A compleat history of the late war: or annual register of its rise, progress, and events, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. ... Illustrated with a variety of heads, plans, maps, and charts. By J. Wright, Gent. In two volumes. ... [pt.1]

Table of contents

- [frontispiece]

- [titlepage]

- THE PREFACE.

- THE CONTENTS.

- A List of HEADS, MAPS, and PLANS, in the COMPLEAT HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR.

- A list of FRENCH, ENGLISH, and SPANISH Ships of War taken, destroyed, or lost, during the late War.

- THE ANNUAL REGISTER OR HISTORY OF THE WAR.

- CHAP. I.

- CHAP. II.

- CHAP. III.

- CHAP. IV.

- CHAP. V.

- CHAP. VI.

- CHAP. VII.

- CHAP. VIII.

- CHAP. IX.

- CHAP. X.

- CHAP. XI.

- CHAP. XII.

- CHAP. XIII.

- THE ANNUAL REGISTER: OR HISTORY OF THE WAR. For the YEAR 1759.

- CHAP. I.

- CHAP. II.

- CHAP. III.

- CHAP. IV.

- CHAP. V.

- CHAP. VI.

- CHAP. VII.

- CHAP. VIII.

- CHAP. IX.

- [frontispiece]

- [titlepage]

- THE ANNUAL REGISTER: OR HISTORY OF THE WAR. For the YEAR 1760.

- CHAP. I.

- CHAP. II.

- CHAP. III.

- CHAP. IV.

- CHAP. V.

- CHAP. VI.

- CHAP. VII.

- CHAP. VIII.

- CHAP. IX.

- CHAP. X.

- CHAP. XII.

- THE ANNUAL REGISTER: OR HISTORY OF THE WAR. For the YEAR 1761.

- CHAP. I.

- CHAP. II.

- CHAP. III.

- CHAP. IV.

- CHAP. V.

- CHAP. VI.

- CHAP. VII.

- CHAP. VIII.

- CHAP. IX.

- CHAP. X.

- THE ANNUAL REGISTER: OR HISTORY OF THE WAR. For the YEAR 1762.

- CHAP. I.

- CHAP. II.

- CHAP. III.

- CHAP. IV.

- CHAP. V.

- CHAP. VI.

- CHAP. VII.

- CHAP. VIII.

- CHAP. IX.

- CHAP. X.

GEORGE. III.

A COMPLEAT HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR, OR ANNUAL REGISTER OF ITS Rise, Progress, and Events, IN Europe, Asia, Africa, and America.

AND EXHIBITING The STATE of the BELLIGERENT POWERS at the Commencement of the WAR; their Interests and Objects in its Continuance: Interspersed with The CHARACTERS of the able and disinterested STATESMEN, to whose WISDOM and INTEGRITY, and of the HEROES, to whose COURAGE and CONDUCT we are indebted for that NAVAL and MILITARY Success, which is not to be equalled in the ANNALS of this or any other NATION.

Illustrated with A Variety of HEADS, PLANS, MAPS, and CHARTS.

By J. WRIGHT, Gent.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON: Printed for DAVID STEEL, Bookseller, at the Bible and Crown, King-Street, Little Tower-Hill.

MDCCLXV.

THE PREFACE.

WE have taken the earliest opportunity that a judicious inspection, and mature consideration of events could give us, of presenting to the public, A COMPLEAT HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR, not less important than, we hope, useful and correct, written with an impartiality which should be the guide of every historian, and from which we have not deviated through national affection.

WE have taken up our HISTORY from the commencement of the war, and have bestowed all the pains upon it, so interesting a subject requires, which, however, we must acknowledge, deserves much more skilful workmen. None was ever more formed to excite curiosity, from the importance of events, the dignity of the persons engaged, the greatness of the actions performed, and the amazing revolutions of fortune; for the Reader will here find the scattered accounts of this war, which has been carried on in the four quarters of the world, united in one connected narrative, and continued to the peace.

To effect this from the materials that offered, has been a work of more labour, than may at first appear, and to render these transactions (which have not been less our amazement, than the world's in general) the more conspicuous and clear, we have added, in Notes, the accounts transmitted from the commanders of our fleets and armies, and published by authority, when facts were recent, and the immediate object of universal attention. These will illustrate and confirm the History; and our readers must be pleased to see so many curious and important pieces, which while they give the clearest evidence, support the national character to future ages. In many places we find them filled with the actions of inferior officers, which, with less care in their superiors, would have been lost in the multiplicity of events: This care, not less commendable than useful, will excite officers to seize every opportunity of immortalizing their fame, and doing honour to their respective corps. Some of these letters must be useful in forming the young soldier, as they are very expressive of that character, pointing out the care, circumspection, anxiety, and perseverance to form a WOLFE, or a GRANBY.

THE CONTENTS.

- ORIGIN of the troubles in North America, page 1

M.DCC.LV.

- Admiral Boscawen and General Braddock sent to America, 2

- Different operations undertaken, 4

- Two French men of war taken by Adm. Boscawen, ib.

- Gen. Braddock defeated near Fort du Quesne, 5

- — Dieskau defeated, and taken by Gen. Johnson. ib.

- Seizure of the French trading ships, ib.

M.DCC.LVI.

- French threaten an invasion, 6

- Fort St. Philip in the island of Minorca, besieged, and taken by the French, ib.

- Sea-fight off Minorca, between Admiral Byng, and M. Galissoniere, ib.

- Treaty with Russia, 7

M.DCC.LVII.

- Alliance with the King of Prussia, ib.

- Ground of the quarrel between her Imperial Majesty and the King of Prussia, 9

- Treaty of Petersbourg, 10

- —of Versailles, 11

- King of Prussia enters Saxony, and Bohemia, ib.

- Battle of Lowositz, 12

- Saxon army surrenders, ib.

- State of the English Ministry, 13

- The characters and designs of the several factions, ib.

- A coalition of parties, 17

- Oswego taken by the French, ib.

- Calcutta taken by the Nabob, 18

- Angria reduced by Adm. Watson, 19

- State of the confederacy against the King of Prussia, ib.

- The French pass the Weser, 22

- King of Prussia enters Bohemia, ib.

- Battle of Prague, ib.

- Prague invested, 23

- Count Daun takes command of the Austrian army, ib.

- Battle of Colin, 24

- Consequences of the battle of Colin, 25

- King of Prussia evacuates Bohemia, ib.

- Battle of Hastenbeck, 26

- Convention of Closter-seven, ib.

- Expedition to Rorchfort, ib.

- Russians enter Prussia, 27

- Austrians besiege Schweidnitz, ib.

- French and Imperialists make incursions into Brandenbourgh, ib

- Swedes enter Pomerania, ib.

- Battle of Norkitten, 28

- General Lehwald defeated, ib.

- Melancholy state of the King of Prussia, ib.

- Battle of Rosbach, 30

- Schweidnitz taken by the Austrians, 32

- Prince of Bevern attacked in his entrenchments, 32

- Bresiau taken by the Austrians, ib.

- King of Prussia marches into Silesia, 33

- Battle of Lissa, ib.

- Breslau retaken, 35

- Austrians driven out of Silesia, ib.

- Russians and Swedes retire, ib.

- Hanoverians resume their arms, 36

- Cruelty of the French, ib.

- Condition of their army, ib.

- Castle of Harburg besieged, 37

- Preparations for an expedition to Louisbourg, and laid aside, 39

- Fort William Henry taken, 41

M.DCC.LVIII.

- Exploits of Adm. Watson and Colonel Clive in India, 42

- Chandenagore, a French fort taken, 43

- Victory over the Nabob, 44

- Nabob taken and beheaded, ib.

- Revolution in Bengal, 45

- Treaty advantageous to the East India company, ib.

- Admiral Watson dies, ib.

- French retire to Hanover, 46

- The taking of Hoya, 47

- Minden taken, 48

- Distress of the French, 49

- Generosity of the Duke de Randan, ib.

- The French retire beyond the Rhine, ib.

- Recovery of Embden by Com. Holmes, 50

- Alterations in the French Ministry, 51

- The state of the English affairs, 53

- Subsidy treaty with the King of Prussia, 54

- Affairs of Sweden & Russia, ib.

- Schweidnitz taken by the King of Prussia, 55

- He enters Moravia and invest• Olmutz, ib

- Conduct of Count Daun, 59

- He attacks the Prussian convoy 57

- Siege of Olmutz raised, ib.

- King of Prussia marches into Bohemia, 58

- Allies pass the Rhine, 59

- Battle of Crevelt, ib.

- Action at Sangershausen, 62

- —at Meer, 63

- Allies repass the Rhine, 65

- Retreat from Bohemia, 66

- Measures of Count Daun, ib.

- Battle of Custrin, 70

- King of Prussia marches into Saxony, and joins Prince Henry, 73

- General Oberg defeated at Lanwerenhagen, 75

- King of Prussia surprised at Hohkirchen, 77

- M. Keith and Prince Francis of Brunswick killed, ib.

- Affair at Gorlitz, 80

- M. Daun invests Dresden, 82

- King of Prussia raises the siege of Neis and Cosel, 84

- Death of the Duke of Marlborough. ib.

- Dispositions for the winter, 86

- The burning of the ships at St. Malo, 90

- Taking of Cherbourg, 91

- Defeat of St. Cas, 94

- Operations in America, 95

- Siege and taking of Louisbourg, 97

- English army defeated at Ticonderoga, 121

- They take Frontenac, 125

- The French abandon Fort du Quesue, ib.

- Goree taken, 127

M.DCC.LIX.

- The inclination of the powers at war at the closing of the last campaign, 132

- The King of Spain's death apprehended, 133

- Condition of the King of Prussia, Empress Queen, Sweden, Holland, France and England, 134

- The allied army moves, 141

- Battle of Bergen, ib.

- Plan of the campaign, 143

- General Macguire defeated, 144

- Bamberg pillaged, ib.

- Hesse abandoned by the allies, 145

- Expedition to the West Indies under Hopson and Moore, 146

- Account of Martinico, ib.

- Failure there, ib.

- Guadaloupe invaded, and description of that island▪ 147

- Basse Terre attacked and burned, 149

- General Hopson dies, 150

- Operations against Grand Terre, ib.

- The inhabitants capitulate, 151

- Letters to the Government on the occasion, ib.

- Bravery of a French lady, 152

- Mariegalante taken, 154

- Progress of the French after the battle of Bergen, 160

- Munster and other places taken, 163

- Motions of Prince Ferdinand, 164

- Battle of Minden, 166

- Hereditary Prince of Brunswick defeats the Duke of Brisac, ib.

- Prince Ferdinand's order after the battle of Minden, 167

- The French pass the Weser, ib.

- Lord George Sackville resigns the command of the British forces; Marquis of Granby succeeds him, 170

- The French driven to Marpurg, 171

- Siege of Munster, ib.

- Project of France for an invasion, 172

- Havre bombarded, 173

- Action of Cape Lagos, 174

- Admiral Boscawen's account of the action, ib.

- Count Dohna disgraced and succeeded by Wedel, 177

- Battle of Zulichau, ib,

- Russians take Franckfort on the Oder, 178

- Battle Cunnersdorf, 179

- King of Prussia repasses the Oder 182

- Soltikoff and Daun communicate, 183

- Parallel of the King of Prussia and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, ib.

- Plan of the campaign in North America, 184

- Ticonderoga and Crown Point abandoned, 186

- Colonel Townshend killed, 18•

- Expedition to Niagara, 18•

- Sir William Johnson's accoun• of it, ib

- Colonel Prideaux killed, 190

- Sir William Johnson defeats the French, 192

- Takes the fort of Niagara, ib.

- The expedition against Quebec, 193

- Description of the town and harbour of Quebec, 195

- Action at the Falls of Montmerenci, 196

- General Wolfe sickens, 198

- His remarkable letter, 199

- Admiral Saunders's letter, 206

- The battle of Quebec, 211

- General Wolfe killed, ib.

- French defeated, 212

- M. de Montcalm killed, 213

- Quebec surrenders, ib.

- Gen. Monckton's account, ib.

- —Townshend's 214

- Admiral Saunders's 218

- Movements of Gen. Amherst, on Lake Chaplain, 222

- Prince Henry's march into Saxony, and Gen. Vehla defeated, 224

- K. of Prussia's surprising march into Saxony, 225

- Prussians defeated at Maxen, 226

- Again defeated at Meissen, 228

- Munster surrenders to the allies, 229

- Hereditary Prince of Brunswick defeats the Duke of Wurtemberg at Fulda, ib.

- The preparations at Vannes and Brest, 231

- Remarkable behaviour of Adm. Saunders, and Gen. Townshend, 232

- French fleet defeated near Belleisle, 233

- Admiral Hawk's account of his engagement with M. de Conflans, 234

- List of the two fleets, 238

- French fleet under M. d'Ache twice beaten, 241

- M. de Lally takes Fort St. David's and repulsed at Tanjour, ib.

- Lays siege to Madrass which he is obliged to raise, 242

- M. Lally's remarkable letter, ib.

- Behaviour of the French in Germany, 244

- The Duke de Belleisle's letter on the occasion, ib.

M.DCC.LX.

- Nothing decided in the war, and the state of the several powers concerned, 249

- Great Britain and Prussia propose an accommodation, 254

- Difficulties in concluding a peace, 254

- State of the English garrison at Quebec, 255

- Designs of Mons. Levi, 256

- Preparations for a siege, ib.

- Gen. Murray's resolutions on the occasions, 257

- Battle of Sillery, and defeat of Gen. Murray, 258

- Quebec besieged, 259

- The English fleet under Lord Colville arrives, 260

- M. Levi raises the siege, ib.

- General Murray's letter on the occasion. ib.

- Distress of Saxony, 267

- Preparations for opening the campaign, ib.

- Losses sustained by the King of Prussia, 268

- Theatre of war in the East of Germany, 571

- Battle of Landshut, 272

- Prussian army under Fouquet destroyed, ib.

- The Austrians take Glatz, 274

- King of Prussia marches towards Silesia and deceives M. Daun, 275

- Siege of Dresden, ib

- —raised by M. Daun, 277

- Breslau besieged by the Austrians, ib.

- Cause of the slowness of the allies and French, 280

- Difference between Broglio and St. Germain, 281

- Marpurg and Dillenburg taken by the French, 282

- Battle of Corbach where the Hereditary Prince was wounded, 283

- Surprise and defeat of M. Gloubitz at Ermsdorf, 283

- Action at Warbourg, 285

- Prince Ferdinand's letter on the occasion, 286

- The Marquiss of Granby's letter, 288

- Prince Ferdinand's order after the day of battle, 290

- Laudohn blocks up Schweidnitz, 293

- March of the King of Prussia, from Saxony to Lignitz, 295

- Laudohn defeated near Lignitz, 296

- Daun forms the blockade of Schweidnitz, and compelled to raise it, 298

- Action between General Hulsen and the army of the Empire, 299

- Intercepted letter from the King of Prussia to the Marquis d'Argens, 300

- Situation of the French and English armies. 302

- Hereditary Prince surprises a body of French in Zierenberg, ib.

- General Bulow takes Marpurg 307

- Defeated by Mons. Stainville, ib.

- Hereditary Prince marches to the Rhine, passes that river, 308

- Cleves taken and Wesel besieged ib.

- Battle of Campen, 313

- Allies defeated, ib.

- Hereditary Prince repasses the Rhine, 312

- Siege of Wesel raised, ib.

- Death and eulogium of George II. ib.

- Accession of George III. and his resolution of supporting his allies, ib.

- Russians and Austrians enter Brandenburgh, 315

- General Hulsen retreats from Saxony to Berlin, 316

- Evacuates it, and the city capitulates, 317

- Enemy retires out of Brandenburgh, after having pillaged it, 318

- Imperialists make themselves masters of Misnia, 319

- Russians besiege Colberg, 320

- Battle of Torgau, 322

- M. Daun wounded, ib.

- Siege of Colberg raised, 324

- The allies raise the siege of Gottingen, 326

- Winter quarters and sufferings of the British troops, ib.

- Popular debates in England concerning the German war, 328

- Thurot sails from Dunkirk, 333

- Puts into Gottenburgh and Bergen, ib.

- Puts into the Isle of Ilay, ib.

- He takes Carrickfergus, 334

- Sails from thence, ib.

- He is killed, and whole squadron taken, 335

- Capt. Elliot's account of the engagement, 336

- War in America, ib.

- General Amherst goes down the river St. Lawrence. 337

- General Murray marches from Quebec, ib.

- Montreal surrenders, 340

- Cherokee war, 341

- Affairs of the East Indies, 344

- Lally defeated by Colonel Coote, 345

- Col. Coote's account of his proceeding in the East Indies, 346

M.DCC.LXI.

- Preliminary remarks, 353

- Treaty proposed and entered into by the belligerent powers, 357

- Mr. Stanley sent to Paris, and M. Bussy to London, 358

- French machinations in Spain, 359

- Difficulties in the negotiation, ib.

- Design of the campaign in Hesse, and of the expedition to Belleisle, 360

- Prince Ferdiand's plan, 361

- Allies enter into Hesse and Thuringia, 363

- French retire, ib.

- Hereditary Prince repulsed at Fritzlar, 363

- Fritzlar taken, 364

- Blockade at Marpurg and Ziegenhayn, 365

- Siege of Cassel, ib.

- Battle of Langenfaltze, 366

- Broglio reinforced from the Lower Rhine, 367

- Hereditary Prince defeated at Stangerode, ib.

- Siege of Cassel, &c. raised, and the allies retire behind the Dymel, 368

- The negotiation continued, ib.

- Proposition of uti possidetis, 370

- Debate concerning the periods, ib.

- Belleisle described, 371

- English repulsed at Lochmaria bay, 372

- Gen. Hodgson and Commodore Keppel's account of their proceeding at Belleisle, 373

- They make good their landing, 374

- Palais besieged, 377

- Town abondoned, 378

- Citadel capitulates, ib.

- England and France agree to treat of a separate peace, 379

- Epochas proposed by England, 380

- Court of Vienna agree, 380

- Objects of the negotiation, 381

- Proposals of France with regard to Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. 382

- French memorial concerning Spain, 385

- Indignation of the English Minister, ib.

- English answer to the French memorial, 386

- Motions of the French and allied armies, 387

- General Sporcken attacked, 388

- French pass the Dymel, ib.

- Position of Prince Ferdinand, 389

- Junction of Broglio and Soubise, ib.

- Battle of Kirch Denkern, and the French defeated, ib.

- Prince Ferdinand's account of the battle, 391

- French threaten Hanover, 393

- Remarkable behaviour of Lord Geo. Lenox, and Major Walsh, ib.

- Prince Henry of Brunswick killed, 394

- Taking of Dorsten, ib.

- Various movements of the armies, ib.

- Destruction of Schartsfelts-castle, 395

- Prince Xavier of Saxony takes Wolfenbuttle, and invests Brunswick, 396

- Detachments from Prince Soubise take and abandon Embden, ib.

- Attempt on Bremen, 397

- Sufferings of Lower Westphalia, ib.

- Condition of the King of Prussia, 398

- Motions of the Russians and of Laudohn, 400

- Breslau cannonaded, ib.

- Tottleben removed, and Colberg besieged, 401

- Russian magazines in Poland destroyed, 402

- War transferred to Pomerania, 403

- King of Prussia quits his strong camp, ib.

- Schweidnitz taken by a coup de main, ib.

- Gen. Platen repulsed, 405

- —Knoblock made prisoner at Treptow, ib.

- Prince Wurtenburg retreats, 406

- Colberg taken, ib.

- Russians winter in Pomerania, ib.

- The negotiation resumed, 407

- French concessions, 408

- Difference concerning the German alliance, 409

- — concerning the captures antecedent to the declaration of war, 410

- Treaty breaks off, and Messieurs Stanley and Bussy recalled, 411

- Conduct of Spain during the negotiation, 412

- Spanish minister's memorial, 413

- Treaty between France and Spain, ib.

- Difference in the English ministry, 414

- Mr. Pitt resigns, 415

- Lord Granville's speech on the occasion, ib.

- Dispute concerning the resignation, 418

- Addresses, 419

- Mr. Pitt's letter to a person of eminence in the city, 420

- Parliament meets, 423

- Dispute with Spain, ib

- Representation of the Earl of Bristol. 424

- Disposition of the court of Madrid, ib.

- Treaty between France and Spain, 426

- England desires a communication, 427

- Court of Spain refuses, ib.

- The Ministers mutually withdraw, 429

- Blockade of Pondicherry, 430

- Fleet dispersed in a storm, but returns again, 431

- Gen. Lally's letter on the occasion. 432

- Town surrenders, 433

- Mahie taken, ib.

- Enterprises of Mr. Law, ib.

- Mogul army defeated by Major Carnac, 434

- Nabob of Bengal deposed, 435

- Coast of Sumatra ravaged by the Count d'Estaing, ib.

- Dominica taken by Lord Rollo and Sir James Douglas, ib.

M.DCC.LXII.

- State of Europe in the beginning of this year, 436

- Ill state of the British alliance, 437

- Condition of the Northern Powers, ib.

- War reaches to the Southern, 438

- Family Compact, ib.

- Some articles from it, 440

- Observations upon them, ib.

- Consequences of this treaty to Europe 441

- War declared against Spain, 442

- State of Spain and Great Britain at the beginning of the war between them, ib.

- Advantages and disadvantages on each side, ib.

- Portugal threatened, and the melancholy state of that kingdom, 443

- Arrogant proposition of the French and Spanish Ministers to the court of Lisbon, 445

- Answer of that court, 446

- Resolution of the court of Portugal, 448

- French and Spanish Ministers depart, ib.

- War declared by those powers against Portugal, ib.

- Death of the Empress Elizabeth of Russia, and her character, 449

- State of the power of Russia on her decease. 450

- Her nephew Peter III. succeeds, 451

- Entire change of system, and peace with Prussia, 453

- Peace between Prussia and Sweden, ib.

- The Czar enters into an alliance with the King of Prussia 454

- War with Denmark threatened, and its cause, ib.

- Campaign between Prussians and Austrians opens, 455

- Prussians obtain advantages in Saxony and Silesia, 456

- Sudden revolution in Russia, ib.

- Causes of the revolution in Russia, 457

- Czar irritates the clergy and soldiery, 458

- Differences with the Czarina, 459

- Czar deposed by the Senate, 460

- His imprisonment & death, 461

- The Czarina declared Empress, 462

- Effect of the revolution in Russia on the King of Prussia's affairs, 463

- Situation of the new Empress, 464

- Russian conquest restored, 465

- Russians quit the Prussian camp, ib.

- King of Prussia draws Marshal Daun from Buckersdorf, ib

- Schweidnitz besieged, 466

- Marshal Laudohn attacks the Prince of Bevern and is repulsed, 467

- Disposition of the French and allied armies, ib.

- Battle of Grabenstein, 468

- Lord Granby drives the French from Hombourg, 469

- Prince Xavier of Saxony defeated, and Gottingen evacuated, 470

- War in Portugal, 473

- Miranda, Braganza and Chaves, taken, 474

- Almeida besieged and taken, 475

- Count of la Lippe arrives in Portugal, 476

- Surprise of Valentia d'Alcantara by General Burgoyne, ib.

- Affair of Villa Velha, 478

- Spaniards retire, ib.

- Expedition against Martinico, 479

- Troops land at Cas Navire, 480

- Attack of the posts near Fort Royal, 481

- Fort Royal surrendered, 482

- General Monckton's and Admiral Rodney's letter relative to the conquest of Martinico, ib.

- St. Lucie, the Grenades and St. Vincent taken, 491

- Preparations for war against the Spanish West Indies, 493

- Commanders in the Expedition against the Havannah, and departure of the fleet, 495

- Passage through the old streights of Bahama, 496

- Town and harbour of Havannah described, ib.

- Troops land, 498

- The siege of Fort Moro, ib.

- Distress of the English forces, 501

- Succours arrive from North America, 502

- The Fort stormed, 503

- Operations against the town, 504

- The Havannah surrenders, 505

- Letters from the Earl of Albemarle and Admiral Pocock relative to their operations, ib.

- An expedition against the Philippine Islands, undertaken by Gen Draper and Adm. Cornish, 510

- Departure of the forces, 511

- City of Manila invested, 513

- The place stormed and taken, 514

- Gen. Draper and Adm. Cornish's account of the expedition, 516

- Proposals for peace, 524

- State of the Ministry and parties, 525

- Dukes of Bedford and Nivernois employed in the negotiation. 528

- Newfoundland taken and retaken, ib.

- War in Germany, 532

- Hereditary Prince defeated at Johannisberg, 538

- Cassel in•ested, 539

- Remarkable cannonade at Bucker Muhl, ib.

- French take Amoneberg, 540

- Cassel surrendered to the allies, ib.

- War in Westphalia concluded, 541

- Lord Granby's letter of thanks to the army, ib.

- Siege and surrender of Schweidnitz, 543

- War transferred to Saxony, 544

- Austrians defeated at Freyberg, ib.

- Prussians ravage the Empire, 545

- Preliminaries of peace between Great Britain and France, 548

- Mr. Fox comes into administration, 556

- Preliminaries approved by parliament, 557

- Peace of Hubertsbourg between Austria and Prussia, 558

- Conclusion, ib.

A List of HEADS, MAPS, and PLANS, in the COMPLEAT HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR.

- I. The Head of his present Majesty to face the Title.

- II. The Head of Admiral Boscawen, Page 4

- III. — of General Amherst, 95

- IV. — of Prince Ferdinand, 164

- V. — of the Marquiss of Granby, 170

- VI. — of General Wolfe, 220

- VII. — of Admiral Hawke, 232

- VIII. — of the King of Prussia, 300

- IX. — of the Right Hon. Wm. Pitt, 420

- X. — of General Monckton, 480

MAPS and PLANS.

- XI. Plan of the Siege of Louisbourg, 110

- XII. — of the Island of Goree, 128

- XIII. View of Montreal, 339

- XIV. Plan of the Siege of the Havannah, 498

- XV. Map of Germany, at the End.

- XVI. — of America, at the End.

A list of FRENCH, ENGLISH, and SPANISH Ships of War taken, destroyed, or lost, during the late War.

FRENCH Line of Battle Ships.

Taken.

Guns.

FOrmidable

80

Foudroyant

80

Centaur

74

Temeraire

74

Achille

64

Alcide

64

Belliqueux

64

Lys

64

Modeste

64

Orphée

64

Raisonable

64

St. Anne

64

Arc en Ciel

50

Oriflamme

53

Destroyed

Guns.

Ocean

84

Soleil Royal

84

Bein Aimé

74

Entreprennant

74

Heros

74

Prudent

74

Redoutab

74

Thesée

74

Juste

70

Superbe

70

Capricieux

64

Celebre

64

Alegon

50

Apollon

50

FRENCH FRIGATES.

Taken.

Guns.

Abenquais

44

Danae

40

Arethuse

32

Bellone

32

Blonde

32

Boufonne

32

Brune

32

Commette

32

Diane

32

Hermione

32

Sirene

32

Vestale

32

Emeraude

28

La Folle

24

Opale

24

Galathée

24

Terpsichore

24

Tygre

24

Zephire

24

Guirlande

22

Hardie

20

Mignonne

20

Escarboucle

16

Anemone

14

Epreuve

14

Sardoigne

14

Destroyed.

Guns.

Aquilon

48

Atalante

36

Felicite

36

Fidelle

36

Rose

36

Fleur de Lys

32

Nymphe

30

Pomona

24

Cleone

16

Biche

16

ENGLISH Men of War taken and destroyed by the FRENCH, this whole War.

Taken.

Guns.

Warwick, retaken

60

Greenwich, since lost

50

Winchelsea, retaken

24

Blandford, restored

20

Hawke, retaken

16

Merlin, retaken

14

Stork

14

Destroyed.

Guns.

Bridgewater

20

Triton

20

FRENCH Ships lost by Accident.

Guns.

Northumberland

70

Opiniatre

64

Leopard

60

Aigle

50

Greenwich

50

Concord

30

Sauvage

30

Harmonie

26

Zenobie

26

Minerve

24

ENGLISH Ships lost this War by Accident.

Guns.

Ramalies

90

Prince George

84

Invincible, F.

74

Resolution

70

Conqueror

70

Duc d'Aquitaine

54

Essex

64

Mars, F.

64

Raisonable, F.

64

Sunderland

60

Tilbury

60

Litchfield

50

Newcastle

50

Chesterfield

44

Humber

40

Hassar

28

Leostoffe

28

Lyme

26

Tartar's prize, F.

24

Biddeford

20

Mermaid

20

Queenborough

20

Ferret

16

Pheasant, F.

16

Peregrine

16

Diligence

14

Scorpion

14

SPANISH Line of Battle Ships.

Taken.

Guns.

Tigre

70

Reyna

70

Soverano

70

Infante

70

Aquilon

70

America

60

Conquestado

60

San Genaro

60

San Antonio

60

Sunk.

Guns.

Neptuno

70

Asia

64

Europa

60

Frigates.

Taken.

Guns.

Vinganaza

24

Thetis

24

Marte

18

N. B. There were two ships of war taken on the stocks, at the Havannah.

THE ANNUAL REGISTER OR HISTORY OF THE WAR.

CHAP. I.

Origin of the troubles in North America. Admiral Boscawen and General Braddock sent thither. Operations intended. Two French men of war taken. Braddock defeated. Gen. Johnson repulses the French. French threaten an invasion. Fort St. Philip besieged and taken. Treaty with Russia, the spirit of it. Alliance with the King of Prussia. Ground of the Quarrel between her Imperial Majesty and that Monarch. Treaty of Petersbourg. Treaty of Versailles. King of Prussia enters Saxony and Bohemia. Battle of Lowositz. Saxon army surrenders.

THE original plan of this work proposed no more than, that each volume should contain a narrative of those events which distinguish its own Year. But, because we have entered upon our undertaking in the heat of an almost general and very important war, I thought it would not be unnecessary or disagreeable to look a little farther back. It would be difficult, perfectly to understand the operations of the several powers at war, without reviewing the transactions of the preceding years; nor would it be easy to enter into the spirit of these, without examining the causes which more nearly or remotely operated to produce those troubles that have involved so many parts of the world in one common distraction.

The war in which all parties and interests seem now to be so perfectly blended, arose from causes which originally had not the least connection: the uncertain limits of the English and French territories in America; and the mutual claims of the Houses of Austria and Brandenbourg on the dutchy of Silesia. It is no wonder that the two former powers seizing on a country in which they considered the right of the natural Inhabitants as nothing, should find it a very difficult matter to settle their own. For a long time neither of these powers were sufficiently acquainted with the geography of America, to enable them to ascertain the limits of their several pretensions with any tolerable exactness; nor, indeed, were these matters deemed of sufficient moment to call for a very laborious discussion. At the treaty of Utrecht, whilst so many more important Interests, or what then seemed more important, were discussed, the limits of Nova Scotia, then called Acadia, were expressed only in general terms, and left to be put on a more certain footing by subsequent negotiations. These negotiations pursued with no vigour, and drawn out into an excessive length, seemed only to increase the former confusion. After the accession of the present Royal Family, a French connection, perhaps necessary from the circumstances of the time, and afterwards a certain negligence of all affairs but those of our domestic polity, suffered this important point to vanish almost wholly out of our consideration. During this interval, our colonies on the continent of North Amerca, extended themselves on every side. Whilst agriculture and the maritime commerce flourished on their coasts, the Indian trade drew several of our wandering dealers far into the inland country, and beyond the great mountains. Here they found themselves in a delightful climate, in a soil abundantly fruitful, and watered with many fair and navigable rivers. These advantages, joined to those of the Indian trade, appeared to compensate for its remoteness from the sea. It was judged, that as the first settlers on the coast, we had a good right to the inland country; and, if so, to the navigation of the Missisippi, which opened another door to the ocean. With these views, a company of merchants and planters, obtained a charter for a considerable tract of land near the river Ohio, on the western side of the Alleganey mountains, but within the province of Virginia; and the adventurers began to settle pursuant to the terms of their patent.

Now began to shoot forth the seeds of another dispute, which had long lain unobserved, but which proved altogether as thorny and intricate as that concerning the limits of Acadia. The French pretending to have first discovered the mouths of the Missisippi, claimed the whole adjacent country, towards New Mexico on the east, quite to the Apalachian or Alleganey mountains on the west. They drove off the new settlers, and built a new fort called du Quesne, on the forks of the River Monongahela, a situation which commanded the entrance into all the country on the Ohio and Missisippi.

The reader will observe, that I do not pretend to decide concerning the right of either nation in this contest. It is evident enough, that the consideration of the right had much less influence on both parties, than the consideration of conveniency. Should the French be able to unite Canada to their colonies at the mouth of the Missisippi by a possession of all that vast country which lies between them, the English colonies must lose all share in the Indian trade in time of peace; and in time of war be exposed to continual dangers, or to the ruinously chargeable defence of a frontier more than 1500 miles in length. If on the contrary, the French should fail to make good these claims on the Ohio, and those on Nova Scotia, their two colonies entirely disunited, and the entrance into one shut up for the winter season by frost, and the entrance into the other difficult in all seasons by the banks at the mouth of the Missisppi, must certainly lose all their value to France, and in their fall involve much of the fortune of their great settlements in the West Indies.

Both nations being fully persuaded of this, no longer looked on the affair of the Ohio as a matter of indifference. They prepared to cut the gordian knot of the long and intricate negotiation by the sword. Ships were fitted out, and some troops silently sent off from Brest. General Braddock sailed to Virginia with about 1500 regular troops; [1755.] 24 men of war under the Admirals Boscawen and Mostyn were ordered to America, to intercept the French supplies. Orders were sent to our colonies to arm; and three operations were actually undertaken, one against Fort du Quesne under Braddock; the other two against the French forts in Nova Scotia, and the fort of Crown Point on the Frontiers of New York. The two courts in the mean time breathed nothing but peace, and exchanged reciprocal professions of friendship, and good will, which deceived neither party.

They who are of opinion that the passions and characters of the ruling men influence all public concerns as much as the public interests themselves, thought they saw other causes operating to hasten this breach. On the death of a great Minister, which happened some time before, the administration was new moulded. Some persons then taken in, were considered as belonging to a party not perfectly united with the remains of the old administration. It was thought, that the leading man of this party proposed to work out the old Servants of the crown, in order to make way for a more uniform system. As long as peace subsists, government is supported by itself; and any change is difficult. But the conduct of a war, is a thing critical to a ministry. The leader of this party therefore, conscious of his own talents, which all men acknowledged to be conspicuous, and of his connections which were considerable, warmly pushed on a war, seconded by the fairness of the public motives, and the general voice of the people. In this war his friends relied, that things must necessarily be so embarrassed, that the old party would find themselves obliged to retire, and to leave the stage clear for them to serve their country according to their own plans, and on their own terms. This design was believed to be pushed forward by another great man of that party, who had played a game nearly of the same kind before, and in whom an advanced age had not abated any thing of his natural fire and love of violent councils.

Things came to a crisis by the taking of two French men of war by the Admirals Boscawen and Mostyn. [June 10.] The operations by land were carried on with vigour; but whether conducted with equal judgment, we stand too near the time to decide. However, the French fort at Beausejour was taken, and soon after those on St. John's river were abandoned; [June 16.] by which we remained masters of all Nova Scotia. The principal expedition was that against Fort du Quesne,
ADM. BOSCAWEN

under General Braddock. That General abounding too much in his own sense for the degree of military knowledge he possessed, commanding in a country which he did not know, and carrying on a species of war in which he had no experience, suffered himself, when he had advanced within 10 miles of Fort du Quesne, to be surprised by an ambuscade of French and Indians. His army was seized with a panic from the unusual appearance, [July 9.] and horried cries of the savages; they fled in confusion; they were totally defeated with a considerable slaughter, especially of their officers. The General himself, after having five horses killed under him, was mortally wounded; wiping away all the errors of his conduct by an honourable death for his country.

The nation was something consoled for this loss in the signal advantage gained by General Johnson, who commanded the expedition designed against Crown Point. [Sep. 7.] He was attacked in his intrenchments by the French General Dieskau, but the assailants wanting cannon, and firing from too great a distance, were totally defeated, and Dieskau himself was made prisoner. This victory, tho' very honourable for Mr. Johnson and the provincial troops under his command, yet as it was gained late in the season, and as the army was in no very good condition, it had no consequences. On the whole, we seemed, after allowing for this victory, and for the dislodgment of the French from Nova Scotia, to have had the worst part in the campaign; considering the sanguine expectations which had been formed, and the great superiority of strength which we exerted, or were able to have exerted, in that part of the world.

During this summer, our court took a resolution not to wait the precarious operation of our arms in America for redress of the grievances complained of, but to strike such a blow as would at once put a security into our hands, for the evacuating the places the enemy had fortified in our territories, and disable them in the two most material points, the resources of their trade, and their seamen. Their merchant ships were every where attacked, as if war had been actually declared, and vast numbers brought into our ports. The French made all Europe resound with complaints of what they called a proceeding so unjust, and a violation of the law of nations so flagrant and unprecedented. But, whether it was that they were really in no condition to act, or that they intended to influence the other courts in their favour, by a shew of extraordinary moderation, they contented themselves with this, and neither declared war, nor made any sort of reprisal for several months after. At lenght they began to act; several bodies of troops moved to the coasts of Picardy, [1756.] Normandy and Britany; and all things threatened an invasion on some part of this kingdom. Under the shadow of this stratagem, they got ready in the harbour of Toulon a fleet of twelve men of war of the line, with the utmost expedition, which convoyed an army of about 11,000 men, [April 18.] under command of the Duke de Richlieu to the island of Minorca. In a few days they opened the trenches before St. Philip's fort. [April 25.]

This was done whilst the nation trembled under a shameful panic, too public to be concealed, too fatal in its consequences to be ever forgotten. The real invasion did not lessen our fears of the imaginary one; it threw us into a confusion that suffered us to be sensible of nothing but our own weakness. We did not look upon ourselves sufficiently secured by the arrival of the Hanoverian and Hessian troops, which the same weakness had induced us to call to our assistance. The ministry seemed to have been infected with the common terror; for though they had very early notice or the French designs, such was the apprehension of the invasion, or such the ill-contrived disposition of our navy, that Admiral Byng was not dispatched to the Mediterranean before the 5th of April, and then with a squadron of no more than 10 ships of the line.

The engagement with the French fleet under M. Galissoniere; the retreat of Byng by which the garrison of fort St. Philip was cut off from all hopes of relief; [May 12.] the surrender of that garrison after nine weeks open trenches; [June 29.] the sentiments of the court and the public, on the different merits of the governor and the admiral; the opposition of some, who thought the one too highly honoured, and the other too severely censured; and the measures which rather indignation at our losses and disgraces, than a cool sense of things obliged us to take, are known to all the world. Our affairs were in such a Condition that we were driven to the expedient of a court martial to revive the British spirit, and to the unfortunate necessity of shedding the blood of an Admiral, a person of a noble family, [Feb. 14. 1757.] as a sacrifice to the discipline of our navy.

From this melancholy picture, let us turn our eyes another way, and review the steps by which this war came to involve the rest of the contending powers. The French, amongst the other plans they formed for distressing our affairs, made no secret of their design of attacking his Majesty's German dominions. These countries evidently had no sort of connexion with the matters which gave rise to the war. But being under a Sovereign so remarkably affectionate to his native country; they judged he might be terrified into a relaxation of his rights in America, to preserve Hanover from the calamities with which it 〈◊〉 threatened. Their politics, however, in this instance proved as unsuccessful as they were unjust. No motion was made towards an abatement in our claims with regard to America; his Majesty took other methods for the preservation of the peace of Germany. His British subjects by their representatives, not more generously than reasonably, resolved to defend the Hanoverians if attacked in their quarrel. To answer this purpose, the ministry entered into a subsidy treaty with the Empress of Russia, in virtue of which she was to hold 55,000 men in readiness to be sent on a requisition wherever the British service required.

The alliance with Russia was chosen for reasons which were then sufficiently plausible; though it is to be hoped they can never subsist again. The long ill understanding between the King of Prussia and our court, and his close connexion with that of Versailles, raised no ill-grounded apprehensions that he might be induced to act a dangerous part on this occasion. Russia was therefore a proper ally, who had both a political and personal enmity to this monarch, and who would be sure to employ a great power with great vigour in such a cause. But this system was in a short time totally reversed. The King of Prussia had been too well apprised of the close conjunction of the courts of Petersburg and Vienna, and of the real motive to that conjunction, to have the least design of embroiling himself with England. Matters were therefore very soon explained, and the treaty between his Prussian majesty and this court, to keep all foreigners out of the Empire, was signed at London in January 1756. These treaties were censured as inconsistent with each other; but in reality they were consistent enough, aiming precisely at the same object, to oppose the schemes meditated by France for disturbing the affairs of Germany.

If reflecting on the sentiments of these courts, there was something unexpected in the alliance between great Britain and Prussia; it was soon followed by another alliance of a nature infinitely more surprising. The Empress Queen of Hungary, finding England in no disposition to co-operate in her designs, had recourse to other measures. The house of Austria, which had formerly united Europe to preserve her from the power of France, now entered herself into the most intimate union with that power. By this extraordinary revolution the whole political system of Europe assumed a new face; it was indeed a revolution so extraordinary, that we shall be justified if we interrupt the course of this narrative, to look back at the causes which produced it.

The house of Brandenbourg, a little more than two centuries ago, was in a very humble condition. But by the part she took in the reformation, which put into her hands the estates of the Teutonic order; by a marriage from which she acquired the duchy of Cleves; and by an uncommon succession of able princes who carefully improved every turn in the affairs of Germany to their advantage, she raised herself by degrees to a considerable state, to an electorate, and at last to a royalty, not only in name but in power. The late King of Prussia, in order to strengthen this power, though he past almost his whole reign in the most profound peace, gave his whole attention to his army; frugal in all other respects, in this alone he was expensive; it was his business, and what was perhaps of greater moment, it was his only diversion. Thus in a reign apparently inactive, there was always kept up an army of near 100,000 men, in as much exercise as they could have in war, and formed with the most perfect discipline.

When his present Majesty came to the throne, he immediately shewed a disposition of employing effectually that military force, which his father had spent his life only in forming and training. He managed his dispute with the Bishop of Liege by the summary method of force; and seemed disposed to carry all things with so high an hand, as made him indeed much respected, but much dreaded too by the Princes of the Empire, who saw that there was another power to be feared in Germany, besides that of Austria. But these were small matters, rather signs of the disposition of this Prince, than exertions of it. He meditated much greater things; and only waited an opportunity to make good the antient claims of his family on the most considerable part of the dutchy of Silesia. The right to that dutchy had been a very intricate affair; but the house of Austria availing herself of the greatness of her power, and of a dissention between the Elector Frederick II. and his son, prevailed with the Elector to give up that right for an equivalent; then she persuaded his son to confirm the treaty; and at the same time for a trivial consideration to give up the equivalent itself. The King of Prussia, not thinking himself bound by these acts, though confirmed be a long possession, took advantage of his own power, and the embarrassed circumstances of the house of Austria, to resume what their power and the embarrassed circumstances of his family had formerly deprived him of. For immediately on the death of Charles the 6th, [Dec. 1740.] when the Austrian greatness seemed irrecoverably lost, he entered into Silesia, and made himself master of the whole country with little opposition. Then uniting with the French and Bavarians, he secured his conquests by two decisive victories, [June 11. 1742,] and by a treaty which yielded him the greatest part of Silesia and the whole county of Glatz. But the cause of the Emperor which the King of Prussia had embraced, soon caused a renewal of hostilities; the Queen of Hungary saw herself defeated in three pitched battles; her new ally the King of Poland, [June 2, 1744,] driven from his German dominions, and the King of Prussia entering Dresden in triumph, where he gave the law in a treaty, by which Silesia was once more solemnly confirmed to him: [Dec. 1745.] in return to which he guarantied to the Queen of Hungary the rest of her dominions.

The Queen of Hungary could not easily lose the memory of the wound she had received in the loss of one of the finest and richest parts of all her dominions. Silesia, which she had just yielded, extended in length 200 miles along the course of the large and navigable river Oder. A country of the most exquisite fertility and highest cultivation; abounding with men, abounding with valuable manufactures, and yielding a clear yearly revenue of 800,000 pounds sterling. The peace was hardly concluded by which she resigned this valuable territory, than she set on foot practices for recovering it. She entered into a treaty with the court of Petersbourg, of an innocent and simply defensive nature, so far as appeared to the public; but six secret and separate articles were added to it; [May 22, 1746,] one of which provides, that in case his Prussian majesty should attack her majesty the Empress Queen, or the Empress of Russia, or even the republic of Poland, that this attack should be considered as a breach of the treaty of Dresden; that the right of the Empress Queen to Silesia ceded by that treaty should revive; and that the contracting powers should mutually furnish an army of 60,000 men to re-invest the Empress Queen with that dutchy.

To this so extraordinary a treaty, the King of Poland was invited to accede; and he did so far accede to it, as to shew he perfectly agreed in his sentiments with these courts. But his situation in the jaws of a formidable enemy, and the experience of passed misfortunes, had rendered him so weary, that he declined signing the treaty; but still, with the consent of the parties concerned, whom he fully convinced of his resolution to co-operate in all their measures. He desired and they agreed, that in the success of their arms he should have a share in the spoil, on the footing of a treaty for the eventual portion, of the King of Prussia's dominions made in the last war. [May 18, 1745.] On these conditions the King of Poland without actually signing, was understood, and received as a party to the treaty of Petersbourg.

In consequence of these measures, all sort of means were employed to embroil the King of Prussia's affairs in the North, and particularly to render him personally odious to the Czarina. When their machinations had taken full effect, and Russia was fixed in an unalterable enmity to that monarch, preparations of magazines and armies were made in Bohemia and Moravia; and the King of Poland, under pretence of a military amusement, drew together about 16000 men, with which he occupied the strong and important Post of Pirna. The Queen of Hungary saw that she stood in need of yet stronger supports than these in the arduous business she had undertaken. She found that Great Britain, which had often done so much for her distress, would do little for her ambition: she therefore had recourse to France, who joyfully accepted an alliance, that promised to confound the whole Germanic body, concluded a treaty with the Empress at Versailles the 1st of May 1756, a remarkable aera in the political history of Europe.

The secret articles of the treaty of Petersbourg, the fountain of the present troubles, and the steps taken to put that treaty in execution, though formed and carried on with as much secrecy as earnestness, could not escape the vigilance of his Prussian majesty, who watched all their motions, and had perfect intelligence of their most hidden designs. When, therefore, he perceived that by the breach between England and France, the Empress Queen would take advantage of these troubles to avail herself of her alliances and her armament; he ordered his minister at Vienna to demand a clear explication, and proper assurances concerning the preparations he saw making: and receiving only a dry and equivocal answer, that the Empress had taken measures for her own security and that of her allies and friends, the King believed himself no longer bound to preserve any terms; a dangerous war was to be kept out of his own territories at any rate; and being always in perfect readiness for action, he fell upon Saxony with a considerable army.

At first the King of Prussia seemed only to demand a free passage for his troops, and an observance of the neutrality professed by the King of Poland; [Aug. 29.] but as he had very good reason to distrust such a neutrality, he demanded as a security, that the Saxon troops should quit the strong post they occupied, and disperse themselve immediately. This demand was refused, and the King of Prussia in consequence of that refusal, immediately formed a sort of blockade about the Saxon camp at Pirna, with a view to reduce it by famine, since its inaccessible situation rendered an attack unadviseable. There were in Bohemia two Austrian armies under M. Brown and M. Picolomini; to keep them in awe, M. Schwerin had entered Bohemia from the county of Glatz; and M. Keith had penetrated into that kingdom on the side of Misnia. But the King of Prussia, not entirely confiding in these dispositions? and still apprehensive that M. Brown might be able to convey some relief to the Saxons, resolved to bring him to action, to the success of which he knew his own presence would greatly contribute. He therefore left the blockade of the Saxon army, joined his forces under Keith, and engaged the Austrians at Lowositz. Here he obtained a victory, [Dec. 1.] which though it was not undisputed with regard to the field of battle, yet with regard to the consequences it was as decisive as could be wished. M. Brown found it impracticable to relieve the Saxons, notwithstanding the judicious efforts he made for that purpose; and that Army, after a vain attempt to retire from their difficult post, which had one fault, that it was as difficult to leave it as to force it, were obliged to surrender prisoners of war. The King of Poland quitted his German dominions; and the Prussians took up their winter quarters in Saxony, seized upon the revenues, levied exorbitant contributions, and obliged the country to furnish recruits. This unhappy people saw their country exhausted, and forced to bear the burthen of a war against itself. It was then that the King of Prussia consulting the rules of policy more than those of politeness, made himself master of the archieves at Dresden, in doing which some roughness was used towards the Queen; but he made himself amends for the clamour industriously raised on this pretence, by acquiring the originals of these pieces, which evinced to the world the reality of the design against him, and which therefore in a great measure justified the means he had taken to come at them, as well as the extraordinary severities he used towards the unfortunate Saxons.

CHAP. II.

State of the English ministry. The characters and designs of the several factions. A coalition. Oswego taken by the French. Calcutta taken by the Nabob. Angria reduced by Admiral Watson.

WHILST the King of Prussia passed the winter in the most vigorous preparations for carrying on the war, his ally Great Britain presented a very different face of things. The loss of Minorca plunged the people into the utmost grief mixed with shame, for such a blot on the national honour, and with indignation not only against those who had acted weakly, but those who had proved insufficiently for the loss of that important possession. The public resentment which at first seemed to have no other object than Byng, was soon turned against the ministry. The clamour in parliament was great; without doors it was excessive. Addresses praying a strict enquiry into the cause of our misfortunes, were presented from all parts of the kingdom. The ministry, notwithstanding this general discontent, had a real strength; and they might have stood, had they agreed amongst themselves. The commons could not be brought to any angry votes; and the result of the enquiry into the loss of Minorca, was as favourable as they could have wished. But Mr. F—x thought it not adviseable to bear a large proportion of the odium caused by counsels, in which he had little share. Perhaps he thought this embarrassment, a situation not unfavourable to the arrangement he had always aimed at? he therefore suddenly threw up an employment, which he hoped to resume augmented with greater power.

On the removal of this principal prop, the whole structure of the ministry fell to pieces. The D. of N. the Ld. Ch. the first lord of the admiralty resigned; and the chiefs of the party by whose manoeuvres they were displaced, [Dec. 4. 1756.] naturally succeeded to the management of affairs. They who had resigned gave them no apparent opposition in parliament; but whether it was, that the new ministry were themselves too fresh from opposition, and some of them too full of the popular manners that introduced them to court to be perfectly agreeable in the closet, or that they had made their bottom too narrow, after holding their employments for some months, to the great concern of the public, they in their turn were obliged to quit their posts. [April 5. 1757.] Thus was the helm of government a second time abandoned. The case of the King and the nation was at that juncture truly deplorable. We were without any ally who could do us the least service, engaged in a war hitherto unsuccessful, with the most formidable power in Europe; we almost despaired of our military virtue; public spirit appeared utterly extinguished, whilst the rage of faction burned with the utmost violence; our operations were totally suspended: and having no ministry established, we had no plan to follow.

Three factions divided the ruling men of the nation, for the gross of the people seemed to have no further views than a redress of their grievances, by whatever means that could be brought about; the first of these factions was composed of those who had grown to place and power, or had formed their connexions under the old ministry. They were some of the most respectable persons in the nation, and had undoubtedly the greatest parliamentary interest. They had at the same time another interest hardly less considerable, that of the monied people; but in some points, and those material too, they were weak. They were not at all popular; a matter of great consideration in a government like ours; and they were supposed by the gross of the people, not to be under the direction of great political abilities.

The second faction, though not suspected of the want of sufficient ability, was yet more unpopular than the former; they had not attempted to preserve even the appearances essential to popularity; and to them the more essential, as their parliamentary strength was, however respectable, much inferior to the first. If their influence at one court was able to ballance that of the old ministry, by means of a then powerful connexion, that very connection made them far worse at another court, and worse with the generality of the people, who entertained or pretended at least to entertain, suspicions of a nature the more dangerous, as they were only dropped in hints and whispers, and never could come to a full and open explanation.

The third party, had little parliamentary and less court influence; but they had a prodigious popularity, which supplied every other defect. The abilities of their leader were of the most shining kind; his application equal to his abilities; his disinterestedness was confessed by his enemies; and though it would have shined in the days of heroism, was now the more valued, and set off to the greater advantage by the general selfishness which prevailed among the men of business. The nation reposed the most perfect confidence in his integrity and love to his country. This party, conscious where its strength lay, cultivated with great care the popularity which was the basis of their power; even perhaps so as to impair on some occasion the dignity of government.

These three factions differed from each other extremely with regard to power, the grand object of all factions. But in the general scheme of their politics, the two first were pretty much agreed. Looking on France as the most constant and most dangerous enemy of Great Britain, they dreaded the increase of her power and influence among the neighbouring nations as the greatest of all evils. To prevent so dangerous an aggrandisement, they thought it absolutely necessary to preserve a constant attention to the ballance of power, and to seek our particular safety and liberty in the general safety and liberty of Europe. A close connection was therefore to be kept up with the powers of the continent, not only by continual negotiations, but by large subsidies, and even by assisting them with our troops if the occasion should require such assistance. For this purpose, as well as to secure the more effectually our present happy establishment, a considerable regular land force ought to be constantly maintained. Our navy, they thought, ought by no means to be neglected; but it was only to be cultivated and employed subserviently to the more comprehensive continental system. These parties were far from being friends to arbitrary power, or in any sort averse to parliaments; they loved the constitution; but they were for preserving the authority of government entire, and in its utmost lawful force. To make government more easy, knowing that many would disturb it, from disaffection or disgust, or mistaken notions of liberty, they thought it just to rule men by their interests, if they could not by their virtues, and they had long been in the practice of procuring a majority in parliament, by the distribution of the numerous lucrative places and employments which our constitution leaves in the disposal of the Crown. Several believed that no other method was practicable, considering the nature of mankind, and our particular form of government.

But the third and popular party, was influenced by different principles. They looked indeed on the power of France in the same light with the two former, and were of the same opinion concerning the necessity of setting bounds to it. In the means of attaining this end they differed. Our situation they thought dictated a narrower, but a more natural, a safer, and a less expensive plan of politics, than that which had been adopted by the other party. We ought never to forget, said they, that we are an island: and that this circumstance, so favourable both to our political and to our civil liberty, prescribes to us a conduct very different from that of any other nation. Our natural strength is a maritime strength, as trade is our natural employment; these must always go hand in hand, and they mutually support each other. But, if turning our back to our real interests, and abandoning our natural element, we enter that inextricable labyrinth of continental politics; if we make ourselves parties in every controversy; if we exhaust our wealth in purchasing the useless and precarious friendship of every petty prince or state; if we waste the blood of our people in all the quarrels that may arise on the continent; so far from going in the right way to reduce France, that we attack her on the strong side, and only destroy ourselves by our ill judged efforts against the enemy. That we can have nothing to fear from the superiority of France on the continent, whilst we preserve our superiority at sea; that we can always cut the sinews of the enemy's strength by destroying their traffic; that to fear an invasion from a power weak in its marine, is the idlest of all fears; that in case an invasion were possible, a well trained national militia, supplying by their zeal the defects of their discipline, would prove our best protection; that a standing army is in whatever shape dangerous to freedom; and that a government like ours, connected by its very essence with the liberty of the subject, can never be in want of the supports of despotic power, As little is parliamentary influence necessary. A government pleasing to the people, as every good government must be, can never be generally opposed; and men need no bribes to persuade them to their duty.

These notions, so opposite in their extreams, might be reconciled in a medium, and used to temper each other. For as, on one hand, it would be very absurd to make no sort of advantage of our insular situation, but to engage in all the business of the continent without reserve, and to plunge ourselves into real evils out of a dread of possible mischiefs; so on the other hand, to think ourselves wholly unconcerned in the fortunes of our neighbours on the continent, or to think of aiding them in any case, only by the way of diversion with our fleets, would be a way of proceeding, still more extravagant than the former. If such notions were reduced to practice, we might soon lose all those advantages derived from a situation which we abused.

The reasonableness of such a temperament, could not be perceived during the ferment of that time, in which these topics were bandied to and fro with infinite heat. The resignation, or rather deprivation, of the popular ministry, only increased their popularity, and the general discontent; the people could not believe that good measures could be pursued, when those, in whom alone they confided, were not employed; almost all the corporations of the kingdom presented the deprived ministers with their freedom, and addressed them in the warmest manner, testifying the most intire approbation of their conduct, and the sincerest concern to see them out of employment.

This conflict between an old established interest, and the torrent of popularity, continued for a long time, and the nation was almost ruined by it. It is not easy, nor perhaps quite proper, to attempt to trace the steps by which so happy a coalition, as we have seen take place, was brought about. But it was formed in such manner, has held together with such solidity, and produced such excellent effects, [June 29. 1757.] as I believe the most sanguine could not have hoped for at that time. Mr. P. was again restored to the office of secretary of state, the D. of N. was placed at the head of the treasury, Mr. F. was appointed paymaster of the forces. This arrangement, which gave very general satisfaction, was however disliked by those, whom their violent attachment to their party had inspired with a narrow and exclusive spirit. It was the best measure, because it was an healing measure; and it was little less than impossible for any particular party to carry on public business on its single bottom.

It was high time that our domestic dissentions should be composed at last. From every quarter of the world, in which we had any concern, [Aug. 14. 1756.] we heard of nothing but losses and calamities. In America we lost the Fort of Oswego. That fort, situated at the mouth of the Onondaga river, commanded a commodious harbour on the Lake Ontario. It was built by General Shirley, and designed to cover the country of the Five Nations; to secure the Indian trade; to interrupt the communication between the French northern and southern establishments; and to open a way to our arms to attack the forts of Frontenac and Niagara. For these purposes, some frigates had been fitted out for cruizing, and a number of boats prepared for the transportation of troops; but they all fell to the enemy with the fort, where 100 pieces of cannon were, and a considerable quantity of provision. 1600 men were made prisoners of war. The place made but a trifling resistance, scarce holding out three days; the attempts to relieve it were too late. The French demolished the fort.

Our losses were not confined to America. The E. India company received a blow, which would have shaken an establishment of less strength to its foundations. The news of the war between France and England had not yet reached India, but a new and very formidable enemy was raised up in that quarter. The Nabob of Bengal (the Nabobs are a species of viceroys to the Grand Mogul, grown almost independent in their several provinces,) irritated at the protection given to one of his subjects in the English fort of Calcutta, and, as it is said, at the refusal of some duties to which he claimed a right, levied a great army, and laid siege to that place. The Governor, terrified by the numbers of the enemy, abandoned the fort with several of the principal persons in the settlement, who saved themselves with their most valuable effects on board the ships.

Thus deserted. Mr. Hollwel, the second in command, bravely held the place to the last extremity, with a few gallant friends, and the remains of a feeble garrison. A very noble defence was insufficient to keep an untenable place, or to affect an ungenerous enemy. The fort was taken, and the garrison being made prisoners, were thrust into a narrow dungeon. [June 26.] Hollwel, with a few others, came out alive, to paint a scene of the most cruel distress which perhaps human nature ever suffered. The East India company lost their principal settlement in Bengal, and a fort, which secured to them the most valuable part of their trade.

In the space of this unfortunate year, we were stripped of Minorca and Oswego; we apprehended an invasion of Great Britain itself: our councils were torn to pieces by factions; and our military force was every where in contempt. Amidst these losses, we considered as some advantage, [Feb. 13.] the reduction of the principal fort of Angria, a piratical prince, who had been many years troublesome to the English trade in the East Indies. This service was performed by Admiral Watson in the beginning of the year.

CHAP. III.

State of the confederacy against the King of Prussia. French pass the Weser. King of Prussia enters Bohemia. Battle of Prague. Prague invested. Count Daun takes the command of the Austrian army. Battle of Colin.

WHAT turn the English politics were like to take in the year 1759, seemed for some time uncertain. The new ministry did not seem well established; nor was it well known, whether they would pursue the plans and preserve the connections of the old. Abroad, every thing was prepared for opening the campaign with the utmost eclat. All Europe was in motion.

France, in order to demonstrate to the Queen of Hungary, the advantageous choice she had made in connecting herself with the house of Bourbon, formed two great armies. The first was composed of near 80,000 men, the flower of the French troops, attended with a vast artillery and commanded by M. d'Etrees, a General of the best established reputation she had in her service. Under him served M. de Contades, M. Chevert, and the Count de St. Germain, all officers of high character, and all fit to command in chief, if M. d'Etrees had not been appointed to that eminence. This formidable army passed the Rhine, and marched by Westphalia, in order to invade the King of Prussia's dominions in quality of allies to the Empress Queen, and guardians of the liberties of the Empire, and to no other intent, as it was pretended; but in reality, with a view to reduce Hanover also. They judged that their operations against the King of Prussia might be executed, and their scheme to drive the King of England into some concessions with regard to America, might be compleated by one and the same blow. The second army was commanded 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 by the Prince de Soubise; it consisted of about 25,000 men. This army was destined to strengthen the Imperial army of execution; but before it had passed the Rhine, it made itself master of Cleves, Meurs and Gueldres, whilst a detachment from d'Etrees's army seized upon the town of Emden, and whatever else belonged to Prussia in East Friesland.

As soon as the King of Prussia had entered Saxony in the beginning of the preceding summer, process was commenced against him in the Emperor's Aulic council, and before the diet of the Empire. It is not difficult to conceive how the affair must have been decided; when those who feared the King of Prussia, believed they had a fair opportunity to reduce him: and when those who feared the house of Austria, were, by that very fear, obliged to support the power they dreaded: accustomed as they were to the influence of a family in which the Empire had so long been in a manner hereditary; and over-awed by the appearance of a confederacy, the most formidable the world had ever yet seen. Accordingly the King of Prussia was condemned for contumacy: and the Fiscal had orders to notify to him that he was put under the ban of the Empire, and adjudged fallen from all the dignities and possessions which he held under it. The circles of the Empire were ordered to furnish their contingents of men and money to put this sentence in execution; but the contingents were collected slowly, the troops were badly composed, and probably this army had never been able to act, if it had not been for the Assistance offered under the Prince de Soubise.

The Austrians, who were principals in the quarrel, were not behind their auxiliaries in the greatness of their preparations; they made the most strenuous efforts, by which they assembled a body of upwards of 100,000 men in Bohemia, and committed the command to Prince Charles of Lorrain, assisted by M. Brown. In the north all things threatened the King of Prussia. The Czarina true to her resentments and her engagements, had sent a body of 60,000 men commanded by M. Apraxin, who were in full march to invade the Ducal Prussia, whilst a strong fleet was equipped in the Baltick, to co-operate with that army. Altho' the King of Sweden was allied in blood and inclination to his Prussian majesty, yet the jealousy which the Senate entertained of their sovereign; the hope of recovering their antient possessions in Pomerania by means of the present troubles, and in fine their old attachment to France, newly cemented by intrigues and subsidies, made their ill inclinations to the cause of Prussia more than suspicious. Hitherto indeed nothing more than the tendency of their councils was fully known. The Duke of Mecklenbourg took the same party, and agreed to join the Swedish army when it should be assembled, with 6000 men; a proceeding which he has since had reason to repent bitterly. Thus were the forces of five mighty states [*], each of which had in their turn been a terror to all Europe, united to reduce the heir of the Marquisses of Brandenbourg; and in such a point of danger and glory, had the great and formidable abilities of his Prussian majesty placed him, with little, in comparison, that could enable him to sustain the violence of so many shocks, except what those abilities supplied. But his astonishing oeconomy, the incomparable order of his finances, the discipline of his armies beyond all praise, a sagacity that foresaw every thing, a vigilance that attended every thing, a constancy that no labour could subdue, a courage that no danger could dismay, an intuitive glance that catches the decisive moment, all these seemed to form a sort of ballance to the vast weight against him, turned the wishes of his friends into hopes, and made them depend upon resources that are not within the power of calculation.

The only army that appeared in his favour was a body of between 30 and 40,000 Hanoverians and Hessians, who with some reinforcements of his own troops, formed an army of observation, commanded by his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland; this army was posted on the Weser, to watch the motions of M. d'Etrees. The vast and unwieldy body of the French, encumbered as the French armies always are by an immense baggage, and an innumerable multitude of mouths without hands, made a very slow progress through the rough and barren country that lies between the Rhine and the Weser. All the abilities of the French general were employed in finding subsistence for his troops. His Royal Highness on the other hand, displayed great abilities in throwing all possible impediments in his way. But when these impediments were removed by the superiority of numbers, the Hanoverian army gradually gave way, yielding to that superiority, and the French troops passed the Weser without opposition.

In the mean time, his Prussian majesty being determined according to his maxim, to lay the cloth as from home as possible; made his dispositions for carrying the war into Bohemia as speedily as the season would admit. Three great bodies of his troops entered into that kingdom by three very different ways, but nearly at the same time. M. Schwerin penetrated into it from Silesia. The Prince of Bevern entered with the corps under his command from Lusatia, and defeated as a preliminary to a more decisive victory, a body of 28,000 Austrians who opposed him. [Apr. 21.] The King himself prepared to enter Bohemia at a great distance from the corps commanded by these Generals; and as he seemed disposed to march towards Egra, the enemy imagined he intended to execute some design distinct from the object of his other armies. With this idea they detached a body of 20,000 men, to observe his motions. The King of Prussia finding that this feint had all its effect, made a sudden and masterly movement to his left, by which he cut off all communication between that detachment and the main army of the Austrians. Spirited with this advantage, he pushed onwards with the utmost rapidity to Prague, where he joined the corps under the prince of Bevern and M. Schwerin, who had advanced with inconceivable diligence to meet him. Never were operations executed with more judgment, celerity and success.

The Austrian army was little short of 100,000 men, and the situation of their camp, fortified by every advantage of nature, [May 6.] and every contrivance of art, such as on common occasions might justly be considered as impregnable; but the Prussians, being nearly as numerous as the enemy, inspired by a society of danger with their King, and filled with that noble enthusiasm, which, whilst it urges to daring enterprises, almost ensures their success, passed morasses, climed precipices, faced batteries, and after a bloody and obstinate resistance, totally defeated the Austrians. They took their camp, military chest, cannon, all the trophies of a complete victory. The loss on the side of the victors, as well as the vanquished, was very great; but both sides had yet a greater loss in the death of two of the best generals in Europe. M. Schwerin was killed at the age of eighty-two, with the colonels standard in his hand at the head of his regiment. M. Brown received a wound, which, from the chagrin he suffered rather than from its own nature, proved mortal.

About 40,000 of the Austrian army took refuge in Prague. The rest fled different ways. The King of Prussia lost no time to invest the place, and to cut off all succours. If on one hand such an immense garrison made an attack unadviseable, on the other that formidable number itself seemed to make the reduction of the place by famine the more certain. The King of Prussia not relying solely on this, prepared to bombard the town. On the 29th of May, at midnight, after a most dreadful storm of rain and thunder, as if it were to display how much more ruinous the malice of men may be, than the greatest terrors of nature, on the signal of a rocket, four batteries, which discharged every twenty-four hours two hundred and eighty-eight bombs, besides a vast multitude of red hot balls, began to pour destruction on that unfortunate city, which was soon in flames in every part. The garrison made a vigorous defence, and one well conducted and desperate sally: but they were repulsed with great loss. The principal magistrates, burgesses, and clergy, seeing their city on the point of being reduced to an heap of rubbish, made the most moving supplications to the commander to listen to terms. The commander was deaf to their prayers. Twelve thousand of the most useless mouths were driven out of the city. The Prussians forced them in again. The affairs of the empress seemed verging to inevitable destruction; a whole army was upon the point of surrendering prisoners of war; the capital of Bohemia on the point of being taken, and with it all the rest of that flourishing kingdom. The sanguine friends to the King of Prussia began to compute the distance of Vienna.

In this desperate situation of affairs, Leopold Count Daun entered on the stage, and began to turn the fortune of the war. This General never had commanded in chief before; but he was formed, by a long course of experience in various parts of Europe, under the greatest Generals, and in the most illustrious scenes of actions. Though of a very noble family, he had, without the least assistance from court favour, risen insensibly by the slow gradation of mere merit, with much esteem and without any noise. This General arrived within a few miles of Prague, the day after the great battle. He collected the fugitive parties of the Austrian army, and retired to a post of great strength, from whence he fed the troops in Prague with hopes of relief. But as no man better understood the superiority of the Prussian troops, and as he was sensible of the impression which the late defeat had left upon his men, he carefully avoided to precipitate matters by an hasty action. He knew that the situation he had chosen would embarrass the Prussians; that a large party of their army must be always employed to watch him; that this would weaken their efforts against the great body shut up in Prague, whilst his own forces gained time to recover their spirits, and to increase in strength by the daily succours, which his court exerted all their powers to send him: with these ideas he waited in his entrenched camp at Colin, to act as events should direct.

The King of Prussia was not less sensible than Count Daun of the effects of this conduct. He determined at all adventures to dislodge him from the post he held; but whether it was that the King feared to weaken his army, which had actually an army to besiege, or whether he was blinded by a train of uniform success, which made him believe his arms irresistable under every disadvantage, or whatever were his motives or necessities, the whole army employed in this undertaking, including the Prince of Bevern's corps, did not exceed 32,000 men, cavalry and infantry; and with these he was to attack 60,000 men, in one of the strongest situations which could be chosen, [June 18.] and defended by a vast train of artillery. Whatever the most impetuous and well regulated courage, whatever an ardor inspired by the remembrance of so many victories could do towards overcoming every kind of disadvantage, was done by the Prussians on this occasion. They returned to the attack seven times: in none of their victorious battles had their bravery been more conspicuous. Both the King's brothers were in the field; and they did every thing that could be expected from the King of Prussia's brothers. The King himself at the head of his cavalry, made one furious and concluding charge. Every thing was tried, and every thing was unsuccessful. The want of a sufficiently numerous infantry, in a ground where his cavalry could not support them, the want of an equal artillery, the advantageous situation of the enemy, their numbers, their bravery, their General, obliged the King of Prussia to quit the field. What his loss was is not so certain; it wa s undoubtedly great in the action, but still greater by desertions, and the innumerable ill consequences that follow a defeat.

Though the King of Prussia was defeated in this battle, and though he brought on his defeat in a great measure, by some errors of his own, yet whatever small blemish his military skill might have suffered, his reputation was raised higher than ever, in the opinion of all judicious men, by the noble and candid manner in which he acknowledged his mistake, by the firmness with which he bore his misfortune, and by those astonishing strokes of genius and heroism, by which he retrived his loss. The smiles of fortune make conquerors; it is her malice which discovers heroes.

CHAP. IV.

Consequence of the battle of Colin. King of Prussia evacuates Bohemia. Battle of Hastenbeck. Convention of Closter-seven. Expedition to Rochfort. Russians enter Prussia. Austrians besiege Schweidnitz. French and Imperialists make incursions into Brandenburgh. Swedes enter Pomerania. Battle of Norkitten. General Lehwald defeated. Bad condition of the King of Prussia.

NEVER was the old observation, une bataille perdue a un mauvais •u, more verified than in the consequences of the unfortunate battle of Colin. Though the King retired unpursued by his enemies, he was obliged to rejoin his own army before Prague without delay, and to raise the blockade of that place. The imprisoned Austrians with joy received Count Daun their deliverer, and their united forces became greatly superior to the Prussians. The King was in a short time obliged to evacuate Bohemia, and take refuge in Saxony. The Austrians harassed him as much as possible; but their armies, notwithstanding their great superiority, were not in a condition from their late sufferings to make any decisive attempt upon him, as the frontiers of Saxony abound with situations easily defended.

The King of Prussia's misfortunes now poured in upon him at once, and from every quarter. The army commanded by the Duke of Cumberland, who continually retired before the French, after they had passed the Weser, came however to a resolution to make a stand at Hastenbeck, within a few Miles of Hammelen, where it was judged that the superior numbers of the enemy might be the least prejudicial; but notwithstanding the advantages of the situation, the bravery of the Hanoverians, and the conduct of the Duke, the allied army was driven from the field of battle, [July 25.] and retreated towards Stade. By taking this route his Royal Highness was driven into a sort of cul de sac. Unable by his situation to retire, or by his strength to advance, he was compelled to sign the remarkable capitulation of Closter-seven, [Sept. 7.] by which 38,000 Hanoverians laid down their arms, and were dispersed into different quarters of cantonment. The French army had a little before this changed its commander. D'Etrees, the favourite of all the military men, was removed from the command, which was conferred on the Duke de Richlieu, who excelled him and all mankind in the profession of a courtier. The Hanoverians were now quite subdued, and all the French force, let loose by this treaty, was ready to fall in upon the King of Prussia's dominions.

An enterprize was concerted in England against the coast of France, to make a diversion in his favour, by drawing a part of the French army to the defence of their own country. England proposed to compass another great design, and which she had equally at heart, by the expedition, which was to give an effectual blow to the marine of France. The destination of this armament was kept a profound secret, and whilst it excercised the penetration of all the politicians of Europe, it filled France with the most serious alarms. The English Fleet at last appeared before Rochfort. Some time was spent before it could be resolved what plan was to be followed in the attack; [Sep. 21.] at last it was resolved to secure the small isle of Aix, from whence some obstruction was apprehended to their landing. The island was soon reduced; but as a good deal of time was consumed in these deliberations and actions, the militia of the country had time to gather, and there was an appearance of two camps on the shore. The commanders now took into consideration the badness of the coast, the danger of landing, the time the enemy had to put the place in such a posture of defence, as might make any sudden attempt, or coup de main, unsuccessful: in consequence of these deliberations, they unanimously resolved to return without making any attempt. The disappointment of the nation was equal to the sanguine hopes we had conceived; [Sep. 29.] nothing could exceed the general discontent. The military men blamed the plan of the expedition. The Ministers, and with them the public voice, exclaimed at the execution. A court of enquiry, of officers of reputation, censured the commander; a court martial, of officers of reputation, acquitted him. The expedition served only in England to increase and imbitter our dissentions, and to turn our attention to vain disputes. It did nothing towards relieving the King of Prussia.

The Russians, who had made for a long time a dilatory march and seemed uncertain of their own resolution, all at once hastened their motions. They entered the Ducal Prussia under M. Apraxin and General Fermer, and marked their progress by a thousand inhuman cruelties. A large body of Austrians entered Silesia, and penetrated as far as Breslau. Then they made a turn backwards, and laid siege to the important fortress of Schweidnitz, justly considered as the key of that dutchy, which was the cause of the war. Another body entered Lusatia, and made themselves masters of Zittau. Twenty-two thousand Swedes pierced into the Prussian Pomerania, took the towns of Anclam and Demmein, and laid the whole country under contributions. Richlieu, freed from all opposition on the side of Hanover, made his way into Halberstad, and the old marche of Brandenburgh, first exacting contributions, and then plundering the towns. The army of the Empire, reinforced by that of the Prince de Soubise, after many delays, was at last on full march to enter Saxony; this left the Austrians at liberty to turn the greatest part of their forces to the reduction of Silesia. General Haddick pierced through Lusatia, passed by the Prussian armies, and, suddenly presenting himself before the gates of Berlin, laid the King of Prussia's capital under contribution; and though he retired on the approach of a body of Prussians, yet he still kept possession of his former post, in order to interrupt the communication of the King with Silesia. The fate which seemed to have threatened the Empress some months ago, was now looked upon as the certain lot of her antagonist. All his endeavours to retrieve his affairs had hitherto been equally brave and unsuccessful. General Lehwald had orders at any hazard to engage the Russians: with thirty thousand he attacked double that number strongly entrenched, at a place called Norkitten; but after several of those wonderful efforts, [Aug. 30.] which the Prussians alone knew how to make, he was compelled to retire; but he retired in excellent order, without being pursued, having killed five times more of the enemy, than he had lost of his own men, and more formidable after his defeat, than the Russians after their victory. The King of Prussia exerted himself upon every side; his enemies almost always fled before him; but whilst he pursued one body, another gained in some other part upon him, and the winter came on fast, as his strength decayed, and his adversaries multiplied from every quarter. The following letter which appeared in the public papers about this time, paints the condition of that distressed monarch, in so full a manner, that I shall attempt no other description of it.

"Many persons, who saw the King of Prussia, when he passed lately through Leipsic, cannot express how much he is altered. They say he is so much worn away, that they scarce knew him. This, indeed, is not to be wondered at; he hath not a body of iron, like Charles XII. and he endures as great fatigues as he did. He is as much on horseback as Charles was, and often lies upon the ground. His inward sufferings cannot be less than his outward: let us cast our eyes on a map of the Prussian dominions; and measure what he hath left of the many fair possessions he had in the month of April last, of which a space of seven months hath stript him. Whence can he have men? he is shut out from the Empire; and from whence can he draw money? the dutchy of Guelders, the dutchy of Cleves, the principality of Moers, the county of Lingen, the county of Lipstadt, the principality of Minden, East-Friesland, Embden, and its infant company, part of the archbishoprick of Magdeburgh, some other parts of the marche, Ducal Pomerania, a great part of Silesia, a great part of the kingdom of Prussia, Berlin itself, almost all his dominions, in short, are either taken from him, or laid under contribution, and possessed by his enemies, who collect the public revenues, fatten on the contributions, and with the money which they draw from the electorate of Hanover, and other conquests defray the expences of the war. This picture certainly differs greatly from that which the King of Prussia might have sketched out, the day he took arms to enter Saxony. Add to this the Duke of Cumberland's convention, which deprived him of all his allies, and left him without any assistance whatever, excepting four or five hundred thousand pounds sterling, which the British parliament may give him. Add likewise some domestic uneasinesses."

CHAP. V.

Battle of Rosbach, Schwaidnitz taken by the Austrians. Prince of Bevern attacked in his entrenchments. Breslau taken by the Austrians. King of Prussia marches to Silesia. The battle of Lissa. Breslau retaken. Austrians driven out of Silesia.

THIS was the King of Prussia's situation, when the will of Providence, and his own wonderful abilities, as wonderfully changed the scene. His majesty deferred to bring on a decisive action, distressed as his affairs were, until the approach of winter; had he marched to attack the Imperial army, whilst it was at a considerable distance, he must either have left Saxony exposed to the insults of the Austrian parties, or have greatly weakened his own forces employed in the principal action. He therefore suffered the army of the Empire to advance to the frontiers of Misnia, and even to threaten the siege of Leipsic, before he began to act against them: he however moved towards them, leaving an army in Lusatia to observe the Austrians. On his first motions, the enemy retired with precipitation. But when they had reinforced themselves with numbers and courage sufficient to persuade them to advance, the King of Prussia in his turn retired. His resolution seemed to have been to fight as near Misnia as possible, and as deep in the winter, as he conveniently might, for if he should have the good fortune to succeed against the Imperial army, such a blow, at such a season, would effectually disable them from acting any thing to his prejudice, for that year at least; but if, on the contrary, he should fail, Saxony was at hand, in which it would prove difficult for the enemy to make any impression whilst the winter continued. As for the time to be lost by following this plan, and the advantage it would afford the Austrians in their designs on Silesia, they were not to be compared with the advantages which the King received from it. He knew that Schweidnitz was strong, and excellently provided; the prince of Bevern was strongly posted near it to obstruct the enemy's operations; the winter would lean heavier on the besiegers; and on the whole, he had reason to trust that his troops, animated by his own presence and example, would prove far superior to the enemy, in enduring all the hardships of a winter campaign.

After some time spent in various movements, between the allied army of the Imperialists and French on one side, and the Prussians on the other, the King resolved to give battle to his enemies, who were now advanced to the confines of Misnia. On the 24th of October, the King had taken his resolution; at that time his army happened to be divided into several corps, some of them at a distance of no less than twenty leagues asunder; yet such were the spirit and excellent dispositions of the Prussians, that the junction of all these corps were fully effected on the 27th, and the King advanced towards the enemy. The enemy fell back at his approach, and repassed the Sala; they were followed close. [Nov. 5.] The two armies met near the village of Rosbach.

The united army, commanded by the prince of Saxe Hilburghausen and the prince of Soubise, was 50,000 men compleat. But the troops of the Circles were new raised, and many of them not well affected to the service, nor to their French allies. The Prussians did not amount to 25,000; but then they were Prussians, and led on by the King of Prussia. As soon as the armies were formed, and the battle going to begin, which was to decide the fate of so many nations, and to determine between force and virtue, the King of Prussia addressed his troops nearly in the following words.

‘My dear friends, the hour is come, in which all that is, and all that ought to be dear to us, depends upon the swords which are now drawn for the battle. Time permits me to say but little; nor is there occasion to say much. You know that there is no labour, no hunger, no cold, no watching, no danger that I have not shared with you hitherto; and you now see me ready to lay down my life with you, and for you. All I ask, is the same pledge of fidelity and affection that I give. And let me add, not as an incitement to your courage, but as a testimony of my own gratitude, that from this hour, until you go into quarters, your pay shall be double. Acquit yourselves like men, and put your confidence in God.’ The effect of this speech was such as cannot be described. The general emotion burst in an universal shout, and the looks and demeanor of the men were animated to a sort of heroic phrensy. In this disposition, which prognosticated the success, engagement began.

In the beginning of the action, the French cavalry came on with great spirit, but they were repulsed; some regiments having gained an eminence, defended themselves bravely, but in the end they were totally routed. The infantry, both French and Imperialists, made but a faint resistance. The King of Prussia in person, exposed to the hottest fire, led on his troops; the enemy gave way in every part; they were seized with a panic, and fled in the utmost disorder. They left 3000 men dead on the field of battle; 63 pieces of cannon, and many colours. Eight French generals, 250 officers of different ranks, and 6000 private men were taken. Night alone saved from total destruction the scattered remains of an army that in the morning was so numerous and so formidable.

I have not undertaken on this, nor shall I undertake upon any other occasion, in these preliminary chapters, to enter into the detail of all the various manoeuvres of every battle; they are matters little understood by, and little interesting to, the generality of readers. Besides, the accounts are sometimes inaccurate, and seldom or never consistent with each other.

The glorious success of the battle of Rosbach, was such as hardly wanted to be improved; the enemy was left totally incapable of action. The King was set free on that side; but it was a freedom which gave him no respite from his labours; it only gave him an opportunity of undergoing new labours in another part. The Austrians had a vast force, and had now begun to make a proportionable progress in Silesia. The dependance which the King had upon the fidelity of his Generals there, seemed shaken by something which then appeared, and still seems ambiguous in their conduct. The Austrians after a siege from the 27th of October to the 11th of November, carried on under infinite difficulties and with a prodigious loss, had reduced Schweidnitz, and obliged the Prussian garrison of 4000 men to surrender prisoners of war. Soon after, as they had intelligence of the victory of Rosbach, and knew that the king of Prussia was on full march to the relief of Silesia, the Austrians resolved to lose no time to attack the prince of Bevern in his strong camp under the walls of Breslau. A treble superiority incited them to this attempt. They attacked the prince's army with great resolution, and their attack was sustained with amazing intrepidity. [Nov. 22.] The slaughter of the Austrians was prodigious. A great part of their army had retired from the field of battle, and the rest were preparing to retire; when all at once the Prussian Generals unexpectedly took the same resolution. A part of their army had suffered a great deal in the engagement. They became apprehensive of a total defeat, in case their intrenchments should be forced in any part, With these ideas they retreated from the strong post they occupied, and retired behind the Oder.. The Austrians returning, with astonishment saw themselves masters of the field of battle, which they had but just been obliged to relinquish. What is remarkable, and what gave rise to many conjectures, the Prince of Bevern going to reconnoitre without escort, and attended only by a groom, was taken two days after the battle by an advanced party of Croats, a small body of whom had crossed the Oder.

This advantage, though dearly bought, was immediately followed with many others. Breslau, the capital of Silesia, [Nov. 24.] immediately surrendered, where, as well as at Schweidnitz, they found vast stores of provision, ammunition and money. All Silesia was on the point of falling into their hands. Fortune seems every where to have thrown the King of Prussia's affairs into distraction, in order to raise, and as it were, to round his glory in establishing them; and to have been even so jealous of his honour as not to permit his own excellent generals and incomparable troops to triumph any where but in his own presence.

The King immediately after the battle of Rosbach, with those troops which he had a few days before collected from places an hundred miles distant from each other, began a march of upwards of two hundred more, and led them from engaging one superior army, to engage another still more superior; from danger to hardship, and from hardship to renewed danger. In the most rapid march he passed through Thuringia, through Misnia, through Lusatia, in spite of the efforts of the Generals Haddick and Marshal, who were posted in Lusatia to obstruct him; and entering Silesia arrived the 2d of December at Parchwitz upon the Oder. Here he was joined by the Prince of Bevern's corps who crossed that river to meet him.

About this time an incident happened which was very remarkable; one of these agreeable adventures that relieve the mind amidst the perpetual horror that attends a narrative of battles and bloodshed. The garrison of Schweidnitz had seen, with the greatest reluctance, the capitulation which bound their hands from the Service of their King and Country. Whilst the Austrians were conducting them to prison, on their route they chanced to hear of the victory their master had gained at Rosbach; animated with this news, they unanimously rose upon the escorte which conducted them, and which happened not to be very strong, and entirely dispersed it. Thus freed, they marched on not very certain of their way, in hope to rejoin some corps of the Prussian troops. The same fortune which freed them, led them directly to the army commanded by the King himself, which was hastening to their relief. Great was the joy on both sides at this unexpected meeting, for the prisoners had heard nothing of his Majesty's march. This little incident, whilst it added a considerable strength to the army, added likewise to its spirit, and seemed an happy omen of success in the future engagement.

As his Prussian majesty approached to Breslau, the Austrians confiding in their superiority, abandoned their strong camp (the same which had been occupied by the Prince of Bevern) and resolved to give the King battle. He was marching with the utmost diligence not to disappoint them; [Dec. 5.] and they met near the village of Leuthen. The ground which the Austrians occupied was very advantageous, and every advantage of the situation was improved to the utmost, by the diligence and skill of Count Daun; who remembring that he was the only General who had ever carried the field from the King of Prussia, knew better than any body how difficult it was to obtain such a victory. All the dispositions were made accordingly; the ground they occupied was a plain, except that in some part it had small eminences; these they surrounded with artillery; the ground was also interspersed with thickets, which they sought to turn to their advantage. On their right and left were hills on which they planted batteries of cannon. The ground in their front was intersected by many causeways; and to make the whole more impracticable, the Austrians had felled a vast many trees, and scattered them in the way. The King of Prussia was not terrified with this situation, nor with the consciousness that above 70,000 excellent troops, commanded by Count Daun, were so posted. The Prussians, who did not exceed, as it is said, 36,000 men, attacked them with their usual resolution. It was almost impossible, at the beginning of the engagement, for the Prussian horse to act, on account of the impediments we have just mentioned, but a most judicious disposition of the King himself overcame that disadvantage; he had in his first dispositions placed four batallions behind the cavalry of his right wing, foreseeing that General Nadasti, who was placed with a corps de reserve on the enemies left, designed to take him in flank. It happened as he had foreseen; that General's horse attacked the King's right wing with great fury; but he was received with so severe a fire from the four battalions, that he was obliged to retire in disorder. Then the King's flank well covered and supported, was enabled to act with such order and vigour, that the enemy's right was obliged to give way. The Prussian artillery, which was incomparably served, and silenced that of the enemy, concurring to maintain the King's infantry, and to enable them to act in grounds where their horse could give them but little assistance. The Austrians made a gallant resistance during the whole battle. The panic of the enemy did not here, as at Rosbach, do half the business; every foot of ground was well disputed. The Austrians rallied all their forces about Leuthen, which was defended upon all sides with intrenchments and redoubts. After reiterated attacks made with the utmost impetuosity, and sustained with great firmness, the Prussians mastered the post; then the Austrians fled on all parts; they were entirely routed. The King pursued them to Lissa. 6000 of the Austrians were slain, 15,000 were made prisoners; and an immense artillery, upwards of 200 pieces of cannon were taken.

This great and decisive action was fought on the very same day of the next month after the no less important and decisive battle of Rosbach. The consequences that followed the action of Leuthen, declared the entireness of the victory. Notwithstanding the rigour of the season, the siege of Breslau was immediately undertaken, and prosecuted with such spirit, that by the 29th of December it surrendered; and with it surrendered the garrison of 13,000 men prisoners of war; the blockade of Schweidnitz was formed as closely as the inclemency of the winter would permit; whilst the Prussian parties not only re-possessed those parts of Silesia which belonged to the King, but penetrating into the Austrian division, reduced Jagerndorf, Troppau, and Tetschen, and left to the Empress Queen, except a forlorn garrison in Schweidnitz, no sort of footing in that country, in which a few days before she reckoned her dominion perfectly established.

CHAP. VI.

Russians and Swedes retire. Hanoverians resume their arms. Cruelty of the French. Condition of their army. Castle of Harburg besieged. Re-capitulation of the events of the year 1757.

AS the misfortunes of his Prussian Majesty, after the battle of Colin, came on him all at once, so his successes, after his victories at Rosbach and Lissa, flowed upon him all at once likewise, and in a full tide. The Russians, though they had repulsed General Lehwald, suffered so much in that action, and their barbarous method of making war had so destroyed the country, that they seemed to themselves to have no way of safety left but in retiring out of the Prussian territories. This extraordinary retreat of so great an army, and so lately victorious, and still possessed of a good sea-port in the country, could scarcely be accounted for on those motives we have assigned, and astonished all Europe, whilst it left Gen. Lehwald at liberty to turn his arms into Pomerania against the Swedes. The Swedes on this occasion did nothing worthy of their ancient military fame; but every where retiring, left the Prussians an easy conquest, not only of the Prussian but of every part of the Swedish Pomerania, excepting the port of Stralsund; they left their allies of Mecklenbourg quite exposed to all the resentment of the King of Prussia, who chastised them with the most severe contributions and levies. The French, who had been ravaging the old marche of Brandenburg, evacuated that country immediately after the battle of Rosbach. But one of the greatest revolutions of fortune in the war, and one of the most glorious and important consequences of that victory, was, that the Hanoverian troops were enabled to resume their arms.

From the moment the capitulation of Closter-seven was signed, the Duke the Richlieu, who came to the command only to reap the advantages, and sully the honour of another's conquest, seemed to think of nothing but how to repair, from the plunder of the unhappy Hanoverians, the fortune which he had shattered by a thousand vices. The most exorbitant contributions were levied with the most inflexible severity; every exaction, which was submitted to, only produced a new one still more extravagant; and all the orderly methods of plunder did not exempt them from the pillage, licenciousness, and insolence of the French soldiery. However, in justice to merit, we must exempt from this general charge the conduct of the duke de Randan, Governor of Hanover for the French; who saved the capital of the Electorate from utter ruin by the strictness of his discipline, by the prudence, the justice and moderation of all his conduct; a conduct which does more real honour to his name, than the most splendid victories.

The Duke de Richlieu's rapaciousness and oppression, whilst they leaned so heavily on the conquered people, did the conquering army no kind of service. Intent only on plunder, which he did not confine to the enemy, he relaxed every part of military discipline; and that numerous army which M. d'Etrees had sustained, and brought in health and spirits through the dismal desarts of Westphalia, under all the opposition of a skilful adversary, were now, in full peace, in the quiet possession of a conquered and plentiful country, reduced in their numbers, decayed in their health, and their spirits, without cloaths, without subsistance, without order, without arms. In this condition they began at last to perceive that the Hanoverians, with the yoke of the capitulation about their necks, were still formidable. As they had broke almost every article of that treaty, they made no scruple to add another breach in order to secure them in all the rest. They attempted actually to take their arms from the Hanoverian and Hessian troops. These gallant troops, who had with a silent grief and indignation seen the distresses of their ruined country, were ravished to find that the victory at Rosbach encouraged their sovereign to resent at last this and all the other indignities they had suffered. They began to collect and to act, and under the command of the gallant Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, reinforced with a body of Prussian troops, they broke from their confinement. They reduced the town of Harburg, and laid close siege to the castle, which it must be owned was defended very bravely. In all other respects the French did not seem in a condition to maintain their ground any where. Those troops, which a few months before had so submitted as to make it necessary to declare that they were not prisoners of war, in order to explain their condition, were now on the point of pushing their adversaries to almost the same streights. Such was the force of French military discipline, and such the triumphs of Voltaire's hero.

The King of Prussia now saw the full effect of his counsels and his labours. His dominions were freed; his allies were enabled to assist him; and his enemies defeated, broken, and flying every where before him. In what light posterity will view these things is uncertain; we, under whose eyes, as we may say, they were atchieved, scarcely believed what we had seen. And perhaps in all the records of time, the compass of a single year, on the scene of a single country, never contained so many striking events, never displayed so many revolutions of fortune; revolutiens not only beyond what might have been expected, but far beyond what the most sagacious foresight, reasoning from experience, and the nature of things, could possibly have imagined. The King of Prussia at first triumphant: the whole power of the Austrians totally defeated; their hopes utterly ruined: then their affairs suddenly re-established, their armies victorious, and the King of Prussia in his turn hurled down; defeated; abandoned by his allies; surrounded by his enemies; on the very edge of despair: then all at once raised beyond all hope, he sees the united Austrian, Imperial, and French power levelled with the ground; 40,000 Hanoverians, a whole army, submit to 80,000 French, and are only not prisoners of war. The French are peacable masters of all the country between the Weser and the Elbe: anon, these subdued Hanoverians resume their arms; they recover their country, and the French in a little time think themselves not secure to the eastward of the Rhine. 500,000 men in action. Six pitched battles fought. Three great armies annihilated. The French army reduced and vanquished without fighting. The Russians victorious, and flying as if they had been vanquished. A confederacy, not of samller potentates to humble one great power, but of five the greatest powers on earth to reduce one small potentate; all the force of these powers exerted and baffled. It happened as we have related; and it is not the history of a century, but of a single campaign.

CHAP. VII.

Preparations for an expedition to Louisbourg. Laid aside▪ Fort William-Henry taken. Exploits of Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive in India. Chandenagore a French fort taken. Victory over the Nabob. Nabob taken and beheaded▪ Revolution in Bengal. Treaty advantageous to the East-India company. Admiral Watson dies.

WITH regard to the part we had in the transactions of this year, though it was not so full of striking events, nor does it afford such a splendid subject for narrative, yet it is as interresting to an English reader, and may perhaps prove more instructive; as it shews us in so strong a light, the miserable consequences of our political divisions, which produced a general unsteadiness in all out pursuits, and infused a langour and inactivity into all our military operations. For, whilst our commanders abroad knew not who were to reward their services or punish their neglects, and were not assured in what light even the best of their actions would be considered, (having reason to apprehend that they might not be judged of as they were in themselves, but as their appearances might answer the end of some ruling faction;) they naturally wanted that firmness and that enterprizing resolution, without which the best capacity, and intentions the most honest, can do nothing in war. The attachment of most men to their parties, weakened their affection to their country. It has been imagined that ministers did not always wish success even to their own schemes lest obnoxious men should acquire credit by the execution of them; as it was suspected that officers even at the expence of their own reputation, did not exert their faculties to the utmost, lest a disagreeable ministerial system should establish the credit of its counsels by the vigour of their operations. For my part, I think that these refinements, in which there is often as much malice discovered as penetration, have carried the matter infinitely too far. But certain it is, that the spirit of personal parties and attachments, never carried to greater lengths than at that time, proved of very bad consequences, if it had no other effect than to raise and to give a colour to such suspicions as we have first mentioned. Whatever was the cause, it is most certain, that our success in America this year, no more answered to the greatness of our preparations and our hopes than it did in the two preceding.

The attack upon Crown Point, which had been a principal object of our attention in the beginning, seemed at this time to be laid aside; and an expedition to Louisbourg, undoubtedly a more considerable object in itself, supplied its place. Lord Loudoun was to command the land forces in this expedition; Admiral Holborn the navy. The former left New York with a body of 6000 men, and sailed to Halifax, where he was joined by the latter, [July 9.] who had sailed from Corke on the 7th of May with a considerable fleet, and much the same number of land forces, which his Lordship had brought from New York. When the united armies and fleets were on the point of departing for Louisbourg, news arrived at Halifax, that the Brest fleet consisting of seventeen ships of the line besides frigates, with great supplies of military stores, provisions, and men, were arrived at the harbour which they were preparing to attack. This news immediately suspended their preparations. Councils of war were held one after another. The result of the whole was, that as the place was so well reinforced, the fleet of the French rather superior to our navy, and the season so far advanced, it was the more prudent course to defer the enterprise to a more favourable opportunity. This resolution seems to have been most eligible in their circumstances, because the council of war was almost unanimous in it.

Lord Loudoun returned to New York, and the Admiral now freed from the care of the transports set sail for Louisbourg, in hopes as it was said, of drawing the French fleet to an engagement. But upon what grounds this hope was conceived, I confess I cannot see; as it could not be imagined, that the French fleet having no sort of occasion to fight in order to protect Louisbourg, would chuse out of a bravado to bring on an unnecessary battle. However it was, the English squadron continued to cruize off that harbour until the 25th of September, when they were overtaken by a terrible storm, in which one of our ships was lost, eleven dismasted, and the rest returned to England in a very shattered condition. This was the end of the expedition to Louisbourg from which so much was expected. But it was not the worst consequences which attended it.

Since Oswego had been taken, the French remained entirely masters of all the lakes, and we could do nothing to obstruct their collecting the Indians from all parts, and obliging them to act in their favour. But our apprehensions, (or what shall they be called?) did more in favour of the French than their conquests. Not satified with the loss of that important fortress, we ourselves abandoned to the mercy of the enemy all the country of the Five Nations, the only body of Indians who preserved even the appearance of friendship to us. The forts we had at the Great carrying Place were demolished; Wood Creek was industriously stopped up and filled with logs; by which it became evident to all those who knew that country, that our communication with our allied Indians was totally cut off; and what was worse, our whole frontier left perfectly uncovered to the irruption of the enemies savages, who soon availed themselves of our errors. For after the removal of these barriers, and the taking of Fort William Henry, of which we shall speak presently, they destroyed with fire and sword the fine settlements which we possessed on the Mohawks river and on those grounds called the German flats. Thus with a vast increase of our forces, and the clearest superiority over the enemy, we only abandoned our allies, exposed our people, and relinquished a large and valuable tract of country. The French soon made us feel effectually the want of what we had lost, and what we had thrown away.

A considerable fort called Fort William-Henry, had been built on the southern edge of the Lake George, in order to command that lake, and to cover our frontiers; a garrison of 2500 men defended it. General Webb with about 4000 men was posted at no great distance. No sooner had the French learned that my Lord Loudoun with the body of the army was gone on the Louisbourg expedition, than they prepared to take advantage of his absence. They drew together all the forces which they had at Crown-Point, Ticonderoga, and the adjacent posts; they added a considerable body of Canadians, and a greater number of Indians than they had ever yet employed; the whole made near 8000 men. With these and a very good artillery, Monsieur Montcalm prepared to besiege Fort William-Henry. It is said that the advances of this commander were not made with so much secresy as to prevent General Webb from having early intelligence of his motions; but unfortunately no credit being given to this intelligence, orders were not sent to collect the militia in sufficient time, which in conjunction with his own forces, and with those in the fort had either obliged the French to relinquish their attempt, or to have made it a very great hazard. But the siege being now regularly formed, and the besiegers meeting but little opposition from within, [Aug. 3.] and no disturbance at all from without, the place was in six days surrendered by the advice of General Webb; [9th.] whose intercepted letter M. Montcalm sent into the fort.

The garrison marched out with their arms, and engaged not to serve during eighteen months. The French savages paid no regard to the capitulation, but falling upon our men as they marched out, dragged away the little effects they had left, hawling the Indians and Blacks in our service out of their ranks, scalping some, carrying off others, and committing a thousand outrages and barbarities, from which the French commander endeavoured in vain to restrain them. All this was suffered by 2000 men with arms in their hands, from a disorderly crew of savages. However, the greatest part of our men, though in a bad condition, got to Fort Edward, some by flight; some having surrendered themselves to the French, were by them sent home. The enemy demolished the fort, carried off the provision, ammunition, artillery, and the vessels which we had prepared on the lake, and departed without attempting any thing farther. Neither was any thing farther attempted on our side. And thus was finished the third campaign in North America, where we had actually near 20,000 regular troops, a great number of provincial forces, and a great naval power of upwards of twenty ships of the line.

A war between the maritime powers is felt in all parts of the world. Not content with inflaming Europe and America, and dissentions of the French and English pursued the tracts of their commerce, and the Genges felt the fatal effects of a quarrel on the Ohio. But here the scene is changed greatly to the advantage of our nation; the bravery of Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, re-established the military honour of the English, which was sinking there as it had done in all other places. Admiral Watson with no more than three ships of the line, sailed from Madrass, and afer a tedious voyage arrived at the port of Balasore in the kingdom of Bengal, [Dec. 5.] where strengthening his force with what recruits he could draw together, he entered the Ganges, and after a short resistance made himself master of Busbudgia fort which commanded that part of the river. [Jan. 30.] This opened him a passage to the fort of Calcutta, the late principal settlement of the company in Bengal, and the scene of the deplorable sufferings of so many of our unfortunate countrymen. Animated with revenge at the affecting sight of this place, our ships and land forces attacked it with so much spirits, that the Indians surrendered it on the same day it was approached. A few days after Hugly, situated higher up the Ganges, was reduced with as little difficulty.

The Nabob, who saw that the torrent of the English valour could not be resisted by such feeble dams as forts defended by Indians, drew down a whole army consisting of 10,000 horse, and 12,000 foot, to drive them from their conquests, Infinitely inferior as our troops were in number, they did not hesitate to attack the Nabob's army. Though our forces did not entirely rout the Indians, [Feb. 5.] yet they made a great slaughter amongst them; and they had so much the advantage of the field, that the Nabob was in a short time glad to conclude a treaty of peace, [9th.] by which the English East-India company was re-established in all its antient privileges; an immunity from all taxes was granted, and a restitution promised for all that the trade had suffered in the taking of Calcutta.

When all obstruction on the side of the Indians was removed, and the company's officers had taken possession of their antient establishments, the Admiral turned his arms against the French. He resolved to attack Chandenagore, situated somewhat higher on the river than Calcutta; a place of considerable strength and the principal settlement of the French in that part of the East-Indies. In this expedition Colonel Clive commanded 700 Europeans and 1600 Black soldiers. The Admirals Watson and Pocock commanded the fleet, if it may be called a fleet, which consisted of no more than three ships of the line, the Kent, the Tyger, and the Salisbury. The French prepared in the best manner they could to receive them, and sunk several large vessels both above and below their fort; but the Admiral having by carefully sounding found a safe passage without being driven to the necessity of weighing up any of the ships, made so severe a fire upon the fort, in which he was seconded by Colonel Clive's batteries on the shore, that the place capitulated in less than three hours. [May 24.] 500 Europeans and 700 Blacks surrendered prisoners of war; 183 pieces of cannon were found in the place, besides a considerable value in goods and money. Four forts cost our troops no more than four days to reduce them.

The judicious timeing of these several operations, as well as those which followed, was not less laudable than the gallant spirit with which they were executed. Before the French were alarmed, cure was taken to re-possess all the posts we formerly held; to humble the Nabob by some effectual blow; and by a treaty tie up his hands from acting against us. This Prince had shewed himself from the moment of his signing that treaty, very little inclined to abide by the stipulations he had made. He indeed promised abundantly, but always deferred the performance upon such frivolous pretences, as evidently demonstrated his ill intentions. The English commanders understood this proceeding perfectly well; but they resolved to dissemble their sense of it, until they had broken the French power in this province, which they had greater reason to dread, small as it was, than all the armies of the Nabob. When they had fully accomplished this by the taking of Chandenagore, they deliberated whether they ought not to re-commence hostilities with the Indians. A resolution in the affirmative had been attended with great difficulty and danger, if a most fortunate incident had not helped to ensure success.

The Nabob Suraja Doula, the same who had the last 〈◊〉 taken Calcutta, had shewn to his own subjects the s••e •∣lent and perfidous spirit, which formerly and still distressed the English. His Generals were mostly discontented, and some of them entered into a conspiracy against him. Jaffier Ali Cawn one of his principal officers, a man of great power and interest, was at the head of this conspiracy. As soon as their designs were ripened, they communicated them to the English government in Calcutta, praying their assistance. The chiefs there did not hesitate long what party they should take; they entered into a treaty with Jeffier Ali Cawn and the conspirators; and in consequence of this treaty, our troops immediately took the field uner Colonel Clive. The Admiral undertook to garrison the fort of Chandenagore with his seamen, in order to leave the greater number of land forces for the expedition. A detachmnnt of fifty seamen with their officers were added to serve as gunners. A twenty gun ship was stationed above Hugly, in order to preserve a communication between Colonel Clive and the Admiral.

Their preliminary measures being thus judiciously taken, they advanced up the river, and in a few days brought the Nabob's army of about 20,000 men exclusive of those who favoured the conspirators, to an action, which was decisive in favour of the English. [June 22.] Two considerable bodies commanded by Jaffier and Roy Dolub remained inactive in the engagement. The Nabob seeing himself ruined by the treachery of his officers and the cowardice of his troops, fled with the few who continued faithful to him.

Jaffier Ali Cawn now declared himself openly; and entering Muxadavat the capital of the province with an army of his friends and victorious allies, [26.] he was placed by Colonel Clive in the antient seat of the Nabobs, and received the homage of all ranks of people as Suba of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa. The deposed Nabob was soon after made prisoner, and put to death in his prison by the conqueror. In about thirteen days this great revolution was accomplished; and with less force and trouble than is often required to take a petty village in Germany, was transferred the government of a vast kingdom, yielding in its dimensions to few in Europe, but to none in the fertility of its soil, the number of its inhabitants, and the richness of its commerce. By the alliance with the new Nabob, and by the reduction of Chandenagore, the French were entirely driven out of Bengal and all its dependencies. This was one of the articles of the treaty. By the other articles, a perpetual alliance offensive and defensive was made between the parties. The territories of the company were enlarged, and upwards of two millions sterling was stipulated to be paid as an indemnification to the East-India company, and the sufferers in the taking of Calcutta. The new Nabob, full of gratitude to those to whom he owed his dignity, gave, besides the above large sums, about 600,0000 pounds, as a gratuity to the sea squadron and the troops. However short of expectation our enterprises in America fell this year, those in the East-Indies greatly exceeded every thing we could hope from the forces which were employed. And it may be doubted whether all the great powers engaged in the present bloody wars in Europe, in which such torrents of blood were spilled, and so many millions of treasure are wasted, will in the conclusion reap amongst them so much solid profit as the English East-India company did with a handful of men in a short campaign. The joy of the nation at these signal successes, was not a little damped by the death of Admiral Watson, who lost his life by the unwholesomness of the country, [Aug. 16.] in which he had established a great and lasting reputation. Colonel Clive still lives to enjoy the fortune and honour he has acquired by his gallant actions.

CHAP. VIII.

French retire out of Hanover. The taking of Hoya. Minden taken. Distress of the French. Generosity of the Duke de Randan. The French retire beyond the Rhine. Recovery of Emden by Commodore Holmes.

ALL the bloodshed of the last campaign in Germany, [1758.] and those losses which both the victorious and vanquished felt so very severely, produced no 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 overtures towards peace from any of the powers at war. And perhaps nothing so singular ever happened, as that so many states, united, if not against their real interests, yet against all their former habits of connection, full of so many occasions of jealousy, abounding with matter of complaint against each other, and even involved in misfortunes which usually destroy a mutual confidence, that not one of these powers either from fear, or hope, or weariness, or levity, desisted from their hostilities against the King of Prussia; nor did that monarch acquire one ally more by the admiration of his successes, than he had formerly gained through compassion to his misfortunes. All the confederates preserved the same attachment to each other, to him the same animosity. It is equally a matter of great admiration, how the resources even of these great states, could keep pace with their ambition, and in a very few months supply the place of great armies almost wholly destroyed. The King of Prussia by his victories had added to his natural resources. These resources were more considerable than is commonly imagined; and the possession of Saxony which yielded him great supplies, saved his own revenue. He was indeed not quite so fresh as at the beginning of the war; but then the condition of the enemy was in many respects far worse than his. His troops had besides acquired a high reputation and a clear superiority over all others. The consideration, however, of an army greatly harrassed, and a most severe winter, obliged him to restrain his ardor, and to attempt nothing against the Austrians in the months of January, February and March. The same inaction owing to much the same causes, prevailed amongst the Hanoverians for a little time: but having been reinforced about the middle of February by a body of Prussian horse, they put their whole army once more in motion.

The Duke de Richlieu had been recalled, and the Count of Clermont now commanded the French troops. This was their third commander in chief within the space of a year; a circumstance alone sufficient to shew the unsteadiness of their councils, and the irregularity of their operations. In effect, they every where retreated before the Hanoverians, whose main body marched on the right to the country of Bremen; whilst a second body under General Zastrow kept on the left towards Gifforn. They pushed the French from post to post. They abliged them to evacuate Ottersberg, Bremen and Werden. The castle of Rotterberg was taken in six hours. A considerable detachment under Count Chabot was posted at Hoya, a strong fort upon the Weser, and a place of such consequence that prince Ferdinand resolved to dislodge the enemy from it. He appointed for that service the hereditary Prince of Brunswick, with four batalions of foot and some light horse. This Prince, not twenty year of age, had already entered into the course of glory under the auspices of his uncle, and full of ardor to signalize himself, with joy embraced the occasion; and here he gave an earnest of his fame, in one of the most lively and best conducted actions in the war. The first fruits of this young hero were such as would have done honour to the maturity of the most experienced soldier.

The Prince had a broad and deep river to pass. He had no means of transporting his men, but a single float; [Feb. 23.] so that a long time must be spent in getting them over: what was worst, before half his troops were passed, a strong wind arose, which rendered the float unserviceable, and entirely cut off all communication between the Prince and the most considerable number of his party, whilst the party he was going to attack was superior to him, had his whole body been together. In this exigence the Prince came to a resolution worthy of himself. He resolved not to spend any time in attempts to bring over the rest of his troops, much less to make any attempts to return to them; but to urge on boldly, in such a manner as to possess the enemy with an opinion of his strength, and to attack them briskly before they could be undeceived. Therefore, between four and five o'clock in the morning, they marched with the utmost speed directly to the town of Hoya. When they had approached within a mile and a half of the place, another accident was on the point of defeating the whole enterprise. Their detachment fired by mistake upon four of the enemies dragoons, who were patrolling; the firing was caught from one to another, and at last became general. This seemed more than enough to discover their motions and alarm the enemy. But the same spirit influenced the conduct of every part of this affair; a bold countenance became necessary, and it was assumed; they marched with the utmost diligence to the town, and encountered the enemy at the bridge; a fierce fire, well supported on either side, ensued. The ground was such, that the Prince could not bring up his whole detatchment equally. Sensible of this disadvantage, he formed a design to overcome it, as judicious, as it was resolute, which was to turn the enemy by attacking them in the rear; to execute this design, it was necessary to make a circuit about the town. Every thing succeeded: The attack on the enemy's rear was made with bayonnets fixed, a terrible slaughter ensued. The French abondoned the bridge, and fled in confusion: The Prince having cleared the town of the enemy, joined the party he had left. The Count de Chabot threw himself, with two batallions into the castle, with a resolution to maintain himself there; but in a little time he capitulated, surrendering the place, his stores, and magazines, his troops being permitted to march out. The Prince, who had no artillery, and who, on account of the badness of the roads, despaired of bringing up heavy cannon, suffered them to depart. Six hundred and seventy men were made prisoners in the action, and a place of much importance, and which opened a passage over the Weser, secured to the Hanoverians, with the loss of less than 1000 men killed and wounded. I have dwelt on this action, and described it as particularly as I could, though nothing decisive in itself, because it is not in pitched battles between great armies, where the most masterly strokes of conduct are always displayed; these lesser affairs frequently call for as much or more of sagacity, resolution, and presence of mind, in the commander; yet are they often slighly passed by, as matters of no consequence, by the generality of people, who rather consider the greatness of the event, than the spirit of the action.

Prince Ferdinand continued to advance, with his right on one side of the Weser, and his left on the other; the French continued to retire, and successively abandoned all the places they had occupied in the electorate, except Minden. A garrison of 4000 men defended that place; but it was closely invested, and in nine days the whole garrison surrendered prisoners of war. [March 14.] Several skirmishes happened between the advanced parties of the Hanoverian army and the French, always to the advantage of the former. The wretched condition of the French troops is hardly to be described or imagined: officers and soldiers involved in one common distress; the officers forgot their rank, and the soldiers their obedience; full hospitals, and empty magazines; a rigorous season and bad covering; their baggage seized or abandoned, and the hussars and hunters of the allied army continually harassing, pillaging, and cutting them off. It was no alleviation to their misery, that the inhabitants of the country, which they abandoned, were reduced to the same extremities. The savage behaviour of some of their troops at their departure, took away all compassion for their sufferings; but this was not universal. The Duke de Randan, who commanded in Hanover, quitted the place with the same virtue, that he had so long held it. Resentment had no power to perswade him to act with rigour, in the adverse turn of the French affairs, than the pride of conquest had in their prosperity. When he had orders to evacuate the place, there were very considerable magazines of corn and forage, amassed for the use of the army; he had full time to burn them, and he had precedents enough to have justified the action: but he left the whole in the hands of the magistrates, to be gratuitously distributed to the poor: he employed all his vigilance to prevent the least disorder amongst his troops, and was himself the last man that marched out of the town. This behaviour, which did such honour to his name and country, has made his memory for ever dear to the Hanoverians, drew tears of love and gratitude from his enemies, and acknowledgments from the generous Prince against whom he served.

The French, through extreme difficulties, marched towards the Rhine in three columns. The several scattered bodies, which had united at Munster, formed the right. The body, which came from Paderborn; and which was commanded by the prince of Clermont in person, marched in the middle. The forces which had occupied Hesse were on the left. In this order they reached the Rhine, which they all passed, except a body under Count Clermont, who still remained at Wesel, and resolved to maintain that post. The French army, which about four months before had passed the Rhine in numbers, and in a condition to make the most powerful enemies tremble, without any adverse stroke of war whatsoever, by a fate almost unparalleled, now repassed it like fugitives, in a condition the most deplorable, reduced to less than half their original number, and closely pursued by the enemy, which they had obliged to lay down their arms.

The same ill fortune, and the same despair of their affairs followed them every where. On the arrival of a small English squadron, commanded by commodore Holmes before Embden, and their taking an advantageous situation, [March 14.] which cut off the communication between the town and the mouth of the river Ems; the French garrison, [19.] consisting of 4000 men, immediately evacuated the place. As soon as Mr. Holmes discovered their design, and that they were transporting their artillery and baggage up the river, he ordered out a few armed boats to pursue them. These took some of the enemy's vessels, in which were the son of an officer of distinction, and a considerable sum of money. The commodore without delay restored the son to his father, and offered to return the money, on receiving the officer's word of honour, that it was his private property. This affair is mentioned, not only to do justice to the judicious conduct by which a place of so much consideration was so easily carried, but also to that generosity of spirit, which so nobly distinguishes almost all those, who hold any rank in our service.

CHAP. IX.

Alterations in the French ministry. The state of the English affairs in the year 1758. Subsidy treaty with the King of Prussia. Affairs of Sweden and Russia. Schweidnitz taken. King of Prussia enters Moravia and invests Olmutz. Conduct of Count Daun. Attacks the Prussian convoy. Siege of Olmutz raised. King of Prussia marches into Bohemia.

WHILST the French arms suffered such disgraces abroad, they endeavoured by an alteration of their councils at home, to restore their credit. Their ministers had been long the sport of female caprice; it was their power of pleasing a mistress who governed their King, that alone qualified them to serve their country. Some of the most able men were turned out of their employments with disgrace; others retired from the publick service with indignation; a certain low character had for a long time appeared in all the proceedings of France, both within and without. Even in their domestic disputes, and where something of a free and manly spirit appeared, this spirit evaporated, and spent itself upon unworthy and despicable objects. These contests which involved the church, the law and the crown, weakened them all; and the state felt all the ill effects of disunion of its orders, without seeing an augmentation of power thrown into the scale of any. But now taught by their misfortunes and disgraces, they were obliged to an alteration in their conduct: they were obliged to call men to the public service upon public principles: at a time indeed, when in many respects things could only be altered, not mended: and wise and able ministers could do little more by their penetration and public spirit, than to see and lament the ruin, caused by the want of those virtues in their predecessors. The duke de Belleisle, known to all Europe for his great abilities, and his great exploits, was at length placed at the head of the military department, as secretary at war.

There appeared in the common prints a speech, said to be made by that nobleman in council; which, if it be not authentic, contains at least such sentiments, as would come not unnaturally from a French patriot, and one who had served his King and country with honour during better times.

‘I know, said he, the state of our armies. It gives me great grief, and no less indignation: for besides the real evil of the disorder in itself, the disgrace and infamy which it reflects on our government, and on the whole nation, is still more to be apprehended. The choice of officers ought to be made with mature deliberation. I know but too well to what length the want of discipline, pillaging and robbing have been carried on by the officers and common men, after the example set them by their generals. It mortifies me to think I am a Frenchman; my principals are known to be very different from those which are now followed. I had the satisfaction to retain the esteem, the friendship and the consideration, of all the princes, noblemen, and even all the common people in all parts of Germany where I commanded the king's forces. They lived there in the midst of abundance; every one was pleased; it fills my soul with anguish, to find that at present the French are held in execration; that every body is dispirited, and that many officers publickly say things that are criminal and highly punishable. The evil is so great that it demands immediate redress. I can easily judge, by what passes in my own breast, of what our generals feel from the speeches they must daily hear in Germany, concerning our conduct; which indeed would lose much to be compared with that of our allies. I must particularly complain of the delays and irregularity of the posts; a service which is very ill provided for. I am likewise displeased with the negligence of our generals returning answers; which is a manifest breach of their duty. Had I commanded the army, a thousand things which are done, would not have been done; and others, which are neglected, would have been executed. I would have multiplied my communications; I would have had strong posts on the right, on the left, and in the centre lined with troops. I would have had magazines in every place. The quiet and satisfaction of the country should have been equal to their present disaffection, at being harrassed and plundered; and we should have been as much beloved, as we are at present abhorred. The consequences are too apparent to need being mentioned. I must insist o• these things, because late redress is better than the continuation of the evil.’

M. de Belleisle being established in his office, turned all his attention to the cure of the evils, which he lamented; and exerted all the power that remained in the nation, to put their army in Germany once more upon a respectable footing. The expedition into Germany was originally a measure as contrary to the true interests of France, as it was of justice and equity; but having adopted that measure, the consequences which arose seemed to demand that it should be pursued with vigour. Therefore the connection with the Empress Queen was drawn closer than ever, and nothing was omitted to give a greater strength, and a better order to the army on the Rhine. But these endeavours which strained all the sinews of France, already too much weakened by the almost total ruin of several essential branches of their trade, drew away all the resources necessary to support their navy. It was then in a sufficiently bad condition, from a want of seamen and stores; and there were no means found, or little attention used, to restore it: so that from a deficiency in the marine, it seemed to be equally impracticable to feed the war in America, or to preserve the coast of France itself from insults. Such was the condition of our enemies, at the opening of the campaign of 1758.

As to England, far from being exhausted by the war, or dispirited by our ill success, our hopes rose from our disappointments, and our resources seemed to be augmented by our expences; with such ease and alacrity were the necessary supplies granted and raised. Many errors and many abuses which the war discovered without making fatal, were corrected. The spirit of our officers was revived by fear or by shame. Our trade was well protected by the superiority, and prudent distribution of our naval force. The revenue was frugally managed, and the whole state well cemented and bound together in all its parts, by the union of the administration, by the patriotism which animated it, and by the entire confidence which the people had in the presiding abilities and intentions. As France persisted in her attachment to the enemies of his Prussian majesty, Great Britain entered into still closer engagements with that monarch, the lustre of whose virtues, set off by his late wonderful successes, quite turned our eyes from the objections which were raised against the consistency of that alliance with our interests. How far it is consistent with them, is I think, a much more difficult point to settle, than the adherents to either party seem willing to allow. But it ought to be considered, that the circumstances of affairs in the beginning of the war, hardly admitted of any other choice; it had been the height of madness, to have been on ill terms with his Prussian majesty at that time; and it was impossible to have kept good terms with him, without being on very bad ones with Vienna. Things were in an ill situation; and the ballance of Germany was in danger of being overset, what party soever should prevail. It was impossible that England could have stood neuter in this contest: if she had, France would not have imitated her moderation; she would gladly have joined with the King of Prussia to distress Hanover, and reduce Austria. These two powers so exerted, would doubtless compass their end, unless we interposed to prevent it; and we must sooner or later have interposed, unless we were resolved tamely to see France and her allies giving laws to the continent. In a word, France would certainly have joined with one party or the other, and the party which she joined, would certainly, by that union, prove dangerous to the common liberty, and must therefore be opposed by us; we must have been in spite of us engaged in the troubles of Germany, as we ever have been, and ever shall be, as long as we are a people of consideration in Europe. The alliance with Prussia was pointed out to us by the circumstance of his acting on the defensive. The King of Prussia meditated no conquests. But her imperial majesty indisputably aimed at the recovery of Silesia, which was to disturb the settled order of things; and this design was the only cause of the troubles in that part of the world. I am sensible that this is notwithstanding all that may be said, a question of some intricacy, and requires a consideration of many more particulars, than the brevity of our design will allow. But whether we chose our party in this alliance judiciously or not, we have, I imagine, very great reason to be pleased with a measure, which has induced France to engage so deeply in the affairs of Germany, at so ruinous an expence of her blood and treasure. Our ministry was at this time fully convinced of the prudence of the choice that had been made, and resolved to support his Prussian majesty, and the army under Prince Ferdinand, in the most effectual manner; 100,000 l. were voted for the Hanoverian and Hessian forces; and a convention between the King of Prussia, [Ap. 11.] and his Britannic majesty, was signed in London, whereby the King of Great Britain engages to pay his Prussian majesty the sum of 670,000 l. sterling; and each of the contracting powers engaged to conclude no peace without the participitation of the other.

The northern courts made no alteration in their system. In Sweden, some real plots to disturb the established constitution ended in the ruin of their contrivers; some fictitious plots were set on foot to give a sanction to measures against the crown party, which answered their ends; and, as the ruling power continued the same and the internal dissensions the same, the hostilities against the King of Prussia were resolved with the former animosity, but promised to be pursued with the former languor. In Russia, the Empress did not think her intentions well seconded by her ministers. The great delays, and the unaccountable retreat in the last campaign, gave ground to suspect, that she had been betrayed by her ministers, or her generals. M. Apraxin was moved from the command, and was put under arrest. He justified his conduct by express orders from Count Bestuchef. Bestuchef was removed from his office, and put under arrest also. Count Woronzoff succeeded Bestuchef in his employment, and the generals Brown and Fermor took the command of the army in the place of Apraxin.

As soon as the season permitted the King of Prussia to re-commence his operations, he laid siege to Schweidnitz, and pushed it with so much vigour, [April 3.] that the place surrendered in thirteen days. The garrison reduced by sickness during the blockade, and by their losses during the siege, from seven to little more than three thousand men, yielded themselves prisoners of war. By this stroke, the King of Prussia left his enemies no footing in any part of his dominions. His next consideration was how to guard against their future attempts, and at the same time to make a vigorous attack upon some part of the Austrian territories. His forces were well stationed for both these purposes; for besides the troops which Count Dohna commanded on the side of Pomerania, a considerable body was posted between Wohlau and Glogau, in order to cover Silesia from the fury of the Russians, in case they should make their inroad that way. An army, in a little time after was formed in Saxony, commanded by his brother Prince Henry, which consisted of thirty battalions, and forty-five squadrons. It was destined to make head against the army of the Empire, which by amazing efforts made during the winter, and by the junction of a large body of Austrians, was now in a condition to act again. A ready communication was kept up between all the King of Prussia's armies, by a proper choice of posts.

The King resolved to make Moravia the theatre of the war this year. Moravia was fresh ground; a country, as yet untouched by the ravages of war. If he should succeed in his operations in this country, his successes by opening to him the nearest road to Vienna, must prove more decisive than they could any where else. If he should fail, the Austrians were at a distance from the centre of his affairs, and would find it difficult to improve their advantages to his ruin. After the reduction of Schweidnitz, the King ordered two bodies of his troops to post themselves in such a manner, as to make it appear that he intended to carry the war into Bohemia. Whilst he drew away the enemies attention from the real objects by these dispositions, the main of his army by a very rapid march, [May 3.] entered into Moravia in two columns, and made themselves Masters, in a short time and with little or no opposition, of all the posts necessary to cover the troops to be employed in the siege of Olmutz. On the 27th of May the trenches were opened before that city.

M. Daun was no sooner apprised of the King's march towards Moravia, than he took his route through Bohemia to that province. Notwithstanding that the Empress Queen omitted no possible endeavours to assemble a large army against the King of Prussia, though she had for that purpose exhausted the Milanese and Tuscany, and swept up the last recruits in her Danubian territories, M. Daun was not yet in a condition to give the King of Prussia battle; neither did his character lead him to trust that to fortune, which he might ensure, though more slowly, by conduct. This wise general took his posts from Gewics to Littau, in a mountainous country, in a situation where it was impossible to attack him. He had the fertile country of Bohemia, from whence he readily and certainly drew supplies, at his rear. He was from his position at the same time enabled to harass the Prussian army before Olmutz, and to intercept the convoys which were brought to them from Silesia.

