leads out the murmuring Hive on the Mountains of Hybla or Hymettus.

PERICLES.

Do you think the Difference so great?

ARISTIDES.

I do: Because, in a City like that of Athens, the whole Multitude of the Community is easily collected in one Body; and therefore may be suddenly seduced, by an Orator, into one ill Purpose: But, in a great and populous Kingdom, the whole Multitude of the Community cannot be collected into one Body; nay, nor into a hundred Bodies; and therefore cannot be suddenly seduced, by an Orator, into one ill Purpose.

PERICLES.

I grant you, the Difference is, in this Respect, essential.

ARISTIDES.

There is another Respect, in which the Difference is no less essential and important. You have confessed, PERICLES, that the People, or Multitude, which you seduced, were

a Rabble of Labourers and Mechanics, who had been accustomed to earn their Bread by the Sweat of their Brows.[*]

But, if Attica had been enlarged into so vast a Kingdom as I have here supposed, the Body of the People would have been of a Character far superior. For, besides those of the highest Rank and Fortune, who would naturally form the two Courts of the AREOPAGUS, and aspire to the leading Offices in the Commonwealth; besides these, I say, there would be an innumerable Number of landed Commoners, the general Body of the Priesthood, the rich Merchants, and wealthy Plebeians of inferior Rank, all independent of the Governing Powers, many of them of excellent Ability, as well as Probity; most of them of Leisure and Education sufficient to enable them to judge of the leading Lines or Features of an upright Government; especially in the great Article of Protection from foreign or domestic Injuries. And can you think it possible, that the good Sense and Honesty of all these should be seduced into their own Destruction, by a designing or venal Orator?

PERICLES.

I must confess, it is utterly incredible.

ARISTIDES.

Still farther. As it would be thus impossible to seduce by Eloquence, so it would be no less impracticable to corrupt, by Bribes, this whole Body of Men, to the Desertion of their own true Interest. A few, nay indeed a Number, might be thus corrupted; but this would never produce an united Voice; for the remaining Part, and that much the largest, would loudly clamour; and thus, nothing but Discord could arise. To silence so many Millions, by repeated Bribes, would require ten Times the Wealth of CROESUS; and more than ever Man, nay, more than ever Nation, possessed.

PERICLES.

You have Reason in what you say: I perceive now, that nothing but a fair and open Prosecution of the general Interest could ever unite so great a People.

ARISTIDES.

I am of your Opinion. And thus you see, that as the small, ignorant, and needy Body of the Athenian People, in such a State as You and I beheld it, is the easiest of all to be seduced by Eloquence, or gained by Bribes; so, upon it's being aggrandized into such a vast, knowing, and wealthy Body, as I have here supposed, it would, above all others, have been secure against the Attacks either of Eloquence or Corruption.

PERICLES.

I perceive, I have been confounding two Things together, as being altogether similar, when, in Reality, their Qualities are altogether opposite; and this, merely because they are called by the same Appellation, the ‘Body of the People.’

ARISTIDES.

At length, you see the Foundation of your Error.

PERICLES.

I confess, ARISTIDES, that in my Discourse with COSMO, these distinguishing Particularities were not sufficiently attended to. I drew Inferences, and extended Consequences, to all free States, without Exception, which could only be justly applyed to a small Republic, circumstanced like that of Athens.

ARISTIDES.

You see then, PERICLES, that if Athens had been a great, rich, literate, and powerful Republic, under the Appearance and Name of a limited Monarchy, you could have had no Chance for seducing the whole collective Body of the People, either by Bribes or Eloquence.

PERICLES.

I allow it.

ARISTIDES.

You see farther, that in Case of any Delinquency in the Courts of the AREOPAGUS, if you had exerted your Talents in Support of the general Welfare, this great and grateful People, with one united Voice, would have adopted and adored you: Yet only so long as you had made that general Welfare the undoubted Object of your Labours.

PERICLES.

It seems probable.

ARISTIDES.

You see then, that by building your Power on so firm a Foundation, you would have been enabled to dispense Rewards and Punishments with Justice and Vigour; that you could have displaced the incapable and unworthy, and put into Action those who were most fit to discharge the several Offices of the Commonwealth; that you could, by Degrees, have checked the Venality and Incapacity of the various Ranks, and thus have given the proper Elasticity and Tone to the several Parts of the Body politic.

PERICLES.

All this I think possible to have been done.

ARISTIDES.