Olmutz, by the extent of its works, and other advantageous circumstances, is a city which it is very difficult compleatly to invest. So that some of the King's posts being necessarily weakened by occupying so great an extent of country, were attacked by Daun's detachments from time to time, with such success, that abundant succours both of men and ammunition were thrown into the place. These attacks were always made by night, and very few nights passed without some attack. The success was various. But the operations of the siege were greatly disturbed by these continual alarms. Besides it is said that the Austrians, before the King's invasion of this province, had destroyed all the forage in the neighbourhood of Olmutz. The horse were obliged to forage at a great distance, which harrassed them extreamly. M. Daun took advantage of all these circumstances. It was in vain that the King of Prussia endeavoured by all the arts of a great commander to provoke or entice him to an engagement. He profited of the advantages he had made, without being tempted by them to throw out of his hands the secure game he was playing.

The great object of M. Daun was the Prussian convoys. On receiving advice that a large and important one was to leave Troppau on the 25th of June, he took measures to intercept it. He ordered general Jahnus, who was at Muglitz on the left, to advance towards Bahrn, and a detachment which was at Prerau at a considerable distance to the right, to march to Stadt-Leibe; so that these two corps should on different sides attack the convoy at one and the same time. To further the execution of this project, M. Daun himself approached the Prussian army, and directed all his motions as if he intended to give them battle. However, the King was too great a master in the game of generalship, which was now playing, to be deceived by this feint. He detached a considerable party under general Ziethen, to support his convoy, which was already about 7000 strong. Before this detachment could come up, the convoy was attacked, but the Austrians were repulsed. But M. Daun, who provided for every thing, quickly reinforced his parties who renewed the engagement the next day. They first suffered the head of the convoy to go unmolested; but as the centre was still embarrassed in a dangerous defile, they easily cut off the head from the rest, and then they attacked the centre with the greatest fury. The Prussians made as good a resistance as the nature of the ground would suffer. General Ziethen did every thing which could be expected from an accomplished officer; but in the end they were entirely routed; all the waggons in that division were taken; the rear was pushed back towards Troppau; the head alone with great difficulty arrived at the Prussian camp.

This was a fatal stroke, because it came at a time when it was impossible to repair it. The siege of Olmutz had been all along attended with great difficulties: and now the news which every day arrived of the nearer and nearer approach of the Russians, called the King loudly to the defence of his own dominions. Already the Cossacks and Calmucks made incursions into Silesia, and by their ravages and cruelties, announced the approach of the great army. The siege must be raised: Moravia must be abandoned; Marshal Daun must have the Honour of freeing his country, and driving away such an Adversary as the King of Prussia, from a conquest deemed certain; all was performed without a battle, by a series of the most refined and vigorous manoeuvres that ever were put in practice.

When the King of Prussia saw that the unprosperous situation of his affairs obliged him to retreat; he took a resolution, such as a victory inspires in other. He took advantage even of the excellent movement of M. Daun, by which that able general had advanced his quarters to Poznitz, and placed himself so as to support Olmutz in the most effectual manner; by this movement, however, he was obliged to uncover the frontiers of Bohemia. The King of Prussia, whom nothing could escape, was sensible of this advantage, and therefore, instead of falling back upon Silesia, which step would immediately have drawn the Austrian army into his dominions, he determined to retreat from one part of the enemies territories into another. The day before the siege was raised the firing of the Prussians continued as brisk as ever, and shewed no sort of sign of an intention to depart; but in the night the whole army took the road to Bohemia in two columns, [July 1.] and gained an entire march upon the Austrians. So that notwithstanding the utmost efforts which the enemy could make to overtake and harass the King upon his march, he advanced into Bohemia with little molestation, seized upon a large magazine at Leutomissel, defeated some corps of Austrians who had attempted to disturb him in his progress, and arrived at Konigsgratz, one of the most important posts in Bohemia, with all his sick and wounded, with all his heavy baggage, all his heavy Artillery, and military stores complete. This place he possessed after driving from it a body of 7000 Austrians who were entrenched there. He immediately laid this city and several other districts under contribution; but his plan not admitting any further operations on that side, he took no other advantage from this momentous post. He soon re-entered Silesia, and marched with the most amazing diligence to encounter the Russians, who had at this time united their divided corps under Brown and Fermor, and fixed the long fluctuating plan of their operations, by entering the New Marche of Brandenburgh, and laying siege to Cu•trin. The reduction of this place could leave them but a 〈◊〉 •ys march to Berlin; Count Dohna was not in a condition to oppose their progress, the King was still at a great distance. But it is necessary to break our narrative of his affairs, however interesting, to take a view of the operations of the armies on the Rhine. We leave the King of Prussia in full march, do give one body of his enemies battle, after executing a retreat from the other, in a manner that did his military genius the greatest honour. So that on the whole, it is difficult to say, which gained the greatest glory, the King of Prussia by his retreat, or M. Daun by the measure which obliged him to it.

CHAP. X.

Allies pass the Rhine. Battle of Crevelt. Action at Sangershausen. Action at Meer. Allies repass the Rhine.

PRINCE Ferdinand had it not in his power to cut off the retreat of the French over the Rhine; but he pressed them closely, and prepared himself to cross that river in pursuit of them. His design was to carry the war beyond the Maese, and thereby oblige the Prince de Soubise to abandon the enterprize he was preparing against Hesse Cassel. His Highness executed the passage of the Rhine at Herven with the corps immediately under his command; [June 1.] then he sent the bridge with which he served himself so well up the river to Rees; the rest of the troops passed there; the whole army were over before the 7th of June. The flattery of the last age saw with astonishment a passage of the Rhine by a French monarch, unopposed, at the head of a mighty army. We saw that river passed by the enemies of France, in the presence of an army of 50,000 of that nation; it was an action which did not need the exaggerations of rhetoric.

The French army retired as the Prince advanced, and took an advantageous camp which threatened to retard the operations of the allies: their right was under Rheinberg; but the Prince by his well-judged motions turned their left flank towards the convent of Campe, by which the French found themselves obliged to quit their advantageous post, and to retire into Meurs: they still kept towards the Rhine: the Prince advanced on the side of the Maese.

It was evident, that whilst the French continued only to retire, it would prove impossible for them to hinder the allies from executing the plan they proposed: they therefore thought it adviseable to change their countenance. They had falled back as far as Nuys; they now returned on their steps, and advanced as far as Crevelt, within a few miles of Prince Ferdinand's camp. The Prince made the dispositions for a battle, with his usual vigour and prudence. He carefully reconnoitred the situation of the enemy. He found that their right was at a village called Vischelon; their left extended towards Anrath, where it was covered with a wood: Crevelt, which was in the front of their right was occupied by a party of their troops. His highness resolved upon three attacks: the first and real attack was on the flank of the enemy's left wing; the other two were designed to divert their attention, and prevent their succouring the object of his principal attack; for which purpose he recommended to his generals to make the best use of their heavy artillery, and not to advance too far unless they were perfectly assured of the success of the main operation.

Having made these wise dispositions, and perfectly learned the best routes by which the enemy might be approached, [June 23.] his highness put himself at the head of the grenadiers of his right wing, and advanced on the side of Anrath in two colums. A canonading violent and well supported opened the action: the Hanoverian artillery was greatly superior to that of the French; but though the French lost many men, they lost no ground in this way, and their position in the wood made a close attack absolutely necessary: the hereditary Prince of Brunswick put himself at the head of the first line of foot, and with his usual spirit, advanced with the whole front directly to the wood. Here a furious fire of small arms commenced, which continued without the smallest intermission for two hours and an half. All the Hanoverian battalions threw themselves into the wood: two ditches well lined with infantry were opposed to their fury: they were forced one after another: the enemies battalions were pushed back, they were entirely broken, and fled out of the wood in a disorder which was irreparable: their cavalry, who kept the best countenance possible, in spite of the terrible fire of the Hanoverian artillery, and in spite of the vigo •ous attempts of the Hanoverian horse, who had by this time •and means to gain the plain, covered the retreat of their scattered infantry, and saved them from utter ruin: the right wing and the centre, though they suffered grievously by the cannonading, were no where broken, but retreated towards Nuys in the most perfect order.

Seven thousand of their best troops were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; but there was nothing in this battle so grievous to France, and so affecting even to the enemy, as the fate of the count de Gisors. This young nobleman, the only son of the duke de Belleisle, not above twenty-five years of age, newly married to the heiress of an illustrious house; himself the last hope of a most noble family, was mortally wounded at the head of his regiment, which be brought up with the most heroic courage, and inspired by his example to make incredible efforts. He had been educated with all the care an excellent father could bestow on a son of an uncommon genius, who was alone able to support the reputation of his family. To the purest morals he had united the politest manners; he had made a great proficiency in learning; he knew many branches of it, and loved all; he had seen every part of Europe, and read courts and nations with a discerning eye; and wanted nothing to fulfil all hope, and to make him a perfect and lasting ornament and support to his country, but a knowledge in the military art; he entered that course of glory and danger, and fell in his first campaign. The unhappy father and minister saw his private misfortunes keep pace with the public calamities, and the tears of his family mingled with those of his country.

Prince Ferdinand gained a victory at Crevelt, which did the greatest honour to his military capacity, and to the bravery of his troops. But it was a victory neither entire nor decisive: the French army on their own frontiers was quickly and strongly reinforced; so that they were not only in a condition in some sort to make head against the allies, but were enabled to detach a considerable reinforcement to the army of the Prince de Soubise on the other side of the Rhine.

Altho' the Prince had reason to imagine that he should not be able to keep his ground on this side of the Rhine for any considerable time, this did not hinder him from improving to the utmost, the advantage he had obtained. Whilst the French, disabled by their late defeat, were in no condition to oppose him, he passed the Rhine with a large detachment, and appeared on the 28th of June before Dusseldorp, a city advantageously situated on the river, and belonging to the Elector Palatine. A severe bombardment obliged it to capitulate on the 7th of July: the garrison, consisting of 2000 men, marched out with the honours of war. Prince Ferdinand placed here three battalions of Hanoverians, and threw a bridge of boats across the river; by that means he multiplied his posts and communications on both sides of the Rhine; and threw a new and no small impediment in the way of the French, to retard their progress, in case he should find himself compelled to retire. After this, the army of the allies and that of France, spent several days in making various marches and countermarches, as if they both proposed to bring on an action, to which, however, it does not appear that either party was very strongly inclined.

Prince Ferdinand still retained his hopes that the Prince of Ysenburg who commanded the Hessian troops, would find the Prince of Soubise employment for some time. He had originally laid his plan in such a manner, that by passing the Maese, and transferring the seat of war into the enemies country, he might draw the French from the Rhine, and perhaps oblige the Prince of Soubise to come to the assistance of the main army under M. de Contades, who commanded in the room of count Clermont, being now the fourth commander of the French troops since they entered Germany. But whilst Prince Ferdinand pleased himself with those hopes, and still continued to act as far as circumstances would admit, in pursuance of this plan, he received an account which disconcerted all his measures.

The duke de Broglio, supported by the corps of the prince de Soubise, [July 23.] with a much superior force, attacked and defeated the Hessian army of seven thousand men near Sangershausen: this opened to them the possession of the Weser: they might act in Westphalia, on which side soever they pleased, and it was to be feared, that if they availed themselves of the advantages they had, they might be able to intercept the British troops. These troops having been landed at Embden, were now on their march under the command of the duke of Marlborough to reinforce the allied army. The prince in this situation of affairs, had no option left but an engagement with the French army, or a retreat over the Rhine: the former was not easy to compass, as the French industriously declined a battle, and it became extremely dangerous to remain long in a position with the enemies army on his left, and the strong fortress of Gueldre on his right. In this situation his subsistence became every day more difficult. To repass the Rhine had its difficulties too; the roads which led to that river were rendered almost impassable by the heavy rains; the river itself was so swelled with them, that the bridge at Rees had been for some time useless.

These disagreeable circumstances of the allied army did not escape the penetration of Mons. de Chevert, one of the ablest commanders among the French. He formed a plan upon them, which, if it had succeeded, must have put the allies into the greatest perplexity. This general had some time before passed the Rhine, with an intention of making himself master of Dusseldorp, and he had prepared all things with great ability for that enterprise: the rains usually heavy for that season, and some other cross accidents, had frustrated his intentions. But perceiving that the same accidents which defeated his design proved also unfavourable to the enemy, he resolved to turn his disappointment into an advantage, and from the ruins of his first project to build another of yet greater importance. Baron Imhoff was posted to the right of the Rhine in a strong situation near Meer. He was to cover the bridge at Rees; to secure a considerable magazine; and to keep open communication between the English reinforcements and the main army. The plan of Mons. Chevert was to dislodge Imhoff, to burn the bridge at Rees, to make himself master of the magazine, and to render the junction of the English troops with the Hanoverians impracticable. To execute this judicious scheme, he united several detachments from the garrison of Wesel, to a considerable corps which he intended to have employed in the siege of Dusseldorp. The whole made near 12,000 men: the troops under Imhoff were but six batallions, and four squadrons, hardly 3000 in all.

When that General was apprised of the designs and motions of the French, he saw it was in vain to expect succours from the army of Prince Ferdinand: the swell of the river had rendered all relief impossible; all his hopes were therefore in his genius and the bravery of his troops. He considered that though the post he occupied was sufficiently strong, the enemy might make themselves masters of Rees, by turning his camp, and thus execute one of the principal parts of their design; he considered the great difference between attacking and being attacked; he considered the effect of an attempt altogether unexpected by the enemy; he therefore took the resolution of abandoning his post, and going out to meet them. Perceiving that the French were marching into difficult ground, he did not lose a moment to begin the action. He ordered a small party, [April 5.] which he had posted in a little coppice, to fall upon the enemies left, which he observed to be uncovered; and appointed the fire of this party, as a signal for all the rest to advance, and make the onset with bayonets fixed. The French thus vigorously and unexpectedly attacked, fell into confusion; their courage ill seconded the wisdom of their general; they did not stand half an hour; they left on the field of battle eleven pieces of cannon, many prisoners, and much baggage to the Hanoverians, who drove them under the cannon of Wesel.

This signal advantage over such a prodigious superiority was not more gallantly obtained than well pursued and improved. Imhoff saw that the rains had increased to such a degree, as to leave no hopes for the allied army to pass by the bridge of Rees. Having taken proper care of his magazines, he quitted his post at Meer, and being reinforced by some parties, who passed the river in boats, he marched with the utmost diligence towards the route of the English forces, and happily effected a junction, which had hitherto been attended with so many difficulties.

Prince Ferdinand in his retreat met with no obstruction, but just what was sufficient to display more fully the gallantry of his officers, and the spirit of his troops. A town called Wachtendonck was on his left, as he retreated; this place, though not fortified, is a post of much importance, and being an inland surrounded by the river Niers, is extremely difficult of access: the French had thrown a body of troops into this place. The hereditary prince, the first in every active service, was employed to force it. The bridge on his approach had been drawn up. The prince seeing that if he attempted to get down this bridge, the enemy would gain time to recollect themselves, threw himself into the river; his grenadiers, animated by so gallant an example, plunged in after him, and furiously attacking the enemy with their bayonets, in a few minutes drove them from that post; this advantage, joined to that gained by general Imhoff, and the uncommon resolution which appeared in both these actions, awed the French. They found that their troops, raw, undisciplined and little fit for hard service, were not to be relied upon; and they feared to bring on an action, which by being decisive against them might draw on the most fatal consequences. So that the prince repassed the Rhine in a most excellent order, even with less trouble than he had at first passed it; and indeed with little molestation, but what he met with from the weather. Such excessive rains had fallen, that he in vain attempted a passage at Rhineberg or at his bridge of Rees; [Aug. 9. and 10.] he effected it a little lower at a place called Griethuysen.

Although Prince Ferdinand was obliged to pass the Rhine, and to act more upon the defensive for the future; yet his vigorous conduct in the beginning was very glorious to him, and very advantageous to the common cause. The French suffered greatly in their military reputation; the Hanoverians had gained a superiority over them, and now so much of the campaign was wasted, that notwithstanding the greatness of their numbers, it was not probable that they would find themselves able to make any considerable progress in their designs against the King's electoral dominions for this year. The advantage gained by Broglio and Soubise was not attended with the consequences, which might have been apprehended. Prince Ysenburg kept so good a countenance in a strong post he had chosen, that the French did not choose to attack him again; and since Prince Ferdinand had repassed the Rhine, he might always be well supported.

CHAP. XI.

Retreat from Bohemia. Measures of Count Daun. Battle of Custrin. King of Prussia marches into Saxony, and joins Prince Henry.

BY the retreat of the Prussians from Moravia, the war had assumed a new face. The Generals who conducted it had changed hands. The King of Prussia was obliged to act upon the defensive; M. Daun was now in a condition of displaying his talents in an offensive war. The affairs of the King of Prussia were scarce ever in a more critical situation than at that time. The Russians seemed at first disposed to enter into Silesia; but now they had united their several disjointed corps, penetrated into the New Marche of Brandenburgh, and having commenced the siege of Custrin, a place that threatened them with no great opposition, they were arrived within a few days march of Berlin Count Dohna posted with a greatly inferior force at Frankfort on the Oder, watched without being able to obstruct their progress. In Pomerania, the Generals Weedel and Manteufel opposed almost the same ineffectual efforts to the arms of Sweden. The army of the Empire, and a considerable body of Austrians under General Haddick, advanced into Saxony, and possessing themselves by degrees of those strong posts, which compose the frontiers of Misnia, they continually streightened the quarters of Prince Henry. That Prince was strongly encamped at Dippolswalde, with about 20,000 men, in order to cover Dresden, and command the course of the Elbe. Thus circumstanced, the King could not find his account in remaining long in Bohemia, where it was impossible to effect any thing decisive. Every thing depended upon his being able to drive the Russians out o• his territories, who with a mighty forced ruined every place they arrived at, and seemed not only to make war against him, but against human nature itself.

M. Daun was soon apprised of the King of Prussia's intentions: but he considered that if he was to pursue the King into Silesia, he most encounter with difficulties almost insuperable; several strong places stood in his way, and i• would prove easy for the Prussian troops left for the defence of that dutchy, to take an advantageous camp under one of those places, and thus oblige them to waste unprofitably the time, which might be employed in the execution of more judicious projects. Besides that in this manner of proceeding he could never act in concert, nor preserve any effectual communication with the several bodies of his allies. To push forward with his whole force directly to Berlin, could at best be regarded as a coup de main, which could prove nothing decisive in the campaign, even supposing the project should succeed, but it was rather probable that it would not succeed, as the King of Prussia might clear his hands of the Russians before the army of M. Daun could, for want of subsistance arrive in the Lower Lusatia. Every consideration therefore pointed out the relief of Saxony as the great object of the Austrian operations. It was an object apparently to be compassed with greater ease, and if compassed, productive of more solid advantages than any other. The army of the Empire already superior to that of Prince Henry could co-operate in the design, and the recovery of Saxony once effected, the King of Prussia would see himself entirely divested of one of the principal resources he had to rely upon in the war, for money, provisions, and forage; whilst his hereditary dominions stripped of this strong barrier defenceless in themselves, and assaulted on three sides by powerful armies, could scarce find them employment to the end of the campaign.

M. Daun having resolved upon his plan of operations suffered the King of Prussia to continue his march towards the Russians, without any molestation: he contented himself with leaving a considerable body of Troops under the Generals Harsch and de Ville, on the southern frontiers of Silesia, in order to form some enterprise on that side, which might draw the attention and forces of the Prussians as far as possible from the great object of his operations. When he had made these dispositions he marched towards Saxony, through the country of Lusatia, by Zittau, Gorlitz, and Bautzen. His first project was bold. He proposed to cross the Elbe at Meissen; by which the communication between Dresden and Leipsic would be cut of at one stroke. Then he proposed to attack Prince Henry in his camp at Seidlitz, whilst the army of the Empire fell upon him in another quarter. Thus the Prince was to be put between two fires, and his retreat into Dresden to be rendered impracticable; but upon mature consideration, this project was laid aside. M. Daun reflected that the fortress of Sonnestein, of which he was not yet in possession, would prove no small impediment to his designs. [Sept. 3.] He considered that the position of Prince Henry opposite to the army of the Empire was too advantageous, to make an attack upon him adviseable: and unless the Prince could be induced to attack the Imperialists first, a point not to be expected in his circumstances, he might always find it easy to throw himself into Dresden, and by proper motions to preserve a free communication with the King. M. Daun was obliged to renounce his first design, but he was left at full liberty to form and to execute such other plans for the relief of Saxony as his prudence could suggest.

About that time the imperial court elated with their recent success, began to shew with what moderation they were likely to behave if it continued and increased. They entirely threw of all the little appearance of respect they had hitherto retained for the King of Great Britain, and several others of the most respectable Princes and persons of the Empire. They made the abuse of their authority go hand in hand with the success of their arms. On the 21st of August a conclusum of the Aulic council was issued against the King of Great Britain, as Elector of Hanover, against the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, against Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, the Count of Lippe Buckebourg, and in general against all the Adherence to the King of Prussia, threatening them with Penalties indignity, person and estate. In consequence of this decree, letters avocatory were issued, notifying to the sovereign Princes, that if they did not within a limited time disperse their armies, break off their connection with the King of Prussia, pay their quota of Roman months, and send their contingents to the army of execution, they were to be put under the ban of the Empire. To all other persons who held any dignity in the Empire, orders were given and penalties were threatened suitable to their condition. They in short went all lengths, but that of actually and formally putting them under the ban, which they would not have failed to do, if their success had answered its beginnings. So little regard had the court of Vienna to former services of the most interesting nature; and so entirely did she seem to forget that she owed to the King of Great Britain, not only that power which she now unjustly and ungratefully turned against him, but almost the very being of the House of Austria. So entirely did she forget that this Monarch had expended his treasures, employed his armies, and even exposed his person in her cause, when it was not only abandoned, but attacked by almost all the rest of Europe. However the violent proceedings of the Aulic council, drew no one State or person from the Kings of Great Britain and Prussia; they rather had a contrary effect, in rousing the whole Evangelic body to a sense of their own danger. Much less were they able to stop the progress of the allied arms.

The King of Prussia conducted his retreat out of Bohemia in admirable order. The Generals Jahnus and Laudohn for several days hung upon his rear with two strong bodies. They took advantageous posts, sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other, sometimes together, sometimes separately, and threw all possibly impediments in his way. But the vigour of the Prussians drove them with loss from every post. So that by the 6th of August, they were obliged entirely to desist from their pursuit. The King of Prussia freed from all molestation, marched with the utmost diligence by Wisoca, Politz, Landshut, and arrived on the 20th at Franckfort on the Oder. Here he joined the troops under Count Dohna. The army was now in a condition to act, [Sept. 22.] and they did not lose a moment's time to march against the enemy. All their vigour and expedition was not more than necessary. The Russians had besieged Custrin from the 15th. Though these people scarcely emerged from barbarism, had not the most perfect skill in operations of this nature, they supplied that deficiency by a ferosity that scrupled nothing, by numbers whose lives they did not regard, and by a most formidable artillery, which rudely but furiously managed, only spread the more general and indiscriminate destruction. In effect, they threw such a multitude of bombs and red hot balls into that unfortunate city, that in a short time it was on fire in every quarter. Of the wretched inhabitants some were burned, some buried in the ruins, some killed by the balls that fell like hail in the streets: the surviving majority safe neither within nor without their houses, abandoned their homes and their substance, and fled, many of them almost naked, out of the side which was not invested. Never was beheld a more deplorable spectacle; nor was it easy to say which formed the more wretched appearance, those who perished, or those who escaped. Mean while the Governor firm in his courage and fidelity, did every thing for the defence of the walls and ruins of the place; but the walls built in the old manner did not promise a successful defence; the enemy had posted themselves in the suburbs, and in the firing of the town, the principal magazine of the besieged was blown up.

The protector and avenger of his dominions, was now however at hand. On the 23th, the King of Prussia's whole army passed the Oder at Glustebissel, about twenty English miles to the north-east of Custrin. The Russians on the first notice of his approach, broke up the siege of that place, and marched towards the villages of Zwicker and Zorndorff. It was the King's intention to wind round the left flank of their army, and to take them in the rear, by which he hoped to throw them into confusion. But in this he found himself disappointed. The Russian Generals had foreseen his purpose and made excellent dispositions. As the ground did not admit them to extend greatly in length, they threw themselves into a square body composed of four lines, forming a front almost equal on every side, and on every side surrounded by cannon and chevaux de frize. In this formidable disposition they waited the attack of the Prussians.

It was on the 25th of August that the King of Prussia, after a march of 56 days, from the midst of Moravia, brought his army in presence of the Russians. The King had never been personally engaged with that enemy before. His troops had never obtained any advantage over them. The whole fortune of the war depended upon the event of this day. The Prussians were now in the closest sense to fight for their country, which was ready to fall under one of the severest scourges with which Providence has chastised a nation. Nothing was wanting which could inspire the soldiers with revenge. Every where the marks of the enemies cruelty were before their eyes; the country desolated on every side, and the villages in flames all round the field of battle.

At nine o'clock in the morning the battle began by a fire of cannon and mortars which rained on the right wing of the Russians without the least intermission for near two hours. Nothing could exceed the havock made by this terrible fire, nor the constancy with which the Muscovite foot, raw and unexperienced, sustained a slaughter that would have confounded and dispersed the compleatest veterans. They fell in their ranks; new regiments still pressed forward to fill their places, and to supply new slaughter. When the first line had fired away all their charges, they rushed forward on the Prussians. That firm body of the Prussian infantry which had often stood, and often given so many terrible shocks, by one of those unaccountable movements of the human mind, that render every thing in war so precarious, gave way in the presence of their Sovereign, and when they had in a manner secured the victory, retired in disorder before the half broken battalions of the Muscovites. Had the Russian officers known how to profit of this disorder; had they immediately thrown in their horse with vigour to compleat it, and entirely break that body; this had probably been the last day of the Prussian greatness. The King was not so negligent. For just in this anxious moment, whilst the battle was yet in suspense, by a very rapid and masterly motion, he brought all the cavalry of his right to the centre, with which General Sedlitz at their head, bursting in upon the Russian foot, uncovered by their horse, and disordered even by their advantage, they pushed them back, with a most miserable slaughter. The repulsed battalions of Prussia had time to recollect, and to form themselves; and now returning to the onset with a rage exasperated by their late disgrace, they entirely turned the ballance of the fight. The Russians were thrown into the most horrid confusion. The wind blew the dust and smoke full in their faces. They no longer distinguished friends or enemies. They fired upon each other. In this distraction they plundered their own baggage which stood between the lines, and intoxicated themselves with brandy. Orders were now no more heard nor obeyed. The ranks fell in upon one another; and being crammed together in a narrow space, every shot discharged by the Prussians had its full effect: whilst the Russians kept up only a scattered fire, without direction or effect, and quite over the heads of their enemies. It was now no longer battle, but a horrid and undistinguished carnage. Yet still, (which is a wonderful circumstance) the Russians thus distracted and slaughtered, kept their ground. The action continued without intermission from nine in the morning until seven at night. At last the night itself, the fatigue of the Prussians, and a judicious attack on their right wing, which drew their attention on that side, gave the Russian army some respite to recover their order, and an opportunity of retiring a little from the scene of their disaster. On their side near 10,000 fell upon the spot, they had more than 10,000 wounded, most of them mortally: 939 officers, not including the inferior, were killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; of two particular regiments consisting before the battle of 4595 effective men, only 1475 were left; their whole loss on this bloody day way 21,529 men. That of the Prussians in every way did not amount to 2000.

The Gazettes of both parties warmly disputed the vain honour of the field of battle. On the most diligent enquiry, it appears that both parties spent the night on or very near the place of action. But this is an affair of little consequence. The Prussians had all the fruits, and most of the proofs of a victory the most complete and decisive. A vast train of artillery taken, the military chest, a number of prisoners, many of them officers of high rank; the retreat of the Russian army, the next and the following days; their General Fermor's request for leave to bury the dead; their incapacity to advance or form any new enterprise; the King of Prussia's unmolested operations against his other enemies; all these form the most clear and certain demonstration of a victory in all the points, for which a victory is desirable.

Nothing less indeed, than a very complete victory could have done any essential service to the King's affair at that time, when four armies of his enemies were making their way to one common centre, and threatened to unite in the heart of Brandenburg. The King renewed the attack on the Russians the next morning. The event of the last day had shewed them, that there was no way of safety but in a retreat, and in effect they retreated before the Prussians as far as Landsperg on the frontiers of Poland. The King of Prussia was convinced that their late check must wholly disable them from attempting any thing material against his dominions on that side; and he saw clearly that whatever he might hope to gain by improving his advantage against the Russians, he must lose far, more by allowing his other enemies to make a progress on the side of Saxony. He satisfied himself therefore with leaving a small body of troops under Count Dohna, to observe the motions of the Muscovite army; and marched with the greatest part of his forces and the utmost expedition to the relief of Prince Henry.

M. Daun having laid aside his first project for passing the Elbe at Meissen, enterprised nothing new on the side of Saxony for some days; he contented himself with taking a position at Stolpen to the Eastward of the Elbe, by which, whilst he preserved to himself an easy communication with the army of the Empire, he interrupted the communication between Bautzen and Dresden; he favoured the operations of General Laudohn, who had advanced through the Lower Lusatia to the confines of Brandenburgh; and by drawing the attention of the Prussian forces which were left in Silesia to the northward of that dutchy, he facilitated the progress of the Generals Harach and de Ville in the southern parts. Admirable dispositions without question, if the time had not called for more vigorous measures, and if the rescue of Saxony from the King of Prussia had not been the great object of the campaign! It is not impossible that the court of Vienna had still such an hankering after Silesia, as induced them to slaken their efforts on the side of Saxony, in hopes, that if M. Daun could protract the operations there, so as to find full employment for the King of Prussia, their other forces might reduce Silesia with great facility; and thus perhaps by aiming at two such difficult objects at once, as it generally happens, they lost them both. Upon any other supposition, it is not very easy to account for the seeming inactivity of M. Daun, whilst he had so fair a game in his hands. However advantageously Prince Henry might have chosen his post, or however strongly he might have secured it, yet the prodigious superiority of the combined armies seems to have more than over-balanced that advantage, and to have justified, nay to have demanded some bold and decisive attempt.

In fact, this appeared at length to be the Marshal's own opinion. For when the strong Fortress of Sonnestein most unaccountably surrendered, with a garrison of 1400 men, to the Austrian General Mac-Guire after the resistance of no more than a single day; [Sept. 5.] M. Daun proposed that the Prince of Deux-Ponts should attack Prince Henry, whilst the grand army of the Austrians laying bridges between two fires, at a small distance from each other, should pass the Elbe, and falling at the same time on the Prussians, [Sept. 10.] second the attack of the Imperialists, and cut off the retreat of their enemies 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 towards Dresden. This was to bring matters to a speedy decision. But now the King of Prussia by the most rapid marches had reached the frontiers of Saxony. The whole design was disconcerted; and far from being able to dislodge Prince Henry, they found themselves utterly unable to prevent the King his brother from joining him, with his whole army. [Sept. 11.] On his approach General Laudohn abandoned his advantages in the Lower Lusatia, and fell back upon M. Daun; who himself retired from the neighbourhood of Dresden and fell back as far as Zittau. The army of the Empire possessed of the strong post of Pirna, which the Saxons had occupied in the beginning of the war, kept their ground; but did not undertake any thing. Thus in fifteen days the king of Prussia, by his unparallelled spirit, diligence and magnanimity, fought and defeated a superior body of his enemies, in one extremity of his dominions, and baffled without fighting another superior body in the other extremity.

These advantages, glorious as they were, were not the only ones which followed the victory at Zorndorf. The Swedes who directed their motions by those of their Russian allies, hastened their operations when that army had advanced into Brandenburgh. General Wedel was detached from Saxony, to stop their progress; and the Prince of Bevern, now Governor of Stettin, gave them some opposition. All this, however, had proved ineffectual, if the news of the defeat of the Russians had not alarmed the Swedes in such a manner, as to make them return with more expedition than they had advanced. Tho' the King of Prussia's affairs began to put on a better appearance by these efforts, the fortune of the war still hung in a very dubious scale. The enemy was still superior. The Swedes and Russians had still some footing in his dominions. The Austrians and Imperialists were yet in Saxony; and if the King's armies had it in their power to take strong situations; the enemy had the same advantages. The condition of things was extremely critical, and the least error or misfortune threatened still to plunge the King of Prussia into an abyss of calamities.

CHAP. XII.

General Oberg defeated at Lanwerenhagen. King of Prussia surprised at Hochkirchen. M. Keith and Prince Francis of Brunswich killed. Affair at Gorlitz. King of Prussia marches into Silesia. M. Daun invests Dresden. The suburbs burned. King of Prussia raises the siege of Neiss and Cosel. He returns into Saxony. The Austrians retire into Bohemia. Dispositions for the winter.

THE operations of the armies in Westphalia, seemed for a long time to languish. The grand army of the French under M. de Contades, was wholly unable to drive Prince Ferdinand from the posts which he had chosen so judiciously along the Lippe. The other division of the French forces under the Prince de Soubise, had made no great progress on the side of Hesse-Castle, against the Prince Isenburg, who still kept his ground in that principality, in order to protect the course of the Weser, and to cover the electorate. The French were sensible that an attack on the principal army of the allies, would prove a very dangerous attempt, in which even if they should have some success, their progress into the King's electoral dominions must be very slow and difficult. But as the Body of the allies employed in Hesse-Castle was far the weakest, and as an advantage on that side promised them the command of the Weser, and a better passage into the heart of the enemies country, they determined to make an attempt there. To further this design, a considerable detachment was made from the army of M. de Contades, which increased the Prince of Soubise's corps to at least 30,000 men. Prince Ferdinand, who was sufficiently aware of the enemies plan, had some time before sent General Oberg with a strong reinforcement to join the Prince Isenburg; but notwithstanding this reinforcement, the whole force of the allies in Hesse did not exceed 15000. This body was attacked by the French at Lanwerenhagen, and their great superiority, especially in point of cavalry, [Sept. 30.] obliged the allies to retire with the loss of about 1500 men. The allies unable to keep the field, had however some woods in their rear which covered their retreat, and they preserved so good a countenance as prevented their defeat from becoming total.

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Great consequences might have been apprehended from this affair. But the vigilance of Prince Ferdinand, who had established the most ready communications all along the Lippe, suffered the victorious army to reap but little advantage from their victory. That accomplished General advanced with the ••most expedition towards Rheda, and the P. Isenburgh having fallen back upon him, they joined in such a manner as perfectly to secure the Weser, without losing any thing on the side of the Rhine. And although these necessary motions, in some sort uncovered the electorate, so as to lay it open to the incursions of the enemies light troops, who penetrated even to the gates of Hanover; yet the French were not in a condition to establish any considerable body, or to take any post of moment in that part.

During this time, the armies of the King of Prussia and M. Daun, made no very remarkable movements. The Marshal kept his advantageous camp at Stolpen, by which he preserved a communication with the army of the Empire. The army was secured by its inaccessible situation, but it enterprised nothing of consequence. The King of Prussia on the other hand, having taken possession of the important post of Bautzen, which lies so opportunely for commanding at once both Misnia and Lusatia, extended his right wing to Hochkirchen. By this position he preserved a communication with the army of his brother prince Henry, he protected Brandenburg from the incursions of the Austrians, and at the same time that he secured these interesting objects, he was better situated for throwing succours into Silesia, than he could be any where else consistently with his general plan. The two armies kept the most watchful eye upon each others motions. The principal aim of the King of Prussia, seemed to have been the preventing M. Daun from communicating with Bohemia. The great intention of M. Daun was to cut off the King from Silesia. Things were so ballanced, that it did not seem possible by mere skill in marches and positions to answer these ends very fully: therefore a battle seemed inevitable. But it seemed too that considering the situation of both armies, a battle could not be attempted without extreme danger to the party who should begin the attack.

M. Daun saw that if any more time was lost without action, the very season must oblige him to evacuate Saxony, and thus give up all the fruits of the campaign. He came to a resolution of giving the King of Prussia Battle. But even in the vigour of this resolution, appeared the extreme caution which characterises that able General. Having communicated his design to the prince of Deux-Ponts, and settled measures with him, he marched in the dead of a very dark night, in three columns, towards the right of the King of Prussia's camp. Notwithstanding the darkness of the night, notwithstanding the necessary division of the Austrian army, [Oct. 14.] the greatness of their numbers, and the length of way they had to march, yet such was the wise conduct and great good fortune of this design, that they all arrived at the same time at the Prussian camp, none having lost their way, without discovery, without confusion, and began the attack with the utmost regularity and resolution at five o'clock in the morning.

How the King's out-guards were kept so as to make such a surprise practicable, is hard to say. It is hard to accuse the vigilance of so able a commander, or the attention of so many finished officers as served under him. To speak of treachery is a way of accounting for misfortunes, more common than reasonable. However it was, the Prussians had not time to strike their tents, when they found the enemy in the midst of the camp, and an impetuous attack already begun. Scarce had the battle begun, when a defeat seemed certain; not so much from the confusion of the troops, as the irreparable loss of two officers in the highest command, and of the greatest merit. M. Keith received two musquet balls, and fell dead upon the spot. Prince Francis of Brunswick had his head shot off by a cannon ball as he mounted his horse. The King of Prussia had then the whole of affairs to sustain alone, at the time when he most wanted assistance. But his presence of mind, his firmness, his activity, remedied in some measure the effects of this unforseen attack, and the losses and disorders it had occasioned; he was every where present, and inspired his troops with an a•dor like his own. The King ordered some detachments from his left, to reinforce his right wing; but in the moment the orders were received, the left itself was furiously attacked. General Retzow who commanded in that quarter, with difficulty repulsed the Austrians, and was not able to afford any considerable assistance to the right, which was alone obliged to support the whole weight of the grand attack.

The Austrians in the beginning of the engagement had beaten them out of the village of Hochkirchen; as the fate of the day depended upon that post, the hottest of the dispute was there. The Prussians made three bloody and unsuccessful attacks on the village; on the fourth they carried it; but the Austrians pouring continually fresh troops upon that spot, drove them out at length after reiterated efforts, and a prodigious slaughter on all sides. Then the King despairing of the fortune of that field, ordered a retreat: his troops, which had been suddenly attacked in a dark night by superior numbers, and had run to arms some half naked, and all in the utmost confusion, had, notwithstanding, made a most vigorous resistance; and maintained the fight for near five hours. They made their retreat in good order without being pursued, supported by the good countenance of their cavalry, and the fire of the numerous and well served artillery, which was placed in the centre of their camp. They lost in this bloody action at least 7000 men, killed, wounded and prisoners, together with many cannon. The Austrian account allowed their own loss in killed and wounded to amount to near 5000.

The King of Prussia, in retiring from Hochkirchen, in fact only altered the position of his right wing, which fell back as far as Weissenberg. His left still remained at Bautzen. This position was nearly as good as the former. The great loss was the loss of reputation, which always attends a defeat, and the loss of two great generals which attended this in particular. M. Keith was a Scochman born. He engaged with his brother the Lord Marshal in the Rebellion of 1715. Being obliged to relinquish his country on this occasion, he entered into the troops of Spain, and afterwards passing into Russia, he obtained a considerable command, and performed many signal services in their wars with Turkey and Sweden; and served them also in peace by several embassies. But finding the honours of that country no better than a splendid servitude, and not meeting with those rewards, which his long and faithful services deserved, he left that court for one where merit is better known and better rewarded: and having been employed since the beginning of the war in a distinguished command in the King of Prussia's armies, he fell at last in a service that was worthy of him.

If the King of Prussia lost some reputation in suffering himself to be surprised in this affair; he fully retrieved it by his extraordinary conduct in the course of the action, and his admirable efforts after it. On the whole, perhaps, when all circumstances are considered, the King of Prussia will appear greater in this defeat, than in any victory he ever yet obtained. The wing of his army that was attacked, was surprised at a distance from him, the two Generals that commanded it slain in the first onset, his other principal Generals wounded, the whole wing in confusion without a leader; to come, in these desperate circumstances, in haste from another quarter; to recover all; twice to repulse the enemy, and at last to retire, overborne only by numbers and fatigue, without being pursued, is such an instance of great Generalship, as perhaps has never been exceeded.

Whilst these things were doing in Saxony, the Russians made no farther attempts on the Side of Brandenburgh; they remained in their camp near Landsperg, until the 21st of September; when after several feigned motions, made to cover their real design, they began their retreat towards Pomerania, where they arrived on the 26th.

It was impossible that they should keep their ground in that province during the winter, unless they could secure some sea-port, from whence they might be supplied with provisions. The little town of Colberg was very opportune for that purpose, as it is a sea-port on the Baltick, and so meanly fortified, that the reduction of it appeared to be as easy as expedient. On the third of October, they formed the siege of this inconsiderable place, with a body of 15000 men. But such was the bravery of Major Heydon the Governor; and such the incapacity of the Russians for operations of this nature, that this little town, defended only by a rampart, without any outwork, and lined with a very feeble garrison, held out against the repeated attacks of the enemy twenty-six days, [Oct. 29.] and then obliged them to raise the siege, without any succours whatsoever from without. This was the last enterprise of the Russians. Their vast army retired with disgrace, first from Brandenburgh, and then from Pomerania; not being able to master one place of strength in either country; but having destroyed with the most savage barbarity both the open towns and defenceless villages; leaving as strong impressions of contempt for their incapacity, as of horror for their cruelty.

After the defeat which the King received at Hochkirchen, he omitted no measures to prevent the enemy from making any material advantage of it. He perceived clearly, that the advantage they proposed to derive from it, was to cover the operations of their armies in Silesia; and that they had no longer any serious design upon Saxony during this campaign. The King therefore, made no scruple to reinforce his army by considerable detachments from that of Prince Henry, which were brought up by that Prince himself. And as he saw that Neiss, the siege of which had been already formed and prosecuted with great vigour, must certainly surrender if it were not speedily succoured, he resolved to march into Silesia.

To the execution of this design, the greatest difficulties started up on all sides. The army of M. Daun, lately victorious, had no other business than to intercept him. To fight was dubious; to avoid it hard. If he could even avoid a battle, he had much to apprehend from the efforts of the enemy to harrass him on his march. If he should be so happy as to escape or conquer these difficulties, yet his march entirely uncovered Saxony, and abandoned that most interesting possession, very poorly defended, to all the force of two powerful armies.

On the other hand, if the consideration of Saxony should detain him in his present situation, Silesia ran the same risque, and the same or greater disadvantages must ensue to his affairs, by suffering the Austrians to obtain a footing there. This dilemma, which would have rendered a meaner genius entirely inactive▪ and hindered him from taking any resolution, only obliged the King of Prussia to take his resolution with the greater speed, and to execute it with the greater vigour.

On the 24th of November at night, he quitted his camp at Dobreschutz, and making a great compass he arrived, without any obstruction from the enemy, in the plain of Gorlitz. A body of the Austrians had in vain endeavoured to secure this post before him; those that arrived were defeated, with the loss of 800 men. By this happy march, all the advantages of M. Daun's studied position, of all the fruits his boasted victory at Hochkirchen, were lost in a moment, and an open passage to Silesia lay before the King. He pursued his march with the greatest diligence. General Laudohn, with 24,000 men was sent to pursue him. That active general continually harrassed his rear guard; but the King continued his march without interruption, and suffered him to take many little advantages, rather than by delaying to contest small matters, to endanger a design, which might be decisive of the whole campaign.

On the other hand, Daun, not content with the obstacles which General Laudohn threw in the King's way, sent a large body of horse and foot by another route to reinforce the army which under the Generals Harsch and De Ville had formed the siege of Neiss, and the blockade of Cosel. But he perceived that all these measures would probably prove ineffectual, as his principal project, which was to cover Silesia, had been defeated. He therefore turned his views towards Saxony, and satisfying himself with detaching General Laudohn, which might create an opinion that the whole Austrian army pursued, he followed the King no further than Gorlitz; which place he immediately quitted, and having by forced marches gained the Elbe, he passed that river at Pirna, [Nov. 6.] and advanced towards Dresden. At the same time the army of the Empire, by its motions having obliged the Prussian army then extremely weakened by the detachments that had been drawn from it, to retire from its post before Dresden, some miles to the westward of that city, cut off their communication with Leipsic, whilst M. Daun attempted to cut off their communication with Dresden; but they found means to throw themselves into that city, and afterwards to retire to the other side of the Elbe. The Austrians and Imperialists began at once to invest those two important places; another party advanced towards Torgau, an attempted that town. It seemed utterly impossible to prevent the Austrians from becoming masters of Saxony, who in a manner covered the whole country with their forces.

In the mean time, the King of Prussia drew nearer and nearer to Neiss. The siege of that fortress was commenced on the 4th of August; on the 3d of October it was completely invested; and the place was pushed on one side with the greatest vigour, and on the other maintained with the most consummate skill and bravery, until the approach of 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 the King of Prussia obliged the Austrians, on the 1st. of November, to raise the siege, leaving a considerable quantity of military stores behind them. The same terror obliged the parties employed in the blockade of Cosel, to leave that place at liberty, and to fall back, together with the armies of the Generals Harsch and De Ville, into Bohemia, and the Austrian Silesia.

The King of Prussia, when he had thus by the report of his march, without fighting, driven his enemies out of Silesia, [Nov. 9.] lost not a moment to return by the same route, and with the same expedition to the relief of Saxony. Two bodies of his troops had moved for the same purpose out of Pomerania, one under Count Dohna, and one under General Wedel. The corps under Wedel had thrown itself into T•rgau, repulsed the Austrians, who had attempted that place, and pursued them as far as Eulenbu•g. The grand operation of the Austrians was against Dresden. M. Daun, with an army of 60,000 men, came before that city, on the very Day on which the King of Prussia began his march to oppose him, so that he might well imagine his success certain against a place meanly fortified, and defended only by 12,000 men. The same day he began to cannonade it, and his light troops, supported by the grenadiers of the army, made a sharp attack upon the suburbs. The Governor, Count Schmettau, saw that from the weakness of the suburbs it would prove impossible for him to prevent the enemy from possessing themselves of them by a coup de main, and if they succeeded in this attempt, the great height of the Houses, being six or seven stories, and entirely commanding the ramparts, would render the reduction of the body of the place equally easy and certain. These considerations determined him to set these suburbs on fire.

It is well known that the suburbs of Dresden compose one of the finest towns in Europe, and are greatly superior to that which lies within the walls. Here the most wealthy parts of the Inhabitants reside, and here are carried on those several curious manufactures for which Dresden is so famous. Count Daun foresaw this consequence of his attempt. He endeavoured to intimidate the Governor from this measure, to which he knew the cruel reason of war would naturally lead him, by threatening to make him personally answerable for the steps he should take; but Count Schmettau answered with the firmness that became a man of honour and a soldier, that he would answer whatever he should do, and would not only burn the suburbs, in case M. Daun advanced, but would likewise defend the city itself street by street, and at last even the castle, which was the royal residence, if he should be driven to it. When the magistrates were apprised of this resolution, they fell at the feet of Count Schmettau, and implored him to change his mind, and to have mercy on that devoted part of their city. The part of the royal family, who remained in Dresden, joined their supplications to those of the magistrates; they prayed him to spare that last refuge of distressed royalty, and to allow at least a secure residence to those, who had been deprived of every thing else. All entreaties were vain. Schmettau continued firm in his resolution. He told them that their safety d•ded on themselves, and on M. Daun; that if he made no attempts, the suburbs should be still secure; but that if he took any farther steps, the necessity of his master's service, and his own honour, would compel him to act very disagreeable to the lenity of his disposition. The magistrates retired in despair. Combustibles were laid in all the houses.

At three a clock next morning, [Nov. 10.] the signal for firing the suburbs was given, and in a moment a place so lately the seat of ease and luxury, flourishing in traffick, in pleasures and ingenious arts, was all in flames. A calamity so dreadful needs no high colouring. However, as little mischief attended such a combustion, as the Nature of the thing could admit. Very few lost their lives; but many their whole substance. When this was done, the Prussian troops abandoned the flaming suburbs, and retired in good order into the city.

M. Daun saw this fire, which, whilst it laid waste the capital of his ally, made it more difficult for him to force it, he sent in some empty threats to the Governor. But the Saxon minister at Ratisbon, made grievous complaints to the Diet, of what he represented as the most unparalleled act of wanton and unprovoked cruelty, that had ever been committed. The emissaries of the court of Vienna spread the same complaints; and they made no scruple to invent, and to alter facts in such a manner as to move the greatest pity towards the sufferers, and the greatest indignation against the King of Prussia. All these, however, were in a short time abundantly confuted, by the authentick certificates of the magistrates of Dresden, and of those officers of the court, who were perfectly acquainted with the transaction. By these certificates it appears, that only 250 houses were consumed. Though this was a terrible calamity; it was nothing to the accounts given in the gazettes of the Austrian faction. By these certificates it appears also, that the people were not surprised, but had sufficient notice of the Governor's intentions, to enable them to provide for their safety. In a word, all the charges of cruelty against the Prussian commander, and soldiery were fully overthrown.

This fire made a coup de main impracticable; regular operations demanded time, and the King of Prussia was now in full march towards Saxony. M. Daun retired from before the place on the 17th. The King, after crossing Lusatia, passing the Elbe, and joyning his troops under Count Dohna and General Wedel, arrived triumphantly at Dresden on the 20th. The armies of M. Daun and the Empire gave way towards Bohemia, into which kingdom they soon after finally retreated, without enterprising any thing further. Six sieges were raised almost at the same time; that of Colberg, carried on by General Palmbach, under the orders of Marshal Fermor; that of Neiss by M. de Harsch; that of Cosel; that of Dresden by M. Daun; the blockade of Torgau by M. Haddick; and that of Leipsick by the Prince of Deux-Ponts.

About the time that the Austrians retired into winter quarters, the French did the same; and the Hanoverians permitted them to do it without molestation, the season being too far advanced, and their army perhaps not of sufficient strength for offensive operations; and Prince Ferdinand kept the field no longer. The British troops had no occasion of signalizing their bravery this year; but without a battle the nation suffered a considerable loss, and was touched with a very deep and general sorrow. The Duke of Marlborough died in Munster, the 20th of October, of a fever, contracted by the fatigues of the Campaign. Never did the nation lose in one man, a temper more candid and benevolent, manners more amiable and open, a more primitive integrity, a more exalted generosity, a more warm and feeling heart. He left all the enjoyments, which an ample fortune and an high rank could bestow in the publick eye; and which every milder virtue, every disposition to make and to be made happy, could give in a domestic life: he left these for the service of his country, and died for its defence, as he had lived for its ornament and happiness.

If we compare the events of this year with those of the last, we shall find in the actions of the present year, perhaps something less of that astonishing eclat; fewer battles; not so many nor so striking revolutions of fortune; but we may discover upon all sides far greater management, and a more studied and refined conduct; more artful movements, a more judicious choice of posts, more quick and vigorous marches. If in the last year, the King of Prussia was the hero of the imagination, he is this year the hero of the judgment; and we have, I think, reason to admire him upon juster principles. Obliged to evacuate Moravia, he throws himself into Bohemia, and executes a retreat with all the spirit of an invasion. He marches more than an hundred miles through an enemy's country, followed and harrassed by large armies, who are unable to obtain any advantage over him. Gaining at length his own territories, he engages the vast army of the Russians and defeats it. He is unable to follow his blow, but he disables them from striking any against that part of his dominions, which he is obliged to leave. Whilst he is engaged with the Russians on the frontiers of Poland, the Austrians and Imperialists enter Saxony. Before they can do any thing decisive, the King is himself suddenly in Saxony, and by his presence, at once disconcerts all their projects. The scene is again changed, they surprise him in his camp at Hochkirchen, two of his Generals are killed, his army defeated, his camp is taken. They attack Silesia with a formidable army. Notwithstanding his late defeat; notwithstanding the great superiority of his enemies; notwithstanding the advantage of their posts; he makes an amazing sweep about all their forces, eludes their vigilance, renders their positions unprofitable; and marching with an astonishing rapidity into the remotest parts of Silesia, obliges the Austrian armies to retire with precipitation out of that province. Then he flies to the relief of Saxony, which his enemies had again profited of his absence to invade; and again by the same rapid and well conducted march, he obliges them to abandon their prize. Defeated by the Austrians he acquired by his conduct all the advantages to the most compleat victory. He guarded all his possessions in such a manner, as to enable them all the endure his absence for some short time; and he conducted his marches with such spirit, as did not make it necessary to them to hold out any longer; he made twice the circuit of his dominions, and in their turn he relieved them all.

Nor was the conduct of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick less worthy of admiration. Placed at the Head of a body of troops, who were but lately obliged to lay down their arms, he found the enemy in possession of the whole open country, and of all the strong places in it. Commencing the campaign in the midst of a severe winter, without any place of strength in his hands, he drove the enemy from all those they held. He obliged them to repass the Rhine, he followed and defeated them in a pitched battle. Being afterwards obliged by the great force of France on its own frontier, and the numerous armies they had in different places, to repass the Rhine; he defended Lippe against numbers greatly superior, and though they defeated a part of his army, they were not able to turn their victory to the least advantage. Prince Ferdinand's campaign may well pass for a perfect model of defensive operations.

The Austrians, in taking winter quarters, disposed their forces so as to form a chain of an amazing length, from the frontiers of Moravia passing through Bohemia, all along the skirts of Silesia and the borders of Saxony. There the Imperial army joined this chain, and continued it through Thuringia and Franconia, where it was united to the quarters of the Prince de Soubise. Th•se troops had fallen back from Hesse Cassel, finding themselves unable to maintain their ground in the landgraviate. The Prince de Soubise's cantonments extended westward along the course of the Maine and Lahn, to meet those of the M. de Contades which stretched to the Rhine, and continued the chain beyond it quite to the Maese, so as to command the whole course of the Rhine, and both sides both upwards and downward. Prince Ferdinand was unable to extend himself to such a length; and especially found it impracticable to establish quarters on the other side of the Rhine; but he disposed his troops in the most advantageous manner in the bishoprics of Munster, Paderborn, and Hildesheim, and in the landgraviate of Hesse Cassel. The several bodies may all unite with ease, and support each other. To preserve a communication between this and the Prussian army, as well as to break some part of that formidable chain of the enemy, the King sent some bodies of his troops into Thuringia, who dispossessed the army of the Empire of several of their posts there, and they now threaten to penetrate still farther.

The King of Prussia, when he had a second time driven the Austrians and Imperialists out of Saxony, resolved to keep no measures with that unhappy country. He declared that he was resolved no longer to consider it as a deposit, but as a country which he had twice subdued by his arms. He therefore ordered those of the King of Poland's privy council, who still remained at Dresden, to retire at a very short warning. But if the King of Prussia had a right, as perhaps he had to consider Saxony as a lawful conquest, he certainly seemed not to consider the people as subjects, when he continued to exact the most severe contributions; and in a manner too, very little becoming a lawful sovereign; for he surrounded the exchange with soldiers, and confining the merchants in narrow lodgings on straw beds, he obliged them by extreme suffering, to draw bills on their foreign correspondents for very large sums. This city had been quite exhausted by former payments, and had not long before suffered military execution. And enemy that acted thus, had acted severely; but when a country is entirely possessed by any power, and claimed as a conquest, the rights of war seem to cease; and the people have a claim to be governed in such a manner as becomes a just Prince; especially when no extreme necessity in his affairs compels him to these rigorous courses. To retaliate on these miserable people some part of the cruelties committed by the Russians on his dominions seems to be very unreasonable, as it is but too obvious, that the barbarity of that people could not be restrained, however it might be exasperated by the total destruction of Saxony. Such retaliations are odious and cruel. We heartily wish we could praise the King of Prussia as much for his temporate use of his conquest, as for those wonderful and heroic qualities by which he obtained it. We might be considered as partial in our account, if we had omitted to take notice of what is alledged against the King of Prussia, when we have spoken so fully of the outrages committed by his enemies. It is now time to turn our eyes from this great theatre towards lesser events, but such as will employ us altogether as agreeably; the operations of the British •leets and armies in Europe and America against the French.

CHAP. XIII.

The burning of the ships at St. Maloes. Taking of Cherburg. Defeat of St. Cas. Operations in America. Siege and taking of Louisbourg. English army defeated at Ticonderoga. They take Frontenac. The French abandon Fort du Quesne. Conclusion of the annals of the year 1758.

IN the beginning of this year, the good condition of our navy and our army; the spirit and popularity of the ministry; the wise choice of commanders, in contempt of vulgar and trivial maxims; the prevalence of the contrary to all these amongst the enemy; gave us the best grounded hopes of a vigorous and successful campaign. Concerning the theatre of our operations there was some doubt. It was the opinion of some, that our push in Europe should be made on the side of Germany; and that we ought to strengthen the army of Prince Ferdinand with such a respectable body of troops, as might enable that finished commander to exert all his talents, and to improve to the utmost the advantages he had already obtained over the French. They imagined, that if an early and considerable reinforcement were sent to the Prince, whilst the French army was yet in a distressed condition, and if in this condition that should receive any considerable blow, they would find it extremely difficult to retrieve it: and receiving this blow, on the frontier of their own territories, the Prince might carry the war into France itself; and thus very probably bring matters to a speedy decision. That in pursuing this plan a diversion on the coast of France was by no means excluded: and that on the contrary it must, on this plan, be attended with consequences infinitely more important than it could otherwise; that otherwise, France might laugh at the little desultory efforts of an handful of men, who were to be embarked and dis-embarked with great difficulty and hazard, and which would always be obliged to fly at the first approach of an enemy. That whilst the French had only an army, greatly inferior in number to engage on the side of Germany, they would always find themselves well able to act abroad, and defend themselves at home.

On the other hand it was strongly urged, that we ought to make the destruction of the French marine our great object, and to consider all continental operations only in a secondary light. That by sending a large body of English troops to the King's army on the Rhine, we must necessarily weaken our efforts in America, and on the coast of France; and by drawing away all our forces, we must shake that internal security, which invigorated all our operations abroad. That whilst we maintained an army of 50,000 foreigners in Germany, it would be the greatest imprudence to send also a large body of our own national troops into the same country, and by that means not only squander away our men, but employ almost every penny granted for the Land service, out of Great Britain; a method which could not fail of exhausting us in a very short time. That the force already in Germany was sufficient to keep the French engaged, and that the proposed expeditions to France would, be attacking the coast, now in one part, now in another, and keeping all parts in continual alarms, necessarily detain a very considerable part of their forces at home, and thus make a powerful diversion, whilst it was pursuing what ought to be the grand perpetual object of all our operations, the destruction of the French maritime power.

The latter opinion prevailed; but it was however so far modified by the arguments on the other side, that after some time a few regiments were sent into Germany, as we have before related. These and better reasons, no doubt, determined the operations on the coast of France; but whilst the necessary preparations were making, their destination was kept an inviolable secret; and now, as they had the year before, inspired France with no little terror. Two squadrons, by the latter end of May, were in readiness for sailing. The greater under Lord Anson, the smaller under Commodore Howe, which was so designed to convoy the transports, and to favour the landing and re-imbarkment. The land forces consisted of sixteen battalions, and nine troops of light horse: they were commanded by the late Duke of Marlborough. They sailed from Portsmouth: but as soon as the fleet set sail, [June 1.] the squadron of my Lord Anson separated from the rest, and bore off to the Bay of Biscay, in order to spread the alarm more widely, and to observe the French squadron in Brest. The other part of the fleet, which was commanded by Commodore Howe, with the transports, arrived without any accident in Cancalle Bay, at a small distance from the City of St. Maloes. Here the troops landed without opposition, [5th.] and having fortified a post near Cancalle (a post by nature well fitted for defence) for the security of their retreat, they marched in two columns to St. Maloes. When the army arrived there it was soon visible, that the town, strongly situated on a peninsula, communicating with the main land only by a long and narrow causeway, was by no means a proper object of a coup de main; and though for want of outworks, it was ill qualified to sustain a regular siege; yet our forces were, for want of strength and artillery sufficient, altogether as ill qualified for such an operation. They were therefore contented with setting fire to about an hundred sail of shipping many of them privateers, [8th.] which lay under the cannon of the town, and to several magazines filled with naval stores. The damage was very considerable; yet, what is to be remarked, the enemy did not fire a single shot on the detachment employed in this service. Having nothing more to do on this side, they retired to Cancalle; and reimbarked with as little opposition as they met with at landing; [12th.] the land and sea commanders having made all the dispositions with great judgment.

Before the fleet returned, they reconnoitred the town of Granville on the coast of Normandy; but finding that a large body of troops were encamped in the neighbourhood, they made no attempt there. From thence they moved towards Cherbourg, and made the proper dispositions for landing near that place; but a hard gale blowing into the shore, and the transports beginning to fall foul on each other, it became extremely hazardous to attempt landing. Besides, the provision was near exhausted, and the soldiers by being so long cooped up in the transports, were grown sickly. It became highly necessary to return home, and they arrived at St. Helen's on the 29th-of June.

The success of this expedition, by which the French suffered largely, with scarce any loss on our side, though it sufficiently answered the intention of the armament, fell somewhat short of the expectations of the public, who had formed much greater hopes, than it was possible for the nature of such enterprises to fulfil. However, their hopes were again revived; by seeing that every thing was prepared for another expedition, and that our armies and fleets were to be kept in constant action during the summer. The time was now come when we were to turn the tables upon France, and to retaliate by real attacks, the terrors which had been raised by her menaces of an invasion. The Duke of Marlborough had now taken the command of the English forces in Germany; and General Bligh succeeded him in this command. Prince Edward resolved to go upon the expedition, and to form himself for the service of his country under so brave and able a commander as Howe. It is easy to imagine, how much the spirit, the presence and example of the gallant young Prince, who went with the utmost chearfulness through all the detail of a midshipman's duty, inspired both the seamen and the troops.

On the first of August, the fleet set sail from St. Helen's. In a few days they came to anchor before Cherbourg. The French had drawn a line strengthened by forts, along the most propable places for landing. They had drawn down three regiments of regular troops, and a considerable body of militia to the shore, and had in all appearance threatened a very resolute opposition to the descent of the English forces. But the Commodore disposed the men of war and bomb ketches so judiciously, and made so sharp a fire upon the enemy, that they never ventured out of their entrenchments; [Aug. 6.] so that the landing was effected in excellent order, and with very little loss. The French who made so poor an opposition to the landing, had still many advantages from the nature of the ground which they occupied; but they neglected them all; and abandoning by a most shameful despair their forts and lines on the coast, they suffered the English to enter Cherbourg the day after the landing, without throwing the least obstacle in their way. It must be remembered too, that the whole number of the English forces on this expedition was rather short of 6000 men.

Cherbourg is on the land side an open town; neither is it very strongly defended towards the sea. The harbour is naturally bad. But the place is well situated, in the midst of the channel, for protecting the French, and annoying the English commerce in time of war and perhaps for facilitating an invasion on England itself. Monsieur Belidor the famous engineer, had demonstrated its importance, and proposed a plan for the improvement and defence of the harbour, as well as for the fortifications of the town. This plan was approved and partly put in execution by the building of a mole, digging a bason and making sluices and flood gates with excellent materials and a vast expence. The work had been for a considerable time discontinued; but in this expedition, that work of so great ingenuity, charge, and labour, was totally destroyed. Whilst our humanity regrets the unhappy necessity of war, we cannot help thinking that the English nation was freed by the success of this expedition, from what might one day be cause of no trivial alarms.

When this work of destruction was over, all the vessels in the harbour burned, and hostages taken for the contributions levied on the town, the forces reimbarked, with great speed and safety without any interruption from the enemy, [16th.] and with the same expedition, care and conduct, as they had been first landed; the army having continued ten days unmolested in France.

The Nation exulted greatly in this advantage, especially as it almost accompanied the news of our glorious successes in America. Nothing was omitted to give the action its utmost eclat; the brass cannon and mortars taken at Cherbourg, were drawn from Kensington to the tower, quite through the city, in great pomp and order, adorned with streamers, [Sept. 16.] attended by guards, drums, music, and whatever else might draw the attention of the vulgar. They who censured this procession as too ostentatious, did not consider, how forcibly things of this nature strike upon ordinary minds, and how greatly they contribute to keep the people in good humour to support the many charges and losses that are incident to the most successful war.

The fleet when it left Cherbourg, was driven to the coast of England; but the troops were not disembarked; it was resolved, that the coast of France should have no respite; and accordingly they sailed towards St. Maloes, and landed in the bay of St. Lunar at a small distance from the town of St. Maloes. This choice of a place for landing, must necessarily have surprised all those who remembered upon what reasons the attempt against that place had been so recently laid aside. There was no other object of sufficient consideration near it. The town was at least in as good a posture of defence as it had been then; and the force which was to attack it had since then been considerably lessened. There is undoubtedly something very unaccountable as well in the choice as in the whole conduct of this affair. The persons in the principal commands, shifted the blame from one to another. There is nothing more remote from our design, than to set up for judges in matters of this nature; or ungenerously to lean on any officer, who, meaning well to the service of his country, by some misfortune or mistake fails in such hazardous and intricate enterprises. We shall be satisfied with relating the facts as they happened.

As soon as the troops were landed in the bay of St. Lunar, it became evident that the design against St. Maloes was utterly impracticable. Other projects were then proposed, but they all seemed equally liable to objection. Whilst they debated concerning a plan for their operations, the fleet was in the greatest danger. The bay of St. Lunar is extremely rocky; and the experience of the people of the country, together with what he saw himself, convinced the Commodore that it was impossible to remain any longer in this road with tolerable safety. Therefore he moved up to the bay of St. Cas, about three leagues to the westward.

The fleet was separated from the land forces; but it was still easy to preserve a communication between them; and as no attack was yet apprehended, they made no scruple to penetrate farther into the country. In two days they arrived at the village of Matignon, having had several skirmishes with small bodies of the enemy, who from time to time appeared on their flanks, and who always disappeared when they were briskly encountered. By this time the Duke d'Aiguillon, Governor of Britanny, was advanced within six miles of the English army, with a body of twelve battalions and six squadrons of regular troops, and two regiments of militia. This determined the council of war to retreat; they wanted but three miles to the bay of St. Cas. But in this little march a considerable time was consumed, and the French army was close upon them before they could be compleatly reimbarked. A very steep hill formed a sort of amphitheatre about the bay of St. Cas, where the embarkation was making; but before the last division, which consisted of all the grenadiers of the army, and the first regiment of the guards, could get off, the French had marched down this hill, through an hollow way, and formed themselves in a long line against the few English troops that remained. There remained in this exigency only the expedient of assuming a bold countenance, and attacking them with vigour. The bravery of our troops on this desperate occasion, was worthy of a better fortune. The ships and frigates seconded their efforts, and made a severe fire upon the enemy. All was to no purpose; their ammunition was at last spent; the enemies numbers prevailed; our little body attempted to retreat, but they fell into confusion, they broke, an horrible slaughter followed, many ran into the water and met their fate in that element. The shore was covered with dead bodies. General Drury was drowned. Sir John Armitage, a young volunteer of great fortune and hopes, was shot through the head. Several officers, men of large fortune and consideration fell. At length the firing of the frigates ceased, and the French immediately gave quarter. About 400 were made prisoners, 600 were killed and wounded.

In the midst of this carnage, in the midst of a fire that staggered the bravest seamen who managed the boats, Commodore Howe exhibited a noble example of intrepidity and fortitude, by ordering himself to be rowed in his own boat through the thickest of the fire, to encourage all that were engaged in that service, and to bring off as many men as his vessel could carry.

This affair dispirited the people of England, and elated the people of France far more than an affair of so little consequence ought to have done. It was in fact no more than the cutting off a rear guard. There is often more bloodshed in skirmishes in Germany, which make no figure in the Gazettes. And certainly, if our expeditions to the coast of France were planned with any judgment, on our part we had rather reason to congratulate ourselves that we were able to land three times on that coast, with so inconsiderable a loss. The French indeed had reason to magnify this loss; and they did greatly magnify it in order to console their people, who had seen their trade suffer so much, and their country so long insulted with impunity.

Mayjor General AMHERST.

Whatever our successes were on the coast of France, they did not affect us in the same manner with those which we had in America. From this part of the world we had long been strangers to any thing, but delays, misfortunes, disappointments, and disgraces. But the spirit which had been roused at home, diffused itself into all parts of the world where we had any concern, and invigorated all our operations.

Admiral Boscawen with a powerful fleet of men of war and several transports sailed for Halifax from England. Feb. the 19th. He had the chief command in the expedition against Louisbourg, and in particular the direction of the naval operations. General Amherst, from whose character great things were expected, and who justified these expectations, was to command the land forces. These amounted to about 14000 men, including some light troops, fitted for the peculiar service of the country. The whole fleet consisting of 151 ships, set sail from the harbour of Halifax. On the second of June they appeared before Louisbourg. They were six days on the coast before a landing was found practicable; such a prodigious surf swelled all along the shore, that no boat could possibly live near it. The French not trusting to this obstacle, had drawn intrenchments in every part where it might be possible to land, supported them with batteries in convenient places, and lined them with numerous infantry. At length the surf though violent at best, [June 8.] was observed to be somewhat abated, and the Admiral and General did not lose a moment to avail themselves of this opportunity of landing; they made all their dispositions for it with the highest judgment. They ordered the frigates towards the enemies right and left, to rake them on their flanks. Then the troops were disposed for landing in three divisions. That on the left was commanded by General Wolfe, and was destined to the real attack. The divisions in the centre to the right, were only designed for feigned attacks, to draw the enemies attention to all parts, and to distract their defence.

When the fire of the frigates continued about a quarter of an hour, General Wolfe's division moved towards the land; the enemy reserved their shot until the boats were near in shore, and then directed the whole fire of their cannon and musquetry upon them. The surf aided their 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 fire. Many of the boats overset, many were broken to pieces, the men jumped into the water, some were killed, some drowned; the rest supported and encouraged in all difficulties, by the example, spirit, and conduct of their truly gallant commander, gained the shore, took post, fell upon the enemy with such order and resolution, that they soon obliged them to fly in confusion. As soon as this post was made good, and centre moved towards the left, and the right followed the centre, so that the landing was compleated, though not without much time and trouble, in an excellent order, and with little loss.

The operations of a siege are too minute and interesting to make a detail of them agreeable to readers, who are not conversant in the art military. The operations against Louisbourg for several days went on very slowly, owing entirely to the prodigious surf and the rough weather, which made it extremely difficult to land the artillery, stores, and instruments to be employed in the siege; however, the excellent conduct of the Generals Amherst and Wolfe, by degrees overcame all the difficulties of the weather, which was extremely unfavourable, the ground which was rugged in some places and boggy in others, and the resistance of the garrison which was considerable. The French had five men of war of the line in the harbour, who could bring all their guns to bear upon the approaches of the English troops. The first thing done was to secure a point called the lighthouse battery, from whence they might play upon these vessels, and on the batteries on the other side of the harbour. General Wolfe performed this service with his usual vigour and celerity, and took possession of this and all the other posts in that quarter. [June 12.] His fire from this post on the 25th silenced the island battery, which was that most immediately opposed to his; but the ships still continued to bear upon him until the 21st of the following month, when one of them blew up, and communicating the fire to two others, they also were in a short time consumed to the water edge. This was a loss not to be repaired; the approaches drew near the covered way, and things were in a good condition for making a lodgment in it; the enemies fire was considerably slackened; the town was consumed to the ground in many places, and the works had suffered much in all. Yet the enemy still delaying to surrender, gave occasion to add one brave action to the others, which had been displayed during the course of this siege. The Admiral who had all along done every thing possible to second the efforts of the land forces, notwithstanding the severity of the weather, resolved on a stroke, which by being decisive of the possession of the harbour, might make the reduction of the town a matter of little difficulty. He resolved to send in a detachment of 600 seamen in boats, to take or burn the two ships of the line which remained, and if he should succeed in this, he proposed the next day to send in some of his own great ships, who might batter the town on the side of the harbour. This was not more wisely planned by the Admiral, than gallantly and successfully executed by Captain L•forey. In spite of the fire from the ships and the batteries, [July 25.] he made himself master of both these ships; one he towed off, the other, as she ran aground, was set on fire.

This stroke, in support of the spirited advances of the land forces, was conclusive. The town surrendered the next day. [July 26.] The garrison were prisoners of war, and amounted with the irregulars and seamen to 5637.

The taking of Louisbourg (a) was an event the most desired by all our colonies; that harbour had always been a receptacle convenient to the enemies privateers, who infested the English trade in North America. It was the most effectual blow which France had received from the commencement of the war. By the taking of Louisbourg, she lost the only place from whence she could carry on the cod 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 fishery; and the only place she had in a convenient situation for the reinforcements that were sent to support the war in the other parts of America; and with Louisbourg fell the island of St. John's, and whatever other inferior stations they had for carrying on the fishery towards Gaspesie and the bay de Chaleurs, which our ships soon after this event entirely destroyed. It is incredible how much this success in America, joined to the spirit of our other measures, operated to raise our military reputation in Europe, and to sink that of France, and consequently how much it influenced our most essential interests and those of our allies.

The plan of our operations in America were, however, 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 by no means confined solely to this object, important as it was. Two other attempts were proposed: the first attempt was with a great force to drive the French from Ticonderoga and Crown Point; in which, if we could succeed, the enemy would lose those posts from which they were in the best condition to molest our colonies, and by 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 losing them, would lay open an easy road into the very heart of their settlements in Canada. The second attempt was to be made with a considerable, though an interior force, from Pensylvania against Fort du Quesne: the success of this attempt would establish us in the possession of the Ohio, (See the map of America at the latter end) and break off the connexion between Canada and Louisiana.

Gen. Abercrombie, commander in chief of our forces in America, conducted the first of those expeditions. He embarked upon Lake George with near 16,000 troops, regulars and provincials, and a numerous artillery on the 5th of July; and after a prosperous navigation, arrived the next day at the place where it had been proposed to make the landing. They landed without opposition. The enemies advanced guards fled at their appearance. The English army 〈1 page duplicate〉
A PLAN of the HARBOUR and TOWN of LOUISBOURG in the ISLAND of CAPE BRETON Drawn on the Spot.

proceeded in four columns to Ticonderoga. As the country through which their march lay was difficult and woody, and the guides which conducted the march to this unknown country, were extremely unskilful, the troops were bewildered, the columns broke and fell in upon one another. Whilst they marched on in this alarming disorder, the advanced guard of the French, who had lately fled before them, was bewildered in the same manner; and in the same disorder fell in with our forces. A skirmish ensued, in which this party was quickly defeated with the loss of near 300 killed, and 148 prisoners. The loss on the English side was inconsiderable in numbers; but great in consequence. Lord Howe was killed. This gallant man, from the moment he landed in America, had wisely conformed and made his regiment conform to the kind of service which the country required. He did not suffer any under him to encumber themselves with superfluous baggage; he himself set the example, and fared like a common soldier. The first to encounter danger, to endure hunger, to support fatigue; rigid in his discipline, but easy in his manners, his officers and soldiers readily obeyed the commander, because they loved the man; and now at the moment when such abilities, and such an example were the most wanted, was fatally lost, a life which was long enough for his honour but not for his country. It adds indeed to the glory of such a death, and to the consolation of his country, that we still possess the heir of his titles, his fortunes and his virtues, whilst we tremble to see the same virtues exposing themselves to the same dangers.[*]

Excepting this loss, the army had hitherto proceeded successfully. In a little time they appeared before Ticonderoga. This is a very important post, and as strongly secured. [July 8.] The fort is situated on a tongue of land between Lake George and a narrow gut, which communicates with the Lake Champlain. On three sides it is surrounded with water; and for a good part of the fourth it has a dangerous morass in front; where that failed, the French had made a very strong line upwards of eight feet high, defended by cannon, and secured by 4 or 5000 men. A great fall of trees with their branches outward, was spread before the entrenchment for about an hundred yards.

The General caused the ground to be reconnoitred; and the engineer made so favourable a report of the weakness of the entrenchment, that it appeared practicable to force it by musquetry alone. A fatal resolution was taken, in consequence of this report, not to wait the arrival of the artillery, which on account of the badness of the ground, could not be easily brought up, but to attack the enemy without loss of time. They were confirmed in this precipitate resolution, by a rumour that a body of 3000 men were on their march to join the French at Ticonderoga, and very shortly expected to arrive.

When the attack began, the difficulty of the ground, and the strength of the enemies lines which had been so little foreseen, was but too severely felt. Although the troops behaved with the utmost spirit and gallantry, they suffered so terribly in their approaches, and made so little impression on the entrenchment, that the General seeing their reiterated and obstinate efforts fail of success, being upwards of four hours exposed to a most terrible fire, thought it necessary to order a retreat, to save the remains of the army. Near 2000 of our men were killed, wounded and taken prisoners; the number of the taken being very inconsiderable. This precipitate attack, was followed by a retreat as precipitate; insomuch that our army gained their former camp to the southward of Lake George, [July. 9.] the evening after the action. (b)

To repair the misfortune of this bloody defeat, General Abercrombie detached Col. Bradstreet with about 3000 provincials against Fort Frontenac. The Colonel with great prudence and vigour, surmounted great difficulties, brought his army to Oswego, where he embarked on the Lake Ontario, and arrived at Frontenac the 25th of August. This fort stands at the communication of Lake Ontario with the river St. Lawrence, the entrance into which river it in some manner commands. However, for a post of such moment, it was poorly fortified, and poorly garrisoned. It was taken without the loss of a man on our side, [Aug. 27.] in less than two days after it had been attacked. The garrison, consisting of 130 men, were made prisoners; nine armed sloops were taken and burned: and a large quantity of provisions amassed there for the use of their garrisons to the southward, was destroyed. Col. Bradstreet having performed this important service, returned. Many were of opinion, that so fine a post ought to be kept and strongly garrisoned; others thought that it would be impossible to preserve a place at such a distance from our own establishments. (c)

It is very possible, that the success of Col. Bradstreet greatly facilitated that of the expedition under Gen. Forbes. The General had had a very tedious and troublesome march, through a country almost impassable, very little known, and continually harassed on his route by the enemies Indians. An advanced guard of this army, consisting of about 800 men under Major Grant, had most unaccountably advanced to Fort du Quesne, with a design as it should seem of reducing the place by a coup de main; but the garrison suddenly sallying out and attacking them warmly on all sides, killed and made prisoners many of this party, and dispersed the rest. This was, however, their last success; for the body of the army being conducted with greater skill and circumspection, baffled all their attempts; so that the French being convinced by several skirmishes that all their efforts to surprize the troops, or interrupt their communication were to no purpose, and being conscious that their fort was not tenable against a regular attack, they wisely abandoned the place after destroying their works; [Nov. 24.] and fell down the Ohio, to the number of 4 or 500 men, towards their more southern settlements. Gen. Forbes once more erected the English flag on Fort du Quesne. [25th.] Without any resistance we became masters in the third year after the commencement of hostilities, of that fortress, the contention for which had kindled up the flames of so general and destructive a war. This place with its masters has changed its name, and is called Pittsburg, with a propriety which does not need to be pointed out. (d)

Notwithstanding the unhappy affair at Ticonderoga, the campaign of 1758 in America was very advantageous, and very honourable to the English interest. Louisbourg, St. John's, Frontenac, and du Quesne reduced, remove from our colonies all terror of the Indian incursions, draw from the French those useful allies, free our frontiers from the yoke of their enemies forts, make their supplies difficult, their communications precarious, and all their defensive or offensive operations uneffective; whilst their country uncovered of its principal bulwarks, lies open to the heart, and affords the most pleasing prospects of success to the vigorous measures which we may be assured will be taken in the next campaign. Gen. Amherst is now commander.

It would be doing great injustice to the spirit and conduct of the ministry, not to observe, that they omitted to distress the enemy in no part, and that their plans of operation were as extensive as they were vigorous.

Two ships of the line with some frigates, were sent early in the spring to the coast of Africa, [Mar. 9.] to drive the French from their settlements there. They entered the river Senegal, and in spite of the obstruction of a dangerous bar, which the ships of war could not pass, [May. 1.] they obliged the French fort which commands the river to surrender. And on the 29th of December following, Commodore Keppel, with the assistance of some troops under the command of Lieut. Col. Worge, made himself master of the island of Goree and its forts; the garrison surrendering at discretion to his majesty's squadron (e). By these successes, we have taken from the enemy one of the most valuable branches of 〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉 their commerce, and one of the most capable of abundant improvement.

From the East Indies we have this year heard nothing remarkable. It does not seem that the French, notwithstanding the great struggle they made to send out a strong armament under Gen. Lally, have been in a condition to enterprise any thing. It is said, and probably with good foundation, that the greatest part of that force was dwindled away with sickness during the voyage. Our naval force was exerted with spirit and effect in the Mediterranean. The French found that the possession of Minorca could not drive us from the dominion of the Mediterranean, where Admiral Osborn gave the enemies maritime strength such blows, as they must long feel, and which merited him the greatest of all honours, to be joined with the conquerors of Louisbourg, in the thanks of the representative body of their country.

The coming year seems big with great events. In Germany the affairs of the rival powers of Prussia and Austria, appear to be more nearly ballanced than at any time since the beginning of the war. This force is as great as ever, and their animosity is no way lessened. Great steps are taken to assemble powerful armies on the Rhine; whilst Great Britain has sent out two considerable armaments, one to the West Indies, the other to Africa; the success of which must go a great way towards determining the issue of the war. Other great preparations are also making on the part of Great Britain. In the mean time, the Dutch enraged at the captures of their ships, make complaints, and threaten armaments. The death of the Princess of Orange, which happened at a most critical juncture, adds more perplexity to affairs in that quarter. If we look to the southward, the clouds seem gathering there also. The imminent death of the King of Spain, will be an event fruitful of troubles. In this affair the King of Sardinia, the house of Austria, and the house of Bourbon, will find themselves concerned; to say nothing of the maritime powers. In a word, the flame of war threatens to spread in every part of Europe.

THE ANNUAL REGISTER: OR HISTORY OF THE WAR. For the YEAR 1759.

CHAP. I.

The inclinations of the Powers at war at the closing the last campaign. The King of Spain's death apprehended. Condition of the King of Prussia, Empress Queen, Russia, Sweden, Holland, France, and England.

WHOEVER reflects upon the conclusion of the several campaigns since the year 1755, will easily perceive that at the end of the last, the fortune of the several powers at war seemed more nearly upon a ballance, than it had been at the close of any of the former. The campaign was rather less bloody, than that which immediately preceeded it; and it was not concluded with any action of such an eclat, as could greatly raise, or depress the hopes of any of the contending parties. All parties became more cautious; because it became every day more evident, that the fortune of war was not to be decided by any single stroke, however considerable. The prize was reserved for the player of the skilful game; for the most attentive patience: for the greatest depth of resources. An equality of this kind seemed at last to promise Europe some repose. All sides might now give and receive honourable and equitable terms; and peace might be settled on that footing, on which it has been usually made, for some time past, in our part of the world. But the great designs entertained by each power; revenge imbittered by the blows which all had felt in their turns, the consideration of the vast expences that fell upon all, and which a peace at that time would have made fruitless; even the hopes arising from the equivocal appearances of the last campaign, estranged every court from the disposition to peace. Insomuch that there were no terms directly offered by any of the belligerent power; nor did any of the neutral interpose their mediation. Besides these, another cause operated powerfully; a great event was hourly expected about this time; an event which threatened to involve the Southern parts of Europe in the calamities of that war, that had so long wasted the Northern; and which, whenever it should take place, threatened to render the political system infinitely more intricate, and probably to give the war quite a new turn.

The late King of Spain, by the force of a conjugal affection, rarely seen in that dignity, since the death of his Queen had been given up to a melancholy, which preyed upon his health, and affected his understanding. His death, or incapacity, appeared inevitable within a short time. The King of Naples, Don Carloss, was next in the order of succession. In the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, it had been agreed, that the dutchies of Parma, Placentia and Guastalla, should be restored to the house of Austria, in case Don Carlos should ever come to the crown of Spain. These countries were at the end of that war, in the hands of the Empress Queen, or her allies. Her imperial Majesty had set up a claim to the reversion of these dutchies, on the extinction of issue male in the house of Farnese. But the ambition of the Queen of Spain to make all her children Sovereigns, put powerful bars in her way to it. This ambition was one of the causes which made the last so general a war. The peace of Aix la Chapelle, which put a period to that war, after settling these contested dutchies as an establishment for Don Philip, second son to the King of Spain, provided, that whenever the event, which we have mentioned above, should take place, that is to say, the accession of Don Carlos to the crown of Spain, then the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily should pass to the infant Don Philip, and the dutchies which formed his establishment should refer to the house of Austria.

The King of Naples, not without reason, looked upon this article of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, as injurious to his rights; accordingly he never acceded to it. No method in this case could be seen, which might prevent matters from coming to extremities, except the situation of the Empress, engaged as she was with a powerful adversary, who kept her forces strained to the utmost pitch. She was in no condition to engage in a new war, however interesting the object might be. Her ally France, who so ineffectually assisted her in Germany, could not probably assist her with more effect in Italy; she therefore seemed to have no other part left, than to acquiesce for the present, and wait in silence a more favourable opportunity to assert her claims. The event of the King of Spain's death has since happened. It has produced none of these immediate effects which were apprehended; and this probably proceeded from the cause which we have just now hinted. A dead calm at present broods over Italy. But in this tranquility and silence there are materials gathering, which may in no very distant period burst in a terrible tempest over that delightful country. They are very nearly the same that produced the last troubles there, and may not only revive them, but spread the horrors of war once more over all Europe.

Such were the inclinations of the powers at war at the opening of this year; their strength seemed also very entire; in particular, the resources of the King of Prussia appeared astonishing, after the great blows he had suffered; and after the advantages he had gained, but gained at so high a price. He was still able to shew himself the father and benefactor, as well as the protector of his people. In the midst of the devouring waste of such an expensive war, from the funds of his oecomony he was enabled to remit the taxes to those parts of his dominions, which had suffered from the Russian barbarity; he even advanced money to those which had suffered the most considerably.

To take a nearer view of his situation, we must observe, that the whole kingdom of Prussia still remained in the hands of the Muscovites. The dutchy of Cleves, together with his other possessions on the Rhine, could yield him nothing; they were held by the French; but in these respects, his situation was not worse than it had been, almost from the beginning of the war. He had to ballance these losses, the rich country of Saxony, which he had twice in one campaign wrested from the hands of the Austrians. Add to this, the renewal of the subsidy treaty with Great Britain, on the advantageous terms of the former year. These were undoubtedly great supports; and the King seemed as entire in power, and more advanced in reputation than ever.

But to a more critical examination, things had an aspect not quite so favourable. This appearance was rather specious than entirely solid; and whilst all without looked full and fair, within there was a decay of substance, and an hollowness that rung at the slightest touch. That incomparable body of troops, which at the beginning of the war had given him so great a superiority, no longer existed in the same persons. If his troops derived advantages from a long series of active service, these advantages were equally on the side of the enemy. His army had known what it is to be beaten; and it is no wonder, if a sort of weariness and despair began to creep upon them, after such an infinite train of unrewarded fatigues, when they saw that so many wonderful exploits had not yet ended the war in their favour. Many of his best generals had been killed in battle, or died, or had retired, or were disgraced. The hoards which he had amassed before the war, by this time must have been intirely spent; his dominions must have been greatly exhausted, both of men and money. Saxony could no longer yield such supplies as formerly. The indigence of the subdued inhabitants, set bounds to the rapacity of the conqueror. The subsidy of Great Britain did a great deal; but it could not supply the deficiencies on this, and on every other side. These circumstances, probably, made the King of Prussia more cautious and dilatory than usual.

The court of Vienna had as great burthens to sustain as the King of Prussia, and she had suffered much greater blows. That power has a strength, somewhat unaccountable and peculiar to herself. More deficient in pecuniary funds, than any other great power in Europe, she is better able to subsist, and to do considerable things without them. For by a long habit, the whole state is formed to its necessities; and the subject is more ready to supply free quarter, and to indure military licence than any other. The country is abundantly fruitful in all its parts. And whilst the war is carried on near home, an arbitrary government, operating on so extensive an object, can hardly fail of such resources, as must serve an Austrian army; which is still paid in a great measure, as Tacitus describes the troops of the antient Germans to have been; they have a plentiful table in lieu of pay. (a)

And indeed it must be owned, that there is no Sovereign, who is more highly honoured in his dominions, or obeyed with a greater mixture of love and reverence, by all his subjects, than her Imperial Majesty. So that having a very ample power, very willing obedience, a large territory and many men, not sufficiently employed in the arts of peace, it perhaps may be guessed, in what manner she has been able to supply her many and great losses, and to continue a war, like the present, better than states more abundant in money. She is besides, and this is a matter of no small consequence, supported by the countenance, the authority, and the forces of the Empire. And she has for her allies the first, and most formidable names in Europe. In the wars which this power carried on in the last, and in this century, though usually not very successful, she has always been the last to desire a peace; though frequently slow in her operations, she makes amends by an extraordinary perseverance.

This slowness could not escape general observation, in the actions of the last year. That the Austrians did not play with sufficient spirit, the great game which was in their hands, after the battle of Hochkirchen, and the entry of the Russians into the New Marche of Brandenburgh, seems hardly disputable. Perhaps it was that the court of Vienna, by an error common to many courts, but particularly so to this, and often fatal to it, interfered too much and too minutely, in the operations of the campaign.

It is not impossible that the character of Marshal Daun himself, might have had some share in this inactivity; a character almost in all things the direct reverse of that of his Prussian Majesty. He saw that the King, active, resolute and advantageous, wasted himself even by that activity and spirit, to which he owed his most brilliant successes. Should the Austrians carry on the war in the same spirit, they might suffer in the same manner, without being ever able to equal, much less to exceed that great Monarch, in a stile of action peculiarly his own. Daun therefore by principle, seems to have kept his army from coming to action, in order to oppose a strength entire, and recruited by a long rest, to that of the King of Prussia, wasted by the efforts it was obliged to make incessantly, and on every side. His design seemed to be, that the issue of the war should rather arise from the general result and concurrence of all the operations, gradually producing a solid though a slow advantage, than from the effects of a bold, quick, and masterly stroke. In fact, the Austrians felt all the benefits, and all the inconveniencies which usually attend this sort of conduct, a conduct which probably lost them Saxony in the last campaign, and which has secured them the possession of what they now hold in that country. The Austrians and Prussians watched the time and one another, and came very late to action.

The court of Petersburg still adhered to its old system, in spite of the late ill success of her arms, and all the efforts of the British minister, to withdraw her from her alliance. If she had some loss of men, it was the least loss she could feel: and she thought that whilst the war was carried on at the expence of others, the reduction of so near, so dreaded, and so hated a rival as the King of Prussia, and the opportunity of the forming her troops to service, and perfecting her officers, were objects of consequence enough to keep her closely attached to her first sentiments.

The Swedes preserved likewise the same connexion; but they continued as before, an inconsiderable, and inglorious part of the war.

Holland preserved her neutrality; but it was a neutrality little respected, and indeed in itself little respectable. Divided in her councils, attentive only to private interests, she disgusted the English, and neither pleased nor served the French. For some of the subjects of that republic had carried on the trade of France in their bottoms, which subjected them to frequent captures from the English men of war and privateers. This prodoced loud complaints in Holland, and warm remonstrances to the court of London. These complaints met with little attention, being in many respects but indifferently founded. The affair was drawn out in length, until the dispute was extinguished by the destruction of its object; some of the French colonies were reduced, and the trade in the others, grown too small and too hazardous to be continued longer with any hope of advantage.

The affairs of France and England were partly connected with the general system, and partly distinct and independent. France perceived that the strength of the English, and the exertion of that strength, increased continually in America; she knew from the natural inferiority of her colonies, and the feeble state of her navy, that she could not in reason hope for great success in that quarter; for which reason, although she sent a fleet under Mons. B•mpart into the West Indies, and some men of war, with as many store and transport ships as she could steal out of the river St. Lawrence, her great efforts were to be made in Europe; she had two objects, the recovery of Hanover, and the invasion of these islands; in either of which if she succeeded, there could be no doubt, but that it would prove a sufficient ballance for all that she had suffered, or had to apprehend in any other part of the world.

With regard to the first object, though it was difficult to attain it, and though if it should be attained, it did not promise to answer her purposes so well as the latter, yet it was upon that she chiefly depended. Hitherto indeed the success which France had in Germany, was not at all proportioned to the prodigious efforts which she made; she began to find herself much exhausted. The wants of the French obliged them to pay little respect to neutral, or even to friendly powers; so that the esteem and assistance which they had in Germany, diminished continually. They eat up the country, and seized on such towns as were convenient to them, without any ceremony: yet freed from all these restraints, their army had made very little progress; their generals had not displayed any great abilities, and their army, in itself very badly composed, was deficient in discipline, to a degree which is scarcely credible. They kept neither guards nor posts, nor centinels; a great part of their troops wandered from the camp into the neighbouring towns, and retu•ned drunk. Their councils of war were held in a tumultuous and disorderly manner; and all their designs were perfectly known in the camp of the allies, where a very different picture was exhibited, with regard to regularity and caution.

The French troops have several essential defects in their constitution, which prevent them from equalling those of Germany, and other nations. Several regiments are in a manner hereditary in great families, who placed at their first outset at a very high point of military rank, think it unnecessary to attain the qualifications, which lead others to it step by step. As to the rest of the officers, as their pay is small and their hopes littl•, few study the art military, as a profession: they serve because it is the fashion to do so, and that it is thought necessary to be a gentleman. Thus they dispatch their business as a disagreeable task; and having little to lose in the service, it is almost impossible to preserve a due subordination. The common m•n are little more than abject vassals, and therefore want that high spirit which in their gentry makes some amends for the want of knowledge and assiduity. And as they are corrupted by the example of their superiors, so by their negligence they are left without any restraint. The officers do not chuse to incur the ill will of their men, or to give themselves trouble, by exercising that wholsome severity in which the health and vigour of military discipline consist.

The German common people are indeed in a still lower state of vassalage than the French, and might therefore be supposed naturally, no better soldiers; but their bodies are more robust and hardy; their treatment is severe and rigorous, their subordination is most exact, which makes their discipline perfect; and Germany is so habituated to war, that all the people may be said to be born soldiers. These things give the Germans a great superiority over the French; a superiority which was more visible in this, than in any former war.

These defects in their army were increased by the low state of their finances, which caused their troops to be very ill paid. The French court made some attempts to keep up their credit, by changing their former methods of raising money. Mr. Silhoute was made comptroller of the finances, and the farmers general were removed from their former employment of finding the supplies. New methods were divised, which might stave off the entire ruin of their finances, until their armies in Germany could strike some effectual blow, or their project of an invasion, which quieted the minds of the people in some degree, should be put in execution.

With regard to the latter project, France had formerly found that the bare report of such a design had served many material purposes; but in England things had since then, been greatly changed. The threats of an invasion increased our internal strength, without raising any apprehensions; they in a great measure executed the militia act, which hardly any thing else could have put in execution; they increased the regular troops, both in their number and their species. England for the first time saw light horse and light foot. There reigned in both houses the most perfect and unprecedented union. Among the great men there was no difference that could in the least affect the conduct of the war. The dispute concerning the preference of the continental and the marine system, was entirely silenced; because a system took place which comprehended both, and operated in both as fully as the warmest advocates of either could desire. Never did England keep a greater number of land forces on foot, on the continent of Europe, in England, in America, when she turned all her power to her land forces only. Never did she cover the seas with such formidable fleets, when her navy alone engaged her attention. Such is the effect when power and patriotism unite; when liberty and order kiss; and when a nation sits with a happy security under the shade of abilities which she has tried, and virtues in which she dares to confide.

CHAP. II.

The allied army moves. Successful skirmishes on the side of the allies. Battle of Bergen. Prince Ferdinand retir•s to Windeken. Plan of the campaign. General Wobersnow's expedition into Poland. Prince Henry's into Bohemia and Franconia. General Macguire defeated. Bamberg pillaged. Prince Henry returns to Saxony. Hesse abandoned by the allies.

THE seizing of Francfort in the last year, by a most flagrant violation of the liberties of the Empire, had given the French and their allies the most material advantage they had acquired in the campaign; for it secured to them the course of the Maine, and the Rhine, and made it easy to them to receive every kind of reinforcement and supply. It secured likewise that communication between them, the Imperial, and the Austrian armies, and formed that chain, from which they derived no small benefit of mutual succour and concurrence in their operations. Much depended upon their being dislodged from that post; as well with regard to the fortune of his Britannic Majesty's army, as to that of the King of Prussia. Such a stroke must necessarily have the greatest influence on the events of the whole ensuing campaign. Prince Ferdinand, sensible of this, as soon as the season permitted him to enter upon action, drew his troops out of their cantonments; and at the head of thirty thousand men, prepared to dislodge them, before they could receive the supplies, of which they were in daily expectation. The rest of his army, consisting of about ten or twelve thousand men, were left to guard the electorate, and to watch the bishoprick of Munster. Some detachments of Hanoverians and Prussians had, in the latter end of February, driven the Imperialists and Austrians from the posts, which they occupied at Erfurth and Eisinach, and some places in the country of Hesse; this drew a strong body of the enemy into that part, which pushed them back; but the hereditary prince of Brunswick, who led the army of the allies through ways, before deemed impassable to an army, defeated them in some severe skirmishes; several places of importance were taken; several whole battalions were made prisoners, with their officers. The French, alarmed at the vivacity of this beginning, judged it but the prelude to something more decisive. Accordingly the Duke of Broglio took an advantageous post, near Bergen, at a village between Francfort and Hanau, which it was necessary the Allies should master, before they could penetrate to his line. This place he had made his right, and secured his flanks and centre in such a manner, that the attack could only be made at that village.

In this disposition was the French army when the Allies approached; they formed themselves under an eminence, and began the attack on the village of Bergen, between nine and ten in the morning with great intrepidity. They were received with a very severe fire, which the enemy had prepared for them; they made three attacks in the space of about two hours, and were every time repulsed.

Prince Ferdinand now observed that the enemy still kept a good countenance in their post, and that his own troops began to fall into some disorder. This able general, who never risques his fortune on a single throw, began to think of a retreat, whilst his loss was yet inconsiderable, and the disorder of his men easily to be repaired. But a retreat in the face of a victorious enemy, was hazardous; and the day was not yet above half spent. In this exigence he made such movements, as strongly indicated a design of falling once more upon the village, in the enemy's right, and of making at the same time a new attack upon their left. These appearances were farther countenanced by a cannonode, on both these posts, supported with an uncommon fury. The French deceived by these manoeuvres, kept close in their posts; they expected a new and a lively attack every moment; they returned the cannonade as briskly as they could; and in this posture things continued until night came on, when the prince made an easy retreat, without disorder, or molestation, and halted at Windeken.

In this action the loss of the allies was about two thousand in every way: that of the French was by no means less considerable. The allies indeed suffered nothing in their reputation; their countenance through the whole action having been excellent. Prince Ferdinand gained as much honour, and displayed as much skill, as could have been obtained, or shewn upon a more fortunate occasion. The event however was, in its consequences, far from indifferent; for the allies having missed this blow, the French still kept Francfort, and all advantages which they drew from that situation; they had time and means to receive their reinforcements; and they acquired in a short space such a superiority, as obliged prince Ferdinand to content himself with acting on the defensive, for a long time after.

The advantages which would have arisen from another issue of that battle appeared more fully, from the operations which were carrying on the side of Bohemia, and which probably were designed to concur with those of the prince, in some grand and comprehensive scheme. There is no doubt, that the army of the allies, and those of his Prussian Majesty, had determined to act in concert, and had settled some plan for that purpose; and though it should not be discovered with equal certainty, what that plan was, it may not however be unpleasant to trace it; as far at least as a reasonable conjecture, guided by the lights derived from the tendency of each operation, may lead us. For if we succeed at all, in such an attempt, it diffuses at wonderful clearness over the whole narrative.

It is not impossible then, that it was designed in the first place, to keep the Russians at a distance, until the latter end of the summer, by the destruction of their magazines in Poland. That on the other side prince Ferdinand should attempt to drive the French towards the Rhine, and to get between them and the army of the Empire; which having thus lost its communication with the French, prince Henry should rush out of Saxony, and fall upon them in Bohemia and Franconia, and cut off also their communication with the great body of the Austrians. Then the Imperialists, would find themselves situated between two hostile and superior armies; whilst in Bohemia, Marshal Daun would be either obliged to try his fortune single handed, with the King of Prussia, or totally to abandon that kingdom, into which it was in the power of the Prussians to enter, in opposite parts at once.

The first part of this plan was executed with great spirit and success. So early as the 23d of February the Prussian general Wobersnow marched into Poland from Glogau in Silesia, with forty-six squadrons, and twenty-nine battalions, where they routed some bodies of Cossacks; and after having destroyed several immense magazines, particularly one at Posen, said to be sufficient for the subsistence of fifty thousand men for three months, they retured without any loss into Silesia, on the 18th of April.

As for the second Act of this military drama, it was executed with as great success, and with some advantages more striking than the first. Prince Henry commanded the Prussian troops in Saxony, which the public accounts called forty thousand men. He had certain intelligence, that some movements, which had purposely been made by the King of Prussia, had drawn the greatest part of the Austrian troops, which had been posted as a watch upon Saxony, towards the frontiers of Silesia, He immediately took advadtage of this opening, and entered Bohemia in two columns: one marched towards Peterswade: [April 15.] the other, which was commanded by General Hulsen, made its way by Pasberg and Commottau. The first penetrated as far as Loboschutz, and Leitmeritz, the enemy flying before them, and every where abandoning or burning the vast magazines which they had amassed in all those parts.

The body under General Hulsen did as much service, and it had a more active employment. The pass of Pasberg, strong in itself, was defended by a considerable body of Austrians. General Hulsen having conducted his cavalry by another way, so as to fall directly on their rear, attacked them with his infantry in front, and drove them out of all their intrenchments; one general, fifty-one officers, and no less than two thousand private men, were made prisoners on this occasion. [April 22.] The Prussians lost but seventy men killed and wounded They returned into Saxony with hostages for the contributions they had exacted.

After this fatiguing expedition, the prince gave his troops a few days to rest, and then led them once more to action. He directed his march through the Voigtland, towards the army of the Empire; they entered Franconia by the way of Hoff; they attacked General Macguire, who commanded a body of Austrians and Imperialists. Here they were bravely resisted for the whole day; but the numbers and spirit of the Prussians prevailing, Macguire gladly took advantage of the night to make a retreat, having lost about five hundred men. A few skirmishes more decided the fate of Franconia. The army of the Empire retreated, as the Prussians advanced, and abandoned the rich bishoprics of Bamberg and Wurtzburg to contribution. The town of Bamberg surrendered upon terms; [May 16.] but some confusion happening before the capitulation was compleatly finished, a party of Croats came to blows with a party of Prussians, who had by this time possession of one of the gates; this was resented as an infringement of the capitulation. A pretence was given to plunder the place; it was given up to pillage, by order of the commanders, for two days, in a very unrelenting and licentious manner. This produced loud and just complaints against the Prussians, and in due time a severe retaliation. Prince Henry had pushed back the army of the Empire, as far as Nuremberg; he had disabled a great part of the circle of Franconia from giving them assistance; and thus far he had accomplished the objects of his expedition. But as that part of the plan, which Prince Ferdinand was to have executed, had ailed, it was impossible on one hand to hinder the French army from succouring that of the Empire, or on the other, to prevent a body of Austrians from availing themselves of his absence, to penetrate into Saxony. In these circumstances any farther stay in Franconia was useless, and might be dangerous. His army, loaded with booty and contribution, returned to their old situation. The Austrians retired into Bohemia at their approach.

Appearances were hitherto favourable enough to the Prussians: however none of the great ends proposed by the general plan were fully answered. The Russians, notwithstanding the destruction of their magazines, continued their march towards Silesia. Count Dohna, who had raised great contributions and levies in the dutchy of Mecklenburg, was preparing to oppose them on the side of Brandenburgh; other parties under other commanders, were posted at those places where their irruption was the most apprehended. The approach of this army brought things nearer and nearer to a crisis. The eyes of all Europe were fixed with anxiety and expectation on their progress. It appeared the more formidable, because the progress of the French arms was very rapid after the battle of Bergen.

Prince Ferdinand finding that another attack was not adviseable, retreated continually. The French possessed themselves of Hesse without opposition; they met as little in making their way through the bishoprick of Paderborn; and whilst their grand army, under Marshal de Contades, pushed the allies in that quarter and on the side of Hesse, M. d'Armentieres was posted by Wesel, to advance on that side as occasion should require. The condition of the allied army was extremely dubious; whilst the French increased in their numbers and spirit. Their new success gave them reason to hope for a campaign as fortunate as that of 1757.

CHAP. III.

Expedition to the West Indies under Hopsen and Moore. Account of Martinico. Failure there. The Causes of it. Guadaloupe invaded. Description of that island. Basse Terre attacked and burned. Gen. Hopson dies. Operations against Grand Terre. Several passes forced. The inhabitants capitulate. Bravery of a French lady, Marygalante taken.

GREAT Britain was not content with the efforts which she had made in Germany: America, the interests of which had given rise to the war, was the object which principally engaged her attention. This was indeed the proper object of her natural strength, and by her success in this quarter, she most effectually laid the axe to the root of the enemy's naval power, and cut away one great part of the resources which fed the war. A squadron of nine ships of the line, [Nov. 1758.] with sixty transports, containing six regiments of foot, in the end of the last year, sailed for the West Indies, in order to attack and reduce the French Caribbee islands. General Hopson commanded the land forces; the fleet in the expedition was to be under the orders of Commodore Moore, then in the West Indies.

Their first object was Martinico, the first in reputation of the French Caribbees, the seat of government, the centre of all the trade which France carries on with those islands; strong both by nature and art. This island lies in the 15th degree N. lat. The shore is on every side indented with very deep bays, which they call Cul de Sacs, and the sands, only discoverable at low water, form in many places a hidden, and almost insurmountable barrier. A lofty ridge of almost impassable mountains, runs north west and south east quite through the island; all the space on both sides is intersected at inconsiderable distances with deep gullies, through which the water pours down in the rainy seasons, with great impetuosity. In other respects, the island is pleasant and fruitful; well watered, and well cultivated, abounding with plantations and villages all along the sea coast. The two principal places are St. Pierre, and Port Royal; both town considerable in this part of the world, for their magnitude, trade and strength.

By this short description may be discerned, how desirable such a conquest was, and the difficulties which naturally opposed themselves to it. They were the greater, because at this time there was in the island a considerable number of regular troops. They have at all times a numerous and well armed militia, not contemptible for their discipline, and well suited to the service of the country; add to this, that they can bring into the field a large body of negroes, habituated to arms, and in general well affected to the interests of their masters.

The English forces landed without opposition, on the west side of Port Royal harbour, aften the men, [Jan. 6.] of war had driven the enemy from their batteries and entrenchments. But on their landing, they found that the nature of the country proved a greater obstruction to their progress, than the strength of the enemy. These profound gullies, inclosed by steep, and almost perpendicular precipices, proved an unsurmountable obstacle to the regular march of the troops, or the conveyance of cannon. The enemy had broke up the roads; and five miles of such roads, and through such an impracticable country, were to be passed before Port Royal could be attacked by land. The commander, therefore, of the forces, judged the difficulties on the land-side insurmountable; the naval commander held it impossible to put the cannon ashore nearer to the fort. Some jealousy seems to have arisen. The result of the whole was, that the forces were reimbarked on the day of their landing.

Very little was done at Port Royal; but it was hoped, that more would be done at St. Pierre. They accordingly set sail for that place; but when they had arrived before it, and examined the coast, [19.] new difficulties arose, which produced a new deliberation. They determined that the fort could not be reduced, without such detriment to the troops and the shipping, that they could afterwards make little use of their success; and in this they had probably good reason. The conduct of the officers afterwards plainly demonstrated, that no mean views had any influence on their councils; they agreed to abandon their enterprize against Martinico. But having been foiled in this their first attempt, they resolved not to return with the disgrace of having done nothing worthy of the greatness of the armament, and the expectation of their country. They considered, that the island of Guadaloupe was an object, though not of such an eclat, of full as much real consequence as Martinico; and they knew, that it was neither so strong in troops or fortifications. Their first failure might lead to an advantage, as considerable as that which they had missed. In pursuance of these resolutions, they set sail for Guadaloupe.

The island is called Guadaloupe, from a resemblance which it bears to a chain of mountains of the same name in Old Spain. To speak with exactness, Guadaloupe is rather to be considered as two islands, divided from each other by a small arm of the sea, or salt-water river, not above three hundred feet over where it is widest. One of these islands is called the Grand Terre; the other more particularly and by distinction, Guadaloupe; they are together in a circle about ninety leagues. The first is nearly destitute of fresh water, and not perfectly cultivated; but it is otherwise with Guadaloupe. No part of the world is furnished with more or better. No less than fifty rivers, in that small circuit, throw themselves into the sea; many navigable by boats, for two, some even for three leagues into the country. Not to mention the numberless springs which rise among the rocks, and, after a thousand beautiful meanders, lose themselves in the larger streams. The first accounts which we have of that country, are lavish in the description of its beauties; and the latest agree with them, that no part of the West Indies, perhaps of the world, affords more agreeable and romantic scenes. It is full of high mountains; one of which towers far above the rest, and is a volcano, continually emitting smoke and fire. From hence they have considerable quantities of sulphur. They have also hot baths, fit for all the medicinal purposes in which such waters are used. The land in the valleys is extremely fertile; it produces the usual West India commodities, sugar, indigo, coffee, cotton, and ginger: the mountains abound with game: so that there is nothing in the island wanting, for the convenience and delight of life, in an air more temperate and salubrious than is commonly breathed between the tropics.

The French began to plant colonies in this island as early as the year 1632. But for a long time this, together with all their other colonies, continued in a languishing condition. It was in the beginning of the present century, that they began to emerge. After the peace of Utrecht had given France time to breathe, she turned her attention strongly to these islands; Guadaloupe partook however less of this care than Martinico, and yet, by its natural advantages, it does not fall short of that island, neither in the quantity, or the goodness of its produce; if it does not greatly exceed it in both; as it certainly does in its capacity to receive all sorts of improvement. The importance of this island, until its late conquest, was very little known in England. The reason was this. By an old regulation, the people of Guadaloupe were forbid to trade directly with Europe, but were obliged to send all their produce to Martinico, from whence they had all their European commodities. A strange regulation, to be continued in an age so enlightened as this, by a nation so enlightened as France.

The English made attempts upon this island in 1691, and 1703; but they were neither powerful enough, nor conducted with sufficient ability to produce any permanent effect; the troops wasted the country, and retired with their booty. But on the occasion, of which we are going to speak, they were more able, strong, and fortunate.

On the 23d of January the fleet came before the town of Basse Terre, the capital of the island, a place of considerable extent, large trade, and defended by a strong fortress. This fortress, in the opinion of the chief engineer, was not to be reduced by the shipping. But Commodore Moore, notwithstanding this opinion, brought four men of war to bear upon the citadel; the rest were disposed against the town, and the batteries which obstructed the landing. About nine in the morning a fire from all sides began, which continued with the utmost fury until night, when the citadel, and all the batteries, were effectually silenced. During this cannonade the bombs, that were continually showered upon the town, set it on fire in several places. It burned without interruption the whole of this and the following day; when it was almost totally reduced to ashes. The loss was prodigious from the number of warehouses in the town, full of rich, but combustible materials. Nothing could be more striking, than the horror of the spectacle, from the mutual and unremitted fire of so many great ships and batteries, heightened with a long line of flames, which extended along the shore, and formed the back ground of this terrible picture.

In this lively engagement, our loss was very inconsiderable. The next day the forces landed without opposition, [Jan. 24.] and took possession of the town and citadel. Notwithstanding this success, the island was far from being reduced. The country is rugged and mountainous, and abounded with passes and defiles, of a difficult and dangerous nature. The inhabitants had retired with their armed negroes into the mountains; and all seemed prepared to defend their possessions bravely, and to the last extremities.

General Hopson died on the 27th of February, and General Barrington succeeded him. He embarked part of his forces for the Grand Terre, where Colonel Crump attacked and reduced the towns of St. Anne, and St. Francois; whilst this attack diverted the enemy's attention, the General fell upon the strong post of Gosier, and possessed himself of it; and thus the Grand Terre was in a manner reduced, and disabled from sending any relief to the other part.

There is a considerable mountain, not far from the town of Basse Terre, called Dos d'Asne, or the Asse's Back; thither a great part of the enemy had retired. It is a post of great strength, and great importance, as it keeps a watch upon the town, and at the same time forms the only communication there is between that town, and the Capes Terre, the plainest, pleasantest, and most fruitful part of the whole island. It was not judged practicable to break into it by this way; and all the rest of Guadaloupe was in the enemy's possession. Therefore a plan was formed for another operation, by which it was proposed to surprize Petit Bourg, Goyave, and St. Mary's, and by that way to march into Capes Terre, which might be easily reduced. But this design failing, it was necessary to attempt those places by main force. Col. Clavering and Col. Crump landed near Arnonville, and attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched at a post, strong by nature, called Le Corne. This was forced; another intrenchment at Petit Bourg had the same fate; a third near St. Mary's yielded in the same manner. An opening being at last made into the Capes Terre, the inhabitants saw, that the best part of the country was on the point of being given up to fire and sword; they came in and capitulated; their possessions, [May 1.] and their civil and religious liberties were granted to them.

Three small islands, near Guadaloupe, Deseada, Santos and Petite Terre, [19th.] surrendered a few days after, and on the same terms.

This capitulation was hardly signed, when the French squadron under M. Bompart appeared before the island, and landed at St. Anne's, in the Grand Terre, the General of the French Caribbees, with six hundred regular troops, two thousand buccaneers, and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. The capitulation was made at the most critical time; for had this reinforcement arrived but a day sooner, the whole expedition had probably been lost.

Thus came into the possession of Great Britain, this valuable island, after a campaign of near three months, in which the English troops behaved with a firmness, courage and perseverance, that ought never to be forgotten, Intolerable heat, continual fatigue, the air of an unaccustomed climate, a country full of lofty mountains and steep precipices, posts strong by nature and by art, defended by men who fought for every thing that was dear to them; all these difficulties only increased the ardour of our forces, who thought nothing impossible under commanders, who were not more distinguished for their intrepidity and skill, than their zeal for the service of their country, and the perfect harmony and good understanding that subsisted between them. There is nothing perhaps so necessary to inspire confidence into the soldier, as to observe that the offirers have a perfect confidence in one another (a).

It must not be omitted, that many of the inhabitants exerted themselves very gallantly in the defence of their country. A woman, a considerable planter in the island, particularly distinguished herself; she was called Madam Ducharmey: this amazon put herself at the head of her servants and slaves, and acquitted herself in a manner not inferior to the bravest men.

Soon after the reduction of Guadaloupe, [May 26.] the island of Marigalante surrendered itself upon terms similar to those which were granted to the former island. This is a small place, but the conquest is of consequence, as the French by this are left no footing in the Leeward islands: Martinico is one of those to the windward. These beginnings were happy omens of the success of the more important undertaking, which was to be carried on in another part of America. The reputation of our arms there, except in the reduction of Louisburg, had hitherto not been very great. But other commanders were now appointed, and other maxims prevailed. However, we postpone the narrative of these very interesting events, to consider those which intervened on the continent of Europe, in which too we are to see our arms no less distinguished; and to behold England emerging from the rubbish of low principles and timid conduct, once more become the pride and terror of Europe, and acting in a manner not unworthy the most illustrious periods of her history.

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CHAP. IV.

Progress of the French after the battle of Bergen. Munster and other places taken. Situation of the French, and of the Allies. Motions of Prince Ferdinand. Battle of Minden. Hereditary Prince of Brunswick defeats the Duke of Brisac. The French pass the Weser. L. G. S. resigns the command of the British forces; Marquis of Granby succeeds him. The French driven to Marpurg. Siege of Munster. M. d'Etrees arrives at the French camp. Project of France for an invasion. Havre bombarded. Action off Cape Lagos. French fleet defeated.

WE left the army of Prince Ferdinand upon the retreat, ever since the battle of Bergen. The French advanced with great vivacity; their light troops made incursions almost to the gates of Hanover. The Prince still continued to retire, but he left garrisons in Lipstadt, Ritberg, Munster and Minden, in order to retard the enemy's progress: their principal design seemed to be be to cut off his retreat to the Weser, to which he kept very close, as he knew the infinite consequence of that communication. However, if the enemy sailed to compass that object, all the
Brother to the reigning Duke of Brunswick L•••nburg 17•• His Serene Highness Prince FE•

DINAND.
precautions of the Prince proved also ineffectual to retard the progress of their arms. Ritberg was surprised, Lipstadt was blockaded, Minden was taken by assault, where a garrison of 1500 men were made prisoners, and where immense magazines fell into their hands. D'Armentieres advanced against Munster; he attempted to take the place by a coup de main. Though foiled in his attempt with considerable loss, he did not desist; he drew up his cannon from Wesel, and after a short siege, [July 25.] made himself master of the city; the garrison of 4000 men, became his prisoners. Nothing seemed able to withstand the rapid torrent with which the French over-ran the whole country; they no longer hoped, the conquest of Hanover; it was with them an absolute certainty. Elated with the fair appearance of their fortune, they kept no bounds. The French minister, the Duke of Bellcisle, in his letters to the Marshal Contades, speaks only of the means of securing their conquest, and preventing another expulsion from Hanover; and for this end proposed the most cruel and unwarrantable expedients. Nor was there less dread and dejection visible on the side of the allies, than pride and confidence on that of the French. The archives and most valuable moveables were sent off from Hanover to Stade. All things seemed hastening to the same posture which drew on the famous capitulation of Closter Seven.

In this general gloom that overspread the fortune of the allies, the Prince kept himself unmoved and attentive to his designs. He did not suffer himself to be disconcerted by blows, which he had probably foreseen, and the ill consequences of which he knew how to prevent. The body of the French army after the taking of Minden, had posted themselves near the city, to which the right of their army extended; their left was protected by a very steep hill; in their front was a large morass; and a rivulet covered their rear. Nothing could be more advantageous than this situation; and whilst they continued in it, nothing could be enterprised against them. The army of the allies, after a continued retreat, began at last to advance, and fixed their camp altogether as advantageously at Petershagen, a place about three leagues from the enemy.

Things were brought to that pass, that nothing but a battle could hinder the French from taking winter quarters in the electorate. There was no possibility of attacking them with any hope of success in the camp which they then occupied. The point was to draw them from that post into the plain; but the movements necessary to effect this were extremely hazardous to an inferior army, in sight of the enemy. The operations of Prince Ferdinand, on this occasion, displayed so penetrating and uncommon a genius, such a guarded boldness, such a certainty of the grounds he went upon, such a perfect possession of himself, that perhaps there is no instance in history of generalship so compleat and finished; for which reason we shall endeavour from the best lights we have, to draw out at length the several parts that concurred to form this remarkable piece; we could indeed wish that the authentick accounts of so very memorable an event, had been more clear and explicit; but we must content ourselves with the materials we have.

On the 29th of July, Prince Ferdinand forsook his camp on the Weser, and marched towards Hillen, a village considerably to his right, with the greatest part of his army: However he took care to leave on the brink of that river, a body under General Wangenheim; which extended to the town of Thornhausen, where they were intrenched, and supported by a considerable artillery. He had the day before detached the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, [July 28.] with 6000 men, to make a compass towards the enemy's left flank, and to post himself in such a manner, as to cut off the communication of their convoys from Paderborn.

The French were not inattentive to these movements; their Generals immediately held a council of war; and the result was, that they gave completely into the snare that was laid for them. They saw, as they imagined, the allied army divided and disjointed; and now the happy moment presented itself, for the attack of General Wangenheim, who they knew was not strong, and who seemed at a great distance from the rest of the army, so that it appeared impossible that he could be relieved. This body being routed, as it easily might, it was obvious that they should then be able to place themselves between Prince Ferdinand's army and the Weser, and cut off his communication with that river; the great object at which they aimed, through the whole campaign, and in which was involved the certain destruction of the allies.

Full of these ideas they left their advantageous post, and in eight columns passed the morass in their front, [Aug. 1.] and advanced into the plain. The Duke of Broglio was to lead the attack, by falling upon that body that lay near the river, which seemed to present him an assured and easy victory. He marched on, therefore, with great confidence; but as soon as he had gained an eminence which lay along his front, he was struck with the utmost surprise, when, instead of a few posts weakly guarded, he beheld the whole army of the allies drawn up in excellent order, extending from the banks of the Weser, quite to the morass, in the front of the late French camp. This was a stroke entirely unexpected; they believed the Prince to have been at Hillen; but he had marched up, and the whole army was joined in the night. This discovery for a while put a stop to the motions of the French; they were hemmed in between the allies, the morass and the river. Their situation was disagreeable, but it was now impossible to recede.

The allies, finding the French slower than they expected, began to advance, and threatened the enemy's centre. This was composed almost wholly of horse; but it was the flower of their cavalry, who anticipated the shock of the allies, and began the engagement. The brunt of the battle was almost wholly sustained by the English infantry, and some corps of Hanoverians, which stood the re-iterated charges of so many bodies of horse, the strength and glory of the French armies, with a resolution, steadiness, and expertness in their manoeuvre, which was never exceeded, perhaps never equalled. They cut to pieces or entirely routed these bodies. Two brigades of foot attempted to support them, but they vanished before the English infantry. Waldegrave's and Kingsley's regiments distinguished themselves in a particular manner this day; nor were their commanders less di•tinguished. The enemy's horse, which composed their centre, being entirely discomfited, and their right, which attacked Wangenheim, having made no sort of impression, they thought of nothing but a retreat.

At this point of time the Prince sent orders to Ld. George Sackville, who commanded the whole British, and several brigades of the German cavalry, to advance. That cavalry formed the right wing of the allies, extended to the morass, and if it could have charged at the instance of the enemy's retreat, such a shock at that time, and in that situation, would in all probability have left the French without an army in Germany. But the orders were not sufficiently precise, or they were not sufficiently understood by the English commander; so that there was some delay in waiting for an explanation. The critical minute passed away; the British cavalry lost their share in the glory of the action; and the French retreated in some order, favoured by the spirited and well-judged efforts of the Duke of Broglio, and the advantages which the possession of Minden gave them.

What is remarkable, the French attributed their misfortune in this battle to the same error in their disposition, which lost them the battle of Blenheim; that of composing their centre almost wholly of cavalry, without any proper support of foot.

The battle was over; but then it was that the effects of Prince Ferdinand's admirable dispositions appeared in their full lustre. The French not having been molested by the British cavalry in their retreat, had an opportunity of regaining their former advantageous post. They had, indeed, lost the honour of the day, and missed the stroke which they had meditated. They had likewise lost a great number of men. But all these losses and disgraces might be repaired, and there seemed nothing decisive in the day of the Minden. It had certainly happened, as it then appeared, if the Prince who foreseeing this, and neglecting nothing which could be provided, had not formed the plan of detaching away the Hereditary Prince in the manner already related. At five in the morning of that day, this young hero attacked a large body of the French under the Duke de Brisac; this body, though posted in a most advantageous manner, he entirely defeated, and obliged them to take refuge in Minden. The news of this blow came with an ill omen to M. de Contades, in the instant when the English infantry began to engage his centre. The enemy himself could not help admiring the dexterity of the stroke under which he sunk: and full of astonishment at a conduct at once so daring and judicious, paid the just applause to a General, who could detach with security so large a body from his army, when he was going to attack an enemy already much superior to him in numbers.

This happy stroke decided the affair, all the passes thro' which the French could draw succour or provision, were seized. They relinquished their strong post; they fled through Minden, and passing the Weser, retreated to the eastward of that river; thus losing all the advantages which they had made in the campaign, and forced to retreat thro' a country different from that through which they had advanced, and in which they had taken no measures to procure subsistence.

The loss of the French in this action amounted to about seven thousand men killed, wounded and prisoners; among whom were many officers of considerable rank. The loss of the allies was not more than two thousand. The English, as they gained the greatest glory, so they were the greatest sufferers. Twelve hundred of the killed and wounded were of that nation. The Prince on the day after the battle paid the due honours to these illustrious corps, as well as to several of the Hanoverians who had behaved in the same gallant manner. He did justice to the merit of the officers; he distinguished their names; and even particularised so low as captains. To some in the most obliging manner he sent considerable presents; and he omitted nothing to shew that he knew what it is to be well served, and how to encourage the troops and officers to do their duty with spirit and chearfulness.

Although the English had the greatest share in the honour of this signal day, and that the Prince acknowledged their merit in the strongest terms, (a) yet a cloud was cast over their triumph. There were some expressions in the orders for the rejoicing, which were supposed to convey a very severe reflection on Lord G. S. commander in chief of the English forces. The Prince required with an emphasis, which seemed particularly pointed, that his orders by his aids de camps for the future should be more exactly obeyed. In a manner still less to be misunderstood, he expressed his concern that the Marquis of Granby had not had the command of the British cavalry. Had he commanded, his highness made no doubt that the success of the day had been much more complete and brilliant. The severe insinuation concerning the disobedience to orders, and the invidious compliment to a subordinate officer, were clear declarations.