But in doing all this, you would have been so far from unhinging Government, that you would have new-hinged it when it was falling; so far from destroying the Balance of Power, that you would have renewed it when it had been destroyed; so far from acting with a View to ‘present Advantage’ only, that you would have secured the future Welfare of the State; so far from consulting a mere temporary Felicity, that you would have fixed it on a Principle of permanent Happiness.

PERICLES.

I cannot deny it.

ARISTIDES.

Haste then, PERICLES: And, lest Mistakes should grow inveterate by Time, inform COSMO of all that hath passed between us.

FINIS.

Notes

*
Plutarch, in his Life of Pericles.
↵

†
Plutarch, in his Life of Pericles.
↵

*
Dialogues of the Dead, p. 242.
↵

*
Plutarch, in the Life of Solon.
↵

*
The Court of the AREOPAGUS was judicial, not legislative.
↵

*
Dialogues of the Dead, p. 255.
↵

*
See above, and Plutarch, in his Life of Pericles.
↵

AN ADDITIONAL DIALOGUE OF THE DEAD.

AN ADDITIONAL DIALOGUE OF THE DEAD, BETWEEN PERICLES and ARISTIDES: Being a Sequel to the Dialogue between PERICLES and COSMO.

Alteram Partem audi.

LONDON, Printed for L. DAVIS and C. REYMERS, opposite Gray's-Inn-Gate, in Holbourn. MDCCLX.

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THOUGH the Study of History be instructive and useful; yet, in one Respect, it becomes the Source of frequent Error, even when it is written with Impartiality and Truth. This ariseth from a mistaken Application of historical Facts. This Error is apt to creep into all Reasonings, on every Subject, where Men and Manners are concerned; but it is peculiarly apt to infect political Reasonings, above all others. As the political Interests of Men make the principal Subject of History, so the political Reasoner hath Recourse to History, as the best Support of his Argument. But, though the Politician is, of all others, the readiest to appeal to History, yet he seems, of all others, most liable to be mistaken in his Application of it to his own Purpose; because the political Connexions and Interests of Men are, above all others, complicated and various. Hence, as no two political Constitutions were ever the same in all their Circumstances, though similar in many; so, all Arguments drawn from a partial Resemblance must be inadequate and inconclusive; unless when it appears, that no other Circumstances took Place, by which that partial Resemblance might be counteracted, and it's Effects destroyed. Yet it hath been a Practice too common among political Reasoners, from a partial Resemblance between two States, to infer a total one; and, because they have been like in some Respects, to draw Conclusions, as if they had been like in all. Here, then, appears a Source of perpetual Error.

Among all the political Questions that can be debated in a free Country, there is none of greater Importance, than that which regards the Character and Influence of the Body of a People. Nothing hath been more usual among political Reasoners, than to represent the Body of every People, as the ready Tools of Demagogues and Faction: And since the endless Factions of the Athenian Republic have been so often alledged, as unanswerable Proofs of this; the intelligent Reader will easily discern, that the Tendency of the following Dialogue is, to fix this Argument to it's proper Limits, and prevent a too general Application of a particular Fact.

Lately published by L. DAVIS and C. REYMERS.

ESSAYS on the CHARACTERISTICS of the Earl of Shaftsbury. The Fourth Edition.

An ESTIMATE of the Manners and Principles of the Times. 2 Vol. Seventh Edition.

Information about this book

Title statement

An additional dialogue of the dead, between Pericles and Aristides: being a sequel to the dialogue between Pericles and Cosmo

Brown, John, 1715-1766.

Publication

Distributor

University of Oxford Text Archive
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ID [ota]

http://ota.ox.ac.uk/id/3584

ID [isbn10]

110600583X

ID [isbn13]

9781106005830

ID [TCP]

K020914.000

ID [BIBNO]

CW3321887579

ID [ECRP]

0801700100

Availability

Distributed by the University of Oxford under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License

Source

— An additional dialogue of the dead, between Pericles and Aristides: being a sequel to the dialogue between Pericles and Cosmo, Brown, John, 1715-1766.. 48p. ; 8⁰. London :: printed for L. Davis and C. Reymers,. 1760.. [Anonymous. By John Brown.] [The dialogue between Pericles and Cosmo, is by George, Lord Lyttelton.] [With a half-title.] [Reproduction of original from the British Library.] [English Short Title Catalog, ESTCT1560.] [Electronic data. Farmington Hills, Mich. : Thomson Gale, 2003. Page image (PNG). Digitized image of the microfilm version produced in Woodbridge, CT by Research Publications, 1982-2002 (later known as Primary Source Microfilm, an imprint of the Gale Group).]

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