The news of a victory so glorious to our troops, and of a censure so disgraceful to their commander, came at once to England. In proportion to the joy which filled all hearts, in proportion to their opinion of the great general to whom they owed so seasonable an an advantage, was their indignation against the unfortunate commander to whom it was attributed that this advantage was not greater. The public, as usual, judged definitively upon the first charge. They never pardon a general whose error it is to fall short. In vain they are prayed to suspend their judgment, and to wait for a full discussion; the matter is already decided; they have a fact against an officer, and they look upon all reasoning in his favour, not so much a defence of his conduct, as the exertion of eloquence and artifice to palliate a neglect of duty. This indeed makes the case of officers particularly hard; but then it always shews them what they have to do.

The merits of the matter are still regarded in the same light by the public. But the heat, the eagerness, and curiosity of the first movements being over, the matter will be heard, whenever it comes to be again discussed with less attention, but with less passion too. It is not for us to deliver any opinion in so nice a controversy. We have in points of less moment hitherto declined it; and we shall always decline it until the proper judges before whom it probably will come, shall have taught us what to think. There is indeed no doubt that if the cavalry of the allies right wing, situated as it was, had been brought to act at the critical time when it had orders to move, the battle of Minden had proved as decisive as that of Hocsted. But whether it was a fault in the giving or the delivering of the orders, or whether it was some misapprehension in him who received them, we cannot but sincerely pity a commander of such admirable talents, who by the error or the misfortune of a moment, lost an opportunity that would have ranked him for ever with the Marlboroughs and the Brunswicks.

A few days after the battle his lordship resigned his command and returned to London. He was but a few days in London when he was deprived of all his military employments. The Marquis of Granby, whom the opinion of Prince Ferdinand, and the desires of the whole army had pointed out, succeeded him in his command. A generous and ardent courage, an affability of manners that flowed from no artifice, a manly freedom and openness of soul, a chearful and unreserved conversation, a munificence that knew no bounds, so many qualities of the man and of the soldier, endeared him to the whole army, and rendered English and foreigners, his inferiors, his equals and his superior in command, unanimous in his favour.

Whilst these changes were making, Prince Ferdinand lost no time to improve his victory, by the pursuit of the French, who retired in the utmost distress. The allies were not indeed able to overtake the main body of their army, but they nara•ed them extreme•y, and the French were obliged to sac•ifice a great part of their army piece-meal to preserve the rest entire. The necessity of providing subsistence drove them towards Cassel. The Prince pursued
THE MARQUIS OF GRANBY

them, obliged them to evacuate that place, and once more freed that poor distressed country from the French tyranny. The castle of Ziegenhayn, after an hour's defence, gave the allies about 400 prisoners. After this the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, [Aug. 23.] equally conspicuous in the greater and the lesser operations of war, [27.] made a private march at night in order to surprise a corps of French irregulars, commanded by the famous partizan Fischer, which were posted at Wetter, where it was convenient for the allies to encamp. This corps he entirely routed, killing a great number and taking 400. The French threw a garrison into Marpurg, in hopes of putting some stop to the rapid career of the allies. In effect this did prove an obstacle for some days, but at length the castle surrendered, and the garrison, consisting of between 8 and 900 men, [Sept. 11.] became prisoners of war.

Here a bound was set to the progress of the allied arms. Not that they were stopped by any considerable obstruction from the main body of the French in that quarter, but from some effects in another quarter of the unsuccessful beginning of the campaign, from which the battle of Minden had not yet perfectly disengaged them. Munster was still behind them, and still in the hands of the enemy, who had a powerful garrison in that city. M. de Contades, who even after his defeat exceeded the allies in numbers, and had now no further view of an offensive campaign, sent a strong body under d'Armentieres, which was reinforced by some troops from the Lower Rhine, to near 15,000 men, to cover that place. Prince Ferdinand had before detached General Imhoff from Cassel in order to reduce it. On the approach of d'Armentieres, Imhoff was obliged to raise the siege. But being soon after reinforced, [Sept. 6.] the French commander retired in his turn towards Wesel, the possession of which place had all along proved of infinite importance to the French in all their operations. The siege of Munster was again resumed, but the business threatened to be difficult and tedious. This however was the only rub which the allies encountered. In all other respects they were perfectly fortunate. They had driven their enemy two hundred miles before them, and at the end of the campaign, after all their efforts, and all their sanguine hopes of conquest, set them down just where they had begun it.

The event of the battle of Minden, and the subsequent misfortunes of the French arms, threw Versailles into the utmost confusion. Ths news of that defeat arrived just as the King was taking horse to hunt. He retired silent and dejected into the apartment of Madam de Pompadour, and for some time saw none of his ministers. The Duke of Broglio and M. de Contades mutually accused each other, for the ill conduct of that day. The public acquitted Broglio. Belleisle and his General Contades lost all reputation: but the duke still preserved his employment and a considerable part of his influence at court.

As soon as the first confusion and surprize of so unexpected an event was a little abated; it was resolved to send reinforcements to their army in Germany, and at the same time to send thither some officer of experience and authority, who might judge, and compose, if possible, the differences which subsisted between the commanders; as well as to assist in the deliberations for retrieving their affairs. Public misfortunes call great men from their obscurity. M. de Etrees was chosen on this occasion, and invested with an authority which he unwillingly accepted. When he arrived at the French camp, [Sept. 25.] he could not avoid a sigh on viewing of the ruins of that army, which had triumphed under his command at Hastenbeck. Howver, his behaviour to M. de Contades was polite and generous. The old Mareschal told him that he was not come to take his command, but to serve under him; and whilst he assisted him with his advice, he would receive his orders.

Whilst the French endeavour to piece up their broken fortune in Germany, they made some show of pushing the other part of their scheme with vigour. All their ports were full of the preparations for an invasion of the British dominions. Men of war, trasports and flat-bottomed boats, now almost a word of ridicule, were prepared with great diligence. They talked of a triple embarkation. M. Thurot was to command a small squadron and several transports from Dunkirk, which it was believed were intended for Scotland. This man from a master of a merchant ship became a captain of a privateer, in which capacity he greatly annoyed the English trade, and acquired a reputation. At a time when France does not abound with great men, his services in this way and his daring spirit, recommended him to a command in the King's service.

The design against England, as the voyage hither is the shortest, was to be attempted from Havre, and some other ports of Normandy, in flat-bottomed boats. The third embarkation, which was supposed against Ireland, was to be made from Vannes in the Lower Brittany, where a large body of troops was assembled, commanded by the Duke d'Aiguillon governor of that province. This embarkation was to be covered by the fleet under M. de Conflans, which was preparing with great diligence in Brest. Had this design been such as it was represented, and had it been put into execution, there is no doubt but such an attempt upon both kingdoms, at three different places at once, must have thrown the whole into no small confusion. But excellent measures were taken on the part of England to frustrate their designs, whatever they might have been.

A squadron under Commodore Boys was stationed before Dunkirk. Admiral Rodney was sent to bombard Havre, which service he performed with success. Admiral Hawke blocked up the harbour of Brest with a strong squadron, whilst a lesser kept a watch upon that of Vannes. These precautions were continued the whole summer, during which time the French proceeded rather slowly, but after the battle of Minden had destroyed their hopes in Germany, they turned to this object with the greater attention. What issue it had we shall relate in its proper place. But their first attempts on the ocean proved as unsuccessful as their arms on land.

A great fleet was equipped at Toulon, which some destined for America, whilst others believed it was designed to unite itself with that of Brest to favour the invasion. Admiral Boscawen who commanded in the Mediterranean, blocked up this squadron, until some unfavourable weather and the foulness of his ships obliged him to return to Gibraltar to refit. The French took this opportunity to sail out, [Aug. 14.] and they proceeded with great diligence to the streights.

They had arrived very near Gibraltar before the admiral had notice of their approach; but notwithstanding that our ships were not perfectly prepared to sail, the admiral used such great expedition that in two hours after the account arrived the English fleet was out at sea.

The English fleet was composed of fourteen ships of the line besides frigates. The enemy had twelve of the line. They were superior in the bulk of their ships and in the number of men, if they were inferior in the number of vessels; and it is the opinion of many persons of judgment▪ that if they had formed a line of battle, and fought Mr. Boscawen in order, they might very well have hoped for a better issue of this matter than they found. But the evil genius of France operating on the cowardice or incapacity of their commander, induced them to separate their fleet and fly. The English ships were newly refitted; they proved better sailors; and the men, animated with the spirited example of their admiral, engaged the French ships as they could overtake them; and they overtook some of them off Cape Lagos in Portugal. A brisk engagement ensued. Two of the enemy's ships, the Ocean and the Redoubtable, were run on shore and burned. The first was the ship of M. de la Clue, the French admiral, who escaped to land; but being grievously wounded, and, as it is said, having lost both his legs, he died soon after. Two other capital ships, the Centaure and Modeste, were taken.

The scattered remains of their fleet with difficulty got into the harbour of Cadiz, where they were soon after blocked up, and where they still remain. This action happened on the 18th of August; and it gave a great eclat to the British arms, which, in the same month, had triumphed so signally both by sea and land (b).

CHAP. V.

Count Dohna disgraced. Wedel succeeds him. The Russians enter Silesia. Battle of Zulichau. Russians take Frankfort on the Oder. Gen. Laudohn joins them. King of Prussia joins Wedel. Battle of Cunnersdorf. King of Prussia repasses the Oder. Soltikoff and Daun communicate. King of Prussia detaches General Wunsch into Saxony. Parallel of the King of Prussia and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick.

AS the King of Prussia's victory at Rosbach had given the Hanoverians an opportunity to free their country, it might be expected that the affair at Minden would have served to free his Prussian majesty from some of the numerous armies that oppressed him. But as this battle was fought in the middle of the season for action, and as Munster still continued in the possession of the French, Prince Ferdinand could not venture at that time, to make any detachment from his army in the King's favour, without risquing all the advantages which he had obtained from his victory. The King of Prussia was therefore left alone to struggle with the Austrians, Russians, Imperialists, and Swedes.

The Russians, whose motions governed those of all the other armies, left their camp at Posna in Poland, and quitting the Vistula, drew near to the banks of the Oder. They were under the command of a Russian nobleman, Count Soltikoff. Count Dohna, who had been ordered to oppose them, saw that their numbers were too considerable, and their posts too strong to be attacked with any prospect of advantage, so that he contented himself with observing their motions, and harassing their march. This conduct seemed more dilatory and timid than the circumstances, or the inclinations of the King could bear. He is said to have reproached that General in so severe a manner, for a conduct in which he was in all probability very justifiable, that he took the first opportunity to resign his command, and, under the pretence of recovering his health, retired to Berlin. The King immediately put General Wedel into his place, with positive orders to engage the Russian army at all events. To enable him to obey his commands, he reinforced him with several detachments from his own army. The positiveness of the King's orders on this occasion may perhaps be censured; but it must be owned, that the time required a course next to desperate. His hereditary dominions were in the utmost danger, and nothing but some great and fortunate stroke could effectually prevent the junction of the Austrian and Russians armies, an event which, of all others, he had the greatest reason to dread.

Fortified in some measure by the reinforcements he had received, and in consequence of his orders, Gen. Wedel resolved to attack the Russians on their march. [July 23.] They had got to Zulichau and directed their course to Crossen in Silesia, to get before the Prussian army, and to make good the passage of the Oder. The situation of the Russians was very advantageous; posted upon eminences, defended by a powerful artillery, and near 70,000 strong. The Prussian army fell short of 30,000; and they had greater disadvantages than their inferiority of number to get over. They had a bridge to pass, and such a narrow defile to struggle through, that scarce a third of a battalion could march in front. The ground was such, that the cavalry could not support their infantry. Yet with all these difficulties the attack was long and resolute. But this resolution made their repulse, which all these disadvantages had rendered inevitable, far more bloody and distressful. Four thousand seven hundred were killed or prisoners: the wounded came to 3000. General Wobersnow, an officer of great ability, was killed, and General Manteuffel was wounded. The Prussians were obliged to retire, but they were not pursued, and they passed the Oder without molestation. The Russians seized upon the towns of Crossen and Frankfort on the Oder.

The King of Prussia, since the beginning of the war, had never hitherto obtained an advantage where he was not personally present. His presence now became more necessary than ever. Since the action at Zulichau, the Russians had penetrated a considerable way into his territories, and had taken possession of the important city of Frankfort upon the Oder. He therefore marched with 10,000 of his best troops, to join the broken army of Wedel, in order to drive this formidable and determined enemy from his country. Prince Henry commanded the remainder of his army, which was too well posted to fear any insult during his absence. The eyes of all were fixed upon his march, and his soldiers, who remembered Zorndorf, eagerly longed to try their strength once more with the same antagonists.

M. Daun was not unapprised of the motions of the Russians, or the designs of the King of Prussia. He knew that the great fault of the Russian troops, was the want of a regular and firm cavalry, which might be depended upon in a day of action. This defect was a principal cause of their misfortune at Zorndorf in the last year; a misfortune which disconcerted all the operations of that campaign. As this was the only want which the Russians were under, so it was that which Daun was best able to supply at a short warning. With this view he selected about 12,000 of his horse, and there is no better horse than that of the Austrians, which with about 8000 foot, he placed under the command of Gen. Laudohn, one of the ablest officers in that service. This body was divided into two columns, one of which marched through Silesia, and the other through Lusatia. By extreme good fortune and conduct, with little loss or opposition, they both joined the Russian army, and were received with transports of joy.

In the mean time the King of Prussia, who was unable to prevent this stroke, joined General Wedel at Muhlrose, [Aug. 4.] and took upon him the command of the united armies. But still finding himself too weak for the decisive action he was preparing to attempt, he recalled General Finck, whom he had sent some time before into Saxony with nine thousand men, in order to oppose the Imperialists in that country. With these reinforcements he was not able to raise his army to fifty thousand compleat. That of the Russians since the junction of Laudohn, was upwards of ninety thousand. They had besides, taken a post, which they had so strongly entrenched, and defended with such a prodigious number of cannon, that it was extremely difficult and hazardous to attempt them, yet under these accumulated disadvantages, it was absolutely necessary that he should fight. The detachments from Count Daun's army already menaced Berlin; Saxony, which he was obliged to leave exposed, had become a prey to the Imperialists; and the Russians united with the Austrians, encamped before his eyes in Silesia, the best and richest part of his dominions. In short, his former reputation, his present difficulties, his future hopes, every motive of honour and of safety demanded an engagement; the campaign hasted to a decision, and it was evident that nothing farther could be done by marches and choice of posts. The sanguine temper of other generals has often obliged them to fight under disadvantages; but the King of Prussia's circumstances were such, that from the multitude of his enemies, he was neither able to consult times nor situations. Rashness could hardly dictate, any thing which in his condition, would not have been recommended by prudence.

When the attack was resolved, the King's troops put themselves in motion at two in the morning, and having formed themselves in a wood, [Aug. 12.] advanced towards the enemy. It was near eleven, before the action began. The principal effort of the King of Prussia was against the left wing of the Russian army. He began according to their usual method, with a fierce cannonade, which having had the effect he desired from it, he attacked that wing with several battalions disposed in columns.

The Russian entrenchments were forced with great slaughter. Seventy-two pieces of cannon were taken. But still there was a defile to be passed, and several redoubts to be mastered, which covered the village of Cunnersdorf. These were attacked with the same resolution, and taken one after another. The enemy made another stand at the village, and endeavoured to preserve their ground there, by pushing forward several battalions of horse and foot; but their resistance there, proved not more effectual than it had done every where else; they were driven from post to post, quite to the last redoubts. For upwards of six hours Fortune favoured the Prussians, who every where broke the enemy, with an unparallelled slaughter. They had driven them from almost all the ground which they had occupied before the battle, they had taken more than half their artillery; scarce any thing seemed wanting to the most complete decision.

The King in those circumstances wrote a billet to the Queen to this effect; ‘Madam, we have beat the Russians from their entrenchments. In two hours expect to hear of a glorious victory.’ This news arrived at Berlin, just as the post was going out, and the friends of the King of Prussia throughout Europe, exulted in a certain conclusive victory. Mean time, Fortune was preparing for him a terrible reverse.

The enemy, defeated in almost every quarter, found their left wing, shattered as it was, to be more entire than any other part of the army. Count Soltikoff therefore assembled the remains of his right, and gathering as many as he could from the centre, reinforced that wing, and made a stand at a redoubt which had been erected on an advantageous eminence, in a place called The Jew• burying ground. Nothing was wanting to finish matters in favour of the King, but to drive the Russians from this their last hope. But this enterprize was difficult. It is confidently said, that the Prussian generals were unanimous in opinion, that they should not endeavour at that time to push any further the advantages they had obtained. They represented to the King, that the enemy was still very numerous, their artillery considerable, and the post which they occupied of great strength; that his brave troops, who had been engaged for so long a time, in the severest action, perhaps, ever known, and in one of the hottest days ever felt, were too much exhausted for a new attempt; an attempt of such extreme difficulty, as might daunt even troops that were quite fresh. That the advantage he gained would be as decisive in its consequences as that at Zorndorf; and whilst the enemy filled the gazettes of their party, with frivolous disputes of the field of battle, he would be reaping, as he did then, all the effects of an unquestioned victory. That the enemy would be obliged to retire immediately into Poland, and to leave him at liberty to act in other quarters, where his presence was full as necessary.

These reasons were very cogent; and for a few moments they seemed to ha• some weight with the King. But his character soon determined him to a contrary resolution. He could not bear to be a conqueror by halves. One effort more was alone wanting to that victory, which would free him for ever from the adversary, which had leaned heaviest on him during the whole war.

Once more he put all to the hazard. His infantry, still resolute, and supported by their late success, were readily brought to act again. They drew on their bodies fainting with heat and labour to a new attack. But the enterprize was beyond their strength. The situation of the enemy was impregnable; and their artillery, which began to be superior to that of the Prussians, on account of the difficulty of the ground, which made it impossible for the latter to bring up any other than a few small pieces, repulsed these feeble battalions with a great slaughter. With an astonishing, perhaps, with a blameable perseverance, the Prussian infantry was brought to a second attack, and were a second time repulsed, and with a loss greater than at first. These efforts being unsuccessful, the affair was put to the cavalry. They made redoubled but useless attacks; the horses were spent, as well as those they carried.

It was just at that time, when the Prussian horse was wasted by these unsuccessful efforts, that the greatest part of the Russian, and the whole body of the Austrian cavalry, which had been hitherto quite inactive, and which was therefore quite fresh, rushed down upon them, broke them to pieces, forced them back upon their foot, and threw the whole into irreparable disorder. The whole army was seized with a panic; and in a few minutes those troops, so lately victorious and irresistable, were totally dispersed and defeated. The King did every thing to restore the field, hazarding his person, even beyond his former daring, and prodigal of a life, which he seemed to think, ought not to be separated from conquest. Thrice he led on his troops to the charge; two horses were killed under him; several balls were in his cloaths. The efforts of skill, courage, and despair, were made, and proved ineffectual; a single error outweighed them all. Scarcely a general, hardly an inferior officer in the army was without some wound. That of General Seidlitz was particularly unfortunate; for to that wound, the failure of the horse which he commanded, was principally attributed. It was to the spirit and conduct of this able officer, that a great part of the success at Zorndorf was owing, and the last campaign. It is known, that if it had not been for a seasonable movement of the horse, the whole Prussian army had then been in great danger of a defeat.

The night, and the prudent use of some eminences, which were defended as well as circumstances would admit, preserved the Prussian army from total destruction. However, this loss was far greater than any which they had sustained from the beginning of the war. All their cannon was taken, the killed, wounded, and prisoners, by the most favourable accounts, were near twenty thousands. General Putkammer was killed on the spot. These generals whose names are so distinguished in this war, Itzenplitz, Hulsen, Finck, Wedel, and Seidlitz, were among the wounded; as was the Prince of Wurtenburg, and five major generals. The enemy could not have fewer than ten thousand killed on their side. For hardly ever was a more bloody battle.

When the King of Prussia found himself obliged to quit the field, he sent another dispatch to the Queen, expressed in this manner, ‘Remove from Berlin with the royal family. Let the archives be carried to Potzdam. The town may make conditions with the enemy.’ We should in vain attempt to draw the picture of the court and city, on the receipt of such news in the midst of the joy, which they indulged for that which they had received but a few hours before. The terror was increased by the indistinct relation that soon followed, which gave them only to understand, that their army was totally routed; that there was no account of the King, and that a Russian army was advancing to take possession of their city.

The day after the battle, the King of Prussia repassed the Oder, and encamped at Retwein. From thence he moved to Fustenwalde, and placed himself in such a manner, that the Russians did not venture to make any attempt upon Berlin. He continually watched their army; a part of which, instead of turning towards Brandenburgh, marched into Lusatia, where it joined that of the Austrians. Here the victorious General Soltikoff, for the first time, met M. Daun, and amidst rejoicings and congratulations, consulted about the measures for improving their success.

The Russian and Austrian armies thus united, scarce seemed from their strength and their victories, to have any other deliberation left, than of what part of the Prussian dominions they should take possession. The King was twice defeated with a vast loss. He was cut off from all communication with the army of his brother Prince Henry; yet to the astonishment of all the world, the superior, the victorious and united army acted upon the defensive, and were curbed in all their motions, and frustrated in all their designs, by the inferior, the beated and divided. Nothing ever shewed the genius of the King of Prussia more fully, than his conduct after the battle of Cunnersdorf. In a few days after so terrible a defeat, every thing was in order in his camp. He supplied the loss of his artillery from his stores in Berlin. He recalled General Kleist, with about five thousand men from Pomerania; in presence of two such armies as those, of M. Daun and Count Soltikoff, he detached six thousand men from his small body, to the relief of Saxony, where the army of the Empire had availed itself of his absence, to reduce the whole country. Hall, Wittemberg, Leipsic, Torgau, and at last Dresden itself, had opened their gates to the Imperialists. With the remainder of his troops, he put himself between the Russians and Great Glogau, covered that city, which was the object of the enemy's designs, and saw them soon after, notwithstanding their two victories, obliged to return again into Poland; and to leave him free for the rest of the campaign.

What was done by the King of Prussia since that time, will be the subject of another chapter; after we have related the proceedings of the English and French in America, to which the order of time directs our present attention. But we cannot dismiss the affairs of Germany, in which two such battles as those of Minden and Cunnersdorf were fought, with events so different for the common cause, without observing something concerning the two generals who conducted them.

They are certainly in reputation the first in Europe, which probably never produced two greater men; though they differ as much in their characters, and in the kind of talents they possess, as they agree in the greatness of their abilities for war. The King of Prussia, rapid, vehement, impatient, often gives decisive blows; but he often misses his stroke, and wounds himself. Prince Ferdinand is cool, deliberate, exact, and guarded; he sees every possible advantage, he takes it at the moment, pursues it as far as it will go; but never attempts to push it farther. Nothing in the man disturbs the commander. In him, we do not see a person who is a great soldier; it is the idea of a perfect General; it is a general in the abstract. Ferdinand suffers his temper to be guided by his business. He never precipitates matters; he takes them in their order and their course, and trusts nothing to fortune. The King on the other hand, leads, and even forces circumstances; he does not endeavour to remove but to over-leap obstacles; he puts all to the risque; and by suffering Fortune to play her part in his designs, he acquires a splendor and eclat in his actions, which mere wisdom could never give him. Prince Ferdinand is famous for never committing a fault. The King of Prussia is above all the world, in repairing those he has committed. Like some of the great masters in writing, when ever he makes, or seems to make a mistake, it is a signal to the observer, to prepare for some great and admirable stroke of spirit and conduct. His errors seem to be spurs to his abilities. He commits an error, he repairs it; he errs again; and again astonishes us by his manner of escaping. We should often condemn the commander, but that we are always forced to admire the hero.

CHAP. VI.

Plan of the campaign in North America. Three expeditions. Ticonderoga and Crown Point abandoned. Colonel Townshend killed. Expedition to Niagara. Colonel Prideaux killed. Sir William Johnson defeats the French. Takes Fort Niagara. Consequences of this.

THE theatre of our operations in America, is of such a vast extent, that if we had persevered in the course we pursued for some time, in attacking but one place at once, the war would inevitably be spun out to an extreme length, without bringing on any thing decisive; and it would have rendered our natural superiority of little use, by suffering the French to collect, as they had hitherto done, their strength into one single point, which enabled them to contend with us, with a force sufficient for the service in that country. This year another method was followed. It was proposed to attack the French in all their strong posts at once; to fall as nearly as possible at the same time upon Crown Points, Niagara, and the forts to the south of Lake Erie, whilst a great naval armament, and a considerable body of land forces should attempt Quebec, by the River St. Lawrence.

This plan was very advisable, as it tended to weaken, by distracting the resistance of the enemy, and whilst we adhered to it, it was clearly impossible for the French to maintain their ground in any of those places which were attacked, without very weakly defending, or even deserting some of the others; and if, by the means of such diversions, any of those places should fall into our hands, the campaign could not be said to be spent to no purpose. But besides the end in distracting the enemy's defence, there was another proposed of no less consequence; which was to make a concurrence in all the various operations, so that whilst they divided the enemy, they might mutually support one another.

General Amherst, who commanded the American forces in chief, with the most considerable body, amounting, in regulars and provincials, to about twelve thousand men, was to attack Ticonderoga and Crown Point by Lake-George; the reduction of those forts would naturally lay open the Lake Champlain, where, having established a sufficient naval force, he was by the River Sorel, which forms the communication between this Lake and the great River St. Lawrence, to proceed directly to Quebec, the capital of Canada. Here he was to make a junction with General Wolfe and Admiral Saunders, who having entered the River St. Lawrence at the opposite quarter, would probably have commenced the siege of Quebec, by the time that General Amherst might find it practicable to join them. It was not doubted, that if this junction could be effected, the reduction of that city would follow of course.

The third of the grand operations was against the fort, near the Fall of Niagara; a place of very great consequence both in war and in peace. The reduction of this was committed to Brigadier General Prideaux, under whom Sir William Johnson commanded the provincials of New York, and several Indians of the Five Nations, who were engaged in our service by the credit that gentleman had obtained among their tribes.

The object of this operation lay too remote from the others, to expect, with any great confidence, that they could be assisted by its success in any other manner than by weakening the enemy's forces. However it was hoped, that if they should be fortunate enough to take Niagara, early in the season, the troops might be embarked on the Lake Ontario, and finding no longer any obstruction from Fort Frontenac, which was destroyed last year, might fall down the River St. Lawrence, and possibly either make themselves masters of Montreal, or by their approach at least, draw such a force to that part, as greatly to facilitate our designs upon Quebec and Crown Point. But if this scheme, in addition to its own end, should not facilitate either of the other two capital undertakings, it would probably, as it was the most important place the French had in that part of the world, draw all the troops they had upon the Lakes to attempt its relief, which would leave the fort, on those Lakes exposed to a fourth, though inferior expedition, which was made against them, under General Stanwix. In reality, it afterwards had that effect.

The army under General Amherst was the first in motion. The Lake George, or, as the French call it, Lake Sacrament, is a long, but in proportion, narrow water, about forty miles in length, and enclosed on either side with marshy grounds. This communicates by another long and very narrow streight with Lake Champlain. This streight is secured at each side by a fort; that to the side of Lake George, is called Ticonderoga; that to the Champlain Lake, is called Fort Frederick, or Crown Point; both extremely strong in their situation; and the former of which had repulsed our troops with a very considerable slaughter, as has been related amongst the events of the last year.

General Amherst, after he had passed Lake George, arrived with very little opposition from the enemy before Ticonderoga; at first the French made some appearance, as if they meant to defend the place; but as they knew the strength of our forces, as they saw that the preparations for the attack were making with as much judgment as vigour, and as the enterprize which was preparing against Quebec, did not leave them a force so considerable as they had there in the preceding campaign, they abandoned their fort in the night, [July] having damaged it as much as they could, and retired to Crown Point

General Am••rst immediately set himself about repairing the fortifications of this post, which effectually secured the Lake George; covered our colonies, and was of such vast importance, to enable him to push forward his offensive operations, or to favour his retreat, in case of a reverse of fortune. The only loss of any consequence which the English army suffered, in making this valuable acquisition, was the death of Colonel Townsend, who was killed in reconnoitring, by a shot from the fort. The steady bravery, the promising genius, and the agreeable manners of this officer, caused this loss to be considered as a very great one. They compared this melancholy event with the death of Lord Howe; they remembered how much these young soldiers resembled each other, both in their virtues, and in the circumstances of their fate. Both dear to the troops, and having both lost their lives on an expedition against this place.

Although the general had reason to imagine, that the same reasons which had induced the enemy to abandon their fort and lines at Ticonderoga, would persuade them also to relinquish Crown Point; he took all his measures with the same care, as if he expected an obstinate defence at the fort, and an attempt to surprize him on his march. He remembered how fatal security had proved to us, in that part of the world upon many occasions.

The French abandoned the fort as it had been foreseen. The general retired with about three thousand five hundred men to the bottom of Lake Champlain, and posted himself at the island called Isle du Noix. He was still pretty strong on the lake, having several armed boats and sloops, with which he hoped to prevent the progress of the English into the interior parts of Canada. General Amherst, as soon as he had taken possession of Crown Point, used every endeavour to attain a naval superiority on the lake, [Aug. 14.] and in the mean time began to fortify this post, as he had that at Ticonderoga. To this time the French were actually established in the heart of our territories; so that during a war of three years, we had in effect been only acting on the defensive. It was on the day on which Mr. Amherst took possession of Crown Point, that he received the agreeable news of the reduction of Niagara, by the troops under Sir William Johnson; and he had the pleasure and encouragement of seeing two of the great objects of the campaign accomplished, whilst he prepared himself to co-operate in the accomplishment of the third, which was to be decisive of the whole. The body which had been appointed for Niagara, under General Prideaux, without any accident arrived at the fort, which lies at the bottom of the lake, towards the south-west (a).

This is without exception, the most important post in America, and secures the greatest number of communications. For it is situated at the very entrance of a streight, by which the Lake Ontario is joined to that of Erie, which is connected with the other three great seas of fresh water, by the course of the ••st riv•• St. Lawrence, which runs through them all, and carries off their superfluous waters to the ocean. A little above the fort, is the cataract of Niagara, which is esteemed the most remarkable in the world, for the quantity of water, and the greatness of the fall. This fall would interrupt the commerce between the lakes, but for a road which the French have made up the hilly country that lies up the streight; so that there is here a good carrying-place, and not very tedious; for after a portage of about eight miles, you reimbark again, and proceed without any interruption to the Lake Erie.

As the great communication of those who go by water is along this streight, and carrying place, so those who travel by land, are obliged to cross it. The lakes are so disposed, that without a somewhat hazardous voyage, the Indians cannot any otherwise pass from the north-west to the south-east parts of North-America, for many hundred miles. The fort of Niagara, thus naturally commands all the Five Nations, and all those Indian tribes that lie to the northward of the lakes, as well as those that are scattered along the banks of the Ohio, Ouabache, and Missisippi, and according as it is possessed by the English or the French, connects or disjoints the colonies of Canada and Lousiana, protects or lays open our own, and is in all respects of so much consequence, that it was the opinion of persons, the most conversant in American business, that this attempt ought to have been made much earlier; and, that if such an attempt, made at such a time, had succeeded, it would have contributed very much to the security of those parts of our colonies, which were the most exposed, and would have, at the same time, greatly facilitated all our offensive measures, and shortened the war.

From the time that the French were acquainted with this place, they were fully possessed with an opinion of its importance, both with regard to commerce, and to dominion. They made several attempts to establish themselves here; but the Indians who seemed more sensible of the consequences than we were, constantly opposed it. They guarded this spot for a long time, with a very severe and prudent jealousy.

But whilst we neglected, confiding in our strength, to cultivate the friendship of the Indians, the French, sensible of their weakness, omitted no endeavour to gain these savage people to their interests, and they prevailed at last, under the name of a trading house, to erect a strong fort at the mouth of the streight, on the very best harbour, not only on this, but on any of the lakes; an harbour which is safe from every wind, and open for the whole year. A French officer, an able and enterprising man, had been a prisoner among the Iroquois for a long time, and having, according to their custom, been naturalized, he grew extremely popular amongst them, and at last acquired his liberty. He communicated to the then Governor of Canada, the plan of an establishment at Niagara, and he himself undertook to execute it. He returned amongst the Iroquois, and pretending great love for their nation, which was now his own, told them, that he would gladly come to make frequent visits to his brethren; but it was proper for that purpose, that they should allow him to build an house, where he might live at ease, and according to his own manner: at the same time, he proposed to them, advantages in trade from this establishment. A request, which seemed a compliment to those to whom it was made, was readily granted. The house was built. By degrees this house extended itself; it was strengthened by various additions; and it grew at last to a regular fortress, which has ever since awed the Five Nations, and checked our colonies.

The siege of this place had not been long formed, before General Prideaux was killed in the trenches, by the bursting of a cohorn. [July 20.] As soon as this accident happened, which threatened to throw a damp on the operations, an express was sent to General Amberst, who always attentive to the service, lost no time to send an officer of character to command in his place. But the command, which in the interim devolved upon Sir William Johnson, could not have been better bestowed. He omitted nothing to continue the vigorous measures of the late General, and added to them, every thing his own genius could suggest. Respected by the regular troops, dear to the provincials, almost adored by the Indians, possessed of that genius for acquiring popularity amongst all kinds of men, and that versatile disposition, which we so seldom see united with disinterestedness and integrity, he employed those talents solely for the benefit of his country. The troops, remembering, that it was under that General, the first advantage had been obtained over the French, pushed on the siege with so much alacrity, that in a few days they had brought their approaches within an hundred yards of the covered way

The French were alarmed at the imminent danger of this interesting place. They therefore collected all the regular troops and provincials, which they could draw from all their posts about the lakes, and to those joined a large body of savages, in order to give the English battle, and to raise the siege. The amounted in all to 1700 men.

When General Johnson was apprized of their approach, he ordered his light infantry, supported by some grenadiers and regular foot, to take post on the road to his left, by which the French were to take their route. He placed his Indians on his flanks. Whilst he took measures to receive the French, who came to relieve the place, he posted a strong body, in such a manner, as to secure his trenches from any attempt of the garrison during an engagement.

In this disposition he waited to receive the enemy. [July 1.] At nine in the morning the engagement began, by a violent and horrid scream of the enemy's savages, according to their barbarous custom. It was this scream, perhaps the most horrid sound that can be imagined, which is said to have struck a panic into the troops of General Braddock, and was one of the principal causes of that defeat, by which our endeavours in America were so long frustrated; but on this occasion it had no effect. The enemy was so well received by the troops in front, and by the Indians on their flanks, that in less than an hour's time, their whole army was ruined. The pursuit was hot and bloody; and it continued for five miles. Seventeen officers were made prisoners, among whom were the first and second in command.

[July 25.] This action was fought in sight of the fort; and it was no sooner concluded it favour of our troops, than the General summoned the garrison to surrender; sending a list of the prisoners, and remonstrating on the ill effects of their holding out longer, particularly with regard to the Indians. The capitulation was signed that night. The garrison, consisting of about 600 men, surrendered prisoners of war, and were conducted to New York. The fort and stores were given up to the English troops.

This was the second very important service performed by General Johnson in this war, and a second time he had the good fortune to make the commander in chief of the enemy his prisoner. It must not be omitted, to the honour of this gentleman, that though he was not regularly bred a soldier, the most compleat officer could not have made more excellent dispositions for the battle, or have conducted the siege from the beginning to the end, with a more cool and steady resolution, or with a more compleat knowledge of all the necessary manoeuvres of war. The taking of Niagara broke off effectually that communication, so much talked off, and so much dreaded, between Canada and Louisiana, and by this stroke, one of the capital political designs of the French, which gave occasion to the present war, was defeated in its direct and immediate object.

CHAP. VII.

The expedition against Quebec. The Isle of Orleans occupied. Description of the town and harbour of Quebec. Situation of the French army. Action at the Falls of Montmorenci. General Wolfe sickens. The camp removed to Point Levi. The troops go up the river. The battle of Quebec. General Wolfe killed. French defeated. M. de Montcalm killed. Quebec surrenders. Movements of General Amherst on Lake Champlain.

THE consequences which attended the reduction of the fort of Niagara, as well as those upon Lake Champlain, were very interesting; but the great and central operation to which all the rest tended, and to which even those were to be only subservient, was that against Quebec, the capital of Canada; and as this was to be the decisive stroke, it was proper that the greatest force should have been employed against it. If we reckon the maritime force, there is no doubt that we employed a greater number of men against Quebec, than against the Champlain forts; but the land forces, from some cause, fell much short of the number originally proposed, for they did not exceed 7000 men, regulars and provincials, though the original plan intended 9000 for that expedition, independent of the junction of those under Gen. Amherst, whose assistance on the occasion was taken for granted. In this expedition Gen. Wolfe commanded the land forces. The fleet was under Admiral Saunders.

[26th.]The whole embarkation arrived in the latter end of June in the Isle of Orleans, a few leagues from Quebec, without any accident whatsoever, notwithstanding the ill fame of the river St. Laurence, and the reports of its dangerous navigation, probably spread for political purposes. They landed upon the Isle of Orleans, which is formed by the branches of the river St. Laurence. This island is about twenty miles in length, and seven or eight in breadth, highly cultivated, and affording every kind of refreshment to the soldiers and sailors after their tedious voyage.

As this island extends quite up to the bason of Quebec, it was necessary to possess it in order to act against the town; for the most westerly point of this island advances towards an high point of land on the continent, called Point Levi. Both of these shut up the view of the northern and southern channel, which environ the isle of Orleans, so that the harbour of Quebec appears to be a bason landlocked upon all sides. The possession of both these points were necessary, as they might be employed either with great advantage against the town, or much to the annoyance of the besiegers; for whilst the enemy continued masters of those, it was impossible for a ship to lie in the harbour of Quebec. When these posts were possessed, which was done with little difficulty, the harbour and town of Quebec appeared full to the view, at on•e a tempting and discouraging sight. For no place seems possessed of greater benefits of nature; nor any of which nature seems more to have consulted the defence.

Quebec, says F. Charlevoix, can boast of a fresh water harbour, capable of containing an hundred men of war of the line, at one hundred and twenty leagues distance from the sea. It lies on the most navigable river in the universe. The river St. Laurence up to the isle of Orleans, that is for about 112 leagues from its mouth, is no where less than from four to five leagues broad; but above that isle it narrows, so that before Quebec it is not above a mile over. Hence this place got the name of Quebeis or Quebec, which, in the Algonquin tongue, signifies a strait.

The city is the seat of the governor and the intendant, and the supreme tribunals of justice for all the French North America; it is also an episcopal see, and a place of considerable trade. It is large in extent, and elegant in many of its buildings both public and private. It consists of an upper and lower town; the lower, which is narrow, is built upon a strand, at the foot of a lofty rock, upon which the upper town stands. This rock extends itself, and continues with a bold and steep front, westward along the river St. Laurence for a considerable way. Another river from the north-west, called St. Charles, falls here into the former, washing the foot of the rock on which Quebec stands; the point on which the town is built, thus becomes a sort of peninsula by the junction of these rivers; so that whoever attacks Quebec, must either make his approaches above the town, and overcome the precipice which I have mentioned, or cross the river St. Charles, and attempt it upon that side. The former of those methods must appear to a prudent commander wholly unadviseable, and the latter extremely difficult. If the former method should be attempted, they would have that dangerous precipice to overcome, defended by the enemies whole force, which the attack would draw to this quarter. On the other hand the country from the river St. Charles to the northward, for more than five miles, is extremely rough, broken and difficult, full of rivulets, gullies, and ravines, and so continues to the river of Montmorenci, which flows by the foot of a steep and woody hill. On the side of the river St. Laurence is a bank of sand of great extent, which prevents the approach of any considerable vessel.

In this advantageous situation was the French army posted, upon what was deemed the only accessible side of Quebec, all along from the river St. Charles to that of Montmorenci, entrenched at every attackable spot, with the river and sandbank abovementioned in their front, and thick impenetrable woods upon their rear. It is impossible to imagine a stronger post; a post at once more defensible in itself, or better calculated for succouring a city, on which side soever it should be attacked. Thus posted, they greatly exceeded in number the besiegers, being about 10,000 men, under an able, and thitherto fortunate commander, M. de Montcalm, who, though he was superior in number to the English, resolved to risque nothing, and wisely relied on the natural strength of the country.

When Wolfe saw the situation of the town, the nature of the country, the number of the troops, and their position, though of a sanguine temper and highly adventurous, he began to despair; but, however another commander might have thought inaction in such circumstances justified to himself, or even to the world, by such strong appearances, Wolfe resolved to leave nothing unattempted, but amidst the choice of difficulties which lay before him, to pitch upon those where the valour of his troops might be employed with the best prospect of success.

As soon as he had secured the west point of the isle of Orleans, and that of Levi, he erected batteries there of cannon and mortars, on the high ground, from the point of Levi, which looks towards the town; these fired continually upon the place; Admiral Saunders was stationed below in the north channel of the isle of Orleans, opposite to Montmorenci; Admiral Holmes was stationed above the town, at once to distract the enemies attention, and to prevent any attempts from the enemy against the batteries that played upon the town.

After this wise disposition was made of the fleet, Gen. Wolfe caused the troops to be transported over the north channel of the river St. Laurence, to the north-east of Montmorenci, with a view of passing that river, and bringing the enemy to an engagement. Some heights which commanded the enemies intrenchments, and a ford above, and another below the falls, encouraged him to this attempt; but upon reconnoitring the ground, the opposite shore was found so steep and woody, that he could not hope to put his design in execution, which was by moving towards the enemies flank, to draw them to an engagement. To bring the French to an action was his single object. He had found that any attempts to assault the city would prove to no purpose, whilst the fleet could only batter the lower town, and must suffer greatly by the cannon and bombs of the upper, whilst they were employed in this ineffectual service; for after the reduction of the lower town, the passages to the upper were extremely steep, and moreover so well entrenched, that this advantage would prove little towards the reduction of the place.

The only point left, therefore, was by every means to entice or force the enemy to an engagement; and to this end no means were omitted, by sending detachments up the river, and by every appearance of a design to attack the town on that side. But the Marquis de Montcalm, in chusing his post, was well apprised of its importance. He knew sufficiently the nature of the country up the river, and he trusted to it; and therefore kept himself closely in his post, disposing his parties of savages, in which he was very strong, in such a manner, as to make any attempt upon him by surprise absolutely impossible. In the mean time, from the town, fireships and boats were let down the stream to destroy the shipping, which, as they almost wholly filled the channel, were greatly endangered. But by the extraordinary skill and vigilance of Admiral Saunders, every vessel of this kind sent against them was towed ashore without doing the least mischief.

The general finding that all his efforts to decoy the enemy to an engagement had proved unsuccessful, and, sensible that they desired nothing more than to act defensively, until the season itself should fight for them and oblige the English to retire, he came at last, in spite of all difficulties, to the resolution of attacking them in their entrenchments on the side of Montmorenci. The place where the attack was to be made, was chosen with great judgment, as the only place thereabouts in which the artillery could be brought into use; as there, and there only, the greatest part, or even the whole of the troops, might act at once, and that there the retreat in case of a repulse was secure, at least for a certain time of the tide. Having determined upon the place where the attack was to be, which was at the mouth of the river Montmorenci, the best dispositions for it were made, both on the part of the Admiral and of the General. [July 30.] But notwithstanding that the whole was conducted with equal vigour and prudence, it was totally defeated by one of those accidents which so frequently interpose to the disgrace of human wisdom, and which demonstrates that she is far from being the sole arbitress of war.

The English grenadiers, who led the attack, had orders, immediately after their landing, to form themselves on the beach; but instead of forming themselves as they were directed, from the hurry and noise of their landing, or from an ill-governed ardor, they rushed impetuously towards the enemies entrenchments in the utmost disorder and confusion, without waiting for the corps which were to sustain them, and join in the attack. In this disorder, they were met by a violent and steady fire from the entrenchments, by which they were thrown into more confusion, and obliged them to shelter themselves behind a redoubt, which the French had abandoned on their appro•ch.

The General perceiving that it was impossible for these grenadiers to form under so severe a fire, that the night drew on, a violent tempest was gathering, and the tide began to make, saw clearly that he had nothing further left, than to order a retreat, with as little disadvantage as possible. He therefore called off those troops, and having formed behind Brig. Monckton's corps, which was on the beach in excellent order, the whole repassed the river without molestation, the General exposing his person with that intrepidity, which distinguished him both during the attack, and the retreat.

The loss in this check was not inconsiderable; and the event on the whole was such, as to discourage any further attempts upon that side. They returned to the old measures. The General again sent some bodies above the town, and some men of war sailed up the stream for more than twelve leagues. They received intelligence that the enemy had amassed some magazines of provisions in the interior country, and they proposed by getting between them and the town, to draw the French army from their entrenchments, to the long-desired engagement; but if they failed to compass this, they might at least destroy the ships of war which the enemy had in the river, and help to open a communication between them and Gen. Amherst, on whom their last expectations were fixed, and who, they flattered themselves, was on his march to their assistance.

But though they succeeded in destroying some of the enemies magazines, there was nothing of great moment in this. They could not come near the men of war. However they received intelligence from some prisoners, of the success of Sir William Johnson against Niagara; they learned likewise, that the French had soothed the difficulties in the way of Gen. Amherst, by abandoning Crown Point and Ticonderoga. But this intelligence, otherwise so pleasing, brought them no prospect of the approach of any assistance from that quarter. The season wasted apace. The General fell violently ill, consumed by care, watching, and a fatigue, too great to be supported by a delicate constitution, and a body unequal to that vigorous and enterprising soul that it lodged. It was not enough for him to escape from so great an expedition uncondemned and unapplauded; to be pitied, was he thought but a milder censure; and he knew that no military conduct can shine, unless it be gilded with success. His own high notions, the public hope, the good success of other commanders, all turned inward upon him, oppressed his spirits, and converted disappointment into disease. As soon as he had a little recovered, he dispatched an express with an accouns of his proceedings to England (c), written indeed in the stile of despondency, but with such perspicuity, clearness, and elegance, as would have ranked him amongst our best writers, if his military exploits had not placed him among our greatest commanders.

He resolved, when he sent away his account, to continue the campaign to the last possible moment; and after a deliberation with his officers, determined, that any further attempts at Montmorenci were to little purpose, and that their principal operations should be above the town, in order, if possible, to draw the enemy to an action. But the design of Wolfe was deeper, and more particularly directed than it had been before. The camp at Montmorenci was broke up, and the troops were conveyed to the southeast of the river, and encamped at Point Levi. The squadron under Admiral Holmes made movements up the river for several days successively, in order to draw the enemies attention as far from the town as possible. This succeeded in some measure; for, though it could not persuade the Marquis de Montcalm to quit his post, it induced him to detach M. de Bougainville with 1500 men to watch their motions, and to proceed along the western shore of the river, whilst the English army directed its march the same way on the eastern bank.

When Gen. Wolfe saw that matters were ripe for action, he ordered the ships under Admiral Saunders to make a feint, as if they proposed to attack the French in their entrenchments, on the Beauport shore below the town, and by their motions to give this feint all the appearance of a reality which it possibly could have. This disposition being made below the town, the General embarked his forces about one in the morning, and with Admiral Holmes's division went three leagues further up the river than the intended place of his landing, in order to amuse the enemy, and conceal his real design. Then he put them into boats, and fell down silently with the tide, unobserved by the French centinels posted along the shore. The rapidity of the current carried these boats a little below the intended place of attack. The ships followed them, and arrived just at the time which had been concerted to cover their landing. Considering the darkness of the night, and the rapidity of the current, this was a very critical operation, and it required excellent heads both on the part of the marine, and the land service, to preserve a communication, and to prevent a discovery and confusion.

As the troops could not land at the spot proposed, when they were put on shore an hill appeared before them extremely high and steep in its ascent; a little path winded up this ascent, so narrow that two could not go abreast. Even this path was intrenched, and a captain's guard defended it. These difficulties did not abate the hopes of the General, or the ardor of the troops. The light infantry under Colonel Howe laying hold of stumps and boughs of trees, pulled themselves up, dislodged the guards, and cleared the path; and then all the troops surmounting every difficulty, gained the top of the hill, and as fast as they ascended formed themselves, so that they were all in order of battle at day break.

Montcalm, when he heard that the English had ascended the hill, [Sept. 13.] and were formed on the high ground at the back of the town, scarcely credited the intelligence, and still believed it to be a feint to induce him to abandon that strong post, which had been the object of all the real attempts that had been made since the beginning of the campaign. But he was soon, and fatally for him, undeceived. He saw clearly, that the English fleet and army were in such a situation, that the upper and lower town might be attacked in concert, and that nothing but a battle could possibly save it. Accordingly he determined to give them battle, and quitting Beauport, passed the river St. Charles, and formed his troops opposite to ours.

He filled the bushes that were in his front with detachments of Indians, and his best marksmen, to the number of about 1500; his regular forces formed his left; his right was composed of the troops of the colony, supported by two battali•ns of regulars. The rest of the Indians and Canadians extended on that side, and attempted to out-flank the left of the English, which was formed to prevent that design, in a manner which the military men call Potence; that is, in a body which presents two faces to the enemy. Here Brigadier General Townshend commanded six regiments, and the Louisbourg grenadiers were disposed in a line to the right of this body, extending to the river. A regiment was drawn up behind the right for a reserve. It was formed in eight subdivisions, with large intervals. The light infantry under Colonel Howe, protected the rear and the left. The dispositions on both sides were judicious, and the engagement on both sides began with spirit.

The English troops were exhorted to reserve their fire; and they bore that of the enemy's light troops in front, which was galling, though irregular, with the utmost patience and good order, waiting for the main body of the enemy, which advanced fast upon them. At forty yards distance, our troops gave their fire, which took place in its full extent, and made a terrible havock among the French. It was supported with as much vivacity as it was begun, and the enemy every where yielded to it; but just in the moment, when the fortune of the field began to declare itself, General Wolfe, in whose life every thing seemed included, fell: General Monckton, the next to him in command, fell immediately after, and both were conveyed out of the line; the command now devolved on General Townshend. It was at a very critical time. For, though the enemy began to fall back, and were much broken, the loss of the two generals was a very discouraging circumstance, and it required great temper and great exertions to support the advantages that had been gained, and to push them to their proper extent. General Townshend shewed himself equal to so arduous a duty; the troops preserved their spirit, and each corps seemed to exert itself with a view to its peculiar character. The grenadiers with their bayonets, the Highlanders with their broad swords, and the rest of the forces, with a steady and continued fire, drove the enemy in great disorder from every post, and compleated their defeat. During the whole action, Colonel Howe with his light infantry covered the left wing in such a manner, as entirely to frustrate the attempts of the enemies Indians and Canadians upon that flank.

The field now seemed to be compleatly decided, when a new enemy appeared, which threatened to bring on a fresh engagement, and to put all again to the hazard. M. de Bougainville, whom the feigned movements of the English troops had drawn up the river, turned back on discovering their real design, and now appeared on the rear of the army, with a body of 2000 men. But fortunately the main body of the French was by this time so broken and dispersed, that the General was able to establish his rear, and to turn such an opposition on that side that the enemy retired after a very feeble attempt.

In this decisive action our troops lost about 500 men; on the side of the enemy at least 1500 were killed. But however glorious this victory was, and however important in its consequences, it must be admitted that it was very dearly bought. Soldiers may be raised; officers will be formed by experience; but the loss of a genius in war, is a loss which we know not how to repair. The death of Wolfe was indeed grievous to his country, but to himself the most happy that can be imagined; and the most to be envied by all those who have a true relish for military glory. Unindebted to family, or connections, unsupported by intrigue or faction, he had accomplished the whole business of life at a time, when others are only beginning to appear; and at the age of thirty-five, without feeling the weakness of age or the vicissitude of fortune, having satisfied his honest ambition, having compleated his character, having fulfilled the expectations of his country, he fell at the head of his conquering troops, and expired in the arms of victory.

The circumstances that attended the death of such a person, are too interesting to be passed over in silence, and they were indeed such as spoke the whole tenor of his life. He first received a wound in his head; but, that he might not discourage his troops, he wrapped it up in his hankerchief, and encouraged his men to advance: soon after he received another b•ll in his belly; this also he dissembled, and exerted himself as before; when he received a third in his breast, under which he at last sunk, and suffered himself, unwillingly, to be carried behind the ranks. As he lay struggling with the anguish and weakness of three grievous wounds, he seemed only sollicitous about the fortune of the battle. He begged one, who attended him, to support him to view the field; but as he found that the approach of death had dimmed and confused his sight, he desired an officer, who was by him, to give him an account of what he saw. The officer answered, that the enemy seemed broken; he repeated his question a few minutes after with much anxiety, when he was told that the enemy was totally routed, and that they fled in all parts. Then, said he, "I am satisfied;" and immediately he expired.

Without the same advantages, the enemy also had an heavy loss in this battle, which, no doubt, contributed to their defeat. M. de Montcalm, commander in chief, was killed on the spot; an officer who had done the highest services to his country throughout the whole American war, and perfectly supported his reputation in this last seene of it, having made the most perfect dispositions that human prudence could suggest, both before the battle and in the engagement. It is something remarkable that in both armies, the first in command should be killed, and the second dangerously wounded. But General Monckton happily recovered, the French officer died a little after the battle.

Five days after the action, the enemy seeing that the communication between the town and the army was cut off, [Sept. 18.] and that the English fleet and troops were preparing with all vigour for a siege, surrendered the city of Quebec upon terms of honour to the garrison, and advantage to the inhabitants, who were preserved in the free exercise of their religion, and the possession of their civil rights, until a general peace should decide their future condition. The fortifications of the city were in tolerable order; the houses almost totally demolished. A garrison of 5000 men under General Murray, were put into the place, with a plenty of provisions and ammunition for the winter. The fleet sailed to England soon after, fearing lest the setting in of the frosts should lock them up in the river St. Laurence. (a)

Thus the capital of French America was rendered to the English, after a most severe campaign of near three months; and perhaps, if the whole be considered, there never was an enterprise of such difficulty carried on with a more gallant perseverance, or accomplished with more vigour and ability. A city strong in situation and fortifications, was to be attacked. An army greatly superior in number to the besiegers, was posted under the walls of that city in an impregnable situation. That army was to be forced to a battle against the inclinations of a wise and cautious commander. A theatre of more than five leagues was to be filled, and operations of that extent to be carried on in the eye of the superior army, by less than 7000 men. In this contest with so many difficulties, one may say with nature itself, the genius of the commander shewed itself superior to every thing.
Major General; JAMES WOLFE.

All the dispositions to that daring but judicious attempt, near Silery, which at last drew Montcalm from his entrenchments, were so many master-pieces in the art of war. But it is certain, that these things, notwithstanding the extraordinary abilities of the general, could never have been compassed, had not the marine co•operated with an unanimity, diligence, and skill, which never could have taken place, but from that perfect love to their country, that animated all those that were concerned in this expedition. Here was no murmuring nor discontent, nor absurd jealousy; no mean competition between the land and sea-service; but the most zealous endeavours to second each others efforts, and the most generous inclinations on each side, to give a due praise to their mutual services.

When the news of this decisive action arrived in England, we all remember, though it is very difficult to describe, the various and mixed emotions with which every one was affected. But two days before this came, was received the express which General Wolfe had sent off after the affair of Montmorenci. When the general doubted, the public thought they had reason to despair. But whilst this gloom was fresh and in the midst of the general despondency; a second express arrives, and brings all at once an account of the victory, the taking of Quebec, and the death of General Wolfe. The effect of so joyful news, immediately on such a dejection, and then the mixture of grief and pity, which attended the public congratulations and applauses, was very singular and affecting. The sort of mourning triumph, that manifested itself on that occasion, did equal honour to the memory of the General, and to the humanity of the nation.

A little circumstance was talked of at that time, and it deserves to be recorded, as it shews a firmness of sentiment, and a justness of thinking, in the lower kind of people, that is rarely met with even amongst persons of education. The mother of General Wolfe was an object marked out for pity by great and peculiar distress; the public wound pierced her mind with a particular affliction, who had experienced the dutiful son, the amiable domestic character, whilst the world admired the accomplished officer. Within a few months she had lost her husband; she now lost this son, her only child. The populace of the village where she lived unanimously agreed to admit no illuminations or firings, or any other sign of rejoicing whatsoever near her house, lest they should seem by an ill-timed triumph, to insult over her grief. There was a justness in this, and who•ver knows the people, knows that they made no small sacrifice on this occasion.

The •ation, which never suffers any public service to pass unrew••ded, proceeded to honour the merits of the living and o• the dead. The minister himself made the motion for this purpose in the house of commons, and all the force of eloquence was displayed in setting off these services in their proper light. A magnificent monument was voted for the deceased General in Westminster Abbey; the living Generals and Admirals received the greatest of honours, the thanks of their country, by their representatives.

It is not known with certainty in what manner the French disposed of the remainder of their army after the battle of Quebec. It is probable that they retired towards Montreal and Trois Rivieres, the only places of any consequence which they had left in Canada. In order to deprive them of subsistence in any attempt they might be induced to make towards the recovery of Quebec in the winter, the country along the river was laid waste for a very considerable extent. A measure, which for the sake of humanity, we could have wished not to have been found necessary.

Whilst the operations were thus successfully carried on in the river St. Laurence, General Amherst was not wanting in his endeavours on the side of Lake Champlain. Though the retreat of the French from Crown Point and Ticonderoga had left him entirely master of Lake George, he found that the command of Lake Champlain was still an object of some difficulty. Mr. Bourlemaque, who commanded in that part, had retired to the Isle de Noix, at the bottom of the lake, where he had three thousand five hundred men strongly entrenched; he had likewise four stout armed sloops, by which he could easily defeat any attempts by boats.

General Amherst found it necessary to attain a naval superiority upon the Champlain, before he could hope to push his operations any further; but this was a work of so much time, that it made it absolutely impossible to attain the great end of the campaign, the communication with General Wolfe, who was left in the manner we have seen to the exertion of his single strength. The naval preparations were not perfectly accomplished before the 10th of October. They consisted of a great radeau, eighty four feet in length, and twenty in breadth, which carried six twenty-four pounders; the rest consisted of a brigantine and a sloop.

Covered by these the army was embarked in boats in a most excellent disposition, and proceeded a considerable way up the lake; [Oct. 11.] but as the season was far advanced, and the weather growing cold and tempestuous, he judged it highly dangerous to venture his troops much upon the water in open batteaux; for the waves run as high on this lake as at sea in an hard gale of wind. Besides, he could not hope at this advanced season to act at such a distance as the Isle de Noix with any effect; he therefore wisely postponed his operations on that side to another year, and contented himself for the present with the efforts of his little marine, which exerted itself with great activity; they blocked up two of the enemies strongest vessels in a bay, but the French abandoned them in the night, [Oct. 15.] and sunk them in a deep water, the crews making their escape; these they were in hopes to weigh up. The French appearing no where to oppose them, the armed sloops returned to Crown Point soon after the troops, [Oct. 21.] which were disposed in winter quarters.

The memorable and vigorous campaign of 1759, which made full amends for the inactivity of the former, was thus happily closed. By the taking of Niagara, Ticonderago, and above all, Quebec, the French, in the little remaining part of Canada, are invested upon every side. The troops which they have under Mr. Levy at Montreal, and those under Mr. Bourlemaque at Isle de Noix, can neither be recruited with men, nor properly supplied with military stores, all communication with France being cut off. So that in the opening of the next campaign, if they are attacked with vigour from the side of Quebec, whilst General Amherst advances with his body by Lake Champlain, of which he has now the entire dominion, the resistance will be no more than sufficient to give reputation to the conquest; and it will depend more upon our own sentiments of convenience what part of North America we shall leave to France, than to any efforts they may make in that part of the world; happy if our European system should so far concur, as to leave us free to conclude a peace in America upon its own merits.

CHAP. VIII.

Prince Henry's march into Saxony. General Vehla defeated. King of Prussia enters Saxony. Prussians defeated at Maxen. Again defeated at Meissen. M. Daun occupies the camp at Pirna. Munster surrenders to the allies. Hereditary Prince of Brunswick defeats the Duke of Wurtemburg at Fulda. March of the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick to Saxony.

WE took notice, in the preceeding part of our narrative, of that movement of the king of Prussia, by which he got between the Russians and Great Glogau, and thereby baffled their design upon that important place. This movement, at once daring, prudent and necessary, hindered the Russians from taking winter quarters in his dominions; but at the same time it unavoidably cut off all communication with the army of Prince Henry.

That Prince, seeing that he could not second the operations of the King, his brother, on the side of Silesia, contrived another expedient of co-operating with him, which was immediately to direct his march towards Saxony. There was no object, the possession of which was more interesting; on that account it was very proper; but this march answered also another end; for it drew the attention of M. Daun to the side of Saxony, and disabled him from assisting the designs of the Russians against Glogau, either with his whole army, or with any considerable detachment from it. The whole country of Lusatia, through which this projected march lay, was in a manner overspread with the enemy. M. Daun, with the main army of the Austrians, lay at a place called Sorau, opposite to the prince's camp. Five bodies of Russians occupied as many advantageous posts between the Bober and the Neiss. General Laudohn possessed the whole country along the Spree, with several Austrian corps. To get round M. Daun, it was necessary to make a vast circuit, and to march between the Austrian and Russian armies for more than sixty English miles.

Before the prince entered upon this arduous design, by several bold movements he obliged M. Daun to retreat from Sorau to Gorlitz, and from Gorlitz as far as Bautzen, keeping himself as much as possible between the prince and Saxony. But his Royal Highness having perceived the direction in which M. Daun was moving, made a compass to the northward of the Austrians, into the Lower Lusatia, passed the Neiss at Rothenburg, and marching with the utmost expedition arrived at Hoyers Werda in two days from his leaving his posts near Zittau. [Sept. 25.] This rapid march brought them quite unexpected upon a body of five or six thousand Austrian irregulars, commanded by General Vehla, who were situated in all security behind the town. They were routed with no small slaughter. Having dislodged this corps, the prince's army had leisure to repose themselves after such a fatiguing march, for two days; and then continued their progress towards the ••be, which river they crossed at Torgau, [Oct. 2.] having received notice that M. Daun had crossed it before them near Dresden. Thus was the grand theatre of the war once more transferred into Saxony, and that mis• country, continually harrased, continually tossed from hand to hand, the sport of violence and fortune, suffered equal distresses from its deliverers and its enemies.

The Prussian army, from the beginning of this war, has been particularly distinguished for its marches; and there is certainly nothing in all the various operations of war, which more particularly distinguishes good troops, and able and spirited leaders. But this march of prince Henry over such a tract of country, almost every where occupied by the enemy, in so short a time, and with so little loss, is perhaps one of the most extraordinary, and the best conducted, of the marches, that have been made by the Prussian, or any other army.

This fortunate stroke, together with the retreat of the Russians, afforded some hope, that notwithstanding his repeated disasters, the King of Prussia might still conclude the campaign to his advantage. The detachments under Finck and Wunsch had no sooner entered Misnia, than they attained a superiority over the united armies of Austria and the Empire; all the places which in so short a time they had seized, in as short a time were reduced to the obedience of their former masters. Wunsch had engaged their army, and defeated one of its wings. This victory gave them the possession of every thing to the gates of Dresden, the only town which remained to the enemy of all those they had taken. They found themselves unable to prevent prince Henry from passing the Elbe; they found themselves unable to prevent General Hulsen from coming to his relief with a considerable detachment; they •ound themselves unable to prevent the King from joining himself to those; when, [Nov. 12.] after obliging the Russians to evacuate Sil•sia, he marched to their relief, leaving General •tzenplitz, with a part of his army, to keep the Russians from availing themselves of his absence. On this the army of the empire retired. M. Dawn fell back towards Dresden. All the King of Prussia's posts were left unmolested, and after all his losses, and all his necessary detachments, he still saw himself at the head of a gallant army of sixty thousand men, in high spirits, and ready to execute the most desperate of his orders, notwithstanding the advanced season, and the great extremity of the cold.

It is true, that M. Daun was superior to him in numbers, and yet more so in situation. He could at any time take possession of the famous camp at Pirna, where he could not be attacked with any prospect of success; but then the freezing of the Elbe, the snow on the mountains which divide Bohemia from Saxony, and the continual molestations which might be expected from the Prussian parties, made this situation as dangerous, in some respects, as it was desirable in others.

It was the opinion of many, that these advantages on the side of the King of Prussia, well pursued without aiming at more, would in a short time infallibly have obliged M. Daun to relinquish his strong post, and to retire into Bohemia, abandoning Dresden, and with it all the fruits of his victorious campaign. But the King, possessed by an idea of the ill situation of the Austrians, thought that advantages of greater moment, and more decisive, might he drawn from it. He knew, that the passes into Bohemia were so difficult, that by some posts properly chosen and strongly guarded, the subsistence of the Austrians might be made impracticable, and even their retreat rendered so difficult, that M. Daun would find himself compelled to fight at a disadvantage, and to put to the hazard of the field, all that his caution and prudence had been so long and so painfully procuring.

Upon this plan the King, having obliged M. Daun to retreat as far as Plauen, advanced himself as far as Kesseldorf; and ordered General Finck, with a strong corps, to turn the Austrians, and seize the defiles of Maxen and Ottendorf, through which alone it seemed possible for the Austrians to communicate with Bohemia. This was so successfully executed, that there appeared no doubt that the King had effectually secured one of his principal objects, and had placed Daun between two fires.

Whilst the Prussians enjoyed this security, M. Daun, who was aware of their design, had so occupied all the eminences about this rough and dangerous place, and all the passes into it, that the Prussians were hardly attacked, when their defeat seemed inevitable. It is probable that they had got too far into these defiles, and had not taken proper measures to secure a retreat, or any sort of communication with the grand army. They became too late sensible of their situation, and they made, for a whole day, the most intrepid efforts to disengage themselves from it; but they were foiled in every attempt, with considerable loss of men, and of the most part of their artillery.

Night put a stop to the engagement; the Austrians employed it effectually, to entangle the Prussians, by guarding with double strength and vigilance, every avenue through which it was possible for them to escape. So that when the morning appeared, [Nov. 26.] they saw the hills covered upon every side with great bodies of their enemies, and every defile presented a wall of bayonets, through which it was impossible to penetrate. Thus galled with the losses of the preceding day, in which it is said they had exhausted almost all their ammunition, stripped of the greatest part of their cannon, surrounded by the enemy on all quarters, no resource, no prospect of relief appearing, the army lost all hope, and all spirit. To make any efforts in this condition, General Finck thought would only be to throw away unprofitably the lives of many brave men, which might be reserved for a more hopeful occasion; he therefore, notwithstanding the known rigour of his master, the apparent shame of the thing, and the thousand circumstances of embarrassment that must have arisen to a man of honour at such a juncture, came to a resolution of surrendering the whole army prisoners of war. Nineteen battalions and thirty five squadrons, composing near twenty thousand men by the Austrian account, above twelve by the Prussian confession, sixty-four pieces of cannon, many standards and colours were taken on this occasion.

It was unquestionably the greatest blow which the Prussians had felt from the beginning of the war; considering the critical time, the numbers taken, and the loss of reputation, which arose from the manner in which they were taken. It is no wonder, that such an extraordinary advantage, thus cheaply obtained, should greatly have elevated the friends of the house of Austria. They had put the cheat upon the Prussians, they had caught their enemy in the very trap which they had laid, as they thought, with such address for them. They had now received a full indemnification for the capture of the Saxon army, which had surrendered in much the same manner, and very near this place, in the year 1756.

The King of Prussia had not time to recover from this stroke, under which he was yet staggering, when he received another blow, and a severe one. General Durceke was posted at the right of the Elbe, opposite to Meissen; [Dec. 4.] but on the approach of a large body of Austrians, they prepared to retreat over the river into that place into which they thought their retreat secure; but having been obliged by an hard frost to withdraw their bridge of boats, a thaw supervening, when they attempted to lay a bridge of pontoons, so many great fragments of ice floated in the river, that they found it impracticable; they were therefore under the necessity of passing over their army in boats. Whilst they struggled wirh these difficulties, their rear guard was attacked by the Austrians with great fury, and all the men that composed it, together with the General, were killed or made prisoners. The loss of the Prussians on this occasions is said to have been three thousand killed and taken; and this second surprize brought a new discredit, as well as a great detriment to the Prussian arms.

M. Daun was not so carried away with this flood of success, as to depart in the least degree from his usual cautious management. Two advantages were now obtained, which, with a very few efforts, might be improved, to the entire destruction of the King of Prussia. At least, many Generals would have thought so; but M. Daun thought that the same conduct, which, with no risque, and with little loss, had reduced the King so low, was the most likely, if pursued, to bring on his entire ruin. He resolved to give that monarch no sort of chance to recover his fortune; Daun, after the two great victories he had himself newly obtained, retired behind Dresden; and as if he had been beaten, as often as he was victorious, he took refuge in the impregnable camp at Pirna, having so disposed matters, that the King of Prussia, now to weak to send out any great detachments, could not prevent his communication with Bohemia.

Whilst the King of Prussia carried on his unsuccessful campaign in Saxony, through all the rigours of the severest winter for many years felt in Europe; the army of the allies kept the field with better fortune. It is true, things had been so disposed by the obstinate resistance of Munster, and the reinforcements which arrived in the French army, that Prince Ferdinand did not find himself in a condition to force them to a decisive action; and therefore the situation of the two armies had continued much the same for a considerable time. At length Munster, after a series of operations, sometimes a siege, sometimes a blockade, now broken off, and now resumed, [Nov. 20.] at last surrendered, and the garrison capitulated for their liberty.

Not long after this, the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, all whose enterprises are distinguished with a peculiar eclat and splendor, that mark them for his own, performed a service that curbed the French, even more than the loss of Munster. Prince Charles of Bevern was also engaged in this design.

The Duke of Wurtemburg had renewed his treaty of subsidy with France, and having recruited and augmented his troops, he lay at Fulda, a great way to the right of the French army. The Hereditary Prince formed a design to attack him at that distance.

On the 28th of November, taking a small, but well chosen corps of horse and foot, and disengaging them from their baggage, he arrived in two days at Fulda, where the Wurtemburgers enjoyed themselves in full security. A feu de joye had been ordered for that day; the troops were all in their best cloaths; the Duke had invited all the ladies in the town to his table, and to a ball, which he intended to have given that very day; but the Hereditary prince disconcerted their measures, both of war and diversion. A large party of the Wurtemburg troops were posted in a plain before the town. The Hereditary Prince fell upon them unawares in their front and flank, and drove them into the town, into which he closely pursued them. Here they made some appearance of maintaining their ground for some minutes, but they were soon driven out on the other side, and hotly pursued by the Prince of Brunswick; without the town they were met by Prince Charles of Bevern, who had made a compass about the place, and attacked them vigorously as soon as they had got out of it. Four battalions made some resistance, and were all cut to pieces or made prisoners; the rest, with the Duke himself, covered by the resistance of these battalions, made a shift to escape. Above a thousand prisoners were made on this occasion; and the Prince returned to the camp of the allies, after having effectually disabled this corps from performing any thing considerable; and this action was of the greatest consequence, as, by the disposition of that corps at Fulda, there was an appearance as if the French meant to form a communication with the army of the Empire, for the mutual extension and security of their winter quarters.

This enterprise was only the prelude to another, which promised to be much more extensive in its consequences. The season was now grown too severe to suffer the allies to push any further the advantages they had obtained over the French; at the same time it disabled the French from attempting any thing considerable against them. Besides these advantages of the season, by possessing Munster, the allies were no longer obliged to keep so large a body of men in Westphalia. These were the considerations which suffered Prince Ferdinand to turn his eyes to the distressed state of the King of Prussia's affairs. After the two great blows which that monarch had suffered, there was no hope of dislodging M. Daun with his single force; and he was utterly unable to avail himself as heretofore, of the rigour of the season, to strike a decisive blow. Prince Ferdinand, distant as he was from his distressed ally, and so near to an enemy superior in numbers, did not hesitate to send him succours, to enable him, if possible, to make a final effort. He detached therefore 12,000 of his best men, and placed them under the command of the Hereditary Prince, with whose vigour and diligence he was perfectly acquainted, and under whom he knew the soldiers would endure any hardship with chearfulness. They marched from Korsdorff, [Oct. 11.] and in the depth of the late severe season, without losing a man by sickness or desertion, in fifteen days, marched near three hundred miles, and joined the King of Prussia at Freybourg.

This junction raised for a while the spirits and hopes of the Prussian army, but, in effect, it did more honour to the abilities of the Hereditary Prince, than service to the King. The season which fought equally against all sides, the inaccessible camp at Pirna, and the caution of M. Daun, rendered it impossible for the King, notwithstanding this reinforcement, to make any attempt. So that after several movements in hopes of bringing the Austrians to an engagement, he was obliged at length to desist, and to suffer the shattered remains of his army to repose in winter quarters, after the fruitless fatigues of so long, so laborious, and so bloody a campaign.

The King of Prussia did not derive the benefits that were expected from this detachment; the French had no sooner notice of it, than they attempted to avail themselves of the weakness it caused in the allied army. The Duke of Broglio was now at the head of the French troops; he had lately returned from Versailles, having ruined the character of M. de Contades, established his own, removed his rival, and, in spight of seniority, had acquired the marshal's staff, and the command of the army. He thought he had now an opportunity for an action of eclat to distinguish his entrence into command. He attempted to attack Prince Ferdinand by surprise. But finding him perfectly prepared, [Dec. 24.] and all his posts well guarded, he thought it most prudent to retire to his former quarters; and with this abortive attempt closed the operations of the German campaign, from whence France had entertained such sanguine hopes; leaving to Prince Ferdinand the glory of taking Munster in the presence of one of their armies, and of securing his own posts against all their efforts, after he had, from an inferior number, detached 12,000 men three hundred miles from his camp.

CHAP. IX.

The preparations at Vannes and Brest. The English fleet driven from their station. The action near Belleisle. French fleet defeated. War in the East Indies in 1758. French fleet under M. D'Ache twice beaten. M. de Lally takes Fort St. David's, and repulsed at Tanjour. Lays siege to Madrass. Obliged to raise the siege. Conclusion of the annals of 1759.

THE severity of the winter could not put a stop to the operations of the land armies; it had no more effect upon the operations at sea, which went on with vigour, in spight of the inclemency of the season. The invasion projected by France, which the engagement off Cape Lagos had retarded, was by no means laid aside.

The preparations for a naval equipment in the harbour of Brest, and for transporting a body of forces from Vannes, went on continually. The winter did not delay these preparations, because it was hoped that in that season, the British fleet might be obliged to take refuge in their own harbours; and thus might afford an opportunity for the French fleet to come out unopposed, and to execute the object of their destination before the British navy could be in readiness to encounter them.

In fact, they were not wholly disappointed in their expectations. A violent storm forced Sir Edward Hawke to quit his station off Brest. He came with his whole fleet to anchor in Torbay.

The French fleet availed itself of his absence to put to sea. [Nov. 14.] The whole English nation was alarmed; but it was an alarm which produced no hurry or disturbance, but vigorous, cool, and settled methods for defence.

And now the event of the whole war was put to the issue; for upon the good or ill success of this stroke every thing depended. Admiral Hawke lost not a moment's time to put again to sea, [Nov. 14.] and to seek the French fleet. Both squadrons put to sea on the same day; Sir Edward Hawke from Torbay, M. de Conflans from Brest. There was a difference of but one ship of the line in their forces.

It is impossible here to pass over the gallant behaviour of one of our Admirals, as it helps to mark the genius and spirip of this happy time, and as this is one of the finest instances of it. Admiral Saunders came into port from his Quebec expedition immediately after Hawke had sailed. After such a long voyage and so severe a campaign, unbroken by fatigue, and still insatiated with glory, he determined immediately to set sail again, and partake the honour and danger of the coming engagement. For this purpose no time was to be lost, and he had no orders. But he thought the exigencies of his country sufficient orders; and he knew that at this time the letter of military discipline would never be set against its spirit. He therefore set sail without waiting for orders with ten ships; but fortune did not favour the generosity of his intentions, and he did not join the British fleet time enough for the engagement.

As Sir Edward Hawke concluded that the first rendezvous of the enemy's fleet would be at Quiberon, he directed his course with all diligence for that bay. But here again fortune for a while seemed to declare for the French; for a strong wind blown in an easterly point, drove the English fleet a great way to the westward; but at length it became more favourable, and bore them in directly to the shore. About eight o'clock the headmost ships discovered the enemy bearing to the northward, between the island of Belleisle and the main land of France.

Hawke saw at last what he had so long, and so ardently wished for, (though hitherto in vain) the enemy in his reach. But yet there were such difficulties in his way, as would have checked a very cautious commander, or perhaps any commander in circumstances less critical to the public safety. On the slightest inspection of the chart it will appear, that all this sea is sown thick with sands and shoals, and shallows, and rocks; our pilots were by no means well acquainted with it; and the wind blew little less than a violent storm, and the waves ran mountain high. In these circumstances they were to attack a very strong squadron of the enemy on their own coast, with which they were perfectly acquainted. All these difficulties only animated the English Admiral. In one of the finest ships in the world, commanding the flower of the British navy, and seconded by some of the most tried and bravest officers in the service; and above all not dubious of himself. He ordered the ships nearest the enemy immediately to chase, and, by engaging them, to give time for the rest of the fleet to come up.

M. Conflans had two choices, either to fly, or to stand and fight it out. But he followed neither perfectly; for some time he appeared as if he meant to fight; but after giving the British ships time to come near him, when it was too late, he crouded all the sail he could carry; at the same time he shewed an attention to keep his squadron together.

At half an hour after two, the action began with great fury. In two hours the enemy had lost three ships of the line, one struck, two were sunk outright. Hawke ordered his ship to reserve her fire, to pass by all the others, and to be laid along side of the Soleil Royal, the best ship in the French navy, and commanded by M. de Conflans; the master remonstrated on the almost inevitable danger of the coast. Hawke answered, ‘You have done your duty in this remonstrance; now obey my orders, and lay me along side the French admiral.’ A French ship of 70 guns generously put himself between them; Hawke was obliged to bestow here the fire he had reserved for a greater occasion, and at one broadside sunk her to the bottom. The headmost of the English ships fired on the enemy as they came up to them, and then passed on to others, leaving those behind to improve their success, and destroy or take them; and by this method they had got up quite to the van of the enemy, and would have totally destroyed their fleet, had not night interposed to save them. Before night came on, the enemy's fleet was much dispersed; but in the eagerness of the pursuit, two of the English ships unfortunately run upon a sand, called the Four, and were lost. The enemy fled in to their own coast. Seven ships of the line threw overboard all their guns, and escaped into the River Villaine; about as many more got out to sea, and made for other ports.

Nothing could be conceived more dreadful than the night which succeeded this action. A violent storm blew all night long. It was a pitchy darkness; a dangerous coast surrounded them on almost all sides. A continual firing of distress guns was heard, without knowing whether they came from friend or enemy; and on account of the badness of the coast and the darkness of the night, our people were equally unable to venture to their assistance.

When morning came on, they found the French Admiral had run his ship, and another called the Heros, on shore; the first was set on fire by the enemy, the other by our seamen. Thus concluded this remarkable action (c), in which the French had four capital ships destroyed, one taken, and the whole of their formidable navy, in which consisted the last hope of their marine, shattered, disarmed, and dispersed. The long threatned invasion which was to repair their losses in every part of the world, was dissipated, and the credit of their arms broken along with their forces. The behaviour of the English captains and seamen, on the contrary, added as much to the glory of the British arms, as to the safety of their country. Perhaps there never was a naval engagement of such extent, in which no captain was accused, nor even in any degree suspected of misbehaviour or cowardice; in which those who engaged, and those who did not, gave proofs that they were equally ardent in the service of their country.

Those who think such matters deserving of their notice, have observed, that this decisive naval engagement, the surrender of the Prussian troops at Maxen, and the taking of Munster, happened on the same day, the 20th of November.

This was the conclusion of the French affairs in Europe. The issue of the campaign in America had not been more favourable to them. Although the events in the East Indies belong properly to the last year, yet, as the accounts did not arrive until this, and that the actions there were of great importance, and equally fortunate on our side, it is proper that we should take some notice of them here.

The English had by no means that superiority over the French in the East Indies, which they had in America. It was here the French seemed to have made those efforts, by which they hoped in some degree to ballance their losses in other parts. They had a very strong squadron under M. d'Ache in those seas. M. de Lally, an officer of credit, and of greater rank than had usually been sent on that service, commanded a body of 2000 Europeans, a great army, in a country where the name of an European is itself a strength.

In the beginning, their success seemed proportioned to their forces; they took the fort and city of St. David's. But in a very short time the ill star of France, which in no part of the world set well on their affairs, began to influence them here. M. d'Ache, in two naval engagements, was worsted, and prevented from co-operating with the land forces for the rest of the campaign. And had the spirit and conduct of Admiral Pococke been as well seconded by some of his captains, as it was by others, there is great reason to believe, that the French naval power had been as effectually destroyed in those seas, as it had been in those of Europe.

Notwithstanding these checks, it was necessary that M. Lally should act. But it was not only the disgrace of the French fleet, but an extreme want of money which delayed his operations. A Prince of the country, the King of Tanjour, appeared the only resource which was open. To this prince he applied for a considerable sum of money, which being absolutely refused, he carried the war into his dominions, and laid siege to his capital city. But after lying several days before it, and after having even made a practicable breach, the skill of some English gunners, the want of provisions and ammunition, and the disorders which reigned in his army, obliged him to return without the money, and with the mortification of being beaten from a place, only fortified after the Indian manner.

This failure in their pecuniary expectations, and their repulse from an Indian town, were bad encouragements to the undertaking of an enterprize against an European enemy, and a fortification in some degree regular. But having seized upon a Dutch vessel, as it is thought much with its own consent, which contained a large treasure, they set out at length to besiege Madrass. But here their success was no better than at Tanjour, though their strength was greater, and their efforts much more obstinate.

Colonel Draper and Major Brereton defended the place with the utmost skill and bravery. Mr. Pigot likewise with equal generosity and prudence, seconded their endeavours, by the supplies of stores and ammunition, which were admirably distributed, and co-operated with the military with a firmness and intrepidity, by which he obtained an honour equal to any in the defence of the place. Whilst the town was defended with great spirit within; parties were continually sent out, which so infested the roads through which the enemy's convoys were to pass, that their army in the trenches were infinitely weakened by the detachments which they were obliged to send out. After a siege of more than two months, they were obliged to abandon their enterprize, and by that means renounce for ever all those sanguine hopes, which they had entertained from the forces in this part of the world. The English, on the contrary, went on from success to success. Whilst they defeated the French on the Eastern coast of the great peninsula of India, on the western they took the great and opulent city of Surat from the powers of the country, with very little loss.

General Lally left Madrass in the utmost transports of rage and despair, which a man of honour and ability in his profession can feel, who is ill seconded by his troops, neglected by those who ought to support him, and cheated by the villainy of contractors, and of all those who turn war into a low traffic (a). His letter is a strong and very striking picture of these agitations; and certainly it is worthy of remark, that every where there should appear something more unaccountably wrong and weak in the management of the French, than has been in the conduct of that or almost any other nation at any time. It seems to argue an essential and radical fault in some superior part of their government, more easily indeed visible in its consequences, than discoverable in its cause.

In Europe they received offers of peace from the Kings of Great Britain and Prussia. But as they did not expect, from their situation, very advantageous or honourable terms, they resolved to act, in one instance, the Roman part, and still hold out, determined to hazard the last extremities; perhaps, hoping something favourable from the fortune of their allies, since their own had deserted them; and resolving to contract their plan, and to make one strong effort in one part, rather than unprofitably to waste their strength upon severeal inferior objects. This effort could be made with any prospect of success only in Germany. (a) But the supplies necessary for this great charge were difficult to a nation, whose trade was wholly destroyed. On this occasion they did not scruple to break in upon the public faith, and to find supplies for one year in an expedient, that struck at the sources of all future credit. They stopped the payment on many public bills and funds[*]. The King threw in his own plate into the public stock as an example, and a request that others should contribute in the same manner from their private fortune, to the necessities of the state; tho' several of the nobility, and many churches and convents sent in their plate, there was yet a general backwardness to give into this method of supply, and to trust the public with so considerable part of their substance at the instant when they saw it so notoriously break its faith in other particulars.

However, these resources, such as they are, will enable them to keep the war on foot. They turn their whole attention to Germany, where they have very greatly augmented their army, and placed it under a general, from whom they have some hopes, after their repeated disappointments, and the frequent changes they have made. They propose also another army under the prince de Soubise; if they can compass this latter project, as it is believed they may, the system of Germany is still in very imminent danger. For notwithstanding the tried goodness of our troops, and the admirable commander at the head of them, it is certain, even with any reinforcements we may be able to send, we shall find it very difficult to contend with two armies, supposing that we shall have no other than French armies to contend with, and that the King of Prussia should be able, as he has hitherto been, to find employment for the many, the powerful, and the implacable enemies that surround him.

It is certain he is much reduced; and that his resources are nearly exhausted. These are facts which cannot be concealed; and yet some glimmering of hopes may be still perceived, when we consider the admirable talents for war and government, which that monarch possesses; and when we consider even the events of the last (to him) unfortunate campaign; where after having suffered four capital defeats, and having obtained no one considerable advantage, he has yet continued in some sort superior in the field; the enemy has not been able to make the least impression upon his dominions; and he has, at last, more than divided Saxony with them; the city of Dresden is all that they possess in that country, and the acquisition of which has been the only fruit •f four campaigns, and four victories in one campaign, and the efforts of the united forces of Austria, Russia, and the Empire, to say nothing of France and Sweden.

As for Great Britain, she has only to fear from her connections. In no one year since she was a nation, has she been favoured with so many successes, both by sea and land, and in every quarter of the globe; nor have her officers, both by sea and land, ever done more honour to their country, by th•ir skill and bravery. And with regard to the internal administration, it suffices to say, that whilst France became bankrupt, without delay or murmuring there have been more than six millions borrowed in England at a very easy rate; and that the interest on this immense sum has been made good by a single tax upon malt, which will scarce be felt by the people. By this the resources of England may be imagined; especially if we consider, that highly as we are taxed for the necessary charges of the war; we have not been prevented from great and expensive voluntary exertions of public spirit and beneficence. The cities of London and Westminster, and after their example other towns made a large subscription for enlisting soldiers. Subscriptions were also carried on to a great amount, for cloathing the enemies prisoners, abandoned through the neglect or poverty of their sovereign; and for administering to the relief of the families of those who had fallen in the battles of Quebec and Minden. Thus actuated by the warmest patriotism, which far from extinguishing, seemed to kindle a beneficence towards our enemies in their distress.

The condition of Europe, which all people thought would have been decided in this campaign, is nearly as dubious as ever; and the difficulties which oppose themselves to a peace are rather augmented than diminished. Here then we close the scene, and conclude the events of the present year; in the next we hope, notwithstanding appearances, after so many scenes of horror, to have the more pleasing task of relating the steps taken to a general peace, on terms as particularly advantageous to our own country, as the mixed interests of Europe, and the various fortunes of the powers embarked in the same cause, will admit.

Notes

*
Austria, Russia, France, Sweden, the Empire.
↵

(a)

Major General Amherst Journal of the siege of Louisbourg.

On the 28th of May, I had the good fortune to meet Admiral Boscawen with the fleet and the troops coming out of the harbour of Halifax. Lieut. Gen. Bragg's regiment, from the bay of Fundy, joined the fleet this day.

The 29th we had fine weather; the ships kept well together; the whole consisted of 157 sail. The Dublin went very sickly into Halifax.

The 30th the wind blew hard in the afternoon; the ships were greatly dispersed.

The 31st the wind sometimes contrary, obliged us to tack, and it blew fresh.

The 1st of June Capt. Rous in the Sutherland came from off the harbour of Louisbourg, said, two ships had got in the 30th; that there were 13 sail in the harbour. We saw the entrance of Gabarus at night.

The 2d it was foggy in the morning; about twelve saw Louisbourg and the ships in the harbour. The fleet, with about a third of the troops, anchored in Gabarus bay; and this evening, with Brigadiers Generals Lawrence and Wolfe, I reconnoitred the shore as near as we could, and made a disposition for landing in three places the next morning, in case the troops arrived.

The enemy had a chain of posts from Cape Noir to the flat Point, and irregulars from thence to the bottom of the Bay; some works thrown up at the places which appeared practicable to land at, and some batteries.

On the 3d most of the transports came in this morning, all well prepared for landing; but the surf on shore was so great, it was impossible to land. This day Brigadier General Whitmore arrived from Halifax, at which place I have left Col. Monckton to command. As one Bay was found to have less surf than the others, a disposition was made to land the next morning in one place instead of three.

The 4th the wind and surf were so very high, Admiral Boscawen told me it was impracticable to land.

The 5th a great swell and fog in the morning, and the Admiral declared it still impracticable to land.

The 6th an appearance of change of weather, in the morning early: I was resolved to seize the first opportunity; the signal was made to prepare to land between five and six o'clock, and at eight all the men were in the boats: The fog came on again, and the swell encreased during the time the men were getting into the boats, and the Admiral again declared it impracticable to land. I ordered the troops on board their respective ships, first acquainting them with the reason for so doing.

The 7th the weather bad in the morning, in the afternoon the swell rather decreased, and gave us great hopes of landing at daybreak the next morning, for which orders were given: and Bragg's regiment, who were in a number of sloops, to sail under convoy, by the mouth of the harbour to Lorembec; sending at the same time a proportion of artillery destined for the light house Point, with orders to make all the show they could of landing, but not to land till further orders, intending to draw the enemy's attention on that side.

From the 2d to this time, the enemy have been reinforcing their posts, adding to their works, cannonading and throwing shells at the ships, and making all the preparations they can to oppose our landing. Seven transports were now missing with troops on board, three of which came in at night. The Admiral gave all necessary orders for the frigates to cover our landing.

On the 8th the troops were assembled in the boats before break of day, in three divisions; and Commodore Durell having viewed the coast by order of the Admiral, and given me his opinion the troops might land, without danger from the surf, in the bay on our left, the Kennington and Halifax snow began the fire on the left, followed by the Grammont, Diana and Shannon frigates in the centre, and the Sutherland and Squirrel upon the right. When the fire had continued about a quarter of an hour, the boats upon the left rowed into the shore, under the command of Brigadier General Wolfe, whose detachment was composed of the four eldest companies of grenadiers, followed by the light infantry, (a corps of 540 men, chosen as marksmen from the different regiments, serve as irregulars, and are commanded by Major Scott, who was Major of the Brigade) and the companies of rangers, supported by the Highland regiment, and those by the eight remaining companies of grenadiers.

The division on the right, under the command of Brigadier Gen. Whitmore, consisted of the Royal, Lascelles, Monckton, Forbes, Anstruther and Webb, and rowed to our right by the white Point, as if intending to force a landing there.

The centre division, under the command of Brigadier General Lawrence, was formed of Amherst's, Hopson's, Otway's, Whitmore's, Lawrence's, and Wharburton's, and made, at the same time, a show of landing at the fresh water Cove. This drew the enemy's attention to every part, and prevented their troops, posted along the coast, from joining those on their right.

The enemy acted very wisely, did not throw away a shot, till the boats were near in shore, and then directed the whole fire of their cannon and musketry upon them. The surf was so great, that a place could hardly be found to get a boat on shore. Notwithstanding the fire of the enemy, and the violence of the surf, Brigadier Wolfe pursued his point, and landed just at their left of the Cove, took post, attacked the enemy, and forced them to retreat. Many boats overset, several broke to pieces, and all the men jumped into the water to get on shore.

So soon as the left division was landed, the first detachment of the centre rowed at a proper time to the left, and followed; then the remainder of the centre division, as fast as the boats could fetch them from the ships; and the right division followed the centre in like manner.

It took up a great deal of time to land the troops; the enemy's retreat, or rather flight, was through the roughest and worst ground I ever saw; and the pursuit ended with a cannonading from the town, which was so far of use, that it pointed out how near I could encamp to invest it: On which the regiments marched to their ground, and lay on their arms. The wind encreased, and we could not get any thing on shore.

The loss of his Majesty's troops at landing is, Capt. Baillie and Lieut. Cuthbert, of the Highland regiment; Lieut. Nicholson of mine, 4 serjeants, 1 corporal, and 38 men killed, 21 were of my regiment, (the grenadiers) of which 8 were shot, and the rest drowned in trying to get on shore.

Five lieutenants, 2 serjeants, 1 corporal, and 51 men wounded; and of the five companies of rangers, 1 ensign and 3 private killed, 1 wounded, and 1 missing.

On the enemy's side, 2 captains of grenadiers, and 2 lieutenants, are prisoners; 1 officer killed, and an Indian chief: Several men likewise killed; and, I imagine, about 70 men taken prisoners: They were sent on board as fast as possible. By some of the prisoners I had intelligence, that M. St. Julien, Colonel, commanded in the Cove: That there were 5 battalions in the town, namely, Bourgogne, Artois, Royal Marine, Cambise, and Volontaires Etrangers, with about 700 Canadians. The three first regiments wintered in Louisbourg; Volontaires Etrangers came there not long since with part of the fleet, and Cambise the night before we landed.

We took from the enemy three 24 pounders, seven 9 pounders, and seven 6 pounders, two mortars and fourteen swivels; all which were placed along the shore, to prevent our landing; with ammunition tools, and stores of all kinds.

The 9th. Lieut. Gen. Bragg's regiment returned in their sloops from Lorembec. The weather continued extremely bad; the surf so great, that we could get only some of our tents on shore in the afternoon.

The 10th the furf still continued, and it was with great difficulty that we got any thing on shore.

The 11th the weather grew clear and better, and the light 6 pounders, which I had ordered on shore immediately after the troops were now only landed, and some artillery stores with them.

On the 12th, from intelligence I had received, that the enemy had destroyed the grand battery, and called in their out-posts, I detached Brigadier Wolfe with 1200 men, 4 companies of grenadiers, 3 companies of rangers, and some light infantry round the N. E. harbour to the Light House Point, with an intention to silence the Island battery, and, at the same time, to attempt to destroy the ships in the Harbour; sending, at the same time by sea, the proportion of artillery, tools, &c. that had been ordered for this service.

I received, this day, a report from Brigadier Wolfe, that he had taken possession of the Light House Point, and all the posts on that side the harbour, which the enemy had abandoned, leaving several cannon, which were rendered useless, tools, &c. and a great quantity of fish at Lorembec. The weather continued extremely bad; but we got some tools on shore this night, so that, on the 13th. we began to make a communication from the right to the left in front of the camp; and I ordered three redoubts on the most advantageous ground in the front. A party of the enemy came out this day towards our camp, but were soon beat back by the light Infantry, before two picquets could well get up to their assistance. We worked at three redoubts in front all night.

The 14th the enemy cannonaded us a great part of the day. The surf still continued so great, that it was with the greatest difficulty we could land any thing. The fleet, under the command of Sir Charles Hardy, which appeared yesterday for the first time, was in the night blown off to sea.

The 15th I sent four more mortars in a sloop to the Light House, but we could not get any artillery landed on this shore. At night two deserters from the Volontares Etrangers came in; said they had 5 killed and 40 wounded in the skirmish on the 13th.

The 16th, the first fine weather, we landed 12 days provision, and got many things on shore, but could not land any artillery.

The 17th I got Colonel Bastide on horseback, and, with Col. Williamson and Major M' Kellar, we reconnoitred the whole ground as far as we could; and Colonel Bastide was determined in his opinion of making approaches by the Green Hill, and confining the destruction of the ships in the harbour, to the Light House Point, and the batteries on that side. I added two 8 inch mortars and three royals to the Light House batteries.

The 18th we had fine weather. Some Indians took three of the transports men at the bottom of Gabarus bay who landed there contrary to orders. The road for the artillery was pushed on as fast as possible. We got three 23 pounders on shore, though the surf was great the beginning of the day.

The 19th the batteries on the Light House were intended to have been opened this night, but could not be got ready so soon. L'Echo, a French frigate of 32 guns, was brought in to-day; had got out of the harbour the 13th at night, and was bound to Quebec: By her we have intelligence, that the Bizane got out the day we landed, and the Comette since our arrival off the harbour.

The 20th the Island Battery and ships fired at the batteries on the shore, who began their fire this last night. The enemy burnt an old ship at the bottom of the harbour.

The 21st very bad weather, and the surf high. The enemy discovered us making the road for the artillery, and cannonaded us; threw some shot into the left of the camp, but did not oblige me to decamp any part. An advanced redoubt towards Green Hill was thrown up this night.

The 22d the bad weather continued; we were employed on the road, and getting up a Block House on the left by the Miray road, to secure the communication to the N. E. harbour and Light House, and to hinder any parties from going into the town.

The 23d the Admiral assured me there were above a hundred boats lost in landing the troops and provisions. This day fine weather; and we now have on shore twelve 24 pounders, and six 12 pounders. The enemy fired a great deal from their shipping and Island Battery, and threw some shot into the left of the camp. Colonel Messervey, and most of his carpenters, taken ill of the small-pox, which is a very great loss to the army. Gabions and fascines are landed, and carried forward as fast as possible, to make an epaulement to Green Hill. The batteries at the Light House fire with success against the Island Battery, and I hope will soon silence it.

On the 24th the enemy fired on the Light House Batteries from the town and shipping, and on our advanced redoubt, which was finished, they fired from the town. Colonel Bastide remained fixed in his opinion of advancing by Green Hill. We had this day in the park of artillery thirteen 24 pounders, and seven 12 pounders.

The 25th the cannonading continued night and day: In the evening the Island Battery was silenced; their own fire had helped to break down part of their works: Fascines and gabions were forwarded to Green Hill as fast as possible. All the men employed at work, and making the necessary communications. The enemy fired a good deal at our advanced redoubt.

The 26th a small alarm on the left of a party that had advanced from the town; had got up to the Block House, which was not quite finished. They had with them a barrel of pitch to set it on fire: The guard on it was not sufficient to oppose a large party; but a detachment was sent out so quick, that they were forced to retreat without effecting their design, though two of the men had been in the Block House, and they were drove back into the town very fast. Three hundred pioneers ordered to Green Hill. Admiral Boscawen landed 200 marines, and took the post at Kennington Cove, which is a great ease to the army. I desired of the Admiral four 32 pounders and two 24 pounders to leave at the Light House, to keep the Island Battery in ruin, that with a proper number of men intrenched there, Brigadier Wolfe, with his detachment, might be able to come round the harbour, bringing his artillery with him; and to try to destroy the shipping, and to advance towards the West Gate.

The 27th one brass 24 pounder was lost in 12 fathom water, by slipping off the catamaran [*], as they were coming from the ship to land it. The cannon I asked of the Admiral were landed this night at the Light House.

The 28th a great many popping shots and cannonading. As the post at Green Hill was covered, we began the road over the bog, and throwing up an epaulement. Colonel Messervey and his son both died this day; and of his company of carpenters of 108 men, all but 16 in the small-pox, who are nurses to the sick. This is particularly unlucky at this time.

The 29th cannonading continued; the frigate fired constantly at the epaulement; we pursued working at the road which cost a great deal of labour: At night the enemy sunk 4 ships in the harbour's mouth; Apollo, a two deck'd one, la Fidelle of 36 guns, la Chevre, and la Biche, of 16 guns each, and they cut off most of their masts. Remain in the harbour five of the line of battle, and a frigate of 36 guns.

The 30th, at night, some firing at Kennington Cove: The marines thought they saw Indians: The frigate fired all night at the epaulement, as the men worked in the night time.

The 1st of July, the enemy creeped out in the morning to get some old palisades and wood. Brig. Wolfe and Major Scott's light infantry pushed them in with a very brisk fire; and the Brigadier took post on the hills, from whence it was intended to try to demolish the shipping; we marched forward on the right; forced the enemy back to Cape Noir with a smart fire.

The 2d. the epaulement and road went on heavily, from the extreme badness of the ground: The enemy continued their cannonading, and threw some shells: We skirmished all day with parties out of the town.

The 3d, a great cannonading from the town and shipping on the batteries. Brig. Wolfe was making an advanced work on the right, thrown up at 650 yards from the covered way, with an intention of erecting a battery to destroy the defences of the place, it being pretty well on the capital of the Citadel Bastion; and the falling of the ground from this place, towards the works, would hinder discovering as much of the works, as would be necessary to do them any considerable damage. In the evening the sea officers thought some of the ships would try to get out of the harbour. The batteries on the left immediately played on them, but it grew so dark they could not continue.

The 4th a great fog; when there were glares of light, the cannonading began; 500 men kept continually making fascines.

The 5th very bad weather; the epaulement was hastened on as much as possible, it swallowed up an immense number of fascines, cost some men, as the frigate cannonaded on it without ceasing.

The 6th a sloop sailed out of the harbour with a flag of truce to Sir Charles Hardy, to carry some things to their wounded officers and prisoners.

The many difficulties of landing every thing in almost a continual surf, the making of roads, draining and passing of bogs, and putting ourselves under cover, render our approach to the place much longer than I could wish.

On the 7th we had very foggy weather; cannonading continued all day, and a good deal of popping shots from the advanced posts.

The 8th I intended an attack on some advanced posts at Cape Noir, but it did not take place. Col Bastide got a contusion by a musket ball on his boot, which laid him up in the gout.

The 9th, in the night, the enemy made a Sortie where Brigadier Lawrence commanded: they came from Cape Noir, and though drunk, I am afraid rather surprised a company of grenadiers of Forbs's, commanded by Lord Dundonald, who were posted in a Fleecke on the right. Major Murray, who cammanded three companies of grenadiers immediately detached one, and drove the enemy back very easily. Whitmore's and Bragg's grenadiers behaved very well on this occasion. Lord Dundonald was killed, Lieut. Tew wounded and taken prisoner, Capt. Bontein of the engineers taken prisoner: 1 corporal, 3 men killed; 1 serjeant, 11 men missing; 17 men wounded: The Sortie was of five picquets, supported by 600 men; a Captain, Chevalier de Chauvelin was killed, a Lieutenant wounded and taken prisoner: 17 men killed, 4 wounded and brought off prisoners, besides what wounded they carried into the town, one of which, a Captain, died immediately. The enemy sent out a flag of truce to bury their dead, which when over, the cannonading began again. The frigate was so hurt, she hauled close to the town; the ships fired very much against Brig. Wolfe's batteries.

The 10th, the road at the epaulement went on a little better; the enemy fired a great deal, and threw many shells.

The 11th, a waggoner was taken off by some Indians between the block-house and the left of the N. E. harbour.

The 12th it rained very hard all night; not a man in the detachment could have a dry thread on; we made an advanced work to Green Hill; at night the waggoner who had been taken, luckily made his escape, said, they were 250 Canadians. The Citadel Bastion fired very smartly.

The 13th, the enemy threw a great many shells; we perfected our works as fast as we could; bad rainy weather; the enemy was at work at Cape Noir to hinder us taking possession near that point, which is of no consequence; some deserters came in, said a sloop of Miray got in three days ago.

The 14th, the batteries were traced out last night, with an intention to place twenty 24 pounders, divided in four different batteries, to destroy the defences, and a battery of 7 mortars, with some 12 pounders to ricochet [*] the works and the town.

The 15th, the cannonading and firing continued; the enemy tried to throw some shells into camp, supposed to be intended against our powder magazine: At ten at night the Light House battery fired some rockets as a signal of ships sailing out of the harbour [†]; Sir Charles Hardy answered it; the frigate got out, and Sir Charles Hardy's fleet got under sail and went to sea. Before day break, Capt. Sutherland, posted at the end of the N.E. harbour, was attacked, and there was a great deal of firing; the grenadiers of Brig. Wolfe's corps marched to sustain him, and all the light infantry; it was over before they could get up, and by a deserter from the enemy, they were only 100 men come from Miray, where they left Mons. de Bosbiere, who had, on the other side the water, 300 men with boats to pass. Major Scott, with the light infantry, pursued, but could not get up with them. I encamped a corps forward.

The 16th, towards night, Brig. Wolfe pushed on a corps and took possession of the hills in the front of the Barasoy, where we made a lodgment; the enemy fired very briskly from the town and shipping.

The 17th, a great fire continued from the town and shipping; we resolved to extend the parallel from the right to the left. The fleet returned.

The 18th, all last night the enemy fired musketry from the covert way, and tried to throw shells into the camp.

The 19th, I relieved the trenches by battalions, the 14 battalions forming 3 brigades; a smart fire from the covert way, the batteries on the left fired against the bastion Dauphine with great success.

The 21st, one of the ships in the harbour, that had some powder blown up in her, made a great explosion, and set the ship on fire, which soon caught the sails of two more; they burned very fast, and we kept firing on them the whole time, to try to hinder the boats and people from the town to get to their assistance; the [‡] Entreprennant, Capricieux [*], and Superb [*], were the three burned ships; the Prudent and Bienfaisant remained.

The 22d, two batteries on the right opened with thirteen 24 pounders, and another of 7 mortars, and fired with great success; the enemy fired very well from the town for some time, and threw their shells into our works. Our shells put the citadel in flames. I ordered Col. Williamson to confine his fire as much as he could to the defences of the place, that we might not destroy the houses. A Lt. of the Royal Americans, going his rounds on an anvanced post, lost his way, and was taken prisoner near Cape Noir. A battery was begun on the left for four 24 pounders.

23d, the cohorns were used at night, and the French mortars sent to throw stones from the trenches. The enemy fired all sorts of old iron, and any stuff they could pick up. Col. Bastide was out to-day for the first time since he received the contusion. Our batteries fired with great success. This night the shells set fire to the barracks, and they burnt with great violence.

On the 24th, the fire was very brisk on our side, and the enemy's decreased. The Admiral gave me 400 seamen to help to work at the batteries, &c. and 200 miners added to a corps of 100 already established, that we might make quick work of it, and they were immediately employed. The 4 gun battery opened, and another of 5 erecting. One of the men of war in the harbour, the Bienfaisant, fired at our trenches at high-water, and the Citadel and Bafiion Dauphine fired against the 4 gun battery; but our men firing small arms into the embrazures, beat the enemy off their guns.

The 25th, the batteries fired with great success. The Admiral sent me word, he intended to send in boats with 600 men, to take or destroy the Prudent and the Bienfaisant in the harbour. I ordered all the batteries at night to fire into the works as much as possible, to keep the enemy's attention to the land. The miners and workmen went on very well with their approaches to the covered way, though they had a continued and very smart fire from it, and grape shot, and all sorts of old iron from the guns of the ramparts. We continued our fire without ceasing, and a Ricochet: The boats got to the ships at one in the morning, and took them both: they were obliged to burn the Prudent as she was aground, and they towed off the Bienfaisant to the N. E. harbour.

The 26th, the Admiral came on shore, and told me he proposed sending 6 ships into the harbour the next day. Just at this time I received a letter from the governor, offering to capitulate, and the articles were agreed upon.

Articles of capitulation between their excellencies Adm. Boscawen and Major General Amherst; and his excellency the Chevalier Draco•, governor of the island of Cape Breton, of Louisbourg, the island of St. John, and their appurtenances.

I. The garrison of Louisbourg shall be prisoners of war, and shall be carried to England in the ships of his Britannic Majesty.

II. All the artillery, ammunition, provisions, as well as the arms of any kind whatsoever, which are at present in the town of Louisbourg, the islands of Cape Breton and St. John, and their appurtenances, shall be delivered without the least damage, to such commissaries as shall be appointed to receive them, for the use of his Britannick Majesty.

III. The governor shall give his orders that the troops which are in the island of St. John and its appurtenances, shall go on board such ship of war, as the Admiral shall send to receive them.

IV. The gate, called Porte Dauphine, shall be given up to the troops of his Britannick Majesty, to-morrow at eight o'clock in the morning, and the garrison, including all those that carried arms, drawn up at noon, on the Esplanade, where they shall lay down their arms, colours, implements, and ornaments of war. And the garrison shall go on board, in order to be carried to England in a convenient time,

V. The same care shall be taken of the sick and wounded that are in the hospitals, as of those belonging to his Britannick Majesty.

VI. The merchants and their clerks, that have not carried arm• shall be sent to France, in such manner as the Admiral shall think proper.

Louisbourgh,26th July, 1758.
(Signed) Le Chevalier de DRUCOUR.

A Description of the Town and Harbour of Louisbourg, with References pointing out the approaches of his Majesty's Forces.

- A. The Town of Louisbourgh.

- B. The citadel

- C. A. lake, where the fishing-barks winter.

- D. Stages for drying fish.

- E. A. battery of 20 guns, erected since 1748.

- F. The Dauphin battery of 30 guns, which defends the West-Gate, being that which was first delivered to the English.

- G. The Island-battery of 40 guns, silenced the 24th of June, by the Light-house battery at I, under the direction of Major-General Wolfe.

- H. A small battery of 8 guns.

- I. The Light-house battery taken by Major Gen. Wolfe, June 12th, from whence the ships in the harbour were destroyed, at X.

- K. A battery of 15 guns, used for the destruction of the shipping.

- L. The grand battery of 40 guns destroyed by the French the 12th, when all the out parties were ordered into the works of the town.

- M. A battery of 15 guns, destroyed the same time.

- N. Houses inhabited by fishermen.

- O. A lake.

- P. Rivers, from whence the inhabitants have their fresh water.

- Q. A pond, which defends part of the works, and makes this part very difficult of access.

- R. The grand beach.

- S. Rocks under water.

- T. The Careening place defended from all winds.

- V. The green hill, from whence the town was annoyed by a redoubt cast up the 21st of June, under the direction of Col. Bastide.

- W. The place where the enemy sunk 4 ships on the 29th, viz. the Apollo, a two-deck'd ship, la Fidelle of 36 guns, le Chevre and la Biche, of 16 guns each.

- X. The station of the French men of war that were destroyed from the Light-house and other batteries, erected for that service.

- Y. The place where the Prudent was set on fire, by the boats from the fleet, June 25th.

- Z. The north east harbour, to which place the Bienfaisant ship of war was towed by the boats of the fleet from Y.

- Aa. Capt. Sutherland's post that was attacked before Day, on the 15th of July, who made a gallant defence, and cleared himself of the enemy, without any assistance, the reinforcement coming too late.

- Bb. Where the block-house was erected, the 22d of June, near Miray [*] road, to secure the communication to the North East harbour and Light-house.

- Cc. Cape Noir Bastion, where the enemy made a sally of their picquets the 9th of July, supported by 600 chosen men; by them Ld. Dundonald was unfortunately surprised. He was posted on the right of the Green-hill, with a command of Forbes's grenadiers. On this occasion Bragg's and Whitemore's grenadiers behaved with uncommon intrepidity, (they were detached by Major Murray) and repulsed the French, who in this expedition lost some able Officers, with many soldiers. It was after this affair the enemy sent a flag of truce to bury the dead.

Extract of a Letter from Admiral Boscawen, to the Righ Hon. Mr. Secretary Pitt, dated Namur, Gabreuse Bay, 28th of July, 1758.

I Will not trouble you with a particular detail of the landing and siege, but cannot help mentioning a particular gallant action in the night between the 25th and 26th instant: The boats of the squadron were in two divisions, detached under the command of Capt. Laforey and Balfour, to endeavour either to take or burn the Prudent of 74 guns, and Bienfaisant of 64, the only remaining French ships in the harbour; in which they succeeded so well, as to burn the former, she being a ground, and take the latter, and tow her into the N. E. harbour, notwithstanding they were exposed to the fire of the cannon and musquetry of the Island battery, point Rochefort, and the Town, being favoured with a dark right. Our loss was inconsiderable, 7 men killed, and 9 wounded.

I have given the command of the Bienfaisant to Capt. Balfour, and the Echo, a frigate, to Capt. Laforey; Mr. Affleck and Mr. Bickerton, Lieuts. who boarded the Bienfaisant, succeeded those gentlemen in the Aetna fireship and Hunter sloop.

I have only farther to assure his Majesty, that all his troops and officers, both sea and land, have supported the fatigue of this siege, with great firmness and alacrity.

↵

*
A kind of raft much used at sea.
↵

*
Is half charging a gun, by which the bullet skips upon the ground like stones when skimm'd upon the water.
↵

†
This was probably the ship which brought news to France of the English landing, and escaped notwithstanding the vigilance of so great a fleet.
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‡
Of 74 guns.
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*
Of 64 guns each
↵

*
Of 64 guns each
↵

*
Miray, a lake some way in land from Louisbourg harbour, lying between the town and the North-east harbour: here Mons. de Boisbere had on the other side of that lake 302 men, with boats to pass over.
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*

Soon after the news of Lord Howe's death arrived, the following advertisement appeared in the public papers; an application worthy of a Roman matron, in the virtuous times of the republic, and which could not fail of success, where the least spark of virtue existed.

'To the Gentlemen, Clergy, Freeholders, and Burgesses, of the 'Town and Country of the Town of Nottingham.

‘As Lord Howe is now absent upon the public service, and Lieut. Col. Howe is with his regiment at Louisbourg, it rests upon me to beg the favour of your votes and interest, that Lieut. Col. Howe may supply the place of his late brother, as your representative in parliament.’

‘Permit me therefore to implore the protection of every one of you, as the mother of him, whose life has been lost in the service of his country.’

Albemarle Street,Sept. 14, 1758.
CHARLOTTE HOWE.

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(b)

General Abercrombie's Account of his Expedition against Ticonderoga.

Camp at Lake George,July 12, 1758.

THE embarkation of the artillery, stores and provisions being compleated on the evening of the 4th instant; next morning at break of day the tents were struck, and all the troops, amounting to 6367 regulars, officers, light infantry, and rangers included, and 9024 provincials, including officers and batteau men, embarked in about 900 ba••eaux, and 135 whale boats, the artillery to cover our landing, being mounted on rafts.

At five in the evening, reached Sabbath Day Points (25 miles down the Lake) where we halted till ten, then got under way again, and proceeded to the landing place (a cove leading to the French advanced guard) which we reached early next morning the 6th.

Upon our arrival, sent out a reconnoitring party; and having met with no opposition, landed the troops, formed them in four columns, regulars in the centre, and provincials on the flanks, and marched toward the enemy's advanced guard, composed of one battalion, posted on a logged camp, which, upon our approach they deserted, first setting fire to their tents, and destroying every thing they could; but as their retreat was very precipitate, they left several things behind, which they had not time either to burn or carry off. In this camp we likewise found one prisoner and a dead man.

The army in the foregoing order continued their march through the wood on the west-side, with a design to invest Ticonderoga, but the wood being very thick, impassable with any regularity to such a body of men, and the guides unskilful, the troops were bewildered, and the columns broke, falling in one upon another.

Lord Howe, at the head of the right centre colum•, supported by the light infantry, being advanced, fell in with a French party, supposed to consist of about 400 regulars, and a few Indians, who had likewise lost themselves in the retreat from the advanced guard; of these our flankers killed a great many, and took 148 prisoners, among whom were five officers and three cadets.

But this small success cost us very dear, not as to the loss, of numbers, for we had only two officers killed, but as to consequence, his lordship being the first man that fell in this skirmish; and as he was, very deservedly, universally beloved and respected throughout the whole army, it is easy to conceive the grief and consternation his untimely fall occasioned; for my part, I cannot help owning that I felt it most heavily, and lament him as sincerely.

The 7th, the troops being greatly fatigued, by having been one whole night on the water, the following day constantly on foot, and the next day under arms, added to their being in want of provision, having dropped what they had brought with them, in order to lighten themselves, it was thought adviseable to return to the landing place, which we accordingly did about eight that morning.

About eleven in the forenoon, sent off Lieut. Col. Bradstreet, with the 44th regiment, six companies of the first battalion of the royal Americans, the batteau men, and a body of rangers and provincials, to take possession of the Saw-mill, within two miles of Ticonderoga [*], which he soon effected: as the enemy who were posted there, after destroying the mill and breaking down their bridge, had retired some time before.

Lieut. Col. Bradstreet having laid another bridge a cross, and having sent me notice of his being in possession of that ground, I accordingly marched thither with the troops, and we took up our quarters there that night.

The prisoners we had taken being unanimous in their reports, that the French had eight battalions, some Canadians and colony troops, in all about 6000, encamped before their fort, who were intrenching themselves, and throwing up a breast-work, and that they expected a reinforcement of 3000 Canadians, besides Indians, who had been detached under the command of Mons. de Levy, to make a diversion on the side of the Mohawk river; but upon intelligence of our preparations and near approach, had been repeatedly recalled, and was hourly expected; it was thought most adviseable to lose no time in making the attack; wherefore early in the morning of the 8th, I sent Mr. Clerk, the engineer, across the river on the opposite side of the fort, in order to reconnoitre the enemy's intrenchments.

Upon his return, and favourable report of the practicability of carrying those works, if attacked before they were finished, it was agreed to storm them that very day: Accordingly the rangers, light infantry, and the right wing of Provincials, were ordered immediately to march and post themselves in a line, out of cannon shot of the intrenchments; the right extending to Lake George, and the left to Lake Champlain, in order that the regular troops, destined for the attack of the intrenchments, might form on their rear.

The Piquets were to begin the attack, sustained by the grenadiers, and by the battalions: the whole were ordered to march up briskly, rush upon the enemy's fire, and not give theirs, until they were within the enemy's breast-work.

After these orders issued, the whole army, except what had been left at the landing-place to cover and guard the batteaux and whale boats, and a Provincial regiment at the Saw-mill, were put in motion, and advanced to Ticonderoga, where they unfortunately found the intrenchments, not only much stronger than had been represented, and the breast-work at least eight or nine feet high; but likewise the ground before it covered with felled trees, the branches pointed outwards, which so fatigued and retarded the advancing of the troops, that notwithstanding all their intrepidity and bravery, which I cannot too much commend, we sustained so considerable a loss, without any prospect of better success, that it was no longer prudent to remain before it; and it was therefore judged necessary, for the preservation of the remainder of so many brave men, to prevent a total defeat, that we should make the best retreat possible: Accordingly, after several repeated attacks, which lasted upwards of four hours, under the most disadvantageous circumstances, and with the loss of 464 regulars k•lled, 29 missing, 1117 wounded; and 87 Provincials killed, 8 m•ssing, and 239 wounded, officers of both included, I retired to the camp we occupied the night before, with the broken remains of several corps, sending away all the wounded to the bat•eaux, about three miles distance; and early the next morning we arrived there ourselves, embarked, and reached this place the evening of the 9th. Immediately after my return here, I sent the wounded officers and men that could be moved, to Fort Edward and Albany.

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*
A fort built about two years ago on the narrow passage or communication between Lake George and Champlain. It has all the advantages that nature or art can give it, being defended on three sides by water, which is surrounded by rocks, and o
•
the half of the fourth side by a swamp, and where h

••

fa
•
ls, there the French had erected an entrenchment and breast wo
•
t about 9 feet high. It is in the way to Crown Point, and must be taken by our forces before they can march thither. (See the Plate.)
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(c)

Colonel Bradstreet's Letter to General Amherst, on the Reduction of Fort Frontenac.

Oswego,Aug. 31, 1758.

I Landed with the troops within a mile of fort Frontenac without opposition, the 25th. The garrison surrendered prisoners of war the 27th, between 7 and 8 in the morning—It was a square fort of 100 yards the exterior side, and had in it 110 men, some women, children, and Indians, 60 pieces of cannon, (half of which were mounted) sixteen small mortars, with an immense quantity of provisions and goods, to be sent to the troops gone to oppose Brig. Gen. Forbes, their western garrisons, Indians, and to support the army under the command of M. Levy, on his intended enterprize against the Mohawk river, valued by the French at 800,000 livres.—We have likewise taken 9 vessels from 8 to 18 guns, which are all they have upon the lake, two of which I have brought here; one richly laden; and the rest and the provisions I have burnt and destroyed, together with the fort, artillery, stores, &c. agreeable to your excellency's instructions, should I succeed. The garrison made no scruple of saying, that their troops to the southward and western garrisons will suffer greatly, if not entirely starve, for want of the provisions and vessels we have destroyed, as they have not any left to bring them home from Niagara.—The terms on which the garrison surrendered were prisoners of war, until exchanged for equal numbers and rank.

↵

(d)

Brigadier General Forbes's Letter on his taking of Fort du Quesne.

"I Have the pleasure of acquainting you with the singal success of his majesty's arms over all his enemies on the Ohio, by having obliged them to burn, and abandon their Fort du Quesne, which they effected upon the 24th inst. and of which I took possession with my light troops the same evening, and with my little army the next day.—The enemy made their escape down the river, part in boats, and part by land, to their forts and settlements upon the Missisippi, having been abandoned, or, at least, not seconded, by their friends the Indians, whom we had previously engaged to act a neutral part, after thoroughly convincing them, in several skirmishes, that all their attempts upon our advanced posts, in order to cut of our communication, were vain, and to no purpose; so they now seem all willing, and well disposed to embrace his majesty's most gracious protection.

Give me leave, therefore, to congratulate you upon this important event, of having expelled the French from Fort du Quesne, and this prodigious tract of fine rich country; and of having, in a manner, reconciled the various tribes, and nations of Indians, inhabiting it, to his majesty's government.

So far I had wrote you the 26th, but being seized with an inflamation in my stomach, and liver, the sharpest and most severe of all distempers, I could proceed no farther; and, as I have a thousand things to say, have ordered Major Halkett down the country, in order to explain the motives upon which I proceeded, and the various, and almost insurmountable difficulties I had to grapple with.

I shall leave this as soon as I am able to stand; but God knows when, or if ever I reach Philadelphia.

I expect the heads of all the Indians in here to morrow, when I hope very soon to finish with them.

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(e)

Commodore Keppel's Letter to Mr. Secretary Pitt, on his taking the Island of Goree.

SIR,

I Arrived here with the squadron under my command the 28th of December past in the evening; and the next morning, agreeable to his majesty's instructions, I attacked with the ships, the fort and batteries on the island of Goree, which were soon reduced to ask to capitulate; and the Governor's demands were, to be allowed to march the French troops out of the garrison with the honours of war. His terms I absolutely rejected and began a fresh attack; it was, however, but of a very short duration, when the island, forts, garrison, &c. surrendered at discretion to his majesty's squadron.

Lieut. Col. Worge had his troops embark'd in the flat-bottomed boats, in good order and readiness, at a proper distance, with the transports, to attempt a descent, when it should be found practicable or requisite.

Two days after the surrender of the island, I ordered it to be delivered up, with the cannon, artillery, stores, and provisions, &c. to the officer and troops Lieutenant Colonel Worge thought fit to garrison the place with; and the colonel is taking all imaginable pains to settle and regulate the garrison in the best manner, and as fast as things will admit of.

The inclosed, Sir, is the state of the island, with the artillery, ammunition, and provisions, found in the place at its surrender.

French, made prisoners of war, 300,

Blacks, in arms, a great number; but I am not well enough informed as yet to say precisely.

The loss the enemy sustained, as to men, is so very differently stated to me by those that have been asked, that I must defer saying the number till another opportunity.

Iron ordnance of different boxes, 93; one brass 12-pounder; iron swivels mounted on carriages, 11; brass mortars mounted on beds, two of 13 inches; ditto, one of 10 inches; iron, one of 10 inches. In the magazine, powder, 100 barrels. Provisions of all species for 400 men for four months.

Explanation of the Plan of the Island of Goree.

- A. The negroe village.

- B. The company's gardens, &c.

- C. The slavery.

- D. The negroes fountain.

- E. The company's fountain.

- F. The gov•rnor's fountain.

- G. The hospital.

- H. The chapel.

- I. The officers house unfinished.

- K. Hutts for labourers.

- L. The barracks for carpenters.

- M. The apartment for bombardiers.

- N. Officers, store-houses, and barracks for soldiers.

- O. The pharmacy and engineer's laboratory.

- P. The armourer's apartment and forge.

- Q The governor's apartment and garden, &c.

- R. A cistern. R. R. A cistern unfinished.

- S. A powder magazine.

- T. Shades for water casks,

- W. The landing beach, and entry into the parade.

- V. The court of the fort of St. Francis.

- X. The shambles.

- Y. The burying place.

- Z. Ditto for the negroes.

- &. A rain water cistern.

Explanation of the Batteries.

1. The grand battery

9 guns.

2. The salute battery (small)

10 guns.

3. St. Philip's battery

5 guns.

4. St. Peter's battery

5 guns.

5. Citadel of St. Michael, en barbet

6 guns.

6. North point battery

9 guns. 1 split.

7. Mortar battery

8 guns.

8. West point battery

5 guns.

9. A battery unfinish'd

3 guns.

10. Negroe batteries

10 guns.

11 Four half moon batteries en barbet on the hill.

13 guns.

12. Two flanking batteries for the bay

4 guns.

13. Three passage batteries

7 guns.

14. Three brass one iron mortars

4 mortars 1 damag.

15. On St. Francis fort

12 guns. 1 split.

Total

110 pieces.

[*]

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*

The river Senga, or Senegal, is in one of those channels of the river Niger, by which it is supposed to discharge its waters into the Atlantic ocean: The river Niger, according to the best maps, rises in the east of Africa; and after a course of 300 miles, nearly due west, divides into three branches, the most northerly of which is the Senegal, as above; the middle is the Gambia, or Gambra; and the most southern, Rio Grande. Senegal empties itself into the Atlantic ocean in 16° north lat. The entrance of it is guarded by several forts, the principal of which is Fort Lewis, built on an island of the same name. It is a quadrangular fort, with two bastions, and of no inconsiderable strength. At the mouth of the river is a bar; the best season for passing it, is from March to August, or September, or rather from April to July, because the tides are then highest. The English had formerly settlements here, out of which they were driven by the French, who have engrossed the whole trade from Cape Blanco to the river Gambia, which is near 500 miles. The Dutch were the first who settled Senegal, and built two forts. The French made themselves masters of them in 1678. In 1692 the English seized them; but next year the French retook them, and have kept them ever since. They built Fort Lewis in 1692, and have beyond it a multitude of other settlements, extending 200 leagues up the river. The principal commodities which the French import from this settlement are, that valuable article gum senega, hides, bees-wax, elephants teeth, cotton, gold dust, negroe slaves, ostrich feathers, ambergris, indigo, and civet.

At present we are obliged to buy all our gum senega of the Dutch, who purchase it from the French; and they set what price they please on it. But as the trade to Africa is now open, by this important acquisition, the price of this valuable drug, which is so much used in several of our manufactures, will be much reduced.

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(a)
Nam epulae, et quanquam incompti, largi tamen apparatus pro stipendio cedunt.

Tacit. de moribus Germ. §. 14.

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(a)

The Hon. Gen. Barrington's Letter to the Right Hon. Mr. Secretary Pitt, particularising his proceedings at Guadaloupe, May 9, 1759.

IN my last letter of the 6th of March, I had the honour to acquaint you, that the troops under my command at Guadaloupe, (except the garrison of Fort Royal) were all embarked, with their baggage, &c. without the loss of a man. The fleet sailed the next morning for Fort Louis, but from the very great difficulty of turning to windward, were not able to reach it till the 11th, at four in the afternoon, when all the ships of war, but only 25 of the transports, came to an anchor; the others were either driven much to leeward, or prevented by the winds and strong currents from weathering the point of Saintes.

I went on shore at Fort Louis that evening to see the Fort, and the works carrying on by the detachment that had already been sent thither from Basseterre.

On the 12th, I went in a boat to reconnoitre the two coasts of this Bay, as well the Grand Terre side, as that of Guadaloupe, to find a proper place for making a descent; but Commodore Moore having acquainted me in the evening of that day, that he had received certain intelligence of a French squadron of skips of war, consisting of nine sail of the line and two frigates, being seen to the northward of Barbadoes, and that it was therefore necessary for him to quit this place, with all the ships of war under his command, and go into Prince Rupert's Bay, in the island of Dominico, as a situation more advantageous for the protection of Basseterre, and this place, as well as the English islands; I thought it adviseable the next day to call together the General Officers to consider what, in our present situation, was best to be done, and it was determined; notwithstanding the divided state of the troops by the separation of the transports, the weak state of Fort Louis, and the impossibility of supplying it with water but from the ships, and the many difficulties which then appeared, that it would be most for his Majesty's service, and the honour of his arms, to do the utmost to keep possession of the Fort, and to wait some further intelligence of the motions of the enemy.

Commodore Moore sailed the next morning for Prince Rupert's Bay, with all the ships of war, except the Roebuck of 40 guns, which he left, as some protection to the transports.

From this time to the 17th, I continued to direct works to be made for the security of the camp, and for the finishing, as well as strengthening the lines, when, the chief engineer, who was on board one of the transports that could not before get up, being arrived, and having made to me a report of the weakness of the Fort, I thought it necessary to call a council of war to consider the state thereof; and it being debated whether the Fort might not be made tenable, and kept as a garrison for his Majesty's service, on a more circumscribed plan, though it appeared impossible to keep it in the present extent of out-posts; it was determined, after much consideration, that from its weakness and bad construction, its being commanded by several heights very contiguous to it, as well as the great difficulty (I may indeed say the impossibility) of procuring for the present, and establishing a constant supply of water, and other more necessary things for the support and defence of a garrison in this part of the world, not to be tenable. However, Sir, I was, determined to hold it, until some future event might convince me what was best to be done for his Majesty's service.

I reflected on the state of the army under my command, and of the little probability there was of succeeding in any attempt of reducing the country by the troops I had, without the assistance of the ships of war to cover them in landing. But however I determined to make a descent on the coast of Grand Terre; and for that purpose I ordered Col. Crump, with a detachment consisting of 600 men, to go in some of the transports that carried most guns, and endeavour to land between the towns of St. Anne and St. Francois, and destroy the batteries and cannon, which was happily executed with very little loss.

As I imagined by my sending Col. Crump to attack the towns of St. Anne and St. Francois, the enemy would be obliged to detach some of their troops from the post of Gosier, I ordered, two days after he sailed, the only 300 men I had left to be put on board transports, and lye off that town; and in the morning of the 29th, I went to reconnoitre the battery and intrenchments, and perceiving that the enemy appeared less numerous than for some time before, I made a disposition for forcing them by two different attacks. This was executed the next morning at sun-rising, with great spirit and resolution by the troops; and notwithstanding the fire of the enemy from their intrenchments and battery, both were soon carried with little loss, and the enemy drove into the woods. The troops immediately destroyed the cannon and battery, with the town.

This being happily effected, I ordered the detachment to force its way to Fort Louis; and, at the same time, sent orders for the garrison to make two sallies, one to the right, in order to put the enemy between two fires, and the other to attack their lines, as I knew that which I had just made would oblige them to send troops to oppose our passage on that side. The first was made, but the latter, by some mistake, was not executed; which, had it been done, we must have inevitably been in possession of their lines. The detachment from Gosier forced their passage with some loss, notwithstanding a very strong pass that the enemy were possessed of, and took possession of a battery of three 24-pounders, which would, the next day, have played upon our camp.

Governor Desbrisay, whom I had left at Fort Royal in Basseterre, having been killed by the blowing up of some cartridges that took fire from the wadding of a 24-pounder that was discharged from the upper bastion of Fort Royal, at a body of the enemy, on the 23d of March, I appointed Major Melvill, who commanded the detachment of the 38th regiment from the Leeward Islands, to be governor in his room. Major Trollone, a lieut. of the 63d regiment, and two private men, were likewise killed by this accident; and a capt. another lieut. and 3 men wounded: And the parapet of that bastion levelled with the ground by the explosion.

At the same time that I was acquainted with this accident, I was told, that the enemy had erected a bomb-battery, and thrown several shells into the fort; and that they had, for some time past, been working, as the garrison suspected, upon another battery; I therefore ordered Govenor Melvill to cause a sortie (sally) to be made from the garrison in order to destroy it. Accordingly a detachment of 300 men sallied out under the command of Capt. Blomer, on the 1st of April, and without much difficulty forced the enemy's intrenchments, and got into the work, which proved to be a battery of one 18-pounder, and one 12 nearly compleated. Our people spiked the guns, and returned to the garrison with the loss of only six men killed, and six wounded.

As I thought the fort, by this accident, might want the assistance of the chief engineer, I sent him thither immediately, as well as the commanding officer of the artillery, that no time might be lost in putting it again in a proper state of defence.

The remaining part of the transports, with the troops, being now arrived; nine having come on the 23d of March, and the others by one or two in a day; as I had long intended, so soon as it was in my power to make an attack on the Gaudaloupe side, as the enemy had there some posts of infinite consequence, I formed, upon the information of some Negroes, who promised to conduct the troops in flat-bottom boats by night, a design of surprizing Petit Bourg. Guoyave, and St. Marie's, at the same time. The first was to be effected by Brig. Crump, who, the moment he had made himself master of it, was to march to bay Mahaut, and destroy the batteries there, as well as a large magazine of provisions that the enemy had collected from the Dutch, and to hinder any more arriving: The latter, under Brig. Clavering, after he had surprised St. Marie's and Guoyave, was to march into the Capesterre, and reduce that fine country. The success of this appeared not only to me, but to the gentlemen who were to execute it, almost infallible: But the night proved so bad, and the Negroe conductors were so frightened, that they run several of the boats on the shoals, of which that coast is full; so that tho' Brig. Clavering did land with about 80 men, yet the place was so full of mangroves, and so deep in mud, that he was obliged to return, but not without the enemy's discovering our design.

This obliged me to attempt by force, what could not be effected upon a safer plan: But as I then was laid up in a most severe fit of the gout in my feet, head, and stomach, I sent Brigadiers Clavering and Crump to reconnoitre the coast near Arnoville; and upon their report, I ordered 1300 regulars, and 150 of the Antigua volunteers, to land under the protection of the Woolwich man of war: What happened afterwards, you will see by the following letter which I received at Petit Bourg from Brig. Clavering, on the 25th of April.

At M. Poyen's, Capesterre, Gaudaloupe, April 24, 1759.

SIR,

ON Thursday the 12th of April, at day-break, I landed with the troops which you put under my orders, consisting of 1300 men, exclusive of the Antigua volunteers, at a Bay not far distant from Arnoville. The enemy made no opposition to our landing, but retired, as our troops advanced, to very strong intrenchments behind the river Le Corn. This post was to them of the greatest importance, as it covered the whole country to the bay Mahaut, where the provisions and supplies of all sorts were landed from St. Eustatia, and therefore they had very early taken possession of it, and had spared no pains to strengthen it, though the situation was such as required very little assistance from art. The river was only accessible at two narrow passes, on account of a morass covered with mangroves, and those places they had occupied with a redoubt and well pallisaded intrenchments, defended with cannon, and all the militia of that part of the country. We could only approach them in a very contracted front, which was at least reduced to the breadth of the roads, intersected with deep and wide ditches. Our artillery, which consisted of four field pieces and two hawbitzers, were ordered to keep a constant fire on the top of the intrenchments, to cover the attack made by Duroure's regiment and the Highlanders, who, on this occasion, behaved with the greatest coolness and resolution, keeping up, as they advanced, a regular platoon firing. This behaviour so intimidated the enemy, that they abandoned the first intrenchment on the left, into which the Highlanders threw themselves, sword in hand, and pursued the enemy, with part of Duroure's regiment, into the redoubt.

The enemy still kept their ground at their intrenchments on the right, from whence they annoyed our people very much, both with musquetry and cannon; and though those who had carried the first intrenchments had got into their rear, yet, till a bridge could be made to pass the river, they could not get round to attack this post. This took us up near half an hour; but however we got up time enough to take near 70 of the enemy prisoners, as they were endeavouring to make their escape, amongst whom were some of the most considerable inhabitants of the island.

We found in both the intrenchments six pieces of cannon. Our loss was one officer and 13 men killed, and two officers and 52 men wounded.

So soon as the ditches could be filled up for the passage of the artillery, we proceeded on our march towards Petit Bourg. A considerable number of the enemy had lined an intrenchment about half a mile on the left of the road, but when they perceived we were endeavouring to surround them, they abandoned it, keeping always about 200 yards in our front, setting fire to the sugar-canes, which obliged us more than once to leave the road, to avoid any accident to our powder.

The troops arrived late on the banks of the river Lezard, behind which, at the only ford, the enemy had thrown up very strong intrenchments, protected with four pieces of cannon on the hill behind them.

Having reconnoitred the side of the river, and finding it might cost us very dear to force the passage at the ford, I therefore kept up their attention all the night by firing into their lines, during which time I got two Canoes conveyed about a mile and a half down the river, where being launched, we ferryed over, before break of day in the morning, a sufficient number of men to attack them in flank, whilst we should do the same in front: The enemy soon perceived their danger, and left their intrenchments with the greatest precipitation.

Thus we passed without the loss of a man, still pursuing them to Petit Bourg, which place they had fortified with lines, and a redoubt filled with cannon.

We found Capt. Uvedale there, in the Granada bomb, throwing shells into the Fort. The enemy did not remain in it long, when they saw our intention of occupying the heights round them, but left us masters of that, and the Port, with all the cannon round the place.

We halted here the 14th, to get provisions for the troops.

On the 15th, at day break, Brig. Crump was detached with 700 men to the bay Mahaut, and at the same time Capt. Steel with 100 to Guoyave, about 7 miles in our front, to destroy a battery there. The panick of the enemy was such, that they only discharged their cannon at him, and abandoned a post that might have been defended against an army. He nailed up 7 pieces of cannon, and returned the same evening to Petit Bourg, Brig. Crump returned likewise the next day with his detachment from the bay Mahaut, where he found the town and batteries abandoned. These he burnt, with an immense quantity of provisions, that had been landed there by the Dutch, and reduced the whole country, as far as Petit Bourg.

The heavy rains on the succeeding days had so swelled the rivers, that it was impossible for the troops to advance; however, this delay gave us an opportunity of strengthening the post a Petit Bourg.

On the 18th in the evening, the Antigua volunteers took possession again of Guoyave; they were supported early the next morning by a detachment commanded by Lieut. Col. Barlow, who had orders to repair the road for the passage of the cannon.

On the 20th, after leavin 250 men to guard Petit Bourg, the remaining part of the detachment, with the cannon, moved on to Guoyave, in order to proceed afterwards to St. Marie's, where we were informed the enemy were collecting their whole force to oppose us, and had likewise thrown up intrenchments, and made barricadoes on the road to prevent our approach to it. We were not long before we perceived them; but, at the same time, we found, as well by our own observation, as by the information of the guides, that it was not impossible to get into their rear by roads the enemy thought impracticable, and consequently had guarded with very little care.

A detachment was immediately formed under Col. Barlow, for this service, and orders were sent to hasten the march of the artillery, which, from the badness of the roads, had not been able to get up. The first shot from our cannon, placed very near their intrenchment, with the alarm that was given by our detachment in the rear, made the enemy very soon sensible of the dangerous situation they were in, and indeed their precipitate flight only saved them from being all taken prisoners.

We pursued them as far as the heights of St. Marie's, where we again formed our men, for a fresh attack on the lines and batteries there.

Whilst the barricadoes were levelling for the artillery, we attempted a second time to pass the woods and precipices that covered the flanks of the enemy's lines; but, before we could get up our cannon, they perceived our movement, and began to quit their lines to oppose it, which made us resolve, without any further delay, to attack them immediately in front; and it was accordingly executed with the greatest vivacity, notwithstanding the constant firing of both their cannon and musquetry. They abandoned here all their artillery, and went off in so much confusion, that they never afterwards appeared before us.

We took up our quarters at St. Marie's that night, and the next day entered the Capesterre, which is the richest and most beautiful part of this or any other country in the West Indies. Eight hundred and seventy Negroes, belonging to one man only surrendered this day.

Here Mess. de Glainvilliers and Duqueruy, deputed by the principal inhabitants of the Island, met me to know the terms you would grant them; and, as I accompanied them to Petit Bourg the next day, and there presented them to you, it is not necessary for me to mention any transaction since that time.

I cannot, however, conclude, without doing justice to those, to whose merit is due the success that has attended the King's arms on this occasion; I mean the spirit and constancy of the troops: To Brig. Crump, without whose concurrence, I never undertook any thing, but chiefly to yourself, Sir, who planned the whole enterprize, and who furnished me with all these means, without which, neither bravery or prudence can little avail.

I have the honour to be, &c. J. CLAVERING.

The Hon. General Barrington's Letter to the Right. Hon. Mr. Secretary Pitt, dated, Head Quarters, in the Capesterre, Guadaloupe, May 9, 1759.

I Have the satisfaction to inform you, that by great perseverance, and changing entirely the nature of the war, by carrying it on by detachments, I have at length made myself master of Guadaloupe and Grand Terre. This is a work, Sir, that, I believe, the most sanguine (considering our total separation from the fleet) could not expect to have been performed by so small a body of men.

I shall not in this trouble you with a detail, as I have done myself the honour of sending it to you in my other letter. I shall only say in general, that the great good conduct and zeal of Brigadiers Clavering and Crump, and the bravery of the troops, got the better of every obstacle; forced the enemy in all their intrenchments, and strong passes; took 50 pieces of cannon, and advanced as far as the Capesterre, the only remaining unreduced part of the country. This at last brought the enemy to terms. My situation was such, that it was absolutely necessary, that what was done should not be procrastinated, as I was determined to grant no truce for time enough for the inhabitants to recover from their fears. Mr. Moore was absent, the thing pressed, and some resolution was to be taken immediately. That, which I took, was according to the best of my understanding, and I hope, Sir, you will approve of it.

I believe, Sir, the infinite consequence and value of Guadaloupe, and Grand Terre, is not perfectly known in England, as (if I am rightly informed) there is more •ugar grown here than in all the Leeward Islands put together; besides great quantities of cotton and coffee. The country, especially the Capesterre, the finest I ever saw, watered with good rivers every mile or two; and a port belonging to it, where all the navy of England may ride safe from hurricanes. All this can be explained much better, than I can by letter, by Brig. Clavering, whose infinite zeal for his Majesty's service, and talents as a soldier, I hope will recommend him to protection. Such men are rare; and I think I may venture to assure you, there are few things in our profession, that he is not equal to, if it should be thought fit to honour him with the execution of any future commands.

I have appointed Col. Crump to the government, who, since governor Haldane left us, I have made act as Brigadier: His merit is very great, both as a soldier, and a man of judgment; He is of this part of the world; understands the trade, customs, and genius of the people; and as he thinks nobly and desinterestedly, he would not have accepted of the government, but in hopes of advancing himself in the army by that means. I cannot say, how very useful, and how much our successes are owing to his good conduct, and great zeal.

As I have now nothing to fear from the land, I am repairing, as well as I can, Fort Louis, and fortifying the isle of Cochon, for the greater security of the harbour. The poor people here are in a miserable condition, but I shall do every thing in my power to procure them the things they want.

I have the honour to send you inclosed the capitulation of the governor, as well as that of the inhabitants. The latter have behaved, in all their dealings, with great candour; and it is a justice I owe them, to acquaint you with it.

It has not as yet been possible for me to go round ths island to see the different posts that must be occupied, I therefore cannot yet determine the exact number of troops that will be necessary to be left for their defence.

The great assistance I have received from Capt. Lynn, of his Majesty's ship the •oebuck, in the different services I have been carrying on for the reduction of these islands, ought not to be forgot by me, as well as his first Lieutenant, Mr. Keating; both whom I beg leave to recommend to your favour.

I find it is impossible (from the different parts of the Islands where they are to be received) for me to procure a return of the artillery and stores (which have been delivered up, in consequence of the capitulation) to send by this opportunity; but I hope to be able to have the Honour of sending it very soon.

I cannot help congratulating myself, that I had just signed the capitulation with the inhabitants of the Grand Terre, when a messenger arrived in their camp to acquaint them, that M. Beauharnois, the general of these islands, had landed at St. Anne's, on the windward part of that island, with a reinforcement from Martinico, of 600 regulars, 2000 buccaneers, and 2000 stand of spare arms for the inhabitants, with artillery and mortars, under the convoy of M. Bompart's squadron. This support, had it arrived there an hour sooner, must have made the conquest of that island very difficult, if not impossible. As soon as he heard the capitulation was signed, he reimbarked again.

Commodore Moore's Letter to the Right Hon. Mr. Secretary Pitt, dated Cambridge, in Prince Rupert's Bay, Dominique, May 11, 1759.

BY the Griffin, which arrived here on 17th of April, I was honoured with your letter, signifying his Majesty's most gracious approbation of my conduct, and of the behaviour of those under my command, which I took the liberty to communicate to those gentlemen: And give me leave to say, Sir, nothing can contribute so much to our happiness, as being honoured with, and executing orders to the honour of his Majesty's arms.

Give me leave, Sir, to congratulate you on the capitulation of the island of Guadaloupe and Grand Terre, which Major Gen. Barrington sends to you by this express; in gaining which, great honour is due to the troops. The strong hold, the enemy had, could not be conquered but by great conduct and resolution.

I hope the conquest will prove as great an acquisition as it appears to me.

It is with great pleasure, I think I may say, Sir, that on this expedition, great unanimity has been kept up between the two corps, as well in obedience to his Majesty's commands, as from our own inclinations. It has ever been my wish to have such harmony subsist, and I flatter myself I have always succeeded.

I beg leave to acquaint you, Sir, that, on the 2d inst. being informed, the French squadron, under the command of M. Bompart, was to windward of Marigalante, I put to sea in the night, and endeavoured to get up with them; but, after beating five days, and having gained very little, two of our cruizers, that I had sent different ways, to watch the enemy's motions, saw them, the 6th inst. return betwixt the two islands into Fort Royal. From the almost constant lee currents, it being very difficult for ships to get to windward, it must always be in the enemy's choice, whether they will come to a general action or not. Their squadron consists of nine sail of the line and three frigates.

I shall, in conjunction with Gen. Barrington, give every assistance in my power to any other services.

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(a)

Prince Ferdinand's Orders the Day after the Battle of Minden.

HIS Serene Highness orders his greatest thanks to be given to the whole army for their bravery and good behaviour yesterday, particularly to the British infantry, and two battalions of Hanoverian guards; to all the cavalry of the left wing, and to Gen. Wangeinheim's corps, particularly the regiment of Holstein, the Hessian cavalry, the Hanoverian regiment du Corps and Hamerstin's; the same to all the brigades of heavy artillery. His Serene Highness declares publicly, that next to God he attributes the glory of the day to the intrepidity and extraordinary good behaviour of these troops, which he assures them he shall retain the strongest sense of as long as he lives; and if ever upon any occasion he shall be able to serve these brave troops, or any of them in particular, it will give him the utmost pleasure. His Serene Highness orders his particular thanks to be likewise given to Gen. Spor•ken, the Duke of Holstein, Lieutenant Generals Imhoff and Urff. His Serene Highness is extremely obliged to the Count de Buckeburg, for his extraordinary care and trouble in the management of the artillery, which was served with great effect; likewise to the commanding officers of the several brigades of artillery, viz, Col. Browne, Lieut. Col. Hutte, Major Hasse, and the three English Captains, Phillips, Drummond, and Foy. His Serene Highness thinks himself infinitely obliged to Major Generals Waldegrave and Kingsly, for their great courage and good order, in which they conducted their brigades. His Serene Highness further orders it to be declared to Lieut. Gen. the Marquiss of Granby, that he is persuaded, that if he had had the good fortune to have had him at the head of the cavalry of the right wing, his presence would have greatly contributed to make the decision of that day more complete and more brilliant. In short, his Serene Highness orders, that those of his Suite whose behaviour he most admired be named, as the Duke of Richmond, Col. Fitzrey, Cap. Ligonier, Col. Watson, Capt. Wilson, aid de camp to Major-Gen. Waldegrave, Adjutant Generals Erstoff, Bulow, Durendolle, the Count Tobe and Malerti; his Serene Highness having much reason to be satisfied with their conduct. And his Serene Highness desires and orders the generals of the army, that upon all occasions when orders are brought to them by his aid de camps, that they be obeyed punctually, and without delay.

Prince Ferdinand, in the orders of the 2d of August, having omitted Captain Machean, sent the following, wrote in his own hand.

SIR,

IT is from a sense of your merit, and a regard to justice, that I do in this manner declare I have reason to be infinitely satisfied with your behaviour, activity, and zeal, which in so conspicuous a manner you made appear at the battle of Thornhausen on the first of August. The talents you possess in your profession did not a little contribute to render our fire superior to that of the enemy; and it is to you and your brigade that I am indebted for having silenced the fire of a battery of the enemy, which extremely galled the troops, and particularly the British infantry.

Accept then, sir, from me, the just tribute of my most perfect acknowledgments, accompanied with my sincere thanks. I shall be happy in every opportunity of obliging you, desiring only occasions of proving it; being with the most distinguished esteem,

Your devoted and entirely affectionate servant, FERDINAND.

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(b)

Admiral Boscawen's Letter to Mr. Clevland, Secretary to the Admiralty, dated, Namure, off Cape St. Vincent, August 20, 1759.

"I Acquainted you in my last of my return to Gibraltar to refit. As soon as the ships were near ready, I ordered the Lime and Gibraltar frigates, the first to cruize off Malaga, and the last from Estepona to Ceuta Point, to look out, and give me timely notice of the enemy's approach.

On the 17th, at eight in the evening, the Gibraltar made the signal of their appearance; 14 sail on the Barbary shore to the eastward of Ceuta.

I got under sail as fast as possible, and was out of the bay before ten, with 14 sail of the line, the Shannon and Aetna fireship. At day light I saw the Gibraltar, and soon after seven sail of large ships lying to; but on our not answering their signals, they made sail from us. We had a fresh gale, and came up with them fast, till about noon, when it fell little wind. About half an hour past two, some of the headmost ships began to engage; but I could not get up to the Ocean till near four. In about half an hour, the Namur's mizen mast and both top-sail yards were shot away; the enemy then made all the sail they could. I shifted my flag to the Newark, and soon after the Centaur of 74 guns struck. I pursued all night, and in the morning of the 19th, saw only four sail of the line standing in for the land, (two of the best sailors having altered their course in the night). We were not above three miles from them, and not above five leagues from the shore, but very little wind. About nine the Ocean ran amongst the breakers, and the three others anchored. I sent the Intrepid and America to destroy the Ocean. Capt. Pratten having anchored, could not get in; but Capt. Kirk performed that service alone. On his first firing at the Ocean she struck. Capt. Kirk sent his officers on board. M. de la Clue having one leg broke, and the other wounded, had been landed about half an hour; but they found the Capt. M. Le Comte de Carne, and several officers and men on board. Capt. Kirk, after taking them out, finding it impossible to bring the ship off, set her on fire. Capt. Bentley, of the Warspight, was ordered against the Temeraire of 74 guns; and brought her off with little damage, the officers and men all on board. At the same time Vice-Admiral Broderick with his division burnt the Redoubtable, her officers and men having quitted her, being bulged; and brought the Modeste, of 64 guns, off very little damaged.

I have the pleasure to acquaint their lordships, that most of his majesty's ships under my command sailed better than those of the enemy.

Inclosed I send you a list of the French squadron, found on board the Modeste.

Herewith you will also receive the number of the killed and wounded on board his majesty's ships, referring their lordships for further particulars to Capt. Buckle.

List of the French Squadron under the command of M. de la Clue.

Ships.

Guns.

L'Ocean

80 burnt.

Le Redoutable

74 burnt.

Le Centaure

74 taken.

Le Souverain

74 escaped.

Le Guerrier

74 escaped.

Le Temeraire

74 taken.

Le Fantasque

64 lost comp.

Le Modeste

64 taken.

Le Lion

64 lost company coming thro' the Streights.

Le Triton

64 lost company coming thro' the Streights.

Le Fier

50 lost company coming thro' the Streights.

L' Oriflamme

50 lost company coming thro' the Streights.

La Chimere

26 lost company coming thro' the Streights.

La Minerve

24 lost company coming thro' the Streights.

La Gracieuse

24 lost company coming thro' the Streights.

In this engagement the English had 36 men killed, and 196 wounded.

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(a)

Sir William Johnson's Letter to Major-General Amherst, on his Conquest of the Fort at Niagara, 25th July, 1759.

SIR,

I Have the honour to acquiant you, by lieutenant Monterieff, Niagara surrendered to his majesty's arms the 25th instant. A detachment of 1200 men, with a number of Indians, under the command of Messrs. Aubry and de Lignery, collected from Detroi, Venango, and Presque Isle, made an attempt to reinforce the garrison, the 24th in the morning; but as I had intelligence of them▪ I made a disposition to intercept them. The evening before, I ordered the light infantry and picquets to take post on the road upon our left, leading from Niagara Falls to the fort: In the morning, I reinforced these with two companies of grenadiers, and part of the 46th regiment. The action began about half an hour after nine; but they were so well received by the troops in front, and the Indians on their flank, that, in an hour's time, the whole was compleatly ruined, and all their officers made prisoners, among whom are Mons. Aubry, De Lignery, Marin, Repentini, &c. to the number of 17. I cannot ascertain the number of killed, they are so dispersed among the woods, but their loss is great.

As this happened under the eyes of the garrison, I thought proper to send my last summons to the commanding officer for his surrendering, which he listened to. M. Mon•rieff will inform you of the state of our ammunition and provisions: I hope care will be taken to forward an immediate supply of both to Oswego. As the troops that were defeated yesterday were drawn from those posts, which lie in General Stanwix's route, I am in hopes it will be of the utmost consequence to the success of this expedition. The public stores of the garrison, that can be saved from the Indians, I shall order the assistant quarter-master-general, and the clerk to take an account of, as soon as possible.

As all my attention at present is taken up with the Indians, that the capitulation I have agreed to may be observed, your Excellency will excuse my not being more particular.

Permit me to assure you, in the whole progress of the siege, which was severe and painful, the officers and men behaved with the utmost chearfulness and bravery. I have only to regret the loss of General Prideaux and Colonel Johnson. I endeavoured to pursue the late General's vigorous measures, the good effects of which he deserved to enjoy.

W. JOHNSON.

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(c)

Major General Wolfe's Letter, and Admiral Saunders's, to Mr. Secretary Pitt, relative to the Operations at Quebec.

Head Quarters at Montmorenci, in the River Saint Laurence,Sept. 2, 1759.
SIR,

I Wish I could, upon this occasion, have the honour of transmitting to you a more favourable account of the progress of his Majesty's arms; but the obstacles we have met with, in the operations of the campaign, are much greater than we had reason to expect, or could foresee; not so much from the number of the enemy (tho' superiour to us) as from the natural strength of the country, which the Marquis de Montcalm seems wisely to depend upon.

When I learned that succours of all kinds had been thrown into Quebec; that five battalions of regular troops, completed from the best of the inhabitants of the country, some of the troops of the colony, and every Canadian that was able to bear arms, besides several nations of savages, had taken the field in a very advantageous situation; I could not flatter myself that I should be able to reduce the place. I sought however an occasion to attack their army, knowing well, that with these troops I was able to fight, and hoping that a victory might disperse them.

We found them incamped along the shore of Beaufort, from the river St. Charles to the falls of Montmorenci, and intrenched in every accessible part. The 27th of June we landed upon the isle of Orleans; but receiving a message from the Admiral, that there was reason to think the enemy had artillery, and a force upon the point of Levi, I detached Brig. Monckton with four battalions to them from thence. He passed the river the 29th at night, and marched the next day to the point; he obliged the enemy's irregulars to retire, and possessed himself of that post: The advanced parties upon this occasion had two or three skirmishes with the Canadians and Indians, with little loss on either side.

Colonel Carleton marched with a detachment to the Westermost point of the isle of Orleans, from whence our operations were likely to begin.

It was absolutely necessary to possess these two points, and fortify them; because from either the one or the other, the enemy might make it impossible for any ship to be in the bason of Quebec, or even within two miles of it.

Batteries of cannon and mortars were erected with great dispatch on the point of Levi, to bombard the town and magazines, and to injure the works and batteries: The enemy perceiving these works in some forwardness, passed the river with 1600 men to attack and destroy them. Unluckily they fell into confusion, fired upon one another, and went back again; by which we lost an opportunity of defeating this large detachment. The effect of this artillery has been so great (though across the river) that the upper town is considerably damaged, and the lower town entirely destroyed.

The works for the security of our hospitals and stores on the isle of Orleans being finished, on the 9th of July at night, we passed the North channel, and incamped near the enemy's left, the river Montmorenci between us The next morning Captain Dank's Company of Rangers, posted in a wood to cover some workmen, were attacked and defeated by a body of Indians, and had so many killed and wounded, as to be almost disabled for the rest of the campaign: The enemy also suffered in this affair, and were in their turn driven off by the nearest troops.

The ground, to the eastward of the falls, seemed to be (as it really is) higher than that on the enemy's side, and to command it in a manner which might be made useful to us. There is besides a ford below the falls, which may be passed for some hours in the latter part of the ebb and beginning of the flood tide; and I had hopes, that possibly means might be found of passing the river above, so as to fight the Marquis de Montcalm, upon terms of less disadvantage than directly attacking his intrenchments. In reconnoitring the river Montmorenci, we found it fordable at a place about three miles up; but the opposite bank was intrenched, and so steep and woody, that it was to no purpose to attempt a passage there. The Escort was twice attacked by the Indians, who were as often repulsed; but in these rencounters we had 40 (officers and men) killed and wounded.

The 18th of July, two men of war, two armed sloops, and two transports with some troops on board, passed by the town without any loss, and got into the upper river. This enabled me to reconnoitre the country above, where I found the same attention on the enemy's side, and great difficulties on ours, arising from the nature of the ground, and the obstacles to our communication with the fleet. But what I feared most, was, that if we should land between the town and the river, Capt. Rouge, the body first landed could not be reinforced before they were attacked by the enemy's whole army.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, I thought once of attempting it at St. Michael's, about three miles above the town: but perceiving that the enemy were jealous of the design, were preparing against it, and had actually brought artillery and a mortar (which, being so near to Quebec, they could increase as they pleased) to play upon the shipping; and, as it must have been many hours before we could attack them, (even supposing a favourable night for the boats to pass by the town unhurt) it seemed so hazardous, that I thought it best to desist.

However, to divide the enemy's force, and to draw their attention as high up the river as possible, and to procure some intelligence, I sent a detachment under the command of Col. Carleton, to land at the Point de Trempe, to attack whatever he might find there, bring off some prisoners, and all the useful papers he could get. I had been informed that a number of the inhabitants of Quebec, had retired to that place, and that probably we should find a magazine of provisions there.

The Colonel was fired upon by a body of Indians the moment he landed, but they were soon dispersed and driven into the woods: he searched for magazines, but to no purpose, brought off some prisoners, and returned with little loss.

After this business, I came back to Montmorenci, where I found that B•ig. Townshend had, by a superior fire, prevented the French from erecting a battery on the bank of the river, from whence they intended to cannonade our camp. I now resolved to take the first opportunity which presented itself of attacking the enemy, though posted to great advantage, and every where prepared to receive us.

As the men of war cannot (for want of a sufficient depth of water) come near enough to the enemy's intrenchments to annoy them in the least, the Admiral had prepared two transports (drawing but little water) which upon occasions could be run a ground, to favour a descent. With the help of these vessels, which I understood would be carried by the tide close in shore, I proposed to make myself master of a detached redoubt near to the water's edge, and whose situation appeared to be out of musquet shot of the intrenchment upon the hill: If the enemy supported this detatched piece, it would necessarily bring on an engagement, what we most wished for; and if not, I should have it in my power to examine their situation, so as to be able to determine where we could best attack them.

Preparations were accordingly made for an engagement. The 31st of July in the forenoon, the boats of the fleet were filled with grenadiers, and a part of Brig. Monckton's brigade from the point of Levi: The two brigades under the Brigadiers Townshend and Murray were ordered to be in readiness to pass the ford, when it should be thought necessary. To facilitate the passage of this corps, the admiral had placed the Centurion in the channel, so that she might check the fire of the lower battery which commanded the ford: This ship was of great use, as her fire was very judiciously directed. A great quantity of artillery was placed upon the eminence, so as to batter and enfilade the left of their intrenchments.

From the vessel which run a-ground, nearest in. I observed that the redoubt was too much commanded to be kept without very great loss; and the more, as the two armed ships could not be brought near enough to cover both with their artillery and musquetry, which I at first conceived they might. But as the enemy seemed in some confusion, and we were prepared for an action, I thought it a proper time to make an attempt upon their intrenchments. Orders were sent to the Brigadiers Generals to be ready with the corps under their command. Brig. Monckton to land, and the Brigadiers Townshend and Murray to pass the ford.

At a proper time of the tide, the signal was made, but in rowing towards the shore, many 〈◊〉 the boats grounded upon a ledge that runs of a considerable •ance. This accident put us into some disorder, lost a great deal off time, and obliged me to send an officer to stop Brig. Towshend's march, whom I then observed to be in motion. While the seamen were getting the boats off, the enemy fired a number of shells and shot, but did no considerable damage. As soon as this disorder could be set a little to rights, and the boats were ranged in a proper manner, some of the officers of the navy went in with me, to find a better place to land: we took one flat-bottomed boat with us to make the experiment, and as soon as we had found a fit part of the shore, the troops were ordered to disembark, thinking it not yet too late for the attempt.

The 13 companies of grenadiers, and 200 of the scond Royal American battalion, got first on shore. The grenadiers were ordered to form themselves into four distinct bodies, and to begin the attack, supported by Brig. Monckton's corps, as soon as the troops had passed the ford, and were at hand to assist. But whether from the noise and hurry at landing, or from some other cause, the grenadiers, instead of forming themselves as they were directed, ran on impetuously towards the enemy's intrenchments in the utmost disorder and confusion, without waiting for the corps which were to sustain them, and join in the attack. Brig. Monckton was not landed, and Brig. Townshend was still at a considerable distance, though upon his march to join us, in very great order. The grenadiers were checked by the enemy's first fire, and obliged to shelter themselves in or about the redoubt, which the French abandoned upon their approach. In this situation they continued for some time, unable to form under so hot a fire, and having many gallant officers wounded, who (careless of their persons) had been solely intent upon their duty. I saw the absolute necessity of calling them off, that they might form themselves behind Brig. Monckton's corps, which was now landed, and drawn up on the beach, in extreme good order.

By this new accident, and this second delay, it was near night, a sudden storm came on, and the tide began to make; so that I thought it most adviseable, not to persevere in so difficult an attack, lest (in case of a repulse) the retreat of Brig. Townshend's corps might be hazardous and uncertain.

Our artillery had a great effect upon the enemy's left, where Brigadiers Townshend and Murray were to have attacked; and, it is probable that if those accidents I have spoken of, had not happened, we should have penetrated there, whilst our left and centre (more remote from our artillery) must have bore all the violence of their musquetry.

The French did not attempt to interrupt our march. Some of their savages came down to murder such wounded as could not be brought off, and to scalp the dead, as their custom is.

The place where the attack was intended, has these advantages over all others hereabout. Our artillery could be brought into use. The greatest part, or even the whole of the troops, might act at once. And the retreat (in case of repulse) was secure, at least for a certain time of the tide. Neither one or other of these advantages can any where else be found. The enemy were indeed posted upon a commanding eminence. The beach upon which the troops were drawn up, was of deep mud, with holes, and cut by several gullies. The hill to be ascended very steep, and not every where practicable. The enemy numerous in their intrenchments, and their fire hot. If the attack had succeeded, our loss must certainly have been great, and their's inconsiderable, from the shelter which the neighbouring woods afforded them. The river St. Charles still remained to be passed, before the town was inverted. All these circumstances I considered; but the desire to act in conformity to the King's intentions, induced me to make this trial, persuaded that a victorious army finds no difficulties.

The enemy have been fortifying ever since with care, so as to make a second attempt still more dangerous.

Immediately after this check, I sent Brig. Murray above the town with 1200 men, directing him to assist Rear Admiral Holmes in the destruction of the French ships (if they could be got at) in order to open a communication with Gen. Amherst. The Brigadier was to seek every favourable opportunity of fighting some of the enemy's detachments, provided he could do it upon tolerable terms, and to use all the means in his power to provoke them to attack him. He made two different attempts to and upon the North shore without success; but in a third was more fortunate. He landed unexpectedly at De Chambaud, and burnt a magazine there, in which were some provisions, some ammunition, and all the spare stores, clothing, arms, and baggage, of their army.

Finding that their ships were not to be got at, and little prospect of bringing the enemy to a battle, he reported his situation to me, and I ordered him to join the army.

The prisoners he took informed him of the surrender of the fort of Niagara; and we discovered, by intercepted letters, that the enemy had abandoned Carillon and Crown Point, were retired to the isle Aux Noix; and that Gen. Amherst was making preparations to pass the Lake Champlain, to fall upon M. de Bourlemaque's corps, which consists of three battalions of foot, and as many Canadians as make the whole amount to 3000 men.

The Admiral's dispatches and mine would have gone eight or ten days sooner, if I had not been prevented from writing by a fever. I found myself so ill, and am still so weak, that I begged the general officers to consult together for the public utility. They are all of opinion, that (as more ships and provisions have now got above the town) they should try, by conveying up a corps of 4 or 5000 men (which is nearly the whole strength of the army, after the points of Levi and Orleans are left in a proper state of defence) to draw the enemy from their present situation, and bring them to an action. I have acquiesced in their proposal, and we are preparing to put it in execution.

The Admiral and I have examined the town, with a view to a general assault; but, after consulting with the chief engineer, who is well acquainted with the interior parts of it, and, after viewing it with the utmost attention, we found, that though the batteries of the Lower Town might be easily silenced by the men of war, yet the business of an assault would be little advanced by that, since the few passages that lead from the Lower to the Upper Town, are carefully intrenched; and the upper batteries cannot be affected by the ships, which must receive considerable damage from them and from the mortars. The Admiral would readily join in this, or in any other measure, for the public service; but I could not propose to him an undertaking of so dangerous a nature, and promising so little success.

To the uncommon strength of the country, the enemy have added (for the defence of the river) a great number of floating batteries and boats. By the vigilance of these and the Indians round our different posts, it has been impossible to execute any thing by surprize. We have had almost daily skirmishes with these Savages, in which they are generally defeated, but not without loss on our side.

By the list of disabled officers (many of whom are of rank) you may perceive, Sir, that the army is much weakened. By the nature of the river, the most formidable part of this armament is deprived of the power of acting, yet we have almost the whole force of Canada to oppose. In this situation, there is such a choice of difficulties, that I own myself at a loss how to determine. The affairs of Great Britain, I know, require the most vigourous measures; but then the courage of a handful of brave men should be exerted only where there is some hope of a favourable event. However, you may be assured, Sir, that the small part of the campaign which remains, shall be employed (as far as I am able) for the honour of his Majesty and the interest of the nation, in which I am sure of being well seconded by the Admiral and by the Generals. Happy if our efforts here can contribute to the success of his Majesty's arms in any other parts of America.

I have the Honour to be, With the greatest Respect, Sir,
Your most obedient, and most humble Servant, JAMES WOLFE.

Sterling-Castle off Point Levi, in the River St. Lawrence, 5th of September, 1759.
SIR,

IN my letter of the 6th of June, I acquainted you I was then off Scutari, standing for the river St. Laurence. On the 26th, I had got up, with the first division of the fleet and transports, as far as the middle of the Isle of Orleans, where I immediately prepared to land the troops, which I did the next morning. The same day the second and third divisions came up, and the troops from them were landed likewise.

I got thus far without any loss or accident whatever; but, directly after landing the troops, a very hard gale of wind came on, by which many anchors and small boats were lost, and much damage received among the transports, by their driving on board each other. The ships that lost most anchors I supplied from the men of war as far as I was able, and in all other respects, gave them the best assistance in my power.

On the 28th, at midnight, the enemy sent down from Quebec seven fireships; and though our ships and transports were so numerous, and necessarily spread so great a part of the channel, we towed them all clear and a-ground, without receiving the least damage from them. The next night Gen. Monckton crossed the river, and landed with his Brigade on the South shore, and took post at Point Levi; and Gen. Wolfe took his on the Westmost Point of the Isle of Orleans.

On the 1st of July, I moved up between the Points of Orleans and Levi; and, it being resolved to land on the North shore, below the falls of Montmorenci, I placed on the 8th inst. his Majesty's sloop the Porcupine, and the Boscawen armed vessel, in the channel between Orleans and the North shore, to cover that landing, which took place at night.

On the 17th, I ordered Capt. Rous of the Sutherland, to proceed, with the first fair wind and night tide, above the town of Quebec, and to take with him his majesty's ships Diana and Squirrel, with two armed sloops, and two catts armed and loaded with provisions.

On the 18th, at night, they all got up, except the Diana, and gave Gen. Wolfe an opportunity of reconnoitring above the town, those ships having carried some troops with them for that purpose. The Diana ran ashore upon the rocks off Point Levi, and received so much damage, that I have sent her to Boston with 27 sail of American transports, (those which received most damage in the gale of the 27th of June) where they are to be discharged; and the Diana, having repaired her damages, is to proceed to England, taking with her the mast ships, and what trade may be ready to accompany her.

On the 28th, at mignight, the enemy sent down a raft of fire-stages, of near a hundred Radeaux, which succeeded no better than the fire-ships.

On the 31st, Gen. Wolfe determined to land a number of troops above the falls of Montmorenci, in order to attack the enemy's lines; to cover which, I placed the Centurion in the channel, between the Isle of Orleans and the falls, and ran on shore, at high water, two catts which I had armed for that purpose, against two small batteries and two redoubts, where our troops were to land. About six in the evening they landed, but the Generel not thinking it proper to persevere in the attack; soon after, part of them re-embarked, and the rest crossed the Falls with Gen. Wolfe; upon which, to prevent the two catts from falling into the enemy's hands (they being then dry on shore) I gave orders to take the men out and set them on fire, which was accordingly done.

On the 5th of August, in the night, I sent twenty flat-bottomed boats up the river, to the Sutherland, to embark 1260 of the troops, with Brig. Gen. Murray, from a post he had taken on the south shore. I sent Admiral Holmes up to the Sutherland, to act in concert with him, and give him all the assistance the ships and boats could afford. At the same time I directed Admiral Holmes to use his best endeavours to get at, and destroy the enemy's ships above the town; and for that purpose I ordered the Lowestoffe, and Hunter sloop, with two armed sloops and two catts, with provisions, to pass Quebec and join the Sutherland; but the wind holding westerly, it was the 27th of August before they got up, which was the fourth attempt they had made to gain their passage.

On the 25th, at night, Admiral Holmes and Gen. Murray, with part of the troops, returned; they had met with, and destroyed a magazine of the enemy's cloathing, some gunpowder, and other things; and Admiral Holmes had been ten or twelve leagues above the town, but found it impracticable at that time to get farther up.

Gen. Wolfe having resolved to quit the camp at Montmorenci, and go above the town, in hopes of getting between the enemy and their provisions, (supposed to be in the ships there) and by that means force them to an action, I sent up, on the 29th at night, the Seahorse and two armed sloops, with two catts laden with provisions, to join the rest above Quebec; and having taken off all the artillery, from the camp at Montmorenci, on the 3d inst. in the afternoon the troops embarked from thence, and landed at Point Levi. The 4th, at night, I sent all the flat-bottomed boats up, and this night a part of the troops will march up the south shore, above the town, to be embarked in the ships and vessels there, and to-morrow night the rest will follow. Admiral Holmes is also gone up again to assist in their future operations, and to try, if, with the assistance of the troops, it is practicable to get at the enemy's ships.

As Gen. Wolfe writes by this opportunity, he will give you an account of his part of the operations, and his thoughts what further may be done for his Majesty's service. The enemy appear numerous, and seem to be strongly posted; but let the event be what it will, we shall remain here as long as the season will permit, in order to prevent their detaching troops from hence against Gen. Amherst; and I shall leave cruizers at the mouth of the river, to cut off any supplies that may be sent them, with strict orders to keep that station as long as possible. The town of Quebec is not habitable, being almost entirely burnt and destroyed.

I enclose you the present disposition of the ships under my command: twenty of the victuallers that sailed from England with the Echo, are arrived here, one unloaded at Louisbourg, having received damage in her passage out, and another I have heard nothing of. No ships of the enemy have come this way, that I have had any intelligence of, since my arrival in the river except one, laden with flour and brandy, which was taken by Capt. Drake of the Lizard.

Before Admiral Durell got into the river, three frigates, and seventeen sail, with provisions, stores, and a few recruits, got up, and are those we are so anxious, if possible, to destroy.

Yesterday I received a letter from Gen Amherst (to whom I have had no opportunity of writing since I have been in the river) dated Camp off Crown Point, August 17th, wherein, he only desires I would send transports and a convoy to New York, to carry to England six hundred and seventy prisoners taken at the surrender of Niagara.

I would have wrote to you sooner from hence, but while my dispatches were preparing, Gen. Wolfe was taken very ill; he has been better since, but is still greatly out of order.

I shall very soon send home the great ships, and have the honour to be,

With the greatest Respect, SIR,
Your most obedient, and most humble Servant, CHARLES SAUNDERRS.

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(a)

The Honnurable Gen. Monckton's letter to the Right Honourable Mr. Secretary Pitt, dated, River St. Lawrence, Camp at Point Levi, September, 15, 1759.

SIR,

I Have the pleasure to acquaint you, that, on the 13th instant, his Majesty's troops gained a very signal victory over the French, a little above the town of Quebec. General Wolfe, exerting himself on the right of our line, received a wound pretty early of which he died soon after, and I had myself the great misfortune of receiving one in my right breast by a ball that went through part of my lungs (and which has been cut out under the blade bone of my shoulder) just as the French were giving way, which obliged me to quit the field. I have therefore, Sir, desired General Townshend, who now commands the troops before the town (and of which I am in hopes he will be soon in possession) to acquaint you with the particulars of that day, and of the operations carrying on. I have the honour to be, &c.

ROB. MONCKTON.

P. S. His Majesty's troops behaved with the greatest steadiness and bravery.

As the surgeons tell me that there is no danger in my wound, I am in hopes that I shall be soon able to join the army before the town.

The Honourable Brigadier General Townshend's letter to the Right Honourable Mr. Secretary Pitt, dated Camp before Quebec, Sept. 20. 1759.

SIR,

I Have the honour to acquaint you with the success of his majesty's arms, on the 13th inst. in an action with the French, on the heights to the westward of this town.

It being determined to carry the operations above the town the posts at Point Levi, and l'Isle d'Orleans, being secured, the General marched with the remainder of the force, from Point Levi, the 5th and 6th, and embarked them in transports, which had passed the town for that purpose. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th, a movement of the ships was made up, by Admiral Holmes, in order to amuse the enemy now posted along the North shore; but the transports being extremely crowded, and the weather very bad, the General thought proper to cantoon half his troops on the South shore; where they were refreshed, and reimbarked upon the 12th at one in the morning. The light infantry, commanded by Col. Howe, the regiments of Bragg, Kennedy, Lascelles, and Anstruther, with a detachment of Highlanders, and the American grenadiers, the whole being under the command of Brigadiers Monckton and Murray, were put into flat-bottomed boats, and, after some movements of the ships, made by Admiral Holmes, to draw the attention of the enemy above, the boats fell down with the tide, and landed on the North shore, within a league of Cape Diamond, an hour before day-break: the rapidity of the tide of ebb carried them a little below the intended place of attack, which obliged the light infantry to scramble up a woody precipice, in order to secure the landing the troops by dislodging a captain's post, which defended the small intrenched path the troops were to ascend. After a little firing, the light infantry gained the top of the precipice, and dispersed the Captain's post; by which means, the troops, with a very little loss, from a few Canadians and Indians in the wood, got up, and were immediately formed. The boats, as they emptied, were sent back for the second embarkation, which I immediately made. Brigadier Murray, who had been detached with Anstruther's battalion to attack the Four Gun Battery upon the left, was recalled by the General, who now saw the French army crossing the river St. Charles. General Wolfe thereupon begun to form his line, having his right covered by the Louisbourg grenadiers; on the right of these again he afterwards brought Otway's; to the left of the grenadiers were Bragg's, Kennedy's, Lascelles's, Highlanders, and Anstruther's; the right of this body was commanded by Brigadier Monckton, and the left by Brigadier Murray; his rear and left were protected by Col. Howe's Light-infantry, who was returned from the Four Gun Battery before-mentioned, which was soon abandoned to him. General Montcalm having collected the whole of his force from the Beauport side, and advancing, shewed his intention to flank our left, where I was immediately ordered with General Amherst's battalion, which I formed en potence. My numbers were soon after encreased by the arrival of the two battalions of Royal Americans; and Webb's was drawn up by the General, as a reserve, in eight subdivisions with large intervals. The enemy lined the bushes in their front with 1500 Indians and Canadians, and I dare say had placed most of their best marksmen there, who kept up a very galling, tho' irregular, fire upon our whole line, who bore it with the greatest patience, and good order, reserving their fire for the main body now advancing. This fire of the enemy was however checked by our posts in our front, which protected the forming our own line. The right of the enemy was composed of half of the troops of the colony, the battalion of La Sarre Languedoc, and the remainder of the Canadians and Indians. Their centre was a column, and formed by the battalions of Bearn and Guienne. Their left was composed of the remainder of the troops of the colony, and the battalion of Royal Rousillon. This was, as near as I can guess, their line of battle. They brought up two pieces of small artillery against us, and we had been able to bring up but one gun; which being admirably well served, galled their column exceedingly. My attention to the left will not permit me to be very exact with regard to every circumstance which passed in the centre, much less to the right; but it is most certain, that the enemy formed in good order, and that their attack was very brisk and animated on that side. Our troops reserved their fire, till within forty yards, which was so well continued, that the enemy every where gave way. It was then our General fell at the head of Bragg's, and the Louisbourg grenadiers, advancing with their bayonets: About the same time Brigadier-general Monckton received his wound at the head of Lascelles's. In the front of the opposite battalion fell also M. Montcalm; and his second in command is since dead of his wounds on board our fleet. Part of the enemy made a second faint attack. Part took to some thick copse wood, and seemed to make a stand. It was at this moment, that each corps seemed in a manner to exert itself, with a view to its own peculiar character. The grenadiers, Bragg's, and Lascelles's, pressed on with their bayonets. Brigadier Murray, advancing with the troops under his command, briskly compleated their rout on this side; when the Highlanders, supported by Arstruther's, took to their broad swords, and drove part into the town, and part to the works at their bridge on the river St. Charles.

The action, on our left and rear, was not so severe. The houses, into which the Light Infantry were thrown, were well defended, being supported by Col. Howe, who taking post with two companies behind a small copse, and frequently sallying upon the flanks of the enemy during the attack, drove them often into heaps, against the front of which body I advanced platoons of Amherst's regiment, which totally prevented the right wing from executing their first intention. Before this, one of the Royal American battalions had been detached to preserve our communication with our boats, and the other being sent to occupy the ground which Brigadier Murray's movement had left open, I remained with Amherst's to support this disposition, and to keep the enemy's right, and a body of their savages, which waited still more towards our rear, opposite the posts of our Light Infantry, waiting for an opportunity to fall upon our rear.

This, Sir, was the situation of things, when I was told, in the action, that I commanded: I immediately repaired to the centre, and finding the pursuit had put part of the troops in disorder, I formed them as soon as possible. Scarce was this effected, when M. de Bougainville, with his corps from Cape Rouge of 2000 men, appeared in our rear. I advanced two pieces of artillery, and two battalions towards him; upon which he retired. You will not, I flatter myself, blame me for not quitting such advantageous ground, and risking the fate of so decisive a day, by seeking a fresh enemy, posted perhaps in the very kind of ground he could wish for, viz. woods and swamps.

We took a great number of French officers upon the field of battle, and one piece of cannon. Their loss is computed to be about 1500 men, which fell chiefly upon their regulars.

I have been employed, from the day of action to that of the capitulation, in redoubting our camp beyond insult, in making a road up the precipice for our cannon, in getting up the artillery, preparing the batteries, and cutting off their communication with the country. The 17th, at noon, before we had any battery erected, or could have any for two or three days, a flag of truce came out with proposals of capitulation, which I sent back again to the town, allowing them four hours to capitulate, or no farther treaty. The Admiral had, at this time, brought up his large ships as intending to attack the town. The French officer returned at night with terms of capitulation, which, with the Admiral, were considered, agreed to, and signed at eight in the morning, the 18th instant. The terms we granted, will I flatter myself, be approved of by his Majesty, considering the enemy assembling in our rear, and what is far more formidable, the very wet and cold season, which threatened our troops with sickness, and the fleet with some accident; it had made our road so bad, we could not bring up a gun for some time; add to this, the advantage of entering the town, with the walls in a defensible state, and the being able to put a garrison there strong enough to prevent all surprize. These, I hope, will be deemed sufficient considerations for granting them the terms I have the honour to transmit to you. The inhabitants of the country came in to us fast, bring•ng in their arms, and taking the oaths of fidelity, until a general peace determines their situation.

I have the honour to inclose herewith a list of the killed and wounded; a list of the prisoners as perfect as I have yet been able to get it; and a list of the artillery and stores in the town as well as those fallen into our hands at Beauport in consequence of the victory. By deserters we learn, that the enemy are re-assembling what troops they can, behind the Cape Rouge; that M. de Levy is come down from the Montreal side to command them; some say, he has brought two battalions with him; if so, this blow has already assisted General Amherst. By other deserters, we learn, that M. de Bougainville, with 800 men, and provisions, was on his march to fling himself into the town the 18th, the very morning it capitulated, on which day we had not compleated the investiture of the place, as they had broke their bridge of boats, and had detachments in very strong works on the other side the river St. Charles.

I should not do justice to the Admiral, and the naval service, if I neglected this occasion of acknowledging how much we are indebted for our success to the constant assistance and support received from there, and the perfect harmony and correspondence, which has prevailed throughout all our operations, in the uncommon difficulties, which the nature of this country, in particular, presents to military operations of a great extent, and which no army can itself solely supply; the immense labour in artillery, stores and provisions; the long watchings and attendance in boats; the drawing up our artillery by the seamen even in the heat of action; it is my duty, short as my command has been, to acknowledge, for that time, how great a share the navy has had in this successful campaign.

I have the honour to be, &c. GEO. TOWNSHEND.

Vice Admiral Saunder's Letter to the Right Honourable Mr. Secretary Pitt.

SIR,

I Have the greatest pleasure in acquainting you that the town and citadel of Quebec surrendered on the 18th instant, and I inclose you a copy of the articles of capitulation. The army took possession of the gates on the land side the same evening, and sent safe guards into the town to p•eserve order, and to prevent any th•ng from being destroyed; and Capt. Palliser, with a b•dy of seamen, landed in the lower town, and did the same. The next day our army marched in, and near a thousand French officers, soldiers and seamen, were embarked on board some English catts, who shall soon proceed for France, agreeable to the capitulation.

I had the honour to write to you the 5th inst by the Rodney cutter. The troops, mentioned in that letter, imbarked on board the ships and vessels above the town, in the night of the 6th inst. and at four in the morning of the 13th began to land on the north shore, about a mile and a half above the town. General Montcalm with his whole army, left their camp at Beauport, and marched to meet him. A little before ten both armies were formed, and the enemy began the attack. Our troops received their fire, and reserved their own, advancing till they were so near as to run in upon them, and push them with their bayonets; by which, in a very little time, the French gave way, and fled to the town in the utmost disorder, and with great loss; for our troops pursued them quite to the walls, and killed many of them upon the glacis, and in the ditch; and if the town had been further off the whole French army must have been destroyed. About 250 French prisoners were taken that day, among whom are ten captains, and six subaltern officers, all of whom will go in the great ships to England.

I am sorry to acquaint you, that General Wolfe was killed in the action; and General Monckton shot through the body; but he is now supposed to be out of danger. General Montcalm, and the three next French officers in command, were killed; but I must refer you to General Townshend (who writes by this opportunity) for the particulars of this action, the state of the garrison, and the measures he is taking for keeping possession of it. I am now beginning to send on shore the stores they will want, and provisions for five thousand men; of which I can furnish them with a sufficient quantity.

The night of their landing, Admiral Holmes, with the ships and troops, was about three leagues above the intended landing place: General Wolfe, with about half his troops, set off in boats, and dropped down with the tide, and were by that means, less liable to be discovered by the French centinels, posted all along the coast. The ships followed them about three quarters of an hour afterwards, and got to the landing place just in the time that had been concerted, to cover their landing; and considering the darkness of the night, and the rapidity of the current, this was a very critical operation and very properly and successfully conducted. When General Wolfe, and the troops with him, had landed, the difficulty of gaining the top of the hill is scarce credible: it was very steep in its ascent, and high, and no path where two could go a-breast: but they were obliged to pull themselves up by the stumps and boughs of trees, that covered the declivity.

Immediately after our victory over their troops, I sent up all the boats in the fleet with artillery, and ammunition; and on the 17th went up with the men of war in a disposition to attack the lower town, as soon as General Townshend should be ready to attack the upper; but in the evening they sent out to the camp and offered terms of capitulation.

I have the farther pleasure of acquainting you, that during this tedious campaign there has continued a perfect good understanding between the army and the navy. I have received great assistance from Admirals Durell and Holmes, and from all the captains: Indeed every body has exerted themselves in the execution of their duty; even the transports have willingly assisted me with boats and people on the landing the troops, and many other services.

I have the honour to be, &c. CHARLES SAUNDERS

↵

(c)

Sir Edward Hawke's Letter to Mr. Clevland, Secretary to the Admiralty.

Royal George, off Penris Point,Nov. 24.
SIR,

IN my letter of the 17th, by express, I desired you would acquaint their lordships with my having received intelligence of 18 sail of the •ine and three frigates of the Brest squadron, being discovered about 24 leagues to the N. W. of Belleisle, steering to the eastward; all the prisoners however agree, that on the day we chased them, their squadron consisted, according to the accompanying list, of four ships of 80, six of 74, three of 70, eight of 64, one frigate of 36, one of 34, and one of 16 guns, with a small vessel to look out. They sailed from Brest the 24th inst. the same day I sailed from Toybay.

Concluding that their first rendevous should be Quiberon, the instant I received the intelligence, I directed my course thither with a prest sail. At the first wind blowing hard, at S. by E. and S. drove us considerably to the westward. But on the 18th and 19th, though variable, it proved more favourable. In the mean time, having been joined by the Maidstone and Coventry frigates, I directed their commanders to keep a head of the squadron: one on the starboard and the other on the larboard bow. At half past eight o'clock in the morning of the 20th, Belleisle, by our reckoning, bearing E. by N. one fourth N. the Maidstone made the signal for seeing a fleet, I immediately spread abroad the signal for a line abreast, in order to draw all the ships of the squadron up with me. I had before sent the Magnanime a head, to make the land. At three fourths past nine she made signal for an enemy. Observing, on my discovering them, that they made off, I threw out the signal, for the seven ships nearest them to chase, and draw into a line of battle a-head of me, and endeavour to stop them till the rest of the squadron should come up, who were also to form as they chased, that no time might be lost in the pursuit. That morning there were in chase the Rochester, Chatham, Portland, Falkland, Minerva, Vengeance and Venus, all which joined me about eleven o'clock; and, in the evening, the Saphire from Quiberon bay. All the day we had very fresh gales, at N. W. and W. N. W. with heavy squalls.

M. Conflans continued going off under such sail as his squadron could carry, and at the same time keep together, while we crowded after them with every sail our ships could bear. At half pa•t two, P. M. the fire beginning a-head, I made the signal for engaging. We were then to the southward of Belleisle, and the French admiral headmost, soon after led round the Cardinals [*], while his rear was in action. About four o'clock the Formidable struck, and a little after, the Thesee and Superb were sunk. About five the Heros struck, and came to an anchor, but it blowing hard, no boat could be sent on board her. Night was now come, and being on a part of the coast, among islands and sho•ls, of which we were totally ignorant, without a pilot, as was the greatast part of the squadron, and blowing hard on a •ee shore, I made the signal to anchor, and came to in fifteen fathom water, the island of Dumer bearing E. by N. between two and three miles, the Cardinals W. half S. and the steeples of Crozie S. E. as we found next morning.

In the night we heard many guns of distress fired, but blowing hard, want of knowledge of the coast, and whether they were fired by a friend or an enemy, prevented all means of relief.

By day-break of the 21st, we discovered one of our ships dismasted ashore on our Four [§], the French Heros also, and the Soleil Royal, which under cover of the night had anchored among us, cut and run ashore to the westward of Crozie. On the latter's moving, I made the Essex's signal to slip and pursue her, but she unfortunately got upon the Four, and both she and the Resolution are irrecoverably lost, notwithstanding we sent them all the assistance that the weather would permit. About fourscore of the Resolution's company, in spite of the strongest remonstrahces of their captain, made rafts, and, with several French prisoners belonging to the Formidable, put off, and I am afraid, drove out to sea. All the Essex's are saved (with as many of the stores as possible) except one lieutenant and a boat's crew, who were drove on the French shore, and have not been heard of: the remains of both ships have been set on fire. We found the Dorsetshire, Revenge, and Defiance, in the night of the 20th put out to sea; as I hope the Swiftsure did, for she is still missing. The Dorsetshire and Defiance returned next day, and the latter saw the Revenge without. Thus, what loss we have sustained has been owing to the weather not the enemy, seven or eight of whose line of battle ships got to sea, I believe, the night of the action.

As soon as it was broad day-light in the morning of the 21st, I discovered seven or eight of the enemy's line of battle ships at anchor, between Point Penris, and the river Villaine; on which I made the signal to weigh, in order to work up and attack them; but it blowed so hard from the N. W. that instead of daring to cast the squadron loose, I was obliged to strike top gallant masts. Most of those ships appeared to be a-ground at low water; but on the flood, by lightening them, and the advantage of the wind under the land, all except two got that night into the river Villaine.

The weather being moderate on the 22d, I sent the Portland, Chatham, and Vengeance to destroy the Soleil Royal and Heros. The French, on the approach of our ships, set the first on fire, and soon after the latter met the same fate from our people. In the mean time I got under way, and worked up within Penris Point, as well for the sake of its being a safer road, as to destroy, if possible, the two ships of the enemy which still lay without the Villaine; but before the ships I sent a-head for that purpose could get near them, being quite light, and with the tide of flood, they got in.

All the 23d we were employed in reconnoitring the entrance of that river, which is very narrow, and only twelve feet water on the bar, at low water. We discovered at least seven, if not eight, line of battle ships about half a mile within, quite light, and two large frigates moored across, to defend the mouth of the river; only the frigates appeared to have guns in.

By evening I had twelve long boats fitted as fire-ships, ready to attempt burning them, under convoy of the Saphire and Coventry; but the weather being bad, and the wind contrary, obliged me to defer it, till at least the latter should be favourable; if they can, by any means be destroyed, it shall be done.

In attacking a flying enemy, it was impossible in the space of a short winter's day, that all our ships should be able to get into action, or all those of the enemy brought to it. The commanders and companies of such as did come up with the rear of the French, on the 20th, behaved with the greatest intrepidity, and gave the strongest proof of a true British spirit. In the same manner I am satisfied, would those have acquitted themselves, whose bad going ships, or the distance they were at in the morning, prevented from getting up. Our loss by the enemy is not considerable; for in the ships which are now with me, I find only one lieutenant, and 39 seamen and marines killed, and about 202 wounded. When I consider the season of the year, the hard gales of wind on the day of action, a flying enemy, the shortness of the day, and the coast we are on, I can boldly affirm, that all that possibly could be done, has been done. As to the loss we have sustained, let it be placed to the necessity I was under of running all risks to break this strong force of the enemy: had we had but two hours more day-light, the whole had been totally destroyed or taken, for we were almost up with their van when night overtook us.

Yesterday came in here the Pallas, Fortune sloop, and the Proserpine fire-ship. On the 16th I had dispatched the Fortune to Quebec, with directions to captain Duff, to keep directly on his guard. In his way thither he fell in with the Phebe, a French frigate of 40 guns, under jury-masts, and fought her several hours. During the engagement lieutenant Stuart, 2d of the Ramilies, whom I had appointed to command her, was unfortunately killed; the surviving officers, on consulting together, resolved to leave her, as she proved too strong for them. I have detached captain Young to Quiberon bay with five ships, and am making up a flying squadron to scour the coast to the isle of Aix, and if practicable, to attempt any of the enemy's ships that may be there.

I am, Sir, &c. EDWARD HAWKE.

LIST of Ships with Sir Edward Hawke, Nov. 20, 1759.

Ships.

Guns.

Men.

Commanders.

Royal George,

100

880

Sir Edward Hawke, Capt. Cambell.

Union,

90

770

Sir Charles Hardy, Capt. Evans.

Duke,

90

750

Capt. Graves.

Namur,

90

780

Capt. Buckle.

Mars,

74

600

J. Young, Esq Commodore

Warspight,

74

600

Sir John Bentley.

Hercules,

74

600

Capt. Fortescue.

Torbay,

74

700

Hon. Capt. Keppel.

Magnanime,

74

700

Right Hon. Lord Howe.

Resolution,

74

600

Capt. Speke.

Hero,

74

600

Hon. Capt. Edgcumbe.

Swiftsure,

70

520

Sir Thomas Stanhope.

Dorsetshire,

70

520

Capt. Denis.

Burford,

70

520

Capt. Gambier.

Chichester,

70

520

Capt. Willet.

Temple,

70

520

Capt. Wash. Shirley.

Revenge,

64

480

Capt. Storr.

Essex,

64

480

Capt. O'Brien.

Kingston,

60

400

Capt. Shirley.

Intrepid,

60

420

Capt. Maplesden.

Montague,

60

420

Capt. Rowley.

Dunkirk,

60

420

Capt. Digby.

Defiance,

60

420

Capt. Baird.

The following Frigates joined Sir Edward Hawke between Ushant and Belleisle.

Rochester

50

350

Capt. Duff.

Portland,

50

350

Capt. Arbuthnot.

Falkland,

50

350

Capt. Drake.

Chatham,

50

350

Capt. Lockhart.

Minerva,

32

220

Capt. Hood.

Venus,

36

240

Capt. Harrison.

Vengeance,

28

200

Capt. Nightingale.

Coventry,

28

200

Capt. Burslem.

Maidstone,

28

200

Capt. Diggs.

Saphire,

32

220

Capt. Strachan.

LIST of the French Squadron which came out of Brest, November 14, 1759.

Le Soleil Royal,

80

1200

M. Conflans, Admiral.

Le Tonnant,

80

1000

M. Beaufremont, Vice-Admiral.

Le Formidable,

80

1000

M. de St. Andre du Verger, Rear-Admiral.

Le Orient,

80

1000

M. Guebriant, Chef d'Escadre.

L'Intrepide,

74

815

Le Glorieux,

74

815

Le Thesee,

74

815

L'Heros,

74

815

Le Robuste,

74

185

Le Magnifique,

74

815

Le Juste,

70

800

Le Superbe,

70

800

Le Dauphin,

70

800

Le Dragon,

64

750

Le Northumberland,

64

750

Le Sphinx,

64

750

Le Solitaire,

64

750

Le Brilliant,

64

750

L'Eveille,

64

750

Le Bizarre,

64

750

L'Inflexible,

64

L'Hebe,

40

La Vestale,

34

L'Aigrette,

36

Le Calypso,

16

Le Prince Noir, a small vessel to look out.

The above ships were all in company when the action began, except the Hebe frigate.

Admiral Saunders was not present at the engagement, which he sought with so much honour, as he did not join Admiral Hawke until sometime after.

General Townshend came from the fleet with the express, the fate of the enemy being determined; he refused to be put on shore when the Admiral declared his intentions of seeking the enemy, but went with him as a volunteer.

↵

*
Rocks so called.
↵

§
A Sand Bank
↵

(a)

Gen. Lally's Letter to M. de Lyrit, dated Madrass, the 14th of February, 1759.

A Good blow might be struck here: There is a ship in the road of 20 guns, laden with all the riches of Madrass, which it is said will remain there till the 20th. The Expedition is just arrived, but M. Gorlin is not a man to attack her: for she has made him run away once before. The Bristol on the other hand did but just make her appearance before St. Thomas; and on the vague report of thirteen ships coming from Porto Novo, she took fright; and after landing the provisions with which she was laden, she would not stay long enough even to take on board twelve of her own guns, which she had lent us for the siege.

If I was the judge of the point of honour of the company's officers, I would break him like glass, as well as some others of them.

The Fidelle, or Harlem, or even the aforesaid Bristol, with the twelve guns restored to her, would be sufficient to make themselves masters of the English ship, if they could manage so as to get to the windward of her in the night. Maugendie and Tremillier are said to be good men; and were they employed only to transport 200 wounded men, that we have here, their service would be of importance.

We remain still in the same position: the breach made these fifteen days; all the time within fifteen toises of the wall of the place, and never holding up our heads to look at it.

I reckon we shall at our arrival at Pondicherry endeavour to learn some other trade, for this of war requires too much patience.

Of 1500 Cipays which attend our army, I reckon near 800 are employed upon the road to Pondicherry, laden with sugar, pepper, and other goods; and as for the Caulis they are all employed for the same purpose, from the first day we came here.

I am taking my measures from this day to set fire to the Black Town, and to blow up the powder mills.

You will never imagine, that 50 French deserters, and 100 Swiss, are actually stopping the progress of 2000 men of the King's and Company's troops, which are still here existing, notwithstanding the exaggerated accounts that every one makes here, according to his own fancy, of the slaughter that has been of them; and you will be still more surprized, if I tell you, that, were it not for the two combats and four battles we sustained, and for the batteries which failed, or to speak more properly, which were unskilfully made, we should not have lost 50 men, from the commencement of the siege to this day.

I have wrote to M. de Larche, that if he persists in not coming here, let who will raise money upon the Paleagers for me, I will not do it: And I renounce (as I informed you a month ago I would do) meddling directly or indirectly with any thing whatever, that may have relation to your administration, whether civil or military. For I had rather go, and command the Caffres of Madagascar, than remain in this Sodom; which it is impossible but the fire of the English must destroy, sooner or later, even though that from Heaven should not.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. Signed, LALLY.

P. S. I think it necessary to apprize you, that, as M. de Soupire has refused to take upon him the command of this army, which I have offered to him, and which he is impowered to accept, by having received from the court a duplicate of my commission, you must of necessity, together with the council, take it upon you. For my part, I undertake only to bring it back either to Arcotte or Sadraste. Send therefore your orders, or come yourself to command it; for I shall quit it upon my arrival there.

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(a)

The Duc de Belleisle's Letter to Marshal Contades, dated Versailles, July 23, 1759.

J'AI toujours peur que Fischer ne soit parti trop tard: Il est cependant bien important, et bien essentiel que nous puissions tirer de grosses contributions. Je ne vois de ressources pour nos Depenses les plus urgentes, et pour les reparations des Troupes, que dans l'Argent que nouspourrous avoir du Païs enemy; d'où il faudra egalement tirer des subsistances de toutes Especes, independamment de l'Argent, c'est â dire des Foins, des Pailles, des Avoines pour l'Hyver, des Bleds, des Bestiaux, des Chevaux, et même des Hommes pour recruter toutes nos Troupes Etrangeres. La Guerre ne doit pas être prolongée, et peut-être faudrat-il, suivant les Evenemens qui arriveront d'ici à la Fin de Septembre, faire un veritable Desert en avant de la Ligne des Quartiers, que l'onjugera á propos de tenir pendant l'Hyver, afin que l'Ennemi se trouve dans une Impossibilité rêelle d'en pouvoir aprocher en nous reservant de la Subsistance seulement sur la Route qui pourra nous convenir de prendre dans le milieu de l'Hyver, pour culbuter ou enlevert nous mêmes les Quartiers des Ennemis. C'est pour pouvoir remplir cet Objet, que je fais travailler sans Ralache à tout ce qu'il faut pour que toutes vos Troupes, sans Exception, soient bien habillèes, bien armèes, bien equipées, et bien reparées, en tout Point, avant la Fin de Novembre, avec des Tentes neuves, pourque si cela convient aux Affaires Politiques ou Militaires du Roy, vous puissiez assembler le tout ou partie de votre Armée pour agir offensivement et avec Viguer, des le commencement de Janvier, et que vous ayez la Satisfaction de montrer á nos Ennemis, et á toute l'Europe, que les Francois scavent agir et faire la Guerre en toutes Saisons, quand ils ont un general tel que vous, et un Ministre Militaire qui scait prevoir et se concerter avec le General.

Vous sentez, Mons. le Marechal, que ce que je vous dis peut devenir non seulment utile et honorable, mais peut-être même necessaire relativement à ce que vous scavez, et dont jevous parlerai encore dans ma Lettre particuliére.

(Signé) M. Duc. de Belleisle.

I AM still afraid that Fischer set out too late: It is, however, very important, and very essential that we should raise large contributions. I see no other resource for our most urgent expences, and for refitting the troops, but in the money we may draw from the enemy's country; from whence we must likewise procure subsistence of all kinds, (independently of the money) that is to say, hay, straw, oats for the winter, bread, corn, cattle, horses, and even men to recruit our foreign troops. The war must not be prolonged, and perhaps it may be necessary, according to the events which may happen between this time and the end of September, to make a downright desert before the line of the quarters, which it may be thought proper to keep during the winter, in order that the enemy may be under a real impossibility of approaching us: at the same time reserving for ourselves a bare subsistence on the route, which may be the most convenient for us to take in the middle of winter to beat up, or seize upon the enemy's quarters. That this object may be fulfilled, I cause the greatest assiduity to be used in preparing what is necessary for having all your troops, without exception, well cloathed, well armed, well equipped, and well refitted in every respect, before the end of November, with new tents, in order that, if it shall be adviseable for the king's political and military affairs, you may be able to assemble the whole, or part of your army, to act offensively, and with vigour, from the beginning of January, and that you may have the satisfaction to shew our enemies, and all Europe, that the French know how to act and carry on war, in all seasons, when they have such a general as you are, and a minister of the department of war, that can foresee and concert matters with the general.

You must be sensible, Sir, that what I say to you may become not only useful and honourable, but perhaps even necessary with respect to what you know, and of which I shall say more in my private letters.

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*
The French court stopt payment of the following public debts, viz. 1. The three kinds of rents created on the posts. 2. Those constituted upon the chest of redemption. 3. The coupons of bills on the same chest. 4. Those of the two royal lotteries. 5. The reimbursement of bills drawn to bearer on the same chest. 6. The bills of the two royal lotteries. 7. The rents created on the two sols per pound of the tenth penny. 8. The reimbursement of the capitals of rents. 9. The payments of bills dischargeable in nine years, under the name of annuities. 10. Those of the new actions on the benefit of the farms. 11. All the bills drawn by the colonies upon the government, amounting to 1,333,000 l.
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EARL TEMPLE.

A COMPLEAT HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR, OR ANNUAL REGISTER OF ITS Rise, Progress, and Events, IN Europe, Asia, Africa, and America.

AND EXHIBITING THE STATE of the BELLIGERENT POWERS at the Commencement of the WAR; their Interests and Objects in its Continuance: Interspersed with The CHARACTERS of the able and disinterested STATESMEN, to whose WISDOM and INTEGRITY, and of the HEROES, to whose COURAGE and CONDUCT we are indebted for that NAVAL and MILITARY Success, which is not to be equalled in the ANNALS of this or any other NATION.

Illustrated with A Variety of HEADS, PLANS, MAPS, and CHARTS.

By J. WRIGHT, Gent.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON: Printed for DAVID STEEL, Bookseller, at the Bible and Crown, King-Street, Little Tower-Hill.

MDCCLXV.

THE ANNUAL REGISTER: OR HISTORY OF THE WAR. For the YEAR 1760.

CHAP. I.

Nothing decided in the war. State of the several powers concerned. Great Britain and Prussia propose an accommodation. Difficulties in concluding a peace. The condition and hopes of France. Demands on the King of Prussia. Treaty said to be between Russia and Austria.

IF all the wars which have harrassed Europe for more than a century had not proved it, the events of the last campaigns must have satisfied every thinking man, that victories do not decide the fate of nations. Four most bloody, and to all appearance most ruinous defeats, which he suffered in that year, had despoiled the King of Prussia of no more than a single town. After these accumulated blows he still found himself in a condition to make good his winter-quarters; to cover his dominions; and to tempt the favour of fortune in another campaign.

To carry our attention a little further back; who could have imagined, that when the French had compelled the Hanoverian troops to lay down their arms, when they had thrust them into a defenceless corner, had bound them down with the yoke of a strict and severe capitulation, and had possessed themselves of every place which could boast the smallest share of strength in the king's German dominions, that in a few months they should find themselves compelled to fly before their captives; and after having suffered a considerable defeat, should be pushed back almost on their own territories.

On the other hand, it might have been supposed that the effects of these advantages under the management of a very great commander, who was besides largely reinforced, could have been frustrated only by the loss of some great battle. But the fact was otherwise. The Hanoverians, without any adverse stroke in that campaign, were obliged to repass the Rhine and the Lippe; and since that time, fortune having decided nothing by the events of five years war, has given to Prince Ferdinand the possession of a great part of Westphalia in the manner of a conquered country, and yet sees him abandoning Hesse, and with difficulty covering the borders of Hanover.

In short, the victory of Crevelt could not enable the Duke of Brunswick to defend the Rhine. The battle of Bergen did not give M. Broglio an entrance into Hanover. The great victory of Minden did not drive the French from the Maine. We have seen armies, after complete victory, obliged to act as if they had been defeated; and after a defeat, taking an offensive part with success, and reaping all the fruits of victory.

These reflections are still more strongly enforced by the fortune of the King of Prussia. Covered with the laurels of Lowositz, Prague, Rosbach and Lissa, when he began after so many compleat triumphs, to pursue his advantages, and to improve success into conquest, the scene was suddenly altered. As soon as he attempted to penetrate with effect into the enemies country, without having suffered any very signal blow, without any considerable mistake committed upon his side, Fortune, who hath as it were attached herself to the defensive, immediately forsook him. He was not able to take a single place. And those advantages which at other times and situations, would have laid the foundation of lasting empire, have in his case only protracted a severe destiny, which some think in the end inevitable; but which as many, as great, and as entire victories since obtained over his forces, have not been yet able to bring upon him.

The ballance of power, the pride of modern policy, and originally invented to preserve the general peace as well as freedom of Europe, has openly preserved its liberty. It has been the original of innumerable and fruitless wars. That political torture by which powers are to be enlarged or abridged, according to a standard, perhaps not very accurately imagined, ever has been, and it is to be feared will always continue a cause of infinite contention and bloodshed. The foreign ambassadors constantly residing in all courts, the negotiations incessantly carrying on, spread both confederacies and quarrels so wide, that whenever hostilities commence, the theatre of war is always of a prodigious extent. All parties in those diffusive operations, have of necessity their strong and weak sides. What they gain in one part is lost in another; and in conclusion, their affairs become so ballanced, that all the powers concerned are certain to lose a great deal; the most fortunate acquire little; and what they do acquire is never in any reasonable proportion to charge and loss.

Frequent experience of this might prove one of the strongest grounds for a lasting peace in Europe. But that spirit of intrigue, which is the political distemper of the time, that anxious foresight which forms the character of all the present courts, prevent the salutary effects which might result from this experience. These modern treaties of peace, the fruits not of moderation but necessity; those engagements contracted when all the parties are wearied and none satisfied, where none can properly be called conquerors or conquered, where after having sought in vain to compel, they are content to over-reach them in the very moment they are formed, and from the very act of forming them, with the seeds of new dissentions, more implacable animosities, and more cruel wars. For if to forward the work of peace, any member in these alliances should acquire a cession of any importance in its favour, this afterwards becomes a ground for another alliance, and for new intrigues to deprive them of their acquisition. To settle the peace of Germany, Silesia was yielded in 1745 to the King of Prussia, and that cession gave occasion for the war of 1756.

The kings of Great Britain and Prussia chose the moment of success, to propose an accommodation; and they desired that the opposite powers should concur with them in nominating some place for a congress. Some spoke of Leipsic, as a means of indemnification to that unfortunate city; the States General would have given a town of theirs; King Stanislaus offered Nancy, his capital: but the time of peace was not yet come. The two kings made a display of moderation; and they had reason to think that if their proposals should be accepted (which probably they did not then expect) they must naturally take the lead in that negotiation, and must give the whole a turn to their advantage. But the adverse alliance unanimously rejected their efforts, and the refusal of some of its members was couched in terms sufficiently haughty.

To speak impartially, they could not at that time have accepted propositions for peace. France had suffered in every quarter: in her present condition she could scarcely look for every favourable terms. As they had now abandoned in despair all attempts by sea, and consequently all efforts in North America and both the Indies, all their hopes were centered in Germany. Hitherto their fortune in that country had not been very encouraging. But still, in that country lay their best and indeed their only prospect. The strength and perseverance of the two empresses, the wasted condition of the King of Prussia, the enormous expence of the German war to England, which must gradually exhaust the resources of her credit, and with them the patience of an inconstant people, had inspired with no small hope. All these considerations confirmed their resolution of hearkening to no terms, until by acquiring superiority, or at least an equality, they might be assured of procuring such as were not very disadvantageous or humiliating.

The empress queen upon her part had a moral certainty, that she could not procure, by a treaty proposed at such a juncture, those objects for which she had begun, and with such steadiness in every fortune had carried on the war. In reality, her circumstances then were, and they still continue, very intricate and embarrassed. It was necessary that she should have allies of great power; but if they have done her great services, they have formed high pretensions; indeed so high, that if she and her allies cannot absolutely prescribe the terms of peace, it is impossible that they should all be in any degree satisfied.

Her situation in this respect has pushed ad internecionem, the war between her and the King of Prussia. Even the cession of all Silesia in her favour, cannot procure a peace for that monarch. The Russians will never let loose their hold of the ducal Prussia; a country conquered by their own arms, a possession which rendered the King most formidable to them, and which is their sole indemnification for what they have expended in a war entered into for other views than those of glory, or even of revenge. It has been confidently asserted, that the empress queen of Hungary has actually guarantied the possession of that country to its conquerors. This is indeed a very extraordinary step, and the fact is not sufficiently authenticated. But the report is not altogether improbable. We may be sure that if such a guarantee has been made, it has been entered into upon some reciprocal engagement of equal force, and for an object equally important.

Nothing but the last desperate necessity, nothing in short but being conquered in the most absolute sense, will ever induce the King of Prussia to submit to both these cessions. By such a submission, beside being despoiled of that conquest, which is the great glory of his reign, and constitutes the firmest support of his revenue, he will see his hereditary dominions curtailed of another province from whence he derives his royal title, and what makes it of infinitely greater importance in his eyes, the best commercial part of his territories, and that only part of his territories, by which he could have hoped to become in any degree a maritime power.

But though it were possible that his Prussian Majesty could be brought to submit to these humiliating terms, a great deal still remains to be adjusted. There are other demands, which though not so high in their nature, nor so strongly enforced, are notwithstanding considerable, and cannot, with any decency be totally neglected. What is the nature of the bargain between the Empress and the Senate of Sweden, has not yet been made publick. Be it what it will, this is probably the least perplexing part of the whole.

But some indemnification for the King of Poland, on whose dominions the greatest calamities of the war have fallen, seems absolutely necessary; and on what principle can Austria ever expect an ally, if she should secure all the benefits of the pacification to herself, and leave to her confederates nothing but the sufferings of a war in which they were involved purely in her quarrel?

This variety of demands, all to be satisfied out of the dominions of a single Prince, must necessarily perplex the work of peace with almost insurmountable difficulties. It ought not indeed to be concealed, that there are circumstances which seem to lead to some solution of this embarrassment. But if they are attentively concerned, they will, I believe, be rather found to increase it.

Great Britain has had remarkable success against France at sea, in America, and in the Indies. On the continent of Europe, her fortune is even at this day, tollerably ballanced: the two weak parts, therefore, in the opposite alliances, (I speak only with regard to the events of the present war) are France and Prussia. As therefore France will expect some cessions from Great Britain, it is reasonable that they should be bought by some moderation of the rigorous terms which otherwise would have been imposed on Prussia.

All the sacrifices to peace must be made out of the advantage acquired by Austria and Great Britain. But when Great Britain shall have consented to some concessions, to forward this great work, what return can the Empress Queen make, but an abatement of her demands upon Silesia? That is, by giving up that grand, favourite, and indeed to her sole object, for which she has brought upon herself a heavy war, disgusted her antient and natural allies, and purchased the aid of her natural enemy, at the price of places which the best blood of Europe has been so often shed to preserve in her family. To all who consider the character of that court, it will appear very plainly that she will hazard almost any thing, and even risque those consequences to which her imprudent alliance with France has exposed her, rather than accept a peace which must deprive her of her hopes of Silesia.

When these things are weighed, it will not appear wonderful that there have been so few serious overtures for peace; and that the longer the war continues, the greater difficulties seem to oppose themselves to any conclusion of it.

The only hope that remains of any happy conclusion, is that some of the great members of the alliance, wearied and exhausted, will at length fly off, and thereby throw the rest into such confusion, that a peace will be suddenly huddled up; and all difficulties not removed, but forgotten, by not allowing time to weigh and study what may be gained or lost. This must produce a system of pacification, the nature of which it is impossible to foresee; because it cannot be said upon which side this defection will begin; but principally because the war still continues, in the event of which, in spight of all that can be conjectured from the strength and present condition of the powers concerned, fortune will have so large a share. But we may predict without rashness, that the first overtures will be between Great Britain and France: for they never think of peace in Germany.

CHAP. II.

State of the English garrison at Quebec. Designs of Mons-Levi. Preparations for a siege. French army marches from Montreal. Their strength. Battle of Sillery. Gen. Murray defeated. Quebec besieged. The English fleet under Lord Colville arrives. French vessels destroyed. Levi raises the siege.

THIS was the posture of Europe at the close of the campaign of 1759. And all thoughts of peace being entirely removed, the war was prosecuted in this part of the world with the utmost vigour as soon as the season permitted them to recommence operations.

But in America, the severity of winter was not able wholly to interrupt the progress of the war. Canada had been supposed conquered, by the taking of Quebec. Indeed without the possession of that place, it had been impossible to reduce that country; but still a great deal remained to compleat the advantage to which the taking of Quebec had only given an opening. The French troops after their defeat, had retired into the heart of their country. And the English navy having provided the town sufficiently with military stores and provisions, set sail, fearing lest they should be overtaken by the frost. Ten battalions, two companies of the artillery, one of American wood-rangers, in all about 7000 men, formed the garrison which was left in Quebec to command Canada during the winter, and to facilitate the entire reduction of that province in the ensuing campaign. They were under the orders of General Murray.

As the river St. Laurence is commonly shut up by ice, for the greater part of the winter, all communication with Europe was cut off. The conquering army was therefore subject to be invested in Quebec. The French commander, M. Levi, was sensible of this advantage; and he saw that it was the only resource by which he could have any chance of preserving Canada. He accordingly prepared to make use of this last, and only opportunity; and he was not without some prospect of success.

He knew that the fortifications of Quebec were weak and incomplete, without any kind of outwork; that the town was almost a general ruin, since the late siege; and that the English garrison had been much enfeebled, and greatly reduced in their numbers by the scurvy. He knew also, that by some misfortune, no provision had been made to prevent his attaining a superiority on the river; as no vessels had been left, on a supposition, that they could not be useful in winter.

The winter had passed in skirmishes always terminating in favour of the English, by which they enlarged the sphere of their subsistence. M. Levi had indeed proposed, during the rigour of the season, to attempt the place by a coup de main; and had made preparations for that purpose. But the activity of the garrison was such; and all the outposts so well secured, that he thought it more prudent to abandon that design, and to postpone his operations, to the opening of the spring, when a regular siege might be formed.

The forces which still remained in Canada, were not unequal to the attempt. Ten battalions of regular troops, amounting to near 5000 men; 6000 of experienced militia of Canada; about 300 savages. This was the force which M. Levi had collected at Montreal, and with which he took the field on the 17th of April, 1760.

His provisions, ammunition, and heavy baggage, fell down the river St. Laurence, under the convoy of six frigates from 44 to 26 guns. By this squadron, which there was nothing to oppose, he acquired the undisputed command of the river, a point of the greatest importance to the whole design. In ten days march, the French army arrived at the heights of Abraham three miles from Quebec.

When Gen. Murray perceived the approach of the enemy, he had two parts to take, either to keep within the town, and confiding in his troops, which though weak as an army, were strong as a garrison, to sustain the siege to the utmost extremity; or to march out, and by trying the fortune of the field, to avoid the tedious hardships of a siege, in a place which seemed to him scarcely tenable.

He resolved on the latter part. But when he came to review his ability for this undertaking, he could possibly draw into the field no more than 3000 men. However he was not frighted by the enemy's great superiority. He determined to engage; and he grounded his resolution on the following reasons.

First, that his army, notwithstanding its inferiority, was in the habit of beating the enemy. That they had a fine train of field artillery; that to shut themselves up at once within the walls, was putting all upon the single chance of holding out for a considerable time a wretched fortification; a chance which an action in the field could hardly alter, at the same time that it gave an additional one, and perhaps a better; and in fine, that if the event was not prosperous, he might, after holding out to the last extremity, retreat, with what should remain of the garrison, to the isle of Orleans or Coudres, and there wait for reinforcements.

It is not easy to comprehend the prudence of engaging in the open field, an army four times superior; especially when the weaker army had it in their power to keep upon the defensive in a strong post; and Quebec may well be considered at least as a strong retrenchment. It is as hard to understand how the chance of holding out a fortress, should not be lessened after a defeat of the troops, which compose the garrison, who must necessarily suffer by such an event, both in numbers and in spirit; it is equally difficult to conceive how the remains of that garrison, which should be driven from Quebec, could have safely retreated to the isle of Orleans or Coudress, or have remained in either of those places, with any tolerable security, whilst the enemy were, as they were, confessedly masters of the river. These are matters not so easily comprehended by those who are at a distance from the scene of action; there circumstances may have given these reasons their due weight; and they had the 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 greater influence from the character of the general; a man of the most ardent and intripid courage, passionately desirous of glory, and emulous of the reputation Wolfe had acquired. He knew that a bold and successful stroke, and well pursued, might so disable the enemy, who were in no likelihood of receiving speedy or considerable succours from France, that the way to conquest would lie plain and open before him; and he might expect the honour of the total reduction of Canada, before the arrival of the rest of the king's forces to his assistance.

Thus depending on fortune, on the tried goodness of his troops, and his own courage to animate them, he marched out of the city, and descended from the heights of Abraham with the army mentioned above, and twenty field-pieces. The right and left of the enemy's van possessed themselves of some small woody eminences; the main army marched by the road of St. Foix; and formed themselves under the shelter of the woods. Whilst the body of the enemies army was yet unformed, the English troops attacked their van, both on the right and left, with the utmost impetuosity, and drove them from the eminences, though they were well maintained; the advanced posts of the French centre gave way, without a blow, and fell back upon their main army.

Hitherto the fortune of the field was favourable to the English; but now the advantages they had obtained brought them full on the main army of the French, which formed in columns, and advanced with great rapidity to support their broken vanguard. The fire became very hot, and stopped the progress of our troops; whilst those of the enemy having supported their centre, wheeled round the flanks of the British army to the left and right, and formed a semicircle, which threatened to close upon our rear. Proper movements were made to protect the flanks, but it was evident the army was in the greatest danger, not only of a defeat, but of seeing itself surrounded, and its retreat to Quebec intirely intercepted. Near one thousand men, soldiers and officers, (a third of the army) had been, by this time killed and wounded. Nothing could be now thought of but as speedy a retreat as possible; and in this there were difficulties, which nothing but the bravery of the soldiery and the skill and spirit of the officers could overcome. They gained Quebec with little loss in the pursuit; but they were obliged to leave their cannon, which they could not bring off, on account of the wreaths of snow, which even in this advanced season, and in the temperate latitude of 47, still lay upon the ground. The French lost at least 2000 in the action.

When the account of this victory arrived in Europe, the French were for a while infinitely elated. The blow was sensibly felt in England. Our sanguine hopes were at once sunk. If Quebec was lost, it was evident that the greatest difficulties must have arisen to our affairs in America, and the reduction of Canada must become the work of more than one campaign. Nobody imagined that the town could hold out longer after such a defeat; and the fleet sent from Europe to reinforce the place was then at a great distance.

Nevertheless all things were prepared at Quebec for a vigorous defence. The late check he had received, only roused the governor to more strenuous efforts. He knew that the loss of the place would be attributed to the temerity of his councils; he was sensible that in proportion to the honours paid by the public to those who had conquered Quebec, would their indignation fall upon those by whom it should happen to be lost; and that in general nothing makes a worse figure, than a rashness which is not fortunate. These thoughts were perpetual stings to a mind like his, passionately desirous of glory; and that very disposition which led him to fight unsuccessfully with a weak army, gave him activity and success in the defence of a weak fortification.

The French, whose whole hope of success depended on perfecting their work before a British squadron could arrive, lost not a moment's time to improve their victory. They opened trenches before the town the very night of the battle. But it was the 11th of May before they could bring two batteries to play upon the fortifications. They were greatly deficient in this respect. Their accounts say, they had no more than twelve pieces of iron artillery, which carried twelve pound balls. The English train, was without comparison, superior. Before the French had opened their batteries, 132 pieces of cannon were placed on the ramparts. The fire of the besiegers was therefore always slack, interrupted, and of little effect.

Notwithstanding the weakness of the enemies fire, the superiority of the English artillery, and the resolution of the governor, and garrison, the relief of the place depended entirely on the early arrival of the British fleet, which was looked out for every hour with the most anxious expectation. Had any French ships of force come before the English, it was the general opinion that the place must inevitably have fallen into their hands.

On the 9th of May to the great joy of the garrison, an English frigate anchored in the bason and brought them an account that the British squadron commanded by Lord Colville, was then in the river. On the 16th, a ship of the line and a frigate arrived; the next morning the two frigates were sent to attack the French squadron above the town. They executed their commission so well, that in a moment all the French vessels of whatever kind were dispersed, and the greatest part destroyed or taken.

M. Levi, who had the mortification to behold from the eminences this action, which at one stroke put an end to all the hopes he had conceived from the late victory, was persuaded that these frigates by the boldness of their manner, must have been the vanguard of a considerable reinforcement; and that too close at hand: He therefore raised the siege in the utmost hurry and precepitation, leaving behind all his artillery, and a great part of his ammunition and baggage, although Lord Colville, with the rest of the squadron, did not arrive at Quebec untill two days after(a).

Thus was fortunately preserved from the most imminent danger, the most considerable place we had taken in the war; and that which gave us the most decisive advantage, The triumph of the French, and the anxiety of England, were but short. The account of the siege, and the raising it, followed close on the heels of each other. And there was nothing now to cloud the prospect of the certain reduction of Canada, by the united efforts of three English armies, who by different routs were moving to attack those parts of it which still remained to France. In the mean time that haughty power was obliged to sit the impotent spectator of the ruin of her colonies, without being able to send them the smallest succour. It was then she found what it was to be inferior at sea.

We shall resume the American affairs, when we have reviewed the scenes that began about this time to open on the theatre of Europe.

CHAP. III.

Distress of Saxony. M. Broglio commands the main body of the French army. St. Germain commands on the Rhine. English army reinforced. King of Prussia's losses. Theatre of the war in the east of Germany. Positions of the Austrian and Prussian armies. Battle of Landshut. Prussian army under Fouquet destroyed.

A Winter remarkably severe succeeded the bloody campaign of 1758. At Bareith in the night of the 16th of December, the cold was insupportable. Reamur's therometer was sunk to 15, which is precisely the same degree it fell to in 1709. A year like this distinguished by the intenseness of the cold, and the fury of war. Birds dropped dead in their flight. At Leipsic ten centinels were froze to death. An infectious disease which began in the armies, diffused itself among the inhabitants of Saxony, and made a dreadful havock. A pestilential contagion raged among the cattle. Famine was soon added to the rest of their calamities; and every misery that can afflict mankind, was poured out upon that unfortunate people with the most liberal measure. There was no prospect of an allevation of these distresses. On the contrary, the sufferings of the people only made their sovereigns more earnest for revenge; and out of the general want a resource arose to their armies, who were the more readily recruited, because the scanty pay and subsistence of a soldier, became an object of envy to the wretched peasantry in most of these countries; and death seemed more honourable and less certain by the sword, than by penury and disease.

France and England vied in their endeavours to augment their forces in Germany. M. Broglio had now the command of the grand army, and the sole conduct of the general plan of operations. He had early in this year, been honoured with the staff of a marshal of France. And nothing was omitted to give lustre to his command, and to furnish him with every means of exerting his talents. His corps was augmented to near 100,000 effective men. Thirty thousand drawn out of their quarters in Dusseldorp, Cleves, Cologne and Wesel, and compleated by draughts from France, formed a seperate army on the Rhine, under the Count de St. Germain. This disposition was made not only to divide the attention of the allied army, but to prevent the ill consequences of the misunderstanding which was known to subsist between this general and the Duke de Broglio. The third army proposed at the close of the foregoing campain did not appear.

On the side of England, the preparations were not less considerable in proportion to her ability for that kind of war. Six regiments of foot commanded by Major General Griffin, were forthwith sent to reinforce the allied army. Elliot's regiment of light horse soon followed them. At the opening of this campaign, we had in Germany twelve regiments of heavy, and one of light horse; and twelve regiments, with two Highland battalions of foot; the whole amounted to near 22,000 men. In the course of the summer, they were further reinforced to near 25,000, Such a number of British troops, serving in one army, had not been seen on the continent, for two hundred years past. The allied army indeed fell short of the French in numbers; but they exceeded it in the quality of the troops. Those newly arrived from England were fresh but not undisciplined; the old were indeed harrassed, but they had been accustomed to victory.

In the beginning of the year, the death of the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel had excited some apprehensions; [Jan. 31.] the dispositions of the successor were uncertain; and his withdrawing himself from the cause of the allies would have made a breach in their army, that it would have proved almost impossible to stop. But these fears were soon dissipated. The new Landgrave among the very first acts of his government, gave the strongest proofs of his steady adherence to the system of his father, and even agreed to add considerably to the Hessian troops in the pay of Great Britain; so that all things promised as favourably to the allies, as from that irremediable inferiority in numbers could have been expected.

The king of Prussia was under far greater difficulties; he had felt the heaviest blows, and was most scanted in the means of healing them.

His losses were not to be reckoned by the men killed and prisoners, but by armies destroyed or taken. Forty generals had died, or were slain in his service, since the 1st of October 1756, exclusive of those who had been wounded, disabled, or made prisoners. And this alone would have been a loss not to be repaired, if these murdering wars which cut off so many experienced officers, did not at the same time, form so many more to supply their places. The king had renewed his alliance on the former terms with Great Britain. By his indefatigable industry, no gaps were seen in his armies. But they were no longer the same troops, and if the king of Prussia had formerly the merit of ably commanding the most excellent armies; he has now to fill up the most remarkable deficiency on the part of his troops by his own heroism; and to undertake far more arduous enterprizes, than his first, with infinitely weaker instruments. His affairs wore a bad aspect in the opening of the former year. In this they seemed altogether desperate.

The Russians had suffered; but they were sufficiently reinforced. The Swedes who had been generally obliged to give ground in the winter, had in that of 1759 the advantage in several smart skirmishes, and had even taken prisoner the Prussian general Manteuffel. As to the Austrians, victorious for a whole campaign almost without fighting, their armies and magazines were full, their corps compleat, their men fresh, vigorous, and full of resolution. Several skirmishes of consequence had been fought during the cessation of the great operations; and they were generally to their advantage.

The King of Prussia was sensible, that in this, as in the former campaigns, he should be attacked by four armies; and that his dominions would be invested upon every side. As these operations were very extensive and complicated, to enable the reader to form an idea of the campaign, it will not be amiss to say something of the ground the king had to defend, which is circumstanced in this manner.

To the north is Pomerania. This country is very open; and it is defended on that part on which the Swedes generally act, with but few, and those mean fortifications, Anclam, Demmein and Passewalk. But then the Swedish army is not numerous, and if they should attempt to penetrate far into the country, they must leave Stetin, in which there is always a strong garrison behind them to their left, which would render their subsistence difficult, and their retreat in case of any misfortune, extremely hazardous; and they have not sufficient strength to master this place by a regular siege. This has always proved a check to the progress of that army, even when they have been otherwise successful.

This same country to the eastward of the Oder, is one great object of the Russian designs. Its chief strength in this quarter is the town of Colberg; a place they have frequently attempted, but always without success. And their failure, in this instance, has been the main cause why they have never been able to take winter quarters in the King of Prussia's dominions, or even during the campaign, to make any considerable impression upon Pomerania. For they can have no communication with their own country by sea, for want of this port. On their rear, lies the extensive and inhospitable desert of Waldow; and this with the uncertain disposition of the city of Dantzick, renders their supplies of provision from Poland difficult and precarious. Neither is it possible in these circumstances, to unite their forces with those of Sweden acting in the same country. The Oder flows between them; which is so commanded by the city of Stetin, as to make all communication between these armies in a great measure impracticable. Insomuch, that on the side of Pomerania, the force of these two powers is compelled to act separately, without concert, and therefore weakly and ineffectually.

To the westward, the King of Prussia is sufficiently covered by the city of Magdebourg, the strongest place in his dominions, and in that part of Germany. Here are his greatest magazines, and his principal founderies; and this is the repository of whatever he finds necessary to place out of the reach of sudden insult.

To the southward he is obliged to defend Saxony and Silesia. Both of these countries on their frontiers towards Bohemia, rise into very rough, broken, and mountainous grounds, abounding in advantageous posts and strong situations. Lusatia lies between them; a level sandy plain, (interspersed with pine-woods,) extending without any obstacle to the very gates of Berlin. Through this country the king's communication between Silesia and Saxony must be kept up, and therefore it has been from the beginning of this war, the great scene of those remarkable marches and counter-marches, by which his Prussian majesty has acquired so great a reputation; and also of those bold and sudden attempts which have distinguished some of the generals of the adverse party. As an army cannot be advantageously posted in this territory, it has not been usual for a considerably body to remain there long; and it is particularly unfavourable to defensive operations. This country may be considered as the curtin, and the frontiers of Saxony and Silesia as the bastions, that flank the sort of fortification, which the king is to maintain.

No part of that monarch's territories are naturally more defenceless than the eastern; at the same time that it is attacked by the most powerful of his enemies. A country altogether sandy and level, extends along both sides of the Oder, from the northern frontier of Silesia, until it meets Pomerania, a country of the same kind. There is no respectable fortification on this side; and the river Warta that falls here into the Oder, makes the transport of provisions, and consequently the subsistence of the armies that act against him more easy.

As to Silesia, it is covered on the Bohemian side with mountains, and it contains places of such strength as to be above the necessity of yielding to the first army that appears before them. Indeed it is to be remarked, that such a degree of strength seems sufficient for the kind of service which has distinguished this war. Never was a war of such a length and extent, in which fewer sieges of consequence have been formed; and the late service which affords so large a field for experience in every other species of military operations, affords very little matter of improvement in the art of reducing or defending strong places.

The King of Prussia's design seems to have been to save himself as much as possible to the end of the campaign; the only time when his success might be decisive, and his ill-fortune not ruinous. He therefore formed a defensive plan. In pursuance of this he withdrew his out-posts from Freyberg, and drawing a chain of cantonments from the forest of Tharandt on his right to the Elbe, he took a most advantageous camp between that river and the Multa; strongly intrenching it where it had not been previously fortified by nature; and furnished it with so numerous an artillery, that they reckoned in their front only 250 pieces of cannon.

In this situation he covered the most material parts of Saxony, kept the attention of M. Daun's army engaged, and was enabled to send out reinforcements to Prince Henry, or elsewhere, as occasion should require, without exposing one part whilst he defended the other.

Whilst the King's army defended his conquests in Misnia, Prince Henry had assembled an army about Franckfort on the Oder, and took various positions about that place and Crossen. In this position, he commanded three principal communications, in such a manner as to protect at once Silesia, the New Marche of Brandenburg, and the avenues to Berlin; all which were threatened by several bodies of the enemy. General Fouquet had established his quarters near the county of Glatz, and whilst he covered that side of Silesia, he communicated with Prince Henry, and was so disposed as to send to or receive succours from him, as either party should happen to be pressed.

M. Daun, as soon as he saw that the King of Prussia had fortified himself in his post, he too buried himself in entrenchments, and kept the most attentive eye upon all hi• majesty's motions. Whilst he confined himself in this position, in order to tie down the King of Prussia, genera• Laudohn, with a strong but light and disincumbered army, moved from the camp he had occupied during the winter in Bohemia, and presenting himself alternately on the side o• Lusatia, and on the frontiers of Silesia, threatened sometimes to penetrate into Berlin, sometimes by a bold stroke to effect a junction with the Russians, and attack Prince Henry, sometimes to sit down before Glatz, Schweidnitz, or Breslau; and thus the alarm was spread upon every side, not knowing where the storm would fall.

At length he declared himself. Having by several fein• persuaded general Fouquet that his intentions were against Schweidnitz, that general marched thither a considerable body of his troops, and left Glatz uncovered. As soon as Laudohn perceived this movement, he on his side made another, and possessed himself of Landshut; and when he had taken Landshut, he pretended a design of securing this post by leaving a small body of troops there. This feint also succeeded, and drew general Fouquet from Schweidnitz back again to Landshut. He drove the Austrians from that place without difficulty; but in the mean time Laudohn made himself master of several important passes, by which he was in some sort enabled to surround the corps of General Fouquet.

The commander finding himself in those dangerous circumstances, had nothing left but to fortify his post, formerly made a very strong one, with additional works; which he did with such effect, that it had more the resemblance of a regular fortification than an entrenchment. However, the army he commanded was far from numerous; and he was obliged to weaken it still farther by a detachment of 2000 men, to preserve, if possible, a communication with Schweidnitz.

Laudohn longed to distinguish himself by some capital stroke; he had now by a series of very artful movements procured a most favourable opportunity. First, therefore, he shut up with great dexterity the passes on every side, and rendered his adversary's retreat impracticable. Then he began an attack on the Prussian entrenchments in the dead of the night in three different places. [June 23.] The signal for the assault was given by four hawbitzers fired in the air. The Austrians rushed to the attack with uncommon fury, and maintained it with so steady a resolution, that in three quarters of an hour the two strongest entrenchments were carried, and the line of communication forced: The Prussians at day-break found themselves pushed back from hill to hill, and line to line, to their last entrenchments. Their resistance was all along brave, and their retreat regular. The enemy purchased every advantage at the dearest rate; but at last pressed upon every side, worn down by a terrible slaughter, their general disabled by two mortal wounds, at eight in the morning the remnant of the army threw down their arms and surrendered on the field of battle.

On the side of the vanquished, the slain were about 4000. The prisoners were, one general of foot, namely general Fouquet; two major generals; two hundred and thirteen officers of the inferior rank; and upwards of 7000 private soldiers, 58 pieces of artillery, with a number of colours. Never was a more entire and decisive victory. The whole army, general, officers, every thing was destroyed. Scarce three hundred of the body intrenched by Landshut escaped. The corps alone which was to preserve the communication, together with some bodies of cavalry who had not been engaged, with difficulty got into Schweidnitz, where they expected every moment to be besieged. This advantage cost the Austrians above 12000 men killed and wounded.

CHAP. IV.

The Austrians take Glatz. Situation of the Prussian armies. King of Prussia marches towards Silesia and deceives M. Daun. King of Prussia returns to Saxony. Siege of Dresden. Town burned. Return of Daun. Siege raised. Breslau besieged by the Austrians. March of Prince Henry. Laudohn retreats.

THIS victory was pursued with as much rapidity as it was obtained with courage and address. Baron Laudohn immediately returned back from Landshut, fell like a storm upon Glatz. Glatz consists of two fortresses, the old and the new. The old was taken by storm; the new surrendered at discretion. Two thousand brave men and some good works could not defend it against the impetuosity of the Austrians. One hundred and one pieces of brass cannon were taken. Immense magazines of provision and military stores piled up in this frontier place to favour in better times an irruption into Bohemia, fell into the hands of the conqueror. Every thing gave way. The possession of Glatz laid all Silesia open, and the Austrians might turn their arms upon any side without the least danger to the freedom of their retreat. Neither was there any sort of army to give the least obstruction. The King of Prussia held down by M. Daun, was in Saxony. Prince Henry was also at a great distance towards Custrin. If that Prince attempted to move to the relief of Silesia, he laid open Brandenburgh, and even Berlin itself to the irruptions of the Russians. If he remained in his post, Silesia was inevitably lost. Even his speediest march seemed by no means a certain way to releive it. The King was yet further distant; and any motion of his threatened to shake and unhinge the whole scheme of his defence; exposing at once Saxony and Berlin. The loss of his third army, small as that army was, laid him under difficulties that seemed insuperable.

Favoured by these circumstances, Laudohn had only to chuse what direction he should give his arms. Silesia, as has been observed, lay open before him. He had threatened Schweidnitz; but he saw that Breslaw was a place of greater consequence, much more easily reduced, and that the possession of it facilitated a junction with the Russians; a point on which the ultimate improvement of his victory wholly depended. The place besides is of so great extent, and the works of so little comparative strength, that he had no small hopes of mastering it before Prince Henry could come, if he should at all attempt to come to its relief.

He therefore delayed no longer than the march of his heavy artillery and the necessary preparatives required, to lay siege to the capital of Silesia, of whose safety the most sanguine friends of his Prussian majesty began to dispair,

But in the interval between the battle of Landshut and the commencement of the siege of Breslau, the King of Prussia was not idle. His thoughts were continually employed to repair this disaster; all ordinary resources were impracticable or ineffectual. His genius alone could enter the lists with his ill fortune. Placing therefore his hopes in himself, he aimed by a daring and unexpected stroke, to draw even from so severe a misfortune some new and more brilliant advantages.

In pursance of the plan he had laid, [July 2.] he disposed all things for a march towards Silesia, and had passed the Elbe and penetrated through a woody country without opposition; had the enemy been apprised of his march as early as he began it, it had been attended with great and unsurmountable difficulties. Marshal Daun no sooner had advice of his march, than he also immediately moved with the utmost expedition at the head of his main army towards Silesia, leaving the army of the empire, and a body under General Lacy, to awe Saxony in his absence.

The two armies continued their route through Lusatia; that of the King of Prussia a little to the northward, that of Marshal Daun to the southward; both apparently pushing towards the same object, and with equal eagerness. But as the army of the marshal had rather the shorter cut to make, and as he moved with far greater and more unaffected diligence, he got very considerably the start of the King.

When his majesty was apprised that M. Daun had gained full two days march upon him; [July 8.] that he had actually arrived at Gorlitz, and was pushing by forced marches to Lauban; his great purpose was obtained. Immediately he struck into M. Daun's track, but wheeled into the opposite direction, repassed the Spree near Bautzen, and whilst every one imagined him on the frontiers of Silesia, he suddenly sprung up like a mine before Dresden. The army of the Empire retired. Lacy's corps was obliged to shift its situation. The Prussian generals Hulsen and Ziethen, who had probably been prepared to act in concert with the King, joined him before that place, and knowing there was no room for delay, [July 13.] began the siege with the utmost vigour.

Then was this most unfortunate city a third time exposed to the fury of war. The inhabitants suffered in their habitations for the weakness of the works; and there were armies both without and within of such mutual and determined rage, and so careless of all things but their enmity, that they little scrupled to strike at each other through the bodies of the suffering Saxons. All Europe had now its eyes turned to the event of this masterly manoeuvre; and certainly through the whole course of this eventful war, nothing appeared more worthy of regard, nor at any time had there been exhibited a piece of generalship more compleat, than the conduct of the King of Prussia's march.

Since Dresden had fallen into the hands of the Austrians, it had been strengthened with the addition of several new works. The burning of the suburbs by the Prussians, in order to keep them out, became an advantage to them when they came to possess the town. In short, the place, was rendered in all respects more defensible than formerly. It had also a very large garrison under General Macguire, an officer of courage and experience, who resolved to maintain it to the last extremity: when he was summoned to surrender, he made answer, "That it was impossible the king could have been apprised with his being entrusted with the command of that capital; otherwise so great a captain as his majesty would not make such a proposal to an officer of his standing: that he would defend himself to the last man; and wait whatever the king should think proper to attempt."

Both parties being therefore inspired with the utmost resolution, the one to attack, the other to defend, the siege was pushed on by every method of force and address; there was scarce any intermission of assaults, surprizes, coups de mains, sallies, and all kind of actions used on such occasions; and all the most vigorous in their way. In the mean time three batteries of cannon and mortars played continually, but with much greater damage to the buildings than effect on the fortifications.

Marshal Daun was in Silesia when he heard all at once of the deceit put upon him by the King of Prussia, of his return to Saxony, of the siege, and the extreme danger of Dresden. His return was as rapid as his march had been. On the 19th he appeared within a league of Dresden. His approach only caused the Prussians to redouble their efforts; that day they had received reinforcements of heavy cannon and mortars, and battered the place with new fury. The cathedral church, the new square, several principal streets, some palaces, the noble manufactory of porcelain, were all entirely reduced to ashes.

The siege continued till the 22d. The night of the 21st, M. Daun had thrown sixteen battalions into Dresden. It was in vain to continue any longer the pretence of besieging a whole army within the town, whilst at the same time there was another army to reinforce it without. The king withdrew his forces without molestation from the suburbs, though there were three considerable armies of the enemy in the neighbourhood, besides that which was within the walls.

Thus ended, without the success so masterly, a proceeding deserved, the King of Prussia's famous stratagem. But the want of success can detract nothing from the merit of the measure. By drawing Marshal Daun from Saxony to Silesia he gained the use of eight days, free of obstruction from the enemy's grand army; eight days at a time when hours and even moments were critical. In this time he had certainly a chance at least of reducing Dresden; and by the possession of that place he would have found himself infinitely better able to carry his arms to the defence of every part of his territories for the present, and for the future would have that great place of retreat in case of any misfortune. If he failed in this attempt his affairs were precisely in their former condition; and he could not suffer in reputation by having made it.

As the King of Prussia could not be blamed for the speedy return of Marshal Daun, and the consequences of that return; so neither in effect could the Marshal suffer any just imputation in having been deceived by the king's march. He knew that there were very plausible motives to call, and even to press him to move that way. He knew that if the king should get into Silesia without any opposition from him, Laudohn might not only be deprived of all the advantages he could hope for from his late victory, but by being attacked by the united armies of the king and his brother, would run the risque of a defeat that might fully revenge that of Landshut.

Whatever the merit of either of the commanders might be on this occasion, it is certain that Laudohn met no considerable obstruction.

But Laudohn who saw all things prepared for an obstinate defence, did not wholly trust to his military manoeuvres. He sent a letter to the governor Count Tavenzien, to intimidate him by the display of his strength. He set forth, that his forces consisted of 50 battalions and 80 squadrons; that the Russian army of 75,000 men were within three days march; that it was in vain for the governor to expect succour from the King of Prussia, who was then at the other side of the Elbe, that it was still more vain to look for relief from Prince Henry, who could scarce hope to stand his own ground against the grand army of the Russians; that in case of obstinacy he could expect no reasonable terms: and that these were the last that should be offered. Moreover he reminded him that the place was a mercantile town, not a fortress; and that he could not defend it without contravening the laws of war.

These rules, by which honour is reduced to act, not by its own feelings, but according to intrinsical circumstances; rules by which they have attempted to determine exactly and mechanically that nicest of all lines which discriminates courage from rashness, form one of the strongest instances of the great difference between the antient and modern methods and ideas of war. In the antient times, a brave commander would have answered this threatning message in general terms of defiance. But Count Tavenzien respected these imaginary laws. He took care to prove that in defending the town, he did not infringe them; and spoke as Laudohn had done in the character of a military jurisconsult, as well as a soldier; he gave for reply. That the town of Breslaw being surrounded with works and wet ditches, was to be considered as a place of strength, and not simply as a mercantile town. That the Austrians themselves defended it as such in 1757, after the battle of Lissa. That the king had commanded him to defend it to the last extremity, that therefore General Laudohn might see it was not from humour he had refused to listen to his summons. That he was not frighted with the General's threats to destroy the town; for he was not entrusted with the care of the houses, but the fortifications.

Laudohn had also sent in a memorial in the same menacing stile, where he thought it might have a greater effect, to the civil magistrates, hoping that the ruin with which the town was threatened, might induce them join with the inhabitants, to persuade the governor to a speedy surrender.

All these menacing measures seemed to argue a fear in Baron Laudohn, that the Russians were not so near as he pretended, and that the town might possibly be releived before their arrival. However he shewed them, at nine of the very evening of the message, that his threats were not vain, by a terrible discharge of mortars and red hot balls that fell in an uninterrupted shower upon the city untill midnight. During this fierce bombardment, that made a dreadful havock in the town, he attempted the out-works by assault. His Croats attacked the covered-way in many places at once, with the usual impetuosity of those brave irregulars; but they were received and repulsed with a resolution equal to their own, and with more steadiness.

This operation of this dreadful night having made no impression on the inflexible determination of the governor, Baron Laudohn had once more recourse to negotiation. He now changed his stile, and held out the most flattering propositions; offering to grant him what capitulations he should think proper to ask, and even to leave himself to draw up the articles. The governor replied that the firing the town had made no change in his resolution; and he would wait with firmness for the enemy upon the ramparts; but that he could not help observing it was contrary to the laws of arms to begin the siege of a fortress, by ruining its inhabitants. The messenger made answer, that the trenches would be soon opened. The governor said, it was what he had long expected.

The Austrians, foiled in their hopes from treaty, continued to batter the town, and made several attacks upon the out-works for three days successively. They found every post bravely defended; the Russian army did not appear, but they now began to perceive the approach of another army less agreeable; that of Prince Henry; which having marched with the utmost diligence from Great Glogau, now came fast upon him; and on the 5th of August, reached within a few miles of the town.

Laudohn did not think it expedient to put the advantage he had gained, and those which he had yet to expect from the management of time, to the issue of a battle; he therefore decamped and made his retreat in good order, but with sufficient quickness; having procured from this enterprise only the wretched satisfaction of reducing a great part of the city to a heap of rubbish, and of having revenged upon Breslaw some part of the sufferings of Dresden.

CHAP. V.

Cause of the slowness of the Allies and French. Advantages on the side of the French. Differences between Broglio and St. Germain. Marburg and Dillenburg taken by the French. Battle of Corbach. Hereditary Prince wounded. Surprize and defeat of Monsieur Glaubitz at Ermsdorf. The Allies change their camp. Action at Warbourg.

THE French and allied armies had been reinforced in the manner we have already mentioned. But the vigour of their operations did not altogether correspond with what might have been expected from their strength and mutual animosity. The campaign, at least in any effective manner, opened late. A country which had been so long the theatre of so ruinous a war, had been too much wasted to make the subsistence, and consequently the free motion of the armies easy. The winter had been severe and long; and it was not untill the green forage appeared plentifully above ground, that those great bodies of cavalry, which make so large a part in our modern armies, were in a condition to act. The sufferings of the English horse, from a want of dry forage, during a great part of the winter and the spring had been extreme; this obliged them to fall much farther back from the French cantonments; and to molest them less than they otherwise would have done. It was besides a loss, that at the opening of the campaign, they had so extensive a tract between them and Hanover; which by an artful choice of posts might have been yielded step by step, and the campaign so managed and spun out, that the season of action must have expired, before the French could have reaped any decisive advantage from their superiority.

Although the French were during the winter supplied far better than the allies with all necessaries by the command of the Maine, the Moselle and the Rhine; and that the countries at their back had been much less consumed by the war; yet the same difficulties embarrassed them as soon as they thought of taking the field, and quitting their advantageous cantonment. Therefore there was a slowness in the principal armies upon both parts, until the middle of summer.

Not however, but that something was attempted in this interval, by lesser parties. On the side of the Rhine, some actions happened between the army of St. Germain, and the corps of General Sporken, who was posted at Dulmen, to observe the French in that quarter. Dulmen formed the right flank of the chain of cantonments made by the allied army, which extended its left to the south-east frontiers of the country of Hesse, above an hundred and fifty miles distant. The Hereditary Prince who was on that wing, exerted, as much as circumstances would permit, his usual activity and enterprize. He threw himself into the district of Fulda; he laid it under an heavy contribution and broke up several French corps that were posted there.

These actions decided nothing. The French army superior in numbers, and in situation, advanced; and the allies, who seemed to have chosen the defensive, gradually retired. In effect, if the French had pursued their original plan, it would have proved almost impossible for the allied army to maintain its ground. If St. Germain, possessed of Cleves, Wesel, and Dusseldorp, had advanced on the side of Munster; and M. Broglio moving forward through the country of Hesse, had made a strong detachment to the eastward of the Weser, whilst with his main body he engaged the attention of Prince Ferdinand, the allies would shortly have found themselves enclosed upon three sides; and nothing could have extricated them but a capital victory obtained under every disadvantage.

The French army was sufficiently numerous for these operations. But it was suspected that the jealousy which subsisted between M. de St. Germain and the Duke of Broglio prevented their being carried into execution. This misunderstanding daily increased. Insomuch, that M. Broglio thought fit to order the corps of St. Germain to unite itself with the grand army. The count, who could not brook obedience to a younger officer, and one besides with whom he was not on the best terms, retired from the service. [July 23.] He had only served before upon condition of commanding an army entirely distinct, and under his own particular orders. This difference deprived France of one of its most able generals, and disconcerted one of its most promised schemes of operation.

Before this misunderstanding had produced these effects, the affairs of the French went on with all imaginable prosperity. The principal army not retarding itself, by consideration of the places of strength which the allies possessed in their front, the castles of Marburg and Dillenbourg, pushed forward into the landgraviate of Hesse, leaving detachments to reduce those fortresses. The first of which surrendered on the 30th of June, the latter held out to the 16th of July; but the garrisons of both surrendered prisoners of war.

In the mean time whilst M. Broglio advanced on the side of Hesse; [July 10.] the corps of St. Germain had penetrated through the dutchy of Westphalia, and the two armies joined near a place called Corbach. The allied army had fallen back from the post they occupied at Fritzlar, and were retreating towards the river Dymel. As yet they had received no advice of the dreaded junction of the French armies; but as it was imagined that the corps of St. Germain only moved that way, and the vanguard only of that corps could be arrived at Corbach, which could not be estimated at more than 10,000 foot, and 17 squadrons at the utmost, the Hereditary Prince formed a sceme of attacking and driving them from that post.

When he had begun the attack, contrary to his expectation he found the enemy already formed; but it was now impossible to recede. The action grew every moment more furious and bloody. The French stood their ground with firmness, and the main army being extremely near, instead of being wasted in the action, they grew more numerous by the reinforcements that were continually sent.

In this situation it was necessary that the Prince should make as speedy a retreat as possible; but the difficulty of drawing out of the field in the middle of the day, before an enemy quite fresh, and every instant reinforced, may be easily imagined. To compleat this difficulty, some bodies of the German troops both horse and foot fell into great confusion. The enemy saw it at the first glance, and to increase it to the utmost disorder, pushed forward upon them with a numerous artillery and a large body of cavalry. The allied army seemed to be in the way of inevitable ruin.

In this exigence the Hereditary Prince, as his last resource, put himself at the head of a squadron of Bland's and Howard's regiments of dragroons. By these the uncommon heroism of their young leader was perfectly seconded. They charged the enemy with the utmost fury, stopped their career of their victorious horse; and enabled the alied battalions to make an undisturbed retreat.

The Hereditary Prince was wounded in this action; about 900 men were killed, wounded, or prisoners, fifteen pieces of cannon, the whole of the artillery, was left to the enemy, but still in their circumstances to have avoided a total defeat, was in some sort victory. The well-timed impetuosity of the Hereditary Prince, and the spirit of the English horse, could not be too highly praised. The Prince retired to the main army of the allies, who had now possessed themselves of the strong post of Saxenhausen: whilst the French continued opposite to them in the no less strong post of Corbach, which they had acquired by their victory; and here for some time they watched each other.

The Hereditary Prince suffered more by this check than from the wounds he had received. His mind, forgetful of his pain and weakness, only brooding over his defeat, seeking out with anxiety an opportunity of revenging his loss by some bold, signal, and unexpected stroke against the enemy. It was not long before an opportunity presented itself.

Advice had been received, that among the detachments which the French employed to reduce those fortresses which the allies had garrisoned on their retreat, there was one very considerable, formed of French and Saxon, under Mons. Glaubitz, moving towards Zigenhagen, a place of importance in the landgrave of Hesse. The Hereditary Prince undertook to relieve it, and for that purpose selected six battalions of the German troops, [14 July.] two brigades of hunters, a regiment of hussars, and Eliot's light dragoons. Although this last corps was but just arrived, had been newly raised, and had never seen any kind of service, the Prince was so well pleased with their countenance, that he chose them preferably to all other for his difficult enterprize, and the event proved that he was not mistaken.

Mons. Glaubitz remained in the most perfect security; he was under no sort of apprehension of being molested by a detachment of an army sixty miles distance, under the eye, and as it were, guard of a superior body which demanded all its attention; [July 16.] when on a sudden he found himself attacked with the utmost violence▪ The Hereditary Prince having reconnoitred hi• position, made a detour of two leagues through woods and mountains, fell upon his left, whilst the rest of his troop• climbed the mountains on the opposite side, and rushe• with the same spirit upon the right.

Glaubitz had scarce time to form his troops; and they were only formed to be immediately broken. They retired with precipitation, leaving their camp and all it contained to the enemy. The Prince had so disposed his cavalry as to cut off the retreat of some; but the most considerable part gained ground upon him. On this occasion he relied entirely on Elliot's horse, as it was altogether impossible for the infantry, already harassed by the action, and a most fatiguing forced march of two days, to follow them. A• the head of this horse he overtook the fugitives as they came out of a wood, charged and broke them five different times, seperated a body of 500 from the rest, surrounded them, and obliged them to throw down their arms. Having routed this, with the like rapidity, he flew to another body who had taken post near a wood, surrounded them in the same manner; summoned and received them all prisoners of war. A regiment of the enemy's hussars was entirely cut to pieces. Nothing was wanting to compleat his victory. Elliot's light horse, proud to be led on by the Prince himself, and worthy of that honour, had the greatest share of the glory and sufferings of that day. So young a corps had never so eminently distinguished itself. No more than 79 of the allies were killed in this action, but of these 71 were of this single regiment.

The numbers of the enemy killed is not known, but for a time the slaughter was terrible. General Glaubitz himself was made prisoner, together with the Prince of Anhalt. There were besides 177 officers, and 2482 private men. A greater number of prisoners could scarely be expected from a victory in a general engagement. The trophies were nine pair of colours and six pieces of cannon. In all the Petite Gurre of this campaign, (and the campaign between the French and the allies was almost wholly made up of such,) this was by far the most billiant action; and alone might have established the reputation of the Hereditary Prince, if any thing had been wanting to establish him the first man of his age, in that species of war. He returned to the camp of Saxenhausen, without molestation, having fully revenged the affair of Corbach.

Prince Ferdinand did not remain long after this action in his camp at Saxenhausen. By so advanced a position, the landgraviate, and even Hanover, lay too open to the enemies incursions. He therefore took his camp at a place called Kalle, in a situation nearer to Cassel On this M. Broglio formed a plan, which the greatness of his army in some sort enabled him to execute. The Chevalier de Muy, who commanded in the room of the Count St. Germain, was ordered to cross the Dymel at Statbergen, with his reserve, consisting of 35,000 men, in order to cut off the allies from their communication with Westphalia. Whilst the rest of the French, dividing themselves into two bodies, moved, the main army under M. Broglio towards Duke Ferdinand's camp at Kalle, the reserve under Prince Xavier of Saxony towards Cassel.

These important movements obliged Prince Ferdinand to set himself also in motion; and as he was not in a condition to make detachments of sufficient strength, he crossed the Dymel with his grand army, in order to fight the Chevalier de Muy.

His Serene Highness formed his main body on the heights of Corbach, [31 July.] and moved towards the enemy, who were advantageously posted near Warbourg; in the mean time the Hereditary Prince with two columns wheeled round the enemy's left, and began a vigorous attack at once upon that flank, and upon their rear. The French commander poured reinforcements on that quarter. An hot engagement was there maintained with equal obstinacy for near four hours. Whilst this combat continued with uncertain fortune on the left, Prince Ferdinand caused some bodies to file off towards the French bridges on the Dymel to their right, by which he proposed to attack also on that side, and intercept them on their retreat; at the same time the main of his army advanced with the utmost expedition to charge the enemy in front.

The French now saw themselves in the most imminent danger of being surrounded. Already their left, attacked in flank and rear by the Hereditary Prince, began to give way: his fire became every moment superior; and the earliest retreat was the safest.

As soon as Prince Ferdinand perceived the enemy to tire, he saw it absolutely in vain to think of bringing infantry upon their front. The English cavalry also, up which he chiefly confided, was too distant to give al• any hope that they could be made to act. But the Engl• cavalry out-did his expectations, and indeed all former ••amples. They considered themselves as defrauded of th• share of the glory of Minden: and they panted for an ••casion of signalizing their courage; and their commande• Lord Granby and Mostyn, forwarded their ardour, kno••ing that great actions are commonly transgressions of or••nary rules.

They came up five miles on a full trot, (the Germa• called it a gallop) without being blown, without the le• confusion or disorder, and attacked the enemies cavalry • infantry several times. The greatest part of the enem• horse fell back and did not stand the charge. The Eng• artillery were brought up with the same surprizing quic••ness, and employed with the same powerful effect. Capt• Phillips had done more with artillery than had been thoug• possible at Minden; and he exceeded it at Warbou• The English foot vied with the cavalry and artillery, a• made such earnest efforts to come to action, that in stra••ing their passage through morassy ground and in burni• weather, several soldiers dropped down on their mar• But they were too late to engage, and probably in th• wasted condition it was well that it so happened.

The French made a precipitate retreat towards Statber• several were drowned in passing the Dymel; 1500 were • on the field of battle; as many were made prisoners. T• pieces of cannon were taken; but they consoled themsel• in having lost no colours. The loss of the allied army general has not been, that I can find, published. That the English in killed, wounded, and missing, was 590, 〈◊〉 then the battle lay chiefly on them, and the killed include in that number were but about 130 (a).

So brilliant a success following close on the heels of the •ormer, raised the reputation of the allied arms. As con•iderable an advantage might have well been expected from it; but according to the usual play of fortune in this w• the first account that followed the defeat of so large a p• of the French army, was, that with a rapid and unresist• tide of success, they had reduced Cassel, Eimbach, and Ziegenhayn; by which they became masters of the whole landgraviate of Hesse; that they had pushed into the king's territories, seized upon Gottingen and Munden, and thre•tened Hanover itself. In short, almost the worst con••quences which could have arisen from a defeat followed victory; and whilst in England we gave loose to our joy on the success of our arms, the French were taking the most important places of our allies.

The fact was that Prince Ferdinand must have been sensible, that in quitting his camp at Kalle, and taking post to the northward of the Dymel, he in a great measure, laid open Cassel and the whole territory of Hesse to the French; nay, that by this movement nothing was left to hinder their entering the Hanoverian dominions on the right of the Weser. But notwithstanding these risques, the step he took was prudent, and even necessary. Had he suffe• the progress of the Chevalier de Muy, on the Dymel; h• he permitted him to strengthen his posts upon that rive• his communication with Westphalia had been inevitably • off, and of course his sphere of subsistence greatly streig••tened. It would have had a worse effect. For he m• have entirely lost the command of the Weser, witho•• which he could not have stood his ground a moment; a• he would on that loss have found himself compelled to re• into the heart of Hanover, where he must necessarily 〈◊〉 streightened in his winter cantonments, and where a blo• of any consequence must be decisive against him.

He therefore fought the battle of Warbourg though • lost all Hesse by his victory; and he would not quit his po• on the Dymel, though he saw Gottingen and Munden the hands of the French. He was not to be frighted fro• his steady and well chosen plan, by vain rumours or threa•¦ening appearances. He was by no means in a condition• make large detachments; it was therefore necessary to s••¦crifice something; and he made the smallest sacrifice th• circumstances would admit. For he foresaw that the Fren•• army whilst he kept his position on the Dymel, could 〈◊〉 possibly take up their quarters in Hanover, or even act the in any considerable body, and for any considerable tim• without subjecting themselves to the same or greater inco•¦veniencies than those to which he would have been hims••• liable, had he in defending Hesse suffered them to occu• those critical posts on the Dymel. He knew farther, th• it would prove extremely dangerous for them to haza•• themselves beyond Gottingen; and that it would be mo•• difficult for the French army to support themselves in th• advanced post, than for him to annoy them there.

It is possible that reasons somewhat like the foregoing together with others probably far more cogent, might ha•• determined that great commander to this conduct. B• whilst he secured that middle communication and acted upo• the defensive plan, the troops were not idle; his detach¦ments acted in many parts with spirit and effect. But w• must defer for a while the narrative of these actions, being called from this part of the theatre to the eastern parts • Germany, where about this time scenes of greater ecl• were opened.

CHAP. VI.

Laudohn blocks up Schweidnitz. Russians enter Silesia. March of the King of Prussia from Saxony to Lignitz. Junction of the Austrian armies in Silesia. The Russians pass the Oder. Plan of M. Daun. Laudohn defeated near Lignitz. Daun forms the blockade of Schweidnitz. Compelled to raise it. Action between General Hulsen and the army of the Empire. Intercepted letter from the King of Prussia to the Marquis of Argens.

FROM the time that the King of Prussia found himself compelled to raise the siege of Dresden, it was evident that he could have no hopes of acting in Saxony to any good purpose. The busy part of the campaign came on fast. Though Prince Henry had obliged Laudohn to retire from Breslaw; that general, able, and lately victorious, was still formidable; he kept Neisse and Schweidnitz blocked up; and wanted to effect a junction with the Russians, by which he proposed to give the final blow to the king's power in Silesia, The Russians had now actually arrived in the frontier parts of that province, and wanted but a very few days easy march to compleat that fatal and long dreaded junction. At the same time another body of Russians had penetrated into Pomerania; laid all the defenceless parts under contribution, and threatened the siege of Colberg: The Swedish army, said to consist of 22,000 men, commenced also, tho' with less vigour, their operations. In all that country the King of Prussia had not 5000 men to oppose them.

In these circumstances a plan of mere defence would have proved altogether without effect. The King of Prussia had but two armies; and it was necessary that one of them, at least, should make the most rapid and sudden movements to oppose so many combinations. On the side of Silesia the danger seemed more pressing, and accordingly he marched to its relief; [July 30.] advanced near two hundred miles, and left Marshal Daun, who had considerably the start, far behind him. This march would have been thought an astonishing exploit in a partizan at the head of a small and disencumbered corps; but that a numerous army clogged with its artillery, with above two thousand waggons, should in that time traverse such a space, should pass the Elbe, the Spree, the Neisse, the Queiss, and the Bober, five considerable rivers; that they should effect all this, with one army of the enemy on one side of it flanks, another behind, and with a third in its front (th• actual position of the Austrians in Lusatia) was an actio• reserved for, and only to be expected from the King • Prussia. The attempt itself could have been justified on•• by necessity; and the necessity was urgent. The Russia• approached. M. Daun followed towards Silesia; and th• king could hardly promise himself success, but from march of such rapidity, as might enable him to try his fo••tune with General Laudohn, before the triple junction • apprehended had made his enemies irresistable. But no•¦withstanding the hopes conceived from this march, befo•• the king could come to an action three bodies of Austria• had joined, Laudohn's, Daun's, and Lacy's; and extendin• themselves along the Katsbach, a river which falls into th• Oder, occupied all the ground from Parchwitz to Cosse•dau, a space of little less than thirty English miles. But this extent their posts were every where strong, and the communications easy. The king's camp was at Lignit• It was in vain that for several days he attempted, by vario• devices, to detach one body of the enemy from the rest, to turn their flanks and attack them at disadvantage. Th• nature of the ground or the skill of the opposite gener•• always disappointed him.

At length Mr. Daun took himself the offensive party. T•• advantage of his situation, and the superiority of his num•bers, prevailed over his cautious nature to risque an atta• It was therefore resolved, after the situation of Lignitz h• been well reconnoitred, all circumstances maturely weighe• and the design communicated to the other generals, to a••tempt the King of Prussia in his camp, with the unit• strength of the three armies. To ensure success beyond doubt, it was determined that this attempt should be ma• by surprize, and therefore in the night. M. Daun reme•¦bered the bad guard which had been kept by the Prussians and the advantage, which in the year 1758 he derived fro• a night attack at the battle of Hochkirchen.

In consequence of this plan the whole army, as soon as should begin to grow dark, was to march from their seven posts to such situation as were marked out for each corps they were to strike their tents, but yet to keep up the fir• in their camps, and to have the drums beat the tattoo as usual.

Some time after Marshal Daun had begun to move, to his astonishment the patroles he had sent out returned with the account, that they had met no out-posts. As soon as day broke and the army had advanced, their apprehensions were confirmed. They were disappointed in their design, there was no enemy in the camp; but when they cast their eyes from thence, they could perceive at a distance the rising of a thick smoke, which left them no room to doubt that their fortune was then on the point of decision, by a part of their forces only, and that the King and Baron Laudohn were at that moment hotly engaged; Daun could only look on and wait the event.

On the 13th of July the king was in his camp at Lignitz, when he received advice that the Russian army of 24,000 men, under Count Czernichew, had thrown bridges over the Oder, at a place called Auras, and that they were to pass the river on that very day. He suspected also, that the enemy had formed the design of a general attack. Troops which have been a long time opposed to each other can reciprocally guess at each other's designs; the method used by the enemies generals grow familiar, and the least motion they make discloses their designs.

This is the account the Prussians gave of the means by which they came to a knowledge of M. Daun's projects. The Austrians attributed this discovery, not to the Prussian sagacity, but to intelligence given by deserters.

Whatever the means were by which the King of Prussia became suspicious of this design, it is certain, that he took the most early, the most vigorous, and the most effective measures to defeat it. He was thoroughly sensible of the danger he ran of being surrounded, if he continued in his post at Lignitz; out of that very design, which was calculated for his ruin, his genius drew a new means of safety. He saw at a glance, that the plan which the enemy had formed to surround him, at the same time, necessarily divided their own armies. And this division was the great object he had pursued so long, and thro' such discouraging disappointments. His only business was to prevent their reuniting in a general attack upon his quarters. Therefore in the very evening calculated for the attempt on his camp, he quitted it with as much privacy as the enemy had proposed to attack it, marched and took an advantageous post on the w• through which Laudohn was to pass.

And now the decisive hour aproached, in which he w• to put to the risque as a great a stake as had been played fo• since the beginning of the war. No vulgar advantag• would suffice in his situation, and that very situation in som• sort disabled him from attaining a great one. After fo• bloody campaigns, and the vicissitudes of a success in all i• changes exhausting, his old corps was nearly annihilate• Those who succeeded to their places, had scarcely seen t• brilliant times of the kings fortune; and they inherite• neither the severe discipline, nor the undaunted spirit of th• first companions of his hopes; they were new to service yet dispirited with defeats. The king himself gave life 〈◊〉 the whole, he alone was to rectify a thousand faults, and 〈◊〉 supply a thousand deficiencies.

The post which he chose, was such, as whilst it stopp• the progress of Laudohn in front, if Daun should attemp• his rear, would from the nature of the ground lay him un¦der great difficulties. This rear he further strengthen• with several batteries. As soon as his army was drawn up he divided it, leaving his right on the ground, where it ha• been formed to observe Marshal Daun and to maintain th• post; whilst with his left he turned in order to fall upo• the corps under Laudohn. No dispositions could have bee• made with a more perfect skill.

Mean time Laudohn was advancing fast to the snare whic• had been laid for him. Already he had passed the Kat•¦bach, and was moving towards Lignitz, full of the hope of no small share in the glory of giving the final blow t• the King of Prussia, and had advanced as far as the villag• of Psaffendorf, when by three in the morning, the day light began to dawn; a thick fog that had covered all th• adjacent grounds suddenly cleared up, and like the openin• of a great scene disclosed at once the whole Prussian army regularly embattled, advantageously posted, furnished wit• a dreadful and well-placed artillery.

He was now come full upon his enemy. 〈◊〉 was impossible to recede; [Aug. 15.] the surprize he intend¦ed was turned upon himself. But this able gene¦ral, though surprised, was not disordered. The best dispo¦sitions were made that the time would admit; a sharp an• obstinate combat began; which continued without giving way on either side, until six. The King of Prussia exerted himself with incredible diligence to preserve an uniform strength in every part of his line, and hazarded his own life with a daring, which nothing but his situation could excuse from temerity. His cloaths were shot through in several places, his horse was killed under him. But all these troubles and dangers were fully compensated by the efforts of his troops, who maintained so steady a fire, and pushed the Austrians with so much ardour, that they at last gave ground, and retreated with precipitation, though not without some order, towards the Katsbach.

The king pursued them to this river, and no further. His advantage as it was gained by the most vigorous steps, so bounds were set to the ardour of improving it with the most guarded caution. He feared if he pursued his success too far, it might disjoin the part of the army engaged from that which he had left to observe M. Daun; and perhaps give that general an opportunity of taking a severe revenge on the right, for the successes of the left. Notwithstanding this reserve of the king, (a reserve, the want of which was formerly the only failing in his military character, but which his misfortunes had now perfectly taught him,) notwithstanding, I say he did not push his good fortune against Baron Laudohn to the utmost, the victory was compleat, glorious, and adorned with all the trophies. By their own confession, the Austrians lost upwards of 6000 men, killed, wounded and prisoners. The Prussians made it amount, and not without probability to 10,000. Among the prisoners, were two generals, and 84 officers; 82 pieces of cannon and 23 pair of colours were taken. On the side of the conquerors, five hundred were killed, and 1200 wounded.

With regard to Silesia, the victory near Lignitz produced some most immediate, and most useful effects. Although M. Daun, not dispirited with his late misadventure, and only sollicitous to repair his loss, had detached a strong corps under Prince Lowenstein, and Gen. Beck to strengthen the Russians and encourage them to advance. Count Czernichew was so intimidated with the late defeat of the Austrians, that he repassed the Oder by the same bridges on which he had lately crossed it.

Thus one great end of the King of Prussia's march was obtained. He prevented the dreaded junction of those two powers. In the other part of his design, he did not s• perfectly succeed. M. Daun since the action of Psaffendorf could indeed make no progress in Silesia; but on the othe•¦hand, the king was not able entirely to drive him out o• that province. The Austrians even after their defeat, fa• superior to the king, had been besides largely reinforced The empress exerted all her power, to remove the ill effec• this late check might have had on the reputation of her arms at the same time that she augmented her troops, she comforted and encouraged Baron Laudohn, and by a very gene¦rous and gracious letter let him see, that she was not a sove¦reign, in whose mind a late misfortune cancels the memory o• past services. In the praises which this letter bestowed o• Laudohn, several were of opinion, was couched an indire• censure on the conduct of Count Daun, the slowness o• whose temper so ill agreed with the ardour of her ambition▪ and with these great hopes, which the number of he forces, and the strength of her alliance had encourage her to entertain.

The king after this victory joined his brother Prince Henry at Newmarcke. One part of that Prince's army under General Goltze had passed the Oder to observe the Russians, who since the repassing that river, seemed to direc• their motions northward. The king being strengthened by this junction, and having his communication with Bresla• clear, marched against Daun, who had begun to form the blockade of Schweidnitz, fell upon a corps under General Beck; made two battalions of Croats prisoners, dispersed several squadrons, and by this lively affair obliged the enemy▪ grand army to raise the blockade, and by a precipitate retreat, to take refuge in the mountains of Landshut.

Whilst his majesty was thus exerting the most heroic efforts in defence of Silesia; Gen. Hulsen, who commanded for him in Saxony, seconded his endeavours in that quarter with uncommon bravery and success. The army of the empire had formed a design of cutting him off from Torgau. To frustrate their intentions, that general quitted his camp at Meissen, and marched to Strehla. The enemy divided into two bodies; one attacked an advanced post about a cannon shot from his camp upon every side, with the greatest fury from, day break to six in the morning, [Aug. 20.] whilst another corps was so placed as to keep his camp in awe, and to prevent his attempting any thing for the relief of the advanced post. Gen Hulsen saw that unless he could speedily do something for its succour, that body must inevitably perish. He therefore in this exigency, gave orders to his cavalry to make a circuit round an height; and to charge if possible the enemies flank. This order was executed with the utmost promptitude and spirit. The Imperialists were charged on their flanks; their battalions and horse were thrown upon one another in confusion, and 41 officers and 1200 men were made prisoners, The loss of the Prussians was inconsiderable. Gen. Hulsen by this advantage, was enabled to encamp under To•gau, while he retreated through an apprehension, as the grand army of the Imperialists was coming up, that he might be cut off from his communication with the Elbe. This retreat made the Austrians magnify the affair into a victory on their side; but the circumstances render the Prussian account much more probable.

Fortune seemed once more to have smiled, after a long interval of gloom on the King of Prussia's affairs; and the reputation of his arms began to revive. But the victories he obtained, though glorious, were decisive of little more than the field upon which they were fought. They were far from having lowered the power of the enemy to an equality with his. And the movements he made to gain those advantages, and to protect one part of his dominions necessarily exposed the rest. The enemy was able to detach without end; and whilst bodies of Russians traversed the Lower Silesia, several corps of Austrians scoured Lusatia; and thus together they broke off all regular communication between the king's army and his hereditary dominions, and of course between him and his general Hulsen, who with very unequal forces was struggling to secure Saxony; a country in which there are towns indeed fortified; but fortified for the greater part in such a manner, as to be little more than snares for increasing the number of prisoners, by betraying defenceless garrisons into the hands of an enemy superior in the field.

In this situation, the king is said to have wrote a letter to the celebrated(1) Marq. d'Argens, very pathetick, and very descriptive of his condition, and of his frame of mind under those pressures. This letter is said to have been intercepted by a Russian detachment, and industriously spread about in order to dis-spirit his friends. On that account some have suspected its authenticity. But the letter is surely highly consonant to his circumstances, and sufficiently agreeable to his general manner of writing: so that we do not think ourselves dispensed with inserting it in this place.

‘Formerly, my dear marquis, the affair of the 5th August would have decided a campaign. At present tha• action is no more than a scratch; a great battle mu• determine our fate. We shall have one, according to all appearances, very soon, and then, if the event is favourable to us, we may rejoice. It required many stratagem• and much address to bring things to this pass. Don't talk to me of danger; the last action cost me only a su• of cloaths and a horse. This is buying victory ve• cheap.’

I have not had the letter which you mention. W• are in a manner blocked up, in regard to corresponde• by the Russians on one side the Oder, and by the Austrians on the other. A small skirmish was necessary to clear the way for Cocceii(2); I hope that he will deli¦ver you my letter; I never was, in the course of my life, in a more embarrassing situation than in this campaign. Believe me, nothing less than a miracle is still necessary to extricate me from the difficulties that I foresee. I shall certainly do my duty when occasion offers, but, my dear marquis, always remember that I pretend not to command fortune, and that I am obliged, in my projects, to leave too much to chance, for want of being able to form any thing more solid. I have the labours of a Hercules to undergo, at a time of life when my strength fails me, my infirmities increase, and, to speak the truth, when hope, the only consolation of the unhappy, begins to defert me. You are not sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances of affairs to have a clear idea of all the dangers which threaten the state; I know, but conceal them; I keep all my fears to myself, and only communicate to the public my hopes, or the little good news that I can acquaint them with. If the blow that I meditate succeeds, then, my dear marquis, it will be time enough to express our joy: but till then, let us not flatter ourselves, for fear some unexpected bad news should detect us too much.

‘I lead here the life of a millitary monk. I have much to think off about my affairs, and the rest of my time I devote to literature, which is my consolation, as it was of the consul, the father of his country and of eloquence. I know not if I shall survive this war, but I am determined, in case it should happen, to pass the rest of my days in retirement, in the bosom of philosophy and friendship.’

‘When our correspondence shall be more open, you'll oblige me by writing more frequently. I know not where we shall have our winter-quarters. My houses at Breslaw were destroyed by the bombardment, Our enemies envy us every thing, even day-light and the air that we breathe. They must however leave us some place, and if it is safe, it will be a treat to receive you there.’

‘Well, my dear marquis, what is become of the peace with France? Your nation, you see, is more blind, than you imagined. Those fools lose Canada, and Pondicherry, to please the Queen and the Czarina. Heaven grant that Prince Ferdinand may well reward them for their zeal. The officers, innocent of these evils, and the soldiers, will be made the victims, and the illustrious offenders will suffer nothing.’

‘These are the subjects which offer themselves to me. I was in a writing vein, but I see that I must conclude, lest I should tire you and neglect my own business. Adieu. my dearest marquis.—I embrace you, &c. ’ [*]

CHAP. VII.

Situation of the French and English armies. Heredit• Prince surprizes a body of French in Zierenberg. Gene• Bulow takes Marburg. Defeated by Monsieur Stainv• General Wangenheim passes and is obliged to repass Weser. French retire from Mulhausen to Cassel. He•¦ditary Prince marches to the Rhine, passes that ri• Cleves taken. Wesel besieged. English Expedition. Castries forms an army on the Rhine. Battle of Cam• Allies defeated. Hereditary Prince repasses the Rh• Siege of Wesel raised. Death and eulogium of George II. Accession of George III. and his resolution of support his allies.

WE leave the King of Prussia to these thoughts, in •¦der to return to the armies on the Weser. Pri• Ferdinand was not mistaken, in imagining that Gotting would prove the utmost bound of the French progress in Hanover. After they had secured that place with a stro• garrison, the grand army of M. Broglio moved towards 〈◊〉 reserve which had been defeated, and pitched his camp Dierenberg, a place within a small distance of the alli• who ever since the battle continued to occupy Warbou• the Dymel running between the two armies. In this sit•¦ation they continued for about a month.

The Hereditary Prince who was ever in motion, continually hovering now on one side, now on the other, the French camp, in one of his excursions had perceiv• that the French, according to their usual negligence, w• not very exact in their out-posts and patrols. He had a• received intelligence, that they had thrown a corps of h• and foot, consisting of something more than two thousa• men, into the town of Zierenberg, a place surround with some damaged walls.

From these lights, he resolved upon the surprize of th• body, and accordingly made his dispositions for this bo• attempt, in the manner following; first, he ordered a bo• of his light troops to turn the town of Zierenberg, and take post between it and Darienberg, in order to interce• any that should attempt passing to the camp of the enemy Next he posted at proper distances eight squadrons of d•¦goons, two battalions of grenadiers, and one regiment of foot, on the road between his own camp and the place which was to be attacked, with a view to cover his retreat, in case he should be repulsed and pursued. With the rest of his foot, consisting for the greater part of English, he marched with the utmost caution and diligence towards the town.

When they had arrived within two miles, [Sept. 5.] they divided into three bodies, which took three different routs, by which the place was compleatly surrounded. At eight in the evening, they set out from Warbourg, and came before this place at two the following morning. Notwithstanding the precautions taken, the trampling of the troops over the gardens gave the alarm to a guard of the enemies dragoons, who immediately began to fire. Strict orders had been given to proceed with as little alarm as possible, and to reserve their fire; and such was the deliberate courage, such the perfect discipline of the English grenadiers, that they sustained this fire, pushed on with bayonets, drove back the enemies piquets, killed the guard at the gate, and entered the town along with the fugitives, without the least noise, hurry, or confusion. Never was surprize more compleat.

The column of the English grenadiers having forced the gate, advanced regularly with their bayonets fixed, and without firing a musquet, by the two streets that led to the church-yard, (which being the only open part of the town, served the French as a place of arms,) killing or taking a great number of those who ran from the houses towards this rendezvous; and thus they advanced with the greatest order and the most profound silence, until they reached the church-yard. The night was so dark that they formed by the side of the French, who for a while took them to be their own piquets that had assembled; but they were soon undeceived; a fierce encounter with bayonets ensued, in which the French were quickly obliged to give way.

Two regiments of the enemies dragoons endeavoured to fly to the gate that led to their camp; but they found it, occupied by 400 grenadiers, who drove them back with their bayonets; forced from hence, they fled to another gate; there they were repulsed with a sharp fire of small arms. Then they were compelled to separate; and flying at random as fortune and the night directed, made their escape 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 at the several breaches of the wall. The prince was m•¦ter of the place in about an hour; but the nearness of 〈◊〉 French camp and the approach of day prevented as long • continuance in the place as he wished for reaping the fruits of his victory; therefore about three o'clock he •¦gan his retreat, carrying off two pieces of cannon, 36 o•¦cers, and between four and 500 private men. The slaug•¦ter of the enemy was considerable. The prince reached camp without the least molestation in his retreat.

If we consider the difficulty of this attempt, very • have been bolder; if we examine the dispositions, 〈◊〉 could be conducted with greater wisdom; if we attend the behaviour of the troops, we shall no where find a• •¦ample of more exact obedience, discipline and coura• To attack so large a body of the enemy, so strongly po• within a small league of their grand camp, to march so fa• that critical situation, and in a very dark night, to divide i• so many parts, yet to act with so much order and so en• a concert, was certainly an exploit of the very first ra• and though not of any great importance in its consequence is so admirable in its conduct and execution, that it • deserves to be told at the length we have given it. • added greatly to the reputation of the British soldie• troops, and no less to their honour as men, by the hu•¦nity they shewed to their prisoners, and the generous •¦timents of the common sort with regard to money; there were several noble instances that night of their re•¦sing to take any thing from their prisoners, who had of•¦ed them their purses. They lost but ten men.

From this time the operations of the two armies, w• for a time seemed to languish, were renewed with fresh gour. Prince Ferdinand perceived, that whilst the Fre• communication with the Rhine and with Frankfort on 〈◊〉 Maine continued open, it must prove to little purpose attempt any thing either for the relief of Gottingen or •sel. Their progress indeed into Hanover had been che•ed; but whilst ever they continued in so advanced a p•on, it was evidently impossible to prevent their making •¦ry ruinous inroads into that country. To force them • battle against their inclination, would be difficult, and attempt itself dangerous. There remained but one me• which was to make frequent and strong detachments i• the southern parts of Hesse and Wetteravia, and thus •¦der precarious the French communication with the Rhine and Maine, from whence they drew the greatest part of their supplies of all kinds.

With this intention, he detached general Bulow at the head of a strong corps, who pushed forward towards Marpurg, surprized the town, destroyed the French ovens, with several hundred waggons of flour, and carried off a considerable quantity of cloathing and military stores. In the mean time, his light troops scoured the country in such a manner as for a while answered the great end of the expedition in breaking the French communication with Frankfort. Proceeding on this plan he made a further movement towards Frankenau, which, at length, necessitated the French general Stainville, who commanded in those parts, to quit his position, and endeavour to stop the progress of this detachment. He came up with their rear as they were passing the river Orche, [Sept. 13.] and falling upon them at this disadvantage with superior numbers and great fury, he entirely routed the rear; and took some men and a very great number of horses.

It was to be apprehended that he might have pursued this advantage, to the entire ruin of M. Bulow's detachment; if the Hereditary Prince by a forced march of five German miles had not arrived time enough to support him. On the prince's arrival M. Stainville fell back, and took possession of a strong post in which it was in vain to attack him.

Whilst these measures were taking with mixed success for disquieting the French, and interrupting their communication to the southward of their quarters, like movements were made to the northward, to oblige them, if possible, to relinquish their hold on Gottingen. But General Wangenheim, who with that design had crossed the Weser, and in the beginning had proceeded with no small expectations; but at length he received a severe check, which forced him to repass the river with some precipitation. [Sept. 19.] However these frequent detachments answered so well the end of harrassing the French, that on the 20th they retired from Immenhausen, and fell back upon Cassel where they began to entrench themselves. Prince Ferdinand followed them close; and the better to observed their motions, fixed his quarters as near as he could to those of the enemy.

But whilst the grand armies thus watched each other, the Eyes of Europe were drawn to a different quarter, by a movement equally astonishing for its rapidity and mysterious for its design. The Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, whom we have seen but a few days before in the further part of Hesse, suddenly appeared on the frontiers of the United Provinces, with an army of twenty battalions and ten squadrons, One detachment of his troops which ha• proceeded on the side of Dusseldorp, passes the Rhine above Roeroot; another which had marched through Munster, passes it nearly about the same time, but a grea• distance below, at Rhees; these two detachments moved t• meet each other, and as they proceed, seize all the French posts along the Rhine; the enemy's guards are every whe• taken or abandon their redoubts. This puts into the• possession a number of boats, by which they are enable to transport all the rest of the troops, which are intended t• act upon the left of the Rhine. Then they proceed with¦out delay or opposition, directly to Cleves; th• garrison takes refuge in the castle, [Oct. 3.] which is vigo¦rously attacked, and in three days surrenders 50 men prisoners of war. Whilst this was performed by o• body, another had laid siege to Wesel, and battered t• place with so much fury, that the reduction of it appeare• certain; and with it the entire possession of the Low• Rhine almost from Dusseldorp to Cleves.

The secrecy, and the rapidity of the march, togethe• with the vigour of the subsequent operations, were such • might be expected from the character of the Heredita• Prince; but on what design this rapid march was mad• and these vigorous steps taken at that particular time, ga• room for a great deal of reasoning. During a good part 〈◊〉 the summer, very great preparations had been made i• England for a conjunct expedition; a powerful fleet was i• readiness; and they had embarked a large train of fi• and battering artillery, a considerable body of foot, and regiment of light horse.

As this armament was supposed in readiness to sail abo• the time of the Hereditary Prince's march to the Rhine• conjecture united these two designs together, and suppose the fleet at Portsmouth and the army in Westphalia, we• to act on the same plan. On this supposition it was judge that the storm would probably fall on the Austrian Nether¦lands; and that Ostend, which the Empress so unpolitically for herself, and so ungratefully to her former friends, had given into the hands of France, would be the first object of those forces which were to unite from such a distance.

This design of the expedition from Portsmouth has, we understand, been formerly disavowed. Whether in strictness, not being a principal in the war, with her imperial majesty, England ought to have made such an attempt, though Ostend was defended by a French garrison, we shall not take upon us to determine; but without the aid of such considerations, it is evident there were sufficient objections to it from the side of mere prudence. Almost insuperable difficulties occurred in such a scheme; and it would scarcely appear to most men adviseable to add a Flemish to our German war.

But we think it possible to give some reasonable account of the expedition of the Hereditary Prince, independent of any connection with the British armament. For a considerable time the French had seemed resolved to resume their former plan of an army on the Lower Rhine; such motions were made as strongly indicated that this design would shortly be put in execution; and the allied army had every thing to fear from it. For as the French were checked from proceeding to the compleat conquest of the electorate by the allied, army on the Dymel, if this army should itself be so checked, by one of the enemy advancing from the Lower Rhine, there would be then nothing to hinder M. Broglio from sending forward so strong a reserve as might finally reduce Hanover. In these circumstances nothing but a very decisive victory could possibly save the allied army, thus surrounded and deprived of its subsistence, from perishing in the most miserable, or surrendering in the most shameful manner.

There was one step only which might with certainty prevent this design, and even in some measure turn it upon the enemy; the taking Cleves and Wesel into the hands of the allies. This would not only defeat the scheme of the French for acting on the Lower Rhine, but greatly embarrass their operations in every other quarter. Even the attempt, though it should not be attempted with success, would necessarily draw the attention of the French that way, and thus save Hanover at least for one campaign. This alone had been a sufficient reason for the march. But had the British armament at the same time been intende• for some part of the coast of France, or had England politically kept up such a rumour, when she had in reality 〈◊〉 more remote object for her armament; in either of thes• cases it would undoubtedly have co-operated with the Hereditary Prince's designs, by detaining a greater body o• the French troops at home to defend their own coasts.

We do not pretend to penetrate into all the motives But it is evident, that in the German enterprise every thing depended on the celerity of the operations. The siege o• Wesel was carried on with great vigour, by that part o• the prince's army which was on the right of the Rhine • whilst the prince covered it on the left. But before the enemy could disturb him, nature declared against his success by the fall of immense rains, which swelled the Rhine and Lippe to such a degree as greatly interrupted the progress of the siege, having rendered the roads of Westphalia impassable, and therefore prevented the arrival of these reinforcements which were intended to push the siege with the greater effect. These rains also made it very difficult for the prince to preserve his communication with the besiegers, which however he made a shift to keep open by one bridge above and another below the town,

In the mean time, the French with all the expedition they could use, had collected an army under M. de Castrie• of thirty battalions and thirty-eight squadrons, partly from the great army in Hesse, partly from the Low Countries. This body advanced as far as Rheinberg, and after a strenuous resistance drove out a detachment of the allies which had been posted there. From thence they marched by their left, and encamped behind the convent of Campen. The Hereditary Prince now saw at the same time the season and a superior army acting against him, to fight this enemy, fully prepared to receive him, with the troops which he could spare from the siege, might be a desperate attempt. To break up the siege would have of itself answered the intention of the enemies march. There was no • medium but a surprize; which was resolved, and all the dispositions for it made with the judgment by which the great prince who commanded is distinguished upon such difficult occasions. This attempt became the more necessary, and the less time was to be lost in making it, as intelligence had been received that the French army was shortly to be augmented by powerful reinforcements. The prince began his march at ten in the evening.

To reach the enemy's camp, it was necessary to dislodge Fischer's corps of irregulars, who had occupied the convent of Campen in their front. This produced some shot, [Oct. 16.] and this shot alarmed the whole French army, which immediately got under arms and posted themselves in a wood. The allied troops pushed forward, twice repulsed the French, and with the most noble perseverance reiterated their attacks on the wood, and kept up a terrible and well supplied fire for sixteen hours without intermission, that is from five in the morning to the same evening at nine. There have been few examples of so obstinate a combat. But at length finding night approach, the troops harrassed, their ammunition spent, and all hopes vain of dislodging a superior enemy from an advantageous post, the Hereditary Prince having had an horse killed under him, and being himself wounded, was with regret compelled to retire. Eleven hundred and seventy of the allies were killed and wounded in this bloody action; about 500 were made prisoners. The loss of the French was far greater but they had the field.

On this occasion, the English nation regretted the loss of one of its most shining ornaments in the death of Lord Downe, who whilst his grateful sovereign was distining him to higher honours, received a mortal wound in this battle. He was a person of free and pleasurable life: but of an excellent understanding, amiable manners, and the most intrepid courage. In the beginning of this war he had a considerable share in rousing a martial spirit amongst the young people of rank in England, and having long shewed them by a gallant example how to fight, he at last by a melancholy one, shewed them how to die for their country.

As the british troops had been the greatest sufferers in this as well as in most other actions of the campaign, great murmers were raised against the commander of the allied army, as if upon all occasions, even the most trivial, he had wantonly exposed the lives of the British, in order to preserve those of the German soldiery. Some carried this complaint to a ridiculous length. But could it with reason have been expected, that where 25,000 English had served for a whole campaign, were engaged in five sharp encounters (some of them a sort of pitched battles) in all which they acquired the whole glory, that they should lose a sma• number than 265 killed and 870 wounded, which is whole of their loss in all the encounters of this campai• It is true, the life of a man is a sacred thing, and of val• his country. But in some circumstances it is ridiculous a nation to think of sparing even a greater effusion of 〈◊〉 to acquire reputation to their arms, and experience to • troops and the officers. The English desired the po• honour with equal spirit and wisdom, they were entitle• it, they had it, and they purchased it more cheaply, on the whole might have been expected. Neither their blood lavished on every trivial occasion, as had 〈◊〉 falsly suggested. The only affairs in which they suff• any thing worth notice, were those of Warbourg• Campen; both actions of the highest consequence.

After the disappointment and loss the Hereditary P• had suffered in the late engagement, he was sensible th• siege could no longer be carried on with any prospec• success, in sight of an army so much superior; the R• every day swelled more and more, and his communica• with the troops before Wesel became every hour more •¦ficult. Besides, as the whole country was by this 〈◊〉 overflowed, his men must have been exposed to the gr•¦est hardships and the most fatal distempers. These c•¦derations determined to repass the Rhine without 〈◊〉 Notwithstanding the extreme nearness of the French a• the late repulse the Prince had met, and the great swel• the waters, such was the impression he had left on 〈◊〉 enemy and the excellence of his dispositions, that they not even attempt to distress his rear; and he passed Rhine without the least molestation, not only under the• but as it were within the grasp of a superior French a•

From this the operations of the armies became grad• more languid; for as nothing decisive happened on e• side during the whole campaign, it was impossible to thin• this advanced season of undertaking any very signal enterp• As if by common consent they began to move tow• winter quarters. So that whatever happened after 〈◊〉 was not connected with the general plan of the campai• and were the sudden acts of detached parties, who atte• tempted some advantages of surprise. Of these we shall 〈◊〉 some notice before we conclude, but we pass them by present; the attention of all men being at this time 〈◊〉 engaged by an event of the greatest importance, and which many were of opinion would make no small change in the nature of the war, and above all in the general system of pacification. This was the death of George II. king of Great Britain.

He died suddenly in his palace at Kensington in the 77th year of his age and 33d of his reign. The immediate cause of his death was the rupture of the substance of the right ventricle of his heart, by which the circulation was stopped in an instant. This was preceded by no sort of apparent illness. His majesty enjoyed an uncommon degree of health and strength for that age; but it was believed that he had suffered, by exposing himself too much to the cold, in reviewing some troops that were to be embarked for the expedition. He had been extremely solicitous about the fortune of this expedition. He had been no less anxious for the fate of the enterprise under the Hereditary Prince, an account of the ill success of which he had received, tho' it was not at that time made public. This was believed to have touched him deeply, and to have been one of the causes of a death so afflicting to all his people.

When future historians come to speak of his late majesty, they will find both in his fortune and his virtue, abundant matter for just and unsuspected panegyric. None of his predessors in the throne of England lived to so great an age; few of them enjoyed so long a reign. And this long course was distinguished by circumstances of peculiar felicity, whether we consider him in the public or the private character. His subjects, allowing for one short and as it were momentary cloud, enjoyed perpetual peace at home, and abroad on many occasions accquired great glory There was to the last a considerable increase in their agriculture, their commerce, and their manufactures, which were daily improving under the internal tranquility they enjoyed, and the wise regulations that were made in every session of his parliaments. By a wonderful happiness, he left these emprovements no way checked, but rather forwarded, in one of the most general and wasteful wars that has raged in the world for many centuries.

He lived entirely to extinguish party and the spirit of party in his kingdoms; it was not till the close of his reign, that his family might have been considered as firmly and immoveably seated on the throne; but he, having baffled all the private machinations of his enemies policy, •¦dued at length the utmost effort of their force: and the • on that menacing occasion, he experienced in the f• measure the affection of his people, yet the completion this great service to his family, he owed solely to the 〈◊〉 city and bravery of his own son.

He lived with his queen in that kind of harmony confidence, that is seen between the best suited couple• private life. He had a numerous issue, in which he• great cause of satisfaction, and very little of disquiet, what was the almost necessary consequence of a life •¦tracted to a late period. He survived seven of his child. He had the satisfaction to see in his successor, what is rare, the most effectionate obedience, the most dutiful• quiescence in his will; and what is no less rare, cont• to the fortune of most old kings, he never possessed 〈◊〉 perfectly the love of his subjects than in the last year• his life. And he died at the very point of time when • terror of his arms, the power of his kingdoms and the• •dom of his government, were all raised to almost as 〈◊〉 a pitch as they could possibly arrive at; they were in• at that height of prosperity and glory, as never had 〈◊〉 exceeded in the reign of the most fortunate of his p•cessors.

His parts were not lively or brilliant; but the whol• his conduct demonstrates that he had a judgment both • lid and comprehensive. He understood the interests of • other sovereigns of Europe; and was particularly ski• in all the recesses of that political labyrinth, the system • Germany; of the liberties of which he was through whole life a most zealous asserter. In the year 1741, took up arms, and even risqued his own person, when the projected dismemberment of the house of Austria, 〈◊〉 were in danger of falling a sacrifice to a French fact• He afterwards resisted with equal firmness that very ho• of Austria, which he had exposed his life to defend, w• the liberties of the empire were threatened from t• quarter.

The acquisitions of his father, were by him confirm• improved and enlarged. He was enabled by his oecono• always to keep up a considerable body of troops in Ha•ver; by which means, when the war broke out, there 〈◊〉 a disciplined force ready to oppose the common enem• and we do not hazard any thing in asserting, that if it had not been for the prudent foresight of that measure, the army which has since been formed, and the great things which have since been done, could never have had existence. So that if we only examine what he has done in Germany, when we reflect what enemies secret and declared he had at different times to manage and to fight in that country, he must in every fair judgment be allowed the greatest prince of his family.

He was in his temper sudden and violent; but this, tho' it influenced his behaviour, made no impression on his conduct, which was always sufficiently deliberate and attentive to his own interests and those of his subjects.

He was plain and direct in his intentions; true to his word; steady in his favour and protection to his servants, and never changed them willingly; this appeared clearly in those who served more immediately on his person, whom he scarce ever removed; but they grew old along with him, or died in their places. But having been in a sort compelled by a violent faction, to relinquish a minister for whom he had great affection, and in whom he reposed an unlimited confidence, it afterwards became a matter of more indifference to him by whom he was served in the affairs of his government.

He was merciful in his disposition, but not to such a degree as in any sort to encourage offences against his government. On the suppression of the rebellion in 1746, he behaved without any remarkable display either of severity or clemency. Many were pardoned, many punished; and this perhaps, is the most proper conduct on such occasions, where offended majesty requires victims, justice examples, and humanity pardons. But though the law in many instances had its free course, the excesses committed in the rage of war, were by him neither commanded nor approved. After that rebellion had been suppressed, he retained no bitter remembrance of it, either to the country in which it unfortunately began, or even to many of the persons who were actually concerned in it.

As he came into England in a riper age, and of consequence never had been able to attain a perfect knowledge of the force and beauties of our language, he never shewed a sufficient regard to the English literature, which in his reign did not flourish: and this must be considered as the greatest, or rather the only blemish that lay upon his g•¦vernment.

He has been censured, as a little too attentive to mone• and perhaps in some minute things this censure was 〈◊〉 wholly without foundation. But there are two consider•¦tions which greatly enervate this objection to his charact• First, that this disposition never shewed itself in one •¦pacious act; and 2dly, that it never influenced his c•¦duct on any important occasion. For it is now well kno• that he shewed no improper parsimony, when this 〈◊〉 broke out. In fact, he expended so much on that oc•¦sion, that on his decease, his private wealth was found 〈◊〉 be far inferior to what had commonly been imagined.

Though it is true, that during his whole life, he 〈◊〉 shewn a remarkable affection to his Hanoverian subjec• yet the last act of it demonstrated that they were 〈◊〉 from engrossing the whole of his regard; and that 〈◊〉 reality his German possessions held no other place in 〈◊〉 consideration than what their relative importance to t• rest of his dominions naturally claimed. For when t• truly severe trial came, in which the interests of Engla• and Hanover were seperated, when a war began for an •¦ject wholly foreign to that country, a war in which Ha•¦ver must suffer much, and could hope no advantage, en• there his majesty did not hesitate a moment to expose 〈◊〉 German dominions to almost inevitable ruin, rather th• make or even propose the smallest abatement from the i•¦mensity of the English rights in America. A conduct th• more than wipes of every suspicion of an improper pa•¦tiality; and which surely ought never to be mention• without the highest gratitude to the memory of that ma•¦animous monarch.

If the authors of these sheets were equal to such a de¦sign, it would perhaps be impossible to exhibit a mo• pleasing picture than that which might be formed from 〈◊〉 just view of his late majesty's conduct, to these two 〈◊〉 differently constituted parts of his dominions. His virtu• was proved by two of the greatest trials to which the nature of man is liable; the trust of absolute and unbounded power; and the most exalted station limited by the strictest laws. For these two so very different situations, very different and almost opposite tempers and talents have been always thought necessary. But that king had a mind perfectly adapted to both; for whilst in England he kept the liberties of his people inviolate, and like a wise magistrate, was satisfied to make his authority co-operate with law, and his will freely subservient to the wisdom of ages, in Hanover like an indulgent father, acting only from the sentiments of a paternal heart, his affection and his equity supplied the want of law and constitution. He has indeed left to his illustrious successor, an admirable example; which he not only promises to follow, but in many respects to exceed; and his subjects take the greater interest in his virtues, as they look upon them as more peculiarly their own; and they now boast of a prince, who neither has, nor can have any partiality but the best, and who is in birth as well as inclination British.

As soon as his present majesty came to the throne, and had met his parliament, [18 Nov.] he in the most public and solemn manner confirmed the hopes of his allies, and gave the most undoubted assurances of his resolution to continue the war on the former plan, and with the former vigour; and he found his parliament no ways changed in their resolution of supporting it with the same liberality and spirit. Insomuch that as there was no apparent change either in the system of the alliance, in the disposition of the king, or in that of the nation, or in the general plan of the war, we have only to pass again to the transactions of the continent, thinking it unnecessary to apologize to our readers for having been diverted from the course of the narrative for a short time, by an event of such melancholy importance to Great Britain and to all Europe.

CHAP. VIII.

Russians and Austrians enter Brandenburg. General Hulsen retreats from Saxony to Berlin. Evacuates it. The city capitulates. Berlin described. King's palaces plundered. Enemy retires out of Brandenburg after having pillaged it.

THE King of Prussia's letter, with which we closed the 6th chapter, exhibited a true picture of that monarch's apprehensions; the events which immediately followed proved that these apprehensions were but too well grounded. The victory near Lignitz, indeed, gave so• relief to Silesia; but whilst the enemy had so many and • numerous armies in the field, even shame independent • their interest exacted from them some stroke of co•¦quence.

The late manoeuvres had necessarily drawn the king 〈◊〉 Prussia into the southern parts of Silesia, and consequen• to a great distance from Brandenburg, with which coun• his communication was much interrupted, or rather who• cut off. The Russian army, which after it had repa• the Oder at Auras, began to move out of Silesia, push• forward a powerful detachment under Count Czerniche• towards the March of Brandenburg. A body of 15• Austrians under the Generals Lacy and Brentano fro• the army of Count Daun, and the whole united corps 〈◊〉 Austrians and Imperialists which acted in Saxony, beg• their march in concert with the Russians, and proposed 〈◊〉 unite at the gates of Berlin. These armies amounted 〈◊〉 forty thousand men.

General Hulsen, who was altogether too weak to o•¦pose the Imperialists in Misnia, sell back upon Berli• General Wernef who had lately been sent into Pomeran• returned with incredible speed and joined the troops und• Hulsen; but when they viewed their combined strengt• they found it consisted of no more than 15 or 16000 me• a force far too weak to oppose to those powerful armi• that were marching against them. Wholly unable to protect a place of such immense extent, and such imperfect fortifications, they saw that to attempt a defence, woul• be only to involve the troops in the inevitable fate the waited the city, without being able to add any thing effectual to its security; therefore after having defended it against the advanced guard of the Russians under Tottleben, who attacked the gates and bombarded the town, when they found the grand armies advancing; they made their retreat; leaving only three weak battalions in the place, to enable it to make some sort of capitulation with the enemy.

Berlin is composed of five towns, which have stretched to each other and grown into one vast city upon the banks of the river Spree. It has been augmented to this grandeur, by having long been the residence of the electors of Brandenburg and kings of Prussia, who as they have enlarged their dominions by inheritance, force, or policy, have all contributed something to the grandeur and magnificence of this their capital. The situation of the town on so noble and navigable a river as the Spree, communicating on one side with the Oder, by a canal (the most princely work of her sovereigns) and on the other falling into the Elbe, has added not a little to its extent and opulence; but that which has contributed most of all, has been the reception of the French refugees, to which this city has always been a most assured and favourable asylum, as it has also been to those protestants who have been persecuted in any part of Germany; and the present king by enlarging his plan, and imparting an extent of toleration unknown to his predecessors, has also introduced Roman Catholics, whom he has encouraged by suffering them to build a most magnificent church in the heart of Berlin. By this means he has brought the most opposite factions to concur in promoting the grandeur of his royal residence. From these causes Berlin is become one of the most considerable cities in Europe; vast in its extent; considerable in its commerce, and magnificent beyond most others in its public and private buildings, and the regular distribution of the streets in the new town. It had long been the seat of the greatest military arrangements in the world; and it was made by the present king the seat of arts and sciences, and the place of resort of ingenious men, in every science, in every art, and from every quarter.

Such is Berlin, which at this time being deserted by the greatest part of its garrison, was abandoned to the mercy of a mighty army of Austrians, Russians, Saxons and Imperialists, animated by revenge; exasperated by injuries; and instigated by avarice. Nothing could exceed the terror and consternation of the inhabitants on this occasion. They were acquainted with the savage character of one part of the enemy, and with the violent animosity of the rest; and they knew that they did not want pretences for colouring their severities, with the appearance of a just retaliation.

In these dispositions of the inhabitants, the enemy appoached. The garrison immediately proposed to capitulate. With respect to them, the terms were short; they were made prisoners of war. But with regard to the inhabitants, where the great danger lay, the conditions were more tolerable than they expected; they were promised the free exercise of their religion; and an immunity violence to their goods and persons. It was also agreed the Russian irregulars should not enter the town; and the king's palace should be inviolable. These on the w• were favourable terms; and they were granted princip• on the mediation of the foreign ministers residing Berlin, who interposed their good offices with great and humanity. The difficulty was, how to secure the servance of them.

These conditions being made, the army of allied powers entered the town; [9th Oct.] totally destr• the magazines, arsenals, and founderies, se• an immense quantity of military stores, and a number cannon and arms; called first for an immense payment 800,000 guilders, and then laid on a contribution 1,900,000 German crowns: not satisfied with this, 〈◊〉 irregularities were committed by the soldiery; but on whole, though some shocking actions were committed far more exact discipline was observed than from such tr• could have been expected upon such an occasion, w• there was every incentive which could work upon the lice• of a conquering army. Their officers no doubt with g• difficulty preserved even that degree of order.

But though their behaviour was tolerable, with regard• the private inhabitants, there was something shocking a• ungenerous in their treatment of the king's palaces. 〈◊〉 apartments of the royal castle of Charlottenburgh w• entirely plundered, the precious furniture spoiled, the p•¦tures defaced, without even sparing the antique sta• collected by Cardinal Polignac, which had been purcha• by the house of Brandenburg. The castle of Schonhou• belonging to the queen, and those of Fredericksfeld, 〈◊〉 longing to the margrave Charles, were also plundered.

The palace of Potsdam, the famous Sans-souci, ha• better fate; Prince Esterhasi commanded there; it was p•served from the smallest violation. The Prince on view• the palace only asked which picture of the king resembl• him most, and being informed, desired that he might h• leave to take it, together with two German flutes which t• king used, to keep them, he said, in memory of his majest• This was a sort of taking very different from pillage.

They staid in the city four days, but hearing that t• king, apprehensive of this stroke ▪ was moving to the rel• of his capital, they quitted it on the 13th of October; and having wasted the whole country round for a vast extent, and driven away all the cattle and horses they could find, retreated by different routs out of Brandenburgh, leaving the people still trembling under the alarm, and hardly yet certain of their safety.

We do by no means undertake to authenticate the ravages which the Prussian accounts charged upon the Austrians and their allies, in this incursion; nor whether they may not have been in general much exaggerated, or in some cases absolutely feigned. We have abundant reason to suspect the exact veracity of many pieces of that nature which have been published on all sides; and which are but too frequently a sort of state libels▪ where the powers at war, not content to destroy each other in the field, pursue their adversaries reputation, and endeavour mutually to paint each other as monsters equally devoid of justice and compassion. Indeed if we were to give credit to all the writings of this kind that have appeared, it were hard to say which of the parties have by their conduct brought the greatest disgrace upon human nature. It is, however, certain, that the country of Brandenburg suffered more severely on this occasion than the city of Berlin. An ill disciplined army is always most furious in its retreat, and the country had made no conditions.

CHAP. IX.

Imperialists make themselves masters of Misnia. M. Stainville enters Halberstadt. Russians besiege Colbert. Laudohn besieges Cosel. King of Prussia and M. Daun march into Saxony. Battle of Torgau. M. Daun wounded. The towns in Misnia retaken. Siege of Colberg raised. Swedes driven back.

THE King of Prussia at last saw his capital taken by his most cruel enemies, and put to ransom; his native country was wasted; they took up their quarters in his palaces: but this was far from the whole of his misfortunes. When Gen. Hulsen marched to cover Brandenburg, there remained no Prussian army in Saxony. So that the Imperial army on their return from Berlin, within a short time, and with little opposition, made themselves masters of Leipsick, Torgau, Meissen, and at last of Wittemberg; in w• city they took the grand magazine of the P•¦sians immensely stored. [15 Oct.] The king was 〈◊〉 totally driven out of Saxony, in which he had longer a single place.

M. Stainville with a detachment of Broglio's arm• soon as Wangenheim had been obliged to repass the W• (as we have related in the seventh chapter) pushed into 〈◊〉 King of Prussia's dominions on that side, and laid the 〈◊〉 and dutchy of Halberstadt under contribution. In the •¦ern Pomerania, the Russians had invested Colberg, bo• land and sea, and pressed that city with a close and unre•¦ted siege. The king could scarcely hope to relieve it▪ the western Pomerania, the Swedes urged forward with common vigour, hoping to partake in the Plunder of •¦in; and they advanced with success. In Silesia, the 〈◊〉 had no sooner began his march to the northward, t• Baron Laudohn profited of his absence to rush again that country, and to invest, the strong and important fo• of Cosel. Whilst the king's dominions were thus atta• in so many parts, he was himself attended every step of march by the superior army of Count Daun, who m• along with him and watched him with the most atte• vigilance. His condition seemed extremely to resemble• to which he had been reduced in the autumn immedia• preceding the battle of Rosbach. In Silesia, his condi• was at that time worse; but he was then in the posses• of Saxony, of which in this campaign he was wholly prived.

Saxony was, however, still his great object, and know that the enemy had evacuated Brandenburgh on his appro• he left that country on his right, and continued his m• to the Elbe, which he pass'd on the 25th of October. Daun passed it the same day. The two champions wer• engage once more for the so often contended prize: now every disadvantage was on the side of the King Prussia, who had no longer any place of strength in country, and all the magazines he had amassed were in hands of the enemy. But being joined by his gen• Hulsen and P. Eugene of Wirtemberg, with the corps •¦der their command, he advanced up the Elbe, whilst Daun fell back to cover Leipsic and Torgau; but find the Prussians directed their march towards the Elbe, encamped within reach of Torgau, one part of his army extending to the Elbe, by which he was covered on that side, and whilst he was protected on every other quarter by ponds, hills, and woods, it was impossible to chuse a more advantageous situation, in which above 80,000 men were posted with every precaution that could be taken by a weak army in the most unlucky position.

The King of Prussia was extremely sensible of the strength, the advantageous posture, and the precautions of M. Daun; he could have no hope of drawing that wary commander from his post; and yet he saw a necessity of fighting him even there. The winter was now far advanced. His troops were extremely harrassed by such long and rapid marches: and he had no place for their winter-quarters but his own country; already wasted by the enemies incursions: and here streightened for subsistence, cut off from all power of recruiting, he was to expect to be attacked, as it were, in a narrow corner by the combined force of so many powerful and exasperated enemies.

In these circumstances he was resolved to come to a battle. He caused his army to be informed that he was to lead them to a most desperate attempt, that his affairs required it, and that he was determined to conquer or die in the expected engagement. They unanimously answered, that they would die along with him.

Animated by this declaration he began his march; [3d Nov.] but having taken a resolution as daring as could be dictated by despair, he made all the dispositions with as much skill and care as could be suggested by the most guarded prudence. He divided his army into three columns; General Hulsen with one was to take post in a wood that lay on the left of the Austrian army, and had orders not to move until he found the rest of the Prussians engaged. General Ziethen was to charge on the right; the great attack in front was to be made by the king in person. The king had disposed his force in such a manner, that either his right or left must take the enemy in rear and close them in, so as to disable them from undertaking any thing against the part where he intended to effect his principal attack. This was the king's disposition.

M. Daun as soon as he perceived that the King of Prussia was serious in his resolution of fighting, to prevent confusion, sent all his baggage over the Elbe, across which he threw three bridges to be ready in case a retreat should found necessary. At the same time he caused Torgau to evacuated. And then extending his first line to a villa called Zinne on the left, he stretched it to another cal• Groswitz on the right; supporting the right of his seco• line, upon the Elbe.

In this disposition he was found, when about two o'clo• in the afternoon the king began his attack, and was recei¦•ed with the fire of two hundred pieces of cannon, wh• were disposed along the Austrian front. Three times 〈◊〉 Prussians were led on; they persevered in their atta• with uncommon resolution, but were every time repul• and broken with a most terrible slaughter. The king length ordered a fresh body of his cavalry to advance, wh• at first compelled the Austrians to give way; but as f• reinforcements were continually poured on that part, 〈◊〉 cavalry was in its turn obliged to fall back, and the ba• still remained at least dubious, or rather inclined against King of Prussia, whose troops, as they had made astonishi• efforts, so they suffered beyond all description. But w• the Prussians sustained themselves in that quarter with su• extreme difficulty, General Ziethen, with the right w• took the enemy in the rear, repulsed them and posse• himself of some eminences which commanded the wh• Austrian army. Encouraged by this success the Pru• infantry once more advanced, mastered several of 〈◊〉 enemy's intrenchments, and made way for a new attack their cavalry, which broke in with irresistible impetuo• upon the Austrians, and threw several bodies of them i• irreparable disorder. It was now about nine o'clock, t• two armies were involved in a pitched darkness; yet the• continued without intermission, and the battalions with blind rage discharged at each other without distinguishin• friend or foe.

M. Daun did every thing in the disposition and the action that became his high character. But he was obliged t• yield to the miraculous fortune of the King of Prussia. H• received a dangerous wound on the thigh, and was carri• from the field, which probably disheartened the troops, a• hastened the defeat. The command then fell on the Cour• O'Donnel, who finding a great part of his troops in diso•¦der, the night advanced, and the enemy possessed of emi¦nences which commanded his camp, and of which it wa• vain to think of dispossessing them, ordered a retreat, which was conducted in this darkness and across the Elbe with wonderful order; none were lost in passing the bridges, and far the greater part of their artillery was preserved. The Prussians remained masters of this well-fought and bloody field. The darkness hindered them from molesting the enemies retreat or improving their victory, which they bought at the expence of ten thousand killed and wounded, and about three thousand prisoners. But even with this loss, the advantage was well purchased: it was a necessary and a glorious victory. It re-established the reputation of their arms; it secured their winter-quarters; and gave them again the possession of a great part of Saxony.

Probably of all the King of Prussia's battles, this was the most important; and it was that in the conduct of which he shewed the greatest skill, intrepidity, and perseverance. His troops behaved with a firmness which would have done honour to those which he formerly led into Bohemia. In this action where they were to surmount every obstacle and encounter every difficulty and danger in order to attack so great and excellent an army as the Austrian, under such an accomplished commander as M. Daun, their number did not exceed fifty thousand men.

The loss of the Austrians was very great; the number killed and wounded is not indeed accurately known. Probably it did not much, if at all exceed the loss on the side of the victorious army; but the prisoners were far more numerous, two hundred and sixteen officers of the Austrians were taken, among whom were four generals, together with eight thousand of the common sort. The king in this battle, in which he every moment exposed his life to the greatest dangers, received a slight contusion in his breast by a musket shot.

The Austrians disputed the victory in the Gazettes. But the King of Prussia reaped all the fruits of it; he recovered all Saxony except Dresden; it had been the extremity of rashness to have commenced the siege of that place in the depth of winter, and in the sight of an army strongly posted, and which though it had been beaten continued after its defeat, more numerous than his own. His troops had already sustained fatigues almost beyond human strength; and the most prudent part now left was to permit them to enjoy a little repose; and in the interval of action to prepare, by employing the means his victory had put into his ha•• for the arduous work of the ensuing campaign.

Indeed the face of the Prussian affairs had been pr•••¦giously changed since the day in which their enemies 〈◊〉 entered Berlin. It was observed that the taking of that 〈◊〉 had been before this ominous to the Austrian cause: that General Haddick's expedition against it in 1757, 〈◊〉 been followed by the victories of Rosbach and Lissa, as •••¦irruption was by that of Torgau. There was some dif•••¦ence between the former victories and the latter. But 〈◊〉 Prussians drew motives of consolation and hope from 〈◊〉 coincidences. There was also something solid in the adv••¦tages they had acquired. After the King of Prussia's 〈◊〉 had delivered Berlin, General Werner marched into Po••¦rania; and on his approach, together with that of Wi••• the Russians raised the siege of Colberg, (which they 〈◊〉 kept so long blocked up by sea and land) and then 〈◊〉 into Poland, not having been able to effect in Pomerania the operations of the whole year, more than the devastat••• of the open country. Then Werner having freed 〈◊〉 Eastern, flew to the relief of the Western Pomerania, wh••• the success was as rapid, and more brilliant. He defea••• a body of Swedes which was posted near Passewalk, c••¦pelled them to retire with the loss of a thousand men, 〈◊〉 killed and prisoners; and pursuing his advantage with 〈◊〉 the Swedes were at length compelled to evacuate the P•••¦sian Pomerania, and to fall back upon Stralsund.

All the armies of the Russians at length quitted the ki••• territories. General Laudohn abruptly raised the blockade 〈◊〉 Cosel; and afterwards abandoning Landshut, he retired i• the Austrian Silesia, and left all the Prussian part in q•••• M. Daun after the battle of Torgau, seeing the King 〈◊〉 Prussia attempt nothing against Dresden, placed one part 〈◊〉 his army in that city, and cantoned the rest in those stro•• posts which lie to the south and west of it, by which 〈◊〉 commanded the Elbe and kept open his communication wi•• Bohemia. The army of the empire retired into Franconi• and placed its head quarters at Bamberg.

The King of Prussia omitted nothing to re-establish 〈◊〉 affairs; and the recovery of Saxony gave him great oppor¦tunities for that purpose. We may judge of the importanc• of that possession by the resources he was able to draw fro• it. He demanded of the circle of Leipsick for the contribu¦tions of the ensuing year, two millions of crowns, exclusive of the ordinary revenue, together with a vast quantity of forage and provision. From all the other parts of Misnia which he held he exacted in the same proportion. He compelled them also to supply a vast number of recruits; his demand was twenty thousand; and though it be certain that they could not supply so many, yet he was enabled by the recruits furnished by Saxony alone, entirely to fill up the breaches which the battle of Torgau had made in his battalions. He drew also vast resources from the dutchy of Mecklenburgh, which he taxed at some millions of crowns, an immense quantity of provision, and a great number of recruits. These he insisted either on receiving immediately, or that the duke should enter his troops into the Prussian service. It is said that his majesty then made some sort of treaty or composition with the duke, whose condition has been from the beginuing of the war, the worst that can be imagined. For his situation is such, just behind the Prussian dominions, and out of all possibility of communication with the grand armies of his allies, that he cannot be benefited by any advantages which they acquire; on the contrary, he suffers almost equally, whether the King of Prussia be victorious or defeated; and his dominions must furnish the means of improving the king's victories, and repairing his losses. If the King of Prussia has made a treaty with this Prince, there is no doubt that it is almost wholly in his majesty's favour, and that he has taken care that he shall not draw much less profit from the Duke of Mecklenburgh as an ally, than he had derived from him as an enemy.

In short, with regard to extent of possession, the King of Prussia is much in the same situation in which he was left at the closing the foregoing campaign; but in all other respects his condition is infinitely preferable. He had then indeed the same possessions in Saxony; but he closed that campaign with the loss of two battles, destructive in themselves, and disgraceful in their circumstances: he closed this by a most beneficial and most glorious victory, by which the reputation of his arms, greatly tarnished, was restored to its former brightness, and which in its consequences has given him as fair a prospect of success as he can have, whilst the alliance against him is not in the least degree weakened by the falling off of the most inconsiderable member, or the abatement of the smallest degree Of their animosity.

CHAP. X.

The Allies raise the siege of Gottingen. Winter qu• and sufferings of the British troops. Popular debates England concerning the German War.

THE allied army in Westphalia after their failure the lower Rhine, turned their attention to the ward of the Wefer, and made a vigorous attempt Gottingen. which from the 22d of November, until 12th of the following month, they kept blockaded. the French made a brave defence, and having taken a post of the allies in a sally, they compelled them to raise blockade. They were before heartily weary of it, ha• suffered incredible hardships, both in this and all the services of the campaign, in which they had so often versed that great tract of country which lies between Maine, the Wefer, and the Rhine: and though the w• continued very temperate and open, such unusual had fallen, that the waters were every where out, and roads so damaged, that their provisions could scarcely a• or their communication be preserved.

At length therefore, they submitted to go into quarters, leaving the French in possession of Hesse, and whole country eastward of the Wefer to the frontier the electorate: by which they communicated with Austrians and Imperialists, and prevented the fuccours• which the King of Prussia, after the battle of Torgau, intended to reinforce the allied army. The English were cantoned for the winter, in the bishopric of P• born; and Lord Granby established his head quarter• the city of that name. But these quarters proved a indifferent place of repose for the British troops, worn with the fatigues of so laborious a campaign, partly the natural penury of the country; and partly from vast numbers to be supported, at a time when the sphere their subsistence was extremely streightened; and even• narrow sphere exhausted by having been four years the of war. This scarcity was increased by the difficulty of roads, and probably in some degree by the avarice of tractors, over whom, several were of opinion, as watch had not been kept, as is at all times necessary for sort of people

But whatever were the causes of this scarcity: it was bitterly felt by the troops, and was accompanied by diseases which thinned them extremely. This raised a general discontent in the army, which was speedily communicated to England, where the people during the preceding year, not having been struck with those brilliant advantages which distinguish an offensive campaign, did not confine their complaints to the conduct of the war, but began to fall into an almost general dislike of the very system upon which it was pursued.

Much of the old dispute between the naval and continental schemes was renewed; and enforced with many additional topics. The alliances of the war in Gerrnany were severely criticised. ‘We are pursuing, said they, a system, by which we must certainly lose all the advantages which we acquired for the short time we followed one that was more national, and suitable to our circumstances; a system of fall others the most absurd; a system in which defeats are Attended with their usual fatal effects, and in which even victory itself cannot save us from ruin. We will not enter, said they, into that long and vainly agitated question, Whether we ought to take any part in the differences which may arise between the powers on the continent? This disquisition is foreign to the present purpose; and it is be •ides of too vague and general a nature to admit any precise determination; but this undoubtedly may be asserted, that we never can consistently with common prudence, engage •n a continental war against France, without a concurrence in our favour of the other powers on the continent. This was the continental scheme of the great King William; and •his principle the foundation of the grand alliance which he projected, and at the head of which, in defence of the liberties of Europe, he made the most august appearance to which human nature can be raised. It was on this principle, that in conjunction with half Europe, we carried on the war with so much honour and success against France, under the Duke of Marlborough. But to engage in a continental war with that power, not only unassisted but opposed by the greatest part of those states with whom we were then combined, is an attempt never to be justified by any Comparative calculation of the populousness, the revenues, or the general strength of the two nations. It is a desperate struggle, which must finally end in our ruin.’

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But what is the scene which we have chosen for 〈◊〉 struggle? We have chosen Germany; the very spot of• others which the French, if they had their choice, w• have pointed out to us. By making Germany the the• of war, they see that country wasted and destroyed, 〈◊〉 strength of which has always proved the greatest bul• against there overbearing ambition. They see the sw• of the Germans, from one end to the other of that vast 〈◊〉 populous country, turned against each other; and they 〈◊〉 with joy the English, whose interest it is to save the• 〈◊〉 much as possible, co-oporating with her blood and •¦sures, to compleat the disunion, and consequently the •¦solation of Germany. In a war in that country France 〈◊〉 many advantages: she supports her armies in a great de• by pillaging those whom in every respect it is her intere• weaken. She is not very remote from her own fro• from whence she is easily provided, easily recruited; an• means of which a great part of the public money is exp•¦ed in the country where it is raised. Is she unsucce• she is brought thereby but the nearer to her frontiers, ports her troops with still the greater facility, and exh• still less the natural wealth of her people. Even sup• the French army driven into France; even then these •¦vantages on her side are increased; and very obvious •¦cumstances render it impossible for the allied army to 〈◊〉 their success on the German frontiers of France to any •¦cisive consequence.

But to the English, every thing is unfavourable in 〈◊〉 a war; their greatest successes will only carry them 〈◊〉 greater distance from their resources, and every step their progress must make the transport of provision, artill• ammunition, and the infinite impediments of a large a• more difficult, and in the end altogether impracticable. 〈◊〉 is not speculation; the events which followed the battl• Crevelt have proved it. Prince Ferdinand, victoriou• that action, was obliged, rather from the difficulty of •¦sisting, than the superiority of the enemy, to repass 〈◊〉 Rhine, and to bring back to Germany that war with w• he threatened France. It is thus, that upon this plan, •¦tory itself cannot save us, and that all our successes serve 〈◊〉 to accumulate new distresses, new difficulties, new cha• Whilst France, who has only contracted her expences the loss of her navy, encourages us to enter deeper deeper into the inextricable toils of a German war, in which we waste our strength only to entangle ourselves further. She holds the strings, and can never be tired out at this game. From all this arises an expence unknown even in thought to our forefathers, and which the single revenue of England is by no means able to bear. The allies, if they deserve the name, supply not the smallest part of it. The Hanoverians and Hessians contribute to our service only by enabling us to protract still longer our efforts in a system, in which nothing can so effectually serve us as being defeated as early as possible.

As to the King of Prussia, what we pay to that monarch, may rather be considered as tribute than subsidy; since we receive nothing in return: and that far from being able to afford any relief to our armies, he is scarcely in a condition to support himself. So that this alliance is worse than the former, as it is an heavy charge compensated not only with no real, but even with no apparent or shewy advantage. Indeed, he is an ally the last in the world we ought to have chosen, on account of his long connection with our worst enemies, the mean and the hostile sentiments he has always entertained towards us, the injuries he has done us, and the general lightness of his faith with regard to his former allies. We regard him, it is true, as the protector of the Protestant religion; but how lightly he thinks of all religion his writings testify; and what mischiefs he has done the Protestant cause in particular, this war will be a lasting memorial. When he entered Saxony, a Protestant country, he found that religion no ways molested in those places, where it had been established or tolerated by the treaty of Westphalia. Even in the Popish dominions the persecution began to lose something of its edge, when he under the name of its protector, brought upon it as great a calamity as its most determined enemies could have wished; by dividing the reformed states of the empire, and setting Protestants to cut the throats of Protestants, whilst all the Popish powers have been forced into a strict confederacy,

Had we kept ourselves clear of this runious system, and instead of engaging France on her strong side, attacked and vanquished her colonies, one after another, we might without exhausting our own strength have gradually wasted away the principal resources of her trade, and whilst we continued this method, have as little reason to grow tired of a war (the whole funds of which would be spent at hom• France has to grow weary in the present manner of •¦ing it on. If the powers on the continent were left 〈◊〉 out our interposition to do their own business they w• probably better understand and better defend 〈◊〉 their rights. At worst let France enter, let them conque• them possess Hanover; there is no mischief they can do• country greater than it suffers by the present war; an• not exhausting ourselves by a fruitless defence, should i• end by the entire possession of the French colonies, be 〈◊〉 besides the security of our own just claims, to restore Hanoverian dominions to their lawful sovereign, and to procure some indemnification for what they might suffered in our quarrel."

This is pretty nearly the substance of what was 〈◊〉 against the German system; and the argument was •¦ducted with great management and address, and interspe• with a number of topics well calculated to spread discon• and to place in an odious light every step taken in tho• •¦liances and in that war. Many, however, strongly adh• to that method, and they answered "That the best •¦sons on the other side were more specious than solid; that the chief writings against our German connections• declamations rather than arguments. That the compl• of the expence of this war was in some measure just; if the advantage was in any degree equivalent, the expe• was incurred to good purpose. That France by enga• so heartily as she has done in the German war, has d• away so much of her attention and her revenue from navy, that it enabled us to give such a blow to her ma• strength, as possibly she may never be able to recover. 〈◊〉 engagement in the German war, has likewise drawn from the defence of her colonies, by which means we h• conquered some of the most considerable she possessed▪ has withdrawn her from the protection of her trade, 〈◊〉 which it is entirely destroyed, whilst that of England 〈◊〉 never in the profoundest peace been in so flourishing a c•¦dition. So that by embarking in this German war, Fra• has suffered herself to be undone, so far as regards her p•¦ticular and immediate quarrel with England. But has 〈◊〉 had in Germany such successes as will counterballance 〈◊〉 loss? Far from it. At this moment she is infinitely less •¦vanced than she was the year she entered Germany, 〈◊〉 •aving spent such immense sums of money, and lost by the •word, by disease, and by desertion, at least 100,000 of her people.

On the other hand, the account stands thus with regard to England; deeply embarked as she has been in this German war, in her particular quarrel with France, she has been carried along with an almost uninterrupted tide of success. She has taken many of the French colonies; she has destroyed their navy and their trade, and having insulted the enemies coasts, has ruined an harbour which might one day prove very obnoxious to us. Then how stands the account in Germany? The French have been there frequently defeated: Hanover has been recovered and protected: The King of Prussia has been preserved so long at least from the rage of his enemies, and in general the liberty of Germany has been hitherto secured. So that if we have incurred a great expence, we have done by it infinitely more than France has done at an expence much greater than ours. For the advocates who declaim against the King of Prussia, seem to have forgot that the charge of the French army must exceed ours, as the number of their troops to be paid, exceeds the difference between French and English pay. Those on the English establishment in Germany, have at no time exceeded 25,000, and the rest of the confederates serve very nearly on the same terms with the French. Not to mention the subsidies so greatly superior to ours, which that power pays to states from whom she has not a single regiment to augment her armies. Thus, although by our victories, France is relieved from the charge of her navy, and that of the defence of some of her most considerable colonies, the German war alone has brought her finances to a distress of which the whole world has been witness. And nothing less could have happened; the expence however contracted was still enormous; and the resource of every war, trade was almost wholly destroyed. In England, the expence was also undoubtedly great: but then, the old trade still remained to supply it, and new channels were opened. Had we lain by and tamely beheld Germany in part possessed, and the rest compelled to receive laws from France, the war there would soon have been brought to an end; and France strengthened by victory, by conquest and alliance, would have the whole force and whole revenue of her mighty monarchy free to act against us alone.

They argued further, that common faith obliged us 〈◊〉 an adherence to our engagements both with Hanover 〈◊〉 Prussia; and that the pleaded incapacity to assist them •¦sing from the greatness of the charge could not excuse because the incapacity was not real; and if the exp• was inconvenient, we ought to have looked to that w• we contracted our engagements. That it was nott• that we received no advantage from our alliance with King of Prussia; for if it be once admitted, that we •∣tered with any reason into the German war (which 〈◊〉 supposed proved) then the King of Prussia has been 〈◊〉 materially serviceable to us; because it was his victor• Rosbach, and the reinforcement from his troops, w• has enabled us to do all that has since been atchieved. 〈◊〉 the like manner, if the support of the protestant relig• be any part of our care, that religion must suffer emin•∣ly by the ruin of the King of Prussia; for though the •¦tings attributed to his Prussian Majesty be such, as if re• his, reflect on account of their impiety great disgrace 〈◊〉 his character as a man, yet as a king, in his public and •¦litical capacity, he is the natural protector of the protes• religion in Germany; and it will always be his interest defend it.

We shall not presume to determine, which party has 〈◊〉 right side of this question; it was once undoubtedly a q•¦tion very fit to be discussed with great care; but hav• chose our party, it is at present little more than a m• of political speculation.

CHAP. XII.

Thurot sails from Dunkirk. Puts into Gottenburg Bergen. Puts into the Isle of Ilay. He takes Carn¦fergus. Sails from thence. He is killed and his 〈◊〉 squadron taken. War in America. General Am• goes down the river St. Laurence. General Mu• marches from Quebec. Montreal surrenders. Che• war. Affairs of the East-Indies. Lally deseated Coote.

BEfore we resume the account of the war in Amen• it will be necessary to take some notice of the atten• of the celebrated Thurot. It happened much earlier in 〈◊〉 year, than the events which we have just related. But to avoid breaking the thread of the more important events in Germany, we have reserved it for this place.

The reader will remember, that in the French scheme for invading these islands, (which was described as it then appeared to us in the 4th chapter of the annals of 1759,) a small squadron was prepared at Dunkirk, under Monsieur Thurot, the destination of which most people at that time imagined to have been for Scotland. But, it has since appeared, that this little squadron was intended to make a diversion on the north coast of Ireland, whilst the grand fleet under Monsieur de Conflans, made the principal descent in some of the southern parts of that kingdom. The manner in which the latter and principal part of this project failed, has already been related among the transactions of that year. It remains now to give some account of the part in which Thurot was concerned.

His squadron, consisting of five frigates, on board of which were 1270 land soldiers, sailed from the port of Dunkirk on the 5th of October 1759. They had been blocked up until that time by an English fleet; but under favour of an hazy night, they put out to sea, and arrived at Gottenburg in Sweden ten days after. From thence they made to Bergen in Norway. In these voyages, the men were reduced by sickness, and the vessels themselves had so suffered by storms, that they were obliged to send one of the most considerable of them back to France. It was not until the 5th of December, that they were able to sail directly for their place of destination. But their old ill fortune pursued them with fresh disappointments. For near three months they beat backward and forward amongst the western isles of Scotland, having in vain attempted a convenient landing near Derry. In this tedious interval they suffered every possible hardship. Their men were thinned and disheartened. Another of their ships was separated from them, of which they never heard more. The now remaining three were extremely shattered, and their crews suffered extremely by famine. This obliged them to put into the isle of Ilay; [Feb. 16.] where they refitted and took in some cattle and provisions, which were liberally paid for by the generous adventurer who commanded, and who behaved in all respects with his usual courtesy and humanity.

Here they heard for the first time of the defeat of C¦flan's squadron. This was a circumstance of great •couragement. But as Thurot could not be sure that intelligence was not given to deceive him; he persisted his resolution to sail for Ireland. Indeed he had sca• any other choice; for he was so poorly victualled, tha• could not hope without some refreshment, to get back France. And he was further urged on by his love of gl• no small share of which he was certain to add to his •¦racter, if he could strike a blow of never so little im•¦tance on the coast of Ireland: For by this he might 〈◊〉 some appearance of having revenged the many ins• which had been offered to the coast of France.

Full of these ideas, he arrived before the town of •¦rickfergus on the 28th of February; and landed his tro• now reduced to about 600 men, the day following. T• were augmented by draughts from his seamen to near 〈◊〉 These he formed on the beach, and moved to the attac• the town. Carrickfergus is surrounded by an old wall •¦ous in many places. Colonel Jennings commanded al• four companies in the town, mostly of new raised men, •¦tremely ill provided with ammunition, and no way pre¦•red for this attack, which they had not the least re• to expect. However, they shut the gates, sent off• French prisoners to Belfast, and took all the measures 〈◊〉 circumstances would admit. The enemy advanced 〈◊〉 attacked the gates. There was no cannon; but the g• were defended with effect by musquet shot, until the •¦munition was spent. Then the garrison retired into 〈◊〉 castle, which having a breach in the wall near 50 fee• extent, was no ways tenable. They therefore surrende• prisoners of war with terms of safety for the town.

Thurot as soon as he was master of Carrickfergus, iss• orders to Belfast to send him a quantity of wine and p•¦visions; he made the same demand to the magistrate• Carrickfergus, which they having imprudently refused comply with, the town was plundered. Thurot havi• victualled, and gained as much reputation by this action could be expected from a fleet which was no more tha• sort of wreck of the grand enterprise, set sail for Fra• But he had not left the bay of Carrickfergus many hou• when near the coast of the isle of Man, he perceived the sail that bore down upon him. These were three Eng• frigates which happened to be in the harbour of Kinsale, when Thurot made his descent; the duke of Bedford, lord lieutenant, dispatched orders to the commander of the frigates to go in quest of the French armament. The English frigates were one of 36 guns commanded by Capt. Elliott; and two of 32.

Such was their diligence and success, that they overtook Thurot's squadron before they could get out of the Irish sea. They were exactly three frigates to three. The French ships were much the larger, and their men much more numerous; but both ships and men were in a bad condition. A sharp and close engagement began. None of the French could possibly escape, and they must take or be taken. Thurot did all that could be expected from the intrepidity of his character; he fought his ship until she had her hold almost filled with water, and her decks covered with dead bodies. At length he was killed. The crew of his ship, and by her example those of the other two, dispirited by this blow, and pressed with uncommon alacrity by the signal bravery of Capt. Elliott, and those who commanded under him, struck, and were carried into Ramsay Bay in the Isle of Man. Even this inconsiderable action added to the glory of the English arms. None had been better conducted, or fought with greater resolution. This sole insult on our coasts was severely punished; and not a vessel concerned in it escaped. The public indeed lamented the death of the brave Thurot, who even whilst he commanded a privateer, fought less for plunder than honour; whose behaviour was on all occasions full of humanity and generosity; and whose undaunted courage raised him to rank, and merited distinction. His death secured the glory he always sought: he did not live to be brought a prisoner into England; or to hear in France those malignant criticisms, which so often attend unfortunate bravery. This was the fate of the last remaining branch of that grand armament, which had so long been the hope of France, the alarm of England, and the object of general attention to all Europe (a).

In America, the French had no great reason to bo• their success. The action of Sillery only gained the• an immense effusion of their blood, a victory which •ttended with no advantageous consequences. Vaudreuil, •he governor of Canada, after Levy had been compelled •o raise the siege of Quebec, fixed his head-quarters at Montreal, to make if possible a last stand in that place; •or which purpose he carried in all his posts; and here he •ollected the whole regular force that remained in Canada. At the same time he sought to keep up the spirits of the peo •le by various rumours and devices, which he practised on •heir credulity. But Monsieur Vaudreuil's greatest hope, •as not in his artifices, nor his force, but in the situation •f Canada, which is much harder to be entered, than when the enemy has entered it, to be conquered. On the •ide where the most considerable part of the British force was to act, it is covered with vast impenetrable woods, •orasses, and mountains; the only tolerable entrance for an •rmy, is by the river St. Laurence; and the navigation of •his river is rendered extremely difficult and hazardous by the number of shallows, rifts and falls, that lie between the discharge of Ontario and the isle of Montreal. Vaudreuil was in expectation, that the preparations necessary for conducting an army through such a long and difficult way, would necessarily consume so much of the summer, as not to leave sufficient time for the operations absolutely necessary to reduce the remainder of Canada. He did not apprehend much danger from the garrison of Quebec, which had been weakened by its defeat in the spring. These considerations gave him some confidence that he might protract the war somewhat longer, and another year might possibly give fortune an opportunity to take some turn in his favour.

But Mr. Amherst, whose calm and steady resolution no difficulties could overcome, was taking the most effectual measures to defeat his expectations. His plan was disposed in this manner. Brig. Gen. Murray had orders to advance towards Montreal, on his side, with all the troops which could be spared from the garrison of Quebec. Colonel Haviland sailed from Crown Point, and took possession of the Isle au Noix, which had been abandoned by the enemy on the 28th of August, and from thence had orders to proceed directly to the city of Montreal. His own army, consisting of about 10,000 men, he proposed to transport by the way of Lake Ontario into the river St. Laurence. Thus he proposed entirely to surround the last place of importance which the enemy possessed, and by the mo• the three armies, in three such different routs, to re• impossible for them to form an effectual opposition to 〈◊〉 his corps.

Having laid this general plan, he left Sher¦dy on the frontiers of New York, [June 21.] and pas• the Mohawks river and down that of the O• to Oswego, where he arrived on the 9th of July. • army he had collected there, consisted of about 〈◊〉 men, regulars and provincials. Sir Wm. Johnson b• 1000 savages of the Iroquois or five nations; the g• number of that race of men which was ever seen in a• the cause of England.

It was a matter of the greatest difficulty to transp• numerous an army, the whole of its artillery, its am•¦tion, and all its provisions, over the expanse of th• lake in open boats and gallies; it required the greate• •¦tion and the exactest order, lest they should fall foul one another, lest they should be driven out too far to the land on the first threatning of a storm, or lest they 〈◊〉 come too near the shore. But all the dispositions made in the most admirable method, and with that •¦rity of military arrangement, which makes so conside• a part of the character of that able commander. 〈◊〉 the whole army embarked on the 10th of August. •¦tachment had been sent some days before to clear th• •¦sage of the river St. Laurence of any obstruction, and 〈◊〉 the best passage for the vessels.

On the 27th he had entered that river, taken pos• of Swegatchie, and made all dispositions for the att• L'Isle Royale, a fort lower down in the river which •¦manded it, and by this command is the most important 〈◊〉 and as it were the key of Canada. The troops and were so disposed, that the isle was compleatly invested the garrison was left no means of escape. The ba• were then raised and opened, and after two sharp firing, [Aug. 25.] the fort surrendered.

This being a post of importance both to command 〈◊〉 Ontario and to cover our frontier, the general spent days here in order to repair the fort, and at the same 〈◊〉 to fit out his vessels, and to prepare all things for passin• troops down the river, the most dangerous part of 〈◊〉 he was now to encounter, as all the rapids lie betwee•
〈◊〉

of the Town and Fortifications of Montreal in Canada.
place and Montreal; but notwithstanding all precautions, near 90 men were drowned in passing these dangerous falls, and a great number of vessels broke to pieces. This loss from so large an embarkation, in such circumstances, is to be regarded as very inconsiderable. At length, after a tedious fatiguing and dangerous voyage of two months and seventeen days since they left Senectady, the English saw to their great joy, [Sept. 6.] the isle of Montreal, the object of their ardent wishes, and the period of their labours.

They were immediately landed in the best order; and all dispositions were made for attacking the place. So excellently was this plan concerted, and so faithfully executed, that Gen. Murray landed from Quebec that very day; and Col. Haviland with his army from Isle au Noix the day following.

Montreal (b) is the second place in Canada for extent, building, traffick, and strength. Its middle situation between the lakes and Quebec, hath made it the staple of the Indian trade; but the fortifications before this war were mean and inconsiderable; something has been since added; but nothing made the taking of it an enterprise of difficulty except that here was collected the whole regular, and no small part of the provincial force which remained in Canada. However, by the dispositions which at once brought against them three armies, the greatest part of the flower of British troops in America, Mons. Vaudreuil saw him entirely enclosed; he despaired of defending the place; therefore surrendered the garrison of Montreal as [*] pr•¦ners of war, and the inhabitants of his government as •¦jects to the King of Great Britain on the 8th of Septem• 1760.

And thus, in the sixth year of the war, and after the 〈◊〉 severe struggles, was the vast country of Canada red• to the King's obedience. In this time six battles had 〈◊〉 fought, the fortune of which was equally divided; in t• the French had been victorious; in three the Eng• The first of those in which the French had the better, fought in the meadows near Fort du Quesne, where 〈◊〉 Braddock was killed; the other at Ticonderoga, w• Gen. Abercrombie commanded; the third at Sillery, w• Gen. Murray was repulsed. The victories of the En• were, 1st. that near Crown Point, where Gen. Joh• commanded, and Dieskau was made prisoner; the 2d Niagara, where Gen. Johnson also commanded; and the and principal near Quebec, where Wolfe gained the vi•¦ry and lost his life. From the English two forts had 〈◊〉 taken, Oswego and Fort William-Henry. The Englis• their side took three cities; Louisbourgh, Quebec, Montreal; and five principal forts, which commanded many important communications. Beausejour, Niag• Frontenac, Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and Isle-Roy besides some others of inferior consideration.

Taking the whole war in America into one view, Ca• had been defended with bravery and conduct sufficient crown the Generals Wolfe and Amherst, and the Adm• Boscawen and Saunders, who finally reduced it, with greatest glory. And without question, the conduct Gen. Amherst in his last expedition, by which he oblig• Montreal to surrender without a blow, and finally c•¦quered Canada without effusion of blood, deserves ev• honour and every recompence a grateful people can besto• The humanity with which he behaved to the conque• both French and Indians, though the one had perpetrate• and the other at least connived at the most horrid cruelties on the English prisoners, adds a high lustre to his conquest. His troops set not one house on fire, not one habitation was plundered, not one man was killed (except in the attack of Isle-Royal). None was more distinguished in this respect than Sir William Johnson; he led into Canada an army of 1000 of the fiercest and most cruel savages which are bred in America, without doing the least damage to the country, or offering the slightest injury to the Persons of the inhabitants. To effect this he was obliged to exert the most unwearied endeavours, and the whole of those uncommon talents which give him such power over the minds of all sorts of men. The great victories by which he has advanced the interest of the nation, have done him less honour than his conduct, by which he has so greatly advanced its character for humanity and moderation. It were to be wished that the same might be said of the army, which marched from Quebec; who finding that the inhabitants in some parts were out in arms, were under a necessity of setting fire to the villages; the tenderness of Gen. Murray's nature revolted when the giving such orders became a necessary part of his duty. In the course of this summer, [July 9,] Lord Byron with three of his majesty's ships destroyed a settlement of French where none had ever been suspected, in the Bay de Chaleurs There he also took three frigates; and about 20 sail of vessels which contained a reinforment of troops and military stores for the relief of Montreal; but when they had received inteligence that Lord Colville's fleet had got into the river before them, and of course entirely commanded it, they disembarked in this place to attempt, if possible, a way to their principal army by land. But they were discovered; the whole armament was taken; and the whole design disconcerted.

Before we take our leave of the American affairs of this year, we ought to make some mention of a war with the savage Indians, which broke out on the back settlements of our southern colonies. The Cherokees, one of the most numerous and powerful nations of these barbarians, had in the beginning, and during the greatest part of the progress of the war, appeared to be heartily engaged in our interests; at their desire a fort had been built in their country called Fort London, from the then commander in chief of the British forces in America. Some parties of them had •¦peared in our favour on the last expedition against Fo• Quesne. But it is thought that on that occasion they ••¦ceived some insults, and had been treated in general w• neglect which made the deepest impression on the min• so vindictive a people. These discontents were fome• by the French, who hoped to cause a diversion of a p• our forces in this quarter. At length they commenced •¦tilities in their usual manner, by cruel ravages and m• on the frontier of their neighbouring provinces. And 〈◊〉 was very great reason to apprehend that the same ar• of the enemy, and the same opinion of ill usage, • draw the neighbouring and powerful nation of the C• into the like measures.

Mr. Lyttleton, who was then governor of Car• having in vain endeavoured to pacify them, 〈◊〉 the resolution of marching with all the force ••¦gular and provincial, [Oct. 1759.] which he could raise, the Cherokee country. This army in all di• exceed 1100 men, but it was conducted with such 〈◊〉 and dispatch by Governor Lyttleton, that in a very 〈◊〉 time, he marched 300 miles through a vast desert 〈◊〉 lies between the Indian castle of Keeowee and Ch• town. He was advanced into their country before they made preparations to receive him. They saw their 〈◊〉 in case of obstinacy on the point of being delivered to and sword. They therefore desired a conference, in 〈◊〉 they acknowledged themselves to blame; and consente• such a treaty of peace as the governor was ple• to dictate. [Dec. 26.] They gave up the persons guilt• the most flagrant murders, and put into his 〈◊〉 twenty-two hostages, as a security for their adheren• the treaty.

The governor had all imaginable reason to be sati• with the effect his expedition had produced; and ha• as every body believed effectually chastised the former •¦lence of the enemy, and secured the future traquillity the southern provinces, he returned to Charles-town. 〈◊〉 these perfidious barbarians, equall regardless of their 〈◊〉 and of the safety of their countrymen, whose lives 〈◊〉 pledged for their fidelity, broke cut as soon as the 〈◊〉 was removed, into their former ravages; blocked up 〈◊〉 London, which stands in the middle of their country, made some attempts on Fort Edward, which lies nearer to the settlements. Their total want of skill in carrying on sieges prevented them from any hope of mastering these places, otherwise than by treachery or famine. They failed in the first instance; and the last required time.

The imminent danger of two English garrisons, and that whole tract of her colonies, being made known to General Amherst, he detached Colonel Montgomery to their assistance, with a regiment of Highlanders, a battalion of the Royal Americans, a body of grenadiers, and the provincial troops. He marched into the enemies country. He made war upon the Indians after their own manner. No other would have been effectual. He burned Estatoe the capital of the Lower Cherokees, consisting of 200 houses, an Indian town of the very first magnitude; and then proceeded to the same execution on all the towns and villages of that district of the Cherokees, which were numerous, populous, and wealthy. The inhabitants generally fled on the approach of our troops; some however were burned in their houses, and some women and children were made prisoners.

This universal destruction of the lower settlements being compleated, Col. Montgomery passed on to the middle Cherokees: [June 27.] but as the army marched through a dangerous ground, favourable to the Indian method of fighting, they were suddenly attacked upon all sides by this savage enemy, with the greatest fury, and with the usual horrible screams and outcries. The troops were so well disposed with a view of this kind of war, that they stood the charge with firmness; they were not intimidated with the covered fire, or the screams of the savages. The fight was long and well maintained on both sides. But at length the Indians fled. A neighbouring town (one of the most considerable) was entered that night. The enemy made some attempt to molest them; but to little purpose. The English lost in this action 20 killed, and about 80 wounded. The Cherokees had near 40 killed. The number of the wounded is not known.

Though Col. Montgomery was victorious on this occasion; yet it was necessary to retreat on account of his wounded, for whom he had no place of safety. For if he should attempt to proceed, he had to apprehend frequent skirmishes as he had advanced, and the number of wounded together with the difficulty of his march, would be hourly ••creased. This retreat was certainly necessary. But wh• Col. Montgomery had arrived at Fort St. George, he •¦covered part of his orders, which threw the whole cou• into consternation; which was, that when he had cha• the enemy, he was to return to New-York with the tr• under his command, and rejoin the grand army. Th• orders without delay he obeyed; not however with 〈◊〉 rigour, but that the earnest entreaties of the province •¦vailed on him to leave about four hundred men for th• protection.

Carolina and the neighbouring colonies were again exp• to the fury of a savage enemy, not so much weakened exasperated by their late sufferings; the fate of the garri• of Fort Loudon was but too certain. For several mo• they had suffered a close blockade; at length seeing hope of relief their provisions being totally •¦sumed and the enemy shewing some pacific 〈◊〉 positions, [Aug. 7] they were reduced to surrender 〈◊〉 honourable conditions.

But the enemy, equally regardless of faith and hum•¦ty, fell upon them in their march, butchered all the •cers but one, killed several of the private soldiers and •¦ried thee rest into an horrible captivity. These outrage• the southern colonies threw some damp on the joy wh• was felt over the English America, on the entire conq• of Canada.

In Europe the fortune of the campaign was nearly b•¦lanced. In America, except this inconsiderable savage w• it was entirely triumphant. In the East-Indies also 〈◊〉 gained glory and new advantages. After the raising 〈◊〉 siege of Fort St. George, in February 1759. 〈◊〉 English army took the field under Major Bre•¦ton, [April 16, 1759.] and possessed themselves of the importa• town and fort of Conjiveram. About the sa• time the city of Masulipatam was stormed and taken 〈◊〉 Major Ford. By these strokes the French trade on the 〈◊〉 of Coromandel was confined to Pondicherry and a few 〈◊〉 considerable places. And traffick of the whole shore 〈◊〉 an extent of 800 miles of a populous and manufactur• country, was entirely in the hands of the English compa• This coast joins to the rich province of Bengal; out which also the French were entirely driven by the heroic actions of Col. Clive.

Encouraged by these successes, a body of about 1200 men, Europeans and Seapoys, under the command of Major Brereton, advanced further, and attempted to dislodge an army of French and their confederate Indians, encamped under the cannon of a fort of that country construction. The acquisition of that place had been a valuable advantage. [Sept. • ] But here our army was obliged to retire, with a loss of between 3 and 400 killed and wounded.

Gen. Lally animated with this and some slighter advantages, threatened the siege of Trichenopoly, and the French affairs seemed again to revive. But it was only a momentary gleam. To check his progress, Col. Coote at the head of the greatest body he could draw together on that coast, invested Wandewash, took the place in three days, and made the garrison prisoners of war. [Nov. 30.] From thence he passed with rapidity to Carongoly; the siege of which town he pressed with such diligence, that in four days from the opening his batteries, [Dec. 10.] he obliged the garrison to march out.

This progress alarmed Gen. Lally; he called large detachments in from every side; and knowing the importance of Wandewash, made all his efforts to recover it. He pushed forward the siege with the utmost vigour; hoping to take the town before Col. Coote could arrive to its relief. But the Colonel marched with equal diligence and arrived about the time when the French had made a practicable breach. [July 22,] His army consisted of 1700 Europeans, and about 3000 black troops. Lally's amounted to 2200 Europeans, and between 9 and 10,000 blacks. The engagement was long and obstinate; but at length, the French gave way. It was a total rout; they abandoned their camp, their cannon, and all the implements of the siege. They left 1000 killed and wounded on the field of battle. Among the prisoners were Brig. Gen. Bussy; the Chevalier Godeville, quarter-master general; Lieut. Col. Murphy, and eleven inferior officers, who were all wounded. Lally fled with his broken troops in despair to Pondicherry.

Of the English in this action near 200 were killed and wounded; in particular the death of the gallant Major Brereton 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 was much regretted. Of the blacks about 70 wounded and slain.

Except the battle of Paissy, followed by the revol• in Bengal, this action was the most considerable in its •¦sequences, of any in which our troops had ever been e•¦ged in India. This was fought in part against Euro• troops headed by an able General. The dispositions •o battle, and the conduct of Col. Coote in the engage• merit every honour.

This victory was pursued with a spirit equal to th• which it was won. Chittiput was taken in a few days 〈◊〉 and the army allowing itself no repose, marched di• from thence to Arcot, the capital of this immense pro• The siege was opened on the 5th of February, and t• surrendered on the 10th; near 300 Europeans were 〈◊〉 prisoners of war (e).

At sea Admiral Pocock seconded the extraordinary efforts of Col. Coote with his own usual skill and intrepidity. [Sept. 4, 1759.] Again he engaged the fleet of Monsieur d'Ache, a brave commander, who has in some degree supported the declining reputation of the French marine; but though superior in the number of ships, and more than in that proportion superior in guns men, he was obliged after upwards of two hours severe bloody conflict to give way before Admiral Pocock, and to take shelter under the forts of Pondicherry. During this engagement eight of the English ships stood the fire of the whole French fleet, which consisted of 16 sail; The 〈◊〉 were greatly shattered; 560 of our squadron were ki• and wounded; and on the side of the French the loss 〈◊〉 not less than 1000. Admiral Pocock immediately got himself again in a fighting condition, and braved the French fleet before pondicherry, who lay under their cannon, and refused a new engagement.

It has been observed that history can hardly produce an instance of two squadrons fighting three pitch'd battles, under the same commanders, in 18 months, without the loss of a ship on either side. After this engagement Admiral Cornish arrived on the coast of Coromandel and joined Pocock, by which we attained so decided a superiority in strength, as we had before in courage and ability, that the French no longer appeared in those seas. Most of their ships went off, as it was thought, to Mauritius. Then the French affairs went rapidly to ruin. On the 5th of April the important fortress of Caracal surrendered to the sea and land forces under Admiral Cornish and Major Monkton. By the taking of this and two other places of lesser consideration, the French were actually reduced to the single port of Pondicherry; which was when these accounts 〈◊〉 away, closely blocked up by land and sea. The stron• hopes are conceived that this capital of the French 〈◊〉 power and commerce will shortly be brought into our •¦session; and with these pleasing hopes we conclude the •¦tory of the war of 1760.

THE ANNUAL REGISTER: OR HISTORY OF THE WAR. For the YEAR 1761.

CHAP. I.

Preliminary remarks. Treaty proposed and entered into by the belligerent powers. Mr. Stanley sent to Paris, and Mr. Bussy to London. French machinations in Spain. Difficulties in the negotiation. Design of the campaign in Hesse, and of the expedition to Belleisle.

AFTER a general war of five years, carried on with the greatest effusion of blood, and the most extraordinary expence ever known to attend a war of that continuance, it was hoped that, if the animosity of the belligerent powers was not abated, at least a great part of the fuel of discord had been consumed; and that the time was arrived for giving peace to Europe. Some propositions for that purpose had been made in the close of the year 1759. Those who rather wished for peace, than very attentively considered the probability of effecting it, se•¦ed to think it might then have been expected. But w• the public was flattered with these hopes, the situatio• affairs would not suffer us to believe that they had any 〈◊〉 foundation. We accordingly ventured to point out the •¦ficulties which then obstructed any scheme for pea• And as these difficulties were such, as did not attend 〈◊〉 particular conjuncture only, but must subsist as long as fortune of war continued in the same train, we were 〈◊〉 the beginning apprehensive that the new negociation 〈◊〉 we have since seen opened, and for some time carrie• with such pleasing appearances, might in the issue be •¦tended with no better success.

There are indeed but two situations in which peace• be very rationally expected. The first situation is th• equality; and this is, either where nothing is gained o•¦side; so that when ever mutual weariness, and unp•¦ble hostilities have calmed the ardor of the warring po• no intricate points intervene to frustrate the first p• disposition; or it may be where the losses are so equal, 〈◊〉 exchanges may easily be made, or the parties may rest •¦tually satisfied with their advantage over each other.

The second situation is that of necessity; where o• the parties is so entirely broken and reduced, as to se• to receive conditions on the footing of conquest, a• purchase repose by humiliating and enfeebling conce• A peace upon this latter basis is always the grand po• object. In every war we flatter ourselves with the ho• it, against an experience almost uniform. In fact, it 〈◊〉 the last degree difficult to reduce any of the great powe• Europe to this disgraceful necessity. For to reduce any• of them to this state of submission, you must, in a ma• reduce all of them to it. The war if it continues, d• state after state into its vortex until all Europe is invol• A sort of ballance is then produced, and the peace of c•¦quest becomes impracticable.

It would prove of the utmost moment to the tranq• of mankind that this point was sufficiently regarded, that they would willingly adopt that system of equality which sooner or later, with more or fewer struggles, are so often compelled to submit. When, seldom, a 〈◊〉 [*] is concluded on other terms, as the King of Prussia has found by severe experience, and as we observed on a former occasion, is only a short cessation, and not a perfect peace. But it must be acknowledged that this situation, the most coincident with their true interest, is at the same time the most contradictory to the passions and prejudices of nations. It appears hard to loose upon every side every object of the war. A peace on this foundation will be censured, but it is the best, on the same principle that the shortest follies are the best; and that no injured pride is left to brood over a future war. Contrary to the opinion of the warm patriots on all sides, we therefore imagined that the year seventeen hundred and fifty-eight, in the close of the third campaign, was the happy moment for negociation. At this time, however, no propositions had been made. The propositions of seventeen hundred and fifty-nine were but slightly regarded, and obviously could end in nothing. But in the beginning of the year, of which we are now going to treat, the scene of negociation was opened with far greater solemnity and parade; and as it was carried on with great diligence, it necessarily makes a principal part of the history of this year. It is indeed somewhat fortunate both for the writers and the readers of these events that this treaty has intervened. The narative otherwise had proved extremely barren and unentertaining. For though the animosity of the belligerent powers was not, as we observed, abated, their efforts, however, had considerably slackened, and their operations began gradually to degenerate into the Petiteguerre. Those vast events that astonish the mind, or hold it in a pleasing suspence; those important battles and sieges; those rapid and well conducted marches, and those lively enterprizes which distinguish the former years, except in a very few instances, scarce make any part of the history before us. But though the operations of the field had fallen into a state of langour, the cabinet became full of business, and negociation flourished. In this situation candour obliges us to acquaint our readers that we are still more liable to mistakes, than when we attempt to describe the transactions of the campaign. It very frequently happens, that the accounts of the military operations come authenticated from the hands of those great generals who have conducted them, and when we have allowed for the partiality of the account, there is nothing to be detracted from them for want of sufficient information. Even in the case of partiality, we are often able to correc• the misrepresentation or over-charge of one of the parties by that of the other. These things are done in the eye of the world. But the motives either to peace or war, and the steps taken in a negociation, are all behind the curtain. They do not appear for a long time, and, sometimes they never appear completely. There is however, an advantage in the present conjuncture. For one of the powers at war, in order to justify to its subjects and to the world, its part in the continuance of a war so fatal to both, has published an account of the late negociation; artful indeed, and probably in some respects unfair; but containing at the same time many valuable and illustrating pieces, the authenticity of which is not disputed. The point in such cases to be dreaded is not the publication of false pieces but the concealment of several that are real and important. The public information is probably rather incompleat, than untrue. We wait with impatience for that full and authentic narrative of so important a negociation, which undoubtedly our court proposes to publish. We have delayed the setting out our work the longer, in hopes of its appearance, by which we might have been able to perfect and correct our account of this transaction. The account of the Spanish negotiation has appeared late, but we have not failed to make use of it. At present we engage in our work, under those difficulties, which it is just the reader should know and allow for. In the succeeding year we shall take care to profit of whatever further lights may be imparted.

Very early in this year 1761, the courts of Petersburgh, Vienna, France, Sweden and Poland, agreed severally and jointly to offer proposals towards renewing that negotiation for peace, which had abruptly been broken off in the close of the year 1759. France was the principal and first mover; for as it was her ambition which had made the war so general, and her revenue which in a great measure supported it; the former being now humbled by a series of unfortunate events, and the latter reduced by most enormous expences, she began at length to relent, and apparently to desire peace in earnest. The other members of the grand alliance could not decently, nor safely oppose these dispositions of France. The court of Sweden in particular was given to understand, that the exhausted condition of France was the true motive of her moderation; that in fact, she was not able any longer to furnish the stipulated subsidies, nor to adhere to the letter of her engagements with her allies. These circumstances, which she was neither able, nor seemed disposed to conceal, formed the surest guaranty of her sincerity.

The five parties to the war on that side, made as many declarations, which were signed at Paris on the 25th of March, and delivered at London on the 31st of the same month. The counter declaration of Great Britain and Prussia appeared on the 3d of April. Augsburg, as the situation most commodious for the powers at war, was appointed for the congress.

Lord Egremont, Lord Stormont ambassador in Poland, and general Yorke our ambassador in Holland, were nominated as the English plenipotentiaries. On the part of France, the count de Choisel was appointed. Augsburg now became the centre of attention to all Europe, and each court prepared every thing towards this important meeting which it could furnish of splendor for the display of its dignity, and of ability for the support of its interest. The public conversation was for a while diverted from scenes of horror, bloodshed, and pillage; and every mind was employed more agreeably on the public scene of magnificence, and the private game of policy, which was to ensue.

In the first place, it was unanimously agreed, in order that a negotiation, in itself sufficiently intricate, should be the less embarrassed, to admit to the treaty none but the parties principally concerned, together with their allies.

Although this exclusion of the neutral interests tended greatly to disembarress and simplify the negotiation, yet such was the variety of separate and independent matters, which still remained to be discussed, that it became adviseable to make a further separation, if they hoped to treat upon them with any tolerable ease, or with any prospect of coming to a speedy decision.

For this purpose it was necessary to bring back the motives to the war to their first principles; and to disengage those several interests which originally, and in their own nature had no connection, from that mass, in which mutual injuries and a common animosity had blended and confounded them. This proposition came first from France, 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 and it was an early and happy omen of her inclination t• peace.

The war, which was truly and originally German, evidently had but a single, though this a very difficult object to determine the fate of the King of Prussia. So many powers were concerned in this determination, and the• views of aggrandisement, indemnification, and revenge, • various and difficult to be reconciled, that this alone seemed matter enough for a separate and very arduous negotiation. In effect all the powers of the north were concerned in it. For this reason, the other great object of the general war, the limits of America, which by that strange chain of hostile connections, which even unites the various independent quarrels and enmities of Europe, had been mixed with the German disputes, was again set upon its proper and peculiar basis; and whilst the truly German interests were handled at Augsburg, it was proposed to treat on this head separately in London and in Paris. For this purpose, ministers were mutually sent from those courts; Mr. Stanley on the part of England; and Mr. Bussy on that 〈◊〉 France.

This proposition was also exceedingly prudent; for there is no doubt that if these potentates could settle their claims to their mutual satisfaction, and should carry to Augsburg the same candour and good faith, and the same sincere desire of peace, their influence must necessarily tend to inspire principles of moderation into the rest, and must contribute largely to accelerate the great work of pacification.

Things were thus set upon the best footing possible, and the negotiation seemed to be in the happiest train that could be wished. But unfortunately the plan and disposition of the treaty were much more easily adjusted, than the matter and the substance. It was very obvious, that France if she was willing even to pretend to a desire of peace, could scarce avoid making concessions, which to her were sufficiently mortifying. The moment her proper quarrel came to be separated from the general cause, she had every disadvantage in the negociation, because she had suffered every disaster in the war. On the side of Germany indeed she had acted with success; but even there the advantages she had acquired were still precarious, as the chance of war was still open: no proposition for a cessation of arms having been admitted. As she knew therefore, that great sacrifices might be expected from her, she did not so finally rest her hopes upon the negotiation, as not to look out for another resource; and this rendered on her part the whole proceeding less effective and less sincere.

The resource she sought was in Spain, who she hoped could not look with indifference on the humiliation of the principal branch of the house of Bourbon. Hitherto indeed the king of Spain had observed a tolerable exact neutrality in his conduct, and in his declarations had spared no expressions of good will and friendship to our court. He seemed to be wholly intent on the internal oeconomy of his dominions, on the improvement of their long neglected police, on the advancement of their commerce, and the regulation of the finances. But notwithstanding these domestic attentions, the French ministry did not despair of drawing his regards abroad. They thought that the offers which France in her present circumstances would find herself obliged to make, must extremely alarm all good Spaniards, who could not see without the most serious apprehensions, the French power wholly annihilated in America. By this event, their colonies, though so much superior to all others in opulence and extent, must in a manner be at the mercy of England: no power being in any sort able to afford them assistance, or to hold the ballance between them and the power of England. At this time indeed, the French court had not absolutely succeeded in her designs at Madrid: but she was in hopes, that every step she took in the treaty and every concession she should make, would prove a fresh incentive to the jealousies and apprehensions of Spain. Thus in effect all the motions which France seemingly made towards peace were in reality so many steps towards a new war; and whilst at London she breathed nothing but moderation, and the most earnest desire of putting a period to the calamities of Europe, at Madrid she was taking the most vigorous measures for spreading them further, and continuing them longer.

On the side of England, though there was far more good faith in the public procedure, there were also, it must be admitted, many circumstances which co-operated to retard the peace. The great and almost unparallelled success which attended our arms in this war, had raised a proportionable expectation, and inspired very high thoughts into the minds of the people. They thought it unreasonable to make almost any concessions to a nation whose ambition and violence they had always found to correspond with its power, and whom they now considered as lying at their mercy. That this was the time for reducing France, which if we let pass, we could never hope again to recover. In these sentiments it must have fared ill with that administration, who should make a sacrifice of any of those objects on which the people had set their hearts.

On the other hand it could not have escaped them, that the situation of affairs in Germany, however they might be artificially separated in the discussion, must necessarily have an influence on the final determination of the treaty. They saw, that after a severe struggle of five years, the affairs of our nearest allies were only not ruined. To say nothing of the condition of the King of Prussia, the whole country of Hesse was in the actual possession of France; they likewise held the county of Hanau; and by their occupation of Gottingen, the Hanoverian territory lay open to their arms. If this quarrel should be considered as a cause not strictly English, (though the French in their memorials contended it was), yet certainly the Hessians, and principally the Hanoverians, were allies of so near a connection, and had done and suffered so much in the common cause, that it must have appeared shocking to all Europe, if solely attentive to our own peculiar advantages, we should patch up a peace without any provision in their favour: and it was very evident, that this provision could not be made in the situation in which the last campaign had left them, unless our government purchased it at a price that would be very grudgingly paid by the English subjects.

The ministry, perplexed between the natural expectations of their country, and the reasonable expectations of their allies, must have found it not a little difficult to know what party they ought to take. In order to reconcile, as much as possible, these contradictory desires, the only solution which could be found was to push the war with the utmost vigour; and in the mean time not to hurry the negotiation: in hopes that during its progress things might take such a turn, as to enable them to purchase peace for their allies out of the acquisitions they should have made after the commencement of the treaty, and without being obliged to have recourse to their conquests, previous to that aera. On this footing they proposed to satisfy the demands of the public faith, and at the same time to preserve the reputation which was so necessary to their affairs at home. Accordingly the duke of Brunswick was to prosecute with the utmost vigour, the operations which he had begun in the depth of winter; and an expedition, the object of which was then secret, was prepared with equal diligence in England.

In these equivocal dispositions, and in this odd mixture of hostile and pacific measures, began the year 1761, a year more remarkable, perhaps, than any of those we have hitherto described, for events which will be radically decisive of the future prosperity or misery of Europe, but less, for those matters by which the imagination of the reader is commonly affected. Having in this chapter laid down, as far as we can conjecture, the political motives for the uncommon effort which was made in Germany, in our next chapter we shall give an account of the military plan of this effort, the execution and the success of it.

CHAP. II.

Prince Ferdinand's plan. Allies enter into Hesse and Thuringia. French retire. Hereditary prince repulsed at Fritzlar. Fritzlar taken. Several magazines taken. Blockade of Marpurg and Ziegenhayn. Siege of Cassel. Battle of Langensaltze. Broglio reinforced from the Lower Rhine. Hereditary prince defeated at Stangerode. Siege of Cassel, &c. raised. Allies retire behind the Dymel.

AT the close of the last campaign, the French had the entire and undisturbed possession of the whole territory of Hesse: a country tolerably provided, and which contains many tenable places. Some of these, they had strengthened with additional works; and they had amassed immense magazines in the most convenient situations. This was their condition in the front of their winter cantonments. On their left they had driven the allies from the Lower Rhine, where they kept a considerable body of troops, which streightened our quarters, and checked our efforts on that side. On their right they possessed the town of Gottingen, in which they had placed a very strong garrison; and thus they shut us up on this quarter also, whilst the king's German dominions lay entirely open to their enterprizes.

If we consider the situation of the French armies, they will present us with the idea of an immense crescent, th• two advanced points of which were at Gottingen and Wes• and the body extended in Hesse: so that being perfectly well provided with magazines, and master of all the prope• communications, necessary for their current subsistence, with strong places in their rear, and in both their flanks▪ in the next campaign they had only to advance their severa• posts in a manner to enclose the allied army, which, withou• some signal success (from their numbers and situation, hard¦ly to be expected) would find itself entirely incapable o• making any stand against them.

Prince Ferdinand was very sensible of these inconveniencies of his situation, and of the advantages the enemy ha• over him. It was extremely difficult to settle a plan for action; but no action could be attended with much wor•• consequences, than inactivity in a bad condition. He knew from experience, that the French were ill qualified for win¦ter operations in Germany, and that his own soldiers, beside• their superior hardiness, and their being inured to the ri¦gour of the climate, could suffer but little more from field service, especially if attended with success, than they mu•• endure from the badness of their winter quarters. It is tr•• that there was something discouraging in the attack of a very superior body of the enemy, possessed of every advantage against him: but it was clear, that this superiority, and these advantages would not lessen as the summer approached. It was clear, that every step the enemy gained on him would render his defence weaker and his resources mo•• scanty; and that if the enemy found themselves in a conditi¦on to commence this campaign where they had conclude• the last, and that nothing should hinder their proceeding 〈◊〉 the earliest season, he could never reasonably hope to pr•∣tract the war to another year. For to speak the truth, th•• was the utmost, which in his circumstances he could promise himself from the most judicious scheme of conduct.

Having therefore resolved to act, he lost no time to a•• with vigour. He appointed three places of rendezvous 〈◊〉 the Dymel, the Rhine, and in Saverland. His army assembled on the 9th of February, without suffering the enemy to have any previous notice of their intentions. The next day the troops halted, and the duke communicated to his generals the disposition he had made for the motions of the whole.

The centre was led by his serene highness in person; it penetrated directly into Hesse, and marching by Zierenberg and Durenberg, made its way towards Cassel. The right and left of the army were each at a very considerable distance from this body; but they were so disposed as fully to co-operate in the general plan of operation, which was very extensive. The hereditary prince commanded on the right: he marched by Stadbergen for Mengeringhausen; and leaving the country of Hesse to the Eastward, as the alarm was to be as sudden, and as widely diffused as possible, he pushed forward with the utmost expedition into the heart of the French quarters. General Sporcken commanded a corps at a greater distance to the left, and penetrated into Thuringia, by Duderstadt and Heiligenstadt. The design of this movement was to break the communication of the French with the army of the Empire, to open one for ourselves with the Prussians, and to cut off all intercourse between the grand army of the enemy, and their garrison at Gottingen.

By this sudden, extensive, and vigorous attack, the French were thrown into the utmost consternation: they retreated, or rather fled upon every side. It could scarcely have been imagined, that this was the same army which had but just closed the campaign with so much success. Such has been the sport of fortune in this war, even beyond all former examples of her caprice, that the instances are numerous of inferior and beaten armies, without any apparent change in their circumstances, driving the conquerors before them. So remarkable was the revolution of fortune at this time, that it is highly credible if the French had had their quarters in an open country, their army had been totally destroyed: but happily for them, they had very sufficient means of securing their retreat. For as the allies advanced, they were obliged to leave Cassel and Gottingen at their backs; into the former of which the enemy had thrown a garrison equal to a moderate army; and in the latter they had 7 or 8000 men. Beyond these again were Fritzlar, Ziegenhayn, and Marpurg, places of a tolerable degree of strength and well garrisoned, besides some other inferior posts.

The hereditary prince, whose party was the most advanced, struck the first blow, by an attempt to surprize Fritzlar. He had received advice that it was not prepared to receive him. He accordingly took only a few battalions and no cannon, in hopes of being able to carry that place at once. But unfortunately he was deceived in his intelligence. The garrison was prepared and resolute, and though the hereditary prince attacked it with his usual spirit, he was obliged for that time to desist, and to draw off with no inconsiderable loss.

About this time, Marpurg was attempted in the same manner, and with no better success. Gen. Breidenback, an Hanoverian officer, of great bravery, experience and reputation, who commanded there, lost his life in the attack. These two severe checks at the entrance into action, did not however discourage either the parties that suffered them, or the rest of the army. They advanced as expeditiously, and with more caution. Cannon and mortars were brought before Fritzlar, which, after a defence that was rather made for the credit of the commander, than from any hope of saving the place, [Feb. 15.] surrendered on honourable terms. A large magazine was found here. The marquis of Granby was employed, with success, in reducing the forts and castles in this neighbourhood. The allied army resolutely advanced, and as they advanced, the French continually retired, abandoning post after post, and fell back almost to the Maine. They fired their magazines as they retreated; but the allies pursued with so much rapidity, that they saved five capital stores; one of which contained no less than 80,000 sacks of meal, 50,000 sacks of oats, and a million of rations of hay, a very small part of which had been destroyed. These were acquisitions of the utmost advantage, as they wonderfully facilitated the progress of the army; which, as it advanced, still found its subsistence; provision was also thereby made for the cavalry, which otherwise, it could never have been supplied with in such a season, and at such a vast distance from our original quarters.

Notwithstanding this success in front, it was not here the grand object of our operations lay. Cassel was to be reduced. The French had in that town a garrison of 17 battalions, besides some other corps, under the command of the count de Broglio; and there was no doubt, that he would defend the place to the utmost. The fortifications of Cassel are mostly in the old manner; they consist of very high, but strong walls. Some works indeed had been newly added; but the great hope of the enemy was in the strength of the garrison and the rigour of the season. The siege of this place was not to be delayed; however it was necessary previously to clear all the adjacent country of the enemy, and to cut off the communication of the garrison with their grand army.

Therefore when marshal Broglio had been driven quite out off Hesse, and had retreated towards Frankfort, prince Ferdinand ceased to advance; and having ordered two bodies to the blockade of Marpurg and Ziegenhayn, which still obstinately held out, he formed that part of the army which was with him into a chain of cantonments, making a front towards the enemy which extended from the river Lahn to the river Ohm, and from the Ohm to the Fulda; thus he proposed to watch the motions of marshal Broglio's army, to cover the siege of Cassel, and the blockades of the two fortresses just mentioned. The siege of Cassel was carried on by the count of Lippe Schaumburg a sovereign prince of the empire, reputed one of the ablest engineers in Europe. His management of the artillery at Thornhausen was a principal cause in the acquisition of that great victory; and it was not doubted that his abilities would be exerted as effectively at Cassel. Trenches were opened on the first of March. All eyes were now directed to this point; for on the success of this stroke depended the whole fortune of the campaign. It was very apparent that if Cassel and its garrison should fall into the hands of the allies, Gottingen and the inferior places must inevitably fall along with it; and this misfortune would be more than equivalent to the loss of a great battle.

Whilst the war was thus carried on in Hesse, M. Sporcken who commanded the detachment to the left, on the side of Saxony, advanced with an intrepidity equal to the rest; he was soon joined by a corps of Prussians, and the united army lost no time to clear the Werra and the Unstrut of the bodies of French and Saxons which occupied the most important post upon these rivers. As these bodies were advantageously posted and could be supported on one side by the garrison of Gottingen, and on the other, as they promised themselves, by the army of the empire, they maintained their ground; and this soon brought on a sharp action. [Feb. 14.] The allies attacked a large body advantageously posted at Langensaltz upon the Unstrut; the event was entirely favourable. Three whole battalions of Saxons were made prisoners by the Prussians; M. de Sporcken took two battalions. The enemy's loss was computed at five thousand men; several pieces of cannon were also taken, and a large magazine was abandoned. This blow was well followed; one body of the combined army pushed to Eisenach and Gotha, whilst another by forced marches got forward to Fulda; the French gave way on their right; and the army of the empire on the left; the latter fell back to Bamberg, totally abandoning a very large tract of country.

Hitherto the affairs of the allies proceeded almost in an uninterrupted course of prosperity. It was indeed a degree of prosperity altogether astonishing, and which as at first it could scarcely have been expected, so there was no reason to imagine it would have any long continuance. For the allies on the side of Saxony, where M. Sporcken acted, in proportion as their activity and success carried them forward, left the countries on their rear more and more uncovered, and exposed, without any or with a very insufficient defence, to the attempts of the powerful garrison of Gottingen. The count de Vaux, who commanded that garrison, is a very able and enterprizing officer. And he no sooner perceived, that the allies were wholly intent upon driving their enemies from the Werra and Unstrut, and on pushing the advantages they had acquired to the utmost, then he marched out of Gottingen with a strong detachment, attacked and routed as Hanoverian convoy, fell upon the town of Duderstadt with the utmost violence; and though he failed in his first attempt, he repeated it with so much spirit, that at length he carried that town, and afterwards some of the most considerable places near it. By these successes he prevented M. de Sporcken's corps from returning by the way they had advanced, and indeed absolutely disqualified them from acting seperately from their main army; to which soon after these events, they were obliged to join themselves. This junction now became necessary on another account,

Marshal Broglio towards the close of the last campaign had been obliged, by the enterprizes of the hereditary Prince, to detach from his army in Hesse a large body to the lower Rhine. He now found it equally proper to recall this body together with further reinforcements, in order to maintain his ground in the country northward of the Maine, where he was closely pressed by the allies, and which he must be compelled shamefully to relinquish, if Cassel was not relieved in time. Sensible of this, with whatever difficulty, he called in his most distant posts, embodied his army, inspired them with new spirits, and made them capable, by a more exact order in their discipline and a great superiority in their numbers, of attempting something considerable.

On the other hand, the hopes of the allies, depended on the effect of their first impression; they were obliged to attempt too many objects at the same time, and these too arduous for the number of which their army consisted. For it was necessary that they should keep one army, and that no small one, employed on the siege of Cassel; another was occupied in the blockade of Ziegenhayn; a third was employed to the eastward of the Fulda; and still a fourth was necessary to cover and sustain all these various operations, and to oppose itself to the attempts of Marshal Broglio. It was but too plain, that when the whole of the French force was collected in one point, it could never be resisted by a part only of the allied army; if they should attempt to draw away any of the seperate corps from the critical service upon which it was employed, the entire purpose of their labours was given up. In a word, Prince Ferdinand had three strong posts of the enemy on his rear, and their grand army now perfectly united on his front, and his situation, which was far from advantageous, obliged him to call in M. Sporcken's body which had effected its purpose and could best be spared. However the prince kept his position as long as possible; and the siege was carried on with as much vigour as a winter operation, and the spirited defence of a great garrison ably commanded, would admit.

But Marshal Broglio, as soon as he had collected his army, advanced without delay. He caused the troops under the hereditary prince to be attacked near the village of Stangerode, in the neighbourhood of Grunberg, where he was advanced in front of the before-mentioned line of the allied army. The attack was made by the enemies dragoons, the very first shock of which broke the whole foot, consisting of nine regiments, Hanoverians, Hessians, and Brunswickers. The French on this occasion made two thousand prisoners, and possessed themselves of several trophies of victory; few were killed or wounded on either side.

After this blow the allied army could no longer think of making head against the French, or of maintaining their ground in Hesse. They broke up the blockade of Ziegenhayn; and soon after raised the siege of Cassel, after twenty-seven days open trenches. They evacuated the whole country of Hesse, retired behind the Dymel, and falling back nearly to the quarters they possessed before this undertaking.

Thus ended an expedition which was carried on against many difficulties, with much spirit, and which at first excited great hopes. It failed indeed in some of its objects; but it produced its effect in the total of the operations of the year. The French, by the destruction or seizure of so many of their principal magazines, were for a long time disabled from taking any advantage of their successes in the preceding campaign, or from their late victory. It was hot until the season was a good deal advanced that they were in a condition to act. This cessation was not dearly bought even by the loss we sustained at Stangerode, and the extreme hardships the troops had endured during the whole service; for circumstanced as both armies were at their quitting the field, without this seasonable check it is probable we should have at this day no footing in Germany. Both armies as it where by consent lay quiet in their winter quarters. During their inaction, the negotiation at London and Paris, whose commencement we have related in the first chapter, was pursued without interruption.

CHAP. III.

The negociation continued. Propositions of uti possidetis. Debate concerning the periods. Belleisle described. Englise repulsed at Lochmaria bay. They make good their landing. Palais besieged. Town abandoned. Citadel capitulates.

IT must be observed, that after the judicious seperations which had been made of the interests of the several powers at war, there still remained a sufficient fund of intricacy and altercations in each particular discussion. In order therefore to make the way to peace as smooth as possible, it was resolved previously to establish some certain and simple points that might serve to direct and keep steady the whole negotiation. These points were but two; indeed they were so inseperably connected with each other, that they seemed rather members of the same proposition than separate articles. The first was, that the two crowns should remain in possession of what they have conquered one from the other. The second imported that, the situation in which they shall stand at certain periods, shall be the position to serve as a basis for the treaty which may be negotiated between the two powers.

As France was known to have had the worst in the war, a proposition of statu quo, coming from her, must have appeared an instance of moderation, altogether surprizing to our ministers. It is certain, that had peace been concluded at that instant, and upon the sole foundation of this article, England would then have possessed all 〈◊〉 conquests she had made, every one of which was in a very high degree advantageous to her commerce and her power, and none of which could be considered as a subject of future discussion. On the other hand, France continuing in possession of the places she had conquered, would have acquired no advantage that could at all countervail the expence of keeping them; at the same time that she would be exposed to endless altercations, and would afford matter of the highest jealousy, indignation, and discontent, even to her nearest allies. This basis being therefore settled, although it was evident, that the treaty could not rest upon this basis solely. England had certainly a great superiority in the negotiation, and might rationally expect (when they should come to talk of restitutions) to purchase the evacuation of the French conquests in Germany, at a much smaller price than their apparent magnitude might seem to demand. However these were still a matter of so much anxiety, and the nature of the precise stipulations were still so uncertain, that the negotiation, though it proceeded with strong appearance of a desire for peace, met with very frequent checks and delays. Both parties were indeed unanimous in the article of uti possidetis; than which, it must be admitted, there could not be a better ground to treat upon. But as the war still continued, and whilst it continued might make a daily alteration in the fortune of the contracting powers, it was necessary to fix upon some epochas to which this possessory article should refer.

The French on this head proposed, that the situation in which they shall stand on the first of September in the year 1761 in the East-Indies, on the first of July in the same year in the West-Indies and in Africa, and on the first of May following in Europe, should be the position, which should serve as a basis to the treaty which may be negotiated between the two powers. They added further, that as these epochas might seem too near or too distant for the interest of Great Britain, they were extremely willing to enter into a negotiation upon that object.

The English ministry received this proposition with less satisfaction than its apparent fairness deserved. They entirely rejected the French epochas; and declared that they could not admit, without prejudice to themselves, any other epochas than those which have reference to the day of signing the treaty of peace. Had this resolution been strictly adhered to, it was evident that the negotiation was that moment at an end. For though what was asserted in the French memorial in reply to this declaration, (that the basis of the proposition of uti possidetis was necessarily connected with the particular epochas proposed) is by no means to be admitted; it is on the other hand not easy to deny the validity of their subsequent assertion, "that if not these, at least some certain periods during the war ought to be fixed; and that the uti possidetis could not reasonably have reference only to the time of signing the treaty of peace." For if the contrary principle was once admitted, it would become difficult to know, or even with probability to guess, at the nature or the value of the possessions which by such an article should be mutually given away. And if these difficulties occurred in the simplicity of a possessory article, they must be increased tenfold upon every other, and must come to such an height as to preclude all possibility of negotiation on things of so intricate a nature as exchanges and equivalents. The French in their memorial insisted so strongly on the propriety of establishing these periods, that they threatened to recal the whole proposition if they were not agreed to.

It must doubtless appear at first view surprizing to see France, whose actual situation was very indifferent, contending for a near period, and England, whose affairs were at that time apparently in a prosperous situation, postponing the uti possidetis to one more remote. But the truth is, that in that particular neither party consulted their present condition. They acted wholly on foresight. For though the English, on the 25th of March, when this proposition was made, were carrying on the siege of Cassel, and the other strong places in Hesse, and the enemy had no army in that country to oppose them, it was notwithstanding evident that from the slow progress of those sieges, and from the alacrity of marshal Broglio in collecting his troops, they must be shortly obliged to abandon the enterprize; it was evident that France must be reinstated in the absolute possession of her former conquests long before the epocha of the first of May, the period which they fixed for Europe. Both courts were fully apprized of this. It was therefore the interest of France to offer and of England to reject this near period; especially as the fate of the design on the coast of France was then depending, and our administration seemed to have conceived no mean hopes of its success, and no small opinion of its importance in the negotiation.

The fleet employed in this expedition sailed from Spithead on the 29th of March, and it was soon discovered that Belleisle was the object.

Belleisle, the largest of all the European islands belonging to the French King, is between 12 and 13 leagues in circumference.

The island originally belonged to the earl of Cornouaille, but has been since yielded to the king: it contains only one little city, called Le Palais, three country towns, 103 villages, and about 5000 inhabitants,

The town of Palais takes its name from a castle, belonging to the duke de Belleisle, in its neighbourhood, which is now converted into a citadel, which is a regular and strong fortification, fronting the sea, composed principally of hornwork, and is provided with two dry ditches, the one next the counterscarp, and the other so contrived as to secure the interior fortifications. This citadel is divided from the largest part of the town by an inlet of the sea, over which there is a bridge of communication; from the other part of the town; and which is most inhabited, it is only divided by its own fortifications, and a glacis. There are three nominal harbours in this island, Palais, Sauzon and Goulfard; every one of which labours under some capital defect, either in being exposed, shallow, or dangerous at the entrance. The only branch of trade carried on here is the curing pilchards.

From this state of the island, poor in itself, capable of little improvement, and so ill circumstanced in point of harbours, a sort of a dislike to the expedition began to arise. Several did not see of what considerable service such a conquest could be of to England in time of peace, or of what prejudice to the enemy in time of war. They foresaw that it could not be taken without considerable loss, or kept without considerable expence; and on the whole they apprehended that when exchanges came to be made, France would lay no great stress upon it. On the other hand it was urged, that though the harbours were bad, yet small privateers might issue from thence, greatly to the molestation of the French coasting trade; and that the fleet of England might ride between it and the continent in a well protected road. They imagined the possession of this island, if not of great detriment to the interest of France, would be a grievous wound to her pride; and that those circumstances which had formerly induced her to expend money on the fortifications there, and on the apprehension of an invasion to fill them with a powerful garrison, would likewise persuade her to set a value on the place when it came to be estimated in the treaty.

Whilst they reasoned in this manner in England, the fleet under the command of commodore Keppel, and the land forces under general Hodgson, arrived before Belleisle on the 7th of April, and on the 8th agreed to attempt a landing on the south-east of the island in a sandy bay near Lochmaria point. Here the enemy were in possession of a little fort; they had moreover entrenched themselves on an hill excessively steep, and the foot of which was scraped away. The attempt was made in three places with great resolution: a few grenadiers got on shore, and formed themselves; but as they were not supported, they were for the greater part made prisoners. The rest of the army, after several very brave and repeated efforts, being wholly unable to force the enemies lines, or make good their landing, were obliged to retire with loss; what added to the disaster was, that several of the flat bottomed vessels were destroyed or damaged in an hard gale which followed on our retiring from the shore. This made the prospect of any future attempt more unpleasing even than the first. In this attack we lost in killed, wounded and prisoners, near five hundred men.

Neither commanders nor soldiers were however dispirited by this mortifying repulse. They resolved, if possible, not to return without effect, and then determined diligently to search the whole coast, in order to find a place more favourable for another attack. The view indeed was not encouraging. The island is naturally a fortification; and what nature had left undone to make it such, had been amply supplied by art.

It was a long time after this first failure before the weather would give our commanders an opportunity of a second trial; however they persisted with the utmost steadiness, and found at length a convenient situation. Not that it was a part of the coast less strong than the rest; on the contrary, they built their principal hopes on the excessive steepness and difficulty of the rocks, which had rendered the enemy rather less attentive on this quarter. This arduous attempt was made at a bold rocky shore, near the above-mentioned point of Lockmaria. Besides the principle attack, two feints were made at the same time to distract the enemy, whilst the men of war directed their fire with great judgment and effect on the hills. These manoeuvres gave brigadier general Lambert with an handful of men, an opportunity of climbing up a very steep rock, without molestation. This little body having thus prosperously gained the top of the hill, formed themselves in good order, and without delay. [April 25.] They were immediately attacked by three hundred of the French, but they maintained their advantage with resolution until the whole corps of brigadier Lambert, which now had ascended in the same manner, arrived to their assistance, and repulsed the enemy (a)

The landing of all the forces was made good in a short time after. The loss in this daring and successful attempt, was inconsiderable. In one or two places the enemy seemed disposed to make some stand; but the body of light horse, which was embarked in this expedition, soon drove them to the town, and laid all quite open to the intrenchments before it. The great difficulty now consisted in bringing forward the cannon, which were first to be dragged up the rocks, and afterwards, for two leagues, along a very rugged and broken road. This necessarily took up some time. However the siege was commenced with vigour: and the garrison, commanded by the chevalier de St. Croix. a brave and experienced officer, threatened on their side a long and obstinate defence. Nothing in fact was deficient on either part. The enemy made some sallies; one of them with considerable effect. Major Gen. Crawford was made prisoner on this occasion. But our troops were only animated by these checks. A furious attack was made upon the enemies lines which covered the town, and they were carried without much loss; principally by the uncommon intrepidity of a company of marines which had been but newly raised, No action of greater spirit and gallantry had been performed during the whole war.

The town was now entirely abandoned, and the defence confined to the citadel. It was obvious, that as our fleet prevented all communication with the continent, and thereby cut off all hopes of relief, the place must necessarily be reduced; but the chevalier de St. Croix was resolved to provide for his own honour, when he could not for the preservation of the place entrusted to him, and, since he could not maintain it, to sell it as dear a possible. Accordingly there was no mention of yielding, until the 7th of June, when there was no longer the slightest prospect of succour, and the place was by no means safely tenable. Then he capitulated, and the garrison marched out with the honours of war.

Thus was the island of Belleisle reduced under the English government, after a defence of two months. In this expedition we had about eighteen hudred men killed and wounded. The loss most regretted was, that of Sir William Peere Williams, a young gentleman of great talents and expectations, and who had made a distinguished figure in parliament. He had but newly entered into the service. He was shot in the night, by having carelessly approached too near a centinel of the enemy. He was the third person of family whom in this war, the love of enterprize had brought to an honourable death in these expeditions to the coast of France.

Whatever difference of opinion might have been entertained concerning the value of this conquest, or the price which was paid for it, the rejoicing in London was great and sincere. The general and the land and sea officers employed in the expedition were the subject of very just applause, who with so noble a perseverance had struggled with, and had overcome such great difficulties, and who had the spirit, after such a disaster on their outset, to renew an attack under circumstances nearly as unfavourable as those by which they had been at first foiled. The city of London addressed the King on the occasion. And it was generally expected that this new proof of our superiority must influence the negotiation in our favour. Some however were of opinion, that it would rather exasperate the French, and irritate their pride to renew these efforts which their misfortunes had slackened when they saw us in the midst of a treaty making attempts, and carrying places in Old France, and as it were, in the presence of that haughty court. However as there was nothing done that was not strictly justifiable, no complaint was made, and the treaty proceeded, to all appearance with as much good humour as before.

CHAP. IV.

England and France agree to treat of a seperate peace. Epochas proposed by England. Court of Vienna agrees. Objects of the negotiation. Proposals of France with regard to Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. French memorial concerning Spain. Indignation of the English minister. English answer to the French memorial.

IT must be observed, that though the courts of London and Versailles treated seperately, it was hitherto by no means proposed, that this seperate discussion should lead to a seperate peace. It was no more than a previous arrangement for the removal of those difficulties, which might prevent the peace of France with England from being united with the general peace of Europe. But in proportion as the treaty advanced, it became obvious, that the settling of any terms, which had no reference to the signature of something obligatory between the two crowns, could at best be only void and illusory, and might in the end even prove the source of dangerous and captious altercations. The English minister therefore, before he would agree to that definitively upon any point, and particularly upon the epochas, insisted upon two preliminary conditions.

First, that every thing, which should be happily adjusted between the two crowns in relation to their particular war, shall be made obligatory, final, and conclusive, independent of the fate of the negotiation of Augsburg.

Secondly, that the definitive treaty of peace between Great Britain and France, or preliminary articles to that end, shall be signed and ratified between the date of that memorial and the first of the following August.

If these conditions were accepted, then England on her part consented to name determinate epochas, to which the uti possidetis should refer; the first of July for Europe; the first of September for Africa and America; and the first of November for the East Indies. The French ministry without contesting the epochas themselves, complained of the conditions; of the first, because they said it departed from the letter and spirit of the memorial of the 26th of March, which was the foundation of the whole treaty; of the second, on account of the extreme shortness of the time allotted for the discussion of some difficult and momentous points; and the adjustment of matters which regarded a war extended over the four quarters of the globe; for the memorial which contained those conditions, was dated on the 17th, and was not received at Paris until the end of June, so that little more than a month was left to obtain the consent of the court of Vienna to a seperate treaty, to settle the terms of this treaty, and finally, to ratify it.

If a very uncommon good understanding had not subsisted between her imperial Majesty and the king of France, it must have been very difficult to have received this consent. But in fact it was immediately received, and upon one very short and apparently reasonable condition, "That nothing might be stipulated to the prejudice of the house of Austria." But when this condition came to be explained, as we shall see presently, it was so far from faciliating, that it created new obstacles to the peace. However, this acquiescence of the principal of her allies, enabled France to accept of the first condition without reserve; and to the last she verbally, though not in the clearest terms, agreed also.

Things seemed for the present in the best situation, which in this stage of the treaty could be expected. The basis of the negotiation was solidly established. The article uti possidetis, since the taking Belleisle, was a matter of less difficulty, and the epochas were in general settled in such a manner, as to coincide with the designs and desires of both parties. The treaty was confined to the two powers, and it was to be perfectly definitive as to them. A time for concluding it, was also in a great measure settled; a circumstance, which if it did not admit sufficient leisure for accurate discussion, cut off however the opportunities of chicane, and seemed to be the most suitable to a candid proceeding, and a sincere desire of peace.

The foundation being thus laid, the superstructure was the next consideration. This superstructure consisted in the adjustment of those compensations which were to be made for the reciprocal conquests (and here the difficulty lay) of the two powers; a punctilio of honour might have intervened at the very first setting out, extremely pernicious to the salutary work in hand; from which party the first proposition should proceed? But in this respect France gave way, and that concession afforded no inconsiderable proof of her pacific intentions.

We must apprize the reader that we do not mean to enter exactly into the whole detail of this negotiation, nor undertake precisely to describe all the turns that were taken in it. This, we imagine, would prove a tedious and unacceptable performance. We shall attach ourselves to the capital objects which were contended for in this game of policy: We shall endeavour to point out the matters which first obstructed, and then finally broke off the treaty; and we shall rest on these things in such a manner, as seems to us fittest for marking out the true spirit of the negotiating powers. Our own observations shall be very sparingly interposed. We are historians, and not advocates.

The uti possidetis being settled as the basis of the treaty, nothing could reasonably be claimed by either party, that was not to be counterpoised by some equivalent from the other; and consequently it was necessary to adjust and value their several possessions, pretensions and demands. There were six principal objects in this negotiation. First, the limits of the two crowns in North America. Secondly, the conquests of Great Britain in the West-Indies, (together with the Neutral Islands there.) Thirdly, our conquests in Africa and in India. Fourthly, the adjustment of the particular affair between the English and French in Germany. Fifthly, the conduct which the two crowns were to hold with regard to their respective allies in Germany. And lastly, the restitution of the captures made by England, previous to the declaration of war.

On the first of these articles, France proposed to cede and guaranty all Canada to England; stipulating only that the free and publick exercises of the Roman Catholick religion should be permitted under the English government, and that those of the old French colonists who chose to retire might have leave to transport themselves from thence, and take away or dispose of their effects. In compensation for this, they required a confirmation of the privilege 〈◊〉 what fishing they enjoyed on the coast of Newfoundland, under the treaty of Utrecht; and that this fishery might be carried on with advantage, they likewise required the restitution of the isle of Cape Breton, excluding themselves in return from erecting on that island any kind of fortification whatsoever.

The affairs in the West-Indies, which make the second capital object, they proposed to settle in this manner. They offered to exchange Minorca for Guadaloupe and Marigalante; and as to the four Neutral Islands, they insisted that two of them, Dominica and St. Vincent, were held by their natural inhabitants the Carribees, under the protection of France, and that they ought still to remain in the same condition. With regard to the two others, they proposed to make a fair division; that St. Lucia should remain to France, and that England should enter into possession of Tobago. On this head it is sufficient to observe, that in the opinion of some people, our ministry did not, in this treaty, set the just value on the acquisition they had made; when they looked upon Canada as the great and leading object, and only considered Guadaloupe and Marigalante in a secondary and subordinate light. This is a question of difficulty, and has been much agitated. Those who dread a fresh American war from the ambition of France, and were struck with the idea of extended empire, preferred the former conquest; those who solely considered our interest as a commercial people, were generally in favour of the latter.

On the side of Africa, France satisfied herself with demanding either the settlement at Senegal, or the isle of Goree: for which (together with the restoration of Belleisle) they consented to evacuate Gottingen, Hesse and Hanau, and to draw off their army to the Maine and the Rhine. This was certainly a full equivalent. But with regard to the East-Indies, they had no tolerable equivalent to offer. They expatiated much in their memorial upon the disadvantages which must arise to the companies of the two nations, from their entertaining views of conquest, so contrary to the true spirit, and the real interest of these trading establishments; and they concluded by proposing the treaty, formerly settled between the sieurs Godcheau and Saunders, as a basis for the re-establishment of peace in Asia. It must be remarked, that this treaty had been concluded at a time when the affairs of France in the East Indies made a figure very different from their present situation; and therefore it seemed unfair to make this treaty a standard under circumstances altogether inapplicable.

The war, which has been so long, with so much bloodshed and so fruitlessly carried on in Westphalia, the French strenuously contended, was from the time of (what they called) the breach of the capitulation of Closter-Seven, a war purely English; and therefore that their conquests in that part of Germany, formed a proper compensation for the English conquests in the other quarters of the world. Our ministers did not attempt formally to refute this assertion; they rather seemed to admit it; and they agreed accordingly to receive the evacuation of these places as an equivalent for cessions to be made on the footing we have already mentioned. On this point there was little difficulty.

The intricate and knotty part was on what we have stated as the fifth object; the conduct of the two crowns with regard to their allies. Here was a real, a capital difficulty. From the beginning of the negotiation, England had declared that they would inviolably preserve their faith to the King of Prussia, and would act strenuously in his support. This picqued the French ministers; who, in their turn, thought themselves bound to make a declaration equally strong in favour of the empress; and they had, moreover, recently conditioned with the court of Vienna, to admit nothing in the treaty to her disadvantage; words of great latitude. However, in this difficulty, they found out a solution, which it must be confessed, had a very fair and captivating appearance. They proposed that both armies in Germany should observe an exact neutrality; and should be reciprocally bound to afford no sort of assistance, nor to give no sort of offence to the allies of either of the parties And they proposed further, that as armies in this state •∣inert neutrality must be a dead and useless expence to the power who maintains them, the French king, from the time his Britannic majesty recalled the English forces from Germany, would cause double the number of French forces from the armies of the Upper and Lower Rhine to return into France; and that no French troops should remain in Germany but in proportion to those which the king 〈◊〉 England should keep in his pay. It might certainly be urged in confirmation of the propriety of this offer, that is reality these armies, whilst they continued in action, though they worried each other abundantly, afforded no kind of assistance to their allies, and therefore, when they came mutually to entertain pacific sentiments concerning their own particular quarrel, and were to give an example of moderation to the rest of Europe, there seemed to be no reason why they should make efforts in favour of any ally which they had not made, or been able to make in the hottest time of hostility.

The last article had its difficulties also. The French insisted, as a point from which they were resolved never to recede, upon the restitution of the captures made before the declaration of war. This demand, they were of opinion, was grounded on the clearest principles of the law of nations, and the most express stipulation of treaties. Without entering into these various arguments with which this position might be maintained and attacked, it appeared to many that the honour of both nations was almost equally concerned, the one to claim, the other as resolutely to refuse this restitution.

On the whole, these proposals, which the French sent to London in a memorial of the 15th of July, formed, tho' in some respects undoubtedly exceptionable, a very agreeable plan for a treaty of peace. A better could not have been expected in the first project of an enemy, and it might be hoped, that a negotiation thus favourably begun, could not fail of adjusting easily whatever appeared wrong, or supplying whatever was defective in this first draught of the propositions. But fatally for the repose of mankind, in the very instant that this fair proposal was made, at the very moment when these strong demonstrations were given, an act was done which blew up at one explosion, the whole basis of the treaty that had been long and carefully laying, scattered the materials which had been so industriously collected, and so cautiously arranged, and instead of extinguishing, spread the flames of war more widely, and made them rage with new fury. From this time forward all the transaction was full of animosity, resentment and mistrust. The reader has been apprized of the measures which France had been invariably pursuing at the court of Madrid, and the arguments she employed to infuse a jealousy into that court. Hitherto however, there was no appearance that these measures had any effect; but to the infinite surprize and indignation of the British minister, together with the memorial which contained the above recited propositions, Mr. Bussy, the French agent, delivered a private memorial, signifying, that in order to establish the peace upon solid foundations, not to be shaken by the contested interests of a third power, the king of Spain might be invited to accede to guaranty the treaty, and that to prevent the differences which subsisted between Great Britain and this monarchy from being a means of producing a fresh war in Europe, with the consent and communication of his Catholic majesty, he proposes, that in this negotiation, the three points, which had been disputed between the crowns of England and Spain, might be finally settled. First, the restitution of some captures made upon the Spanish flag. Secondly, the privilege of the Spanish nation to fish on the banks of Newfoundland. Thirdly, the demolition of the English settlements made on the Spanish territories in the bay of Honduras.

It may be easily imagined, from the character of the then secretary of state, in what manner he received these proposals: he rejected with the utmost scorn, the offer of negotiating, through an enemy humbled, and almost at his feet, the disputes of his nation, with a power actually in friendship with us. He called upon the Spanish minister to disavow the propositions, which had been said to be made with the knowledge of his court. He returned as wholly in admissible this offensive memorial, declaring, that it would be looked upon as an affront to the dignity of his master, and incompatible with the sincerity of the negotiation, to make any further mention of such a circumstance.

And now he prepared, without delay, an answer to the principal memorial, in a stile rather dictated by the circumstances which accompanied that paper, and which sufficiently indicated the designs of France, than what the propositions themselves strictly deserved. Indeed, as he had by this time conceived an incurable suspicion of the sincerity of France in the whole proceeding, it would not have been prudent to have made those advances, which on a supposition of good faith and pacific intentions, might possibly have been adviseable; for though both powers had over and over declared, that their respective propositions, if the treaty should by any accident be broken off, would be considered as retracted or never made; yet it is certain, tha• things once settled and agreed to, unavoidably stamp their own impression upon any future negotiation, relative to the same subject.

Mr. Pitt's answer, which is dated on the 29th of July, agrees to the restitution of Guadaloupe, Marigalante and Belleisle, on the compensations proposed by France. It agrees also to receive Canada, but without any new limits or any exception whatsoever; and it adds to the French offer of all Canada, "its appurtenances." It admits the proposal of the partition of the Neutral Islands. It rejects the French demand of Cape Breton, or of any other island in the gulph or river of St. Lawrence; or of any power of fishing in that river, in that gulph, or on those coasts; and it allows the privilege of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, only on consideration of the demolition of Dunkirk. But the proposed restitution either of Senegal or Goree, is utterly refused. The German neutrality is rejected with disdain; and it is declared that Great Britain is unalterably resolved to support the king of Prussia with efficacy and good faith. In addition to the offer made to evacuate Hesse, &c. it is insisted that the French shall make a general evacuation of all her conquests in Westphalia, and all its countries, including its conquests from the king of Prussia on the Rhine, though France had before declared, that they were conquered for the queen of Hungary, that they were actually governed in her name, and that she could not, consistently with good faith, agree to deliver them to the king of Prussia. The treaty between Saunders and Godcheau was not admitted as a proper basis for a treaty relative to the East Indies. But it was agreed, that the two companies should negotiate concerning their respective interests, as the king of Great Britain could not dispose of the rights of the English East India company without their consent. As to the restitution of the captures before the war, this was most positively refused.

In this period we leave the negotiation to follow the motions of the armies in Germany. It is certain, that the dispositions of the two courts grew daily more unfavourable: their confidence in each other, and their mutual good-will wore away; and it was to be feared, that this negotiation, if it broke off in an unsatisfactory manner, must leave impressions on the minds of the two nations of such a nature, as might cause them to wish they had never engaged in it.

CHAP. V.

Motions of the French and allied armies. General Sporcken attacked. French pass the Dymel. Skirmishes. Position of prince Ferdinand. Junction of Broglio and Soubise. Battle of Kirch Denkern. French defeated. French threaten Hanover. Prince Henry of Brunswick killed. Taking of Dorsten. Various movements of the armies. Destruction of Schartsfelts-castle. Prince Xavier of Saxony takes Wolfenbuttle, and invests Brunswick. Detachments from prince Soubise take and abandon Embden. Attempt on Bremen. Sufferings of Lower Westphalia.

ALthough the great purpose of the early and strenuous effort made by the allies was not fully answered, it nevertheless produced, as we have before observed, a very considerable and useful effect. The destruction of the French magazines retarded their operations in such a manner, that the greatest part of the month of June was spent before their armies found themselves in a condition to act. But as soon as they had taken proper measures for their subsistence, the prince of Soubise caused his troops to pass the Rhine, and to advance on the side of Munster, not far from which city the hereditary prince of Brunswick was posted to oppose him. Marshal Broglio assembled the forces under his command at Cassel, and moved towards the Dymel, in order to effect a junction with the body under the prince of Soubise. They made no doubt that their conjoining strength would soon attain a decided superiority over the allies, who had ended their late enterprize with a loss which was considerable, and which in their circumstances, they could not well bear, nor easily supply.

These hopes were supported by the success of their first encounter. General Sporcken with a strong detachment had been posted in an advantageous situation on the Dymel, and in the front of the allied army. On the approach of Marshal Broglio, he attempted to retire with all that expedition which his inferiority made necessary. But the French came upon him with such rapidity, [June 29.] that they overtook and attacked his rear, which was instantly routed; they took 800 prisoners, 19 pieces of cannon, 400 horses, and upwards of 170 waggons. The same day they passed the Dymel; and whilst prince Ferdinand, discouraged by this check, fell back to the Lippe, they made themselves masters of Warburg, [July 2.] Dringleburg, and Paderborn.

The allies, however, soon recovered their spirits; and the main body of their army being well secured, they sent out several detachments. Their small bodies were conducted by General Luckner, and other able partizans, who undertook several bold and very distant enterprizes, attacked the enemy where they were least upon their guard, routed their convoys, destroyed several of their magazines, carriages and horses, and carried off their prey even from the gates of Cassel. These lively actions seemed a prelude to some more important and decisive attempt.

The French became sensible that a stroke of some importance was expected from the greatness of their force, and that it was not for the credit of their arms only, but for their security from the minute, but continual and galling attempts of parties from the allied army.

For some time prince Ferdinand had been posted to the south of the Lippe, between Ham and Lipstadt. This position he took, in all probability, because M. Broglio had, by occupying the places on the Dymel, got between him and Hanover. Therefore he judged it expedient for him in his turn to get between the prince de Soubise and the Rhine. In this situation, if the enemy attempted any movement towards the king's dominions, he was ready to fall directly on the places they occupied by that river, which, in the present circumstances, were full as important to them as the Hanoverian territory was to us. Thus whilst he seemed to retire from that territory, and in a manner to abandon it, he in reality provided with the greater effect for its security.

Marshal Broglio, when he had resolved on the attack of the allied army, united his troops to those of the prince de Soubise, at a place called Soest, between Lipstadt and Ham. On the other hand, as soon as the general of the allies was apprized of their intention he posted his army in a very strong and advantageous manner.

The river Aest runs for a considerable way, almost parallel to the Lippe, from which it is not distant in some places, much more than half a mile. The high road from Lipstadt, to Ham passes between these rivers; and it was of the utmost moment to prince Ferdinand to secure that important communication by which, alone he could hope an advantageous retreat, or in any degree propose to command the adjacent country. With a view therefore to protect that communication, he established his left wing on the Isthmus between the rivers. The left extremity of that wing under General Wutgenau, leaning to the Lippe, by which it was perfectly secured, as the right was supported by the village of Kirch Denkern, situated immediately on the Aest. The marquis of Granby commanded in that wing, with the assistance of lieutenant general Howard and the prince of Anhalt, who were posted towards the above-mentioned village.

At that village another river called the Saltzbach, small, but very deep, joins the Aest almost in a right angle. Behind this river on a considerable eminence was placed the centre commanded by general Conway; and on the continuation of the same eminence, the right wing, under the hereditary prince, stretched out towards the village of Werle, and it was well defended on the flank by rugged, bushy, and almost impracticable ground. Nothing could be more advantageous than this disposition of the army, by which the whole centre and right wing were covered in front by the river, and the left supported by rivers on both its flanks. In the left indeed was the strength and flower of the army; the count of Lippe had placed also in this wing, the greatest part of the artillery, as he knew that it defended the most important situation, was the most exposed in front, and consequently would be the object of the enemy's most considerable efforts.

He was not mistaken in his conjecture. On the 15th of July, in the evening, a very furious attack was made on lord Granby's posts, which was sustained for a long time with all the intrepidity and firmness, which British troops always exert, and which that gallant officer knows so well how to inspire. The disposition we have just mentioned, was not then compleated; so that they had the whole torrent of that impetuosity, which distinguishes the French in their first attacks, to resist for some hours, until Wutgenau, according to the plan originally projected, arrived to their assistance, and then with efforts united and redoubled in a long and obstinate combat, which continued untill it was quite dark, they repulsed the French and drove them into the woods.

By the next morning, the disposition of the allies was perfected; [July 16.] and it was evident that the French, far from being dismayed by their misfortune, were preparing for a more general and better sustained attack than the former. M. Broglio commanded against our left, which, as on the preceeding day, was the principal object of the enemy. The prince de Soubise led their centre on their left. The engagement began at three in the morning, and it was a severe and continued fire for upwards of five hours, before the least effect could be perceived on either side. The weight of the attack this day lay on Wutgenau's corps, which supported it with a degree of bravery, that rivaled the stand which had been lately made by the British forces. But about nine, the prince discovered that the enemy were preparing to erect batteries on an emminence, in the front of the Marquis of Granby's camp, which he had not been able to enclose within his lines. Sensible of the pressing necessity there was of preventing the enemy from seizing on an eminence, from whence they might cruelly gall his army, he called in a reserve, which had been placed at the other side of the Lippe under general Sporcken. Strengthened by this supply, and encouraged by the irresolution which now began to appear in the motions of the enemy, he commanded the troops which were nearest at hand to advance upon them.

This movement was decisive, the enemy gave way, fell into disorder, and retired with precipitation. Their centre and left, which had not been able to pass the Saltzbach, after a long and effectual cannonade, retired with the rest, and covered their retreat; so that favour'd by this circumstance, and the closeness of the country, which was full of hedges, they marched off in tolerable order, and were pursued but a little way. However, their loss was considerable: the Regiment of Rouge, consisting of four battalions, with its cannon and colours, was entirely taken by the single battalion of Maxwell. Their whole loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, has been estimated at 5000. The allies had about 300 killed, 1000 wounded, and about 200 prisoners. This action was the climax of the campaign of 1761 (a), in Westphalia; it did the greatest honour to the wisdom of the accomplished commander in the disposition, and to the bravery of the troops in the combat; but it was far from decisive. Notwithstanding the loss the French suffered, they were still much superior, in their numbers. On this misfortune the old ill understanding between Soubise and Broglio broke out with fresh animosity. Narratives, memorials, and replies, conceived with great bitterness, were mutually remitted from both marshals to their court. Marshal Broglio alledged, that his misfortune was owing to the prince de Soubise's delay, who did not begin the attack till it was too late for him to continue it; the prince de Soubise, on the other hand, suggested, that Broglio began his attack earlier than the time that had been fixed, in hopes of forcing the allies without Soubise's assistance; and when he found that point lost, obliged Soubise to retreat, that he might not have the honour of recovering it.

The allies after this battle kept their ground for some time, whilst the French retreated. It is impossible regularly to account for all the unexpected turns which have happened, perhaps, more in this campaign, than in any of the former. It is enough to know that the original superiority of the French, together with their opportunity of continual reinforcement, may very tolerably explain the reason of the advantages which they so often obtained after very considerable defeats. This is a point which it is necessary the reader should continually keep in his mind during the whole narration of this strange war. After their late loss and retreat, the French soon advanced again. The party under the prince de Soubise passed the Lippe, and made dispositions for the siege of Munster, whilst marshal Broglio's army turned off on the other side, crossed the Weser, and threatened to fall in upon Hanover.

This division of the enemy compelled prince Ferdinand, though little in a condition for it, to divide his army also. The hereditary prince posted himself to cover Munster; whilst prince Ferdinand continued in the country towards the Weser, to observe the motions of marshal Broglio.

Whilst these various positions were mutually taken, as the armies were continually moving near each other, a number of very sharp skirmishes ensued. Marshal Broglio cautiously avoided a battle whenever he saw that the duke of Brunswick, by calling together his troops, had prepared for, and was desirous of it; so that there was no way left, but if possible, to check his motions, and wear down his force, by reiterated lesser actions (b). These actions were 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 almost always to the advantage of our troops. In one of them however, the young prince Henry of Brunswick was mortally wounded; and the whole army saw with regret, [July 20.] the disappointment of such great hopes as were formed from the rising gallantry of a prince, who so nobly supported the martial spirit of his family, and had fallen whilst he was emulating the heroic actions of his brother the hereditary prince and his uncle Ferdinand.

On the side of Westphalia, the prince de Soubise persevered, notwithstanding some checks, in his design of laying siege to Munster; there was great reason to apprehend that he might succeed in that enterprize, as it was always in marshal Broglio's power, by taking some steps on the side of Hanover, to make it necessary to draw away the greatest part of the force destined to the succour of Munster. He therefore began to make the previous arrangements at Dorsten. The hereditary prince, who knew that he was continually liable to be called off, took the first opportunity of attacking this place. [Aug. 30.] A battalion of French troops formed its garrison, and made a brave defence, but it was assaulted with so much resolution and perseverance, that they were obliged to surrender prisoners of war. The prince totally destroyed the ovens [1] which were established here, and by this means not only frustrated their design of besieging Munster, but compelled them for a time, to retire from the Lippe.

As to prince Ferdinand, he saw clearly, that the intentions of marshal Broglio were to make himself master of his majesty's, and the duke of Brunswick's territories. To attempt to follow him, and to beat him from thence, would only be irrecoverably to transfer the seat of war into those countries, and wholly to abandon Westphalia to the enemy. Diversion therefore, and not direct opposition, became his object. He resolved, that as often as he perceived marshal Broglio making any progress on the suspected quarter, he should throw himself as far into Hesse as the enemy had advanced towards Hanover, and by stopping their subsistence, oblige them to quit their enterprize. This plan at first succeeded to his wishes, and drew back marshal Broglio into Hesse, upon whose approach prince Ferdinand retired to his old quarters at Paderborn, and ready for a new movement as soon as Broglio should return to the execution of his former design. [Oct. 19.]

Accordingly he soon returned to the Weser. Then the hereditary prince, who had by this time re-joined the grand army, advanced into Hesse, and pushed to the farthest extremities of that country, even as far as Fritzlar; but tho' he succeeded so far in his attempts as to destroy all the lesser magazines which he found in the open country; yet as all the fortresses were in the hands of the enemy, as the garrisons had been newly reinforced and the grand magazines were well secured in those places, he kept his ground in his advanced position.

It was on this occasion principally that prince Ferdinand found the disadvantage of not being able to form two armies, which might act seperately. For on one hand, marshal Broglio, when he had perfectly secured his posts in Hesse, took a situation in which he watched all the motions of prince Ferdinand, and kept himself in readiness to fall back into Hesse, or to advance into Hanover, as might best agree with his designs. From hence he sent out some powerful detachments which acted with great effect. One of these detachments entered the Harts Forest (the remains of the great Hercynian, so famous among the antients) and besieged the strong castle of Schartsfelts, which they took and demolished. Then they laid the whole tract of country under severe contribution. Another, and still more powerful detachment under prince Xavier of Saxony appeared before Wolfenbuttle, a considerable city, and strongly situated, [Oct. 5.] as it is wholly surrounded by the Ocker. But the French, as they knew that the town is mostly built of wood, commenced their operations with a very fierce bombardment. This had such an effect, that the resistance of the place was not proportioned to its strength; in five days it surrendered, and was subject, like the rest, to a grievous contribution.

Flushed with this success, the French followed their blow, and advanced, keeping still the course of the Ocker, to Brunswick; and began also to invest that city. The reigning prince, unable to protect his subjects, or to secure his person in his dominions, fled to Hamburgh, where he met the landgrave of Hesse, whom the rage of war had in the same manner driven from his territories. This free city now became a place of general refuge, and enriched itself by the calamities, as it had in better times done by the prosperity of Germany. It was lately computed, that the strangers there had increased to 40,000, amongst whom they could reckon two sovereign princes, and several other persons of the first distinction.

This rapid and unresisted progress of the French to the eastward of the Weser, was to the highest degree alarming. Prince Ferdinand with all the expedition in his power, detached the hereditary prince to the relief of Brunswick. This measure fortunately saved that very important place. This active commander compelled the enemy not only to raise the siege of Brunswick, but to abandon Wolfenbuttel, and to make a precipitate retreat with the loss of some of their cannon, and upwards of 1000 men.

Whilst Broglio's detachments proceeded thus in distressing the country to the eastward of the Weser, the prince of Soubise, who by the removal of the hereditary prince of Brunswick to another quarter, saw no longer any thing capable of opposing him, spread his army by detachments over all Westphalia, and ravaged it in the most cruel manner. They took Osnabrug; and because the contributions were not immediately paid, they gave up the place to be pillaged by their troops, who rifled the miserable inhabitants without mercy. Another body pushed as far as Embden. This important town was immediately surrendered by the garrison (two English companies of invalids) at the desire of the timid inhabitants, and the promise of a favourable treatment: notwithstanding this capitulation, and the merit of so easy a surrender, the town, as well as the whole country of East-Friesland, was laid under a ruinous contribuon. But their exorbitances grew to such an extremity, that the boors were at length compelled to rise, and with such arms as a sudden rage supplied them, to drive these oppressors out of their country.

A more considerable corps commanded by the prince de Conde, laid siege to Meppen, a place on the Ems, of some consequence, [Oct. 13.] and where we had some magazines. In three days it was reduced, and the garrison of five hundred men were made prisoners of war.

The city of Bremen was defended by a weak garrison. This was a place of far greater moment than Meppen, the allies having amassed their immense magazines, as it was a great and trading town, advantageously situated on the river Weser; and the possession of this place must undoubtedly have given to the French the command of that river, thro' which the allies derived all their subsistence. If the English had lost Bremen, they must have seen themselves invested and locked up in a barren counrry, in the heart of Germany, surrounded by their enemies, and deprived of every resource. Fortunately the inhabitants of this city proved as brave as those of Embden were timid. They were exasperated by the example of the French rigour, which they had seen on every side of them. They therefore joined the garrison, instead of discouraging them in the defence of the place. The French were obliged to retire precipitately; and a strong reinforcement was thrown into Bremen, to secure that very important city from the like enterprizes for the future.

Whilst the two French armies in this manner ravaged all the country held by the allies, prince Ferdinand, who saw the rage of war spread all around him, with his usual firmness, kept that central position which he had taken soon after the battle of Kirch Denkern; no movements of the enemy could terrify or allure him from it. He had settled his head quarters at Buhne, and his army extended from thence towards Hammelen. Posted in this manner, he secured the course of the Weser, by preventing the enemy from making themselves masters either of Hammelen or Minden; he lay in the best situation in which it was possible to place a single army, that was to act against two; and knowing that he could not follow their movements with the body of his army, without hazarding the king's electoral dominions, and indeed every object of the war, he contented himself with sending out such detachments as he could spare, successively to the relief of the places which were attacked. He saw that the winter approached, which had always been a circumstance fayourable to him; and it was evident that whilst he continued with his main body immoveably fixed as it was, and his detachments active on every side, it was impossible for the enemy to keep any of those places, they had seized in their incursions.

CHAP. VI.

Condition of the King of Prussia. His inaction. Motions of the Russians and Laudohn. Breslau cannonaded. Tottleben removed. Colberg besieged. Russian magazines in Poland destroyed. War transferred to Pomerania. King of Prussia quits his strong camp. Schweidnitz taken by a coup de main. General Platen repulsed. General Knoblock made prisoner at Treptow. Prince Wurtenburg retreats. Colberg taken, Russians winter in Pomerania.

UNTIL this year the operations of the Prussian armies took the lead in interest and importance before all the other events of the war. The firmness and activity of their illustrious monarch, the number and animosity of his enemies, the blows that he gave, and those that he suffered, his distressing and terrible falls, his amazing and almost miraculous recoveries, kept all eyes fixed on his motions, as the great centre of public attention. Undoubtedly nothing that has ever been acted on the scene of human affairs, attracted the minds of men to it with greater justice; none perhaps afforded at once more entertainment to the imagination, and furnished more copious materials for political and military instruction; and probably, therefore, this part of all our modern history, will be the most carefully studied by posterity, when it comes to be properly known, and worthily written.

To judge of the importance of this branch of the general war, it will be proper to recollect that, besides a number of sieges which were prosecuted, together with innumerable and bloody skirmishes, no less than nineteen pitched battles, or capital actions, have been fought on his part since the close of the year 1756, when the king of Prussia first seized upon Saxony, and made an iruption into Bohemia. In eleven of these battles, the King or his generals were defeated. He was victorious only in eight. Ten of them were fought under his own command; and seven out of the eight victories which were gained, were obtained by himself in person; of the eleven defeats, he was present only at three.

From these circumstances some judgment may be formed of the active and enterprizing character of this monarch, and of the amazing resource he had prepared, or formed, or seized, and in some instances, one may say, almost created. We have observed that the last campaign had ended more to his advantage than the one preceding had done; for those two great victories of Lignitz and Torgau, with which he then ended his operations, had not only rescued his affairs in Silesia and Saxony from impending destruction, but had enlarged his field for recruiting, and prepared him, to all appearance, for more early and vigorous action, than could have been expected in most of the preceding campaigns. But every one was surprized to observe, that this year he had totally altered the system of his conduct. An inactivity and languor was diffused over all his proceedings. He seemed to have adopted the caution and slowness which had been so long opposed to his vivacity by M. Daun. The summer was almost wholly spent, and the King of Prussia had scarcely been mentioned.

It was not suspected that the proposed negotiation at Augsburg could have had much, if any influence upon his method of proceeding. No particular proposals had been made concerning his affairs, nor indeed any other marks of a pacific disposition towards him shewn, except what were contained in those general declarations, which a regard to common decency had exacted. It must have added to the anxiety of his situation, that Great Britain and France were at that time engaged in a separate treaty, in which the latter power was in a condition to make so many flattering offers in relation to Germany, that he might well have dreaded the withdrawing of that assistance which had hitherto been his great support against all attacks, and his final resource in all his distresses. Perhaps he was well assured, that the faith of Great Britain was proof against every offer, however alluring; in fact it proved to be so; for in rejecting the German neutrality, which the French proposed in the late negotiation, our country afforded as convincing a proof of an unshaken public faith, as any people had ever given to their allies.

However, whilst this point remained in any degree of suspence, it would have appeared natural, that the King of Prussia should make some uncommon exertions to confirm the faith of his allies, as well as to put himself upon a more respectable footing at the ensuing congress. It is, notwithstanding certain, that he contented himself with acting wholly upon the defensive; a conduct, which perhaps his circumstances had rendered absolutely unavoidable. Prince Henry commanded an army in Saxony, which intrenched itself strongly under Leipsic. M. Daun continued near Dresden; and these two armies did no more than watch each other during the campaign. The King was also intrenched in a very strong position in Upper Silesia, not far from Schweidnitz, whilst the fortresses in the lower part of that country were filled with such garrisons, as put them out of the reach of any sudden insult.

This position was pointed out by the motions and apparent designs of his enemies. The Russian army was this year, as well as in the former, divided into two strong bodies; one of which, led by Tottleben, directed its march towards Pomerania: and the other under M. Butterlin, entered into the upper Silesia, advancing towards Breslau Baron Laudohn entered that province in the part opposite to them, and they proposed to unite their armies, in order to attack the King, or to take Breslau or Schweidnitz in his presence. The remarkable drought in the beginning of the season, which had greatly lowered the Oder, facilitated their junction. The Russians spread themselves over all the open country of Silesia; and exacted heavy contributions. [Aug. 1.] A body of them appeared before Breslau, and began to cannonade the town from seven batteries. Laudohn exerted the whole of his skill to draw the king from his post, and to engage him in a disadvantageous action. Sometimes he advanced, as if he meant to join the Russians: sometimes his motions indicated a design on Schweidnitz; these attempts failing, he turned off and made a feint as if he proposed to fall upon the Lower Silesia, in hopes that he might at least oblige the King of Prussia to detach and divide his forces; but the King continued immoveable in his post.

Whilst these various movements were making with little effect, on the side of Silesia, the other grand division of the Russians advanced without opposition into Pomerania; and it was expected that their proceedings would be attended with greater effect since the removal of Tottleben, and the appointment of general Romanzow to the command. Tottleben had been long suspected, and, it is said, at length convicted, of a secret correspondence with the King of Prussia. The situation of this Monarch obliged him to fight with every sort of weapon; and Tottleben, a soldier of fortune, without any national attachment or particular allegiance, was a fit object for the King of Prussia's pecuniary stratagems. He did not succeed so well in the attempts of the same kind which he is said to have made upon Laudohn. Every circumstance concurred to render the method of corruption less successful in that quarter.

Colberg, regularly besieged, or closely streightened every campaign, since the Russians made themselves masters of the kingdom of Prussia, was now assaulted with greater and more determined force than ever. A strong fleet consisting of forty sail of all kinds, blockaded it by sea, whilst the army of general Romanzow formed the siege by land. On the other hand, the place threatened a defence worthy of its former efforts. This city was from the beginning of the war of greater strength than it had commonly been represented; every attempt of the Russians, by demonstrating where any weakness lay, taught the Prussians, who were fully sensible of its importance, in what part and in what manner it was necessary to add to its works; and they had omitted no opportunity. In addition to this defence, the Prince of Wurtenburg was strongly intrenched under the cannon of the town, with a body of six or seven thousand men.

The King of Prussia was extremely alarmed at the danger of this momentous post, the key of his dominions to the north, from the relief of which he was removed, and, as it were, chained down, at such an immense distance. Though Laudohn and Butterlin found abundant employment for his forces, he resolved to send a considerable detachment under general Platen to the assistance of Colberg. The fertility of his genius proposed two ends from this single expedient. He ordered Platen to direct his march through Poland, and to destroy the Russian magazines, which had been amassed on the frontiers of that kingdom, and from which their army in Silesia drew its whole subsistence. This service, might, he hoped, be performed without any considerable interruption to the progress of the detachment towards Colberg. The event was entirely answerable to his wishes. General Platen ruined three principal magazines of the enemy. He attacked a great convoy of their waggons; destroyed 500, and burned 〈◊〉 dispersed the provisions they carried. Four thousand men who protected this convoy, were, for the greater part, killed or made prisoners. General Platen, after this useful and brilliant exploit, pursued his march with the utmost diligence to Pomerania.

Intelligence of this blow was no sooner received by the Russians in Silesia, than they were struck with the utmost consternation. They had lately effected one of their purposes by their junction with the Austrians; [Aug. 25.] but this stroke compelled them at once to sever this union, so lately and with such difficulty compassed to drop all their designs upon Breslau, to repass the Oder, and to retire without delay into Poland, lest their remaining magazines should share the same fate with the three above-mentioned, and there future subsistence be thereby rendered wholly precarious.

So unfortunately circumstanced were the affairs of the King of Prussia, that his wisest schemes and happiest successes could hardly answer any other end than to vary the scene of his distress. The storm which had been diverted from Silesia by general Platen's expedition, was only removed from thence to be discharged with irresistible fury on Colberg. The Russians, when they saw that the measures the king had taken, rendered the completion of both their designs impracticable, resolved at all adventures to secure one of them. Colberg was the object of their choice, not only as the place furthest from succour but as the possession of it would be an advantage fittest for answering those ends which were more nearly and properly Russian. M. Butturlin, therefore, as soon as he had established his convoys, directed his course towards Pomerania, and being master of Lansperg, he sent detachments from thence, that cruelly wasted all the adjoining Marche of Brandenburg, without at the same time diverting himself by these ravages from his main intention.

A force of Russians was by this time assembled in Pomerania, to which it was impossible for the king of Prussia to oppose any thing that was in any degree able to contend with them in the field; of course he could not promise himself that immediate raising the siege could be the effect of these succours. All he could do was to send another detachment to that part under general Knoblock; and hoped that by the union of these several small corps, and by their intercepting or at least distressing the Russian convoys of provision, the place might be enabled to hold out, until the severe setting in of winter should render the operations of a siege impracticable.

He was providing in this manner, and studying new methods for the relief of Colberg, to the danger of which place his whole attention was drawn, when an event happened just by him, and, as it were, under his eye, almost as distressing as the taking of Colberg would have proved, and so much the more distressing, as it was entirely unexpected.

On the retreat of the Russians under Butturlin, the king of Prussia imagined himself at liberty. He found a want of provisions in his strong camp near Schweidnitz, and to be the more easily supplied, he aproached nearer to the Oder, He was so little in fear of the enemy, that on making this movement he drafted 4000 men from the garrison of Schwidnitz: he thought that the preparations necessary to a siege would give him sufficient notice, and sufficient leisure to provide for the safety of that important place, from which after all, he had removed but to a very small distance. Laudohn, who through the whole campaign had watched the king with a most diligent and penetrating assiduity, and hitherto had found no part open and unguarded, thought in this instant he perceived an advantage. It was indeed an advantage which would never have appeared as such, but to a general as resolute as sagacious. He resolved to attempt this strong place, by a coup de main. On the 1st of October at three in the morning, the assault began. An attack was made at the same time on all the four outworks which the troops, ordered on this important enterprize approached with so much precaution, that they were not perceived by the garrison. They scaled all the four at the same time; and the troops which defended them had scarce time to fire a few cannon shot. On the side of the assailants, not a gun was discharged: but in one of those out-works the fire of the small arms set fire to a powder magazine, which blew up, and on this occasion about 300 of the Austrians, and about the same number of the Prussians were killed. As soon at the out-works were carried, they prepared to assault the body of the place, which they entered by bursting open the gates, and at day-break they found themselves-masters of the town after firing a few shot. Five battalions, making about 3000 men, and lieutenant-general Zastrow, governor of the fortress, were made prisoners. The conquerors found here a great number of cannon, and a large magazine of meal. Their loss in the whole of this bold and fortunate undertaking amounted, by their accounts, to no more than 600 men.

In a manner so unexpected, and considering the nature of the fortifications, so unprecedented, Schweidnitz fell for a second time in this war into the hands of the Austrians; and that city, which in the year 1758 had cost the Prussians a blockade of some months, and a siege of thirteen days open trenches to recover it, was again lost in a few hours, and with a very inconsiderable damage to those who undertook this daring enterprize.

The king of Prussia felt this grievous blow to the quick. By their possession of Schweidnitz he saw the Austrians enabled to winter in Silesia; he saw that whilst they held this place, he could possibly make no motion for the relief of any other part of his dominions, without exposing Breslau, and along with it the whole of Upper Silesia, to a certain and irrecoverable conquest. In the first agitations produced by so extraordinary and affecting a disaster, he was disposed to attribute this misfortune to the treachery of the governor, but he was too generous to harbour such a suspicion, for any time, against an officer who had hitherto served him with fidelity, and who might have been surprized with an attack of so uncommon a nature, and which the king himself had as little suspected as the governor. He immediately recovered his temper, and said with a smile, ‘It is a fatal blow; we must endeavour to remedy it.’ He wrote to general Zastrow, who commanded there, ‘We may now say, what Francis I. of France wrote to his mother after the battle of Pavia, We have lost all except our honour. As I cannot comprehend what hath happened to you, I shall suspend my judgment; the thing is very extraordinary.’

Schweidnitz was lost suddenly; but Colberg made a most obstinate and noble defence, At length, however, the garrison began to be sorely distressed for provisions. General Platen quitted the intrenchments, which he had maintained in conjunction with the prince of Wurtenburg, in order to cover the reinforcements, which the numerous and strong detachments of the Russians, who overspread the whole country, had hitherto kept at a distance. But he had the misfortune to meet an infinitely superior body of the enemy, to be beaten, and to lose part of his convoy; and it was with difficulty he escaped with the remainder to Stettin.

The other (general Knoblock) had established himself at Treptow, which was to serve as a resting place for the convoys; but as general Platen had been repulsed, in the manner we have just seen, Romanzow advanced with a large force to Treptow. Knoblock, hopeless of assistance in a town which had scarcely any walls, and invested by a body so vastly superior, yet made a vigorous and gallant defence for five days; he was at length compelled to surrender himself and his body of about 2000 men prisoners of war.

These successive disasters were occasioned by the necesssity there was for revictualling Colberg, cost what it would, for that end, of dispersing the Prussian troops in the face of a Russian army of 50,000 men. The revictualling in these circumstances could not be effected without a singular piece of good fortune; and, in order to get into the way of this good fortune, every risque was to be run.

These advantages over Platen and Knoblock raised the spirits of the Russians, and enabled them to contend with the extreme rigour of the season in that northern latitude; they pushed the siege with redoubled efforts. All hope of a supply from the land was absolutely at an end; and though the Russian fleet had been by a violent storm driven off the coast, the succour from the sea was too precarious to be depended on. In this desperate situation the prince of Wurtenburg became apprehensive, lest his army, which had been unable to relieve the town, by delaying any longer under its walls would only share its fate, and that famine might also oblige him to surrender. He therefore resolved, whilst his men retained their vigour, to break through a part of the Russian army, and to leave Colberg to make the best terms its circumstances would admit. This design he accomplished happily, and with little or no loss.

[Dec. 16th.]And now Colberg, hopless of all relief, the garrison exhausted, provision low, the fortifications in many places battered to pieces, after a long siege of near six months, surrendered to the Russians. The governor and the garrison were made prisoners of war. This place was defended by the gallant Heyde, who to this time had maintained it successfully against all the efforts of the Russians during the war; and as he was distinguished by the king his master, for his merit in the successful defence of it, he had likewise as full assurances of his favours after having on the late occasion conducted himself with his former bravery, though it was not with the former good fortune.

The loss of two such places as Schweidnitz and Colberg, at the two extremities of his dominions, was decisive against the king of Prussia. It was now impossible for him to make any movement by which the enemy could not profit to his almost certain destruction. To form sieges, with an army like his, inferior in the field, was impossible. The Russians, by possessing Colberg, possessed every thing. They were masters of the Baltic; and they now acquired a port, by which their armies could be well provided, without the necessity of tedious, uncertain, and expensive convoys from Poland, The road lay almost open into the heart of Brandenburg. Stetin alone stood in their way; but it was obvious that nothing but the advanced season could save Stetin from the fate of Colberg. The Russians, now for the first time, took up their winter quarters in Pomerania.

It is remarkable, that this whole year passed without a regular battle between the king of Prussia and any of his enemies, yet none of the most unfortunate of his campaigns had been so ruinous to him. He had suffered four terrible defeats, without having ballanced them with a single advantage of consequence in the campaign of 1759. Yet in these circumstances it is almost incredible how little he really lost. He was able to take the field again the ensuing year in a very respectable manner, and to make head against his enemies. In that year he lost a whole army near Landshut; still he was far from being broken. Afterwards in that same campaign, he gave his enemies two signal defeats, and ended his operations advantageously, and with great glory. But in the year, of which we now write, without suffering any considerable blow in the field, without any striking efforts on any side, his power has gradually crumbled away. The most calamitous defeats could not sink him lower. And in the situation in which he stood after the taking of Colberg, we may safely say, that there was scarcely a possibility that he could be preserved from destruction by any thing that lay within the reach of human endeavours.

CHAP. VII.

The negotiation resumed. French concessions. Difference concerning the German alliance. Difference concerning the captures antecedent to the declaration of war. Treaty breaks off. Messieurs Stanley and Bussy recalled.

AFTER having been so long detained on the theatre of war, it is time we should return to take a view of the negotiation for putting an end to the miseries it occasioned. In reality the view, even of this scene, was very glooming and unpromising. The confidence and good humour of the two courts being subverted, all that followed was rather an altercation than a treaty. It is true, that papers passed backward and forward; and the pretensions of each party, the points they agreed to cede, and those which they were determined to adhere to, grew more distinct and explicit. But all that cordiality was vanished, which is so necessary towards smoothing and clearing a road, which a long hostility had broken up, and so many intricate topics had contributed to embarrass.

Without involving ourselves in the detail of the several memorials which were delivered in and without referring numerically to the several articles, it will be sufficient that we briefly state those points which were, or seemed to be, in a fair way of adjustment between England and France; and afterwards those on which it should appear that the negotiation broke off.

After some discussions concerning its proper limits, it was agreed, that all Canada should be ceded to the English. This cession comprehended, on one side, all the islands and countries adjoining to the gulph of St. Lawrence. On the other, it took in all the great lakes, and the whole course of the Ohio, to its discharge into the Missisippi. A territory sufficient for the basis of a great empire.

In drawing this line of division, another question arose concerning the bounds of Louisiana, and the state of the intermediate Indian nation between the lakes and the Missisippi, who inhabit, or are rather scattered over an immense country, that lies along the back of our colonies all the way from Pensylvania to Georgia. It was therefore very proper that something definitive should be settled on this article, as it might otherwise easily be made productive of a new war, England proposed that all those nations should continue, as she contended they had heretofore been, under the protection of Great Britain, without saying any thing precise as to the dominion of the soil.

France controverted this proposition; she on her part proposed to divide these nations; that those to the northward of the line drawn to ascertain the limits of Canada should be independent, under the protection of England, but that those, which were to the southward, should enjoy the same independence, under the protection of France. Nothing was perfectly settled in relation to this point; but it does not seem as if there could have been any material disagreement upon it had the other matters in debate been adjusted to their mutual satisfaction.

The African contest seemed to have been attended with still less difficulty. The French consented to give up both Senegal and Goree, provided Anamaboo and Acra were guarantied to them.

The momentous question of the fishery was likewise determined, The French gave up their claim to Cape Breton and St. John's, and were satisfied to receive the little island of St, Pierre on the coast of Newfoundland; but even this they were to receive on conditions sufficiently humiliating. They were to erect no sort of fortification, nor to keep up any military establishment there. An English commissary was to reside on the island, in order to see that these stipulations were adhered to. As to the rest, the French were to have the same privileges on the coast of Newfoundland, checked with the same restrictions, which before the war they had enjoyed under the 15th article of the treaty of Utrecht. In conformity to another article of that treaty, and in compensation for the privilege of the fishery, they consented that Dunkirk should be demolished.

Concerning the islands of Guadaloupe, Marigalante, Minorca and Belleisle, no great controversy had subsisted from the beginning. It had all along been agreed, that, these conquests should be reciprocally restored. Neither did the French scruple to adopt our proposal concerning the affairs of the East-Indies, nor to make satisfactory declaration concerning Ostend and Nieuport.

So many delicate and interesting points were settled, that it does not first appear what it was that could have retarded the peace. A discussion of the seperate interests of two powers only, that are in earnest to agree, may be settled without any very considerable difficulty. The hard and almost inextricable part of the knot, is that wherein the cross concerns and interests of allies intervene. There were two points upon which, if we may form a judgment from appearances, this negotiation unfortunately broke off. The first was upon the manner in which England and France might be at liberty to assist their respective allies; and on the restitution of Wesel, Gueldres, and such other places as the French had conquered from his Prussian majesty.

On the first member of this principal point, the repeated proposals of France for a neutrality in Germany had been uniformly and positively rejected by our administration. They were considered as so many attacks upon national integrity. This scheme therefore, not being admitted they would or could come to no agreement, and scarcely to an intelligible explanation either of the mode or the quantity of the assistance which they should be at liberty mutually to impart to their German allies, or of the place in which such succours should be employed. As to Wesel and Gueldres, the French obstinately refused to restore those places. They declared that such a cession would be directly against the faith by which they were bound to the empress queen of Hungary, for whom they insisted that these places had been conquered, and in whose name alone they were governed, though they had been reduced by the French arms, and were at that moment held by French garrisons.

As to the second point, namely, the restitution of captures 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 made previous to the declaration of war, the negotiating powers were equally positive, the one to demand, the other to refuse it. The English argued that this claim had no sort of foundation in the law of nations, neither was it grounded on any particular convention. That the right of all hostile operations results, not from a formal declaration of war but from the hostilities which the aggressor has first offered; that the contrary of this proposition is at least extremely contestible; and since, it can by no means be clearly established, it follows that the detainment of those captures must be considered, on the side of England, as part of the uti possidetis, originally proposed as the basis of this treaty.

France on the other hand, seemed as fully convinced of the justice of her pretensions, and she deemed the arguments with which she supported them to be so unanswerable, that she offered to submit them to the justice of the English tribunals. They urged that this claim of restitution was founded on the law of nations, and upon particular convention; by the 19th article of the peace of Utrecht; and by the second article of the treaty of commerce; and that this was strengthened by the third article of the treaty of Aixla-Chappelle, which renews and confirms those articles in the preceeding treaties.

By these articles a protection is allowed to the respective subjects who may have ships in the ports of either of the powers, because having no opportunity of knowing that a rupture is fallen out, they sailed under a security of peace, and under the faith of treaties. By a parity of reasoning, the ships not actually in those ports ought to enjoy the same security; else, as they are included in the same parity of circumstances, it would follow, contrary to the principals of humanity and right reason, that the sovereigns had provided for the preservation of one part of their subjects from the miseries of a sudden rupture, to which they expose the rest. The particular conventions of these treaties, they said, had their foundation in general equity and the law of nations; since, as it is impracticable for belligerent states to agree amongst themselves which is the agressor, it is proper that the subjects should receive previous notice of the rupture, in order that they may be able distinctly to know when they are, or are not in security, or when they may, or may not rely on the treaties which subsist between their sovereigns.

These topics were as usual, bandied to and fro with great heat and little effect; and as in such discussions the arguments on both sides are plausible, and there can be no authorised judge, the weight of the several pretensions commonly depends upon the power of the parties to enforce them. On these two points, therefore, the renunciation of German alliances, and the restitution of captures, the negotiation from the beginning was at a stand; and on these at length to all appearance, it finally broke off.

Not but we are fully satisfied that the disagreement even on these points might have been only the ostensible cause of the rupture. The true cause of the breach seems to have been the unseasonable interposition of the Spanish claims. For could France be supposed in good earnest to desire peace, that is, to desire such a reasonable peace, as her circumstances might demand, when she officiously mingled with our particular debate, the affairs of a foreign and neutral power, which had not the smallest connection with those that were at this time properly under deliberation? It was ridiculous to urge, that this was done from a prudent foresight, and to prevent a future war, which these disputes might possibly occasion. The business was to put an end to the war which then actually subsisted; and nothing could be farther from assisting this design than to increase the subjects of debate. France must be sensible of the weight of this argument, who herself proposed in the very beginning of this treaty, as means almost necessary for carrying it on with effect, that their particular dispute should be separated from those of their German allies, with which it certainly had a more natural connexion than with those that subsisted between England and Spain; as all the former parties were then engaged directly or indirectly in the war, to which Spain had then no manner of relation.

The English ministry finding the French immoveable on the two capital points above mentioned and having no opinion of the sincerity of their procedure, sent directions to Mr. Stanly, to return to England, and to desire that Mr. Bussy should on the part of his court, receive the same orders. [20th Sept.] An end was thus put to this negotiation, (from which Europe had conceived such sanguine hopes of the alleviation of its miseries) after it had continued near six months. So far indeed it was from producing the happy effects that were proposed from it, so far was it from appeasing the animosities of the powers originally engaged, or from extinguishing the old war, that the parties seperated with intention more hostile, and opinions more adverse than ever; and the war was soon spread to a much greater extent by the taking in of a new party, and may possibly spread, still more widely, by laying open new sources of contention which may gradually draw in other powers, and finally involve every part of Europe. It was also a means of producing changes in England, which at a time of less tranquility, and in circumstances of less internal strength might have been productive of the most fatal consequences. But these matters are reserved for the subject of the ensuing chapter.

The leading negotiation in London and Paris being thus broken off, that which was proposed at Augsburg never took place.

CHAP. VIII.

Conduct of Spain during the negotiation, Spanish minister's memorial. Treaty between France and Spain. Difference in the English ministry. Mr. Pitt resigns. Mr. Pitt's letter. Dispute concerning the resignation. Addresses, Parliament meets. The German war continued.

AS nothing could have been more unprecedented, so nothing was more alarming than the proceeding of the court of Spain in the negotiation. It was altogether extraordinary to see a proposal for accommodating disputes that subsisted between friends coming thro' the channel of an enemy. It was extremely singular to see points of such consequence formally communicated and proposed for deliberation by a French agent, commissioned only to negotiate a particular and distinct business, when the Spaniards had an ambassador residing in London, from whom no sort of intimation had been previously received of such a design.

That proposal not only marked out a want of sincerity on the part of France, but it manifested so strange and irregular a partiality on the part of Spain, that it would very little have become the dignity of the king of Great Britain, or his attention to the safety of his subjects, to let it pass without a full and satisfactory explanation. Accordingly the Spanish ambassador was called upon to disavow this irregular procedure; but he returned a verbal, and soon after was authorised by his court to return a written answer, in which he openly avowed and justified the step taken by the French agent, as entirely agreeable to the sentiments of his master. He declared that the kings of France and Spain were united not only by ties of blood, but by a mutual interest. He applauded the humanity and greatness of mind which his most Christian majesty demonstrated in the proposition that was complained of. He insisted much on the sincere desire of peace, the only motive which influenced the conduct of the two monarchs; and he added, haughtily, that if his master had been governed by any other principles, ‘His Catholic majesty giving full scope to his greatness, would have spoken from himself, and as became his dignity.’

It appeared evidently from the whole of this paper, that the court of Spain was regularly, as a fort of party, apprised of every step that was taken in the negotiation; that her judgment was appealed to upon every point, and her authority called in aid to force the acceptance of the terms which were offered by France; in a word, that there was a perfect union of affections, interests, and councils between these two courts; and the minister of the former, so far from denying or palliating this conduct, seemed to glory in it.

Mr. Pitt who then took the lead in the ministry, was fully satisfied the intentions of Spain were by no means equivocal, and that this partiality, which they strongly avowed not only by declarations, but by facts, would drive them into all the measures of France. That a war on that account was absolutely inevitable; and if, for the present moment, the Spaniards rather delayed their declaration of war, than laid aside their hostile intentions, it was in order to strike the blow at their own time, and with the greater effect; that therefore their reasons for delaying to act were the very motives, which ought to induce us to act with the utmost speed, and utmost vigour. That we ought to consider the evasions of that court as a refusal of satisfaction, and that refusal, as a declaration of war. That we ought from prudence as well as from spirit to secure ourselves the first blow; and to be practically convinced, that the early and effective measures, which had so large a share in reducing France to this dependence upon Spain, would also be the fittest for deterring or disabling Spain from affording any protection to France. That, to carry on this war with vigour, it was only necessary to continue our present efforts; no new armament would be necessary; and that if any war could provide its own resources, it must be a war with Spain. That their flota had not yet arrived, and that the taking of it, would at once disable theirs and strengthen our hands. This procedure so suited to the dignity of the nation, and the insults it had received, would be a lesson to Spain, and to every other power, how they should presume to dictate in our affairs, and to intermeddle with a menacing mediation, and an officiousness as insidious as it was audacious. That he would allow our enemies, whether secret or declared, no time to think and recollect themselves.

These sentiments, so agreeable to the resolute and enterprising character of this minister, appeared shocking to almost all the rest of his collegues. They admitted that we ought not to be terrified from the assertions of our just demands, by the menaces of any power. They owned that Spain had taken a very extraordinary and very unjustifiable step; but that we ought to admit and even to wish for, an explanation; this court upon a sober yet spirited remonstrance, might recall that rash proposition into which they had been perhaps unwarily seduced by the artifices of France; that to shun war upon a just occasion was cowardice, but to provoke or court it was madness. And, if to court a war was not in general a very wise measure, to desire it with Spain, if possibly it could be avoided, was to overturn the most fundamental principles of the policy of both nations. That this desire of adding war to war, and enemy to enemy, whilst we had our hands already as full as they could hold, and whilst all our faculties were strained to the utmost pitch, was ill to calculate the national strength of our country, which, however great, had its limits, and was not able to contend with all the world; that whilst we were calling for new enemies, no motion was made of new allies, nor indeed of any new resource whatsoever. To plunge into such measures, in the manner proposed, and upon no better grounds, could not fail to scandalize and alarm all Europe; and we could possibly derive no advantage from this precipitate conduct, which would not be more than counter-balanced by the jealousy and terror it would necessarily create in every nation near us. As to the seizure of the flota, it was not to be reckoned upon, as at the very time of that deliberation it might be expected to be safe in its harbour; and perhaps if we could succeed in seizing it, we might perform a service not very agreeable to neutral nations, and as little advantageous to our own commerce. If Spain, blind to her true interests, and misled by French councils, should give in a more decisive manner into the designs of that court, and obstinately refuse a reasonable satisfaction, it would be then the true time to declare war, when all the neighbouring and impartial powers were convinced that we acted with as much temper as resolution, and when every thinking man at home should be satisfied that he was not hurried into the hazards and expences of war, from an idea of chimerical heroism, but from inevitable necessity; and that in such a case we might depend upon the utmost support which the nation could give to an administration that depended upon its strength, and yet dreaded to waste it wantonly, or to employ it unjustly. The minister warmed by this opposition, declared that, ‘This was the time for humbling the whole House of Bourbon; that if this opportunity was let slip, it might never be recovered; and if he could not prevail in this instance, he was resolved that this was the last time he would sit in that council. He thanked the ministers of the late king for their support; said he was himself called to the ministry by the voice of the people, to whom he considered himself as accountable for his conduct; and that he would no longer remain in a situation which made him responsible for measures he was no longer allowed to guide.’

The noble lord, who precided in this council, to whom years have added the wisdom of experience, without abating the vigour and fire of youth; and who was himself as bold a minister as ever directed the affairs of this nation, made him this reply: ‘I find the gentleman is determined to leave us, nor can I say I am sorry for it, since he would otherwise have certainly compelled us to leave him; but, if he be resolved to assume the right of advising his majesty, and directing the operations of the war, to what purposes are we called to this council? When he talks of being responsible to the people, he talks the language of the house of commons, and forgets, that at this board, he is only responsible to the king. However, though he may possibly have convinced himself of his infallibility, still it remains that we should be equally convinced before we can resign our understanding to his direction, or join with him in the measure be proposes.’ (a)

On the division, the minister himself, and a noble lord closely connected with him, were the only voices in favour of the immediate declaration of war; the rest of the board were unanimously against it.

The reader will observe that together with those matters, which have been published, relative to this very important deliberation, with some appearance of authenticity, we have added such arguments as have been agitated among the people; a liberty necessary to place the matter in its full light.

Mr. Pitt and lord Temple, adhering to their first opinion, and having delivered their reasons in writing, resigned their employments. This resignation seemed equal to a revolution in the state. An universal alarm was spread; a thousand rumours flew abroad, and the first suggestions were, that this great minister, endeavouring to avail himself by his firmness in negotiation of the advantages he had acquired by his vigour in war, was opposed by the whole council, who were resolved to have a peace at any rate, and that this opposition had driven him to resign the seals▪ But the true cause of the resignation very soon came out; and on this point a violent conflict ensued, in which the popular cause was worse sustained, and the ministerial better, (that is, with greater effect) than is usual in such discussions. Some circumstances contributed not a little to this success.

When Mr. Pitt resigned the seals, the great person to whom they were delivered received them with ease and firmness, without requesting that he should resume his office. His majesty expressed his concern for the loss of so able a servant; and to shew the favourable sense he entertained of his services, he made him a most gracious and unlimited offer of any rewards in the power of the crown to bestow. His majesty at the same time expressed himself not only satisfied with the opinion of the majority of his council, but declared he would have found himself under the greatest difficulty how to have acted, had that council concurred as fully in supporting the measure proposed by Mr. Pitt, as they had done in rejecting it. A sentiment (in the light in which his majesty considered this measure) grounded upon the firmest principles of integrity and honour, and which must raise the highest veneration for his royal character not only among his own subjects, but amongst all nations, when they see a power which has so little to fear from any human effort, so very fearful of the least infringement of the strictest and most critical rules of justice.

Mr. Pitt was sensibly touched with the grandeur and condescension of this proceeding. 'I confess, Sir, I had but too much reason to expect your majesty's displeasure. I did not come prepared for this exceeding goodness. Pardon me, Sir,—it overpowers, it oppresses me.' He burst into tears.

We are far from an attempt to add any colouring to so exquisitely affecting a picture. We are indeed far from being able to do justice to perhaps one of the most pathetic and elevated scenes which could possibly be displayed, the parting of such a prince, and such a minister.

The next day a pension of three thousand pounds a year was settled on Mr. Pitt for three lives, and at the same time a title was conferred upon his lady and her issue; a pension the best bestowed, and a nobility the most honourably acquired, and most truly merited. Immediately the Gazette gave notice to the public of all these transactions. The resignation made the first article; the honours and rewards the next; and they were followed by a letter from our ambassador in Spain, containing an account of the favourable and pacific language of that court, and of the strong assurances they gave of a desire to accommodate all differences in an amicable manner.

It must be owned that this manoeuvre was very skilfully executed. For it at once gave the people to understand the true motive to the resignation; the insufficiency of that motive, and the graciousness of the king notwithstanding the abrupt departure of his minister. If after this the late minister should chuse to enter into opposition, he must go into it loaded and oppressed with the imputation of the blackest ingratitude; if on the other hand he should retire from business, or should concur in support of that administration which he had left, because he disapproved its measures, his acquiescence would be attributed by the multitude to a bargain for his forsaking the public, and that the title and the pension were the considerations.

These were the barriers that were opposed against that torrent of popular rage, which it was apprehended would proceed from this resignation. And the truth is, they answered their end perfectly: This torrent for some time was beaten back, almost diverted into an opposite course; and when afterwards it returned to those objects, against which it was originally directed, and where it was most dreaded, it was no longer that impetuous and irresistible tide, which in the year 1757 had borne down every thing before it; it was weakened, divided, and ineffective.

On this occasion the clamours and inferior members of each party went lengths, which undoubtedly were neither authorised nor approved by their leaders. The friends of Mr. Pitt raised the most violent clamours for displacing a minister, whose measures had raised the nation from the most abject state, to the highest pinacle of glory. They said, that ‘he was in fact displaced, when he was compelled to resign, by not being suffered to carry into execution those measures which he knew to be necessary to the honour and safety of his country. That the check which this minister had received, would most unseasonably revive the drooping hopes of France, sunk by the vigour of our military operations, and the firmness of our councils under his administration, and would shew Spain with what impunity she might insult the honour of the British crown, and violate the property of its subjects. They reckoned up the disgraces which the nation had suffered before Mr. Pitt had entered into the management of affairs, and the victories and conquests which were the fruit of his councils.’

In consequence of these reasonings, addresses, resolutions and instructions were set on foot in the great corporations; and it was believed that the example would be followed, as on a former occasion of the same kind, by all the other cities and boroughs of the kingdom. But the progress of this measure, though commenced with much alacrity, was slow and languid: a few only of the corporations entered into it, and some even of these few in a manner less warm than was expected. A strenuous defence was made on the part of the remaining ministry.

‘Was it ever heard, said they, that a sovereign has been censured for listening to the whole body of his council, in preference to the particular opinions of a single man? On the contrary, this uncontrouled sway of a single minister has been often thought dangerous, and was always odious in our free constitution; and is the more justly to be disliked, as perhaps inconsistent with the true spirit, either of absolute monarchy, or of limited government. Let the merit of this minister be what it will, shall his master therefore be forced to receive him upon any terms? Must his prince, to gratify his ambitious views, or if you please, his virtuous intentions, dismiss his whole council, and annihilate his prerogative as a king, his reason and judgment as a man? Was it ever heard before, that a counsellor has professed without any reserve or any mask, that because he could not guide in government, he would not co-operate? This has unquestionably been the true motive for the conduct of many ministers, but never was the avowed motive until this occasion. Mr. Pitt has had the freest scope for the exertion of his genius; he was, perhaps, the only English minister that never met with the slightest opposition; he has had the treasures and the forces of the nation at his most absolute command; let him, in his turn, do that justice that has been done to him; let him if the favours of the crown constitute no obligation, be bound at least by the rules of equity; and if he will not partake in the conduct of the present most intricate and difficult business of administration, let him not render it still more intricate and more difficult by his opposition; and let him not study to find a justification of his measures, from the ill success of those whom he has left, when that ill sucess will be owing to his own devices.’

Thus far the points seem to have been urged with propriety and weight. A torrent, however, of low and illiberal abuse was also poured out on this occasion (a). His
SECRETARY PITT.

whole life, public and private, was scrutinized with the utmost malignity, to furnish matter of calumny against him.

The successes of his administration were depreciated; his faults were monstrously exaggerated, and the rewards and honours so justly conferred on him by his sovereign, were by every trick of wit, ridicule, and buffoonery, converted into matter of degradation and disgrace.

Without presuming to take any part in a controversy, which (however unequally) divided the royal council, or without entering into the sentiments of any faction, which we have always shunned, we may affirm with truth and impartiality, that no man was ever better fitted than Mr. Pitt, to be the minister in a great and powerful nation, or better qualified to carry that power and greatness to their utmost limits. There was in all his designs a magnitude, and even a vastness, which was not easily comprehended by every mind, and which nothing but success could have made to appear reasonable. If he was sometimes incorrect he was never vulgar.

His power, as it was not acquired, so neither was exercised in an ordinary manner. With very little parliamentary, and with less court influence, he swayed both at court and in parliament with an authority unknown before, to the best supported ministers. He was called to the ministry by the voice of the people; and what is more rare, he held it with that approbation; and under him for the first time, administration and popularity were seen united. Under him Great Britain carried on the most important war in which she ever was engaged, alone and unassisted, with greater splendour, and with more success than she had ever enjoyed at the head of the most powerful alliances. Alone this island seemed to ballance the rest of Europe.

In the conduct of the war he never suffered the enemy to breathe, but overwhelmed them with re-iterated blows, and kept up the alarm in every quarter. If one of his expeditions was not so well calculated or so successfully executed, amends were made by another, and by a third. The spirit of the nation once roused, was not suffered for a moment to subside; and the French, dazzled, as it were, by the multitude and celerity of his enterprizes, seemed to have lost all power of resistance. In short, he revived the military genius of our people; he supported our allies; he extended our trade; he raised our reputation; he augmented our dominions; and on his departure from administration, left the nation in no other danger than that which ever must attend exorbitant power, and the temptation which may be, to the invidious exertion of it. Happy it had been for him, for his sovereign, and his country, if a temper less austere, and a disposition more practicable, more compliant, and conciliating, had been joined to his other great virtues. The want of these qualities disabled him from acting any otherwise than alone: it prevented our enjoying the joint fruit of the wisdom of many able men, who might mutually have tempered, and mutually forwarded each other; and finally, which was not the meanest loss, it deprived us of his own immediate services.

Those who censured his political conduct the most severely, could raise but few exceptions to it; none of them singly and perhaps, the whole united, of no great weight against a person long engaged in so great a scene of action.

Whether the part, which under his administration we rather continued to act than newly took, with regard to the affairs of Germany, be for the real interest of Great Britain, is a question of the utmost difficulty, and which perhaps will never admit a satisfactory solution. To condemn him on this head we must be sure of this solution. It has been observed in favour of that contested measure, that France demonstrated, through the whole progress of the late treaty, the most earnest desire, that we should abandon the German connection; no trifling argument, that our enemy did not look upon it to be extremely prejudicial to our interests. If he has carried on that war at a vast expence, a prodigious stand has been made against the intire power of France; had less been expended, the whole expence might have been lost. How far this part of his conduct was agreeable to his former declarations, is a discussion which can avail but little. He found the nation engaged in these affairs; it was more easy to push them forward, than to extricate himself from them; as he proceeded, he discovered by experience the advantages of that plan of action, and his opinion was changed.

But even admitting, that, to attain the ends of opposition, he had once fallen upon popular topics, which even then he knew were not tenable, it can form but a very small blemish in a public character, however wrong it may be by application to the strictest rules of morality. Ill would it fare with statesmen if this sort of consistency were to be expected from the most consistent of them.

With regard to the pension and title, it is a shame that any defence should be necessary. What eye cannot distinguish, at the first glance, the difference between this and the exceptionable case of titles and pensions? What Briton, with the smallest sense of honour and gratitude, but must blush for his country, if such a man retired unrewarded from the public service, let the motives to that retirement be what they would? It was not possible that his sovereign could let his eminent services pass unrequited; the sum that was given was undoubtedly inadequate to his merits; and the quantum was rather regulated by the moderation of the great mind that received it, than by the liberality of that which bestowed it.

The conduct of Mr. Pitt when the parliament met, in which he made his own justification, without impeaching the conduct of any of his colleagues, or taking one measure that might seem to arise from disgust or opposition, has set a seal upon his character.

Lord Egremont was appointed to succeed him as Secretary for the southern department.

CHAP. IX.

Dispute with Spain. Representation of the earl of Bristol. Disposition of the court of Madrid. Treaty between France and Spain. England desires a communication. Court of Spain refuses. The ministers mutually withdraw. A rupture.

THE unfortunate intervention of Spain in the late negotiation, raised so many difficulties, and created so▪ much mischief both abroad and at home, that it becomes an aera in this history, and it is necessary we should pursue that object from the point at which we left it, to its final and fatal determination.

The answer which had been received from the Spanish minister in London was far from being satisfactory to our court. Orders were immediately given to the earl of Bristol, our ambassador in Spain, to remonstrate with energy and firmness on so extraordinary a proceeding; to adhere to the negative put upon the Spanish pretensions to fish at Newfoundland; to rest the article of disputed captures, on the justice of our tribunals; to continue the former professions of our desire of an amicable adjustment of the logwood dispute; and of our willingness to cause the settlements on the coast of Honduras to be evacuated, as soon as ever his Catholick majesty should suggest a method for our enjoyment of that traffic to which we had a right by treaty, and which was further confirmed to us by repeated promises from that court.

At the same time that the earl of Bristol was authorised to proceed with that spirit, which the offended dignity of our court required, and to bring Spain to a categorical and satisfactory declaration, concerning her final intentions; yet if he perceived on her part any intention to disavow or even to explain away this offensive transaction, he was readily to accept it, and to afford to that court as handsome a retreat as possible. The letter which conveyed these instructions was written by Mr. Pitt, and dated on the 28th of July, a few days after the fatal memorial had been delivered by Mr. Bussy.

The earl of Bristol punctually obeyed those orders. He found General Wall, the Spanish minister, much in cold blood, and in very equivocal dispositions. He heard with great patience the proper and energetic representation that had been very ably made by the earl of Bristol. He applauded the king of Great Britain's magnanimity in not suffering France as a tribunal, to be appealed to in his disputes with Spain; and declared, that in the proposition which had been made with the consent of his court, things were not considered in that light; asked whether it could be imagined in England, that the Catholic king was seeking to provoke us in our present most flourishing and most exalted situation, and after such a series of prosperous events as no single nation had ever met with? He valued, and reciprocally returned, our frequent professions of friendship and our desire of amicable adjustment. But these favourable demonstrations were accompanied with some circumstances, that had a very menacing appearance. For in the first place, he declared that at that time the utmost harmony subsisted between the courts of France and Spain; that in consequence of their perfect agreement, there was a mutual unreserved communication of every step taken in their several negotiations with England; that France had even offered to assist Spain, in case the discussions she had with us should grow into a rupture; and that this offer was considered in a friendly light. Such an intimate union of a third power with one of the parties at war, forebodes no long duration to its friendship, or even to its neutrality with the other. If Spain justified the proceedings of France, and owned herself concerned in them, it was but one, and that a short, step, to a junction with her.

As to the three matters in dispute, the Spanish minister resolutely adhered to them all; and as to the last (that of the logwood) he observed, that Great Britain had offered them nothing, but what they had long since been tired of, treaty and negotiation; that this matter had been already fully discussed; and that on this head Spain had given the most convincing proofs of her desire to be on the best terms with England; for in the beginning of this war, before England had grown terrible by her successes, when their American governors had endeavoured to dislodge the English from some new establishments on the coast of Honduras, they had, at the complaint of our court, in order to take away all cause of mistrust, ordered the governor to desist from so justifiable an enterprize. That on the offer of England on this occasion to settle matters in an amicable manner, they chearfully agreed to that method. But that six years had elapsed without their receiving the least satisfaction. They even alleged that the English encroachments on their coasts in that time increased.

In this manner the Spaniards vindicated the form and the matter of their proceeding: they shewed no sort of disposition to relax from their claims; but at the same time they no longer insisted on blending together the several discussions; and they professed in general, though not very warm terms, a desire of continuing in amity with us. With regard to the matter in dispute, the pretensions of both powers stood in this posture throughout the whole discussion; except that they were urged with more or less asperity, according to the fluctuating disposition of the court of Spain, which seemed to rest upon no sure and settled principals. There were probably two factions in her councils who as they alternately prevailed, changed the language and countenance of the Spanish minister. However, for some time the aspect of things continued on the whole to be rather favourable; and even an express declaration was at length made, that Spain had been, at no time, more intent on cultivating a good correspondence with us. But still the French interest silently gained ground at Madrid; the confidental communications of that court with Spain; her affected moderation in the treaty; the dangerous greatness of England; the common interest of the house of Buorbon, every part of which must suffer, both in its dignity and safety, by allowing the principal of its branches to be pruned to the quick: these points were urged with continual sollicitation; and they assured the Spaniards that even the signing an alliance between the sovereigns of the two nations, would intimidate England, already exhausted by the war, and apprehensive of losing the valuable commerce she carried on with Spain.

These arguments and suggestions at length prevailed, and a treaty was signed between the two courts, the purpose of which was to preserve from oppression, and to maintain the interests of the house of Bourbon. This alliance was of a nature the more dangerous, as it turned upon family not national interest, and because not stating exactly its objects, it might be made just of what extent they pleased. We make no mention of any other treaty than this, of itself sufficiently alarming, because whatever suspicions may be entertained,, there is no certainty that any other has been concluded between those powers.

France had obtained in this treaty almost all that she aimed at; by it she entered into the closest connection with Spain; this connection did not indeed seem directly of necessity to conclude a breach with England; it led to it however, almost inevitably. At first the whole transaction was kept a profound secret; the inferiority of the marine of Spain, and the precariousness of their supplies from America, in case they came to a present rupture with England, obliged them to this temporary reserve. France took care that this treaty should not transpire untill the negotiation was broken off; and Spain, whilst she was under these apprehensions, exhibited those occasional proofs of a pacific disposition, which we have just now seen. But as soon as France had lost all hopes of concluding the negotiation in the manner she had wished, and had failed in the use she made of the intervention of the claims of Spain, she circulated with great industry a report, that Spain would immediately declare against Great Britain, in consequence of a treaty lately concluded among the Bourbon courts.

England found that those boasts of the French were too confidently made, and too generally believed, to be altogether without foundation. In consequence of these apprehensions, orders were sent to Spain, to demand in the most moderate terms, but in a manner not to be evaded, a communication of this treaty, or at least a disavowal that it contained any thing to the prejudice of Great Britain. But before these orders could reach Spain, lord Bristol had himself received intelligence of the treaty, and of the hopes, which the French made no secret of their deriving from that source. He therefore thought himself under a necessity of desiring satisfaction from the Spanish secretary of state concerning it.

Upon this application there appeared on a sudden such a change in the countenance, language, and sentiments of that minister, as indicated but too fully the justness of the suspicions that were entertained. The Spanish flota was now safely arrived with a very rich cargo; the French arms had made a considerable progress in the king's electoral dominions; the success of the Imperial arms was no less striking; the reasons for their former shew of moderation no longer existed. They therefore gave a loose to those movements which they had hitherto concealed. M. Wall, evading a direct answer, entered into a long and bitter complaint, not only of the treatment which Spain had received from us, but of the haughtiness of our late proceedings with France; that it was time for them to open their eyes, and not to suffer a neighbour, an ally, a relation, and a friend, any longer to run the risque of receiving such rigid laws as were prescribed by an insulting conqueror; that we were intoxicated with our successes; and a continued series of victories had elated us so far, as to make us reject the reasonable concession offered by France. This refusal made it evident that our design in ruining the French power, was the more easily to crush Spain; that we proposed entirely to chase the French from all their colonies in America to have the easier task in seizing on the Spanish dominions in those parts, thereby to satisfy to the utmost of our ambition, and to gratify our boundless thirst of conquest; therefore he would himself be the man to advise the king of Spain, that since his dominions were to be overwhelmed, at least that they should be siezed with arms in his subjects hands, and not to continue the passive victim he had hitherto appeared in the eyes of the world.

The English ambassador, though astonished at so extraordinary a change of stile, replied with coolness to the invectives, and with firmness to the menaces of the Spanish minister; he obviated the objections which had been made, and supported our pretensions; after answering in the best manner to what M. Wall had urged, he returned to his first demand, an explanation concerning the treaty: as often as a direct answer was evaded, the same question was again put; and at length the only reply was, that the king of Spain had thought proper to renew his family compact; and then Mr. Wall, as if he was gone farther than he was authorised, suddenly turned the discourse, and no farther satisfaction could be obtained,

This revolution in the appearances of things in Spain, was too interesting not to be immediately communicated. Our ministry saw evidently, that the moderation they had hitherto displayed, might be attributed to fear, and that the language of the court of Spain would permit no doubt of their hostile intensions. Orders were therefore given to the earl of Bristol, conformable to dignity of the nation, and the justice of our claim. He was ordered to renew his instances concerning the treaty; to demand an explanation with a proper firmness, but without the mixture of any thing which might irritate; and to signify, that a peremptory refusal to communicate the treaty, or to disavow an intention to take part with our enemies, would be considered as an aggression on the part of Spain, and an absolute declaration of war.

Things were now brought to a single and precise point. The demand was made in the terms of the order. Then it was that the pride of Spain entirely threw of the remainder of that mask, which her policy had persuaded her to assume; the secretary, M. Wall, replied,
That the spirit of haughtiness and of discord,
Note: Dec. 10.
which dictated this inconsiderable step, and which for the misfortune of mankind still reigns so much in the British government, is what has made the declaration of war, and attacked the king's dignity; and that the Earl of Bristol might return when and in what manner was convenient to him.

The Earl of Bristol parted from Madrid the 17th of December; and thus was brought on a rupture which has prodigiously extended the operations, and consequently the miseries of war, and threatens to protect them to a very long duration. Europe unfortunately found herself plunged into the gulph of a new war, at the time she hoped to emerge from the old one, and by the very means which were used to draw her out of it. A point of honour alone seemed to have been the last and immediate cause of the breach; but whoever has diligently attended to the Spanish affairs from the memorial presented by Bussy to the final answer delivered by Wall, will see that the motives were, however ill understood, of a much more serious and important nature.

As the two powers had now come to extremities, and the English ambassador had departed from Madrid, the Spanish minister also quitted London; but before his departure he left a paper, in the nature of a manifesto, of very little importance in point of argument, but filled with invectives, charging the war on the haughtiness of the late English minister, and on the little respect with which his court had been treated, both during the administration of that minister, and since his resignation. That had the purport of the treaty been desired in a manner less offensive to the dignity of his master, it might as easily have been obtained, as it could have been justified; for the treaty, which was believed to have been signed on the 15th of August, contained only a reciprocal guaranty of the dominions of the several branches of the house of Bourbon, but with this particular restriction, that it should only extend to the dominions which shall remain to France after the present war.

It must be remarked that, this paper, whilst it pretends to set forth the purport of a treaty dated the 15th of August, does not deny the existence of any other treaty, which might more offensively concern the interest of Great Britain. It was however answered in every article with the utmost moderation, perspicuity and force, in a memorial of loth Egremont. Here we close the Spanish transaction; as the is the whole of what belongs properly to the year we trea• of. All that remains for us to do, is to touch upon the affairs of the East Indies and America.

CHAP. X.

Blockade of Pondicherry. Distress of the French. Fleet dispersed in a storm. Fleet returns. Town surrenders Mahie taken. Enterprises of Mr. Law. Mogul's are defeated by Major Carnac. Nabob of Bengal deposed Coast of Sumatra ravaged by the count d'Estaing. Dominica taken by lord Rollo and Sir James Douglas.

AFTER the defeat of the French near Wandewash, the taking of the city of Arcot, and the reduction of the fortresses of Chitteput and Carrical, Pondicherry wa• the only space of consequence which remained to our enemies in India. This town, beautifully built, strongly fortified, and four leagues in circuit, seemed rather the capital of a kingdom, than a trading establishment. It is situated on the coast of Malabar, about forty miles from our settlement at Madrass, which in the days of its prosperity it ri¦valled, if not exceeded in trade, opulence and splendor; and it still remained the depository of whatever wealth was left to the French, after the reverse of their fortune in war.

As soon as the fortresses adjacent to this important place had been reduced, and the inland country brought perfectly to our interests by the total expulsion of the French, the blockade of Pondicherry was commenced by the land forces under colonel Coote, and the marine under admiral Stevens. A regular siege was at that time impracticable on account of the periodical rains, which were daily expected; and even under more favourable circumstances it would have proved a task of infinite difficulty to attempt any army that could be supported in India, the taking of a place so strongly fortified, defended by a good garrison, and by an officer able and resolute, and whose pride and obstinacy, so prejudicial on all other occasions, would have made him, as in effect they did make him, persevere to the very last moment, is the defence of the last stake, which the French had left in India.

The blockade being therefore chosen as the most eligible for the time, was continued with the best dispositions, and the most extraordinary patience on both sides, for full seven months. In this time the garrison and inhabitants suffered sorely by famine. Col. Coote, in order to augment their distress, erected batteries at a distance, not with a view of ruining the walls, but to harrass the enemy by an encrease of garrison duty.

At length when the weather appeared settled, four batteries were raised at some distance to enfilade the streets of Pondicherry, whilst others were advanced nearer in order to play upon the works. These operations, though the siege was not yet formally undertaken, commenced on the 26th of November, 1760, but as the season of the rains and winds was not yet quite over, much was suffered from storms, which ruined the batteries and approaches. They were however always repaired with the utmost alacrity and speed, and the siege suffered no intermission. So that the besieged, who eagerly expected the arrival of their fleet to their relief, were reduced to the most extreme distress. They lived on camels, elephants, dogs, and cats. The extreme scarcity and dearness even of this wretched provision, increased their misery. Sixteen roupies (half crowns) had been paid for the flesh of a dog.

In the midst of this distress their hopes were suddenly revived, and those of the besiegers, notwithstanding the progress they had made, almost totally depressed. On the first of January 1761, one of those terrible storms, so frequent in the Indian sea, and so ruinous, drove the English squadron from before Pondicherry. Two ships of the line were wrecked, and their crews, with the exception of two or three men, entirely perished. Two others of the same class were driven ashore, and beat to pieces. The men fortunately escaped. The real damage which our fleet sustained on this occasion, together with the idea of a far greater, suggested by their own desires, and justified by the violence of the storm, elevated to the highest pitch the spirits of the garrison, sunk by disease, famine, fatigue, and an uninterrupted train of adverse fortune. General Lally seeing the port clear, sent an express without delay to the French agent in the neighbouring neutral settlements, that this was the time to throw in succours; he seemed sanguine and f• of vigour. The letter, which was intercepted, is printed below (a), as it may tend to furnish some idea of the character of this singular man.

But admiral Stevens, and those who commanded under him, exerting themselves with unparalleled diligence and celerity, appeared again before Pondicherry in less than four days after the storm, with eleven ships of the line and one frigate, and the blockade was as compleat as ever. No succours had been thrown in, and admiral Stevens in order to prevent the ill impression which the late disaster might have occasioned, sent a message to the neighbouring Dutch and Danish settlements, of the good condition and strength of the remainder of his fleet, and assured them he would make prize of such vessels as he found infringing the neutrality by attempting to supply the enemy.

Notwithstanding this mortifying disappointment, M. Lally made no proposal to surrender. The siege was carried on with redoubled alacrity; and at length a large battery being advanced within four hundred and fifty yards of the rampart, a breach being effected, and not more than one day's provision of any kind remaining, a signal was made for a cessation of arms; the principal of the Jesuits, together with two Civilians came out, and offered terms of capitulation. The governor preserving all his haughtiness, which neither his errors nor misfortunes could in the least abate, declined to offer any terms; [Jan. 15.] he sent out a paper full of invectives against the English, for the breach of treaties relative to India; he alledged that those breaches disqualified him from proposing any terms; and in consequence he rather suffered our troops to take possession of the place, than formally surrender it. As the governor refused to capitulate, the proposal of the inhabitants was little regarded, and the city of Pondicherry, with a garrison of about fourteen hundred European soldiers, a vast quantity of military stores, and great riches, was given up at discretion to our victorious arms.

Nothing can be said too highly of the conduct, perseverance, and unanimity of the land and sea services during a tedious siege and blockade of eight months, in a climate so unfavourable to all military operations. Colonel Coote gave the final blow to the French power in India; he was now indisputed master of the rich coast of Coromandel; the French power was wholly extirpated; the neutral nations were contemptible; the princes of the country considered us with an aweful regard, and nothing but a little French settlement on the coast of Malabar, called Mahie, (and which was soon after reduced) opposed our commanding the whole trade of that vast peninsula of India from the Ganges to the Indies, the most extensive and profitable sphere of commerce in the world.

Whilst every thing was giving way to our arms in the southern parts of this peninsula, the affairs of France, which in Bengal had been to all appearance totally suppressed, rose up again for a moment from a quarter, and in a manner, which was little expected. After the taking of Chandenagore by admiral Watson in the year 1757, Mr. Law, (nephew to that Law who had made himself so well known by the Missisippi scheme) put himself at the head of a party of French fugitives, which was augmented from time to time to about two hundred men. With this small party he threw himself into the heart of the country, and joining himself sometimes to one, sometimes to another of the native princes, as his interest led him; he rendered himself considerable by several striking services, and supported the credit of his little corps with a very high reputation.

The Great Mogul having some time since been deposed by an irruption of the Marrattas, and dying soon after, one of his sons, Sha Zaddah, assumed the title, and was supported by some of the provinces of that extensive and disunited empire; he was opposed by others; and though he was at the head of a royal army of his native subjects, such is the state of the military in that part of the world, that he considered an handful of European fugitives, as an acquisition of the greatest importance, and such as might turn the ballance against any weight of Indians, which might be thrown into the opposite scale. In fact, it was to Mr. Law he attributed the reduction of several considerable provinces to his obedience.

Elated with these successes, Law persuaded him to turn his arms against Bengal, which had not acknowledged him; it was a rich and flourishing country, and the possession of it, would undoubtedly contribute more than all the rest to set him on the throne of the Moguls. Here, unfortunately for him the evil genius of Law impelled him to encounter again with those arms, by which the interest of his country had been before ruined in this part of the world, and which indeed were those only, from which he had a great deal to fear. Sha Zaddah entered the kingdom of Bengal at the head of an army of 80,000 Indians and something more than 200 French.

The French support was more prejudicial to his title in the eyes of the English, than any other objection, and as they were now become the arbiters of crowns in the East, they joined the Nabob of Bengal to oppose his progress. About 20,000 blacks supported by 500 English soldiers, formed the army against him. A major (major Carnac) commanded that body, which engaged, and totally routed an army of fourscore thousand men, commanded by the Mogul in person. That prince was taken prisoner; Mr. Law was also taken, and the party of French adventurers dispersed for ever. It is not yet known with certainty, in what manner they mean to dispose of their captive monarch. It was some heightening to the satisfaction of this great event, that it happened on the same day in which the French agreed to the surrender of Pondicherry.

A little before this, Jaffier Ali Cawn, the Nabob who, in 1757, had been placed in that dignity by general Clive, notwithstanding the terrifying example of his predecessor, by his weakness and misgovernment, drew on himself the hatred of his subjects, and lost the protection of the English. But as his ambition was the feeblest of his passions, he consented quietly to quit the throne. The revolution was effected without bloodshed, his son-in-law was appointed in his room; and as the whole transaction was with the consent and co-operation of the English governor Vansittart, the old privileges of the company were confirmed, and new were acquired: the English in Bengal were become necessary to the government of that country, and every change produced something to their advantage.

It is certain, that the period of this war in the East Indies, has been marked by as many striking events, uncommon circumstances, and singular reverses of fortune, as any that have happened from the time of our knowledge of this part of the world.

It can hardly be said, that this series of prosperity was interrupted by the successful attempts of the count d'Estaign. This lively adventurer, with the command of no more than two ordinary frigates, had in October 1759, taken and destroyed the English settlement of Bender-Abassi, on the Persian gulph; he then struck over to the island of Sumatra, where we carry on our most considerable commerce in pepper; and before the end of the following April, reduced Bencoolen, the principal settlement, and all the rest of our forts and factories on that island, which made a defence altogether as unworthy of the rest of our conduct in India, as that of the count d'Estaign was superior to the efforts of his countrymen in that quarter. This bold adventurer, however, could not derive so much honour from the vigour of his enterprize, as disgrace from having made them against the most sacred law of arms: if what is said is true, that he was at the very time a prisoner upon parole.

In America the island of Dominica, one of those islands called Neutral, but which the French had fortified and settled, was reduced by a small armament under lord Rollo and Sir James Douglas. North America was perfectly quieted by a peace with the Cherokees. Colonel Grant reduced them to this necessity, by penetrating with great courage and perseverance into their country, and destroying fifteen of their towns, and almost their whole harvest.

THE ANNUAL REGISTER: OR HISTORY OF THE WAR. For the YEAR 1762.

CHAP. I.

State of Europe in the beginning of this year. Ill state of the British alliance. Condition of the northern powers. War reaches to the southern. Family compact, Some articles from it. Observations upon them. Consequences of this treaty to Europe. War declared against Spain. State of Spain and Great Britain at the beginning of the war between them. Advantages and disadvantages on each side.

THE close of the year 1761 left the affairs of all Europe, both military and political, in the most interesting situation, in which they have stood, at perhaps any period of our modern history. The endeavours which had been made to bring about peace amongst the belligerent powers, served only to increase their animosity. And at the same time they brought into light and exertion, those latent motives and dispositions to war, which had long lurked in other powers under the veil of neutrality; and had only been kept down sometimes by irresolution of temper in persons, and sometimes by want of system in politics. These ineffectual endeavours for peace produced also many occasions of quarrel and debate, that were absolutely new.

To the north there was no appearance of relenting in any one of the powers engaged. It was not to be expected, that the confederacy, which had held together so long, and under such difficulties and disappointments, should now break to pieces, just at the moment when the states which composed it seemed in a condition to reap the mature fruits of their unanimity and perseverance. The king of Prussia was not in a state either to allure or to intimidate. Great Britain could not increase his subsidy, nor reinforce his armies. The allied army in Westphalia played a defensive, and, on the whole of the campaign, a losing game; and there was nobody so sanguine as to think that Great Britain could increase her strength in Germany, where she paid already 100,000 men, and expended five millions annually.

Although nothing seems more certain in a general view of the political system, than that the king of Prussia is not the natural and necessary ally of this nation; yet his fortune neither was, since the beginning of the war, nor is it now a matter of indifference to us.

The late Mr. Shippin was of opinion, that the power of France was become an object of much less terror since the growth of the power of Russia. But he never imagined it possible, that all the great continental powers of Europe should ever be united with France; and that they should conspire to load her scale instead of ballancing it. He never could foresee, what has actually happened in this war, that this very power of Russia could co-operate with France, and even with Sweden; and what is full as extraordinary, that both these latter could co-operate with Austria to destroy in effect the system, which had been established by the treaty of Westphalia; that system, which it had been the great drift of policy, and the great object of war to both France and Sweden in the last century to establish and to confirm, and to the house of Austria constantly to oppose. The destruction of the king of Prussia seemed to include the destruction of the treaty of Westphalia; because he is the only power in the empire capable of asserting the independency of its members, and supporting the declining credit of the Protestant cause.

The total ruin of Saxony, with such circumstances of unpardonable cruelty by that prince himself, and the exhausted state of all the other Protestant members of the empire, have narrowed that interest more and more to the single object of Prussia. As this interest was first formed in the empire, so its condition there cannot fail of having the most sensible influence on all the potentates of the same communion. Even in this light, England had an interest that the king of Prussia should not be entirely crushed by the prevalence of a combination composed in so extraordinary a manner, that its success must necessarily produce a total revolution in the system of Europe, and draw on a series of consequences, which, though it is impossible to particularize, must have undoubtedly been of the most important and alarming nature.

But there was an interest yet nearer to us, the fate of our own army in Germany, which could not survive the destruction of the king of Prussia for an hour. These circumstances rendered the prospect of the campaign in Germany very gloomy; as there was no sort of ground to suppose that this prince, upon whose fate so many important interests immediately depended, could hold out to the middle of summer. Besides, Denmark shewed no favourable dispositions towards us; and Holland discovered evident marks of coldness, if not of absolute alienation. Such was the disposition of the powers in the north.

The southern powers of Europe, whose total inconnection with the causes, and whose great remoteness from the seat of war might appear sufficient to ensure their tranquillity, began to enter into action with a spirit equal to that of any of the parties, who had from the beginning acted as principals; new fewel was heaped upon the fire of contention, which had wasted so many nations, just as it seemed to be on the point of expiring.

That alliance between the branches of the house of Bourbon, of which we have spoken last year, and which is so well known by the name of the Family Compact, is one of the most extraordinary transactions of this, or, perhaps, of any time, It has already produced some effects answerable to its design; it may produce others still more important; and on the whole must be considered as an event of the most extensive, lasting, and alarming influence.

The treaty of Vienna in 1756, between France and Austria, has certainly contributed not a little to give that new turn to affairs, by which almost all the discourses, that have hitherto been written on the interests of princes, are rendered erroneous, and of little use in future speculations. That treaty, however, though it seems entirely to have disjointed the antient system of alliance by which France was formerly counterpoised, may, possibly, not be so much a lasting change, as a temporary and excentric deviation from the sphere in which the house of Austria had formerly moved, and into which it seems so sutiable to her natural and permanent interest to return. The Bourbon compact is of a different nature; and it seems to have at length produced that intire union between the French and Spanish monarchies, which was so much dreaded on the death of Charles II. and which it was the great purpose of the treaty of partition, and the war of the grand alliance to prevent. We have seen it take place in our days, comparatively with very little notice; so much greater is our present strength; or so much greater was the apprehension in those days, than the danger of the actual event in the present.

It was a bold push in France to attempt, and an uncommon success to procure, towards the close of an unfortunate and disgraceful war, an alliance of this kind. France could not have expected from the most fortunate issue of her affairs, an advantage so great as that which she derived from her uncommon distresses. It is some time since the jealousy of her power has began to abate. But in fact her security, and probably too her power, will be greatly increased by this very circumstance. Instead of forming such an object as alarmed mankind, and against which all Europe used to unite, she is herself become the centre of an alliance, which extends from the northern to the southern extemity of Europe; and she was in this war, actually united with Russia, Sweden, Austria, the Empire, Spain, and Naples; to say nothing of Denmark, with which she had also some connections.

With other nations, however, her ties are comparatively slight: but the engagements of the Bourbon compact form rather an act of incorporation than an alliance. It contains stipulations hitherto unheard of in any treaty. By the 23d and 24th articles, the subjects of the several branches of the house of Bourbon are admitted to a mutual naturalization, and to a participation of such privileges and immunities, as if they were natural born subjects of the countries of their respective sovereigns. The direct trade to America forms the only exception to this comprehensive communitive of interests. The tenor of this article is of infinite consequence to the general trading interest of Europe; all the states of which, by the 25th article of the same alliance, are excluded from any prospect of obtaining similar advantages.

This forms a civil union in almost the strictest sense; the political union is even more perfect. By the 1st and 16th articles, the two monarchs of France and Spain agree to look upon every power as their enemy, which becomes an enemy of the other; that a war declared against either, shall be regarded as personal by the other; and that, when they happen to be both engaged in a war against the same enemy or enemies, they will wage it jointly with their whole forces; and that their military operations shall proceed by common consent and with a perfect agreement.

By the 26th article, they agree reciprocally to disclose to each other their alliances and negotiations.

By the 17th and 18th, they formally engage not to make, or even to listen, to any proposal of peace from their common enemies, but by mutual consent; being resolved, in time of peace as well as in time of war, each mutually to consider the interests of the allied crown as its own; to compensate their several losses and advantages, and to act as if the two monarchies formed only one and the same power. The king of the Sicilies, and the infant duke of Parma are comprehended in this treaty.

Here is the model of the most perfect confederacy. There is but one restriction to the extent of this scheme; but this particular restriction is a key to the whole treaty; as it shews, in the most satisfactory manner against what object it was principally directed. For by the 8th article it is provided, that Spain shall not be bound to succour France, when she is engaged in a war in consequence of her engagements by the treaty of Westphalia, or other alliances with the princes and states of Germany and the north, unless some maritime power takes part in those wars, or France be attacked by land in her own country. This exception of the maritime powers indicates sufficiently that the tendency of this article is to affect England, and serves to point out clearly, though obliquely, to the other powers of Europe, that their connection with England is the great circumstance which is to provoke the enmity of Spain.

It should seem that this treaty alone, when once its true nature came to be discovered, if no other cause existed, would have been sufficient to justify Great Britain in a declaration of war against a monarchy, which had united itself in so intimate a manner with her enemy, that it was rendered impossible to distinguish the one from the other. In this point, however, prudence was to interpose, and circumstances to direct. It was not therefore, untill every attempt to bring Spain to a clear declaration of pacific intentions had been tried without success, in the manner she have already seen, that war was actually declared against her. This declaration was made, on our part, in London, the 2d of January of the present year.

Since Great Britain was a kingdom, she never was in such a doubtful and dangerous situation; for at this time we was engaged, directly or indirectly, in a war, not only with all the great continental powers, but, what is more material, with the most considerable part of the maritime strength of Europe. According to the ordinary computations, the navy of Spain consisted of more than 100 men of war; and though the French navy was greatly reduced, it became of consideration when added to the Spanish. Great efforts were made to render it respectable. Several communities in France engaged to fit out men of war at their own expence; and in general that whole people felt, after having been sunk under a long despondency, a momentary glow of hope and animation from this alliance, so powerful in its real strength, and in its principals so flattering to the national vanity. The glory of their royal house, was, on this occasion, united with the safety of their country. They were reinforced by the most cordial amity of a power untouched in its resources of men, money, and stores; whilst Great Britain was exhausted of men by her many victories, and her resources were sinking under a debt of more than one hundred millions.

Besides a rude shock had been lately given to the system of the English ministry, which might be supposed, in some degree, likely to affect public credit. The part which Mr. Pitt might finally take, and the consequences which might result from his actions, were extremely undetermined; nor was it at all clear, what degree of harmony and real confidence continued amongst the several parts of the subsisting administration. All these considerations could not fail of inspiring France with great confidence.

Great Britain, under these circumstances, had, however, some things in her favour. The hope of plunder which always attends a Spanish war, disposed the minds of many towards the present; and was sure to call forth a very vigorous exertion both of public and private strength. This circumstance also insured the supplies.

With regard to the administration, their delay in entering into this Spanish war, contrary to the ideas of Mr. Pitt, his resignation in consequence of this delay; the necessity, which so soon after appeared, of engaging in hostilities, and which, to the bulk of the people, seemed to justify the sentiments of that minister, together with a recollection of the singular spirit with which the French war had been carried on, must necessarily have excited them to the most strenous efforts, and to every act of laudable emulation. There was a necessity of shewing, that the spirit of the nation, and the wisdom of its councils, were not confined to a single man; and it was shewn effectually.

We had also, to ballance the great strength derived from the extraordinary combination of our enemies, that uniform tenor of success on our side, which made our people believe themselves invincible. This was not an ungrounded presumption, or a dream of enthusiasm; their just opinion of superior courage, together with the solid experience derived from such a variety of services, and so many sharp conflicts by sea, and land, all combined to make our forces seem, and be, almost irresistible.

Spain, on the other hand, had, in the very constitution of her power, an essential defect, which exposed her on this, as upon all other occasions. Her resources, though very great, are not within herself; and consequently are not always at her command, being subject not only to be intercepted by the operations of the war, but to be destroyed or lost by the casualty of long voyages; and, in every event, are liable to delay and disappointment.

CHAP. II.

Portugal threatened. Melancholy state of that kingdom. Arrogant proposition of the French and Spanish ministers to the court of Lisbon. Answer of that court. Several memorials. Resolution of the king of Portugal. French and Spanish ministers depart. War declared by those powers against Portugal.

SUCH was our situation, both at home and abroad, at the breaking out of this new war. Something extraordinary was to be expected from the confederacy of the house of Bourbon. It was not, however, altogether certain where the storm, that was gathering, would fall. There were apprehensions for the peace of Italy; Holland had some cause of dread; and menaces were used in that quarter. But Portugal seemed to be most endangered, on account of her close and natural connection with Great Britain, her internal weakness, the antient claims of the Catholic king, and the opportunity of invasion; that kingdom being on all sides, except to the sea, in a manner inclosed by Spain.

Public conjecture was not mistaken in fixing upon Portugal. No mention was made, indeed, of the Spanish pretensions to that crown; but a resolution was taken not only to oblige her to renounce all friendship, but to violate her neutrality with Great Britain.

No attempt was ever designed with less appearance of justice; no proposition was ever made with more arrogance and despotism to an independent sovereign; and no scheme seemed, according to every human appearance, so certain of success.

The kingdom of Portugal, on the recovery of her liberty; which happened in the year 1640, found herself stripped of the greatest part of those acquisitions, in both Indies, which had been the principal sources of her power, and the great monuments of the captivity of her former kings and commanders. During the interval of her subjection, new commerical powers had risen, some on the 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 ruins of her fortune, and others upon different but not less substantial foundations. though the Brazils were recovered, and Goa and some other places in India remained still to Portugal, her maritime power, and the share of trade, on which it depended, were not recoverable. Contrary to the fate of other nations, who have shaken off a foreign dominion, she did not owe her liberty to great abilities. Whilst the United Provinces were first freed, and afterwards aggrandized, by the capacity of the princes of Orange, and whilst Prussia, from an inconsiderable and dependent principality, grew into a formidable monarchy by the genuis of her sovereigns, Portugal continued to languish in a state of mediocrity. Without any symptoms of danger to her existence, she suffered a gradual decay of her power and consideration. The character of her government was narrow and biggoted, and the whole system of her commerce preposterous. If, on the one hand, a long peace added to the resources of her revenue, it, on the other, absolutely annihilated her military; and no country in the world had an army so complete in numbers, so ill furnished with arms, so deficient in discipline, and so wholly unprovided of able and experienced officers.

In this condition she suffered a fatal blow from the earthquake in 1756. The wealthy and flourishing city of Lisbon was laid level with the ground; near 30,000 of the inhabitants were buried in the ruins; and those who remained, with the court itself, were reduced to the utmost distress and misery.

As if this earthquake, which overturned their capital, had also shaken and destracted the frame of their government, and the temper of their minds, the most dreadful distempers broke out in the state, A series of horrid crimes, and of cruel punishments, succeeded to this calamity. The most noble and wealthy family of Portugal, having engaged itself in a sacrilegious attempt on the life of their sovereign, was cut off at once, with little distinction of sex or age, by a bloody and dreadful exertion of justice. Many others, who were accused or suspected, suffered death, or exile, or imprisonment. Amongst these, and from the same causes, one of the most considerable religious orders for wealth, influence, and policy, was stripped of its possessions, and intirely driven out of the country.

All these circumstances left this unhappy kingdom in the utmost weakness and confusion. All those, and they were not a few, who were attached by connection of blood or interest to the nobles that had suffered, or by religious prejudice to the Jesuits who had been expelled, could never be cordially relied upon by the crown, and were probably as little inclined to any extraordinary efforts in favour of a government, which their resentments must have represented to them as no better than a bloody tyranny.

The Bourbon confederacy had some ground to suppose that Portugal, in this situation, would not have courage to withstand their menaces, and much less ability for any long time to resist their efforts. The Spanish army overspread the frontiers of Portugal; the commerce of corn between the two kingdoms was prohibited, and every thing threatened a sudden invasion. In the midst of these hostile preparations, [Mar. 6.] the French and Spanish ministers presented a joint memorial to the court of Lisbon which was followed by several others. The purport of these memorials was to persuade his most faithful majesty to enter into the alliance, and co-operate in the measures of the two crowns, against Great Britain.

It was not easy to find very convincing arguments to induce Portugal to adopt so extraordinary a change of system. The united crowns, in a memorial which was signed by the ambassadors of both, insisted largely on the tyranny which Great Britain exerted upon all powers, especially the maritime, and upon Portugal among the rest; on the particular insult which had been offered to her jurisdiction, by Boscawen's attack on de la Clue's squadron in a Portuguese harbour; on that affinity, by which the two monarchs of Spain and Portugal are as closely connected by the ties of blood, as all powers are by a common interest, to oppose the ambitious designs of the English.

Whatever these arguments were deficient in reason, was made up by a strong insinuation of force. The memorial concluded with a declaration, that, as soon as his most faithful majesty had taken his resolution, which they doubted not would prove favourable, their army was ready to enter Portugal, and to garrison the principal ports of that kingdom, in order to prevent the dangers to which they might be exposed from the attempts of the English.

The two ministers added to this extraordinary memorial, that they were ordered by their courts to demand a categorical 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 answer in four days; and that any delay, beyond that time, should be considered as a negative.

The situation of Portugal was at this time certainly worthy of compassion. If, contrary to her known interests, contrary to her antient connections, and to the faith of treaties, she should engage in this offensive alliance, she must expect to see her territories and her colonies exposed to the formidable navies of England. This however dangerous condescension was not to secure her, by her own act, she would have put herself, bound hand and foot, into the power of the Bourbon alliance; and having received foreign garrisons into all her places of strength, would have reduced herself to the condition of a province to Spain. On the other hand, if she adhered to her faith, and attempted to maintain her independency, an army of sixty thousand men was ready to enter her territories, which contained no place of real strength, and which had not twenty thousand troops, and those ill armed, and worse disciplined, to defend it.

In this emergency, the firmness of the king of Portugal was eminent, and such as must deliver his name to posterity with the most distinguished advantage. He resolved steadily to adhere to his antient and natural alliance, and to brave all dangers and difficulties, that he might preserve his fidelity inviolable; following that generous maxim of king John of France, that if good faith were to be banished from all other parts of the world, it ought to be found in the breast of sovereigns.

His answer to this insulting proposition was humble and moderate, but firm: he observed, that the ties, which equally united him to Great Britain and the two crowns, rendered him as proper a mediator to them all, as they made it improper for him to declare himself an enemy to any of them; that his alliance with England was antient, and therefore could give no offence at this conjuncture; that it was purely defensive, and therefore innocent in all its circumstances; that the late sufferings of Portugal disabled her (in case she were willing) from taking part in an offensive war, into the calamities of which, neither the love his faithful majesty bore to his subjects as a father, nor the duty by which he was bound to them as a king, could suffer him to plunge them. Finally, he reminded the catholic king of his pacific dispositions, by which, on former occasions, he had yielded so much, to preserve peace between the two kingdoms.

This reasonable and moderate answer drew on replies, which more and more disclosed the true character and spirit of the Bourbon confederacy. They denied that the alliance with England was purely defensive, or intirely innocent; and for this unheard-of reason, that the defensive alliance is converted into an offensive one, from the situation of the Portuguese dominions, and from the nature of the English power: the English squadron, said they, cannot keep the sea in all seasons, nor cruize on the principal coasts for cutting off the French and Spanish navigation, without the ports and the assistance of Portugal; that these islanders could not insult all maritime Europe, if all the riches of Portugal did not pass into their hands; that therefore Portugal furnishes them with the means to make war; and their alliance with the court of Great Britain is offensive.

Certainly, the situation of a country was never before given as a reason, however it might have served as a secret motive, for declaring war against it. Nor was it before heard, that the common advantages of trade, derived from a neutral nation, could be deemed an act of hostility. These were rather insults than arguments. And the whole proceedings of the united crowns were in the same strain; they undertook to judge for Portugal of the pretended yoke which was imposed upon her by England, and which she could not herself discover; to resent injuries for her, for which she had received and accepted satisfaction; and, as if this had not been indignity sufficient, they insultingly inform the king of Portugal, that he ought to be glad of the nececessity which they laid upon him to make use of his reason, in order to take the road of his glory, and the common interest. This necessity was the immediate march of their army to take possession of his dominions.

So extraordinary a treatment neither intimidated the king from the firmness of his resolution, nor provoked him to change from the moderation of his language. He maintained, that the treaties of league and commerce, which subsisted between Portugal and Great Britain, are such as the law of God, of nature, and of nations, have always deemed innocent. He intreated their most christian and catholic majesties to open their eyes to the crying injustice of pursuing against Portugal, the war kindled against Great Britain; he desired them to consider, that they were giving an example, which would produce the destruction of mankind; that there was an end of the public safety, if neutral nations were to be attacked, because they have defensive treaties with the belligerent powers; that a maxim so destructive would occasion desolation in all Europe, the moment a war was kindled between any two states; that, therefore, if their troops should enter his dominions, he would, in defence of his neutrality, endeavour to repulse them with all his forces, and those of his allies; and he concluded with this magnanimous declaration, that it would affect him less, though reduced to the last extremity, of which the Great Judge is the sole arbiter, to let the last tile of his palace fall, and to see his faithful subjects spill the last drop of their blood, than to sacrifice, together with the honour of his crown, all that Portugal holds most dear; and to submit, by such extraordinary means, to become an unheard-of example to all pacific powers, who will no longer be able to enjoy the benefit of neutrality, whenever a war shall be kindled between other powers, with which the former are connected by defensive treaties. When this final resolution was thus spiritedly declared, passports were demanded for the ambassadors of the two crowns, [April 27.] who immediately departed; and, in a little time after, France and Spain jointly declared war against Portugal.

We have dwelt some time upon this transaction: we hope the reader will not think the narrative drawn into a blameable length. The subject is interesting, the procedure uncommon, and the example alarming. This war against Portugal was the first fruit of the Bourbon compact: they shewed very early to the world, what it was to expect from the maturity of this league; when they were so elevated by the superiority they imagined they had attained, even in forming it, that they thought themselves dispensed from those decorums, and plausible appearances, which the most ambitious princes commonly make use of, in the execution of their most ambitious designs. If they had invaded Portugal without any declaration at all, it might, perhaps, be considered as a piece of convenient injustice, which they left to the previous necessity, and subsequent success of their affairs, to justify as they could; but so many memorials and reasonings on the subject, shew that this oppression was deliberate, and that they had not been driven to it by a sudden emergency, but that it became a regular and avowed part of their political system.

Having laid open the manner in which the southern part of Europe so surprisingly became engaged in this war, it is now our business to relate in what manner some of the northern parts were as surprisingly extricated out of it.

CHAP. III.

Death of the empress Elizabeth of Russia. Her character. State of the power of Russia on her decease. Her nephew, Peter III. succeeds. Intire change of system. Peace with Prussia. Peace between Prussia and Sweden. Prussian conquests restored. The czar enters into an alliance with the king of Prussia. War with Denmark threatened. Its cause. Extorted loan from Hamburgh. Campaign between Prussians and Austrians opens. Prussians obtain advantages in Saxony and Silesia. Sudden revolution in Russia.

WE have seen, in the close of the last year, that by the taking of Colberg, on one hand, and Schweidnitz, on the other, the king of Prussia's dominions were entirely at the mercy of his enemies: his forces were worn away, and even his efforts had gradually declined: a complete victory, tho' this was an event not at all probable, could not save him. The Russians, by wintering in Pomerania, and by the possession of Colberg, which insured them supplies by a safe and expeditious channel, were in a condition to commence their operations much earlier than usual, as well as to sustain them with more spirit and uniformity. No resource of policy could be tried with the least expectation of success. After such a resistance for five years, of which the world never furnished another example, the king of Prussia had nothing left but such a conduct, as might close the scene with glory, since there was so little appearance of his concluding the war with safety.

In the midst of these gloomy appearances, his inveterate and inflexible enemy, the empress of Russia, died, in the sixty-third year of her age, [Jan. 2.] and the twenty-second of her reign.

This princess was second daughter to Peter the Great and a descendant not altogether unworthy of that illustrious founder of the Russian empire. From being little better than a prisoner, she became in a moment a despotic sovereign. At the accession of this princess, the Russian power, so newly created, seemed to be in danger of a decline, from the many revolutions to which the empire had been subject; and the institutions of Peter the Great, by which that extensive part of the world was drawn out of barbarism, began perceivably to decay, until her accession to the throne, when the former was put out of all question by the vigour of her government, and the latter cherished and promoted by the encouragement which she gave to every valuable art and science. The academy at Petersburgh is at present one of the most flourishing in Europe, and has already enriched the learned world with considerable discoveries.

In fact, she governed the Russian empire with more lenity than any of her predecessors; and, perhaps, carried this amiable disposition to an impolitic access. She regulated and increased her finances; kept alive, and even increased, the discipline of her armies; and in all her transactions with foreign states, and in the various faces which her politics assumed, she always supported the dignity and importance of her country at the highest point. For her private pleasures, indeed, she has been much censured; but as they were merely pleasures, and of such a nature that sentiment had little share in them, they had little influence on her public conduct, which was always manly and firm.

The part she took in this war, though it might in some measure have been dictated by resentment, was at the fame time the result of the soundest policy. No power, but that of the king of Prussia, was capable of checking hers. He was, not only from his strength and character, but from the situation of his dominions, the only prince in Europe from whom it could be materially her interest to make conquests. By the retention of Prussia, and by the dominion which in another name, she held over the dutchy of Courland, she possessed a very great share of the Baltic coast, and thereby possessed the means of becoming a maritime power of the first order. With these advantages, she might easily complete all that had been wanting, towards establishing an uncontroulable power over Poland. By the same means she might entirely over-awe Denmark and Sweden; and also, by her vicinity, she would be enabled to interpose in the concerns of Germany, with much more authority than she had hitherto possessed; although her intervention had always been of consequence.

In reality, the house of Austria seemed to make far greater sacrifices of her interest to her resentment than Russia did, with whom those two principals went hand in hand, and supported each other. For nothing is more evident, than that Russia would set up for a defender of the liberties of Germany, if ever she got any footing in its neighbourhood; that she would animate the powers there to assert a greater degree of independence than they do at present; that she would render, by her machinations, the empire in the Austrian family very precarious; and might even find means of setting some feeble prince on the imperial throne, in order to embroil the whole Germanic body, and to keep it in entire dependence upon Russia. On the whole, if the projects of Austria had succeeded in their full extent, she would have very soon found in Russia a more powerful restraint than ever she had either in France or Sweden, even in the greatest heights of their power and credit in Germany. She would, indeed, have ruined the king of Prussia; but she would have purchased his ruin with her own independency.

These were the prospects that lay before all political reasoners at the time of the death of the empress Elizabeth. Charles Peter Ulric, of the house of Holstein, who had been created grand duke of Russia, and appointed heir apparent to that vast empire by the late czarina, succeeded, under the name of Peter III. None but those who were intimately acquainted with the character and disposition of the new czar, could have any reason to imagine that he would abandon the system of his predecessor, which was certainly founded on the true interest of the country he governed. The king of Prussia himself seemed for some time to have entertained no great hopes from this change. The czar had, however, sometimes discovered marks of esteem for the character of this monarch. He had the black eagle, of which order the king of Prussia is grand master. But the king of Prussia could place very little confidence in this: however, with that air of pleasantry, which never entirely forsook him in all his misfortunes, he said in a letter to Mr. Mitchel, the British minister at the Russian court, "Is not this a very extraordinary knight, to feed 80,000 men at my expence? He is the only one of my knights that takes that liberty. If every knight of the garter did the same, your England (England though it is) would be devoured by them. I beg you would endeavour to make my knight more tractable, and tell him it is against the institutes of the order, for a knight to eat up his grand master."

The eyes of all Europe were now fixed upon the steps which the czar might take. With regard to the government of his country, nothing could be more popular and auspicious than his first measures. The earliest use he made of his absolute power, was to set the Russian nobility and gentry free, and to put them on the same footing with those of their rank in the other more moderate governments of Europe. Almost all the exiles were recalled to court, and amongst the rest the unfortunate count Biron, who, from a sovereign prince, had been reduced to the most wretched condition, in the most wretched country on the globe. He had been many years a peasant of Siberia, and may very probably once more become a sovereign prince. It is in those despotic governments we see the most striking excesses, and dismal reverses of fortune; in which one day a person is raised to something almost above man, and the next is perhaps in a moment degraded to the lowest station of humanity.

The new emperor proceeded in his reformation to abolish some severe and tyrannical jurisdictions, and intending the same benign disposition to all degrees of his subjects, he lessened the tax upon salt, to the very great and universal relief of the poor.

These beginnings gave the most favourable impressions of his domestic government. But Europe was principally concerned in his foreign politics. It was not long before his dispositions to peace became apparent. What astonished the world, was the high rate at which he valued this blessing. In a memorial, which he caused to be delivered on the 23d of February, to the ministers of the allied courts, he declared, that, in order to the establishment of peace, he was ready to sacrifice all the conquests made by the arms of Russia in this war, in hopes that the allied courts will on their parts equally prefer the restoration of peace and tranquillity, to the advantages which they might expect from the continuance of the war, but which they cannot obtain but by a continuance of the effusion of human blood.

The allies praised the disinterestedness, spirit, and humanity of this declaration; but recommended to his attention the fidelity to treaties, which constitutes a no less valuable part of the royal character, and a no less considerable branch of the duty of a monarch to his subjects. They shewed a disposition to imitate his desire for peace, but by no means to follow his example in purchasing it by a cession of all the advantages, which they had acquired, or hoped to acquire by the war.

The Czar having thus far complied with decency, and being of a character little fitted to wait the slow procedure of a joint negotiation, gave way to his ardent desires for peace, and to the sentiments of that extravagant admiration, which he had conceived for the king of Prussia. A suspension of hostilities was concluded between them on the 16th of March; and it was followed not long after by a treaty of peace and alliance. [May 5.] Nothing was stipulated by the czar in favour of the former confederates, whom he entirely abandoned. He even agreed to join his troops to those of the king of Prussia to act against them. In a little time a Russian army was seen in conjunction with one of Prussia, to drive out of Silesia those Austrians, who had been a few months before brought into that province by the Russian arms.

This was a miraculous revolution. Fortune who had so long abandoned the king of Prussia to his genuis, after having persecuted him for near five years, and overpowered him with the whole weight of her anger, at length made amends by a sudden turn, and did for him at one stroke the only thing, by which he could possibly be saved.

Sweden who since she has recovered her liberty has lost her political importance, and for a long time acted entirely under the direction of Russian councils, followed on this, as on all other occasions, the example of the courts of Petersburgh, and signed a treaty of peace with the king of Prussia on the 22d of May.

In order to account for whatever was not the result of mere personal character in this extraordinary revolution of politics in Russia, it will be necessary to remind the reader, that the czar Peter the third was duke of Holstein; and that the dukes of Holstein had pretensions to the dutchy of Sleswick. These pretensions were compromised by a treaty in 1732. But as the cession made by the house of Holstein in this treaty was the effect of necessity, it had been always apprehended that she would make use of the first safe opportunity of reclaiming her antient rights. The czar seised eagerly on the great one, which the possession of the whole Russian power afforded him, and he resolved to enter into an immediate war for this object, to which his predilection for his native country gave in his eyes a far greater importance than to all the conquests of his predecessor. As long as this war with the king of Prussia subsisted, it was impossible that his designs against Denmark could be prosecuted with any hope of success. Wholly indifferent therefore to all others, and passionately fond of this object, as soon as he came to the throne, without any dispute or negotiation, he offered the king of Prussia in his great distress every thing he could have hoped from a series of victories, and whilst he joined his arms to those of that monarch in Silesia, he caused an army to march towards Holstein.

Thus the peace with Russia, far from conducing to the general peace of Europe, did very little more than change the face of the war. It brought in new subjects of dispute, and new parties, and by threatning Denmark, left not a single power in the north in a state of assured tranquillity.

The king of Denmark, though threatned by so formidable a power engaged in pursuit of a favourite object, was not terrified into any mean concessions. He recruited His army, repaired his fortifications, and prepared for his defence; with temper and magnanimty. As money must be much wanting for the services of so important a war, as his country could furnish no great supplies, and the borrowings in every part of Europe, together with the sudden invasion of his dominions, could enable him to form no sanguine hopes of public credit, he turned his eyes towards the city of Hamburgh, which had enriched itself by its industry and neutrality during the whole war, and by the number of wealthy persons who had fled there for refuge from the calamities, which all the neighbouring countries had suffered.

His Danish majesty had always kept alive a claim of sovereignty over that city, which (whoever founded) he exercised whenever he found himself able. He thought the present one of those conjunctures. Therefore without any previous notice he appears with a strong army before Hamburg, [June 18.] seizes the suburbs, threatens the city with an immediate siege, if they did not immediately submit to a loan of 1,000,000 of rix dollars. The magistrates of this trading city, little prepared for, or accustomed to war, having no ally at hand, and who would be equally endangered by the strength of any ally able to protect them, prudently submitted, and furnished the king with such a supply as his affairs required.

The king of Prussia lost no time to profit of this great and unexpected revolution in his favour. The neutrality of the Russians still left the Austrians much superior to him Their alliance brought him to an equality. Two Austrian armies in Silesia and one in Saxony, were prepared to act, and it was not clear which side would begin to act on the offensive; the Austrian armies threatened Glogau and Breslaw with a siege, and the king of Prussia's threatened Schweidnitz.

The active character of the king of Prussia, and the caution of marshal Daun, soon determined the part which the several armies were to take, and the spirit of the several operations. [May 12.] Very early in the camppaign prince Henry made a vigorous push on the imperial posts towards the frontiers of Saxony. The Imperialists were obliged to evacuate Dippolswalda with some loss in killed. About four thousand men were taken prisoners; 356 waggons were also taken, and several military trophies,

By this signal advantage, all the part of Saxony, possessed by the Prussians, was effectually secured; and any attempt which might hereafter be thought proper for the recovery of Dresden, was much facilitated. Although the Austrians, sensible of the consequence of this loss, and largely reinforceed from the armies in Silesia, attempted to recover these posts by several lively efforts, they were repulsed with no small slaughter on both sides; and prince Henry remained so much master of Saxony, that it was necessary to keep a large army from the war in Silesia, to prevent if possible his making irruptions into the very heart of Bohemia.

His Prussian majesty derived advantages from the conduct of his brother, which he did not neglect to improve. It was not until the latter end of June that he was joined by his new Russian allies. As soon as this junction was formed, he resolved to make a tryal of what these men could do in his favour, who had acted so strenuously against him. Marshal Daun's army occupied several strong, but detached eminences, which enabled him to communicate with and protect Schweidnitz from all attempts of the enemy. The king of Prussia undertook to dislodge, [July 21.] him from those advantageous posts. In some of his attempts he succeeded, in others he was baffled with some loss.

This was no regular battle; but the king of Prussia, though he did not succeed immediately in his attack, yet by his judicious manoeuvres he attained all the advantages he proposed from his enterprise. For marshal Daun, apprehensive from the motions of his army, that the king of Prussia intended to seize upon his principal magazine, and even cut off his communication with Bohemia, abandoned those important posts which he had hitherto maintained with success, fell back to the extremities of Silesia, and left Schweidnitz entirely uncovered.

The king of Prussia immediately prepared to invest that city whilst different detachments of Prussians, some on the side of Saxony, others on the side of Silesia, penetrated deep into Bohemia, laid many parts of the country under contribution, and spread an universal alarm. It was about five Years since they had been driven from thence by the victorious arms of marshal Daun, who now found himself unable to protect that kingdom from their ravages. A considerable body of Russian irregulars also made an irruption into Bohemia, and began there to retaliate on the Austrians those excesses, which they had themselves so often before committed on the Prussian dominions,

Whilst the king of Prussia was thus playing with spirit the great game which fortune had put into his hands, he was all at once threatened with a sudden reverse, by another revolution in Russia, which bore all the appearance of being as unfavourable to him, as the former had been beyond all hopes beneficial. The variable political climate of Russia, under whose influence all his fortune decayed or flourished, was covered with a sudden cloud by the deposition, followed close by the death, of his fast friend, and faithful ally, the czar of Muscovy.

CHAP. IV.

Causes of the revolution in Russia. Czar irritates the clergy and soldiery. Differences with the czarina. Conspiracy against him. Czar deposed by the senate. Attempts an escape. His imprisonment and death. The czarina declared empress. Her politic conduct. Ingratiates herself with the People.

FROM the moment of the late czar's accession to the throne of the Russia's, something extraordinary was expected. His disposition seemed to lead him to make alterations in every thing, and having set before himself two great examples, that of the king of Prussia and of his predecessor Peter I. it was expected that this vast empire was going once more, almost within the life of a man, to assume a new face; a circumstance which could not fail of having a serious influence on the affairs of Europe. Peter III. made more new regulations in Russia in a few weeks, than wise and cautious princes undertake in a long reign. It was to be feared that his actions were rather guided by a rash and irregular turn of mind, and the spirit of innovation, than by any regular and well digested plan, for the improvement of his extensive dominions.

His first actions on coming to the throne, it is true, were laudable, and seemed well calculated to acquire him the affections of his people. But if in some instances he consulted their interests, in many he shocked their prejudices; and he lost thereby that opinion, which is on all occasions necessary, but is particularly so for carrying such uncommon designs as his into execution.

The power of the czar's though absolute and uncontroulable in its exercise, is extremely weak in its foundation. There is not perhaps in Europe a government which depends so much on the good will and affection of those that are governed; and which requires a greater degree of vigilance and a steadier hand. The regular succession which has been so often broken, and the great change of manners, which in less than a century has been introduced, have left in Russia a weakness amidst all the appearance of strength, and a great facility to sudden and dangerous revolutions.

Peter III. paid little attention to those difficulties, which to him were the greater, as he was a foreigner born. They were augmented by the superior and invidious regard he seemed to pay to foreign interests, and foreign persons. The preference he so manifestly gave to the uncertain hope of inconsiderable conquest in Holstein over the solid and valuable possessions which the fortune of his predecessor had left him, must have disgusted all the politicians of his country. His intimate connection with, and boundless admiration of that prince, with whom Russia had been so lately, and so long, in a state of the most violent hostility, could not add to the opinion of his prudence. They did not think he sufficiently consulted his dignity, in soliciting with great anxiety a command in the Prussian service. When he received it, he dressed himself in the Prussian uniform, made a grand festival, and displayed all the marks of an immoderate and puerile satisfaction. He pushed his extravagance in this point so far, that he made preparations in this immature state of his government to quit Russia, and to go into Germany for the sake of an interview with that great monarch, whose genius, principles and fortune he so greatly admired.

Although this proceeding was, almost in every respect, extremely impolitic, it did not threaten so dangerous consequences as the other steps, which he took about the same time. Nothing requires so much judgment, and so nice a hand, as to effect a change in the settled establishments of any country. Above all, there must be something favourable in the conjuncture; or something so uncommon and over-ruling in the genius of the conductor of those changes, as will render him superior to all difficulties. This latter was the case of Peter I. who had indeed very little favourable in the conjuncture; but he did every thing by his capacity, courage, and perseverance. The soldiery and the ecclesiastics are the great supports of all absolute rule, and they are certainly the last bodies, upon which a prince of this kind would chuse to exert any invidious act of authority. But the czar was indiscreet enough, very early in his reign, highly to provoke both these bodies; the soldiery, by the manifest preference he gave to his Holstein guards, and to all officers of that nation; and by the change he made in favour of the Prussian uniform to the exclusion of that, in which the Russians believed they had so often asserted the honour of their country, and gained many signal advantages over the troops distinguished by those regimentals which were now preferred

These trifles had very important consequences. But what he did in matters of religion was still more dangerous. This prince had been educated a Luthern; and though he conformed to the Greek church, in order to qualify himself for the succession, he never shewed much respect to that mode of religion, to the rites and doctrines of which his subjects had been always extremely attached. He seized upon the revenues of the clergy, whether monks or seculars, whether bishops or inferiors, and for compensation allowed them some mean pensions, in such a proportion as his fancy suggested. His capricious order that the clergy should be no longer distinguished by beards, was in itself of less moment, but it was hardly less offensive. He made also some regulations concerning the images and pictures in their churches, which gave them reason to apprehend his intention of accomplishing a total change in the religion of the empire, and introducing Lutheranism.

Whilst he was taking these measures to alienate the minds of his people in general, and especially of those bodies, with whom it was the most his interest to be well, he had not the good fortune to live in union with his own family. He had long slighted his consort, a princess of the house of Anhalt Zerbst, a woman of a masculine understanding, and by whose councils he might have profited. He lived in a very public manner with the countess of Woronzoff, niece to the chancellor of that name, and seemed devoted to her with so strong a passion, that it was apprehended he had some thoughts of throwing his empress into a monastery, and raising this lady to the throne of all the Russias. What seemed to confirm this opinion, was his omitting formally to declare his son the grand duke Paul Petrowitz the successor. This omission in a country where the succession is established and regular, would have been of no consequence; the punctual observance of such a ceremony would rather have betrayed some doubt of the title. But the nature of this government, as well as possitive constitutions, had made it necessary in Russia, and the omission was certainly alarming.

That unfortunate prince, having in this manner affronted his army, irritated his clergy, offended his nobility, and alienated his own family, without having left himself any firm ground of authority, in personal esteem or national prejudice, proceeded with his usual precipitation to new changes. In the mean time a most dangerous conspiracy was forming against him. The cruel punishments inflicted in Russia on state criminals, have only an effect to harden the minds of men already fierce and obdurate, and seldom deter them from the most desperate undertakings. Rosamouski, Hetman or chief of the Cossacks, a person of importance by that command, Panin, governor of the grand duke Paul, marshal Butterlin, the chamberlain Teplow, the attorney general Glebow, baron Orlow major of the guards, and many others of the great officers and first nobility of the Empire, engaged in a conspiracy to dethrone the czar, who was now universally hated; and, what was more fatal to him, universally despised.

They assured themselves that their actions could not be disagreeable to the empress; whose conduct had always been the very reverse of that of her consort, This princess finding that the affections of her husband were irrecoverably alienated, endeavoured to set up a separate and independent interest in her own favour, and for asserting the rights of her son. She therefore assiduously cultivated the affections of the Russian nation, and paid a respect to their manners and religion, in the same degree that her husband seemed to cotemn them.

So ill was the czar served, that this conspiracy was grown general, without his receiving the least notice of it, and he remained in perfect security, whilst the senate and the clergy were assembled to pass the sentence of his disposition. [June 28.] At this time the empress and he were both absent from the capital at different country seats. The empress, as soon as she found that the design was declared, got on horse-back, and with all possible speed arrived at Petersburg. She immediately harangued the guards, who chearfully and unanimously declared in her favour, and proclaimed her empress of Russia independently of her husband. She then addressed herself to the clergy, and the chief of the nobility, who applauded her resolution; and all orders immediately took the oath of allegiance to her as sole empress. She was no sooner acknowledged in this manner, than, without losing a moment's time, she marched from Petersburg towards the emperor at the head of a body of troops.

This prince was indulging himself in indolent amusements, and lulled in the most profound security at a house of pleasure, called Oraniebaum on the sea shore, when a soldier brought him an account that his kingdom was taken away from him.

Astonished, and wholly unprepared for this event, he was some time senseless, and entirely at a loss what part to take. When he was rouzed from this trance by the approaching danger, his first suggestion was to defend the place with his Holstein guards; but tho' satisfied of their attachment, he doubted their strength, and he knew it was in vain to hope for any effort in his favour from the Russians.

Nothing then remained but flight, by which he might escape to Holstein, and wait some favourable turn of fortune. This late lord of powerful fleets and armies embarked in a small vessel, and with a few attendants, rowed towards Cronstadt; but he had not proceeded very far, when he was informed that this fortress was in the hands of his enemies, and that every avenue for escape was shut against him. Dejected and desponding he returned to Oraniebaum. After some short and tumultuous deliberation, he resolved to abandon all thoughts of defence, and to throw himself on the compassion of the empress.

On her march she met his messengers, who brought letters containing a renunciation of the empire, and stipulating no other terms than leave to return to Holstein, and the satisfaction of taking with him, as the companion of his retreat, the countess of Woronzoff and one single friend.

Reasons of state could not permit the empress to consent to the first of those terms, and the last could not be very flattering to her. His terms were rejected; and he was required to sign an unconditional resignation of his crown, according to a form that was prepared for him. Not satisfied with depriving him of his crown, it was thought fit to make him the murderer of his own reputation; and this unfortunate prince, moved with the vain hope of life, signed a paper declaring his conviction of his inability to govern the empire, either as a sovereign, or in any other capacity, and his sense of the distress, in which his continuing at the head of affairs would inevitably involve it. After he had signed this abdication, he gave up his sword, and was conducted to prison, where in a short time, [July 6.] but according to what had been universally expected, he died. The disorder, which killed him, was called an hemorrhoidal cholic.

Thus was a revolution of such immense importance effected in a single day, and without shedding a single drop of blood. The unfortunate emperor enjoyed the power, of which he had made so imprudent and unpolitic an use, no longer than six months. His wife, without any hereditary title, is sovereign mistress of the Russian empire; and the most absolute power on earth, is now held by an elective monarch.

Immediately on this revolution a number of manifestoes appeared, in which the conduct of the late czar was severely condemned, the weakness of his personal character exposed, and designs of the blackest kind, even that of murdering his consort, attributed to him. Those manifestoes at the same time were filled with the strongest declarations of affection from the empress to the subjects of Russia, of regard to their interests, and of attachment to their religion; and they are all filled with such unaffected and fervent strains of piety, as must needs prove extremely edifying to those who are acquainted with the sentiments of pure religion, by which great princes are generally animated on occasions of this nature.

Nothing could be more able than the conduct of the empress, since her accession to the throne. In almost all respects it was the very reverse of that of her husband. She dismissed all foreigners from her confidence and service; she sent away the Holstein guards, and chose Russian, whose antient uniform was revived with lustre, the empress herself frequently condescending to appear in it. The clergy were restored to their possessions, and their beards. She conferred all the great posts of the empire on native Russians, and entirely threw herself on the affections of that people to whom she owed her elevation.

CHAP. V.

Effect of the revolution in Russia on the king of Prussia's affairs. Situation of the new empress. She adopts a neutrality. Russian conquests restored. Russians quit the Prussian camp. King of Prussia draws marshal Daun from Buckersdorff. Schweidnitz besieged. Marshal Laudohn attacks the prince of Bevern. Is repulsed. Disposition of the French and allied armies. Broglio removed. Battle of Grabenstein. French defeated. Lord Granby drives the French from Hambourgh. Prince Xavier of Saxony defeated. Gottingen evacuated. French army called from the Lower Rhine.

THIS great change in the government of Russia, it was universally feared, would be followed by a total change of system with regard to foreign affairs. The peace and alliance with the king of Prussia were very unpopular measures in Muscovy. It was not probable that the close and intimate connection which had subsisted between the king of Prussia and the late czar, could greatly recommend him to the successor. And as it was imagined that this revolution must have been in a great degree owing to the machinations of those courts, whom the czar had irritated by withdrawing from their alliance, there was the greater reason to apprehend that the power, which was now set up, would be exerted in their favour.

There were also great advantages on the side of Russia, if the empress should not hold the peace concluded by her late husband to be binding on her, as none of the conquests were at this time evacuated. Every thing seemed to conspire towards plunging the king of Prussia into the abyss of his former distresses, after he had emerged from them, only for such a time, and in such a manner, as to make them more bitter and insupportable.

Fortunately, however, for this wonderful man, the empress, who had come to the Russian throne in the extraordinary manner that we have seen, could not look upon herself as sufficiently secure to undertake again a war of so much importance as that which had been just concluded. It was necessary, for some time at least, that she should confine her attention solely to her own safety. Therefore it was expedient to collect, within itself, all the force of the empire, in order to oppose it to the designs of the many malcontents, with which that empire always abounds, and who, though not attached to the interest of the late czar, and little inclined to revenge his fate, would find now both inducement and opportunity for raising troubles and attempting new changes. Very plausible pretences for such attempts existed from the time of Peter the Great; who, whilst he improved and strengthened his kingdom, left in it, at the same time, the seeds of civil wars and revolutions.

These considerations, whatever her desires might be, induced the czarina to continue so much of the system of her predecessor, as coincided with her situation. She therefore declared to the king of Prussia's ministers, "that she was resolved to observe inviolably, in all points, the perpetual peace concluded under the preceding reign, that nevertheless she had thought proper to bring back to Russia, by the nearest roads, all her troops in Silesia, Prussia, and Pomerania."

It was not the critical situation alone of the czarina which produced this moderation; the prudent behaviour of his Prussian majesty, during the time of his connection with the late czar, had a considerable share in reconciling the mind of this empress to him, and of perpetuating something like the same friendship, with interests so very different. The Russian senate, flaming with resentment against this monarch, and against their late sovereign; and the empress, full of suspicion that the conduct of the latter might have been influenced by the councils of the former, searched eagerly amongst the papers of the late emperor for elucidation or proofs of this point. They found indeed many letters from the king of Prussia; but in a strain absolutely different from what they apprehended. The king of Prussia had, as far as prudence would admit, kept a reserve and distance in regard to the rash advances of this unhappy ally. Too experienced to be carried away by his inconsiderate impetuosity, he gave him much salutary, though fruitless, advice; he counselled him to undertake nothing against the empress his consort; to desist from the war with Denmark; to attempt no changes in the religion and fundamental laws of the country; and not to think of coming into Germany.

On hearing these letters read, the empress is said to have burst into tears of gratitude, and made in consequence the strongest declarations in favour of this prince. They were not without effect. Orders had been given with relation to Prussia, which threatened a renewal of hostilities. They were soon suspended. The army of the Russians was indeed separated from that of Prussia; but all the important places, which the Russians had, with so much bloodshed, and through so many difficulties acquired, and which gave them the command of every thing else that remained to the king, were faithfully restored.

This change from a strict alliance to a cold neutrality, though it made no small difference in the Prussian affairs, yet, all things considered, must be regarded as an escape, and as a deliverance almost as wonderful as his former. However, this circumstance could not fail of inspiring some degree of confidence into his enemies, which the king of Prussia endeavoured above all things to prevent.

On the 21st of July▪ the orders arrived at the allied camp from Petersburg, for the Russians to separate themselves from his army, and return without delay to their own country. The king, without being confounded by this sudden order, and instead of slackening his efforts on account of this desertion, resolved to fall with vigour, and without delay; upon marshal Daun, and to attack him before the news of this change could reach him. Since he could no longer profit by the arms of the Russians, he endeavoured to profit at least by their appearance in his camp. The very next day therefore he attacked the Austrian army, whose right wing occupied the heights of Buckersdorff; drove them from that eminence, and from some villages where they were advantageously posted. The success was not owing only to the spirit of the actual attack, but to an apprehension of the Austrians, that the whole united army of the Prussians and Muscovites was on the point of engaging them. The king of Prussia made an use of those allies, in the moment they deserted him.

This lively attack was made with a loss only of three hundred men on the side of the Prussians; the number of the Austrians killed is not known. The prisoners amounted to one thousand; and fourteen pieces of cannon were taken. It was indeed no more than an affair of posts; but its consequences were important; for the communication of the Imperialists with Schweidnitz was now entirely and finally cut off; they could not attempt any thing considerable for the relief of that place. Prince Henry held them in continual alarm for Bohemia, and a great part of their attention, and no small part of their forces were kept continually engaged upon that •ide.

The king of Prussia having thus pushed back marshal Daun, invested Schweidnitz, and laid siege to that important fortress before his face. This was the fourth time which that place had been besieged since the beginning of this war; and this circumstance alone might suffice to shew the many and extraordinary changes of fortune which distinguished these campaigns. We apprehend no instance has happened before of any place like this of real strength being so often successively taken and retaken in the course of a single war.

As Schweidnitz is the key of Silesia, and, though not quite a regular place, is notwithstanding well situated and well fortified; as the garrison amounted to nine thousand men, commanded by a good officer, and assisted by a very experienced engineer, and as two great armies of the enemy observed all his motions, it was necessary to make the dispositions for the siege with uncommon care. His infantry were encamped on the heights behind Schweidnitz. His cavalry formed a chain in the plains of Keintzerdorf, to be nearer the camp of the prince of Wirtemberg, which was situated so as to prevent any enterprize from the county of Glatz. The prince of Bevern commanded a strong corps, which posted itself advantageously near Cosel. One under general Werner did the same at Noissa.

By these dispositions the Prussian convoys were protected, the principal places in Silesia guarded, the siege of Schweidnitz covered, and an easy communication preserved between all the detached corps employed in these several services.

The effects of this wise disposition were soon felt. Marshal Daun, despairing to succeed against the army, which, under the king in person, covered the siege of Schweidnitz, endeavoured to break this chain, and by that means distress the Prussians who were carrying on the siege. Laudohn was therefore detached, with a very superior force, to attack the prince of Bevern, and to drive him from the advantageous post he occupied. This attack was made with all the celerity and resolution, which distinguish the operations of this brave officer. But the prince, mindful of the disgrace he had formerly suffered in this province, opposed him with such constancy and perseverance, that the king of Prussia had time to come to his relief. The Austrians were then put between two fires, routed, and pursued with a terrible slaughter.

This attempt being defeated, the king of Prussia met with no disturbance in his preparations for the siege, and the trenches were opened on the night of the 8th of July.

Whilst the king of Prussia was making this advantageous use of his fortune, the armies of the French and the allies in Westphalia were not inactive. Among the commanders of the former a great disunion had long prevailed. The marshals de Broglio and de Soubise had mutually accused each other; the camp and the court were for some time entirely distracted with the cabals of the partizans of these officers. The result was not favourable to marshal Broglio. In him the French court was obliged to recal, and in some measure to disgrace, one of the very best of their officers. A suspicion, and that not weakly founded, prevailed against this general, that unable to bear a competitor in fame, or an associate in command, he had often, in order to disgrace those with whom he was to act, neglected to improve his favourable opportunities; and that in some instances, by his conduct, he had purposely occasioned some failures, and even defeats. This was a fault which no great qualities in an officer could compensate, He was therefore removed from his command, and the conduct of the army left to the prince de Soubise, who was infinitely beloved by the soldiers for his generous and benevolent disposition; and marshal d'Etrees, who has been so often mentioned in the course of this history, was associated with him.

The plan of the campaign, on the part of the French, did not differ much from that which had been formerly pursued. They had, as before, two armies; this under the prince de Soubise and marshal d'Etrees on the Weser, and another under the prince de Conde on the Lower Rhine.

The disposition of the allies was also but little varied. The hereditary prince was posted in the bishoprick of Munster, to watch the latter of these armies; and prince Ferdinand in person, with the body of the army, lay behind the Dymel to make head against the former. So little had the French profited by their superior numbers, and superior resources in this continental war, and so little decisive use had they made even of some advantages in the field, that this campaign commenced very nearly in the same place, and they contended for pretty much the same objects, which they had struggled for in the two preceding years.

So superior was the genius of prince Ferdinand, that under many disadvantages he was the first to commence offensive operations. The stroke he struck on this occasion would suffice alone to rank him with the first commanders of his age. His abilities throughout the war have never shone out with more lustre than in this campaign, which concluded it.

The French army was most advantageously posted, both for command of the country, and for strength, near a place called Graebenstein, in the frontiers of Hesse; their center occupied an advantageous eminence; their left wing was almost inaccessible by several deep ravines, and their right was covered by the village of Graebenstein, by several rivulets, and a strong detached body under one of their best officers, monsieur de Castries.

In this situation they imagined they had nothing to fear from the attempts of prince Ferdinand, whose army, besides the inferiority of its numbers, was separated in such a manner, and in such distant places, that they judged it impossible it could unite in any attack upon their camp. But whilst they enjoyed themselves in full security, the storm was preparing to fall upon them from all quarters.

A considerable corps of the allied army, under general Luckner, was posted to the eastward of the Weser, near E•mbecke, on the Leine. He lay there to observe prince Xavier of Saxony, who was encamped between the Werra and Gottingen. But if he watched the prince, the prince also watched him. When, therefore, he had orders to quit this post, that he might co-operate in the grand design, he left a small party of his corps in his station, by which he deceived the prince of Saxony; and marching in the night with the utmost speed, he crossed the Weser, turned the right of the French army, and, without being discovered, placed himself upon their rear. General Sporcken at the same time placed himself so as to attack the same wing in flank. Prince Ferdinand crossed the Dymel, in order to fall upon their center. The attack on the enemy's left was commanded by lord Granby.

These preparations were made with so much judgment, celerity, and good order, that the French had not perceived the approach of the allies, when they found themselves attacked with infinite impetuosity in front, flank, and rear. [June 24.] The battle was scarcely begun, when they thought of nothing but flight. The corps under mounsieur de Castries had time to retreat in tolerable order, and without any great loss. But it did not fare so well with their center, and their left, which were opposed by the calm resolution of prince Ferdinand, and the generous courage of Granby.

As the French placed all their hopes rather in retreat than combat, an entire rout must have ensued, if monsieur Stainville, who commanded on the left, had not thrown himself with the flower of the French infantry into a wood, which enabled him, at the expence of the best part of it, to cover the retreat of the army. Here this brave and accomplished officer made a resolute stand, and for a long time sustained the whole weight of the allies. His corps was a devoted sacrifice. All but two battalions were cut to pieces or made prisoners. The other bodies, covered by this resolute manoeuvre, made a shift to cover themseles under the cannon of Cassel, or precipitately escaped to the other side of the Fulda.

Thus did the French army, by the virtue of monsieur de Stainville, escape a total defeat; but the consequences of the action were not recovered during the whole campaign. They lost much credit both in point of resolution and generalship. Their infantry, in this engagement, consisted of one hundred battalions, when that of the allies was composed but of sixty. The common men made prisoners by the allies on this occasion were two thousand seven hundred and fifty, and no less than one hundred and sixty-two officers were taken. The English lost but a few men killed, and no officer of rank but lieutenant-colonel Townshend (a), who fell with great glory to himself, and to the regret of the whole army.

Every thing in the conduct of prince Ferdinand appears the effect of a well digested plan; and one great action compleated always helps to disclose a series of bold, masterly, and connected designs.

As soon as the enemy was disloged from their strong post, use was made of this advantage (whilst the French, under the hurry and confusion of their late misfortunes, were unable to provide against unexpected accidents) to push forward a body of the English under lord Granby and lord Frederick Cavendish. The French could scarcely imagine, that, whilst they were in possession of so strong a place as Cassel, and commanded an army so superior in numbers to the allies, that, whilst prince Ferdinand braved them in front, they should find one of his detachments upwards of thirty miles behind them. In this emergency, monsieur de Rochambeau perceiving their motions, hastily collected some brigades of infantry and cavalry at Hombourg, [July 6.] to prevent, if possible, the communication of the grand army with Franckfort from being cut off. But they were charged with so much vigour by the two english commanders, that, though they defended themselves with spirit for some time, they were in the issue dispersed with considerable loss. They were obliged to evacuate that tract of country. Fritzlar, Feltzberg, and Lohr; and almost all the important posts in the south part of Hesse were occupied by the allies. The communication with Franckfort, from whence the French drew their whole subsistence, was absolutely intercepted.

To the north of Hesse also the allies were not less active, nor less successful: they obliged prince Xavier, with his Saxon detachments, to abandon his advanced post on the Leine, and unite himself to the grand army. They got between him and Gottingen, by which the French garrison there was left without support. This garrison, seeing its communication interrupted, blew up a part of the fortifications, and attempted a retreat; but finding no avenue open, they were obliged to return in confusion. Despairing of their ability to hold this important place, they thought themselves happy, when at length, with much management and difficulty, [Aug. 16.] they were able to evacuate it without opposition.

Prince Xavier, after having, as we said before, quitted his advanced situation at Morungen in the territories of Hanover, united himself to the right of the principal army, which was posted to the eastward of the Fulda, not far from the place where that river forms an angle in its junction with the Werra. In this angle stands the town of Munden, a fortified place, in which the French had a garrison. Full of confidence from this situation, they were under no apprehension: but the generals Zastrow, Gilsac, and Waldhausen, passed the Fulda in their sight, [July 23.] and under a heavy fire of their cannon. The corps of the two former officers possessed themselves of a wood on the enemy's right flank. General Waldhausen, in the mean time, had seized the village of Bonnevert, which enabled him to keep the garrison of Munden in check, and gave him also an oportunity, whenever the occasion required it, of falling on the enemy's rear.

The bold passage of the Fulda, and the judgment of the subsequent dispositions, insured the victory. Prince Xavier, for a good while, defended himself with an obstinate resolution; but finding his flank gained, he began to give way. In this Instant Waldhausen, who had hitherto only watched the issue of the engagement, threw in his horse upon the rear and compleated the defeat.

General Stainville, who occupied a strong entrenched camp in the neighbourhood, seeing the party of the prince of Saxony in danger of being totally cut to pieces, quitted his intrenchments with his whole army of ten thousand men, and hastened to their relief. Prince Frederick of Brunswick, attentive to this movement, with great quickness seized this critical opportunity, entered their camp the moment they had left it, and entirely destroyed all their works. In this action 1100 of the enemy were made prisoners.

The French finding their communication destroyed, their army surrounded and harrassed on every side, and without intermission, were neither able to advance with a prospect of success, or to retreat with any hope of safety. In this distress they had nothing left but to call their army from the Lower Rhine to their assistance. No time was to be lost. Express after express was sent to hasten them. In consequence of these dispatches, the prince of Conde advanced by forced marches; the hereditary prince stuck close to him, and kept himself in readiness to fall upon his corps, when a favourable opportunity should offer.

In the mean time prince Ferdinand pressed upon Soubise's army. Advantageously as they were situated, he offered them battle for a whole day. Rather than risque an engagement they decamped in the night, and quitted, without an action, those advantageous grounds called the heights of Mulsingen, where they could not be attempted without the greatest difficulty and hazard; and the quitting of which gave prince Ferdinand the most important advantages over them.

Never were military operations pushed with more vivacity, whilst the negotiation for peace was in great forwardness. The two great contending courts had opened conferences, whilst their armies were cutting one another in pieces: but prince Ferdinand on that account, rather strained than slackened his efforts. He knew that the negotiation for peace is always much forwarded by the opperations of the campaign, and that a successful action often hastens the decision of a contested article. Perhaps too he was willing to shew in England, that the necessity of making peace ought not to be attributed to the circumstances of that part of the war which had been committed to his care. People imagined they could discern something like coldness towards this great commander in the new British ministry; and that he, on his side, seemed rather to favour that party in England which was for prolonging the war.

CHAP. VI.

War in Portugal. Plan of the Campaign. Mirand, Braganz, and Chaves taken. Almeida besieged and taken. Count of La Lippe arrives in Portugal. Surprize of Valentia d' Alcantara, by general Burgoyne. Affair of Villa Velha. Spaniards retire.

THE events of the war in Germany, though its object was not more interesting than that in Portugal, seem to rank far before the actions of the latter in dignity and importance. They naturally occupy the first place, and justify a more minute detail in an history of military operations. It is in Germany that the great efforts of all the great powers in Europe were made from the beginning. Here the most considerable armies were maintained; here the great battles were fought; and on this theatre the great commanders gave a full scope to their genius. Germany seems, as it were, the natural soil of hostility; but Portugal, which had long languished in a tranquil obscurity, could scarce furnish out a faint image of war.

Of the state of the military in that country we have spoken in a preceeding chapter. The marine was not on a much more respectable footing. About six or seven ships of the line, and a very few frigates, composed all the naval force of Portugal that was fit for service; of that Portugal which had formerly been one of the first maritime powers in Europe. The fortifications in that kingdom had been also long neglected, and scarce any of them were in a condition to sustain a regular siege.

Portugal, however, possessed some advantages; but they were only such as she derived from her weakness. The extreme barrenness and poverty of the country, made it very difficult for an army, either of friends or enemies, to subsist in it. The badness of the roads, and the frequency and steepness of the mountains, which occupy the greatest part of that kingdom, made it no less difficult to advance with rapid marches, and to improve the advantages of the campaign with proper expedition. The nature of the country also rendered it not unfit for that species of defence, which the best force it had was best qualified to make; that is, in the way of an irregular war, by its armed peasantry; for the defiles in many places are of such a nature, as to be capable of being maintained by a small and undisciplined body, against very numerous and very regular forces. And the Portuguese, from the highest to the lowest, were animated with such a sincere and inveterate hatred to the Spanish name, and were filled with so much terror at the prospect of falling a second time under the government of that nation, that great hopes were entertained of their exerting themselves to the utmost on this occasion, and of their rousing that natural courage in which the Portuguese are not deficient.

These advantages, however, did by no means balance the dangers to which that kingdom was exposed, from the joint hostility of France and Spain. All the hope of Portugal was centered in England, for whose sake, and in whose quarrel she had been drawn into this unequal contest. The greater the weakness of Portugal was, the more conspicuous were the magnanimity and resources of Great Britain, who made in the close of so expensive and ruinous a war, such astonishing efforts and who was in a condition by her strength to prop up, at least for a time, so very feeble a system. She sent to Portugal, officers, troops, artillery, arms, military stores, provisions, and money, every thing which could enable the Portuguese to exert their natural strength, and every thing which could supply that strength where it was deficient.

When the Bourbon courts made war against Portugal, the declared object was to prevent Great Britain from the military and commercial use of the ports of that kingdom. As it was impossible to attain this object by naval operations, they attempted it by military ones, and aimed their principal endeavours at the two great ports, to which the English principally resort, Oporto and Lisbon. The possession of these two objects would probably have finished the war in their favour; the possession of either of them would have given them the most decisive advantages in it.

With this view three inroads were to be made, one to the north, another was proposed more to the south, whilst the third was made in the middle provinces, in order to sustain these two bodies, and preserve the communication between them. The reader must consider this as what appears from their designs, and from the steps they took to execute them to have been their general plan; not that it was ever perfectly executed in all its parts, or at the same time.

The first body which commenced hostilities was commanded by the marquis de Sarria. This army entered into the north east angle of Portugal, and marched towards Miranda. This town, though in no good state of defence, might have delayed them in their progress; but a powder magazine having blown up by accident, the fortifications were ruined, and the Spaniards, before they had raised their first battery, [May 9.] marched into the town by the breaches in the wall.

Animated by this easy and fortunate success, they proceeded to Braganza, a considerable city, from whence the royal family of Portugal derived its ducal titles. This town made no greater defence than Miranda. From thence a detachment marched to Moncorvo, [May 15.] which was surrendered in the like manner; and every thing was cleared before them to the banks of the Douro. A party under count O'Reilly made a forced march of fourteen leagues, in two days, [May 24.] to the city of Chaves, which was immediately evacuated. By these successes they became masters of almost the whole of the extensive province of Tralos Montes, and their progress spread a general alarm. Oporto was almost given up as lost; and the admiralty of England prepared transports to carry off the effects of the British factory. However, the body which had traversed this province without resistance, attempting to cross the Douro, had its progress checked on that side. The peasants, animated and guided by some English officers, and seizing a difficult pass, repulsed and drove them back to Torre de Moncorvo. They are said to have been guilty of some cruelties to the Spanish prisoners who fell into their hands. These cruelties were afterwards severely retaliated upon them. These people, on both sides naturally ferocious had not been sufficiently inured to war, to moderate its fury, and reduce it under laws; they hated mutually, and they gave a full scope to their hatred: they did not see each other as soldiers, but as enemies.

The second body of the Spaniards, which we have mentioned as the connective link between the two others, entered into the province of Beira, at the villages called Val de Mula and Valde Coelha. They were joined by strong detachments, amounting to almost the whole army in Tralos Montes, and immediately laid siege to Almeida, which, though in no good order, was the strongest and best provided place upon the frontiers of Portugal. Besides, it was of the greatest importance from its middle situation, as the possession of it would greatly facilitate the operations upon every side, and would especially tend to forward an attempt upon Lisbon, which was the capital object, towards which, at this time, all the endeavours of the Spaniards seem to have been directed.

Almedia was defended with sufficient resolution; but its fate was foreseen as soon as it was attempted, there being no means of affording relief to any of the places besieged. It surrendered however, [Aug. 25.] upon terms honourable to the garrison.

The Spaniards, having made themselves masters of this place overspread the whole ter•iority of Castle Branco, a principal district of the province of Beira, making their way to the southward, until they approached the banks of the Tagus. During the whole of their progress, and indeed during the whole campaign, the allied troops of Great Britain and Portugal had nothing that could be called a body of an army in the field, and they could not think of opposing the enemy in a pitched battle. All that could be done was by the defence of passes, by skirmish, and by surprize.

By this time the count of la Lippe Buckeburg had arrived in Portugal. Lord Tyrawly, who had been sent, at the desire of the court of Lisbon, thither before the breaking out of the war, being disgusted by the behaviour of some persons at court, and much disappointed in his expectations of the exertion they had promised to make of their own force, and even of the use they had made of the succours from England, had been recalled very early in the campaign, and probably not contrary to his own inclination.

It is impossible to express the joy which filled the whole nation at the arrival of so celebrated an officer as the count la Lippe to their assistance. More unanimity was now expected, as the count had nothing to complain of, and came an entire stranger to all the subjects of debate, which had hitherto existed between the British general and the court of Lisbon.

That army, which we have mentioned as the third corps destined for the invasion of Portugal, assembled on the frontiers of Estremadura, with an intention of penetrating into the province of Alentejo. Had this third body been joined to the others already in Portugal, it would probably have formed such an army as might, in spight of any obstruction, have forced its way to Lisbon: had it acted separately, it might have greatly distracted the defence, so as to enable some other body to penetrate to that city. It was necessary to prevent, if possible, their entrance into Portugal; since their mere entrance would have been almost equal, in its consequences, to a victory on their side.

The count la Lippe, therefore formed a design of attacking an advanced body of the Spaniards which lay on their frontiers, in a town called Valentia de Alcantara, as he heard that they had here amassed considerable magazines. The conduct of this important enterprize was committed to brigadier general Burgoyne.

This gallant and able officer, though at a distance of five days march, and in spight of all the disappointments and obstructions to which services of this kind are so liable, when they cannot be executed immediately; yet effected a complete surprize on the town of Valentia de Alcantara; took the general, [Aug. 27.] who was to have commanded in the intended invasion, one colonel, two captains, and seventeen subaltern officers. One of the best regiments in the Spanish service was entirely destroyed.

Although they were disappointed in their expectations of finding magagines in this place, the effect of this well-conducted enterprize was not lost. The taking of this general was probably the cause which prevented the Spaniards from entering into the province of Alentejo. This seemed to have been for some time the destination not only of that particular body, but also the great object of the Spanish army, which had hitherto acted in Beira. The former of these provinces is a plain, open, fertile country, where their cavalry, in which consisted the chief of their army, and in which lay their most marked superiority, might have acted, and acted decisively; whereas the latter was a rough mountainous region, in which the horse were subsisted with difficulty, and could be of little service. To prevent, therefore, the entry of the Bourbon army from any quarter, into Alentejo, seemed to be the great and single object of the campaign on our side. General Burgoyne, by his expedition into the Spanish territories, had already prevented it on one part; and the vigilance and activity of the same officer had no small share in preventing it also on the other.

That part of the Bourbon army, which acted in the territory of Castel Branco, had made themselves masters of several important passes, which they obliged some bodies of the Portuguese to abandon. They attacked the rear of the combined army, which was passing the river Alveito, with the appearance of a retreat; but, in reality, with a view to draw them insensibly into the mountainous tracts: here they were repulsed with loss; but still they continued masters of the country; and nothing remained but the passage of the Tagus, to enable them to take up their quarters in Alentejo.

Burgoyne, who was posted with an intention to obstruct them in their passage, lay in the neighbourhood, and within view of a detached camp, composed of a considerable body of the enemy's cavalry, which lay near a village called Villa Velha. As he observed that the enemy kept no very soldiery guard in this post, and were uncovered both on their rear and their flanks, he conceived a design of faling on them by surprize. He confided the execution of this design to colonel Lee, who turned their camp, fell upon their rear in the night, [Oct. 6.] made a considerable slaughter, dispersed the whole party, destroyed their magazines, and returned with scarce any loss▪ Burgoyne, in the mean time, supported him by a feint attack in another quarter, which prevented the enemy's being relieved from the adjacent posts.

This advantage, being obtained in a critical moment, was attended with important consequences. The season was now far advanced; immense rains fell at this time; the roads were destroyed; the country became impracticable; and the Spaniards, having seised no advanced posts in which they could maintain themselves during the winter, and being especially unprovided with magazines for the support of their horse, every where fell back to the frontiers of Spain, where their supplies were at hand, and where they were not liable to be harrassed by the efforts of the combined army.

In this manner Portugal was saved, at least for that campaign, by the wise conduct of count la Lippe, and the distinguished valour of the English commanders and soldiery: all that was wanting towards their deliverance was accomplished by the success of the English army in more distant quarters, and by the peace, in which so valuable and so exposed an ally was not neglected. There never was probably so heavy a storm of national calamity, ready to fall upon an unprovided people, so happily averted, or so speedily blown over. Every thing, at the beginning of this campaign, bore the most louring and ominous aspect to the affairs of Great Britain. As it advanced, the sky continually cleared up; and the fortune of no nation, towards the close of it, was enlivened with a more brilliant and more unclouded prosperity. We shall now proceed in the relation of those successes, and of the progress of the English arms in other parts of the world, where new scenes of danger and honour were now opened to them.

CHAP. VII.

Expedition against Martinico. Forces sent thither. Troops land at Cas Navire. Nature of the country. Attack of the posts near Fort Royal. Fort Royal surrendered. St. Pierre and the whole island capitulate. St. Lucie, Grenades, and St. Vincent taken. Preparations for war against the Spanish West Indies.

TOwards the close of the last year, it was determined to resume the scheme of operations in the West Indies; where nothing had been attempted since the year 1759. Distressed as the French trade to their islands had been, it still continued a resource to that nation. On the other hand, nothing could possibly furnish us with places of more importance, either to retain, or to exchange upon a peace, than our success in this part of the world. Another consideration had probably no small share in directing our arms towards that quarter. From the time that the dispositions of Spain had become equivocal, it was necessary to take such steps, as would put us in a respectable situation, in case a war with that kingdom should become unavoidable. It was therefore very proper to have a strong armament in the West Indies, that side on which Spain is most vulnerable, and in which every wound affects a part of the quickest sensibility. Accordingly the force which was sent into the West Indies on this occasion was very great; and, if we take the naval and military together, it was such an armament as had never been before seen in that part of the world. It was certainly very right to leave as little to hazard as possible; and when, in the most frugal method of proceeding, a great many men must have been employed, and a great deal of money spent, it would have been an unpardonable error, from a consideration of almost any saving, to have left any thing imperfect; especially at a time, when the effect of every operation became almost hourly, more and more critical and decisive.

Every thing which had been an object of war in North America, was by tnis time completely acquired. It was therefore easy to draw a very considerable part of the army from thence. Eleven battalions were drawn from New York; a draught was also made from the garrison of Belleisle. These were reinforced by some troops which had been scattered among the Leeward Islands; so that the whole land armament did not fall very short of twelve thousand men. General Monckton, who had acquired so much reputation in North America, and had received a very grievous wound at the taking of Quebec, commanded the land forces in this expedition. The marine was under rear-admiral Rodney.

The failure in 1759 did not discourage our administration from making Martinico the object of another attempt. The English fleet, after having rendezvouzed at Barbadoes, came before this island on the 7th of January, 1762. The troops landed at a creek called Cas Navire without the loss of a man; the fleet having been disposed so properly, and having directed their fire with such effect, that the enemy was obliged in a short time to abandon the batteries they had erected to defend this inlet.

When the landing was effected, the difficulties were far from being at an end. It is true, that neither the number nor the quality of the enemy's regular troops in the island were very formidable. But the militia was numerous, well armed, and not unqualified for service in the only kind of war, which could be carried on in their country. Besides, the whole country was a natural fortification, from the number of ravines with rivulets between them, which lay from distance to distance. Wherever these grounds were practicable, the French had posted guards, and erected batteries. It is easy from hence to discern what obstructions the progress of an army was liable to, particularly with regard to its artillery. These obstructions were no where greater than in the neighbourhood of the place, against which the first regular attack was proposed.

This town and citadel is overlooked and commanded by two very considerable eminences, called Morne Tortenson and Morne Garnier. Whilst the enemy kept possession of these eminences, it was impossible to attack the town; if they lost them, it would prove impossible to defend it. Suitable to the importance of those situations were the measures taken to render them impregnable. They were protected, like the other high grounds in this island, with very deep ravines; and this great natural strength was improved by every contrivance of art. The Morne Tortenson was first to be attacked. To favour this operation; a
The Honble. ROBT. MONCKTON.

body of regular troops and marines were ordered to advance on the right along the sea-side, towards the town, in order to take the redoubts which lay in the lower grounds. A thousand sailors in flat-bottomed boats, rowed close to the shore to assist them. On the left, towards the country, a corps of light infantry, properly supported, was to get round the enemy's left; whilst the attack in the centre was made by the British grenadiers and the body of the army, under the fire of batteries, which had been erected on the opposite side with great labour and perseverance; the cannon having been dragged upwards of three miles by the seamen.

The dispositions for the attack of this difficult post having been made with so much judgment on the part of the commander, it was executed with equal spirit and resolution by the soldiery. The attack succeeded in every quarter. With irresistable impetuosity the enemy's works were successively carried. They were driven from post to post; until our troops, after a sharp struggle, remained masters of the whole Morne; some of the enemy fled precipitately into the town, to the very entrance of which they were pursued. Others saved themselves on the Morne Garnier, which was as strong, and much higher than Morne Tortenson, and overlooked and commanded it. Thus far had they proceeded with success; but nothing decisive could be done, without the possession of the other eminence, our troops being much molested by the enemy from that superior situation.

It was three days before proper dispositions could be made for driving them from this ground. Whilst these dispositions were making, the enemy's whole force descended from the hill, sallied out of the town, and attacked the English in their advanced posts; but they were immediately repulsed: and the ardour of the British troops hurrying them forward, they improved a defensive advantage into an attack, passed the ravines, mingled with the enemy, scaled the hill, seized the batteries, and posted themselves on the summit of Morne Garnier. The French regular troops escaped into the town. The militia dispersed themselves in the country.

All the situations which commanded the town and citadel were now secured; [Feb. 4.] and the enemy waited no longer than until the batteries against them were completed to capitulate, and to surrender this important place, the second in the island. (a)

The capital of the island, St. Pierre, still remained to be reduced: this is also a place of no contemptible strength; and it was apprehended that the resistance here might be considerable, if the strength of the garrison in any degree corresponded with that of the fortifications, and with the natural advantages of the country. Our troops therefore were still under sorne anxiety for the final success of their work, and feared, if not disappointment, at least delay. But the reduction of Fort Royal had so greatly abated the 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 enemy's confidence, that the militia despaired of making any effectual defence. The planters also, solicitous for their fortunes, were apprehensive of having their estates ruined by a war too long continued, or perhaps of losing all by passing the opportunity of a favourable capitulation. Influenced by these motives, and disheartened by the train of misfortunes which had attended the French arms here and in all other parts of the world, they resolved to hold out no longer; and general Monckton, just as he was ready to embark sor the reduction of St. Pierre, [Feb. 12.] was fortunately prevented by the arrival of deputies, who came to capitulate for the surrender of that place, and of the whole island.

The surrender of Martinico, which was the seat of the superior government, the principal mart of trade, and the centre of all the French force in the Caribbees, naturally drew on the surrender of all the dependent islands. Granada, a fertile island, and possessed of some good harbours, was given up without opposition. St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, the right to which had so long been objects of contention between the two nations, followed its example. The English were now the sole and undisturbed possessors of all the Caribbees, and held that chain of innumerable islands which forms an immense bow, extending from the eastern point of Hispaniola almost to the continent of South America. And though some of these islands are barren, none of them very large, and not many of them well inhabited, they boast more trade than falls to the lot of many respectable kingdoms.

The time, in which Martinico was reduced, was a circumstance of almost as much consequence as the reduction itself; for the war against Spain having been declared in the beginning of the year, it became adviseable to strike early such an effective blow against that nation as might incline them to a speedy peace, or might influence the fortune of the whole war, if, contrary to our wishes, the war should continue. It was, on this plan, necessary to employ a very great force, and, of course, to call away a very considerable part of that which had been employed at Martinico, whilst the season permitted them to act.

When the British administration determined to transfer the war into the Spanish West Indies, with great judgment they fixed they eyes at once upon the capital object (a): and resolved to commence their operations where others of less ability would have chosen to conclude them. In an attack upon subordinate places, the conquest would not have been much more certain; when obtained, it would be far from decisive; and a failure would have been fatal, as it would include a loss of reputation. The failure of an armament in a subordinate attack is a bad preparative for a greater attempt. The plan, therefore, of the war of 1740 in the Spanish Indies, in which we began with Porto Bello, and so proceeded to Carthagena, &c. was mean, because the success in one of these attempts did nothing towards insuring success in the other; and if we had succeeded in both attempts, our advantage would have had but little influence on a third. But the plan of the war, just now concluded, was great and just; because we began with the Havannah, in which the whole trade and navigation of the Spanish West Indies center, and without which it cannot be carried on. If we should acquiesce in this conquest, this conquest alone would almost have finished the war; because it would have utterly intercepted the enemy's resources. If we chose to pursue our advantage, it exposed the whole Spanish America.

CHAP. VIII.

Commanders in the expedition against the Havannah. Fleet sails from Portsmouth. Passage through the old streights of Bahama. Town and harbour of the Havannah described. Troops land. Disposition of the troops. Siege of Fort Moro. Captain Harvey cannonades the Moro. English battery fired. Distress of the English forces. Succours arrive from North America. A sally. The fort stormed. Operations against the town. The Havannah surrenders. Advantages of this acquisition.

IT being determined to commence with this enterprize, such commanders were to be chosen, as could be safely intrusted with the conduct of an undertaking so weighty, and on the success of which so much depended. Lord Albemarle, the friend and disciple of the duke of Cumberland, commanded the land forces. Admiral Pococke, who having contributed by his valour towards that sovereignty which his country had obtained in the East Indies, was now chosen to extend its empire and its honour in the West.

They sailed from Portsmouth on the 5th of March, the day on which the Grenades were surrendered. A fleet had sailed from Martinico under the command of that spirited and intelligent officer, Sir James Douglas, in order to reinforce them. The squadrons very happily met, without delay or dispersion, at Cape Nichola, the north-west point of Hispaniola, on the 27th of May. After this junction, the armament amounted to nineteen ships of the line; eighteen small vessels of war; and near one hundred and fifty transports, which conveyed about ten thousand land forces. A supply of four thousand had been ordered from New York, and was expected to join them very near as early as they could be supposed able to commence their operations.

There were two choices before the admiral for his course to the Havannah. The first and most obvious was the common way, to keep to the south of Cuba, and fall into the track of the galleons. But this, though by much the safest, would prove by far the most tedious passage; and delays, above all things were to be avoided, as the success of the whole enterprize would probably depend upon its being in forwardness before the hurricane season came on. He therefore resolved to run along the northern shore of that island, pursuing his career from east to west through a narrow passage, not less than seven hundred miles in length, called the old streights of Bahama.

This passage, through almost the whole of its extent, is bounded on the right and left by the most dangerous sands and shoals, which render the navigation so hazardous, that it has usually been avoided by single and small vessels. There was no pilot in the fleet whose experience could be depended on to conduct them safely through it. The admiral, however, determined on this passage; and being provided with a good chart of lord Anson's, he resolved to trust to his own sagacity, conduct, and vigilance, to carry safely through those streights a fleet of near two hundred sail. So bold an attempt had never been made; but every precaution was taken to guard this bo•dness from the imputation of temerity. A vessel was sent to reconnoitre the passage, and, when returned, was ordered to take the lead; some frigates followed; sloops and boats were stationed on the right and left on the shallows, with well adapted signals both for the day and the night. The fleet moved in seven divisions. And being favoured with pleasant weather, and secured by the admirable dispositions which were made, they, without the smallest loss or interruption, got clear thro' this perilous passage on the 5th of June, having entered it on the 27th of May.

The Havannah, the object of their long voyage, and of so many anxious hopes and fears, was now before them. This place is not denominated the capital of Cuba; St. Jago, situated at the south-east part of the island, has that title: but the Havannah, though the second in rank, is the first in wealth, size, and importance. The harbour, upon which it stands, is, in every respect, one of the best in the West Indies, and perhaps in the world. It is entered by a narrow passage, upwards of half a mile in length, which afterwards expands into a large bason, forming three cul de saes; (a) and is sufficient, in extent and depth, to contain a thousand sail of the largest ships, having almost throughout six fathom water, and being perfectly covered from every wind. In this bay the rich fleets from the several parts of the Spanish West Indies, called the Galleons and the Flota, assemble, before they finally set out on their voyage for Europe.

This circumstance has rendered the Havannah one of the most opulent, flourishing, and populous cities in this part of the world. Great care was taken to fortify and secure a place, which, by being the center of so rich a commerce, would naturally become the fairest mark for the attempts of an enemy. The narrow entrance into this harbour is secured on one side by a very strong fort, called the Moro, (C) built upon a projecting point of land: on the other, it is defended by a fort called the Puntal, (D) which joins the town. The town itself, which is situated to the westward of the entrance of the harbour, and opposite to the Moro fort, is surrounded by a good rampart, (AA) flanked with bastions, and covered with a ditch.

The Spaniards, who had been for some time preparing for war, had formed a considerable navy in the West Indies: this fleet, (q) which was near twenty sail, mostly of the line, lay at this time in the bason of the Havannah; but they had not, when our armament appeared before the port, received, it seems, any authentic account from their court concerning the commencement of hostilities between the two nations.

Whether the Spaniards were rendered inactive by the want of instructions, whether all their ships were not in fighting condition, or whatever else was the cause, this fleet lay quiet in the harbour. If some of the above reasons did not oppose, it may be very rationally supposed, that their best part would have been to come out, and fight our squadron. They were not very far from an equality; and though the issue of a battle might have proved unfavourable to them, yet a battle tolerably maintained would have much disabled our armament, and perhaps have been a means of preventing the success of the whole enterprize. The loss of their fleet in this way might possibly have saved the city; but, the city, once taken, nothing could possibly save the fleet. It is true, they much trusted, and not wholly without reason, to the strength of the place, and to those astonishing difficulties which attend any military operation, that is drawn out to length in this unhealthy climate. In other respects, they were very far from being deficient in proper measures for their defence. They made a strong boom (p) across the mouth of the harbour; and almost the 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 only use they made of their shipping, in the defence of the place, was to sink three of them (n) behind this boom.

When all things were in readiness for landing, the admiral, with a great part of the fleet, bore away to the westward, (s) in order to draw the enemy's attention from the true object, and made a feint, as if he intended to land upon that side; while commodore Keppel and captain Harvey, commanding a detachment of the squadron, approached the shore to the eastward (t) of the harbour, and effected a landing there in the utmost order, [June 7.] without any opposition, having previously silenced a small fort, (F) which might have given some disturbance.

The principal body of the army was destined to act upon this side. It was divided into two corps; one of which was advanced a considerable way in the country, towards the south-east of the harbour, in order to cover the siege, and to secure our parties employed in watering and procuring provisions. This corps was commanded by general Elliot. The other was immediately occupied in the attack on Fort Moro, (w) to the reduction of which the efforts of the English were principally directed, as the Moro commanded the town, and the entrance of the harbour. This attack was conducted by general Keppel. To make a diversion in favour of this grand operation, a detachment, under colonel How, was encamped to the westward of the town. This body cut off the communication between the town and the country, and kept the enemy's attention divided. Such was the disposition, and it was impossible to make a better, of the land forces during the whole siege. (a)

A PLAN of the SIEGE of the HAVANA Drawn by an OFFICER. 15th August 1762. PLAN of the CITY and HARBOUR of HAVANNA.

The hardships which the English army sustained, in carrying on the siege of the Moro, are almost inexpressible: the earth was every where so thin, that it was with great difficulty they could cover themselves in their approaches. There was no spring or river near them; it was necessary to bring water from a great distance; and so precarious and scanty was this supply, that they were obliged to have recourse to water from the ships. Roads for communication were to be cut through thick woods; the artillery was to be dragged for a vast way over a rough rocky shore. Several dropped down dead with heat, thirst, and fatigue. But such was the resolution of our people, such the happy and perfect unanimity which subsisted between the land and the sea services, that no difficulties, no hardships, slackened for a moment the operations against this important, strong, and well defended place. Batteries were, in spite of all difficulties, raised against the Moro, and along the hill upon which this fort stands, in order to drive the enemy's ships deeper into the harbour, and thus to prevent them from molesting our approaches.

The enemy's fire, and that of the besiegers, was for a long time pretty near on an equality, and it was kept up with great vivacity on both sides. The Spaniards in the fort communicated with the town, from which they were recruited and supplied; they did not rely solely on their works; [June 29.] they made a sally with sufficient resolution, and a considerable force, but with little success. They were obliged to retire, with a loss of two or three hundred men left dead on the spot.

Whilst these works were thus vigorously pushed on shore, the navy, not contented with the great assistance which they had before lent to every part of the land service, resolved to try something further, and which was more directly within their own province, towards the reduction of the Moro. Accordingly, the day the batteries on shore were opened, three of their greatest ships, (g) the Dragon, the Cambridge, and the Marlborough, under the conduct of capt. Harvey, laid their broadsides against the fort, [July 1.] and began a terrible fire, which was returned with great obstinacy. This firing, one of the warmest ever seen, continued for seven hours, without intermission. But in this cannonade the Moro, which was situated upon a very high and steep rock, had great advantages over the ships, and was proof against all their efforts. Besides, the fire from the opposite fort of Puntal, and the batteries of the town, galled them extremely. Insomuch that, in order to save the ships from absolute destruction, they were obliged at length, tho' unwilling, to bring them all off. Even this retreat was not effected without difficulty, as the ships were very much shattered in this long and unequal contest. They had one hundred and fifty men killed and wounded; and one of the captains, captain Goostrey of the Marlborough, a brave and experienced officer, was also killed. The captains Harvey and Burnett gained, with better fortune, an equal honour, by their firm and intrepid behaviour throughout the whole operation.

This bold attempt, though it had very little effect upon the works on that side of the fort which the ships attacked, was nevertheless of considerable service. The enemy's attention being diverted to that side, the other was a good deal neglected: our fire was poured in the mean time with redoubled fury from the batteries; it became much superior to that of the enemy, and did no small damage to their works. But the moment the Spaniards were released from their attention to our men of war, they returned again to the eastward face of the fort: their defence was revived with as much vigour as before; on both sides a constant unremitted fire was kept up, with a fierce emulation, for several days. It now became evident, that the reduction of this fortress was to be a work of time. Never, from the beginning of the war, had the English valour been so well matched. Here was at length an adversary worthy of our arms, and our whole military skill and spirit was put to the severest trial.

In the midst of this sharp and doubtful contention, the capital battery against the fort unfortunately took fire; [July 3.] and being chiefly constructed of timber and fascines dried by the intense heats and continual cannonade, the flames soon got a-head, and became too powerful for opposition. The battery was almost wholly consumed. The labour of six hundred men, for seventeen days, was destroyed in a moment; and all was to begin anew.

This was a mortifying stroke. It was felt the more severely, because the other hardships of the siege were become by this time almost insupportable. The sickness, something of which the troops had brought with them from Martinico, and which increased infinitely in this unwholesome country and rigorous service, had reduced the army to half its number, at the same time that it doubled the fatigue of those few who still preserved some remains of strength. Five thousand soldiers were at one, time down in various distempers; no less than three thousand of the seamen were in the same miserable condition. A total want of good provisions exasperated the disease, and retarded the recovery. The deficiency of water was of all their grievances the greatest, and extremely aggravated all the rest of their sufferings. The procuring from a distance this wretched supply, so unequal to their wants, exhausted all their force. Besides, as the season advanced, the prospect of succeeding grew fainter. The hearts of the most sanguine sunk within them, whilst they beheld this gallant army wasting away by diseases; and they could not avoid, trembling for that noble fleet, which had rid so long on an open shore, and which must to all appearance, be exposed to inevitable ruin, if the hurricane season should come on before the reduction of the place. A thousand languishing and impatient looks were cast out for the reinforcement from North America. None however as yet appeared; and the exhausted army was left to its own endeavours. Many fell into despair, and died, overcome with fatigue, anguish and disappointment.

But in the midst of these cruel delays and distresses, the steadiness of the commanders infused life and activity into their troops, and roused them to incredible exertions. The rich prize, which was before them; the shame of returning home baffled; and even the strenuous resistance which was made by the enemy; all these motives called loudly on their interest, their honour, and their pride, and obliged them to the exertion of every nerve. Nobody could imagine that it was this reduced and slender army, by which these astonishing efforts were made, and this extensive sphere of duty so perfectly filled. New batteries arose in the place of the old; the fire soon became equal, and then superior to that of the enemy. [July 20.] They by degrees silenced the cannon of the fort, beat to pieces all the upper works, and made at length a lodgment in the covered way. There hopes were now become more lively. Some days before they had gained this grand advantage, [July 12.] the Jamaica fleet appeared in its passage to Europe, with several conveniences for the siege. Not many days after this they received a considerable part of the New York reinforcement. [July 28.] Some of the transports in their passage thro' the old Bahama Streights were lost, but the men were saved on the adjacent islands.

These favourable events infused double life into their operations, in this advanced state of the siege; but a new and grand difficulty appeared, just at the seeming accomplishment of their work. An immense ditch yawned before them, for the greater part cut in the solid rock, eighty feet deep, and forty feet wide. To fill it up by any means appeared impossible. Difficult as the work of mining was in those circumstances, it was the only expedient. It might have been an impracticable one, if fortunately a thin ridge of rock had not been left, in order to cover the ditch towards the sea. On this narrow ridge, [July 20.] the miners wholly uncovered, but with very little loss, passed the ditch, and soon buried themselves in the wall.

It now became visible to the governor of the Havannah, that the fort must be speedily reduced: if left to its own strength. At all events something must be done in this exigence for its immediate relief. Accordingly before break of day a body of twelve hundred men, [July 22.] mostly composed of the country militia, Mulattoes and Negroes, were transported across the harbour, climbed the hills, and made three attacks upon our posts. But the ordinary guards, though surprised, defended themselves so resolutely, that the Spaniards made little impression, and were not able to ruin any part of the approaches. The posts attacked were speedily reinforced, and the enemy, who were little better than a disorderly rabble, and not conducted by proper officers, fell into terror and confusion. They were driven precipitately down the hill with great slaughter; some gained their boats, others were drowned, and they lost in this well imagined, but ill executed sally, upwards of four hundred men.

This was the last effort for the relief of the Moro; which, abandoned as it was by the city, and while an enemy was undermining its walls, held out with a sullen resolution, and made no sort of proposal to capitulate. The mines at length did their business. [July 30.] A part of the wall was blown up, and fell into the ditch; leaving a breach, which tho' very narrow and difficult, the general and engineer judged practicable. The English troops, who were commanded on the most dangerous of all services, rejoiced that it was to be the end of labours much more grievous to them. They mounted the breach, entered the fort, and formed themselves with so much celerity, and with such a spirited coolness of resolution, that the enemy, who were drawn up to receive them, and who might have made the assault an affair of great bloodshed, astonished at their countenance, fled on all hands. About four hundred were slaughtered on the spot, or ran to the water where they perished. Four hundred more threw down their arms, and obtained quarter. The second in command, the marquis de Gonsales, fell while he was making brave, but ineffectual efforts to animate and rally his people. Don Lewis de Velasco, the governor, who had hitherto defended the fort with such obstinate bravery, seemed resolved in this extremity to share the same fate with it. He collected an hundred men in an entrenchment he had made round his colours. But seeing that all his companions were fled from him, or slaughtered about him, disdaining to retire or call for quarter, he received a mortal wound, and fell, offering his sword to his conquerors. The English wept with pity and admiration over that unfortunate valour, which had occasioned them so many toilsome hours, and cost them so many lives.

Thus the Moro came into our possession after a vigorous struggle, forty-four days from the time the first operations had been begun against it. No time was lost to profit of this great advantage, notwithstanding that the sickness still raged like a pestilence, and that many new and great works were to be undertaken. Not only the fire of the fort was turned against the town, but a line of batteries (l) was erected along the hill of the Cavannos, on the extremity of which the fort stands. By these batteries which mounted three and forty pieces of cannon, and twelve mortars, almost the whole eastern side of the city was commanded from one end to the other. Preparations for an attack were also made, and batteries erected to the westward of the town, which on that side had hitheto been only watched. Some time before a part of the second division of the troops from North America had arrived. [Aug. 2.] A part had been taken by a squadron of French men of war; but those who escaped, came very seasonably, and were of signal service.

When those preparations were perfectly ready to take effect, [Aug. 10.] lord Albemarle by a message represented to the governor the irresistible force of the attack, which he was ready to make upon the town, but which, in order to avoid unnecessary effusion of blood, he was willing to suspend, that the Spaniards might have leisure to capitulate. The governor in a resolute but civil manner returned, that he would defend the place committed to him to the last extremity, and began instantly to fire.

To convince the governor that the menaces employed were not an empty boast, lord Albemarle the very next morning ordered a general fire from the batteries, which was poured from all sides, with such continued and irresistible fury, that in six hours almost all the enemy's guns were silenced. To the inexpressible joy of the fleet and army, flags of truce appeared from every quarter of the town. A capitulation ensued, in which the established religion, the former laws, and private property were secured to the inhabitants. The garrison, which was reduced to about seven hundred men had the honours of war, and were to be conveyed to Spain. A district of an hundred and eighty miles westward of the Havannah was yielded along with the town. The Spaniards struggled a long time to save the men of war; but this was a capital point, and wholly inadmissible. They also made some attempts to have the harbour declared neutral during the war; but this was no less essential to the completeness of the conquest, and was steadily refused. After two days altercation, they gave up these points, and the English troops were put in possession of the Havannah on the 14th of August, when they had been before it two months and eight days.

Although we have not pursued in exact order all the detail of the more minute operations of this memorable siege, we have dwelt on it a longer time, than we have on our plan generally allowed to such transactions; because it was, without question, in itself the most considerable, and in its consequences the most decisive conquest we have made since the beginning of the war; and because in no operation were the courage, steadiness, and perseverance of the British troops and the conduct of their leaders more conspicious. The acquisiton of this place united in itself all the advantages which can be acquired in war. It was a military advantage of the highest class; it was equal to the greatest naval victory, by its effect on the enemy's marine; and in the plunder it equalled the produce of a national subsidy. Nine sail of the enemy's ships of the line, some of the finest vessels in the world, were taken, with four frigates. Three of their capital ships had been, as already mentioned, sunk by themselves at the beginning of the siege; two more were in forwardness on the stocks, and these were destroyed by the English. The enemy, on this occasion, lost a whole fleet. In ready money, in the tobacco collected at the Havannah on account of the king of Spain, and in other valuable merchandizes, the plunder did not perhaps fall short of three millions sterling (a)

Spain now began very sensibly to feel the inconveniences and miseries she had voluntarily drawn on herself, by entering into a war so fatal to her. No sooner had the news of this important capture reached Madrid, than an universal dejection appeared in every countenance, and the high-towering hopes they had formed at the beginning of the war entirely vanished: the prodigious advantages they had vainly expected to flow from the family compact, were now rendered abortive, and grief and despair were the melancholy offspring of injustice and rashness.

Great Britain, on the contrary, as prudent in the enjoyment of victory, as brave in gaining it, seemed not so elated with her good fortune, as to make her indulge in the luxurious lap of indolence, but determined by the prosecution of the war in the same able and vigorous manner, to compel her enemies to sue for that peace they had, when offered, haughtily refused.

To effect so great, so desirable a work, it was thought the reduction of the Philippine islands would not a little contribute; that enterprize was therefore formed, and entrusted to the execution of two great men, who had on many occasions before, signalized themselves in the service of their country, and approved themselves equal to the greatest things: these were General Draper, and Admiral Cornish. The troops allotted for the service, were the 79th regiment, and a company of the royal artillery, 30 of the artillery furnished by the gentlemen of Madrass, 600 Seapoys, a company of Caffrees, one of Topazes, and one of Pioneers; to which were added, the precarious assistance of two companies of Frenchmen, enlisted in their service, with some hundreds of unarmed Lascars, for the use of the engineers, and park of artillery. This little supply of men was farther reinforced with a fine battalion of 550 seamen, and 270 good marines; so that the whole force amounted to 2300 men, who, with the necessary stores, were embarked on board of his majesty's squadron, and two India ships employed as transports.

As it may appear surprizing so important a conquest should be attempted with so small a force, when a greater might be employed, it may not be amiss to observe, that if more were drawn from the coasts the settlements would be in danger; and therefore, it may be thought adviseable, rather to attempt with a few brave men, a place that was unprepared (as imagined) for such a visit, than by employing a greater force to subject our own colonies to hostile attempts, and, perhaps, to give the enemy time to be aware of our designs.

On the first of August the forces set sail, the Seahorse, Capt. Grant, having been previously dispatched through the streights of Malacca, to the entrance of the China sea, to stop all vessels that might be bound to Manila, or sent from any of the neighbouring settlements to give the Spaniards intelligence of the design. On the 23d of the following month they anchored in Manila bay, and found that their visit was unexpected, and the enemy unprepared. To increase as much as possible their visible confusion and consternation, it was determined to lose no time in the attack of the port of Cavite, as at first determined, but proceed directly to the grand object, the city of Manila, the general and admiral rightly judging, that their conquest of that important place would of course occasion and draw after it the fall of Cavite.

In consequence of this resolution, a summons was sent to the governor to surrender the town, [Sept. 24.] but it had no effect on him; wherefore the admiral and some other principal officers examined the coast, in order to fix upon a proper spot for landing the troops, artillery, and stores. About two miles to the south of Manila a convenient place was found. Accordingly all the boats were prepared, and the frigates sent in very near the shore, to cover the descent. These latter kept up a very brisk fire to the right and left, to protect the flanks, and disperse the enemy who were assembled in great numbers, both horse and foot, to oppose a descent. It had the desired effect. The Spaniards retired, and left a clear coast; but a violent surf arising, many boats were dashed to pieces, the arms and ammunition much damaged, but providentially, no lives were lost. The troops then formed upon the beach, marched, and took possession of the Malatta, fixed their out-posts, and passed the whole night under arms. The Spaniards in the mean time, were employed in burning of their suburbs. The next day a fort, named the Polverista, which the enemy had abandoned was seized, [Sept. 25.] which proved a most excellent place of arms for covering the landing of the stores, and securing a communication with the squadron. Colonel Monson, who had been detached by the general with 200 men to view the roads and approaches to Manila, occupied the Hermita church, which was large and commodious, and about 900 yards from the city. Orders were then sent to major Moore to march up with the 79th regiment, to secure and maintain that post, which was performed with great activity and good conduct. Possession was then taken of St. Jago's church, near the sea, it being looked on as a place of infinite importance towards the carrying on their operations.

On the 26th, the admiral sent on shore the battalions of seamen under the command of the captains Collins, of the Weymouth, Pitchford of the America, and George Ourry from the Panther. The rest of the company's troops of all sorts were likewise landed, and put under cover. The Spaniards advanced out of the garrison, under the command of the chevalier Fayet, with 400 men, and two field pieces, and from a church about 200 yards to the right of St. Jago's church, began a cannonade upon the right flank of the troops posted there. Some seapoys, under ensign Carty, were sent to skirmish with them, supported by three picquets of the 79th regiment, and 100 seamen, all under the command of colonel Monson, who soon drove the enemy back into the town.

The superior skill and bravery of the English troops were so evident from this affair, that it occasioned a second summons to the governor, but to no purpose; the answer was much more spirited than their conduct had been. The church from whence the Spaniards had been driven, colonel Monson had orders to keep possession of, if he found it tenable, from the top of which a perfect view was had of the enemy's works. The front they were obliged to attack, was defended by the bastions of St. Diego and St. Andrew, with orillons and retired flanks; a ravelin which covered the royal gate, a wet ditch, covered way, and glacis, but all these works were out of repair, except the bastions, which were in excellent order, and lined with a great number of fine brass cannon. It became absolutely necessary to sound the ditch, and which might have proved a very perilous enterprize, had the Spaniards been careful in posting centries on the covered way, but their omission and negligence made it the more easy. It was therefore undertaken and effected by a small party of the 79th regiment under captain Fletcher, with the loss only of three men.

The city of Manila being of great extent, and the number of men employed to reduce it very small, it became impossible to invest it on every side; two sides therefore were constantly open to the enemy to introduce supplies of men and provisions, and carry out their effects. The garrison consisted of 800 men of the royal regiment under the command of the marquis of Villa Mediana, brigadier general, which was farther reinforced by a body of 10,000 Indians. It is evident from hence, that the disadvantages under which the English forces laboured could not be remedied, nor could there be any reasonable ground for success, but in the prudence and wisdom of the general, and the matchless intrepidity of the troops.

The city continued thus invested, and was cannonaded both by the batteries erected, and the frigates, which were brought up till the 2d of October, when a battery for twenty-four pounders was completed, and a mortar battery for the heavy shells of ten and twelve inches, which made a good parallel, and communication from the church to the gun battery, and established a spacious place of arms on the left of it, near the sea. These were greatly facilitated by the roaring of the waves, it being very tempestuous weather, and which prevented the Spaniards from hearing the noise of the workmen, who gave no sort of interruption, but seemed to trust entirely to the elements. In the mean time, the governor, who was an archbishop, gave out, that an Angel from the Lord was gone forth to destroy the English, like the host of Senacherib. In the afternoon the seamen, with great activity and indefatigable labour had brought up and mounted all the guns in the battery, [Oct. 2.] which were masked.

A sally was made the 4th by 1000 of the Indians, who attacked the cantonment of the seamen; but upon the alarm, colonel Monson and captain Fletcher, with the picquets, being dispatched to their assistance, the enemy was repulsed, and forced to fly, with the loss of 300 men. Had the skill and weapons of these Indians, who are a wild and barbarous people from the province of Pampanga, been equal to their strength and ferocity, the dispersion of them might not have been so easy; for though armed chiefly with bows, arrows, and lances; they advanced up to the very muzzles of their enemy's pieces, repeated their assaults, and died like wild beasts, gnawing the bayonets. In this skirmish, captain Porter, a brave and experienced sea officer was slain. Scarce were the Indians thus routed, when another body of them, with part of the Spanish garrison, attacked the church, and forced the seapoys from their post in it, nearest the town, took possession of the top, from whence they killed and wounded several of the English, who were entirely exposed to all their weapons. Notwithstanding their disadvantageous situation, the European soldiers maintained their post behind the church with great patience and firmness, and at last dislodged the enemy, with the loss of captain Strahan, of the 79th regiment, and 40 private men wounded or killed. The Spaniards left 70 dead behind them in and about the church. This was their last effort. All their Indians, excepting 1800, discouraged by the loss, returned home, and the fire of the besiegers continuing with unremitted fury, the next day a breach appeared practicable, and it was thought the Spaniards, sensible of their danger, would think of giving up the town: but they were obstinate without bravery, or any generous resolution of defending the breach.

The next day, at four in the morning, in consequence of a resolution formed the preceding night, the troops filed off from their quarters in small bodies to give the less suspicion to the enemy, [Aug. 6.] with an intention of storming the town, and by degrees, assembled at St. Jago's church, observing the utmost silence, and concealing themselves in the place of arms, and parallel between the church and the battery, while in the mean time a brisk fire was kept up upon the works, and those places where the enemy might be lodged or intrenched. At day break a large body of Spaniards was discerned, forming themselves on the bastion of St. Andrew, but upon the explosion of some shells that were thrown among them, they went off. Taking immediate advantage of this, and by the signal of a general discharge of artillery and mortars, the troops rushed on to the assault, under cover of a thick smoke that blew directly upon the town. Sixty volunteers of different corps under lieutenant Russel of the 79th led the way, supported by the grenadiers of that regiment. The engineers, with the pioneers and other workmen, to clear and enlarge the breach, and make lodgments, in case the enemy should have been too strongly intrenched in the gorge of the bastion, followed. Col. Monson and major More were at the head of two grand divisions of the 79th; the battalion of seamen advanced next, sustained by the other two divisions of the 79th: and the company's troops closed the rear. They all mounted the breach with amazing spirit and rapidity, and dispersed the Spaniards with the greatest facility. Little resistance was given, except at the Royal gate, and from the galleries of the lofty houses which surrounded the grand square. In the guard house over the Royal gate, 100 of the Spaniards and Indians who would not surrender, were put to the sword; and according to the enemy's own account, 300 men were drowned in attempting to escape over the river, which was very deep and rapid. The governor and principal officers retired to the citadel, and were glad to surrender as prisoners at discretion, as that place was in no good posture of defence; the marquis of Villa Mediana, and the rest of the Spanish officers, were admitted as prisoners of war on their paroles of honour, and to conciliate the affections of the natives, all the Indians taken prisoners, were dismissed in safety.

The joy on taking this important place was greatly clouded by the loss of major More, who being transfixed with an arrow near the Royal gate, died immediately, universally lamented for his good qualities. A few officers only were wounded, and no more than 30 private men killed or wounded. In consequence of the terms given to the Spaniards, the port of Cavite, and the citadel, with the islands and forts dependent on Manila, were given up to his Britannic majesty, and they were to pay four millions of dollars for the preservation of the town and their effects.

Such lucrative conquests as the Havannah and the Phillippine islands, had never before been made (a). But these immense captures though they inriched individuals, contributed nothing directly to the public service. However, they might be said to contribute something to it indirectly; by increasing the stock of the nation, and supplying that prodigious drain of treasure, which for several years had been made from this kingdom for foreign subsidies, and for the maintainance of armies abroad. If it had not been for such pecuniary supplies, with which the uncommon successes of this war were attended, it never could have been maintained in the extent to which it was carried, notwithstanding the increase of trade, which has been uniformly progressive for the last three years. It has in a loose way been computed, that the success of our arms in the East Indies; independently of the great increase of valuable merchandize, (which used to be formerly the sole produce and advantage of the East India commerce,) has brought into England during the war, near six millions in treasure and jewels.

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The capture of the Spanish register ship, the Hermione, [May 21.] which happened soon after the commencement of the war with Spain, and just as she was on the point of entering one of the ports of Old Spain, and that of the Santissimo Trinidad, a Manila ship, must be added to these resources. The first of these was worth little less than a million sterling, and the other at least three millions of dollars. The taking of these ships is not altogether unworthy a place in history; because it had no small influence on the affairs of the Bourbon alliance, and considerably sunk those resources of money, which were the principal objects to France, when she formed that famous treaty. All these advantages were without any considerable allay on the side of Great Britain; they would have served to ballance any possible success, which the enemy might have had in Portugal. But their success in that quarter, where they had entertained the most sanguine hopes, was by no means considerable, and very far from tending to any thing decisive. These considerations helped to dispose the Bourbon courts to peace, almost as soon as they had jointly entered into the war; and Europe, after having been deceived in the hopes of tranquillity, which were entertained from the late negotiation, and plunged apparently deeper than ever into war, was in reality approaching fast to peace, and the public repose was preparing, when it seemed to be at the greatest distance.

CHAP. IX.

Proposals for peace. State of the ministry and parties. Dukes of Bedford and Nivernois employed in the negotiation. Newfoundland taken and retaken. War in Germany. Hereditary Prince defeated at Iohannisberg. French repulsed. Cassel invested. Remarkable cannonade at Bucker Muhl. French take Amonebourg. Cassel surrendered to the allies. War in Westphalia concluded.

WHEN France had found experimentally, that the present at least was not the favourable time for drawing from her alliance all those advantages with which she flattered herself, she inclined in good earnest to peace, The sincerity of her procedure in the former negotiation might be justly questioned; because she had prepared an after game in case of its breaking off. And she so much relied on it, that it is very possible the negotiation itself was but a feint made to cover and to prepare that project. But finding that Great Britain was neither intimidated by the threats of that formidable alliance, nor at all likely to be reduced by the exertion of its forces; she came in good earnest into these pacific sentiments, which formerly she had only counterfeited. The slow progress of the Bourbon troops in Portugal, the retrograde motion of the French army in Germany, the taking of Martinico and its dependencies, and the imminent danger in which they beheld the Havannah, all conspired to humble the pride, and dash the hopes of the Bourbon alliance.

On the side of Great Britain likewise, the dispositions to peace became much more cordial. No people were ever less intoxicated with their successes. Victories were become familiar to us, and made but little impression. The marks of public joy on the most considerable conquests, were become much slighter and colder, than were shewed at the beginning of the war, upon very trivial advantages. Besides the nation had occasion for peace. Though her trade had been greatly augmented, a circumstance without example favourable, and though many of her conquests, as we have seen, were very far from unlucrative, her supplies of money, great as they were, did not keep pace with her expences. The supply of men too, which was necessary to furnish the waste of so extensive a war, became sensibly diminished, and the troops were not recruited but with some difficulty, and at a heavy charge. It was time to close the war, when every end, we could rationally propose to ourselves in carrying it on, was answered; we had enough in our hands to answer all our demands, and almost all our expectations; and as it is grown into a sort of maxim, that nations greatly victorious, must cede something on a peace, the difficulty on our side was only what, and how much we should retain. Not that there was a doubt, but whatever choice of acquisition could be made upon any rational principles, a great deal would still remain to give the fullest scope to every sentiment of equity and moderation,

All these were sufficient inducements to peace. But other things operated as causes. An alteration in the system of the British ministry had begun this war; another alteration put an end to it.

The whole council had been almost unanimous to oppose Mr. Pitt, in his scheme for precipitating the declaration of war against Spain. They thought his principles too violent, and they did not perfectly like his person. When he retired from publick business, it seemed as if they breathed more freely, and had got rid of a burthen that oppressed them. But he was not long removed, when it appeared that the remaining part of the system, was framed upon principles so very discordant in themselves, that it was by no means likely to stand.

The duke of Newcastle, first lord of the treasury, by his early zeal in favour of the protestant succession, by the liberal and politic use he had made of a great fortune, by the obligations which in a course of many years, and in a succession of great employments, he was enabled to confer on some of the most considerable people in the kingdom, had attached a great number to his fortunes, and formed an interest in the parliament and the nation, which it was extremely difficult to overturn, or even to shake. He came to be considered as the head of the whigs; and he was in reality well qualified in many respects for the chief of a party, from his unbounded liberality, from his affability, magnificence, and personal disinterestedness. Even the defects and faults, which might have appeared in his character, were rather of service to him, as they often tended to soften resentments, and helped to give that great power, of which he was possessed, an appearance less formidable.

During a great part of the late king's reign, his family had directed all things without controul. On the accession of his present majesty, his situation seemed more doubtful. But in a little time he appeared outwardly as well established as ever, not only in his former high employments, but in that share of influence which is commonly supposed to attend it. There was, however, very little reality in this specious appearance; for he did not possess the royal confidence, upon which all the essential of power depends. Neither his age, nor his situation in the former reign, had allowed him the opportunity of cultivating an interest with the present king. Another noble person (a) had been in an employment near his person; and having formed his mind with much attention and success to those virtues which adorn his station, deserved and obtained a very uncommon share of his confidence.

This nobleman was first groom of the stole: afterwards, taking a more open share in the conduct of affairs, he accepted the seals as secretary of state. On the removal of Mr. Pitt, who preserved a sort of union in the administration by their common dread of him, the only competition was between the duke of Newcastle and lord Bute. The former could not well endure that decay of influence, which, on a thousand occasions, he must have sensibly felt, and which the great rank he held must have rendered only more painful. Lord Bute, on the other hand, could not bear to see the treasury board, which, under whatever limitations, was attended with so much power, in the hands of his rival. It is indeed a department, the entire conduct of which is absolutely essential to the person who has any pretensions to be at the head of the British administration.

These principles soon produced their natural effect. In a short time the duke of Newcastle thought himself obliged to resign, [May 26.] and lord Bute became first commissioner of the treasury. This resignation was followed by that of others of great consideration for their rank and influence. No one was surprised at the ferment which ensued; in which personal resentment, party violence, and national, or rather local prejudices, were all united, to throw every thing into confusion.

In this condition of parties, a number of those called Whigs, who had lost their places, being highly irritated at the late changes, and even many of those who still continued in employments, being supposed attached to the interest of the duke of Newcastle, and therefore not to be depended on by the new administration, it became necessary to have recourse to those called Tories, or country gentlemen.

From the beginning of this reign it had been professed, with the general applause of all good men, to abolish those odious party distinctions, and to extend the royal favour and protection equally to all his majesty's subjects. The persons called Tories had, besides, been before active in support of some of those, who now clamoured at the very measures which they had themselves, more than once, adopted. However, occasion was taken from thence to endeavour at the revival of this almost exploded distinction. There were great heats, which were blown into a combustion by every art, and every instrument of party, that had ever proved effectual upon similar occasions.

Whilst the nation was thus distracted, the conduct of a war became difficult; its continuance unsafe; and its supplies uncertain. If the administration failed, their failure would be construed into incapacity; if they succeeded, their success would be converted into an argument for such terms of peace, as it would be impossible for them to procure. Above all, the antient and known connection between the chiefs of the moneyed interest and the principal persons in the opposition, must have been a subject of great anxiety to the administration.

These causes co-operated to render the intentions of the British ministry towards peace altogether cordial and sincere; and they thought themselves abundantly justified in their wishes for it at this juncture, both from the successes and the burthens of the nation; from the flourishing state of some of their allies, and the doubtful state of others; and in general, from those arguments of humanity, which made it high time that Europe should enjoy some interval of repose.

Both courts thus concurring in the same point, all difficulties were speedily smoothed. It is said, that the first overtures were made under the mediation of his Sardinian majesty. As soon as terms were proposed, in order to give a pledge to each other of their mutual sincerity, it was agreed that this treaty should not be negotiated, as the former had been, by subordinate persons; but that the two courts should reciprocally send to London and Versailles a person of the first consequence and distinction in either kingdom. Accordingly the duke of Bedford was sent to negotiate on the part of England, and the duke de Nivernois on that of France; the great outlines of the treaty were very soon explained and adjusted. The detail of some articles took up more time.

During this mixed interval of war and treaty, the French obtained a temporary advantage; but which neither suspended nor influenced the negotiation. It was the last offensive effort, which they made; and though this enterprize was attended with a temporary success in the execution, it was in the design not superior to any of those that had failed. Monsieur de Ternay, with a squadron of four men of war and a bomb ketch, and M. d' Hausonville, with a proportionable number of land forces, arrived the 24th of June at the bay of Bulls in Newfoundland, and finding the island little prepared to resist them, took without difficulty, the forts of St. John, Trinity; and Carbonear, destroyed the two last, and likewise the stages and implements of the fishery, to a considerable value. The immense extent of our military operations, rendered it little wonderful or blameable, that this particular part was found weak.

The French presumed by far too much on the supineness of the nation, when they hoped such an advantage could have any great effect on the negotiation. In fact, as soon as the news arrived in England, a force was fitted out to retake those places. But such was the vigilance and readiness of general Amherst; our commander in America, that it superseded the necessity of this armament. He detached colonel Amherst with a body of forces, and Lord Colville with a small, but sufficient squadron, to recover this valuable island. The land forces attacked some detachments of the French, advantageously posted in the neighbourhood of St. John's, and prepared to attack St. John's itself, with so much vigour and activity, that M. d'Hausonville, who had remained there as governor, thought proper to deliver up that place, and surrendered himself and garrison prisoners of war (a), before Sept. 18. lord Colville could arrive from the place where the troops had been landed, to co-operate with them. M. de Ternay escaped with the fleet, partly by having gained a considerable distance, before they were discovered, by means of a thick fog; and partly because lord Colville, after their having been discovered, did not apprehend that they really were the enemy's ships.

It was in Germany that the greatest efforts were made. Even after the negotiations had been considerably advanced, the military operations were in that country no way slackened. The body under the marshal d'Estrees and Soubise, being streightened, in the manner we have seen, by the incomparable judgment of prince Ferdinand's measures, had been obliged to call that under the prince of Conde from the Lower Rhine to their assistance. In order to complete their junction with this corps, the grand army uncovered Cassel, quitted the banks of the Fulda, and fell back to a considerable distance. The hereditary prince of Brunswick, who had attended this corps all along, thought at length a fair opportunity had occurred of striking a decisive blow against it. [Aug. 30.] With this aid he attacked, with his usual vivacity, that part of the French army, which was posted at a place called the heights of Johannisberg, near the banks of the Wetter. At first his success was answerable to his own expectations, and the courage 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 of his troops. He drove the enemy intirely from the high grounds into the plain; but whilst he pursued his advantage, the body he attacked was reinforced by the main army. The action which began so favourable for the allies, ended in a defeat. They lost above three thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The hereditary prince, who had, through the whole action, made the most powerful efforts, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers, received a wound from a musket-ball in his hip-bone, from which his life was a long time doubtful, and his recovery lingering and tedious. Whilst his life continued in danger, the concern was unusual, and common to both armies; both taking an interest in the preservation of a prince, as much endeared by his humanity, as admired for his valour and military genuis.

A victory of the greatest importance could not have more fully displayed the superiority of prince Ferdinand's capacity, in the conduct of a war, than his measures after this defeat. The French were not suffered to derive the smallest advantage from their victory; nor did the allies lose a foot of ground. The communication with Cassel was still at the mercy of the allies. The French, in their retreat, had thrown a garrison of ten thousand men in that place; and the prince made immediate and vigorous preparations to besiege it.

When the prince had adjusted his army to cover the siege the French took advantage of his movement for that purpose, to repass the Lahan near Giessen, and advanced towards Marpurg. But as they advanced, the prince drew his army from the siege, and made such dispositions as enabled him to fall at once upon their flank and rear, drove them from all their posts, [Sept. 26.] and obliged them once more to fly with precipitation behind the Lahne.

After this successful affair, the body of the army resumed their preparations for the siege of Cassel, which was now become the grand object of the campaign; and the great purpose of the endeavours of both armies was, of the one to open the communication with Cassel, of the other to cut it off.

A number of skirmishes happened in these movements. The most remarkable among them was the affair of Bucker Muhl, [Sept. 30.] not so much for the consequences, which were not extraordinary, but for the uncommon steadiness of the two parties engaged. It was a post of some moment, the forcing of which would facilitate to the French the reduction of Amonebourg, a small fortress, but of importance, as it commanded a pass which led into the country which they proposed to enter. This post was nothing more than a bridge over the Ohme, defended by a slight redoubt on one side, and by a mill on the other. The allies had no cover, except the redoubt; nor the French, except the mill. The engagement began at first between two small bodies, and an artillery proportionably small; but as the action warmed, the artillery was gradually augmented, until it amounted to about five and twenty heavy cannon on each side. The allies had originally but one hundred men in this post; but before the business ended, seventeen complete battalions were engaged, who successively relieved each other, after each detachment had made sixty discharges. The artillery fired at a distance of three hundred paces, and the musquetry at thirty. Besides, the allied troops, as they passed to and from the redoubt, were, for a length of four hundred paces, exposed to all the enemy's cannon loaded with grape shot.

The situation of the French was nearly the same. A dreadful fire was supported between these resolute bodies, without a moments intermission, or the least slackening on one side or the other, for near fifteen hours, from the dawn of day to dark night. Neither side gave way; and this most bloody contest for a most trifling object in the end left the allies in the possession of their redoubt, and the French of their mill. The whole compass of military history furnishes no instance of so obstinate a dispute. The allies lost six hundred men in killed and wounded; towards the close of the day, the dead bodies served to raise a parapet for the redoubt, in the place of that which had been beat to pieces by the cannonade.

The French are thought to have suffered more in this action than the allies. However, though they did not succeed in their attack upon the bridge, they battered at the same time the castle of Amonebourg with so much fury, that in a short time they effected a breach, and obliged the garrison to surrender. By this advantage they gained a good deal of ground, and even got on the rear of the allied army. But with this advantage, considerable as it was, they were able to do nothing decisive: they were able neither to raise, nor materially to disturb the siege of Cassel, which went on without interruption; nor where they able to throw the least relief into this place, where their garrison already began to suffer for want of provisions.

This capital of an unfortunate principality, which has so often been taken and retaken during the course of this war, dispairing of relief, at length surrendered to the victorious arms of the allies, [Nov. 1.] after a siege of fifteen days open trenches. The garrison made an honourable capitulation. And now prince Ferdinand might consider himself as master of Hesse, no place of strength in that country remaining in the enemy's hands, except Ziegenhayn. Advanced as the season was, the prince prepared to lay siege to that fortress; and as he was now able to draw down his whole army into that quarter, there was no question but he would have made himself master of the place without any difficulty. But the signing of the preliminaries of peace, [Nov. 15.] at this time notified in the two armies, put an happy conclusion to all military operations.

These preliminaries had very little to do towards completing the relief of our allies; except that they set the seal on their good fortune, and prevented their being exposed any longer to the chances of war. This campaign, though it was not distinguished by any great decisive victory, was not the less honourable to the commander or the troops. A connected series of judicious and spirited operations produced all the effects which could be proposed from a single and brilliant stroke. At this period, the French, after having for six years exerted almost the whole undivided strength of their monarchy upon this single object, were, in the end, very little more advanced than they were the day they first set their foot in Germany. The possession of three or four poor unimportant places was all they had purchased by many millions of treasure expended, and possibly near two hundred thousand lives thrown away.

The whole body of the allies acquired great and just glory in this war; but the English had all along the post of honour, and obtained the highest reputation. As to their commander the duke of Brunswick, having begun his operations almost without an army, having continued the war with an army always inferior in numbers, having experienced every variety of fortune, his capacity and his firmness carried him with credit through all; and enabled him to conclude the war with a triumphant superiority. He may now enjoy in the honourable repose which his exploits have purchased for himself and his country, the best of rewards, the consciousness of public service. Posterity will consider him as the deliverer of Germany.

The English troops, after so many fatigues and dangers, at length enjoyed the prospect of a speedy return to their country; but a general damp was cast suddenly on their joy by the illness of lord Granby; who was attacked by a very dangerous and long continued fever, (a) It is impossible to express the concern of the whole army during this anxious interval, or the joy which enlivened every breast on his recovery. No commander had ever been more distinguished for an enterprising and generous courage; and none half so much for an unlimitted benevolence. The sick and wounded soldier, the officer whose income was unequal to his rank or his necessities, in him found a never failing and never burthensome resource. Whatever could be done to animate the soldiery, to make them chearful in the service, to alleviate the hardships of war, was exerted beyond what could be thought possible in the limits of a private fortune; and the satisfaction of the giver went always beyond the actual benefit, because in his greatest liberality, it was evident that he wished to do a thousand times more. By his whole conduct he inspired foreigners with a favourable idea of the English nobility. His character is, indeed, such as we are apt, in romantic ideas, fondly to conceive of our old English barons. It is with pleasure we attempt, however feebly, to do justice to the merit of those men, living or dead, who, in this memorable war, have contributed to raise this country to a pitch of glory, in which it has not been exceeded by any other in antient or modern times. Future history will pay them a reward more adequate to their merits.

CHAP. X.

Siege and surrender of Schweidnitz. War transferred to Saxony. Austrians defeated at Freyberg. Prussians ravage the Empire. Preliminaries of peace between Great Britain and France. Disputes concerning them. Mr. Fox comes into administration. Preliminaries approved by parliament. Peace of Hubertsbourg between Austria and Prussia. Conclusion.

WHILST the courts of London and Versailles Were making so considerable a progress towards peace, those of Vienna and Berlin seemed to remit nothing of their antient animosity. The king of Prussia, deprived of the assistance, but at the same time freed from the hostilities of the Russians directed his whole force and attention towards the single object of driving the Austrians out of Silesia.

Prince Henry, who commanded in Saxony, contented himself with acting upon the defensive. The king in person carried on the siege of Schweidnitz, almost in the presence of marshal Daun, who scarce made any attempts to relieve it. But whatever deficiency there might have been in the spirit of the grand army of the Austrians, it was amply compensated by the obstinate bravery of the garrison, which resisted all the attacks of the Prussians for near two months from the opening of the trenches. It is said that the attack was conducted, and the defence made, by two engineers, who had written on the subject of the attack and defence of places; and they were now practically engaged to prove the superiority of their several systems.

However this may be, Schweidnitz cost the king of Prussia a great deal of time, many laborious efforts, and a number of men. The brave garrison, to the number of eight thousand men, [Oct. 9.] were at length obliged to surrender prisoners of war. Their ill fortune pursued them every where. A great part of this body of gallant 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 prisoners were drowned at the mouth of the Oder, on their passage to their intended confinement at Konigsberg: only nine men of the whole number escaped.

The king of Prussia now master of Schweidnitz, and consequently of Silesia, turned his attention to Saxony, where he considerably reinforced his brother's army and made preparations which indicated a design of laying siege to Dresden.

In Saxony also the Austrians began to exert themselves with great spirit; and made some progress under the generals Stolberg, and Haddick. They obtained considerable advantages, in several encounters, over the army of prince Henry; and even pushed them back to Freyberg; the possession of which place they prepared to dispute with the Prussians.

But here fortune, which has seldom proved long constant to their arms, entirely forsook them. The united army of Imperalists and Austrians was attacked by prince Henry, [Oct. 29.] (who took advantage of the absence of general Haddick,) in the neighbourhood of Freyberg, and totally routed. Great numbers were slain. The Prussians took near six thousand prisoners, among whom were about two hundred and forty officers of all ranks, thirty pieces of cannon, and several standards. The victory was complete, and, as far as regarded the event of the campaign, decisive.

The Austrians attributed this defeat to the treachery of one of their superior officers, who was soon after taken into custody. But whilst they were inquiring into the cause of their disaster, and preparing to punish the author of it, the Prussians were pushing the advantages which their victory afforded them with all imaginable alacrity. And this they were enabled to do with the greatest effect, by means of a partial cessation of hostilities, which the Austrians were so imprudent as to conclude with the king of Prussia for Silesia and the electoral Saxony only, without foreseeing the danger, or providing for the safety, either of their own immediate dominions, or of those members of the Empire, which were the most attached to their interests, and which were now exposed to the attempts of a bold, rapacious, and exasperated enemy.

One body of the Prussian army broke into Bohemia, pushed on almost to the gates of Prague, and destroyed a capital magazine. Another fell upon the same country on another quarter, and laid the town of Egra almost in ashes, by a bombardment and a cannonade of red hot bullets. Some extended themselves all over Saxony; others penetrated into the furthest parts of Franconia, and even as far as Suabia, ravaging the country; exacting the most exorbitant contributions, and spreading dismay and confusion upon every side. The dyet of the Empire sitting at Ratisbon did not think themselves in safety; but were beginning to fly and preparing to remove their records.

The free city of Nuremberg, so famous for the ingenious industry, and pacific disposition of its inhabitants, suffered the most by this invasion; having been obliged to pay contribution to the amount of two hundred thousand pounds of our money. It has been supposed, that in this expedition the Prussians raised a sum equal to the annual subsidy, which had formerly been paid by Great Britain to their sovereign. Many of the states found themselves obbliged to sign a neutrality, in order to save their territories from further ravages.

And now a great part of the Empire being already included in the peace between Great Britain and France, and the rest, tied down by this neutrality, entirely disabled by the late defeat, or exhausted by the subsequent incursions, were no longer in a condition to furnish an army under the imperial name and authority. After the whole alliance had been thus gradually dissolved, the affair was, at length, left to be decided as it was begun, by the single arms of Austria and Prussia; so that there was great reason to hope, as the war in Germany had succeeded immediately to the rupture between Great Britain and France, the peace between these powers would also lead to the speedy pacification of the Empire.

The preliminaries had been signed by the British and French ministers at Fountainbleau, on the third of November, and it is necessary for the completion of our design, that we should here give some account of the definitive treaty which was built upon them.

The reader will recollect, that, in the negotiation of 1761, it was laid down as a principal by the two courts, that their respective propositions, in case the treaty should by any accident be broken off, were to be considered as retracted or never made. At that time we remarked, that these propositions would probably have their influence, notwithstanding 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 this provision; because, as we then observed, things once settled and agreed to, unavoidably stamp their own impression upon any future negotiation relative to the same subject. It happened very nearly, as was then foreseen; for, as far as we can judge, the negotiation did not set out upon any new or peculiar principle of its own, but seemed to assume as a basis those points, which were nearest to an adjustment in the preceding treaty; and to commence where that transaction concluded.

The spirit of the two negotiations, so far as regarded the peculiar interest of Great Britain, seems to have been perfectly similar. There was scarcely any other difference, than that Great Britain, in consequence of her successes since that time, acquired more than she then demanded; but still the general idea, on which she acquired, was nearly or altogether the same. But with regard to some of our allies, the principal was greatly varied; and we imagine that this change was sufficiently justified by the alteration which happened in the affairs of Germany, during the interval between the two treaties. Those who conducted the negotiation in 1761, were steady in rejecting every proposition, in which they were not left at liberty to aid the king of Prussia, with the whole force of Great Britain; those, who concluded the peace in 1762, paid less attention to the interests, though they did not wholly neglect the safety of that monarch. At the beginning of the year, and before they had entered into the negotiation, they refused to renew that article of the annual treaty, by which our court had engaged to conclude no peace without the king of Prussia; though at the same time they declared themselves willing to assist him with the usual subsidy. He on his part refused the subsidy unconnected with that article. Some coldness grew between the two courts from this time forward.

The adjustment of affairs in the Empire, seemed to form no material impediment to the progress of the treaty. Both parties readily agreed to withdraw themselves totally from the German was. They thought and rightly, that nothing could tend so much to give peace to their respective allies, as mutually to withdraw their assistance from them; and to stop that current of English and French money, which, as long as it ran into Germany, would be sure to feed a perpetual war in that country.

Circumstanced as affairs then were, this conduct on our side was as defensible as the conduct which we held in 1761. At that time the affairs of the king of Prussia were at the lowest ebb; he was overpowered by the whole weight of Austria, of Sweden, of the Empire, and of Russia, as determined as ever, in her enmity, and then successful; to say nothing of France. Neither generosity, nor perhaps sound policy, ought to have permitted us to desert him in that situation. But when the last treaty was made, the condition of his affairs was absolutely reversed. He had got rid of the most powerful, and one of the most implacable of his enemies. He had concluded a peace with Sweden. The treaty itself freed him from all apprehensions of France. He had then none to contend with, but a nominal army of the Empire, and one of Austria, which, though something more than nominal, was wholly unable to oppose his progress. His situation, from being pitiable, was become formidable. It was good policy to prevent the ballance of Germany from being overturned to his prejudice. It would have been the worst in the world to overturn it in his favour.

These principles sufficiently explain and justify the different conduct of this nation, at these two periods, towards the king of Prussia. The demand of the evacuation of Wesel, Cleves, and Gueldres, which had been made in the first negotiation was then justly excepted to, because we refused to put an end to the German war. In this last the French agreed to it, and with reason, because we agreed in common with them to be neutral in the disputes of the Empire. And on these principles, the peace of Germany, so far as it depended on Great Britain and France, was restored. The rest of Europe was pacified by the stipulation for the evacuation of Portugal. This was indeed, with regard to the contracting courts, the primary object.

What remained after the concerns of the allies were provided for, was the adjustment of what related to the settlements and commerce of Great Britain and the Bourbon courts. The difficulty, which prevented this adjustment in the preceding negotiation, was the intervention of the claims of Spain. The attempts of the Bourbon powers to intermix and confound their affairs in the preceding negotiation, had a share in making the war more general; on this occasion it had a contrary effect. As the whole was negotiated together, it facilitated the peace, by affording easier methods of adjusting the system of compensation, and furnishing more largely to the general fund of equavalents.

The great object, and the original cause of the war, had been the settlement of limits in America. This was therefore the first object to be attended to in the treaty. And it must be observed, that this point was much more accurately, as well as beneficially, settled, than it promised to be in the negotiation of the foregoing year. For the French, not having ascertained the bounds between their own several possessions with great exactness, than they had those between their possessions and ours, it was not clear in ceding Canada, how much they ceded to us. Disputes might have arisen, and did indeed immediately arise upon this subject, besides, the western limits of our southern continental colonies, were not mentioned. And those limits were extremely obscure and subject to many discussions. Such discussions contained in them the seeds of a new war, In the last treaty it was agreed, that a line drawn along the middle of the river Missisippi, from its source to the river Iberville, (a small but navigable branch of the Missisippi,) and thence along the middle of this river, and the lakes of Maurepas and Pontchartrain, (which lakes communicate with both rivers) to the sea, should be the bounds of the two nations in North America.

Nothing could be more distinct than this boundary. It gave us, in addition to what was properly Canada, a very large tract of territory, which the French used to include under the name of Louisania; to which our claims were never clearly ascertained, and much less established by any possession. The French have had for a long time forts and settlements in that country; whereas the English never had either the one or the other; and this is a consideration of no small moment in a contest concering rights in a country such as America.

What added also to the rounding of our territories, and cutting off the occasions of limitary disputes, was the cession of Florida on the part of Spain. This country indeed makes no great figure in the commercial world; and cannot be therefore put in competition with the other conquests, But from the situation of its harbours of Pensacola and Mobile, it affords some advantages in the time of peace, and very considerable ones in time of war; by connecting our future settlements on the Missisippi with those upon the Atlantic ocean, and by enabling us greatly to distress, if not wholly to destroy the trade of the Spaniards in case of a rupture with them. The navigation of the Missisippi was made common to both nations.

By the treaty of Utrecht, which settled our northern limits, and by this treaty which ascertained those to the west, our possessions in America are as well defined, as the nature of such a country can possibly admit. They comprehend in their extent the foundation of a vast empire; they have many advantages of soil and climate; and many of intercourse and communication, by the number of noble lakes and navigable rivers, with which that part of the world abounds. These circumstances afford, though a distant, a fair prospect of commerce to Great Britain, when this immense country comes to be fully peopled, and properly cultivated. Some advantages also we derive from this possession, that are not only considerable but immediate; among the principal of which must be reckoned, the monopoly of the furr and peltry trade of North America, much the greatest trade of that kind in the world, and which is now, we may say, entirely in our hands. Besides the possession of Canada enlarged the sphere of our fishery, and took from the French an opportunity of trade, which she might employ greatly to our detriment.

Such are the advantages fairly, and without any exaggeration, for which we are indebted to this part of the treaty, in which the interests of Great Britain were well weighed and solidly provided for.

The next point we shall consider, is the arangement made concerning the Newfoundland fishery, This was a point of infinite importance, and a subject of much controversy. In a commercial view it is certainly of great estimation. But it has been considered as even more material in a political light. Every body knows that these extensive fisheries are the life of many maritime places, which would otherwise be of no sort of value; that they are the great nurseries of seamen, and consequently the great resources of the marine. Scarce any object could be of more importance to two nations, who contended for a superiority in naval power.

The more clearly therefore it was the interest of Great Britain, to acquire the exclusive exercise of this fishery, the more strongly and evidently it became the interest of France to oppose themselves to such a pretension. Not only a large part of her foreign trade depended on this fishery, but a great part of her domestic supply. Besides every hope of the strength and almost of the existence of a naval power, must vanish with the cession of this fishery.

The English administration probably saw, that France would rather run all the hazards of war, than totally relinquish this object. Since therefore they despaired of driving the French entirely from the fishery, they endeavoured as much as possible to diminish its value to them. In this respect they followed the plan of the former negotiation, except that some improvements were added.

In the first place, that article of the treaty of Utrecht was established, by which the French were admitted to fish, and to dry their fish, on the north-east and north-west parts of Newfoundland, from Cape Bonavista to Point Biche, and excluded from the rest of this island. They were also permitted to fish within the Gulph of St. Lawrence, but with this limitation, that they shall not approach within three leagues of any of the coasts belonging to England.

This precaution was taken, not only with a view of abridging the French fishery of dry cod, but principally in order to prevent their landing, and on that pretence forming settlements on those extensive desarts, which surrounded the Gulph of St. Lawrence. Otherwise this privilege might become a means of exciting new controversies between the two nations.

In compensation for the cession of the isles of Cape Breton and St. John to England, we agreed to surrender to France the small island of St. Pierre and Miquelon, situated to the south of Newfoundland. The cession of the two former islands was, unquestionably, more than an equivalent for the two latter, though the latter are by no means either incommodiously situated or ill circumstanced for carrying on the fishery. The French stipulated to erect no fortifications on these islands, nor to keep more than fifty soldiers to enforce the police. In this instance the plan of the former negotiation was pursued. The ideas of a resident commissary, and the occasional visitation by a ship of war were omitted; as regulations, which were in truth more humiliating to France, than in any respect advantageous to our interest.

The fishery was, as it had been at the treaty of Utrecht, divided between France and England, but with less equality on this than on that occasion. The French are not wholly deprived of their share; but this share is considerably impaired. Their loss of Cape Breton does not appear to be fully supplied by St. Pierre and Miquelon. The considerable and growing fishery, which the French had settled at Gaspe is taken away without hope of recovery. On the whole, we are thus circumstanced; we have advantages in this fishery, which we may certainly improve to a great superiority; but we have still a rival, which makes it necessary to exert ourselves with unremitting industry in order to secure it.

With regard to Spain, she entirely desisted from the right she claimed of fishing on these coasts. A more satisfactory expression could have been wished; if it had been of great importance, in what terms a right was renounced, which for a long time had never been exercised.

When the affairs of the West Indies came to be settled, though they caused great difference of opinion among the publick, they do not seem to have raised any great difficulty in the negotiation. We had here made great conquests, and here also we made great concessions. We ceded the Havannah, with a considerable part of the island of Cuba; the islands of Martinico; Gaudeloupe; Mariegalante; Desirade; and Santa Lucia. We retained in our hands the islands of Tobago, Dominica, St. Vincent, and the Grenades. To the three former, of which, (as well as to Santa Lucia, which we surrendered) we had an old claim. The last only was a new acquisition; and the three others are at present of small value.

Many censured with great vehemence and asperity this part of the treaty. They insisted that in this treaty we had lost sight of that great fundamental principal, that France is chiefly, if not solely, to be dreaded by us in the light of a maritime and commerical power. That therefore we had, by restoring to her all her valuable West India islands, and by our concessions in the Newfoundland fishery, left in her hands the means of recovering her prodigious losses, and of becoming once more formidable to us at sea. That the fishery trained up an innumerable multitude of young seamen; and that the West India trade employed them when they were trained. That France had long since gained a decided superiority over us in this lucrative branch of commerce, and supplied almost all Europe with the rich commodities, which are produced only in that part of the world. By this commerce, said they, she enriched her merchants and augmented her finances; whilst from a want of sugar land, which has been long known and severely felt by England, we at once lost the foreign trade, and suffered all the inconveniences of a monopoly at home.

That, at the close of so expensive a war, we might very reasonably demand something towards our indemnification, as well as towards our security. It is evident said they, that our conquests in North America, however, they may provide for the one, are altogether inadequate to the other of these ends. The state of the existing trade of these conquests is extremely low; the speculations of their future are precarious, and the prospect, at the very best, very remote. We stand in need of supplies, which will have an effect, certain, speedy, and considerable. The retaining both, or even one of the considerable French islands, Martinico or Guadeloupe, will, and nothing else can effectually answer this tripple purpose. The advantage is immediate. It is a matter not of conjecture but of account. The trade with these conquests is of the most lucrative nature, and of the most considerable extent; the number of ships employed by it are a great resource to our maritime power; the monopoly at home is corrected, and the foreign trade is recovered. And what is of equal weight, all that we gain on this system, is made fourfold to us, by the loss which ensues to France. But our conquests in North America, however advantageous they may prove to us, in the idea of security, (for in that respect alone they are of any moment) are of very little detriment to the commerce of France. On the West India scheme of acquisition, our gain and her loss go hand in hand.

They insisted upon the obvious connection of this trade, with that of our colonies in North America, and with our commerce to the coast of Africa. The African trade, said they, will be augmented, by the demand for slaves. That of North America will all center in ourselves. Whereas if the islands are all restored, a great part of the benefit of the northern colony trade must redound, as it has hitherto done, to those who were lately our enemies, and will always be our rivals.

They observed, that there was nothing extravagant or overbearing in this demand. That though we should retain either Martinico or Guadeloupe, or even both these islands, our conquests were such, that there was still abundant matter left to display our moderation in the cession of the rest. To say nothing of our many concessions in the fishery; on the coast of Africa; and in the East Indies; from all which great provinces of commerce the French had been entirely driven this war, and to a considerable share of which they were restored by the treaty. But if further concessions must be made (for which however they saw no necessity) let the prodigious demand in North America be somewhat contracted; by this method we loose nothing to our commerce; and we do not hazard our security, as we shall still be infinitely superior in strength; and whenever a war breaks out, that power will be most secure, whose resources are most considerable.

Such are concisely, and, we flatter ourselves, fairly, the principal heads of argument, brought by the best writers upon this side of the question; they were replied to by the best writers on the other, upon the following principles.

That the original object of the war was the security of our colonies upon the continent; that the danger to which these colonies were exposed, and in consequence of that danger, the immense waste of blood and treasure which ensued to Great Britain, together with the calamities, which were from the same source, derived upon the four quarters of the world, left no sort of doubt that it was not only our best, but our only policy, to guard against all possibility of the return of such evils. Experience has shewn us that while France possesses any single place in America, from whence she may molest our settlements, they can never enjoy any repose, and of course that we are never secure from being plunged again into those calamities, from which we have at length, and with so much difficulty, happily emerged. To remove France from our neighbourhood in America, or to contract her power within the narrowest limits possible, is therefore the most capital advantage we can obtain; and is worth purchasing by almost any concessions.

They insisted that the absolute security derived from this plan, included in itself an indemnification. First; by saving us, more effectually than any other method could, from the necessity of another war, and consequently by giving us an opportunity of increasing our trade, and lowering our debt. Secondly; by permitting our colonies on 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 he continent to extend themselves without danger or molestation. They shewed the great increase of poppulation in those colonies within a few years. They shewed that their trade with the mother country had uniformly increased with this population. That being now freed from the molestation of enemies, and the emulations of rivals, unlimited in their possessions, and safe in their persons, our American planters would by the very course of their natural propogation in a very short time, furnish out a demand of our manufactures, as large as all the working hands of Great Britain could possibly supply. That there was therefore no reason to dread that want of trade, which their adversaries insinuated, since North America alone would supply the deficiences of our trade in every other part of the world.

They expatiated on the great variety of climates, which that country contained, and the vast resources which would thence arise to commerce. That the value of our conquests thereby ought not to be estimated by the present produce, but by their probable increase, Neither ought the value of any country to be solely tried on its commercial advantages; that extent of territory and a number of subjects, are matters of as much consideration to a state attentive to the sources of real grandeur, as the mere advantages of traffic; that such ideas are rather suitable to a limited and petty commonwealth, like Holland, than to a great, powerful and warlike nation. That on these principles, having made very large demands in North America, it was necessary to relax in other parts. That France would never be brought to any considerable cession in the West Indies; but that her power and increase there could never become formidable, because the existence of her settlements depended upon ours in North America, she not being any longer left a place from whence they can be supplied with provisions; that in losing something of the sugar trade, we lost very little else than a luxury: as to the other produce of the West Indies, it might be in a great measure, and in part already was supplied by our possessions on the continent, which daily increased not only in the quantity but in the kind of its produce.

We do not pretend to pass any judgment on the merits of the several sides of this question, which is certainly a very difficult one. We relate opinions, as well as facts, historically.

The only point, which remained to be adjusted in the West Indies, was the logwood trade. Spain consented not to disturb the English in their occupation of cutting logwood in the bay of Honduras, and to permit them to occupy such buildings as may be necessary for them in this occupation. Great Britain, on her side, stipulated to destroy the fortifications which had been erected on that bay[*].

By this article the English acquired a solid right in this long contested trade; but seemed at the same time, to lose all the means of protecting it. It is, however, difficult to point out a better method of adjusting a claim of such a peculiar nature. The right we claimed was not a right to the territory, nor directly to the produce; but only a privilege of cutting and taking away this wood by indulgence. To have insisted on the right of erecting fortifications, would have been making the strongest claim to an absolute, direct and exclusive dominion over the territory itself; a point, to which I do not find that our most extensive claims have ever been carried.

In Africa, Goree was restored to France, and Senegal remained to Great Britain [†]. This regulation seems to have divided the trade on this river, and the adjacent coast, between the two nations. The English as they are now circumstanced on that part, seem to be the most advantageously situated for the trade in time of peace; and the French for carrying away the whole of it in time of war.

With regard to the East Indies, all the French factories and settlements are restored to that nation in every part of India[‡]: Although this must be regarded as a very great concession, it does not however afford all those advantages to France, which might be imagined at the first view. First, because the fortifications erected at such a vast expence in all those settlements have been totally destroyed; and it cannot be expected, in the present situation of the French company, that they can, in the course of many years, if at all, be restored to their former state; in Bengal, (including, by an explanation annexed to the definitive treaty, the kingdom of Orixa.) they have engaged to erect no kind of fortification, nor to keep any number of soldiers whatsoever. Secondly, they have agreed to acknowledge the present reigning subas of Bengal, Decan, and the Carnatick, as the lawful sovereigns of these countries. These princes are the greatest on the peninsula of India: they are in our interest, and most of them owe either the acquisition, or depend for the preservation of their power upon our arms; by which means our company is become, in effect, arbiter of the commerce and politics of that great and opulent coast, extending from the Ganges to Cape Comorin; and in a great degree also of the other, from the same cape to the mouth of the Indus. Thirdly, during the course of our successes, the traders and the manufacturers have removed from the French to our settlements, where they will have at least an equal market, and a superior protection; and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to bring them back.

Minorca and Belleisle were to be restored to their former possessors ‖. The fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk were to be demolished agreeable to the stipulations of former treaties [§].

This is the general outline of the late treaty. The particulars given here will serve to point out the spirit and the general effect of that transaction, which has been the subject of so much heat and controversy; and which nothing but adulation will assert to be free from defect, nor any thing but •action can deny to be productive of many very great and essential advantages to this kingdom.

This treaty, while it remained in agitation, formed a great crisis, not only in the affairs of the nation, but in the fortune of the new ministry. Towards the latter end of the summer Mr. Fox was called in, and engaged in their support. Though he continued in his old place of paymaster, he undertook to conduct the affairs, of government in the house of commons. Mr. Grenville, whose employment would naturally have engaged him in that task, resigned the seals of secretary of state, and was appointed first lord of the admiralty. The great experience and known parliamentary abilities of Mr. Fox, seemed to give new life to the affairs of the administration. A more vigorous and determined conduct was from that time adopted. Many of those, who were not perfectly attached to the new system, were immediately removed from their employments; and measures were taken to clear every department of every friend of the Duke of Newcastle.

The spirit of these proceedings seemed to augment that of the opposition. It was apprehended, that the preliminaries would undergo a rigorous scrutiny, and might possibly incur a heavy censure from parliament. The terms of peace were criticised without mercy. They were declared to be inglorious, inadequate, and insecure; unequal to the great successes of the war, and below the just expectations of the nation; that our commerce was neglected, and our allies abandoned. Public expectation was however entirely disappointed. The preliminaries were approved, without any qualification, by both houses; by the lords with out any division; [Dec. 9.] by the commons with a very disproportioned majority.

Many causes concurred to produce this moderate disposition. First, a very great number, which included almost all the Tories, were engaged in the support of the administration. The then chiefs of the opposition were not well agreed among themselves. Mr. Pitt who was considered as a party in himself, had not joined with the duke of Newcastle, nor seemed disposed to act with any particular body. The same general plan of peace, which many now in the opposition had formerly approved, had been adopted in these preliminaries, and evidently improved. It is true, it had been objected, that our additional successes, since that time, gave us ground to expect better terms; but it was answered, that our national burthens, and the extent of the war, had increased in, at least, an equal proportion; and that peace was become necessary to the nation.

These arguments whatever weight they might have in themselves, were strong against these, upon whom they were rather retorted, than for the first time levelled, being altogether agreable to the system which many now in opposition had always pursued, and to the sentiments many of them had publickly avowed, and perhaps still secretly retained. On the whole, it was evident, that, when the question came on, the discontented party was found not very well united, and absolutely unprovided of any regular scheme of opposition. However, though baffled on this occasion, it has since begun to revive and to unite; and though peace is happily restored with foreign powers, our domestic quiet is still far from being securely established.

With regard to the powers in Germany, the peace between England and France, and the superiority of the king of Prussia at the close of the campaign, inspired, at length, though unwillingly, a disposition to peace. Conferences were opened at Hubertsberg, and a treaty concluded between his Prussian majesty and the empress queen. As affairs in this treaty were speedily adjusted, so they may be very concisely related. The substance of it was no more than that a mutual restitution and oblivion should take place, and each party sit down at the end of the war in the same situation in which they began it. Thus the king of Prussia, after having for six years contended against the efforts of almost all the great powers of Europe, by whose enmity he could be affected, having stood proof against the most terrible blows of fortune, enjoys at length the full reward of his uncommon magnanimity. He retains his dominions in their utmost extent; and having delivered his country by his incomparable talents for war, he now enjoys leisure to recover it by his no less admirable talents for government. Scarcely was the war concluded, when he began to display his attention to domestic policy, and his care for the happiness of his people. He imediately distributed lands to his disbanded soldiery; and gave them the horses of his artillery to aid them in their cultivation.

Europe is new pacified; and she begins to respire, after a more general and a more bloody war than any the world had experienced since that which was concluded by the peace of Westphalia. As far as it is safe to judge concerning a system which is subject to so great and unforeseen variations, and sometimes from very slight causes, this peace promises a considerable duration. The king of Prussia will hardly again commit his affairs, so miraculously retrieved to the chances of war. He sees how dearly he has a second time purchased his conquest of Silesia, and he will hardly aim at new acquisitions. The empress, since she failed to reduce Silesia, or even to recover the smallest particle of her losses, with such an exertion of her own strength, and with such an alliance as never was seen united before, and with which she can never flatter herself again, must be convinced how vain it is to attempt any change in the present system in Germany.

Whilst Russia remained circumstanced as she seems to be at present, there is a very good prospect for the tranquillity of the North.

France has turned her thoughts to a much wanted oeconomy and the re-establishment of her marine, she has reduced her land forces, by above one half. England, with out lessening the ordinary establishment of her navy, has augmented her military, in consequence of the extent of her conquests. Both nations seem sensible of the necessity of being prepared, and yet quiet. The Bourbon courts are united but weakened. The mutual jealousy of the nations, which have been lately at war, continues; but their subjects of dispute, and occasions of animosity, are much lessened. This is as good a situation as could reasonably be expected.

We have thus accomplished our design of laying before the public a connected narrative of the events of the late most remarkable war, which we have pursued from its commencement to its conclusion. We have omitted no care to make it as perfect as the nature of such an undertaking would permit; and we flatter ourselves, that it will be thought as impartial, and satisfactory, as any work of the kind extant.

••NI•

Notes

(a)

The Hon. James Murray's Letter to Mr. Secretary Pitt, dated, Quebec, May 25, 1760.

SIR,

HAVING acquainted General Amberst, three weeks ago, that Quebec was besieged, by an army of 15,000 men, I think it necessary, to do myself the honour of addressing directly to you, the more agreeable news of the siege being raised, lest, by your receiving the former intelligence, before the latter, some inconvenience might arise to his Majesty's service.

By the journal of my proceedings, since I have had the command here, which I have the honour to transmit to you, you will perceive the superiority we have maintained over the enemy, during the winter, and that all Lower Canada, from the Point Au-Tremble, was reduced, and had taken the oath of fidelity to the King. You will, no doubt, be pleased to observe, that the enemy's attempts upon our posts, and ours upon theirs, all tended to the honour of his Majesty's arms, they were always baffled, and we were constantly lucky.

I wish I could say as much within the walls; the excessive coldness of the climate, and constant living upon salt provisions, without any vegetables, introduced the scurvy among the troops, which, getting the better of every precaution of the officer, and every remedy of the surgeon, became as universal as it was inveterate, insomuch, that, before the end of April, 1000 were dead, and above 2000 of what remained, totally unsit for service.

In this situation, I received certain intelligence, that the Chevalier de Levis was assembling his army, which had been cantoned in the neighbourhood of Montreal; that he had compleated his eight battallions, and forty companies of the Troops de Colonie, from the choice of the Montrealists; had formed these forty companies into four battalions; and was determinad to besiege us, the moment that St. Laurence was open, of which he was entirely master, by means of four King's frigates, and other craft, proper for this extraordinary river.

As I had the honour to acquaint you formerly, that Quebec could be looked upon in no other light, than that of a strong cantonment, and that any works I should add to it, would be in that stile, my plan of defence was, to take the earliest opportunity of entrenching myself upon the heights of Abraham, which entirely commanded the ramparts of the place at the distance of 800 yards, and might have been defended by our numbers against a large army. But the Chevalier de Levis did not give me time to take the advantage of this situation; the 23d, 24th and 25th of April. I attempted to execute the projected lines, for which a provision of fascines, and of every necessary material, had been made, but found it impracticable, as the earth was still cover'd with snow in many places, and every where impregnably bound up by the frost.

The night of the 26th, I was informed, the enemy had landed, at Point Au Tremble, 10,000 men, and 500 barbarians. The post we had taken at the embouchure of the river Caprouge (the most convenient place for disembarking their artillery and stores, and for securing their retreat) obliged them to land where they did, 20 miles higher up.

The 27th, having broke down all the bridges over the Caprouge, and secured the landing places at Sillery, and the Foulon, I marched with the grenadiers piquets, Amherst's regiment, and two field pieces, and took post so advantageously, as to frustrate the schemes they had laid of cutting off our posts. They had begun to form from the defile they were obliged to pass, but thought proper to retreat, on reconnoitring our position; and about four this afternoon we marched back to town, having withdrawn all our posts, with the loss of two men only, though they did every thing in their power to harrass the rear.

The enemy was greatly superior in number, it is true; but when I considered that our little army was in the habit of beating that enemy, and had a very fine train of field artillery; that shutting ourselves up at once within the walls, was putting all upon the single chance of holding out for a considerable time, a wretched fortification; a chance which an action in the field could hardly alter, at the same time it gave an additional one, perhaps a better, I resolved to give them battle; and if the event was not prosperous, to hold out to the last extremity, and then to retreat to the isle of Orleans, or Coudres, with what was left of the garrison, to wait for reinforcements.

This night the necessary orders were given, and half an hour after six next morning, we marched with all the force I could muster, viz. three thousand men, and formed the Army on the heights, in the following order; Amherst's Anstruther's 2d battalion of Royal Americans, and Webb's, composed the right Brigade, commanded by Col. Burton: Kenneny's Lascelles's, Highlanders, and Townshend's, the left brigade, commanded by Col. Fraser: Otway's, and the third battalion of Royal Americans, were the corps de reserve. Major Dalling's corps of light infantry covered the right flank, and Capt. Hazzen's company of rangers, with 100 volunteers, under the command of Capt. Donoald Macdonald, a brave and experienced officer, cover'd the left. The battalions had each two field pieces.

While the line was forming, I reconnitred the enemy, and perceived their van had taken possession of the rising grounds, three quarters of a mile in our front, but that their army was upon the march, in one column, as far as I could see. I thought this the lucky moment, and moved with the utmost order to attack them, before they had formed. We soon beat them from the heights they had possessed, tho' they were well disputed; and Major Dalling, who cannot be too much commended for his behaviour this day, and his services during the winter, forced their corps of grenadiers from a house and windmill they had taken hold of, to cover their left flank. Here he, and several of his officers were wounded; his men, however, pursued the fugitives to the corps which were now formed to sustain them. They halted, and dispersed along the front of the right, which prevented that wing from taking advantage of the first impression they had made on the enemy's left. They had immediately orders given them to regain the flank, but, in attempting this, they were charged, thrown into disorder, retired to the rear, and from the number of officers killed and wounded, could never again be brought up, during the action. Otway's was instantly ordered to advance, and sustain the right wing, which the enemy in vain made two attempts to penetrate. On these occasions, Capt. Ince, with the grenadiers of Otway's, were distinguished. While this passed there, the left were not idle; they had dispossessed the enemy of two redoubts, and sustained with unparallelled firmness the bold united efforts of the enemy's regulars. Indians and Canadians, till at last fairly fought down, and reduced to a handful; though sustained by the 3d battalion of Royal Americans from the reserve, and Kennedy's from the centre, where we had nothing to fear, they were obliged to yield to superior numbers, and a fresh column of Roussillon, which penetrated.

The disorder of the left was soon communicated to the right; but the whole retired in such a way, that the enemy did not venture upon a brisk pursuit. We left most of our cannon, as the roughness of the ground, and the wreaths of snow, made it impossible to bring them off; what could not be brought off were nailed up.

Our killed and wounded amounted to one third of those in the field; that of the enemy, by their own confession, exceeds 2500 men; which may be readily conceived, as the action lasted an hour and three quarters.

Here I think it my duty to express my gratitude to the officers in general, and the satisfaction I had in the bravery of all the troops.

On the night of the 28th, the enemy opened trenches against the town; and, at the same, we set to work within, to fortify it, which we never had in our power to attempt sooner, from the severity of this climate during the winter, and the absolute necessity of executing works of more immediate importance last autumn, before the frost set in. I wanted the assistance of Major Mackeller, the chief engineer, dangerously wounded in the action; his zeal for, and knowledge in the service, is well known; but the alacrity of the garrison made up for every defect.

My journal of the siege which accompanies this, sets forth in full what was done; and I flatter myself, the extraordinary performances of the handful of brave men I had left, will please his Majesty, as much as they surprized us who were eye witnesses to them.

Great praise is due to Commodore Swanton, and the Captains Schomberg and Dean; I have not words to express the readiness, vivacity, and valour they shewed in attacking and destroying the enemy's squadron. Capt. Dean has lost his ship; but it was in a good cause, and he has done honour to his country.

The morning of the 27th of May, I had intended a strong fortie, to have penetrated into the enemy's camp, which, from the information of the prisoners I had taken, and the concurrent account of the deserters, I conceived to be very practicable.

For this purpose, I had ordered the regiments of Amherst, Townshend, Lascelles, Anstruther, and Highlanders, with the grenadiers and light infantry under arms, but was informed by Lieut. M'Alpin, of my battalion (whom I sent out to amuse the enemy with small allies) that their trenches were abandoned.

I instantly pushed out at the head of these corps, not doubting but we must have overtaken and forced their rear, and had ample revenge for the 28th of April; but I was disappointed, for they had crossed the river Caprouge, before we could come up with them. However, we took several prisoners, and much baggage, which would otherwise have escaped. They left their camp standing; all their baggage, stores, magazines of provisions and ammunition, 34 pieces of battering cannon, four of which are bra•s 12 pounders, 10 field pieces, 6 mortars, 4 petards, a large quantitg of scaling ladders and entrenching tools beyond number; and have retired to their former asylum, Jacques Cartier. From the information of prisoners, deserters and spies, provisions are very scarce: ammunition does not abound; and the greatest part of the Canadians have deserted them. At present they do not exceed 5000 men. The minute I am joined with that part of my garrison, which was sent from hence last autumn, I shall endeavour to co-operate with Mr. Amherst, towards compleating the reduction of this country; though, if rightly informed, he can hardly act by the lakes before the month of July, of which I am the more convinced, because from the intelligence forwarded to him last February, of the enemy's designs, by Lieut. Montusor, he would certainly have been upon them before now, had it been at all practicable.

Major Maitland, the bearer of these dispatches, who has acted as Adjutant General this last winter, is well acquainted with all our transactions here; he has a thorough knowledge of the country, and can give you the best lights with regard to the measures farther to be taken, relative to his Majesty's views in Canada.

I cannot finish this long letter, without observing how much I think myself obliged to the Lieut. Governor, Col. Burton; his activity and zeal were conspicuous during the whole course of this winter's campaign, and I flatter myself, Sir, you will be pleased to lay his services before his Majesty.

P. S. Since I have wrote the above, a nation of Indians has surrendered, and entered into an alliance with us.

I have the honour to be, With great regard,
SIR, yours, &c. JAMES MURRAY,

Admiralty-Office,June 27, 1760.

CAPTAIN Schomberg arrived this morning, with dispatches from Lord Colville, and Commodore Swanton, dated at Quebec, the 24th of May, giving an Account, that on the 11th of that month, the latter arrived at the Isle of Bec, in the river of St. Laurence, with the Vanguard and Diana, where he intended to wait for such of his squadron as had separated from him in his passage from England; but having on the 14th, received advice from Brig. Gen. Murray, that the enemy had besieged Quebec, he got under sail with the utmost dispatch, and anchored above Point Levi the 15th in the evening, where he found the Leostoffe, one of his squadron, which arrived a few days before, and whose commander, Capt. Deane, immediately came off to him with a message from the General, earnestly recommending the speedy removal of the French naval force above the town, consisting of two frigates, two armed ships, and many smaller vessels; in consequence of which he ordered Capt. Schomberg of the Diana, and Capt. Deane of the Leostoffe, to slip their cables early the next morning, and attack the enemy; but they were no sooner in motion, than the enemy fled in the greatest hurry and disorder: the Pomona, one of the frigates, was driven on shore above Cape Diamond; the Atalanta, the other frigate, run ashore, and was burnt at Point Au Tremble, about ten leagues above the town; and most of the other ships and vessels were likewise driven ashore, or effectually destroyed.

The night following, the enemy raised the siege of Quebec very precipitately, leaving their cannon, small arms, stores, &c. behind them.

The Leostoffe run upon some unknown rocks, in pursuit of the enemy, and was irrecoverably lost, but the officers and men were saved.

Lord Colville sailed from Halifax, with the squadron under his command, the 22d of April, but did not arrive at Quebec till the 18th of May, having been much retarded in his passage by thick fogs, great quantities of ice, and contrary winds.

[Gazette Extraordinary.]

↵

(a)

Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick's Letter to His Maje• particularising the Battle of Warbourg.

SIR,
Warbourg,Aug.•

I Have the honour of acquainting your Majesty with the defe• of the reserve under the Chevalier de Muy; who having passe• •he Dymel at Stadbergen, extended his corps down the banks of •hat river, in order to cut me off from Westphalia, whilst M. de Broglio was advancing with his main army towards my camp at •alle, and Prince Xavier with his reserve, on our left towards Cassel. Hereupon I determined to leave General Kielmansegge with a body of troops at Cassel for the protection of that city, and •o march myself with the army the night of the 30th, in order to pass the Dymel between Liebenau and Dringelburg; which was •appily executed. The Hereditary Prince who had passed the Dymel on the 29th, to go and reinforce General Sporcke (who was posted since the 28th between Liebenau and Corbeke) reconnitred •he position of the Chevalier de Muy, who from the 30th in the morning was in possession of a very advantageous camp between Warbourg and Ochsendorff. It was agreed, that the Prince and M. Sporcke should turn the enemy's left, whilst I advanced with the army upon their front; which was done with all possible success; the enemy being attacked almost in the same instant by M. Sporcke and the Hereditary Prince in flank and in rear, As the infantry of the army could not march fast enough, to charge at the same time, I ordered my Lord Granby to advance with the cavalry of the right. The English artillery got up on a gallop, and seconded the attack in a surprizing manner. All the troops have done well, and particularly the English. The French cavalry, though very numerous, retreated, as soon as ours advanced to charge them, excepting only three squadrons[*], that kept their ground, but were soon broke. A part of the English cavalry then fell upon the enemy's infantry, which suffered extremely; and particularly the regiment of Lockmann Swiss. I ordered an attack to be made on the town of Warbourg by the Legion Britannique; and the enemy finding themselves thus attacked upon their two flanks, in front and rear, retired with the utmost precipitation, and with the loss of many men, as well from the fire of our artillery, as from the attacks of the cavalry. Many were drowned in • Dymel in attempting to ford it. The enemy's loss in men is • considerable: I cannot exactly ascertain it, but it is supposed, t• they have left fifteen hundred men upon the field of battle; • the amount of the prisoners we have made, probably exceeds • number. We have taken ten pieces of cannon, with some colo• The loss on our side is very moderate, and falls chiefly upon brave battalion of Maxwell's English Grenadiers, which did w••ders. Colonel Beckwith, who commanded the brigade, form• of English Grenadiers and Scotch Highlanders, distinguished hi• self greatly, and has been wounded in the head.

My Lord Granby, with the English cavalry, has contribu•• extremely to the success of the day. I charge Capt. Faucitt, Lordship's Aid-de-Camp, with this letter, to be delivered to y•• Majesty, and to give your Majesty a more particular account the action from his own mouth, till I can have the honour of l•¦ing at your Majesty's feet a more extensive and circumstantial•lation.

I am, with the most profound respect, Sir,
Your Majesty's most obedient cousin and servant, Ferdinand Duc de Brunswic & de Lunebo••

The Marquis of Granby's Letter to the Earl of Holdernesse.

IT is with the greatest satisfaction, that I have the honour • acquainting your Lordship of the success of the Heredit• Prince yesterday morning.

General Sporken's corps marched from the camp at Kalle L••benau, about four in the afternoon of the 29th; the Heredit• Prince followed, the same evening, with a body of troops, amo• which were two English battalions of Grenadies, the two • Highlanders, and four squadrons of Dragoons, Cope's a Conway's.

The army was under arms all the day on the 30th; a• about eleven at night, marched off in six columns to Liebe• About five the next morning, the whole army assembled, a• formed on the heights of Corbeke. The Hereditary Prince • at this time, marching in two columns, in order to turn t• enemy's left flank; which he did, by marching to Donhelb• leaving Klein-Eder on his left, and forming in two lines, with • left towards Dossel, and his right near Grimbeck, opposite to the left flank of the enemy, whose position was, with the left to the high hill near Ossendorff, and their right to Warbourg, into which place they had flung Fischer's corps. The Hereditary Prince immediately attacked the enemy's flank; and after a very sharp dispute, obliged them to give way; and, by a continual fire, kept forcing them to fall back upon Warbourg. The army was, at this time, marching with the greatest diligence to attack the enemy in front; but the infantry could not get up in time; General Waldegrave, at the head of the British, pressed their march as much as possible; no troops could shew more eagerness to get up, than they shewed. Many of the men, from the heat of the weather, and over-straining themselves to get on, through morassy and very difficult ground, dropped down on their march.

General Most•n, who was at the head of the British cavalry that was formed on the right of our infantry, on the other side of a large wood, upon receiving the Duke's orders to come up with the cavalry as fast as possible, made so much expedition, bringing them up at a full trot, though the distance was near five miles, that the British cavalry had the happiness to arrive in time, to share the glory of the day, having successfully charged several times both the enemy's cavalry and infantry.

I should do injustice to the general officers, to every officer and private man, of the cavalry, if I did not beg your lordship would assure his majesty, that nothing could exceed their gallant behaviour on that occasion.

Captain Phillips made so much expedition with his cannon, as to have an opportunity, by a severe cannonade, to oblige those who had passed the Dymel, and were formed on the other side, to retire with the utmost precipitation.

I received his Serene Highness's orders yesterday in the evening, to pass the river after them, with 12 British battalion's, and 10 squadrons; and am now encamped upon the heights of Wilda, about four miles from Warbourg, on the heights of which their grand army is encamped.

M. de May is now retiring from the heights of Volkmissen, where he lay under arms last night, towards Wolfshagen. I cannot give your lordship an account of the loss on either side. Capt. Faucitt, whom I send off with this, shall get all intelligence he can upon this head before he sets off.

I am, &c. GRANBY.

P.S. Saturday morning six o'clock. I have just joined grand army with my detachment.

[Capt. Faucitt arrived at London in the afternoon August 8, • according to a short account of this action published in a gaze extraordinary in the afternoon of the 9th, M. Muy's corps was• posed to be upwards of 35,000 men; the hereditary Prince's co• when joined to that of Gen. Sporke, consisted of 24 battalions • 22 squadrons.]

Total loss sustained in the cavalry in killed, wounded and ••sing, 164. Total loss sustained in the Grenadiers and Highla• in killed, wounding and missing, 415. Bombardiers, gunn• and matrosses, killed, wounded and missing, 11. Total 590.

His Serene Highness Prince Ferdinand's Orders after the Battl•

Warbourg Camp, Friday,August 1, 17

HIS Serene Highness again renews the compliments of than that he gave in general terms yesterday to the generals, offic• regiments, and corps, who were then engaged, and who, by th• valour and excellent conduct, gained so complete a victory o• the enemy; and orders his thanks to be publickly given so I• Granby, under whose orders the British cavalry performed p•¦digies of valour, which they could not fail of doing, having • Lordship at their head, and the other general officers of the Br• cavalry, who by their examples shewed the troops they led • the charge, how much they acted with an astonishing coura• and a presence of mind not to be equalled. His Serene Highne•• much oliged to them, and gives infinite thanks as well to the• as to all the officers in general, and in particular to the wa• British cavalry, and principally to Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson Conway's regiment; the family of Lord Granby, in particu• Capt. Vaughan, are hereby desired to receive the same comp•¦ment of thanks, as they constantly attended Lord Granby in 〈◊〉 different attacks of the cavalry, and executed his Lordship orders in the most punctual manner.

The corps of brave Grenadiers, who so much contributed • the glorious success of the day receive by this the just pra• due to them. His Serene Highness cannot enough acknowledg• how much esteem and regard he has for them: He orders his b• thanks to Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith and Major Maxwell, also to the three Captains of the British artillery, Phillips, M'Baine and Stevens, who so well managed their artillery. All the regiments under the command of his Serene Highness the Hereditary Prince, and Lieut. Gen. Sporcken, from the Generals down to the private men, are particularly thanked by his Serene Highness, for the good conduct and courage with which they fought yesterday.

Major-General Bredenbeck, at the head of Cope's regiment, who signalized himself so much, is especially thanked, as is Colonel Hund of the Hessian artillery by whose care his artillery was so well managed.

Major Bulow, with the British Legion manoeuvred the whole day in the face of the enemy, and who did them infinite damage, his Serene Highness returns him many thanks, and assures him that he shall, on all occasions, retain a proper sense thereof. In fine, his Serene Highness gives many thanks to those who accompanied his person, as well as those of his suite, particularly to the brave Capt. Winsenrood, who is very much wounded; Capt. Carpenter, greatly contributed to the taking of several of the enemy's cannon; Count Daunaw, who was instrumental in making prisoners a great number of Fischer's corps; Capt. Sloper, Major of brigade Hordinburg; and Capt. Mallortie; who at all times executed with alacrity and exactness the orders they received from him.

His Serene Highness desires that on the first occasion the army will return thanks to the Almighty for the success of yesterday, and flatters himself that by his assistance and the bravery shewed yesterday, we shall in the end overcome every obstacle that offers.

Warbourg Camp, Saturday,August, 2, 1760,

His Serene Highness orders that a particular complimemnt be made to Lieutenant-Colonel Sloper, for his behaviour and bravery in the affair of the 31st of July: he likewise desires his thanks to be given to Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton, acting as aid-de-camp to his Serene Highness the Hereditary Prince.

↵

*
[A squadron of French horse when complete, is 160 men, of dragoons 180.—This serves to confirm what Colonel Sloper said on Lord G.S's trial, That had the front of the cavalry moved fast enough tb have obliged the regiment he commanded to have galloped, it was his opinion it would have come up fit for business, and would have beat any three French squadrons it could have met with.]
↵

(1).
Author of the Jewish Spy, &c. and now resident at Berlin.
↵

(2).
The aid-de-camp, who was charged with this letter, and who came to England with the news of the above mentioned, action: In our papers, it is translated Stage Coach, from the similitude, probably, of the word Cocher,
↵

*
To authenticate the above it may be proper to add 1. That this letter was shown at Bath and London by M. Conceii himself. And 2. That the coppy here printed was sent to the translator by a friend at Magdeburg belonging to the court.
↵

(a)

Capt. Elliott's Account of his Engagement with Mons. Thurot, in a Letter to his Grace the Duke of Bedford.

Aeolus, in Ramsay Bay,Feb. 29, 176•
My Lord,

I Had the honour to write to you on the 26th inst. off D• but very incorrectly and in great haste, as I that minute information from the fishermen, that the enemy were then at• •rickfergus, I made all the dispatch possible to attack them 〈◊〉 and got off the entrance of the harbour that evening, but the• being contrary and blowing very hard I could not get in.

On the 28th, at four in the morning, we got sight of the •¦der sail, and gave chace; about nine I got up along side 〈◊〉 Commodore, and, in a few minutes after, the engagement came general, and continued very briskly for an hour and a• when they all three struck their colours.

They proved to be the Marshal Belleisle, of 44 guns and 〈◊〉 men, M. Thurot, commander, who is killed: the La Bl• 32 guns and 400 men, and the Terpsichore, of 26 guns and 〈◊〉 men (including the troops in this number). I put in here to the ships who are all greatly disabled in their masts and rig• the Marshal Belleisle in particular, who lost her bowsprit, 〈◊〉 mast, and main-yard in the action, and it is with much diff• we keep her from sinking.

I have acquainted my Lords Commissioners of the Admi• with the particulars by express, and I purpose returning to •¦port in England as soon as the ships can possibly be rep• Subjoined is a list of the killed and wounded.

I am, My Lord,
Your Grace's Most humble, and most obedient Servant, JOHN ELLIOTT

In his Majesty's Ships.

Killed.

Wounded.

Aeolus,

4

15

Pallas,

1

5

Brilliant,

0

11

5

31

↵

(b)

An Explanation of the Referrences to the Perspective Views of Montreal.

- 1. The river St. Laurence.

- 2. St. Peter's river.

- 3. A bridge over St. Peter's river.

- 4. M. de la Calliere's house.

- 5. The general hospital.

- 6. A dry ditch encompassing the town, except that part towards the river; it is about eight feet deep.

- 7. The glacis.

- 8. The small gate.

- 9. Market-gate.

- 10. St. Mary's-gate.

- 11. Water-gate.

- 12. The sally-port.

- 13. The Recollets convent.

- 14. The parish-church.

- 15. The nunnery-hospital.

- 16. The Jesuits church and seminary.

- 17. The palace of M. Vaudreuil, Governor-general of Canada.

- 18. M. de Longuevil's house.

- 19. The citadel.

- 20. The wharf.

↵

*
They were not in strictness prisoners; but sent to Fra
•
upon condition not to serve during the war.

↵

(e)

Colonel Eyre Coote's Letter to Mr. Secretary Pitt, dated, Village, 13th of February, 1760.

SIR,

I Have the honour to acquaint you of the situation of our 〈◊〉 on the coast of Coromandel since my arrival, and of our 〈◊〉 successes. Soon after I arrived, the governor and council •¦dras being informed, that Gen. Lally had sent a detach• his army to the southward, and that that party had taken •¦ham, and threatned Trichenopoly with a siege, it was thoug• •¦viseable, that I should take the field with the army, and by means endeavour to draw the enemy from the southward. •¦cordingly on the 25th of November, 1759, I took the field on the 27th, invested Wondiwash, and erected batteries having made a breach by the 30th, took the place and ma• garrison (which consisted of five subaltern officers, 63 pri•men, and 800 seapoys,) prisoners of war. There were 〈◊〉 garrison 49 pieces of cannon, and a great quantity of ammu• December the 3d, I invested Carangoly. On the 6th, I ope• two gun battery, and on the 7th another, and began to ca• the approaches. On the 10th, being near the crest of the 〈◊〉 and having dismounted all their guns but four, Col. O'• who commanded, sent out a flag of truce, and, on the ac• of his gallant defence, I granted him the following terms: 〈◊〉 the Europeans should have leave to march out with their two rounds per man, drums beating, and six days provi• The Seapoys to be disarmed, and turned about their bu• The garrison consisted of 100 Europeans, (officers included) 500 Seapoys, and nine guns. Having intelligence that Brig. Gen. Bussy was arrived at Arcot from the northward, with 300 Europeans, and a large black army, and that the army, which lay at Chittiput, was to join him, and that the force from the southward were on their march towards Arcot, I therefore thought it adviseable to cross the Palla, and encamp the army opposite the Arcot, having the Palla between us. Three thousand Moratta horse about this time joined the enemy, which put me to the greatest distress for want of provisions, as they plundered all the country. On the 27th, Lieut. Gen. Lally arrived at Arcot, and took the command. January the 9th, the enemy were all in motion. On the 10th, Gen. Lally marched with all his army towards Wondiwash, and I moved with our army along the bank of the river, in order to observe their motions, and cover our own country. On the 12th, I received a letter from the commanding officer at Conjeveram, that 500 of the enemy's Europeans, and a large body of horse, had entered the town; and that the rest of their army lay at Jangolam, three miles distance from it: I therefore put the army in motion, and endeavoured, by a forced march, to save that place, which was very weak (but of consequence to us) and happily arrived there the 13th before day-light. The enemy quitted the place, their army moved towards Wondiwash. The 15th I crossed the Palla with all the army, and on the 17th arrived at Outremalour, about fourteen miles from Wondiwash, which place I found M. Lally had invested, and began to raise batteries. The 21st, I went with all the cavalry to reconnoitre, having received a letter from the commanding officer of the garrison, that a breach was made; I therefore determined to engage the enemy the next morning. Accordingly, I sent orders back to the army to join me at Irimborough, nine miles from Wondiwash, where I had taken post with the cavalry. On the 22d, the army marched, at six o'clock in the morning, agreeable to the orders I had given out the day before for that purpose. About 7 o'clock, our advanced guard of horse, and that of the enemy, began to fire at each other; upon which I ordered Captain Baron de Vasserot, who commanded the cavalry, to form them in order of battle; he was supported by five companies of Seapoys; and, at the same time I ordered up two pieces of cannon, and advancing 〈◊〉 with two companies of Seapoys, obliged the enemy to reti• their main body of horse, which consisted of 200 European, 3000 Morat•as, on their left. Upon the whole of our ca• advancing, that of the enemy retired in pretty good orde• our cannon began to play, which was extremely well served obliged them to retire precipitately. I then ordered the• of brigade to the army, which was about three quarters of 〈◊〉 in the rear, with orders for them to form the line of battle, not to advance till I had joined them. Soon after, having t• possession of a tank, which the enemy's cavalry had occupi• returned to the line, which by that time was formed accordi• my orders. After reviewing the whole, and finding the 〈◊〉 great spirit, and eager to engage, I ordered the army to 〈◊〉 forward.

About nine o'clock we arrived at the post we had drive• enemy from, which was about two miles from their camp▪ halted in their view, near half an hour; during which t• went very near to them, and reconnoitred their situation. 〈◊〉 finding they were strongly posted, and our flanks exposed to enemy's cavalry, which was vastly superior to ours, I ord• the army to march by the right, in order to gain the advantag• a hill three miles from us, and about two miles from Wondi• fort; and the horse, which was then in the front, to wheel to right and left, and form behind the second line, in order to 〈◊〉 the rear guard, and cover the baggage. By this motion, •¦vered my right flank with the hill, and had some villages i• rear, where I then ordered the baggage to. This oblige• enemy to alter their disposition. During all this time we can•¦ded each other, and skirmished with their advanced posts, 〈◊〉 Mor•tta horse: The latter disappeared about 11 o'clock▪ 〈◊〉 enemy, after making their second disposition, moved toward about the distance of three quarters of a mile, under cover• bank The cannonading then began to be smart on both 〈◊〉 and upon seeing the enemy coming briskly up, I ordered the• to march forward. At 12 o'clock the enemy's European ca• pushed with a great deal of resolution, in order to force our 〈◊〉 and come round upon our rear. Immediately I ordered up 〈◊〉 companies of Seapoys, and two pieces of cannon, which wer• sustain our cavalry, who had been ordered to oppose them. 〈◊〉 on the cannon and Seapoys flanking them, they broke. The cavalry then had orders to charge, who drove them a mile from our left, upon the rear of their own army. We continued all this while advancing towards each other, the enemy's flank being very well covered by a tank. It was one o'clock when we arrived within reach of musquetry, when a shot from us striking one of their tumbrils, it blew up. I then immediately ordered Major Brere•on to wheel Col. Draper's regiment to the left, and charge their left flank, which was executed with great order, and much honour to that corps. Seeing that regiment likely to suffer from a body of black troops, together with their marines, who were under cover, and fired very briskly upon them; and at the same time, finding they had reinforced their left with a piquet from Lally's regiment, I ordered the grenadier company of Draper's which was on the right of the second line, to support their own regiment; and having likewise two pieces of cannon playing upon the enemy's flank, compleated the rout of that wing, who abandoned their cannon, and fell upon their own center, which was by this time, together with their right, closely engaged with our left. I then ordered up Major Monson, with the rest of the second line, and placed him so as to be able to support any part of our line, at the same time flanking the enemy. About two o'clock their whole army gave way, and ran towards their own camp; but finding we pursued them, quitted it, and left us intire masters of the field, together with all their cannon, except three small pieces, which they carried off. The number of cannon taken is as follows. One 32, one 24, three 20, two 18, one 14, two 3, and two 2-pounders, iron. Three 6, four 4, one 3, and two 2-pounders, brass. In all 22 pieces. Round shot 3204. Grape 110, besides tumbrils, and all other implements belonging to the train. The prisoners we have taken are Brig. Gen. Bussy, le chevalier Godeville, quarter-master general. Of Lally's regiment, Lieut. Col. Murphy, two Captains, two Lieutenants,. Of the Lorrain regiment, one Captain, one Lieutenant. Of the Indian battalions two Lieutenants, two Ensigns. Of the Marines, le chevalier le Poete, knight of Malta, who is since dead of his wounds. All the above gentlemen were wounded, but M. Bussy, and an ensign of the Indian battalion. The French reckon they had 800 killed and wounded, 200 of which we buried in the field. We have taken above 200 wounded prisoners, besides 40 not wounded. Our loss is as follows: Of col. Draper's regi• ensign Collins killed, and 17 private men. Wounded, 〈◊〉 Brereton, and lieut. Brown (since dead of their wounds) t• Knutial, ensign Halfpenny, Thompson and Horier and 66 •¦vate. Of my regiment, killed ensign Stuart, and 13 pri• Wounded; lieuts. Frasier and Tyd, ensign Heron, and 36 pri• The honourable company's troops, killed, ensign Evans, and private. Wounded, cornet Kuhn, and 29 private. Among black troops, about 70 killed and wounded. The enemy's a• commanded by Lieut. Gen. Lally, consisted of 2200 Europ• including artillery and cavalry; 300 cofferies, and between 〈◊〉 10,000 black troops. Twenty pieces of cannon in the field, five in their batteries against the fort, where they blew up a• magazine of powder upon their retreat. Our army amount• 1700 Europeans, including artillery and cavalry; 3500 〈◊〉 troops; 14 pieces of cannon, and one howitz. The enemy •¦lected themselves under the walls of Chittiput, about 18 〈◊〉 from the field of battle, and the next day marched into 〈◊〉 Our cavalry being greatly fatigued, put it out of my powe• pursue the enemy as far as I could have wished. During 〈◊〉 whole engagement, and ever since I have had the honour of ••¦manding the army, the officers and men have shewn the gre• spirit; nor can I say too much for the behaviour of the •¦tillery.

The next day I sent out a detachment of cavalry, to be• the enemy. January 26. Finding that Gen. Lally had re• with his broken troops to Pondicherry, I sent capt. de Vos• with 1000 horse, and 300 Seapoys, towards Pondicherry, to •¦stroy the French country, and marched the army to besiege C•put; and on the 28th at night, erected a two gun battery, 〈◊〉 got in one 24 and one 20 pounder, and played upon them fr• 8-inch howitz. The next day, after making a breach, Le •¦valier de Tilly, with his garrison surrendered prisoners of 〈◊〉 The garrison consisted of four officers 54 private, and 300 •¦poys, with 73 Europeans wounded in the hospital. I found in• fort 9 guns, and a good quantity of ammunition. Having int•¦gence of a party of the enemy going from Arcot to Gingey, 〈◊〉 capt. Smith with a detachment to intercept them. On the 〈◊〉 marched the army towards Arcot, the capital of the province▪ •¦der to besiege it. This day capt. Smith joined me, having taken the party I had sent him after, which consisted of 10 Europeans 50 Seapoys, and two brass 8 pounders; and soon after he took a captain of the Lorrain regiment, and three French commissaries.

On the 1st of February, I set out from the army for Arcot, leaving orders with major Monson to throw a few shells into Timmery, and to summon the garrison. February 2. The army marched and encamped within two miles of Arcot. Major Monson reported to me this day, that the garrison of Timmery had surrendered prisoners of war. There were in it, six guns, one serjeant, 20 Europeans, and 60 Seapoys. February 5. I opened the batteries against the fort of Arcot, viz. One of five 18-pounders, and another of two 18 and one 24-pounders. On the 6th, began to carry on approaches to the south west and west towers of the fort; and having by the 10th, got within 60 yards of the crest▪ of the glacis, the garrison surrendered prisoners of war. It consisted of three captains, eight subalterns, 236 private, and between 2 and 300 Seapoys. There were in it, four mortars, 22 pieces of cannon, and a great quantity of all kinds of military stores. We had during the siege, seven non-commissioned and private, killed; and ensign Mac Mahon, who acted as engineer, and 16 wounded.

↵

*
See History of the War 1760, Chap. I. p. 249.
↵

(a)

Letters from Major Gen. Hodgson, and the Hon. Coommodore Keppel, to the Secretaries of State, relative to their expedition against the Island of Belleisle.

On board the Valiant, off BelleisleApril 12, 1761.
SIR,

I Have the honour to acquaint you, that his Majesty's fleet under the command of Com. Keppel, and the transports with his Mjesty's forces on board, came to an anchor in this road on Tuesday, the 7th inst. about twelve o'clock. Soon after their arrival, I went with the Commodore to take a view of the coast; and we agreed at our return, that the port of St. Andro appeared to us to be the best place to make a descent; and it was settled, that Sir Thomas Stanhope, with some of his Majesty's ships, and the transports, with Stuart's and Gray's battalions and marines on board, should make a feint at Sauzon, at the same time that we made a real attack at St. Andro. Then it was too late in the day to do more than give the necessary orders for the troops destined to land first, to be ready to embark early in the morning in the flat bottomed boats, that I might attempt a landing as soon as the ships had silenced a four gun-battery, which commanded the entrance of the bay. This was soon done by the Achilles, after she took her station. No time was then lost to go in with the boats, with the grenadiers, and the regiments ordered for this service. But when we entered the bay, we found the enemy so strongly intrenched on each side of the hill, which was excessively steep, and the foot of it scraped away, that it was impossible to get up to the breastwork. After several unsuccesful efforts, seeing it was impracticable to force the enemy from their lines, I thought it advisable to desist. Maj. Gen. Crawford and Brig. Carleton exerted themselves as much as possible on the occasion: the latter is wounded in the thigh, but in a good way of doing well. The loss we suffered in our retreat was very inconsiderable, as the fire of the ships covered it. The weather has been so bad ever since the 8th, that I have not been able to get returns from the several corps, so I cannot ascertain our loss; but I believe there are near 500 killed, wounded, and prisoners. I shall desire Mr. Keppel to go along with me to reconnoitre the island once more, and if we can discover any part whereon an attempt can be made with the least probability of success, we shall make a second trial. I cannot help observing to you, that the whole island is a fortification; and that the little nature had left undone, to make it such, has been amply supplied by art; the enemy having been at work upon it ever since Sir Edward Hawke appeared before it last winter.

I have the honour to inform you, the greatest harmony has subsisted between the two services; and I should not do justice to the commander and officers of his Majesty's fleet, if I did not at the same time I inform you, that they have assisted me to the utmost of my wishes in carrying on the operations, pursuant to his Majesty's instructions.

I have the honour to be, &c. SHEDHOLM HODGSON.

Valiant in the great road of Belleisle,April 13, 1761.
SIR,

I Had the honour of writing to you the 29th of March, when I left Spithead. It was from that time to the 6th inst. before the wind came to the westward, to enable the fleet to steer in with the coast of France; and that evening I detached six frigates, in hopes they might in the night get so stationed, as to cut off the enemy's communication with the main land. The next morning the fleet passed the south end of Belleisle, close along the shore; and at one of the bays by Point Lomaria, the General and myself thought a descent might be tried: but as the wind was southerly, it could not possibly be attempted at that time. At twelve o'clock the whole fleet anchored in the great road; when immediately I went with Gen. Hodgson to the northern part of the island, to be as well informed of the strength of the enemy's works there as the time would admit; and while we were upon this necessary service, the ships of war in the road were preparing the flat boats for the reception of the troops; but by the time we got back, it was too late in the day to make any trial.

The 8th the wind north-easterly, the boats being ready for the reception of the troops, the signal was made very early in the morning for them to assemble at the rendezvous; and three ships, with two bomb-vessels, were ordered to proceed round the point of Lomaria, at the S. E. part of the island, and attack the fort and other works in the Sandy Bay round the before-mentioned point, the place the General and myself had agreed to have attacked,

Capt. Barrington, in the Achilles, got placed first, and soon silenced the fire from the fort and from the shore; and then, as he was directed, made the signal of his having done so; when the troops in the boats were pushed to the landing, with great briskness and spirited behaviour, at three different places near to each other, by Capt. Barton, whom I ordered to command the boats. But the difficulty of getting footing, and the enemy being strongly intrenched on the heights, and in the little fort, the troops soon met with such a repulse, that it became necessary, as well as prudent, to desist from the attempt for the present, and retire with the flat boats; in which they were well covered by the ships and bombs.

One of the flat boats landed sixty of Erskine's grenadiers, who got up a very difficult place to the top of the hills; where they formed with great skill, but were so immediately routed by a much more numerous body of the enemy, that all attempts to succour them was ineffectual, any further than the boats bringing from the rocks about twenty of them.

While all this was transacting, Sir Thomas Stanhope, with four ships of war, the battalions of Gray's and Stuart's, with 500 marines in transports, were opposite Sauzor, at the northern part of the island. these troops were embarked in the boats, if possible to divert the enemy from the principal object.

A gale of wind coming on very quick after the retiring from the shore, has occasioned so much damage among the transports, by the loss of anchors and flat boats, that it takes up a very considerable time to put things in away to attempt what further may be thought practicable. The loss of flat boats in the gale is twenty-two, which will render the force of landing much inferior to what it was first attempted with.

While the repairing and adjusting of these defects are in hand, I hope some spot may be agreed upon, where we may be more successful in the attempt, than we were on the 8th; but if not so, I hope his Majesty will believe I have had nothing more at heart than the exerting the force intrusted to me, in a manner most conducive to the honour of his arms.

I have the honour to be, &c. A. KEPPEL.

Belleisle, four o'Clock in the morning,April 23, 1761.
SIR,

AS I have just had a note from Com. Keppel, to inform, me, that a frigate will sail this day for England, I have only time to acquaint you, that his Majesty's troops under my command landed yesterday at five. The enemy's attention was so distracted with our attempts of landing at different places, where there was the least appearance of our being able to succeed, that it gave Brig. Lambert an opportunity of climbing up a rock with a corps I had left with him for that purpose, if practicable. The difficulty of mounting had made the enemy least attentive to that part. Beauclerk's grenadiers, with their captain, Patterson, got up before they saw what was intended. They immediately marched a body of 300 men to attack him. The grenadiers maintained their ground till the rest of Brig. Lambert's got up. We took three brass field-pieces, and some wounded prisoners. It is impossible for me sufficiently to commend Mr. Lambert's conduct and gallant behaviour on the occasion; and take the liberty to beg you will permit me to request you will recommend him to the King, as an officer deserving his majesty's favour. Capt. Patterson has lost his arm. I believe our loss is not above thirty killed. I am afraid you will not be able to read this scrawl, as I write it in the field, the troops being on their march,

I am, &c, S. HODGSON.

Valiant, in the Great-Road of Belleisle,April 23, 1761.
SIR,

I Had the honour to send you a letter by the Actoen frigate, in which I gave you but little hopes. Since which time the General and I having considered, that by attempting a place where the mounting the rocks was just possible, and where the enemy were no otherwise prepared, from the impracticable appearance it had to them, than by a corps of troops to annoy the boats in the attempt, that it carried some degree of hopes with it; and by making a disposition for the attack of their intrenched bays, and at Sauzon at the same time, which the arrival of the transports with the light horse enabled me to do, we might possibly gain a footing; I have now the greatest pleasure in acquainting you, that his Majesty's troops have made good a landing on the rocks near Point Lomaria; and cannot sufficiently commend the spirit and good behaviour of the troops in the attempt, and the judgment with which Sir Thomas Stanhope, and the rest of the captains of the king's ships, directed the fire upon the hills.

Capt. Barrington having been employed in many of the operations of this service, I have sent him home with this letter: and •eg, Sir, to refer you to him for the particulars.

I have the honour to be, &c. A. KEPPEL.

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(a)

Prince Ferdinand's Letter to his Majesty from the Field of Battle, dated, Kirch Denckern, July 16, 1761.

I Have the honour to congratulate your majesty upon a very signal advantage, which your majesty's arms have this day gained. It is impossible for me to set down every particular of this glorious day. The bearer of this, an officer of very distinguished merit, and who has greatly contributed to the happy success of this day, will give your majesty an exact account of it, I have the honour to recommend him to your majesty's royal favour.

FERDINAND, Duke of Brunswick and Lunebourg.

What follows is the Account given by Major Wedderbourne,

ON the 15th of July the French attacked the light troops in the front of Lord Granby's corps, which was encamped on the heights of Kirch Denckern. His Lordship ordered the regiments of Cornwallis, Keith, Campbell, and Marsberg, to the left to support the posts. There was an uninterupted fire of cannon and small arms, till nine at night, when it ceased, without any impression having been made by the enemy upon Lord Granby's left.

In the morning of the 16th, about three o'clock the cannonading began very briskly on both sides, and continued till nine, when the enemy gave way in great disorder. His most serene highness the Duke, then ordered the corps of the prince of Anhalt, Lord Granby and Wutgenau, to attack them on their retreat; which they did with so much vigour that the enemy never attempted to form before them, but threw down their arms and ran off in the utmost disorder.

When major Wedderbourn came away, there were six colours already taken, eleven or twelve pieces of cannon; many officers, amongst whom the Comte de Rouge, and great part of the regiments of De Rouge, Dauphin, and Provence, to the amount of 3000 men.

After having pursued them about a league, the duke ordered the troops to form upon the heights of Kirch Denckern. The hereditary prince was still driving the enemy on their left. Prisoners and cannon, were coming in every moment.

It was said, that the Marshal duc de Broglio commanded on the right of the French army, opposite to the prince of Anhalt, Lord Granby, and Lieutenant General Wutgenau, where his serene hignness was in person.

Major Wedderbourn adds, that this great victory was obtained with scarce any loss on the part of the allied army.

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(b)

Translation of Prince Ferdinand's Letter to the Marquis of Granby.

Convent at Bubren,August 6, 1761.
"My Lord,

I Think it my duty to acquaint your lordship how much I admire the valiant and brave conduct of lord George Lenox, with the picquets, and of major Walsh, with his battalions of grenadiers yesterday in the attack of the post and village of Westen. I beg your lordship will be pleased to signify to them my most grateful acknowledgements, and that these two gentlemen would do the same to the brave troops who were led on by commanders of such distinguished valour.

I have the honour to be, With the most perfect respect, My Lord &c.

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1

Copy of the Marquis of Granby's Leter to Major Walsh, commanding the first Battalion of British Grenadiers.

Camp at Haarn,August 7, 1761.
"SIR,

YOU will perceive, by the copy of the letter I have the pleasure to enclose to you, how much his Serene Highness admired your behaviour, and that of the first battalion of grenadiers under your command, at the attack of the post and village of Westen, on the 5th.

"You will, therefore, according to his Serene Highness's desire, testify to the troops his extreme approbation of their distinguished bravery and firmness, and likewise my thanks in the strongest manner.

I am, with the greatest regard, Sir, &c. GRANBY.

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(a)

This speech has been since discovered to be one amongst the number of contrivances that were formed and published by the opposite party to prejudice Mr. Pitt in the eyes of the public; for after Mr. Pitt and lord Temple had taken their leaves at the third and last council summoned to deliberate on the conduct of Spain, the late earl Granville, then lord president of the council, rose up to speak, expressing a very high opinion of Mr. Pitt's wisdom, penetration, abilities, honour and integrity, and in a very particular, and emphatical manner, spoke of the innumerable and almost insurmountable difficulties, which Mr. Pitt and lord Temple had to struggle with; these, he said, were the sentiments he then delivered, and in justice to himself, several times declared, that the speech sent abroad, (as spoke by him on that occasion) was no other than a vile forgery, calculated to serve a purpose as base as it was ungrateful. It may not be improper to detect another instance of their base conduct, propagated with no less avidity; that Mr. Pitt in his heart was not an enemy to pensions, ‘witness his letter to a noble duke solliciting his grace's interest, with his late majesty for a pension:’ By the noble duke is meant the duke of Newcastle, who, on all occasions publicly declared, he had never received any such letter.

Review of Lord Bute's Administration.

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(a)

A Letter from the Right Hon. Mr. Pitt, to a Person of Eminence in the city.

London,October 17.
Dear Sir,

FINDING, to my great surprize, that the cause and manner of my resigning the seals, is grosly misrepresented in the city, as well as that the most gracious and spontaneous marks of his majesty's approbation of my services, which marks followed my resignation, have been infamously traduced as a bargain for my forsaking the public, I am under a necessity of declaring the truth of both these facts, in a manner which I am sure no gentleman will contradict; a difference of opinion with regard to measures to be taken against Spain, of the highest importance to the honour of the crown, and to the most essential national interests, (and this founded on what Spain had already done, not on what that court may farther intend to do) was the cause of my resigning the seals▪ Lord Temple and I submitted in writing, and signed by us, our most humble sentiments to his majesty, which being over-ruled by the united opinion of all the rest of the king's servants, I resigned the seals on Monday the 5th of this month, in order not to remain responsible for measures, which I was no longer allowed to guide. Most gracious public marks of his majesty's approbation of my services followed my resignation: They are unmerited and unsolicited; and I shall ever he proud to have received them from the best of sovereigns.

I will now only add, my dear Sir, that I have explained these matters only for the honour of truth, not in any view to court return of confidence from any man, who with a credulity, as weak as it is injurous, has thought fit hastily to withdraw his good opinion, from one who served his country with fidelity and success; and who justly reveres the upright and candid judgment of it; little solicitous about the censures of the capricious and ungenerous: Accept my sincerest acknowledgments for all your kind friendship, and believe me ever with truth and esteem,

My dear Sir,
your faithful friend, &c.

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(a)

Translation of an intercepted letter from general Lally, to 〈◊〉 Raymond, the French resident at Pullicat, dated Pondicherry the 2d of January 1761.

Mr. Raymond,

THE English squadron is no more, Sir; out of the twelve ships they had in our road, seven are lost, crews and all, the four others dismasted; and it appears there is no more than one frigate that has escaped; therefore don't lose an instant to send us chelingoes upon chelingoes loaded with rice; the Da• have nothing to fear now; besides (according to the law of nations) they are only to send us no provisions themselves, and we are no more blocked up by sea.

The saving of Pondicherry has been in your power once already; if you miss the present opportunity, it will be entirely your fault; do not forget also some small chelingoes: offer great rewards: I expect seventeen thousand Morattoes within these four days. In short, risque all, attempt all, force all, and send us some rice, should it be but half a garse at a time,

Signed, LALLY.

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(a)
This col. Townshend was second son to the hon. Thomas Townshend, Esq He had distinguished himself on several occasions. Guadaloupe he was pushed overboard in the landing of the troops, but his black saved his life by jumping after him. In the last campaign in Germany, he was shot through the arm, and in this engagement he lost his life, seeking the post of honour that his duty did not require
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(a)

General Monckton's Letter, to the Right Hon. the Earl of Egremont.

Head-Quarters in the Island of Martinico.Jan. 20, 1762.
My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your lordship, that we left Barbadoes the 5th Instant, anchored in St. Anne's bay in this island the 7th, the ships of war having silenced some batteries which the enemy had erected there, and where I was in hopes to have been able to have landed on the western side of the bay, and to have crossed over to Port Royal bay; but the difficulties that would have attended our being supplied with provisions and stores, added to the scarcity of fresh water in that part, made me desist. I then thought that if I could get possession of Pidgeon Island, a secure anchorage might be had for the fleet and transports in Port Royal harbour. For this purpose, I detached two brigades of the army, under the command of brigadiers Haviland and Grant, to Ance Darlet, where they landed, and marched to the ground opposite to the island; but finding the road impassable for cannon, which were necessary for the reduction of that island, I judged it best for his majesty's service, to proceed (having previously reconnoitred the shore) and land near the Case des Navires; which we effected on the 16th, without any molestation, the ships of war having silenced the batteries above us. I had forgot, my lord, to mention, that with the above command, were the light infantry under lieutenant colonel Scott, who were advanced the night the command remained there, and were attacked in the night by three companies of grenadiers, some free-booters, negroes and mulattoes, which the enemy had passed over from Fort Royal; but they were so warmly received, that they retreated precipitately, leaving some dead; and a serjeant and three of their grenadiers taken prisoners, without any loss on our side.

We are now encamped upon the heights, above Case des Navires; and I was in hopes, before this time, to have given your lordship more satisfactory accounts of our operations. But the ravines or gullys we have to pass, are of such depth and difficulty of access, and that in the face of many batteries and redoubts, with the whole country, as well mulattoes and negroes, as inhabitants in arms, and without being able to procure any material intelligence, that I do not think it prudent to expose his majesty's troops until I can erect batteries to cover them, which we are at work upon with the utmost expedition.

However, my lord, I have the pleasure to acquaint you, that the troops continue healthy, although they have been necessarily exposed to laying on their arms, and are in the highest spirits; and I don't in the least doubt, but that I shall be able to execute this principal object of his majesty's commands, of which I shall give your lordship the earliest notice.

It gives me great pleasure to acquaint your lordship, how much I am indebted to admiral Rodney, for the assistance received from the fleet under his command: the utmost harmony has subsisted hitherto, and I am persuaded will continue to do so.

This will be delivered to your lordship by captain Walsingham, who takes home the admiral's dispatches.

I have the honour to be, &c.
ROBERT MONCKTON.

Admiral Rodney's Letter to Mr. Cleveland.

Case Navire Bay, Martinico,Jan. 19, 1762.
SIR,

I Desire you will acquaint their lordships, that I arrived at Barbadoes on the 22d of November, having parted company with the squadron under my command in a hard gale of wind, a few days after we left the channel.

The Foudroyant, Modeste, and Basilisk, joined me the 27th, the Nottingham and Thunder the 1st of December, and the Vanguard, with the remainder of the squadron, on the 9th. The Temeraire, and Acteon, with the troops from Belleisle, arrived the 14th of December, and major general Monckton, with the forces from North America, on the 24th; and having remained a few days to water the ships, refresh the men, and make necessary dispositions for our enterprize, we arrived off Martinico the 7th of January; and on the 8th we all anchored in St. Anne's bay; the ships I had appointed (under Sir James Douglas) having silenced the forts of that coast; in performing of which, we had the misfortune to lose the Raisonable, as she was leading in for one of the enemy's batteries, owing to the pilot's being ignorant of a little reef of rocks which took her up. We have saved all her people, all her stores, and I hope soon to get all her guns.

Having by the motion of the fleet and army, taken possession of an excellent harbour, and secured a landing on the weather-most part of the island, which might be made tenable at any time, as likewise thereby greatly alarming the enemy.

At general Monckton's request, I dispatched commodore Swanton, with a squadron of ships, and two brigades, to the bay of Petite A•ce, in order to take post there. Captain Hervey of the Dragon having silenced the battery of the Grand Ance, landed his marines and seamen, who attacked it also from the shore, and took possession of the fort; and, on the 14th, I followed with the whole fleet and army, after destroying the enemy's batteries at St. Anne's bay, when (having reconnoitred the coast with the general) we came to a resolution, to make an attempt between Point Negroe and the Cas de Pilotte, which I ordered to be attacked on the 16th; and having very successively, and with little loss silenced the batteries, I landed general Monckton with the greatest part of his forces by sun-set; and the whole army was on shore a little after day-light next morning, without the loss of a man (the boats being commanded by commodore •wanton in the centre, capt. Shuldoam on the right wing, and capt. Hervey on the left) with such necessaries as they were most immediately in want of, and had all the ships and transports anchored as much in safety, as this coast will a•mit.

I also landed two battalions of marines, consisting of 450 men each.

The army are now carrying on their approaches to the heights of •ount Grenie and Mount Townson, which the enemy have made as strong as art can do, and from whence the general proposes to lay siege to Port Royal.

I have the happiness to add, that the army and navy continue in perfect health; and carry on th• •ervice with the greatest spirit and harmony.

General Monckton's second Letter to the Earl of Egremont.

Fort Royal in Martinico,Feb. 9, 1762.
My Lord,

I Had the honour of writing to your •ordship the 20th of J•nuary, when I acquainted you that I intended to attack the enemy in the strong posts they occupied on the opposite heights, and the Morne Tartenson, leading to Fort Royal, as soon as I had erected batteries (which were thought necessary) to assist us in the passing a very deep and wide ravine[*], or gully, which seperated us from them.

My disposition for the attack being made on the 24th of January, at break of day the troops advanced under a brisk fire of our batteries. The grenadiers under brigadier Grant first falling in with the enemy's advanced posts, began the attack: brigadier Rufane on the right, with his brigade, and the marines, was to advance and attack the redoubts along the coast; 1000 seamen in the flat-bottomed boats, rowed us as he advanced: Lord Rollo's brigade supported the grenadiers: Brigadier Walsh with his brigade, (supporting the light infantry under lieutenant colonel Scott) to attack the left of a plantation, and to endeavour to get round the enemy. The light infantry effected their attempt, and while the grenadiers were driving the enemy from post to post, they got upon their left, which helped to complete the event of the day. The enemy's works were now successively attacked with the most irresistible impetuosity, so that at nine o'clock we were in the entire possession of all their works, and the strong ground of Morne Tartenson, consisting of many redoubts mounted with cannon, and advantageously situated to assist the natural strength of the country. The enemy retired in the greatest confusion, to the town of Fort Royal, and to Morne Garnier (a still higher hill than the Morne Tartenson, and seperated from it by a deep ravine, covered with a very thick brush, and a rivulet at the bottom) from whence they thought they were never to be dislodged, both from its natural strength, and the works and batteries they had on it. The spirit of the grenadiers in this attack was such, that some of them even pursued the enemy to the bridge of the town, and brought off prisoners from thence.

While this was doing on this side, brigadier Haviland with his brigade, two battalions of Highlanders, and a corps of light infantry (which I had formed from the several regiments and given the command of to major Leland) had orders (from the reported practicability of the passage) to cross the ravine a good deal to the left, and attack a body of the enemy who were posted on several heights opposite to him, and to try to get into their left; and by that means divide their force. Yet, although they began their march at two o'clock in the morning such was the difficulty of access, though I am convinced every means were tried, that it was late before they effected it.

When I found that the enemy were giving way on all sides, I ordered lieutenant colonel Scott's light infantry, brigadier Walsh's brigade, and a division of the grenadiers, to a plantation more to the left, where brigadier Haviland was to have come down: they drove off some of the enemy posted there; and the light infantry possessed themselves of a very advantageous post opposite to Morne Garnier. To support them, I ordered brigadier Haviland's corps (which now had passed) to their right: the division of grenadiers under brigadier Grant, and Walsh's brigade, kept possession of the upper plantation, and communicated with Haviland's corps. The marines, which I had taken from brigadier Rufane, I posted to cover the road between the two plantations.

On the 25th, we began to erect batteries on Morne Tartenson, against the citadel of Fort Royal, but were much annoyed on that, and the following day, by the enemy from Morne Garnier. Finding that it was absolute necessary to attack this place to the left, where the corps of light infantry, and brigadier Haviland's brigade were posted, I determined immediately to errect batteries against these of the enemy which annoyed us, and which might also cover our passage of the ravine.

On the 27th, about four o'clock in the evening, the enemy, under cover of their batteries, and with the greatest part of their force, had the temerity to attack the two corps of light infantry, and brigadier Haviland's brigade, in the posts they occupied; but were received with such steadiness, that they were immediately repulsed; and such was the ardour of the troops, that they passed the ravine with the enemy, seized their batteries, and took post there, being reinforced by brigadier Walsh's brigade, and the division of grenadiers under brigadier Grant, who immediately on the attack had marched to support them. Night was now come on; but major Leland moving on to the left with his light infantry, and finding no opposition, continued his rout towards the enemy's redoubts, which he soon came up to, and took possession of the enemy (except a few grenadiers, who were prisoners) having abandoned them. Their troops retired into the town and citadel, and the militia dispersed in the country. Brigadiers Walsh, Grant and Haviland, immediately moved up to support the light infantry: so that at nine o'clock at night, his majesty's troops were in possession of this very strong post, which entirely commanded the citadel. So precipitate was the enemy's flight, that they left a mortar loaded, and 8 or 9 guns unspiked, with a quantity of ammunition and provisions. The cannon and mortar were turned against the citadel in the morning.

Having gained this advantageous post, from which the enemy had so much annoyed us and having completed two batteries on Morne Tartenson, consisting of fourteen guns and three mortars, we opened them on the 30th: but finding that the distance was too great, and having now Morne Capuchine in our power, not more than 400 yards distant from the fort, as well as the possession of the town, I immediately resolved to erect batteries at both these places, the sooner to reduce the citadel; but for the easier conveyance of our cannon by water, I ordered major Leland, with his light infantry, to take post on the river monsieur.

The enemy perceiving our designs, and for reasons best known to themselves, on the evening of the 3d instant, beat the chamade; in consequence of which, the gate of the citadel was delivered up to his majesty's troops the evening of the 4th, and at nine o'clock next morning the garrison marched out, on the terms of the capitulation. It consisted of about 800 men, grenadiers, marines, militia, and free-booters. About 150 of the garrison were killed and wounded in the siege. The enemy might have kept us much longer, as it would have been absolutely necessary to have made two or three breaches, which must have taken some time.

In the several attacks, I am credibly informed, that the enemy had not less than 1000 men killed, wounded, and taken prisoners: among the latter, several of their principal officers of the militia, taken the 24th. Our loss your lordship will see by the return. You have also my lord, a return of the artillery and stores taken from the enemy on the 24th and 27th of January; and in the citadel at its surrender on the 5th instant.

I cannot find words, my lord, to render that ample justice due to the true valour and persevering ardour of his majesty's troops, which I have the honour to command. The difficulties they had to encounter in the attack of an enemy, possessed of every advantage that art or nature could give them, were great. Their perseverance, in surmounting these obstacles, furnishes a noble example of British spirit.

The brigadiers Haviland, Grant, Rufane, Lord Rollo, and Walsh, and all the officers in general, deserve the highest applause for their animated and soldierlike conduct.

The grenadiers of the army, in three divisions, headed by the lieutenant colonels Fletcher, Massy, and Vaughan, and the light infantry and rangers, in three bodies, commanded by lieutenant colonel Scott, major Leland, and captain Kennedy, particularly distinguishing themselves, the warmest part of the service having fallen to their lot.

M. la Touche the governor general, after leaving a garrison in Fort Royal, retired with the remains of his grenadiers, and is now, as I am informed, at St. Pierre. We have not as yet had the least correspondence together, nor has he so much as sent to enquire after his killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Immediately upon the fort surrendering, the admiral and I received a deputation from most of the quarters of the island, desiring likewise to capitulate, M. La Touche having refused them to enter into any terms. On the 7th instant we agreed upon the capitulations, to which we have every day some of the other quarters of the island acceding. St. Pierre, and the neighbouring quarters, are the only ones which hold out, owing to the presence of M. La Touche; but should they not come in, in a day or two, which I am told I may expect every hour, I purpose moving that way, and do not the least doubt but that I shall soon reduce them to reason.

On the 7th instant, Pidgeon Island, one of the defences of this harbour, surrendered by summons on the same terms of the citadel, (cannon excepted.)

Your lordship may look upon the capitulation for the island as fixed, the admiral and myself being resolved not to make the least alteration. The other quarters must accede to it.

We hope both the capitulations will receive his majesty's approbation, as it has been our earnest study to obtain, on our part, every advantage to the nation, that could accrue from the conquest of this island.

The day after the affair of the 27th, learning from one of my parties that M. Nadau Deutruil, late the French governor of the island of Guadaloupe, was at a house about two leagues from my quarters, I thought it necessary to send, and bring him in, and he is now with me a prisoner. I purpose sending him to France by some opportunity that may offer hereafter. The French troops are all aboard, and will soon sail for France according to the capitulation.

I have given orders for the repair of the citadel, and for every necessary work. The inhabitants, who had all quitted their houses, and retired to the heights, are now returning to them; and as soon as I have fixed the inhabitants of St. Pierre, I shall pursue the other parts of his majesty's instructions.

I must repeat to your lordship the harmony that subsists between the fleet and army, and the cordial assistance we have received from admiral Rodney, in every part of the operations where his aid could be useful.

This will be delivered to your lordship by major Gates, one of my aid-de-camps, who will inform your lordship of any particulars you may desire to know. I must beg leave to recommend him to his majesty's favour, as a very deserving officer, and who has now served upwards of twelve years in America with much credit.

I have the honour to be, &c. R. MONCKTON.

Rear Admiral Rodney's second Letter to Mr. Cleveland.

Fort Royal Bay, Martinico,Feb. 10, 1762.

SINCE my letter of the 19th of January, sent express by captain Walsingham, acquainting their lordships with my arrival and landing the army at Case Navire; I have the honour to congratulate them on the surrender of the most important citadel of Fort Royal, and Pidgeon Island; which has given his majesty's forces possession of the noblest and best harbour in these parts of the West Indies.

The almost insurmountable difficulties the troops had to struggle with, and the surprizing strength of the country, improved by all that art could add, will be best explained by general Monckton. But this I must say, in justice to those I have the honour to command, that the intrepidity and gallant behaviour of the officers and troops employed on this expedition, could be equalled only by the eager and chearful activity of the officers and seamen; who contributed every thing in their power towards the reduction of the place, and made no difficulties in transporting numbers of the heaviest mortars and ships cannon, up the steepest mountains, at a very considerable distance from the sea, and across the enemy's line of fire.

I have the pleasure to acquaint their lordships, that we have taken, in this port, fourteen of the enemy's best privateers; and many more which are in the other ports of the island, will be immediately delivered into my hands, agreeable to the capitulation of the inhabitants: and for all further particulars, I must refer their lordships to captain Darby, who is charged with these dispatches.

It gives me the sincerest satisfaction, that I can assure their lordships, the most perfect harmony has subsisted between the navy and army, each vying (in the most friendly manner) which should serve his majesty and their country best.

General Monckton's third Letter, dated, St. Peter's, Martinino,February 27, 1762.
My Lord,

I Had the honour of writing to your Lordship the 9th inst. from Fort Royal which went by my aid-de-camp, major Gates, who sailed from thence in his majesty's ship Nightingale, on the 10th inst. a duplicate of that letter I now inclose.

Just when I was about to embark for the reduction of St. Peter's two deputies arrived at Fort Royal on the 12th inst. offering terms of capitulation for the whole island, on the part of M. La Vassor Delatouche, the Governor-General on the 13th. They received the Admiral's and my answers, to their proposals, which they carried to St. Peter's; and on the 14th returned with the capitulation signed. In consequence of which, I left Fort Royal on the 15th, with the grenadiers of the army, and the 2d brigade; and on the following day took possession of this large and opulent town, with all the posts in the neighbourhood. The enemy marched out about 320 grenadiers, who are embarked, and will sail immediately for France. M. Le Vassor Delatouche, the Governor-General, M. Rouille, Lieutenant Governor, and the staff will shortly follow.

Inclosed I send your Lordship a copy of the capitulation for the island, which we humbly hope will meet with his Majesty's approbation. Commodore Swanton is now off the Grenades with a squadron of men of war; and I propose sending immediately Brig. Gen. Walsh with the 5th brigade, and the corps of light infantry under Lieut. Col. Scott, in order to reduce that and the other islands. I have undoubted intelligence, that the number of white men in the Grenades do not exceed 500; and in the other islands not quite so many.

I should have proceeded upon this service myself, had I not thought it of more consequence, for his Majesty's service, my remaining here at this critical time, when, by what we can learn, a rupture with Spain may be daily expected; and here I am also at hand to settle many material affairs relative to the security of this conquest.

Indeed, I have good reason to believe, that Brig. Walsh will meet with very little obstruction in his operations. However, should he not immediately succeed, I shall move that way with a larger force, and make no doubt to compel them to a speedy surrender.

It was not my intention to have sent home an express until I could have informed your Lordship of the reduction of the other islands mentioned in his Majesty's instructions.— But as this island is now completely reduced to his Majesty's obedience, I was apprehensive that a delay, in signifying this interesting event, might be attended with some bad consequences at this critical juncture. I therefore send this by my Aid-de-Camp. Captain Ricaut, who can inform your Lordship of any particulars you may desire to know; and I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship's countenance, as a very deserving and good officer.

As it was necessary for his Majesty's service, immediately to fill some civil employments here, I have, accordingly, appointed proper persons to act until his Majesty's pleasure be known.

Your Lordship has, herewith, a return of the artillery, and warlike stores, found in the town, the Reduit, and the other different posts.

I have the honour to be, &c. ROB. MONCKTON.

Admiral Rodney's third Letter, dated, St. Pierre's Road, Martinico, February 28, 1762.

SINCE my dispa•ches of the 10th instant, by Capt. Darby, acquainting their Lordships with the surrender of Fort Royal, and the capitulation of the greatest part of the inhabitants, I have the additional pleasure to congratulate their Lordships on the conquest of the whole island of Martinico; M. Delatouche having thought proper to send his brother on board the Marlborough, with articles of capitulation, just in time to save the town of St. Pierre from destruction; a copy of which capitulation, I have the honour to inclose.

As this great island is now entirely subjected to his Majesty's obedience, I can only repeat, in this public manner, my entire approbation of the conduct of all the officers and seamen of that part of his Majesty's fleet, which I have the honour to command, all having exerted themselves in their proper stations, with an order and resolution becoming British seamen.

Immediately on the surrender of St. Pierre's, I dispatched Commodore Swanton, with a squadron of his Majesty's ships to join those already before the island of Granada, and block up that port as close as possible: The islands of St. Vincent and St. Lucia are likewise very closely blockaded; and I make not the least doubt, but that all the Caribbee islands will, in a very short time, be subjected to his Majesty.

On the 4th instant, Capt. Ourry, of his Majesty's ship the Acteon, cruizing off Tobago, fell in with and took a large Spanish register ship, laden with cannon, powder, small arms, and ordinance stores, bound to Laquira.

Admiral Rodney's fourth Letter, dated, St. Pierre's Road, Martinico, March 1, 1762.

I Have this moment received an express from Captain Hervey, that the island of St. Lucia is surrendered at discretion.

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*
A large hollow made between two hills, occasioned by a sudden current of water, which is very frequent and rapid at the time of the Equinox. It is of a considerable depth, and not less difficult to get into than to ascend as it is tufted with trees, brush-wood on every side, and in many places covered over. These the French lined with infantry; but our forces resolute, and determined to carry the batteries on the other side, let each other down first slinging thelr muskets; when they got to the other side, clambered up as fast as possible, formed, and carried all before them. Some were let down precipitately, b
•
the banks giving way, but they soon recovered themselves and joined their corps,

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(a)
As the merit of projecting this expedition has been variously related, the following particulars may not be improperly given here. —Admiral Knowles on his return from Jamaica in 1756, took an opportunity of visiting the Havanna, and inspecting its fortifications, of which he made plans, and other material observations; these at the request of the duke of Gumberland, were laid before him for his inspection, who knowing the merit of the admiral as an engineer, consulted him on the most probable means of putting them into execution; these his royal highness formed into a regular plan for execution, which he sent to the ministry, who held them under consideration for some time; however, this plan was disapproved of by lord Anson, then first lord of the Admiralty, who formed another, which was carried into execution; but as his royal highness had very early interested himself in the expedition, the appointing of a commander of the land-force was left to him, which naturally fell on the earl of Albemarle, whom he had in a manner tutored from his earliest years.
↵

(a)
Deep Bays.
↵

(a)

Explanation of the Plan of the siege of the HAVANNAH, drawn by an officer on the spot, August 15, 1762.

- AA Extent of the wall.

- B The Land Gate.

- C Moor Castle.

- D Puntal Fort.

- E The Fort; or Governor's House.

- F Fort Cojimar.

- G Fort Chorera.

- H The Castle of Bocanoa.

References to the PLAN.

- a Where his majesty's troops first landed, June 7, 1762.

- b The march of the army immediately after landing.

- c His majesty's ship Dragon against Cojimar.

- d Where the army first encamped,

- e Where the cannon and stores were landed.

- f The batteries against the Moro.

- g The Dragon, Cambridge, and Marlborough, against the Moro.

- h The bombs against the Puntal.

- i His majesty's ship Belleisle against Chorera fort.

- k The batteries on the west-side against the Puntal.

- l The batteries on the Cavannes hill.

- m The hoetzers against the shipping.

- n The Neptune of 70, Asia of 64, and Europa of 60 guns, sunk at the entrance of the harbour.

- o One Company's ship overset.

- p▪ The chain and bomb.

- q. The Spanish Admiral and fleet.

- r Two ships on the stocks.

- s Sir George Pocock, with the men of war and transports.

- t Commodore Keppel▪ with the men of war and transports.

- u Camp at the water-mills.

- w The besieging camp•.

- x Fortified houses.

- y Head-quarters.

- z A merchant ship struck with lightning, which blew up.

↵

(a)

Letter from the Earl of Albemarle to the Earl of Egremont, dated head quarters near the Havannah, August 21, 1762.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour of informing your Lordship, that the town of the Havannah, with all its dependencies, and the men of war in the harbour, surrendered to his majesty's arms by capitulation on the 13th instant.

Inclosed is a copy of the capitulation, various returns, and the chief engineer's continuation of the journal of the siege of the M• fort, which was taken by storm on the 30th of last month, so much to the honour and credit of his majesty's troops, and to major general Keppel, who commanded the attack, that I should do them injustice if I did not mention them in a particular manner to your lordship. Our mines were sprung about one o'clock, and a breach made just practicable for a file of men in front. The enemy was drawn up on the top of it, in force with a seeming determination to defend it; the attack was so vigorous and impetuous, that the enemy was instantaneously drove from the breach, and his majesty's standard planted upon the bastion.

I did not send a particular express with this good news to your lordship, because I flattered myself, that what has happened would soon be the consqeuence of our success at Fort Moro.

•n the 11th in the morning, by a signal from the fort, we opened our batteries against the town, and Punta fort: The guns and mortars were so well served by the artillery and sailors, and their effect so great, that in less than six hours all the guns in the fort and north bastion were silenced. The governor hung out the white flag, and beat a parley; and at the same time sent out an officer to propose a cessation of arms for twenty-four hours in order to prepare the articles of capitulation.

I sent on board the Namur to the Admiral, to inform him of the governor's proposals.

Sir George Pocock immediately came to my quarters, and we agreed to a suspension of hostilities to the 13th at twelve o'clock.

I summoned the governor on the 10th. His answer was very civil and proper; at the same time said he would defend his town to the last extremity.

The difficulties the officers and soldiers have met with, and the fatigues they have so chearfully and resolutely gone through since the army first landed on this island, are not to be described. They deserve from me the greatest commendations; and I must intreat your lordship to take the first opportunity of informing his majesty how much I think myself obliged to lieut. general Elliot, and the rest of the general officers under my command; to every officer and soldier in the army; and to the officers and sailors of his majesty's fleet, for the zealous manner with which they have carried on the service, and for the great assistance I have received from them. Happy we shall all think ourselves, if our conduct meets with his majesty's approbation.

Sir George Pocock and commodore Keppel have exerted themselves in a most particular manner: And I may venture to say, that there never was a joint undertaking carried on with more harmony and zeal on both sides, which greatly contributed to the success of it.

Capt. Nugent, one of my Aid-de-Camps, who has the honour of delivering you my dispatches, can inform your lordship of any particulars you are pleased to learn from him, He has been very active, and present at every material affair that has happened since the landing of the troops. I must beg through your lordship to recommend him to his majesty as a very deserving young man. He carries with him the Spanish ensign taken at the Moro.

Colonel Carleton, who has acted as brigadier since lord Rollo left the army, had the misfortune of being wounded on the 22d of July, when the enemy made a sortie: He is at present in a fair way of doing well;

I think it but justice to major Fuller, who is my elder Aid-de-Camp, to say, that I should have sent him to England, if I had not thought it would be more agreeable to his majesty to receive the news by one of his own servants.

I am, &c. ALBEMARLE.

Letter from Sir George Pocock, to Mr. Cleveland, dated off Chorea River, near the Havannah, the 19th of August 1762.

SIR,

I Desire you will acquaint their Lordships, that it is with the greatest pleasure I now congratulate them on the great success of his majesty's arms, in the reduction of the Havannah with all its dependencies.

The Moro fort was taken by storm on the 30th of last month, after a siege of twenty-nine days; during which time the enemy lost above a thousand men, and a brave officer in Don Lewis de Valasco, captain of one of their men of war, and governor in the Moro, mortally wounded in defending the colours sword in hand in the storm: And on the 11th instant, the governor of the Havannah desired to capitulate for the town, which was granted, the articles agreed to, and signed, (a copy of which I enclose) and we were put in possession of the Punta and land gate the 14th. With this great and important acquisition to his majesty, have also fallen twelve men of war of the line, as per list, three of which were sunk, with a company's ship, in the entrance of the harbour; nine are fit for sea, and two on the stocks; a blow that I hope will prove the more capital to the enemy, as they receive it so early in the war; and, I may venture to say, will leave all their settlements, in this part of the world, exposed to any attempts that may be thought proper to be made on them. But however trivial, with the possession of the Havannah, it may appear, yet I cannot help mentioning the discovery and possessing of the harbour of Mariel, about seven leagues to the leward of this, and which we had made ourselves masters of, though the enemy had endeavoured to ruin it by sinking ships in the entrance: and we had lately sent near one hundred transports with some men of war there, for security against the season, in which we are already advanced.

It will be as needless, as almost impossible, for me to express or describe that perfect harmony that has uninterruptedly subsisted between the fleet and the army, from our first setting out. Indeed it is doing injustice to both, to mention them as two corps, since each has endeavoured, with the most constant and chearful emulation, to render it but one; uniting in the same principles of honour and glory for their King and Country's service. I am glad, on this occasion, to do justice to the distinguished merit of Commodore Keppel, who executed the service, under his direction, on the Coxmar side, with the greatest spirit, activity and diligence; and I must repeat that the zeal of his majesty's sea officers and seamen exerted in carrying on the services alloted to them, is highly to be commended.

I shall now beg leave to refer their Lordships to capt. Harvey for all further particulars, who I send with this letter, and who has approved himself a brave and deserving officer in this expedition; therefore think myself obliged to desire their lordships will recommend him to his majesty.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant, G. POCOCK.

A List of the ships of war that were in the harbour of the Havannah, under the command of the Marquis del Real Transporte, commodore and commander in chief of all his Catholic Majesty's ships in America, and surrendered with the city the 12th of August, 1762.

Guns.

Tigre

70

Reyna

70

Soverano

70

Infante

70

[*]Neptuno

70

Aquilon

70

[*]Asia

64

America

60

[*]Europa

60

Conquestado

60

[†]San Genaro

60

[†]San Antonio

60

Frigates.

[‡]Vinganaza

24

[§]Thetis

24

[‡]Marte

18

N. B. There are two ships of war on the stocks, and several merchants ships in the harbour.

Letter from Sir George Pocock to Mr. Cleveland, dated off Chorera River, the 16th of Aug. 1762, inclosed in the foregoing of the 19th.

ON the 28th of July the Intrepide arrived, with 11 sail of transports, with troops from New York. They sailed from thence the 11th of June. The Chesterfield and four transports run on Cayo Comfite, the entrance of the Bahama Streights on the Cuba side, the 24th of July, an hour before day light, and were stranded, but lost no seamen or soldiers. The Intrepide met the Richmond the day after, who was looking out for the convoy. Capt. Elphinston returned with the three transports which were cleared, in order to bring away the seamen and troops who were on shore; and, to make all possible dispatch, I sent away the Echo, Cygnet and Thunder bomb, to meet the Richmond, and to take the men out of her; and ordered captain Elphinston to take the Cygnet with him, and proceed up the Streights to meet the second division of transports.

The 2d instant, the Echo and bomb returned with the second division, consisting of eleven sail of transports, which sailed from New York the 30th of June. The Richmond, Lizard, Enterprize, Cygnet, and Porcupine sloop, arrived the 8th, bringing with them all the seamen and soldiers from the ships that were wrecked. Captain Banks informed me, that, on the 21st of July, at three o'clock in the afternoon, being near the passage between Maya Guanna, and the North Caicos, he discovered two French ships of the line, three frigates, and six sail of brigantine and sloops; that the men of war and frigates gave chace to the convoy; and that five of the transports were taken with 350 regulars of Anstruther's regiment, and 150 provincial troops on board of them. All the rest of the troops arrived and landed in perfect health.

I have thought it necessary to order the Sutherland and Dover to be fitted as flags of truce, taking out their lower tier of guns in order to accommodate the late Spanish commodore, the governor of the Havannah, the viceroy of Peru, and the governor of Carthagena, to Old Spain, and then return to England. Transports are getting ready for the Spanish soldiers and sailors, agreeable to the capitulation, which I hope we shall be able to dispatch in a few days.

I have not been able to collect an account of the killed and wounded seamen belonging to the different ships since the beginning of the siege, who were employed at the batteries on shore, but it shall go by the first opportunity.

↵

*
Sunk at the entrance of the harbour.
↵

*
Sunk at the entrance of the harbour.
↵

*
Sunk at the entrance of the harbour.
↵

†
New ships.
↵

†
New ships.
↵

‡
Taken by the Defiance.
↵

§
By the Alamain.
↵

‡
Taken by the Defiance.
↵

(a)

Brigadier Gen. Draper's Letter to the Earl of Egremont, dated Manila, November 2, 1762.

My Lord,

I DO myself the honour of sending lieut. col. Scott, late adjutant-general, to inform your Lordship of the success of his Majesty's arms in the conquest of Manila, the surrender of the port of Cavite, and the cession of the Phillippine islands.

On the 6th of October we took the capital by storm, after 12 days operation, which are detailed in my journal. Our loss upon this occasion would have been trifling, but for the death of major More, a valiant good officer; and it is with particular satisfaction I can assure your Lordship, that the firm bravery and perseverance of the troops, could only be equalled by their humanity after victory. Out of respect and deference to Admiral Cornish, we waited till he came on shore, and being desirous to save so fine a city from destruction, we jointly dictated the annexed conditions to the governor general (the Archbishop) and the chief magistrates, who most readily embraced them.

Considering their critical situation, and vast opulence, the terms were as reasonable for them as beneficial to us. We allow the India company a third part of the ransom, the whole of which amounts to a million sterling; and, according to my instructions, I have this day delivered up Manila, one of the richest cities and islands in this part of the world, with the port of Cavite, to Dawson Drake, Esq and the other gentlemen appointed to receive them on behalf of the company, with all the artillery, ammunition, and warlike stores found therein, agreeable to the inclosed inventories.

I have appointed major Fell of the 79th regiment to be commandant of the garrison, which must consist of all the troops brought from Madrass, as the great extent of the place, its very numerous inhabitants, and unsettled country, with the importance of the Cavite, demand at least, this force for an effectual security.

The season of the year, and condition of the squadron, oblige us to defer the taking possession of the subordinate places ceded to the crown, until the ships have had a sufficient repair; and I have the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship, that the large quantity of naval stores taken in the royal magazines at Cavite, supply most excellent materials for this purpose, in which the Admiral is indefatigable, whose zeal for his majesty's service, great cordiality, and constant attention to us during the whole course of the expedition, and fatiguing progress of the siege, are beyond all praise. The other officers of the fleet exerted themselves to the utmost upon every occasion. As a small acknowledgment of our many obligations to Mr. Kempenfelt, the Admiral's captain. I begged his acceptance of the government of the citadel and port of Cavite, till it was given up to the company; his prudent and excellent regulations there were of infinite utility to the public service.

The captains Collins, Pitchford, and George Ourry, who commanded the battalion of seamen, behaved with great spirit and conduct, and capt. Jocelyn, who was intrusted with the care of the disembarkations, gave us all the assistance that could be wished or expected from a diligent good officer. The marine officers and corps were of great service, and the seamen astonished us with most extraordinary proofs of activity and valour, particularly those who assisted at our batteries.

The reduction of Manila has been so much owing to the consummate skill and bravery of Col. Monson, that I fear my faint representations cannot do justice to his merit; and I most humbly beg leave, through your Lordship, to recommend him to his Majesty, together with the following officers, viz. Lieut. Col. Scott, Major Barker, who commanded our artillery; Capt. Fletcher, Major of Brigade; the engineers, Captains Stephenson, and Cotsford, and Ensign Barnard; the Captains Moore and Pemble, aids-de-camp, who have all acted in their several departments with extraordinary merit, and greatly facilitated my good fortune. Both the royal and the company's artillery, with their other troops, behaved very well. In the last place, may I presume to point out the services of the 79th regiment, which, from the good conduct of their former and present field-officers, has the peculiar merit of having first stopped the progress of the French in India, and not a little contributed to the happiness and decision of that war under Col Coote, and has since extended the glory of his Majesty's arms to the utmost verge of Asia. Twenty-three officers, with upwards of 800 men have fallen in the cause of their country, since the regiment left England: Numbers of the survivors are wounded. Your Lordship's goodness encourages me to mention them as objects of compassion and protection. Captain Fletcher has nine colours to lay at his Majesty's feet.

I have the honour to he, &c. WILLIAM DRAPER. Brigadier General, and Commander in Chief.

Letter from Vice-Admiral Cornish, to Mr. Cleveland, dated in the Bay of Manila, the 31st of October, 1762.

IT is with the greatest pleasure I have the honour to acquaint their lordships with the success of his majesty's arms in the reduction of the city of Manila, which was taken by storm on the morning of the 9th instant. In my letters of the 23d and 31st of July, I acquainted their lordships with my proceedings to that time; after which I used every possible means at Madras for dispatch; the decline of the S. W. monsoon making it of the utmost importance. To promote this end, I compleated the Elizabeth, Grafton, Lenox, Weymouth, and Argo, with such of the troops and military stores, as they were to take on board, and on the 29th sent them away under the command of Commodore Tiddeman, to proceed to Malacca, with a view that they might compleat their water there by the time I should arrive with the remainder of the squadron

Having accomplished the embarkation of every thing designed for the expedition, with a dispatch much beyond my expectations, as we had from the whole time of my being there a violent surf to contend with, I sailed the first of August with the ships undermentioned, viz. Norfolk, Panther, America, Seaford, South-Sea Castle store ships, Admiral Steven's store-ship, Osterly Company's ship, leaving the Falmouth, at the request of the president and council, to convoy the Essex India ship, who was not ready to sail, having the treasure to take on board the China cargoes, and to bring to Manila such of the company's servants, as were to be put in possession of that Government, if the expedition succeeded.

The 19th, I arrived at Mallacca, and was disappointed in not finding Mr. Tiddeman there, who did not join me till the 21st having met with long calms: the difficulty of watering the squadron at this place made it the 27th before I could leave the road.

On the 2d of September I arrived off Pulo Timean, and was joined by capt, Grant, in the Seahorse, whom I had detached, upon my first arrival at Madrass, to cruize between this island and the straits of Sincapore, to stop any vessels he might suspect going to Manila.

On the 19th I made the coast of Luconia, but was drove off again by a strong N. E. wind, which seperated some of the squadron. The 22d the gale broke up, and the wind shifting to the S. W. the 23d we recovered the land again; the next day entered the bay of Manila, and in the close of the evening anchored off the port of Cavite with the whole squadron, except the South-Sea Castle, and Admiral Stevens, the Falmouth and Essex having joined me off the coast. In the night I sent the masters to sound about the fortifications of Cavite, and, by their report found that it might be attacked by ships.

The 25th in the morning, the wind not being favourable to attack the Cavite. I took two of the frigates, and with general Draper, and some other officers, reconnoitred the shore about Manila: and observed some churches and other buildings to stand near the works on the south side of the town, particularly toward the S. W. bastion. We had some design of attacking Cavite first, to have had the conveniency of that port for the shipping, but considered that though the attack should be attended with all the success we could hope, yet it would cause a delay at least of two days before we could land at Manila, which time would afford opportunity to the enemy to demolish those buidings near the works, and to prepare many obstacles to our landing and perhaps recover from that consternation our unexpected arrival had thrown them in; and surther, Manila being the capital, if that fell, Cavite would in consequence.

From these considerations, I joined in opinion with the general to take advantage of circumstances, so favourable for a descent, and land the troops with all dispatch, and endeavour to get possession of some posts near their works, which, if effected, would greatly facilitate the reduction of the city.

In consequence of these resolutions, I immediately made the signal on board the Seahorse for the squadron to join me, and for the troops to prepare to land. About seven in the evening the •9th regiment, with the marines in the boats, under the direction of the captains Parker, Kempenfelt, and Brereton, pushed for the shore; and under the fire of the three frigates, effected the landing at a church called the Moratta, about a mile and a half from the walls. We had no opposition from the enemy; but some difficulty from the surf, which ran high, and bilged all the long boats, but happily lost no men.

The next morning the general took an advanced post about 200 yards from the glacis, and there, under cover of a blind, intended his battery against the face of the S. W. bastion. The number of troops being small, I landed a battalion of seamen, consisting of about 700 men, under the command of the Captains Collins, Pitchford, and George Ourry.

The 25th I dispatched three armed boats after a galley, coming up the bay to Manila; they came up with her, resolutely boarded her; and took her, notwithstanding she kept up a smart fire with patteraroes and muskets; she mounted two carri•g and seventeen brass swivel guns, and had eighty men. By letters found in her, we discovered she was dispatched from the galleon St. Philippina, from Acapulca, and whom she had left the 10th of September, at Cajaya•an, between the Embocad•r• and Cape Spi•itu Santa. Upon this discovery, I came to a resolution to send the Panther and Argo in quest of her, but it was the 4th of October before the weather permitted their sailing.

The 28th of September the General acquainted me, that he was beginning to work on the battery, and that if some ships could get near enough to throw shot on the works of the town opposite to it, it might take off some of the enemy's fire and attention, and thereby facilitate its construction. In consequence of this, I ordered Commodore •iddeman, with the Elizabeth and Falmouth, towards the town, as near as the depth of water would permit, and to place the ships in such a position as would best answer the purpose intended, which was accordingly done the next day, and their fire had a very good effect.

On the 30th, the South Sea Castle arrived with stores which were much wanted, particularly the entrenching tools, for want of which the army had been so greatly distressed, that I was obliged to employ all the forges in making spades, pickaxes, &c. for them. The first of October it began to blow fresh, and in the night increased to a hard gale, which drove the South Sea Castle ashore near the Pulverista, a little to the southward of our camp. This accident, however, had some considerable advantages attending it, as the situation she lay in made her cannon a protection for the rear of our camp: it was likewise the means that all her military stores were got on board with safety and dispatch, and the army supplied with the provisions she had on board, both of which were articles they stood in immediate need of, and which could not have been supplied by boats, as it continued blowing weather for several days after, and the surf breaking very high on the beach.

This gale was from the W. S. W. directly on the shore, which gave me much concern for the safety of the squadron, particularly for the Elizabeth and Falmouth, who were only in four fathom water, and, as I have been since informed, struck; but the bottom being mud, and soft to a considerable depth, they received no damage. On the 4th in the morning, the General opened the battery, which was so well managed, and seconded by the ships before the town that in four hours the defences were taken off, and the next day in the evening the breach was made practicable.

On the 6th, at day light in the morning, the general's regiment, with the sea battalion, mounted the breach, made the attack, and soon got possession of all the bastions, which completed the conquest. I immediately went on shore, and with the General, had a meeting with the Spanish Governor, and some of the principal officers, when a capitulation was agreed on, that the town and port of Cavite, with the islands and forts dependent on Manila, should be given up to his Britannick Majesty, and that they should pay four millions of dollars for the preservation of the town and their effects, (a copy of which capitulation I have inclosed)

On the 10th I sent capt. Kempenfelt in the Norfolk, with the Seaford and Seahorse, to take possession of Cavite, agreeable to the capitulation; by this acquisition we are in possession of a very large quantity of naval stores; and beside the advantage of almost every convenience for resisting a squadron, the people are supplied with fresh meat and vegetables in great plenty.

The siege, though short, was attended with many difficulties and great fatigue, in which both the officers and men exerted themselves with the utmost chearfulness. We had constant fresh gales, a lee shore, and consequently a high surf to contend with, which made it always difficult, frequently hazardous and sometimes impossible to land with boats. The rains fell very heavy; and our little army were surrounded and harrassed by numerous bodies of Indians, who, though undisciplined, and armed only with lances, bows and arrows, yet by a daring resolution and contempt of death, they became not only troublesome but formidable. I have the satisfaction of acquainting their lordships, that throughout the whole expedition, the most perfect harmony and unanimity have subsisted between his majesty's land and sea forces.

You will receive with this, an account of the number of officers and men, both seamen and marines, that were landed from the squadron, as likewise of the killed and wounded in each corps. It is with concern, I acquaint their lordships with the loss of commodore Tiddeman, who, in attempting to enter the river in his barge, the morning after the reduction of Manila, was drowned with five of his people, by which unhappy accident, his Majesty has lost a brave and experienced officer.

Captain Kempenfelt, by whom I send this (and will present to you for their lordships a plan of the town of Manila, and the port of Cavite) has been of the greatest assistance to me during the course of this enterprize; he is very capable of furnishing their lordships with many particulars necessary for their information; and his great merit makes it my duty to recommend him as a very able and good officer.

I am, &c. S. CORNISH.

Letter from Vice-Admiral Cornish to Mr. Cleveland, dated in the Bay of Manila, Nov. 10, 1762.

IN my letter of the 31st of October, I acquainted you of my having sent Captain Parker with the Panther and Argo, in quest of the galeon St. Philippina, from Acapulco, bound to Manila.

The 7th instant capt. King in the Argo, returned with a letter from capt. Parker, acquainting me, that, in consequence of my orders, having the 30th of October got the length of the island Capul, near the entrance into the Embocadera, in pursuit of the St. Philippina, where the Argo had come to an anchor (and which he intended to do for that night) just as the day closed saw a sail, and standing to the northward; at eight in the evening he got sight of the chase, about two leagues to leward, but unluckily by the rapidity of a counter current, to what the chase was in, drove among the Narrango's in the utmost danger of being lost, and obliged to anchor; the frigate having escaped the danger, got up with the chace, and engaged her near two hours; but was so roughly handled, that capt. King was obliged to bring too to repair his damages. By this time the current slackened, which enabled capt. Parker to get under sail with the chace in sight: about nine the next morning he came up with her, and after battering her two hours within half musket shot, she struck. The enemy made but little resistance, trusting to the immense thickness of the sides of their ship, which the Panther's shot was not able to penetrate, except her upper works. Capt. Parker was no less disappointed than surprized, when the general came on board, to find, that instead of the Saint Philippina, he had engaged and taken the Santissimo Trinadad, who departed from Manila the first of August for Acapulco, and had got three hundred leagues to the eastward of the Embocadero; but meeting with a hard gale of wind, was dismasted and put back to refit. She had eight hundred men on board, and pierced for sixty guns, but when Capt. King engaged her, had only six mounted, and but thirteen when taken: she draws thirty-three feet water, and is a much larger ship than the Panther. I cannot ascertain the value of the cargo, but there is to the amount of one million and a half of dollars registered, and she is reputed so be worth three millions.

Capt. King left the Panther with her prize at anchor about three leagues south of the Corrigedow, at the mouth of this bay; and as I have sent a reinforcement of men with launches and warps, I hope very soon to have her in safety.

I am, &c. S. CORNISH.

Officers killed and wounded, &c. belonging to the Norfolk Lieut. Peter Porter, and Mr. White, surgeon's second mate, killed.— Lenox Thomas Spearing, second lieutenant of marines, wounded.

Total officers, seamen and marines landed, 1017. Killed, 17. Wounded, 17.

N. B. The surgeons, armourers, and other artificers, are not included in the above account.

Norfolk, off Cavita,Oct. 31, 1762.
S. CORNISH.

↵

(a)
The Earl of Bute.
↵

(a)

Colonel Amherst's Letter to the Earl of Egremont, dated, St. John's, Newfoundland, Sept 20, 1762.

My Lord,

ACcording to the orders I received from Sir Jeffery Amherst, at New York, of which your Lordship have been informed, I proceeded from New York to Halifax with the transports, to take up there the troops destined for the expedition. I got into the harbour the 26th of August; and finding Ld. Colville had sailed, determined to embark the troops there, and at Louisbourg, as expeditiously as possible, and proceed after his Lordship.

The men of war being sailed, who were to have taken part of the troops on board, I was obliged to take up shipping to the amount of 400 tons.

I had every thing embarked, ready to sail the 29th, but contrary winds kept us in the harbour till the 1st of September, when we got out, and arrived at Louisbourg on the 5th. The next day the troops were embarked, and we sailed out of the harbour the 7th in the morning.

I had the good fortune to join Lord Colville's fleet on the 11th, a few leagues to the southward of St. John's; and by the intelligence his Lordship had received, I was obliged to change my resolution of landing the troops at Kitty Vitty, a narrow entrance, close to the harbour of St. John's, the enemy having entirely stopped up the passage, by sinking shallops in the channel.

From the best information I could get, it appeared that Torbay, about three leagues to the northward of St. John's, was the place to land the troops at, within that district.

Lord Colville sent the Syren man of war into Torbay with the transports; and it was late at night on the 12th, before they all came to an anchor. Capt. Douglas of his Majesty's ship Syren, went with me to view the Bay, and we found a very good Beach to land on. It blew hard in the night, and one of the transports, with the Provincial Light Infantry corps on board, was driven out to sea.

I landed the troops early the next morning, at the bottom of the Bay, from whence a path led to St. John's; a party of the enemy fired some shots at the boats as they rowed in. The Light Infantry of the Regulars landed first, gave the enemy one fire, and drove them towards St. John's. The battalions landed, and we marched on. The path for four miles very narrow, through a thick wood, and over very bad ground.

Capt. M'Donnell's Light Infantry corps in front came up with some of the party we drove from the Landing Place: They had concealed themselves in the wood, fired upon us, and wounded three men. A part of M'Donnell's corps rushed in upon them, took three prisoners, and drove the rest off.

The country opened afterwards, and we marched to the left of Kitty Vitty: It was necessary to take possession of this pass, to open a communication for the landing of artillery and stores, it being impracticable to get them up the way we came.

As soon as our right was close to Kitty Vitty river, the enemy fired upon us from a hill on the opposite side. I sent a party up a rock, which commanded the passage over, and under cover of their fire, the Light Infantry companies of the Royal and Montgomery's, supported by the grenadiers of the Royal, passed, drove the enemy up the hill, and pursued them on that side towards St. John's: when I perceived a body of the enemy coming to their support, I immediately ordered over Major Sutherland, with the remainder of the first battalion, upon which they thought proper to retreat; and we had just time, before dark, to take post.

Capt. Mackenzie, who commanded Montgomery's Light Infantry, was dangerously wounded. We took ten prisoners; the troops lay this night on their arms.

The next morning, the 14th, we opened the channel, where the enemy had sunk the shallops: they had a breast-work which commanded the entrance, and a battery not quite finished.

Lieut. Col. Tullikin, who had met with an accident by a fall, and was left on board, joined me this day; and Capt. Ferguson commanding the artillery, brought round some light artillery and stores from Torbay in the shallops.

The enemy had possession of two very high and steep hills, one in the front of our advanced posts, and the other nearer to St. John's, which two hills appeared to command the whole ground from Kitty Vitty to St. John's. It was necessary that we should proceed on this side, to secure effectually the landing at the Kitty Vitty, from the first hill the enemy fired upon our posts.

On the 15th, just before day-break, I ordered Capt. M'Donnell's corps of Light Infantry, and the Provincial Light Infantry, supported by our advanced posts, to march to surprise the enemy on this hill. Capt. M'Donnell passed their centries and advanced guards, and was first discovered by their main body on the hill, as he came climbing up the rocks near the summit, which he gained, receiving the enemy's fire. He threw in his fire, and the enemy gave way.

Capt. M'Donnell was wounded; Lieut. Schuyler of his company killed, with three or four men, and eighteen wounded.

The enemy had three companies of grenadiers and two picquets at this post, commanded by Lieut. Col. Belcombe, second in command, who was wounded; a Captain of Grenadiers wounded and taken prisoner; his Lieut. killed, several men killed and wounded, and 13 taken prisoners.

The enemy had one mortar here, with which they threw some shells at us in the night: a six-pounder not mounted, and two wall pieces.

This hill, with one adjoining, commands the harbour,

The 16th, we advanced to the hill nearer St. John's, which the enemy had quitted. Twenty-nine shallops came in to day with artillery and stores, provision and camp equipage from Torbay, which we unloaded. I moved the remainder of the troops forward, leaving a post to guard the pass of Kitty Vitty, on the other side. Last night the enemy's fleet got out of the harbour. This night we lay on our arms.

The 17th, a mortar battery was compleated, and a battery begun for four 24-pounders, and two 12-pounders, about 500 yards from the fort, made the road from the landing for the artillery, and at night opened the mortar battery, with one eight inch mortar, and seven cohorns, and six royals. The enemy fired pretty briskly from the fort and threw some shells.

The 18th, in the morning, I received a letter from Count de Ha•ssonville, of which I do myself the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy, as also of my answer; with copies of other letters that passed, and of the capitulation.

As Lord Colville, at this time, was some distance off the coast, and the wind not permitting his Lordship to stand in, to honour me with his concurrence in the terms to be given to the garrison, I thought no time should be lost in so advanced a season, and therefore took upon me to determine it, hoping to meet with his Lordship's approbation; and he has given me the greatest pleasure, by entirely approving of everything I have done.

I must beg leave to say, my Lord, that every assistance we could possibly desire from the fleet, has been given us, Lord Colville upon the short notice he had of our joining him, having laboured to get together all the shallops he could, and with which we were so amply supplied, was a measure of essential service: and without which our operations must have been considerably retarded.

The indefatigable labour and persevering ardour of the troops I have the honour to command, so necessary towards compleating the conquest, before the bad season set in, did indeed exceed what I could have expected. Lieut. Col. Tullikin seconded me in every thing as I could wish.

Capt. M'Donnell, of Col. Frazer's regiment, having Sir Jeffery Amherst's leave to go to England, was to have delivered this to your Lordship; but his leg is broken by the wound he received, which keeps him here: may I humbly presume, my Lord, to recommend this gentleman to your Lordship's protection, as a real, brave and good officer.

Lord Colville intends sending his Majesty's ship Syren immediately to England: I send Capt. Campbell, of the 22d regiment, with these dispatches, who will inform your Lordship of any particulars you may desire to know.

I do myself the honour to transmit to your Lordship such returns as I can possibly get in time, to show the true state of the French troops and garrison here.

I am, with the most profound respect, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most humble, and most obedient Servant, WILLIAM AMHERST

Capt. Campbell has brought with him the French colours which were hoisted on the fort of St. John's.

Lord Colville's Letter to Mr. Cleveland, dated, St. John's, Newfoundland, September 20, 1762.

SIR,

I Had the honour of sending you an account of my proceedings until the 18th of August, by a vessel which sailed from Placentia for England at that time; and on the 22d I sailed with his majesty's ships the Northumberland, Antelope, Gosport and Syren, and the King George, belonging to the province of Massachusett's Bay. On the 25th, we chased a schooner off St. John's and took her close to the harbour's mouth. She had been an English privateer, taken by the enemy, had eight carriage guns mounted, and was manned with thirty Frenchmen, commanded by an ensign de Vaisseau.

The enemy had sent away great part of the inhabitants of St. John's, men, women, and children, by giving them vessels and provisions to carry them where they pleased; two of these, a sloop and a schooner, we met with on the coast, and took twenty-three Irishmen that were single men out of them, to replace in part the marines of the squadron that were left in garrison at Placentia and the isle of Boys. These Irishmen said, that if I would go into the bay of Bulls, numbers of their countrymen would resort to me and enter on board the squadron; but during two days which I stayed in that bay, not a man joined me. The few inhabitants that remained there, quietly followed their business of fishing, and 'tis possible the enemy prevented any others at St. John's from coming.

Mr. Garland and Mr. Davis, two of the principal inhabitants of Harbour Grace and Carbonera, in Conception Bay having acquainted me that a number of men in their neighbourhood were willing to serve in the squadron during the present exigency, I sent the armed schooner for them, and she returned with fifty men, which I have distributed among the ships. And the same gentlemen representing, that the enemy sometimes sends small parties by land to Portugal Cove, which have threatened to molest them in shallops from that place, desired, in behalf of themselves and all their neighbours, that the schooner might be stationed in Conception Bay. for their protection and defence, which request I complied with.

The island of Carbonera, in Conception Bay, has had no other garrison for many years but a few old men of the artillery, to take care of the guns and ordnance stores. Had some of the inhabitants of the adjacent coast taken post here, they might easily have defended it against any force, except one narrow landing place, and no safe road in the neighbourhood for great ships; but the enemy landed in boats, and destroyed the whole without resistance. And the isle of Boys, near Ferryland, would probably have shared the same fate, had it not been possessed in due time by the Syren's marines.

In frequently passing the harbour's mouth of St. John's, we could plainly see that the fort, which fronts the entrance, was fortifyed all round the new works; and that a redoubt, or something like one, was raised at the little harbour of Kitty Vitty. The old battery at the South-side of the harbour's mouth was repaired with additional works, and a new one erected on the same side nearer the entrance. All these were to be seen from the sea; and I could not learn that the enemy intended any thing more than the finishing these works.

On the 8th of September I received by a sloop express from Halifax, letters from Sir Jeffery Amherst at New York, acquainting me, that he had come to a resolution to send a body of troops, in order to dislodge the enemy as soon as possible from St. John's; and that Lieut, Col. Amherst was to command these troops. The same conveyance brought me letters from Col. Amherst, acquainting me with his arrival at Halifax on the 26th of August, his departure from thence on the first of September, and with his intention to call at Louisbourg for the troops there, and then proceed round Cape Race, to join me on this coast. Upon receipt of these letters, I sent the s•oop which brought them to look out for Col. Amherst and the transports off Cape Race; and in order to join them the sooner, to concert measures for the ensuing operations, before the enemy could have notice of their arrival, I dropped down with the squadron to Cape Broyle, but Mr. Gili, of St. John's who had been sent out of the town in a cartel schooner two days before, sending off advice from Ferryland, that he was sure the enemy intended to sail in a very little time, I returned with the squadron to our station off St. John's.

On the 11th we were joined by Col. Amherst, with the troops in ten transport vessels; and I proposed Torbay as the properest place to land at: It is to the northward of St. John's, about seven miles by land, and the roads pretty good, but the bay is not reckoned safe anchorage, being open to the easterly winds, which usually begin to prevail at this season. By one of the transports from New York, I received a duplicate, the original not yet come to hand, of their Lordship's order of the 7th of June, directing me to repair myself, or send a sufficient force to enable Capt. Graves of the Antelope, to defeat the designs of the squadron commanded by M. de Ternay.

On the 12th we proceeded to Torbay. I sent capt. Douglas in the Syren to anchor with the transports, accompanied by the boats of the squadron, and a number of shallops, or fishing boats, which I had collected from different parts for the king's service. With the rest of the ships I returned to my station close to St. John's harbour. Next morning Col. Amherst landed with the troops in the head of the bay, having only four men wounded from a distant bush-firing of the enemy. He marched directly to Kitty Vitty, and made himself master of that important post in the evening, without having a man killed, and only two or three wounded. Every thing belonging to the army was carried from Torbay to Kitty Vitty in shallops, escorted by boats from the squadron. And this service was conducted with diligence and care, by Mr. Dugdale, my first Lieutennant, Capt. Douglas having joined the squadron again. The enemy's fleet was to have sailed the morning I passed the harbour with the transports; and 300 men only were to be left in St. John's for the winter; but, upon seeing us, they landed their grenadiers again.

The 15th it blew strong from E. to E. S. E. with thick rainy weather. In the evening the wind shifted to the westward, light breezes, and thick fog. At six next morning, it being calm, with a great swell, we saw from the mast-head, but could bring them down no lower than half way the topmast shrouds, four sail, bearing S. S. E. distant seven Ieagues; the mouth of St. John's harbour at the same time bore W. four leagues. We lost sight of them about seven, though very clear; and some time after, a small breeze springing up in the S. W. quarter, I stood in towards Torbay, in order to cover the shallops that might by going from thence to Kitty Vitty.

In the afternoon I received a note from Col. Amherst, acquainting me that the French fleet got out last night. Thus, after being blocked up in St. John's harbour for three weeks by a squadron of equal number, but smaller ships, with fewer guns and men, did M. Ternay make his escape in the night by a shameful flight. I beg leave to observe, that not a man in the squadron imagined the four sail, when we saw them, where the enemy; and the pilots were of opinion, that they must have had the wind much stronger than with us, to overcome the westerly swell in the harbour's mouth. I sent the King George round Cape Race, as far as Trepassy, to bring me intelligence if the enemy should steer towards Placentia; and I directed Capt. Douglas of the Syren to get the transports moved from Torbay as a very unsafe road to the bay of Bulls.

A bomb battery was opened against the fort, in the night of the 17th, and next day it capitulated, before any other battery began to play.

The squadron got into the harbour yesterday morning; and in the evening I received their Lordships order of the 3d of August, sent me by capt. Palliser of the Shrewsbury, who, with the Superbe, Bedford, and Minerva, had just arrived on the coast. I have directed capt. Palliser, with the other ships, to come into the harbour, as soon as a convenient opportunity offers for so doing.

We have about eight hundred prisoners, grenadiers, picquets, and some marines, being a very fine body of men, and nearly equal in number to the regulars of our army. I am now preparing transports to carry them to Brest.

The enemy did not intend to leave so great a part of their force here; their grenadiers were ready for embarking, but M. de Ternay seemed determined at all events to grasp an opportunity, which, if once lost, might never be regained; therefore, in the utmost confusion, he left behind his grenadiers, anchors, and turned his boats a drift when they had towed him out. The fog was so thick that Lieut. Col. Tullikin, who was posted on an eminence in the narrowest part of the harbour's mouth, could hear their noise, but could not discern any of their ships. The fog even altered the direction of the sound, which seemed to come from another part of the harbour, whilst they must have been directly under him.

There is a considerable quantity of provisions and other goods at this place, collected and tumbled promiscuously into different storehouses by the enemy. Many of the Irish servants have also been robbing and plundering their masters. To ascertain property, in order to make restitution as far as can be, and to restore regularity to a country, so long distracted by being in the enemy's possession, will be the particular care of governor Graves, who, in my opinion, is well qualified for such an office; and as he will stay here, he will be able, in a great measure, to restore the affairs of this country.

Capt. Douglas of the Syren has behaved with spirit and activity, and exerted every talent of a good officer during this expedition; and (without adding any more officers to the corps) I am happy in the opportunity of sending him to wait on their lordships.

The following Letters having something in them very particular, we shall subjoin them here, leaving our Readers to make such observations as may occur.

SIR,

'I Now being under some doubt of St. John's and Placentia in Newfoundland this summer, as the squadron from Brest is sailed, I read in the news-papers whither can they go but to Newfoundland, and as a loyal subject to his majesty, and a great friend to trade, in which I have suffered much by being too enterprising; I do therefore most humbly offer my thoughts for the good of my king and country; that is, I really think from my heart that said Brest squadron is gone to Newfoundland, many of our Newfoundland ships being taken the last year. The common enemy must know the slender force of our Newfoundland convoy in those parts; and, was a small squadron of his majesty's ships to go soon to Newfoundland, and return again after examining into the safety of that valuable island and trade, may likely save many of his majesty's subjects from ruin, and prevent the common enemy a •ooting in the Newfoundland fishery.

'You will please to communicate these my thoughts to their lordships, which, I humbly think with submission, is worthy at this time of their consideration.

'I have by long experience, some judgment in sea affairs; as also a willingness to serve my king and country, these will plead an excuse in my behalf to their lorships for this trouble.

I am, &c.

To John Cleveland, Esq Answer.

Admiralty-Office,June 11th, 1762.
SIR,

'I Have received and communicated to my lords commissioners of the admiralty your letter of the 8th instant, with respect to the apprehension you are under, that the Brest fleet is gone for Newfoundland.

Your very humble servant, J. CLEVELAND.

↵

(a)

The Marquis of Granby's Letter of Thanks to the British Forces in Germany, dated Munster, Jan. 1, 1763.

"LORD Granby hoped to have had it in his power to have seen and taken his leave of the troops, before their embarkation for England; but a severe illness having detained him at Warburg, and his present state of health obliging him to take another route, he could not leave this country without this public testimony of his entire approbation of their conduct since he has had the honour of commanding them

"These sentiments naturally call for his utmost acknowledgments; he therefore returns his warmest thanks to the generals, officers, and private men, composing the whole British corps, for the bravery, zeal, discipline, and good conduct he has constantly experienced from every individual; and his most particular and personal thanks are due to them for their ready obedience, upon all occasions to such orders as his station obliged him to give.

"His best endeavours have always been directed to their good, by every means in his power; and he has the satisfaction to think he has some reason to flatter himself of their being convinced, if not of the efficacy, at least of the sincerity of his intentions, if he may judge by the noble return their behaviour has made him; a behaviour, that while it fills him with gratitude, has endeared them to their king and country, and has covered them with glory and honour.

"Highly sensible of their merit, he shall continue, while he lives, to look upon it as much his duty, as it will for ever be his inclinations, to give them every possible proof of his affection and esteem• which he should be happy to make as apparent as their valour has been, 〈…〉 exemplary to after ages."

↵

*
Def. tr. art. xvii.
↵

†
Def. tr. art. x.
↵

‡
Def. tr. art. xi.
↵

‖
Def. tr. art. viii and xii.
↵

§
Def. tr. art. xiii.
↵

Information about this book

Title statement

A compleat history of the late war: or annual register of its rise, progress, and events, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. ... Illustrated with a variety of heads, plans, maps, and charts. By J. Wright, Gent. In two volumes. ... [pt.1]

Wright, J. (John), fl. 1761-1765.

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http://ota.ox.ac.uk/id/3537

ID [isbn10]

1106005368

ID [isbn13]

9781106005366

ID [TCP]

K018267.001

ID [BIBNO]

CW3307702760

ID [ECSS]

1261701201

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— A compleat history of the late war: or annual register of its rise, progress, and events, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. ... Illustrated with a variety of heads, plans, maps, and charts. By J. Wright, Gent. In two volumes. ..., Wright, J. (John), fl. 1761-1765., Burke, Edmund, 1729-1797.. 2v.([16],559,[1]p.),plates : ill.,ports.,maps ; 8⁰. London :: printed for David Steel, bookseller,. 1765.. [Compilation drawn from the Annual Register for 1758-62; attributed to John Wright as compiler; sometimes also attributed to Edmund Burke, who was editor of the Register during this time. Originally published in Dublin, 1763.] [Reproduction of original from the Library of Congress.] [Sabin, 105603] [English Short Title Catalog, ESTCN47902.] [Electronic data. Farmington Hills, Mich. : Thomson Gale, 2003. Page image (PNG). Digitized image of the microfilm version produced in Woodbridge, CT by Research Publications, 1982-2002 (later known as Primary Source Microfilm, an imprint of the Gale Group).]

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